Full opinion text
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1391 I. Preliminary Facts and Legal Background. 1391 A. Procedural History. 1391 B. Factual Background. 1391 1. The Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi. 1391 a. Nature, Functions and Duties. 1392 b. Supreme Court Elections. 1393 c. Population Within the Three Supreme Court Districts 1393 d. Black Supreme Court Justices. 1393 C. Legal Background.. 1393 1. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . 1394 2. Application of Section 2 to Judicial Elections. 1395 3. Standard for Proving a Section 2 Violation. a. Thornburg Tripartite Test. 1396 (1) Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact Minority Group Population.....1396 (2) Political Cohesion in the Minority Group Population. 00 05 CO rH (3) Bloc Voting in the White Majority Population. 05 05 CO i-H b. Totality of the Circumstances . 0 O ■'sF rH II. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 1401 A. At-large, Multimember District Challenge . 1401 1. District Two: The Southern District. 1401 a. Thornburg Tripartite Test. 1402 (1) Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact Black Population . OJ o ^ rH 2. District Three: The Northern District. <M o ^ rH a. Thornburg Tripartite Test. CM o ^ iH (1) Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact Black Population . CM o ^ rH 3. District One: The Central District. CO o ^ rH a. Thornburg Tripartite Test. CO o ^ t — I (1) Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact Black Population . 1403 (2) Political Cohesion in the Black Population. 1404 (3) Bloc Voting in the White Majority Population. 1405 b. Totality of the Circumstances . 1407 (1) History of Official Discrimination . 1408 (2) Racially Polarized Voting. 1408 (3) Unusually Large Districts, Majority Vote Requirements, Anti-Single-Shot Provisions, or Other Discriminatory Voting Practices or Procedures.. 00 o rH (4) Candidate Slating Process. 05 o Til rH (5) Socioeconomic Effects of Discrimination 05 o ^ rH (6) Racial Appeals in Political Campaigns. .1409 (7) Minority Electoral Success. .1410 (8) Lack of Responsiveness to the Particularized Needs of Blacks. .1410 (9) Tenuousness of State Policies Underlying Multimember, At-Large Districts. O rH rH B. District Line Challenge. <N! T — t rH 1. Three North-South Districts Without Splitting Counties. ^ rH rH a. Tripartite Test. lO tH rH (1)Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact Black Population . LO rH rH 2. Subdistricts Within the Proposed North-South Districts. LO rH rH a. Thornburg Test. LO r — 1 tH (1) Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact Black Population .. LO rH rH (2) Political Cohesion in the Black Population .. <£> rH rH (3) Bloc Voting in the White Majority Population. <£> rH rH b. Totality of the Circumstances . CO rH rH (1) Tenuousness of State Policies Underlying Existing Supreme Court Lines. 1417 III. Conclusion.1418 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER BARBOUR, Chief Judge. This action is a challenge by Plaintiffs under section 2 et seq. of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq., to the system of electing justices to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi. Plaintiffs are the Magnolia Bar Association, Inc., a predominately black bar organization incorporated under the laws of the State of Mississippi; the Mississippi State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a civil rights organization; the Rainbow Coalition, a civil rights organization; the Mississippi Association of Black Supervisors, an organization of black elected county supervisors; the Mississippi Conference of Black Mayors, an organization of black elected mayors; George Flaggs, an adult black citizen and registered voter in Warren County, Mississippi; Bennie Thompson, an adult black citizen and registered voter in Hinds County, Mississippi; Sheila Johnson, an adult black citizen and registered voter in Adams County, Mississippi; and Sam McCray, an adult black citizen and registered voter in Quitman County, Mississippi. Defendants are the justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi; Ray Mabus, the Governor of the State of Mississippi, Mike Moore, the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, and Dick Molpus, the Secretary of State of the State of Mississippi, the members of the Mississippi State Election Commission; the Mississippi Republican Party Executive Committee; and the Mississippi Democratic Party Executive Committee. Plaintiffs make two distinct challenges in contending that the present supreme court electoral system impermissibly dilutes black voting strength in violation of section 2. First, Plaintiffs challenge the at-large, multimember, numbered post and staggered term features of supreme court elections. These features, Plaintiffs contend, dilute black voting strength by subsuming insular black geographical areas into larger majority white voting districts and spacing elections so blacks cannot marshal their most effective electoral effort. Second, Plaintiffs challenge the east-west district lines which divide the State of Mississippi into three supreme court districts. Plaintiffs contend that the east-west configuration of these lines dilutes black voting strength by dividing the heavily black populated areas on the western side of the state into each of three majority white districts. A trial was held from February 25, 1992, through February 27, 1992. The Court in making its rulings considers the evidence presented at trial and the evidence received at the hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction held on October 18, 1991. I. Preliminary Facts and Legal Background A. Procedural History In their Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted claims pursuant to section 2 and section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, and Mississippi state law. On September 24, 1991, a three-judge panel constituted to hear Plaintiffs’ section 5 claim granted Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on that claim. By pretrial order on February 14, 1992, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all claims except their claims pursuant to section 2. On October 18, 1991, after a hearing, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction enjoining the general election for Mississippi Supreme Court Central District, Place No. 2, scheduled for November 5, 1991, and all future elections- B. Factual Background 1. The Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi a. Nature, Functions and Duties The Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi is established by the Mississippi Constitution and is the appellate court of last resort in the state. The Mississippi Constitution provides as follows: Section 144. The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court and such other courts as are provided for in this constitution. Miss. Const. art. 6, § 144. Nine justices comprise the Supreme Court of Mississippi, any five of whom when convened constitute a quorum. Id. art. 6, § 145B. The supreme court is a court of general appellate jurisdiction and hears both criminal and civil appeals from the twenty circuit courts and twenty chancery courts in the State. Miss.Code Ann. § 9-3-9 (1972). The supreme court justice who has served for the “longest time continuously” is the Chief Justice. Miss.Code Ann. § 9-3-11 (1972). The Chief Justice is the administrative head of the Court. The two justices who have served continuously for the next longest time periods are the Senior and Junior Presiding Justices. Id. The Court ordinarily decides cases by panels of three. The Chief Justice, Senior Presiding Justice and Junior Presiding Justice preside over the three-justice panels. The composition of these panels varies and is not based upon the three electoral districts. Cases are assigned on a random basis so that individual justices decide cases which originated both within and without their electoral districts. Supreme court justices must meet certain age, residence and professional criteria, as provided by the Mississippi Constitution. No personal [sic] shall be eligible to the office of judge of the Supreme Court who shall not have attained the age of thirty years at the time of his appointment, and who shall not have been a practicing attorney and a citizen of the state for five years immediately preceding such appointment. Miss. Const. art. 6, § 150. b. Supreme Court Elections It is the manner in which Mississippi elects its supreme court justices, however, rather than the actual functions of the supreme court, that forms the crux of the present action. Article 6, Section 145 of the Mississippi Constitution provides in pertinent part as follows: The legislature shall divide the state into three Supreme Court districts, and there shall be elected one judge for and from each district by the qualified electors thereof at a time and in the manner provided by law. Miss. Const. art. 6, § 145. The Mississippi Constitution was subsequently amended to provide for six justices, id. art. 6, § 145A, and then was finally amended to provide for nine justices, which is the number presently on the Court. Id. art. 6, § 145B. Every amendment to the number of justices sitting on the supreme court retained the electoral component. Section 145B now provides in pertinent part as follows: The Supreme Court shall consist of nine judges.... The additional judges herein provided for shall be selected one for and from each of the supreme court districts in the manner provided for by Section 145A of this Constitution or any amendment thereto. Id. art. 6, § 145B. The term of office for justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court is eight years. Id. art. 6, § 149. Candidates for the supreme court are nominated and elected by party affiliation, with elections to be held concurrently with the election of representatives to Congress. Three justices are elected from each of the three districts. District Number Three, or the “Northern District,” covers roughly the northern one-third of the state. District Number One, or the “Central District,” covers roughly the middle one-third of the state. District Number Two, or the “Southern District,” covers roughly the southern one-third of the state. Miss.Code Ann. § 9-3-1 (1972). Each supreme court justice is elected individually, as provided for by Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-993 (1972), which states in pertinent part as follows: For the purpose of all elections, including primary elections, each of the nine (9) judgeships shall be considered a separate office. The three (3) offices in each of the three (3) Supreme Court districts shall be designated Position Number 1, Position Number 2 and Position Number 3, and in qualifying for an office as a candidate for any office of judge of the Supreme Court each candidate shall state the position number of the office to which he aspires and both the primary and regular election ballots shall so indicate. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-993 (1972). Justices within a district, therefore, do not run for office against each other. In sum, the Mississippi Supreme Court is comprised of nine justices elected, by party affiliation, to numbered posts for staggered eight-year terms on an at-large basis from three separate multimember districts, c. Population Within the Three Supreme Court Districts Plaintiffs in the present action contend that the existing supreme court districts impermissibly dilute black voting strength. Table 1 summarizes 1990 population statistics in the three supreme court districts. TABLE 1 DISTRICT Total Pop. Black Pop. Black Pop. % Total *VAP Black *VAP Black *VAP % District 3 (Northern) 815,365 264,978 32.50% 583,931 166,367 28.49% District 1 (Central) 887,966 414,478 46.68% 623,064 263,205 42.24% District 2 (Southern) 869,885 235,601 27.08% 619,462 148,097 23.91% (* — Voting Age Population) d. Black Supreme Court Justices Two blacks, former Justice Reuben V. Anderson and current Justice Fred L. Banks, Jr., have served on the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi. Former Justice Anderson was appointed to fill a vacancy in Central District, Place No. 2 by former Governor William Allain in January 1985, thus becoming the first black justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi in the twentieth century. Justice Anderson was elected to a full term on the supreme court in 1986, and served on the court until he resigned on December 31, 1990. Justice Banks was appointed in January 1991 by former Governor Ray Mabus to fill the unexpired term of former Justice Anderson. Justice Banks was elected to a full term in November 1991. Justice Banks currently serves on the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi. C. Legal Background 1. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, was enacted to abolish discriminatory voting devices, such as poll taxes and literacy tests, that impeded the participation of black citizens in the political process. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as originally enacted, stated as follows: No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, or practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color. 79 Stat. 437. In Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that a violation of section 2 could not be proved absent a showing of intentional discrimination. In holding that the strictures of section 2 and the fifteenth amendment to the United States Constitution were coextensive, Justice Stewart, in his plurality opinion, stated that [t]he Fifteenth Amendment does not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected.... That Amendment prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” Id. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 1498, quoting U.S. Const. amend. XV. In 1982, Congress abrogated the “intentional discrimination” requirement set forth in Mobile, and amended section 2 to allow a violation to be proved if a voting practice or procedure “results” in a denial of the right to vote. Section 2 now reads as follows: (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b) of this section. (b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. As the Supreme Court recently noted, subsection (a) of section 2 adopts a “results” test which does not require proof of intentional discrimination, and subsection (b) indicates the manner in which the results test should be applied. Chisom v. Roemer, — U.S.-,-, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2364, 115 L.Ed.2d 348, 363 (1991). 2. Application of Section 2 to Judicial Elections Plaintiffs in the present action, in two distinct challenges, contend that the method of electing supreme court justices in the State of Mississippi, including the district lines used to apportion voters in supreme court elections, violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This Court has held that section 2 applies to judicial elections. In Martin v. Allain, (“Martin F), 658 F.Supp. 1183 (S.D.Miss. 1987), this Court held that the system of electing circuit, chancery, and county court judges in the State of Mississippi diluted black voting strength in violation of section 2. This Court subsequently held that single-member districts should be adopted to remedy the section 2 violations in certain judicial districts. Martin v. Mabus, (“Martin II), 700 F.Supp. 327 (S.D.Miss.1988). It had previously been determined that section 5 applied to the election of state court judges. Kirksey v. Allain, 635 F.Supp. 347 (S.D.Miss.1986) (three-judge court). Subsequent to the decisions of this Court in Martin I and Martin II, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that section 2 did not cover judicial elections. In League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, (“LULAC’), 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc), rev d, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2376, 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991), the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana Supreme Court elections were not covered by section 2 because judges were not “representatives” as that term is used in section 2. In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit stated that “the judiciary serves no representative function whatever: the judge represents no one.” LULAC, 914 F.2d at 625. The United States Supreme Court recently settled the question of the applicability of section 2 to judicial elections. In Chisom, the Court held that elected judges are, in fact, “representatives” within the meaning of section 2 and that § 2 applies to judicial elections. Chisom, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348. Chisom involved the same Louisiana Supreme Court system for electing judges as was at issue in LULAC. After noting that the Fifth Circuit in LULAC correctly stated that judges should ideally administer justice unfettered by public sentiment, Chisom, — U.S. at ——, 111 S.Ct. at 2366, 115 L.Ed.2d at 366, and after noting that Louisiana had chosen to elect rather than appoint supreme court justices, the Court summarized its rationale for applying section 2 to judicial elections: The fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral politics cannot be resolved by crediting judges with total indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them to run for elected office. When each of several members of a court must be a resident of a separate district, and must be elected by the voters of that district, it seems both reasonable and realistic to characterize the winners as representatives of that district ... Louisiana could, of course, exclude its judiciary from the coverage of the Voting Rights Act by changing to a system in which judges are appointed, and in that way, it could enable its judges to be indifferent to popular opinion. The reasons why Louisiana has chosen otherwise are precisely the reasons why it is appropriate for section 2, as well as section 5, of the Voting Rights Act to continue to apply to its judicial elections. Chisom — U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2367, 115 L.Ed.2d at 366-67. In Houston Lawyers' Assn. v. Attorney General of Texas, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2376, 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991), decided on the same day as Chisom, the Supreme Court held that section 2 applied to the election of trial judges in the State of Texas. Under Chisom and Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n, therefore, section 2 applies to judicial elections. 3. Standard for Proving a Section 2 . Violation Plaintiffs alleging vote dilution in violation of section 2 must meet the tripartite threshold test set forth by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). If they satisfy the Thornburg tripartite test, they must then demonstrate that under the “totality of the circumstances” they do not have an equal opportunity to “participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice.” Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 44, 106 S.Ct. at 2763. These inquiries are district-specific where multimember districts are involved. Id. at 59 n. 28, 106 S.Ct. at 2771 n. 28 (“The inquiry into the existence of vote dilution caused by submergence in a multimember district is district-specific”). A court cannot aggregate data from all challenged districts and conclude that vote dilution exists in each district. Id. a. Thornburg Tripartite Test The Thornburg tripartite test requires plaintiffs alleging section 2 vote dilution claims resulting from multimember or gerrymandered districts to show proof of (1) a sufficiently large and geographically compact minority group population; (2) minority political cohesion; and (3) white bloc voting. The rationale for the test, as the Supreme Court noted, is to require plaintiffs to show that their candidates could prevail in an election absent the allegedly dilutive conduct. Id. at 48-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2765-66. (1) Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact Minority Group Population Under Thornburg, plaintiffs alleging a section 2 violation must first establish that the minority group of which they are members is “sufficiently large and geographically compact” to constitute a numerical majority in a single-member district. Id. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. Accord, Westwego Citizens v. City of Westwego, (“Westwego III’), 946 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir.1991); East Jefferson Coalition v. Parish of Jefferson, 926 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.1991); Brewer v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448 (5th Cir.1989); Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529 (5th Cir.1989). At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiffs need not establish that the minority group of which they are members would constitute a supermajority within a proposed single-member district. In Martin II, the Court held that a figure of 60 percent of total population should be used to create trial court subdistricts in the State of Mississippi as a remedy for section 2 violations. Martin II, 700 F.Supp. at 333. In creating this remedy, the Court recognized that the Department of Justice has utilized a guideline of 65 percent total black population, or 60 percent total black voting age population, in approving redistricting plans and fashioning remedies under the Voting Rights Act. Id. The Department of Justice arrived at the 65 percent figure by augmenting a simple majority population by 5 percent to account for low minority voter registration; by 5 percent to account for low minority voter turnout; and, if total population rather than voting age population is used, by 5 percent to account for minority population younger than age 18. See Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1415 (7th Cir.1984). The Supreme Court tacitly approved the use of the 65 percent guideline as an approximate remedial goal for Voting Rights Act violations in United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164, 97 S.Ct. 996, 1009, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). In United Jewish Organizations, the Court stated that “it was reasonable for the Attorney General to conclude in this case that a substantial nonwhite population majority — in the vicinity of 65% — would be required to achieve a nonwhite majority of eligible voters.” Id. The reason for the 65 percent guideline, as this Court has held, is to ensure minorities “the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice.” Martin v. Mabus, 700 F.Supp. at 333; Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1415. The 65 percent guideline, therefore, is a general remedial goal in Voting Rights Act cases that is irrelevant to the first part of the Thornburg tripartite threshold test for liability. The guideline, if invoked, is generally urged upon courts by plaintiffs seeking to establish “safe” districts that will ensure consistent minority electoral success. See, e.g., Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1402 (court noted that plaintiffs-appellants requested a “new map which ... adopts a 65% minority population guideline for remedial purposes, whenever possible.”); Jeffers v. Clinton, 756 F.Supp. 1195, 1198 (E.D.Ark.1990) (in fashioning a redistricting plan with approximately 60% black voting age population per district, the court stated that “[o]n a strictly numerical and quantitative view of equality, any district with a BVAP [black voting age population] of 50% or higher would be per se lawful. We think the Voting Rights Act means something more than this”).' Accordingly, the Court has found no authority for the proposition that the 65 percent guideline can be used to defeat Voting Rights Act claims at the liability stage of proceedings. Courts adhering to the 65 percent requirement do so in attempting to fashion remedies for violations of section 5 and section 2. See Ketchum, 740 F.2d. at 1402 (court adhered to guideline in considering alder-manic ward redistricting plan under section 2); Jeffers, 756 F.Supp. at 1195 (three-judge panel adhered to guideline in considering plan of apportionment for Arkansas General Assembly); Hastert v. State Board of Elections, 777 F.Supp. 634 (N.D.Ill.1991) (court adhered to guideline in considering congressional redistricting plan). The 65 percent guideline does not factor into a section 2 determination of liability. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Board, 933 F.2d 497, 503 (7th Cir.1991) (“We have east doubt on such a [supermajority] requirement as a threshold.... The court may consider, at the remedial stage, what type of remedy is possible based on the factors traditionally examined in single-member districts, such as minority voter registration and turn-out rates. [Citation omitted]. But this difficulty should not impede the judge at the liability stage of the proceedings.”); Neal v. Coleburn, 689 F.Supp. 1426, 1438 (E.D.Va.1988) (“Contrary to defendants’ contention, the general 65% guideline for remedial districts is not a required minimum which the plaintiffs must meet before they, can be awarded any relief under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Rather, the 65% standard is a flexible and practical guideline to consider in fashioning relief for a section 2 violation.”). It is important to note that, although Thornburg does not so expressly require, the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the first part of the tripartite test to require plaintiffs to show a majority of the voting age population in a single-member district, as opposed to a majority of the total population. See Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1117 n. 7 (“This Court has held that in order to satisfy the first Gingles factor, plaintiffs ordinarily must show that members of the minority group constitute a majority of the voting age population in a single member district.”); Westwego Citizens v. City of Westwego, (“ Westwego IT’), 906 F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir.1990) (“[A] majority black voting age population in a proposed district [is] generally required to satisfy the first Gingles factor.”). Plaintiffs must be able to show that they have the potential to elect candidates of their choice. As Judge Jones stated in her concurring opinion in Overton, “[t]he need for voting age population data ... should be obvious. Only voting age persons can vote. It would be a Pyrrhic victory for a court to create a single-member district in which a minority population dominant in absolute, but not in voting age numbers, continued to be defeated at the polls.” Overton, 871 F.2d at 542. (Jones, J., concurring). Thus, to satisfy the first part of the Thornburg tripartite test as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit, plaintiffs must show that the minority group of which they are members could comprise a simple majority of the voting age population in a proposed district. See Brewer, 876 F.2d at 452 (“[District courts may rely on such figures as evidence that the minority’s voting age population exceeds 50%.”). Accord, Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1117, quoting Brewer, 876 F.2d at 452 (“All that must be shown is that ‘the minority’s voting age population exceeds 50%.' ”). Plaintiffs must show that their minority group constitutes a majority of the voting age population in a geographical area that could be configured as a new single-member district, but is presently part of a larger multimem-ber district in which the plaintiffs’ group is a numerical minority, or is split into two or more districts in each of which their group is a numerical minority. Requiring the minority group to demonstrate that it could comprise a numerical majority of the voting age population in a single-member district is, as stated earlier, another way of requiring the minority group to prove that it possesses the capacity to elect representatives of its choice in the absence of alleged discrimination. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 n. 17. A minority group that is dispersed throughout an existing district cannot claim that a multimember district dilutes its voting strength, because it is the dispersion of the minority group, rather than the multimember district, that accounts for a relative lack of voting strength. Id. Similarly, a minority group that is geographically compact but numerically insignificant cannot maintain that a voting practice or procedure dilutes its vote, because the minority group simply lacks the numerical voting strength to elect candidates of its choice. Id. (2) Political Cohesion in the Minority Group Population The second part of the tripartite Thorn-burg test requires plaintiffs alleging a section 2 violation to show that the minority group of which they are members is “politically cohesive.” Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. Accord, Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1118; East Jefferson Coalition, 926 F.2d at 492; Brewer, 876 F.2d at 453. As the Supreme Court stated in Thornburg, [i]f the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. The Court did not explicitly define “political cohesiveness,” but stated that courts should examine “racially polarized voting” to “ascertain whether minority group members constitute a politically cohesive unit.” Id. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 2769. The Court stated that racially polarized voting exists where there is a “consistent relationship” between voter race and voter choice. Id. at 53 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 2768 n. 21. Plaintiffs, therefore, can prove political cohesiveness by showing “that a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidate.” Id. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 2769. In that regard, a pattern of racial bloc voting over a period of time is “more probative” of political eohesiveness than a single election. Id. at 57, 106 S.Ct. at 2769. The actual degree of bloc voting necessary to show political cohesion, however, varies from district to district. Id. at 55-56, 106 S.Ct. at 2768-69. The Fifth Circuit has held that plaintiffs can demonstrate political cohesion without relying on statistical evidence of racial polarization, although statistical evidence is usually employed to prove political cohesion. See Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1118 n. 12; Brewer, 876 F.2d at 453; Overton, 871 F.2d at 538. Plaintiffs may demonstrate racially polarized voting by utilizing regression analysis, which measures the strength of the correlation and linear relationship between the variables “r” and “r2” that represent the race of the voter and the candidate supported. See Overton, 871 F.2d at 529; Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1246 (5th Cir.1988); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.1987). The greater the “r” value the higher is the correlation. The “r” value can range from -1 to 1, with 1 being perfect correlation and -1 being perfect inverse correlation. See Campos, 840 F.2d at 1246 n. 9. Some courts have based findings of racially polarized voting for “r” values of .8 or higher, although other courts have found an “r” value of .5 to be significant. See Overton, 871 F.2d at 544-45 (Jones, J., concurring), citing, e.g., Campos, 840 F.2d at 1246 (.8 “r” value as statistically significant), and Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.Supp. 345, 368 (E.D.N.C.1984) (noting that correlations above .5 are rare). The significance of “r” values utilized in regression analysis should not be assumed upon a cursory examination, but should be determined only after a thorough explanation of their characteristics and limitations. See Overton, 871 F.2d at 545 (Jones, J., concurring). Elections that involve both black and white candidates are most probative of racially polarized voting. See Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1208 n. 7 (“Westwego I”) (5th Cir.1989); East Jefferson Coalition, 926 F.2d at 493; Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245. The Fifth Circuit has held that a court may limit its investigation of racial polarization to elections involving minority candidates. See East Jefferson Coalition, 926 F.2d at 493; Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245. Plaintiffs may rely on evidence from “exogenous” elections, or elections involving other offices, to establish racially polarized voting where there is sparse data from “indigenous” elections involving the office in issue. See Citizens for a Better Gretna, 834 F.2d at 502. Accord, Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1119 n. 15; East Jefferson Coalition, 926 F.2d at 493. (3) Bloc Voting in the White Majority Population The final part of the tripartite test requires plaintiffs alleging a section 2 violation to demonstrate that the white majority “votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. Proving white bloc voting is not unlike proving minority political cohesion. Evidence of racial polarity is demonstrative of both. See Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1118. Furthermore, elections involving both white and minority candidates are most probative of white bloc voting. See East Jefferson Coalition, 926 F.2d at 493; Citizens for a Better Gretna, 834 F.2d at 503. In a manner similar to minority political cohesion, plaintiffs attempting to prove white bloc voting need not rely on statistical evidence, see Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1119 n. 15, but may rely on data from exogenous elections, see Citizens for a Better Gretna, 834 F.2d at 502. As the Supreme Court stated in Thornburg, “in general, a white bloc vote that will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white ‘crossover’ votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc voting.” Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 2769. b. Totality of the Circumstances If plaintiffs satisfy the Thornburg tripartite test, a court must then consider the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether the challenged electoral system impedes the ability of plaintiffs to “have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice.” Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 44, 106 S.Ct. at 2763. Accord, Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120; East Jefferson Coalition, 926 F.2d at 491. The Supreme Court has stated that, as a general matter, an inquiry into the “totality of the circumstances” requires “a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality” and a “functional view of the political process.” Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 45, 106 S.Ct. at 2764. Accord, Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120; Westwego I, 872 F.2d 1201, 1204 (5th Cir.1989). More specifically, the “totality of the circumstances” inquiry requires a court to consider in detail the factors included in the Senate Judiciary Committee Majority Report that accompanied the 1982 amendment to section 2. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 36-38, 106 S.Ct. at 2758-59. Accord, Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120 n. 16; East Jefferson Coalition, 926 F.2d at 491; Campos, 840 F.2d at 1249; Citizens for a Better Gretna, 834 F.2d at 498-99. Congress culled these factors from the decision of the Supreme Court in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), and the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.1973) (en banc). The factors include, but are not limited to: (1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; (2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; (4) if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; (5) the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; (7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Additional factors which may be probative include: (8) whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group. (9) whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 36-38, 106 S.Ct. at 2759, quoting S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 177, 206-07. Accord, Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120 n. 16; Brewer, 876 F.2d at 451 n. 4. The Supreme Court has stated that the two most important factors to be considered are the extent to which minority group members have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction and the presence of racially polarized voting. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. at 2765 n. 15. Accord, Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120. In noting their importance, the Supreme Court stated that unless minority group members experience substantial difficulty electing representatives of their choice, they cannot prove that a challenged electoral mechanism impairs their ability “to elect.” § 2(b). And, where the contested electoral structure is a multimember district, ... in the absence of significant white bloc voting it cannot be said that the ability of minority voters to elect their chosen representatives is inferior to that of white voters. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. at 2765 n. 15. A “totality of the circumstances” inquiry, however, is not limited to a consideration of only those two factors. The other factors may be relevant. No one of the factors is dispositive, and proof of a majority of the factors is unnecessary for plaintiffs to prevail. See Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120. See also East Jefferson Coalition, 926 F.2d at 494 (“The court need not rule on all of the Senate factors as long as it is satisfied that the totality of the circumstances warrant liability.”). A court, therefore, may consider the factors enumerated in the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights Act and any other relevant factors in evaluating the “totality of the circumstances” pursuant to a section 2 claim of vote dilution. II. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Having set forth the general factual background and law applicable to the present action, the Court now makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiffs in this action allege that the present system of electing supreme court justices in the State of Mississippi dilutes black voting strength in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiffs make two distinct challenges under section 2. First, Plaintiffs challenge the at-large, multimember, numbered post, and staggered term features of the existing supreme court election system. In addition, Plaintiffs challenge the district lines used to delineate the three existing supreme court election districts. A. At-large, Multimember District Challenge The Court will initially address Plaintiffs’ challenge to the at-large, multimember aspects of the present system of electing supreme court justices in the State of Mississippi. The Court notes that Plaintiffs included the numbered post and staggered term features of the system in their Complaint, but Plaintiffs’ proof focused on the at-large, multimember aspects of the system and did not directly address the numbered post and staggered term features. The Court, therefore, considers the numbered post and staggered term features only insofar as they are implicated in a discussion of the at-large,. multimember features of the supreme court electoral system. In determining whether the at-large, multimember system, in which three justices in each district are elected for staggered eight-year terms, violates section 2, this Court undertakes its analysis on a district-specific basis, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Thornburg. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 59 n. 28,106 S.Ct. at 2771 n. 28. Appendix 1 shows the supreme court districts as they are presently configured. 1. District Two: The Southern District Supreme Court District Two (“Southern District”), covers roughly the southern one-third of the State of Mississippi. Under the 1990 census, the Southern District has a total population of 869,885, and a total black population of 235,601, or 27.08 percent. See supra, Table 1; Defendants’ Exhibit 2; Factual Stipulations of the Parties, Paragraph 11. The Southern District has a total voting age population of 619,462, and a total black voting age population of 148,-097, or 23.91 percent, under the 1990 census. See supra, Table 1; Defendants’ Exhibit 2; Parties’ Factual Stipulations, Paragraph 11. a. Thornburg Tripartite Test (1) Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact Black Population To satisfy the first part of the Thornburg test, Plaintiffs’ expert demographer, Henry Kirksey, attempted to create a majority black single-member district by subdividing the existing Southern District into three subdistricts. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 27. Kirksey avoided splitting counties and attempted to attain a subdistrict population deviation of fifteen percent or less. Using this methodology, Kirksey was unable to create a single-member district in the existing Southern District with a majority black population or a majority black voting age population. The proposed sub-district with the highest percentage of eligible black voters, proposed Subdistrict One covering the western segment of the existing Southern District, would have a total black population of 115,764, or 40 percent of the total population of 290,009. There was no proof as to the black voting age population. Kirksey testified that he could create a majority black subdistrict in the existing Southern District if he split counties between subdistricts, but presented no supporting evidence to the Court. Plaintiffs, therefore, have failed to satisfy the first part of the Thornburg tripartite threshold test with respect to the existing Southern District. Accordingly, their section 2 claim challenging the at-large, multimember features of the Mississippi Supreme Court election system as applied to the existing Southern District is without merit and is dismissed. 2. District Three: The Northern District Supreme Court District Three (“Northern District”) covers roughly the northern one-third of the State of Mississippi. Under the 1990 census, the Northern District has a total population of 815,365, with a total black population of 264,978, or 32.50 percent. See supra, Table 1; Defendants’ Exhibit 2; Parties’ Factual Stipulations, Paragraph 12. The Northern District has a total voting age population of 583,931, and a total black voting age population of 166,-367, or 28.49 percent, under the 1990 census. See Defendants’ Exhibit 2; Parties’ Factual Stipulations, Paragraph 12. a. Thornburg Tripartite Test (1) Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact Black Population Plaintiffs’ expert demographer Kirksey attempted to create a majority black single-member district by subdividing the existing Northern District into three subdistricts. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 28. Kirksey avoided splitting counties and attempted to attain a subdistrict population deviation of fifteen percent or less. Using this methodology, Kirksey was unable to create a single-member district in the existing Northern District with a majority black population or a majority black voting age population. The proposed sub-district with the highest percentage of eligible black voters, proposed Subdistrict One extending from the western edge of the existing Northern District to the south-central section of the existing Northern District, would have a total black population of 128,427, or 48 percent of the total population of 266,890. Id. There was no proof as to the black voting age population. Kirksey testified that he could create a majority black subdistrict in the existing Northern District if he split counties between subdistricts, but submitted no supporting evidence to the Court. Plaintiffs, therefore, have failed to satisfy the first part of the tripartite Thorn-burg test with respect to the existing Northern District. Accordingly, their section 2 claim challenging the at-large, multi-member features of the Mississippi Supreme Court election system as applied to the existing Northern District is without merit and is dismissed. 3. District One: The Central District District One (“Central District”) covers roughly the middle one-third of the State of Mississippi and includes much of the region known as the Mississippi Delta, and the metropolitan Jackson, Mississippi area. Under the 1990 census, the Central District has a total population of 887,966, and a total black of population of 414,478, or 46.68 percent. See supra, Table 1; Defendants’ Exhibit 2; Parties’ Factual Stipulations, Paragraph 10. The Central District has a total voting age population of 623,-064, and a total black voting age population of 263,205, or 42.24 percent, under the 1990 census. See Defendants’ Exhibit 2; Parties’ Factual Stipulations, Paragraph 10. a. Thornburg Tripartite Test (1) Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact Black Population Plaintiffs’ expert demographer Kirksey attempted to create majority black single-member districts by subdividing the existing Central District into three subdistricts. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 26. Kirksey avoided splitting counties and attempted to attain a subdistrict population deviation of fifteen percent or less. Kirksey created two proposed subdis-tricts with total black majority populations, one of which, proposed Subdistrict 2, would have a black majority voting age population. Appendix 2 shows Kirksey’s proposed subdistricts within the existing Central District. Proposed Subdistrict Two, which encompasses the western, or Delta section of the existing Central District, includes the following counties: Bolivar, Claiborne, Holmes, Humphreys, Issaquena, Jefferson, Sharkey, Sunflower, Warren, Washington and Yazoo. Id. Proposed Subdistrict Two would have a total population of 278,799 and a black population of 165,881, or 59.50 percent. Defendants’ Exhibit 10. Proposed Subdistrict Two would have a total voting age population of 187,-203, with a total black voting age populátion of 101,570, or 54.26 percent. Defendants’ Exhibit 10. The Court notes an apparent discrepancy between Plaintiffs and Defendants regarding the population deviation in the proposed subdistricts within the existing Central District. Plaintiffs’ expert Kirksey testified that Subdistrict One has a total population deviation of —4.7 percent, Subdistrict Two has a total population deviation of —5.8 percent, and Subdistrict Three has a total population deviation of +10.52 percent. Using the percentages given by Kirksey, the total population deviation for the three proposed subdistricts in the existing Central District is 16.32 percent. Defendants’ Exhibit 10, however, lists the population deviation in Plaintiffs’ proposed Subdistrict One as —1.36 percent, in Plaintiffs’ proposed Subdistrict Two as —2.49 percent, and in Plaintiffs’ proposed Subdistrict Three as +14.42 percent. Defendants’ Exhibit 10. Using the percentages in Defendants’ Exhibit 10, the total population deviation for the three proposed subdistricts is 16.91 percent. This Court has previously held that a fifteen percent maximum range of deviation is appropriate in creating judicial sub-districts. See Martin v. Mabus, 700 F.Supp. at 335. Therefore, under either Plaintiffs’ or Defendants’ proof, Plaintiffs have failed to attain a fifteen percent population deviation. The fifteen percent deviation, however, is not a mandatory threshold in section 2 cases. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ failure to attain a fifteen percent deviation does not foreclose their section 2 claim as to the existing Central District. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the black population is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority of the voting age population in proposed Subdistrict Two in the existing Central District and have therefore satisfied the first part of the Thornburg tripartite test. (2) Political Cohesion in the Black Population Having determined that Plaintiffs can create a single-member subdistrict in the existing Central District with a majority black voting age population, the Court must now inquire into the second part of the tripartite Thornburg test and determine whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated black political cohesion. Plaintiffs presented Dr. Allan J. Licht-man by affidavit as an expert witness in the areas of racial bloc voting, minority vote dilution, political systems, and quantitative and socioeconomic analysis. See Stipulation of Parties Regarding Plaintiffs’ Expert Testimony, Paragraph 1. Dr. Lichtman analyzed local, state, and federal elections in the State of Mississippi involving black and white candidates over a twenty-year period ending in 1992. Id., Paragraph 2. The parties stipulated that Dr. Lichtman used accepted ecological and homogenous precinct methods and acceptable values for “r” and “r2” linear correlation in performing his analysis. Id., Paragraph 3. See also Overton, 871 F.2d at 544-45 (Jones, J., concurring). Dr. Lichtman found that 70 to 99 percent of black voters voted for black candidates in elections in which black candidates ran against white candidates, and concluded that [rjesults of the ecological regression analyses show a pattern of severe racial polarization in elections held in the State of Mississippi. Analyses results show that black voters are a highly cohesive electorate who invariably support'black candidates by substantial majorities. Id., Paragraph 4. Defendants contend that blacks are not politically cohesive. In support of their proposition, Defendants introduced the testimony of Kathryn Hester as an expert demographer. Hester analyzed three supreme court elections from the Central District, four supreme court elections from the Southern District, and one supreme court election from the Northern District. See Stipulations of Parties Regarding Defendants’ Expert, Paragraph 2. Hester also analyzed sixty-six trial court elections throughout the State of Mississippi from 1978 through 1982, id., Paragraph 3, and twelve trial court elections in 1989 and 1990. Hester specifically relied on data from biracial elections, including the 1991 Supreme Court Central District, Place No. 2 election between black Justice Fred Banks and white challenger W.O. “Chet” Dillard; the 1986 Supreme Court Central District, Place No. 2 election between black former Justice Reuben Anderson and white challenger Richard Barrett; twelve judicial races in 1989 and 1990; and judicial elections studied by Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Lichtman. Both Justice Banks and former Justice Anderson were successful in their electoral efforts, as noted earlier. Hester concluded that blacks are not politically cohesive in judicial elections. In an Eleventh Circuit judicial election between black candidate McDowell and white candidate Pearson, Hester concluded that 40% of blacks voted for the white candidate. In another Eleventh Circuit judicial election between black candidate Morris and white candidate Smith, Hester concluded that 3,000 blacks voted for the white candidate. In a 1978 Eleventh Circuit Chancery Court election between unsuccessful black candidate Smith and successful white candidate Case, Hester concluded that Smith would have won if approximately 3,400 blacks had not voted for the white candidate Case. Despite Defendants’ contentions, the Court finds that there is black political cohesion in the State of Mississippi and in the existing Central District. Dr. Licht-man’s expert testimony clearly shows, as this Court previously found in Martin I, that blacks overwhelmingly tend to vote for blacks in both judicial and non-judicial elections. See Martin I, 658 F.Supp. at 1194. The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the second part of the tripartite Thornburg test. (3) Bloc Voting in the White Majority Population The final part of the tripartite Thorn-burg test requires Plaintiffs to show that the majority white population votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the candidate preferred by the minority population. As stated earlier, the inquiry into majority bloc voting is similar to black political cohesion, because both inquiries involve evidence of racially polarized voting. Dr. Lichtman relied on data from the same biracial elections that he used in reaching a finding of black political cohesion. Again, the parties stipulated that Dr. Lichtman used accepted and recognized ecological regression and homogenous precinct methods, and used acceptable values for “r” and “r2”. See Parties’ Stipulation Regarding Plaintiffs’ Expert Testimony, Paragraph 3. Dr. Lichtman found that “severe racial polarization” exists in elections held in the State of Mississippi. Id., Paragraph 4. With respect to white bloc voting, Dr. Lichtman found that 70 to 99 percent of whites generally, with some exceptions, vote for white candidates in biracial elections, and concluded that: white voters strongly unite behind white candidates, generally providing very little crossover votes for black candidates. This very strong bloc voting by whites would pose a formidable obstacle to black candidates seeking office in districts with a white voting age majority. Id. Defendants’ expert Hester analyzed information relied on by Dr. Lichtman, including the two supreme court elections involving black candidates, plus twelve biracial judicial elections in 1989 and 1990. Hester found that whites do not always vote as a bloc for white candidates in biracial elections. Hester relied primarily on the Anderson-Barrett 1986 Supreme Court Central District, Place No. 2 election and the 1991 Banks-Dillard Supreme Court Central District, Place No. 2 election. These are the only two Mississippi Supreme Court elections involving black candidates. In the 1986 Anderson-Barrett election, Anderson, the black candidate and an incumbent justice at the time of the election, received approximately 59,168 votes, or approximately 73 percent of the total vote, compared to 21,467 votes, or approximately 27 percent, for Barrett, the white candidate and an “avowed segregationist.” See Exhibit A to Motion to Continue of former Defendant W.O. “Chet” Dillard; Martin v. Allain, 658 F.Supp. at 1193. In the Anderson-Barrett race, Defendants contend, whites did not vote as a bloc for Barrett, the white candidate. In the 1991 Banks-Dillard election, Banks, the black candidate and an incumbent justice at the time of the election, received 118,122 votes, or approximately 51 percent of the total vote, compared to 111,-949 votes, or approximately 49 percent, for the white candidate Dillard. See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 36. Dr. Lichtman estimated that Banks received approximately 30 percent of the white vote, combined with nearly unanimous black support. Parties’ Stipulation Regarding Plaintiffs’ Expert Testimony, Paragraph 6. Defendants’ expert Hester concluded that in the only two supreme court races involving black candidates, the 1986 Anderson-Barrett election and the 1991 Banks-Dillard election, white voters voted for the black candidates in substantial numbers. Hester concluded that these elections disprove the existence of white bloc voting. Hester cited statistics based on data from Dr. Lichtman concerning white voting in majority white precincts from eight counties in the Central District. Hester studied only those counties where voter registration rolls had been purged or where complete re-registration had occurred, and relied on the 1990 census to determine precinct population by race. Hester used turnout rates estimated by Dr. Lichtman. With regard to the Bank-Dillard election, Hester assumed, as did Dr. Lichtman, that Banks received 100 percent of the black vote in these precincts in ascertaining the extent of Banks’ white vote. Hester found that in Hinds County, Banks received over fifty percent of the white vote in two majority white precincts; received over 45 percent of the white vote in three majority white precincts; and received between 30 and 45 percent of the white vote in six majority white precincts. Blacks comprise less than an estimated three percent of the voting age population in these precincts. In Neshoba County, Hester found that Banks received 65 percent of the vote in an all-white precinct; received approximately 55 percent of the white vote in two virtually all-white precincts; and received between 35 and 45 percent of the vote in six all-white precincts. In Bolivar County, Hester found that Banks received 88 percent of the white vote in one precinct; received 56 percent of the white vote in another precinct; and received over 40 percent in another precinct that was virtually all-white. Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Lichtman opined that the Anderson and Banks elections were aberrational. Both Anderson and Banks, Dr. Lichtman noted, were incumbents seeking election who had been appointed by white governors. Dr. Lichtman stated that appointed judicial incumbents have “significant advantages” not available to other black candidates in Mississippi and the South. Parties’ Stipulation Regarding Plaintiffs’ Expert Testimony, Paragraph 6 (citing experiences in litigation involving the Alabama Supreme Court and Florida Supreme Court). The Court notes that the power of incumbency can be a mitigating factor of which courts should be cognizant in examining the existence of racially polarized voting. In Thornburg, the Supreme Court stated that the success of a minority candidate in a particular election does not necessarily prove that the district did not experience racially polarized voting in that election; special circumstances, such as ... incumbency ... may explain minority success in a polarized contest. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 57, 106 S.Ct. at 2770 [Emphasis added]. Dr. Lichtman examined elections over a twenty-year period and concluded that 70 to 99 percent of white voters usually support white candidates in biracial elections. In Thornburg, the Supreme Court stated that “a pattern of racial bloc voting that extends over a period of time is more probative of a