Full opinion text
ENTRY GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TINDER, District Judge. This cause comes before the court on defendant Indiana Bell Telephone Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff George J. Luddington, a black employee of Indiana Bell, filed a two-count complaint on November 3, 1986, against his employer for its alleged actions or inactions with respect to his promotion and transfer opportunities. In count I, Luddington alleges race discrimination and retaliation by Indiana Bell in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e — 2000e-17. This court has jurisdiction over this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). In count II, Luddington alleges that Indiana Bell denied Luddington the same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens of the United States in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This court has jurisdiction over the second claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. I. Standard of Review Summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, is properly granted only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In making this determination, this court views the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Morgan v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 867 F.2d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir.1989) (per curiam). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. The non-moving party must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. A court must enter summary judgment against the non-moving party if, after adequate time for discovery, the party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. Furthermore, a factual dispute must.be outcome determinative to preclude summary judgment. Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir.1988). Thus, the mere assertion of a factual dispute cannot defeat the motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment is frequently not an appropriate resolution in a Title VII case. See Holland v. Jefferson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir.1989); Powers v. Dole, 782 F.2d 689, 694 (7th Cir.1986). However, summary judgment is not automatically inappropriate simply because issues of discriminatory motive or intent are raised. See Holland, 883 F.2d at 1312. As the Seventh Circuit has counselled, this court must approach a question of summary judgment in a discrimination case with special caution. Id. at 1313. II. Background Luddington, who has been employed by Indiana Bell since January 1966, was a Level 1 Supervisor at the time material to this litigation and had been since his promotion from an hourly craft worker in 1979. His relatively long employment relationship with Indiana Bell, however, has not been without strife. In 1978, Luddington filed suit against Indiana Bell also alleging race discrimination. Apparently, this suit was settled. He also has filed two other charges of race discrimination against Indiana Bell with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and one similar charge with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission. Luddington filed the EEOC charge upon which this suit is based on January 16, 1986. At the last count, Luddington alleges that Indiana Bell discriminated against him in not selecting him for promotion to twenty-eight job positions and for seven transfers. However, Luddington did not inform Indiana Bell that he was alleging discrimination regarding four of the job promotion positions until after discovery was closed and over a month after the filing of the motion for summary judgment. This court finds the defendant’s concerns regarding these tardy claims to be of merit, and this court will not allow the plaintiff to raise these new claims, which would require additional discovery. Thus, any claims regarding the following four job openings cannot be pursued in this litigation, though the plaintiff is free to try to pursue them in a different suit: Director-ONA Market Development; Director-Technical Regulatory Liaison; Director-Switched Service Systems; and Director, BOC Personnel Support. This leaves Luddington with claims regarding twenty-four job promotions and seven transfers. In order to understand the facts surrounding the thirty-one job positions involved in this case, this court will give a brief synopsis of Indiana Bell’s procedures for job openings as set forth by the defendant. Indiana Bell has a Management Resource Center (MRC) that maintains information about job openings within Indiana Bell and outside Indiana Bell with other Bell Operating Companies and their affiliate (BOCs). An Indiana Bell employee may visit the MRC to obtain information on job openings, and the MRC also publishes a Management Job Openings List, which is circulated internally. Once a year, employees complete Form 2930, which lists their backgrounds, experience, qualifications and desires. This information is given to MRC. Thus, if there is a job opening, the MRC, upon request, provides a manager with the names of employees who meet the general qualifications and who have expressed an interest in that area. An employee could also' submit his or her name as an applicant for a particular opening. According to Indiana Bell, it has been down-sizing its work force since the divestiture of AT & T on January 1, 1984. Thus, Indiana Bell states that its policy is that any manager who has a job opening has an obligation to fill it with existing managers at that same level who have the requisite qualifications. If there are no qualified lateral candidates, then the manager may consider candidates for promotion. The procedures for filling the BOC positions are more complex. According to Indiana Bell, BOC openings were generally delineated either “career” or “rotational” prior to 1988. Career openings meant that an employee selected for the job would become an employee of that BOC permanently. Rotational openings, on the other hand, meant that an employee selected for the job would be an employee of the BOC for a certain number of years and would then return to Indiana Bell at a pre-designated level. This was known as a “buyback,” and Indiana Bell had to agree to it before an employee could be considered for a BOC job. If an Indiana Bell employee was interested in a BOC job opening, he or she would complete an inter-company transfer form and submit it to his or her supervisor. The employee’s fifth level supervisor had to approve the request for transfer and a buy-back before he or she could be transferred to a BOC position. All decisions regarding interviews and job selections for a BOC opening were made by the BOC, not by Indiana Bell; however, Luddington states that it was Indiana Bell’s responsibility to deliver his applications to the respective BOCs. Luddington alleges that between 1982 and 1986 he sought promotion or transfer to over thirty jobs and that he was not chosen because of his race and/or in retaliation for his previous charges of discrimination. Luddington cites his high rating on employee evaluations, his employment experience and his educational background as evidence that he was qualified for all of the job openings that he sought. Some openings that would have been promotions were with Indiana Bell, while others were with BOCs. All of the transfers were with Indiana Bell. The management levels of the job openings ranged from Level 2 to Level 4. The job openings and pertinent information are listed below. Promotions IBT Employer Mgmt. Level Other BOC Employer Date Filled 1(a) Specialist-Personnel IBT 2 06/01/82 1(b) Manager (St. Rate Case Support) 2 BOC 09/15/83 1(c) Associate, Network of' the Future 2 BOC 02/15/84 1(d) Specialist, Personnel IBT N/A 12/31/83 Promotions IBT Employer Mgmt. Level Other BOC Employer Date Filled 1(e) District Manager-Network Planning BOC 04/10/84 1(f) Manager (Comptroller) (#95) IBT 09/01/84 1(g) Manager (Comptroller) (# 69) IBT 07/01/84 1(h) Manager (Network) IBT 2 12/01/84 l(i) Public Affairs 3/4 BOC 10/01/84 l(j) Director, Federal Regulatory 3 BOC 08/01/84 l(k) Claims Representative (#24) IBT 09/24/85 l(i) Specialist-Personnel (#36) IBT 07/01/85 l(m) Temporary Specialist-Personnel IBT 08/05/85 l(n) Manager (Labor Relations ■BOC 08/01/83 l(o) District Manager-NECA BOC 09/24/84 l(p) Attorney IBT 05/85 l(q) Manager (Labor Relations BOC 01/01/86 l(r) Supervisor, Tax Research & Planning BOC 04/01/86 l(s) Manager, Affirmative Action & EEO BOC 12/01/86 l(t) Manager (Network) IBT 10/01/85 l(u) Manager (Network) IBT 12/15/85 l(v) Manager (Personnel) (#57) IBT 09/16/85 l(w) Manager (Marketing) (# 138) IBT 01/01/85 l(x) Manager (Marketing) IBT N/A 08/85 Transfers IBT Employer Mgmt. Level Other BOC Employer Date Filled 2(a) Law Clerk IBT N/A 1984-85 2(b) Scan Alert/Packet Switching IBT 1 01/16/85 2(c) Staff Associates, Regulatory (# 118) IBT 1 12/20/84 2(d) Rate Associate, Regulatory (# 130) IBT 1 10/16/84 2(e) Staff Associate, Comptroller (# 131) IBT 1 10/29/84 Transfers IBT Employer Mgmt. Level Other BOC Employer Date Filled 2(f) Bell Independent Relations (# 20) IBT 08/21/84 2(g) Tariff/Costs-Rate Assoc. (# 84 & 109) IBT 07/02/84 09/16/84 III. Discussion Because of the numerous job positions involved and the multiple legal theories alleged, the discussion will be structured in order to minimize the confusion inherent in addressing so many issues. This court will discuss first the plaintiffs section 1981 claims according to the following outline. A. Section 1981 i. Statute of limitations ii. Significance of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union iii. Merits of remaining claims a. Refusal-to-promote claims b. Retaliation claims Second, this court will discuss the plaintiff’s Title VII claims as set forth below. B. Title VII i. Statute of limitations ii. Claims included in the EEOC charge iii. Merits of remaining claims not already discussed under the section 1981 merits The conclusion of this entry provides charts that summarize the court’s holdings as to each job opening under both section 1981 and Title VII. Thus, the parties may refer to it for clarification. A. Section 1981 While Indiana Bell seeks summary judgment as to all of the claims based upon various legal arguments, this court will first address Luddington’s section 1981 claims under count II of his complaint. Section 1981 reads as follows: All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. It appears that Luddington is asserting the following claims pursuant to section 1981: racial harassment; disparate treatment; disparate impact; and retaliation. Indiana Bell presents four arguments as to why it is entitled to summary judgment on count II of Luddington’s complaint: (1) Indiana Bell was not the employer regarding ten of the promotion job openings; (2) acts prior to November 3, 1984, are barred under the applicable statute of limitations; (3) all of the claims fail in light of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989); and (4) all of the claims fail on their merits. i. Statute of limitations A two year statute of limitations applies to this section 1981 claim. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987); Movement for Opportunity & Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235, 1241-44 (7th Cir.1980). Luddington filed his complaint on November 3, 1986; thus, any acts occurring prior to November 3, 1984, are seemingly barred. Luddington asserts that those claims that arose two years prior to the filing of the complaint may be properly pursued and cites to Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int’l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1315 (7th Cir.1974), though this case did not so hold and, thus, is inapposite. He then argues that the dates cited above in which the openings were supposedly filled were the dates that the openings were expected to be filled, but that in reality many of the employment decisions were not made for at least six months after the date listed. Thus, the allegedly discriminatory employment decisions occurred later than the dates listed in some circumstances. In an affidavit, Luddington lists several job openings that he contends were filed within the two year statute of limitations; however, only two of the jobs that Luddington lists were challenged by the defendant as falling outside of the two year statute of limitations. Construing these facts most favorably for the non-moving party, Luddington has still failed to show how the remaining eight promotion job openings and three transfer job openings fall within the two year statute of limitations. Thus, any claims under section 1981 regarding the following promotion and transfer job openings are time-barred: 1(a) Specialist-Personnel; 1(b) Manager (St. Rate Case Support); 1(c) Associate, Network of the Future; 1(d) Specialist, Personnel; 1(f) Manager (Comptroller); 1(g) Manager (Comptroller); l(j) Director, Federal Regulatory; l(n) Manager (Labor Relations); 2(d) Rate Associate, Regulatory; 2(e) Staff Associate, Comptroller; 2(f) Bell Independent Relations; and 2(g) Tariff/Costs-Rate Associate. This leaves Luddington with claims regarding sixteen promotion and three transfer openings. ii. Significance of Patterson v. McClean Credit Union The Supreme Court’s recent holding in Patterson shut the door on many section 1981 employment discrimination claims, though the Court cracked a window for those claims of racial discrimination in promotions. In Patterson, a black former employee of a credit union sued her employer under section 1981 claiming that the employer harassed her, failed to promote her and discharged her all because of her race. In pertinent part, the Court held that the racial harassment claim was not actionable under section 1981, which extends only to conduct at the initial formation of the contract, “not to problems that may arise later from the conditions of continuing employment.” Patterson, 109 S.Ct. at 2372. Thus, to the extent that Luddington pleads in his complaint that he was harassed in violation of section 1981, this claim is no longer viable. However, the Court stated that the employee’s claim that the employer failed to promote her, because of race, from a teller and a file coordinator to an intermediate accounting clerk was “a different matter.” Id. at 2377. The Court went on to state as follows: [T]he question whether a promotion claim is actionable under § 1981 depends upon whether the nature of the change in position was such that it involved the opportunity to enter into a new contract with the employer. If so, then the employer’s refusal to enter the new contract is actionable under § 1981. In making this determination, a lower court should give a fair and natural reading to the statutory phrase “the same right ... to make ... contracts,” and should not strain in an undue manner the language of § 1981. Only where the promotion rises to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and the employer is such a claim actionable under § 1981. Cf. Hishon v. King & Spaulding [sic], 467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (refusal of law firm to accept associate into partnership) (Title VII). Id. Several courts have decided cases involving promotion claims since the holding in Patterson and have had to face the question of whether a given promotion presents a “new and distinct relation” and thus is an actionable claim under section 1981. For example, the Fourth Circuit concluded, with little discussion, that “[promotion from clerk to supervisor with a consequent increase in responsibility and pay satisfies this test.” Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration Supply Co., 882 F.2d 908 (4th Cir.1989). In Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir.1989), a Seventh Circuit panel, in three separate opinions, discussed the application of Patterson to promotion cases, but did not reach a decision on that issue. Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1311-12. Judge Posner stated that one possible interpretation of the “new and distinct relation” test would distinguish between those job positions that accepted applications from inside, as well as outside, of the firm and those job promotions that were “the sort of routine advancement that only existing employees qualify for.” Id. at 1311. Judge Posner then cited an example of the latter situation where a federal employee receives an in-grade promotion, which involves a raise in salary, but not a new job with new responsibilities; this “promotion” would not be a sufficiently “new and distinct relation” to bring a claim under section 1981. Id. Another interpretation of the “new and distinct relation” test focuses on whether the terms of the contractual relationship between the employee and the employer would change. Id. Finally, a third interpretation of the Patterson language focuses on whether the promotion would involve a substantial change in the employee's job responsibilities. Id. at 1317 n. 6 (Cudahy J. concurring). Indiana Bell points to the holding in a Northern District of Illinois case in which an Assistant Director of Housekeeping, who was black and was not selected to become the Director of Housekeeping, sued for discrimination under both Title VII and section 1981. Crader v. Concordia College, 724 F.Supp. 558 (N.D.Ill.1989). Judge Shadur held, in part, that Patterson barred the plaintiff’s section 1981 claim. Noting the Supreme Court’s reference to the Hishon case, which dealt with a Title VII claim against a law firm refusing to accept an associate into the partnership, Judge Shadur wrote: While a promotion to Director might perhaps have represented a substantial increase in responsibility and authority for [the plaintiff] (a matter in some dispute between the parties), in any event it would not have fundamentally altered the quality of his relationship with [the employer] in any way comparable to the move from associate to partner in a law firm — it would not have “involved the opportunity to enter into a new contract with” [the employer] or the “opportunity for a new and distinct relation” in the sense called for by the most reasonable reading of that language in Patterson. Crader, 724 F.Supp. at 563. Another Northern District of Illinois court also faced the issue, though the facts were less strong for the plaintiff, in which the court held that the “promotion” of an employee from probationary to tenured status was not a “new and distinct relation,” especially when the employee would have performed the very same functions regardless of his status. Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc., 717 F.Supp. 597, 599 (N.D.Ill.1989). After considering the Supreme Court’s discussion in Patterson and the subsequent lower court rulings cited above, this court holds that only those jobs that would have provided an increase in management level and significantly different responsibilities rise to the level of a “new and distinct relation” that are sufficient claims under section 1981. These criteria are intended to exclude those jobs in which an employee, for example, supervises a growing department. While such an employee may go from supervising a few to- many employees and may receive a concomitant increase in salary, this is not a “promotion” under the Patterson framework. Additional responsibilities are not sufficient; an employee must assume responsibilities that are distinctly different from the previous job, along with an increase in the level of the job. This framework also excludes those jobs that are lateral transfers that merely involve new duties without significant changes in management level and the amount or type of responsibilities. See White v. Federal Express Corp., 729 F.Supp. 1536 (E.D.Va.1990) (applying the “contract test” set forth in Malhotra and holding that a section 1981 claim concerning the denial of a job change was more in the nature of a lateral transfer than a promotion and, thus, barred by Patterson); Brown v. Avon Prods., Inc., 1989 WL 122334 (N.D.Ill.1989) (noting that a failure-to-transfer claim clearly fails the tests stated in Patterson). This court agrees with District Judge Ellis that if this court interpreted the “new and distinct relation” test to allow claims regarding lateral transfers, “virtually all requests for changes in job assignments would be swept back within the ambit of § 1981, a result at odds with the thrust of Patterson.” White, 729 F.Supp. 1536. Therefore, based upon these criteria and the information in the record at this point, all of the jobs that fall within the two-year statute of limitations are viable promotion claims under Patterson except for l(k) Claims Representative, which was a Level 1 job and would not have been an increase in management level for Luddington, and the three transfers, which were essentially lateral openings. While the BOC jobs technically involved an employment contract with an employer other than Indiana Bell, the section 1981 claims regarding these jobs are still viable under Patterson as to Indiana Bell’s alleged actions in the processing of Luddington’s applications. iii. Merits of remaining claims Finally, this court must decide if summary judgment is appropriate on the merits of the section 1981 claims, which involve the remaining fifteen promotions. In order to prevail on his section 1981 claims, the plaintiff must prove that he was the victim of intentional racial discrimination in connection with the making or enforcing of an employment contract. Luddington must make such a showing by following the methods and burdens of proof that are applicable to claims under Title VII. See Randle v. LaSalle Telecommunications, Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 568 (7th Cir.1989). This showing may be made either by direct proof of discriminatory intent or by the method of indirect proof as set forth in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-95, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Lynch v. Belden & Co., 882 F.2d 262, 268 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1080, 110 S.Ct. 1134, 107 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1990). Direct evidence of a racially discriminatory motive consists of actions or remarks by the defendant that reflect a discriminatory attitude in the employment decision-making process. See Grader, 724 F.Supp. at 564-65. The indirect method of proof as outlined in Burdine and McDonnell Douglas Corp. allows a plaintiff to raise an inference of discriminatory intent when there is no direct evidence available. See Lynch, 882 F.2d at 269. Under this indirect method, the plaintiff first has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. If the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption arises, and the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. Id.; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. Should the defendant carry this burden, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95. The plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093; see also Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat’l Corp., 834 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (7th Cir.1987); Collins v. State of Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 698 (7th Cir.1987). The record in this case fails to reveal any direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of race in the consideration of Luddington’s employment applications. Thus, Luddington can prevail only by utilizing the McDonnell Douglas Corp. — Bur-dine method of indirect proof. Focusing on this three step method of proof, this court will address the merits of the plaintiff’s section 1981 claims for retaliation and disparate treatment involving the remaining fifteen promotion opportunities. In order for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case regarding his refusal-to-promote claims, he must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a member of a protected class, that he applied for promotion and was qualified, that despite his qualifications he was rejected, and that others not in the protected class but with the plaintiff’s or lower qualifications were promoted. See Bigby v. City of Chicago, 766 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir.1985). In order for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, he must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he engaged in statutorily protected activity, that the employer took an adverse personnel action, and that a causal connection existed between the above two actions. See Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 369 n. 4, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2347 n. 4, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1970); Jennings v. Tinley Park Community Consol. School Disk Number U6, 796 F.2d 962, 966-67 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017, 107 S.Ct. 1895, 95 L.Ed.2d 502 (1987). a. Refusal-to-promote claims Of the plaintiff’s remaining claims, he applied for six BOC job openings. Indiana Bell states that the employment decisions for the BOC job openings were made by the respective. BOCs and not by Indiana Bell; thus, Indiana Bell argues that it cannot be held accountable for decisions made by other employers. Luddington argues that he is not trying to hold Indiana Bell accountable for the decisions of the BOCs; rather his complaints go toward Indiana Bell’s actions or inactions. He alleges that the defendant failed to deliver his .applications to the BOCs because of his race and/or in retaliation for his previous charges against the defendant. In the plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff states there is a question of material fact and cites to specific portions of depositions. However, the plaintiff does not meet his burden on his refusal-to-promote claim because he fails to show that the defendant did deliver the applications of similarly or lower qualified non-minority persons to the BOCs for consideration of employment as to those six specific jobs to which the plaintiff had also applied. Furthermore, as the defendant points out, Luddington testified in his deposition that he was not aware of any instance, except for one that involved a human resources Level 3 BOC job, in which an Indiana Bell employee did not pursue Luddington’s interest in job openings. The plaintiff has failed “to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [his] case, and on which [he] will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. Thus, summary judgment will be granted for the defendant on the plaintiff's section 1981 refusal-to-promote claims as to the following BOC job openings: 1(e) District Manager-Network Planning; l(i) Public Affairs; l(o) District Manager-NECA; l(q) Manager (Labor Relations); l(r) Supervisor, Tax Research & Planning; and l(s) Manager, Affirmative Action & EEO. With regards to the job opening 1(h) Manager (Network), the plaintiff does not even discuss the merits in his memorandum in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment or in his affidavit. He does argue that this job was inappropriately listed by the defendant as one that was barred by the statute of limitations, which the defendant subsequently admitted. However, Luddington does not show in his pleadings that he was specifically qualified for the position or that Indiana Bell filled the position with someone with the same or less qualifications than the plaintiff. Thus, Luddington has failed to present a prima facie case of a failure-to-promote discrimination claim under section 1981 regarding the 1(h) Manager (Network) position. Questions of material fact exist as to the job opening designated 1(1) Specialist-Personnel. The plaintiff contends that he was told that no promotions would be made to fill this Level 2 management position, but that the white male who was ultimately hired was promoted. The defendant, on the other hand, asserts that no Level 1 supervisors, black or white, were considered and that the person selected was not promoted to the position. Thus, the section 1981 failure-to-promote claim regarding job 1(1) Specialist-Personnel survives summary judgment. The plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case regarding job opening l(m) Temporary Specialist-Personnel. The plaintiff acknowledges that Frank Thomas filled the position while the employee who normally filled the position went on maternity leave. The defendant states, and the plaintiff does not refute, that Thomas (as well as the employee who went on maternity leave) are black. Thus, Luddington has failed to show that someone not in the protected class, i.e., black, but with the plaintiff’s or lower qualifications was promoted. Again, Luddington has failed to allege a prima facie case regarding position l(p) Attorney because he does not show that someone other than a black person was subsequently chosen to fill the vacancy. Luddington asserts, without citing to any evidence in the record, that “the defendant allowed two of the white attorneys, who worked for it to transfer to its legal department____” While there seems to be a question of fact as to whether Indiana Bell had a policy to hire persons for this position who had practiced law outside of Indiana Bell, the plaintiff still fails to allege that these two white attorneys were hired for the specific position to which he had applied. Indeed, Thomas J. Reiman, vice president and general counsel of Indiana Bell, states in his affidavit that Joset Wright-Lloyd, a black attorney with practice experience outside Indiana Bell, was hired for the position, and the plaintiff does not dispute this. The next two job openings, l(t) Manager (Network) and l(u) Manager (Network), will be discussed together because they involve the same job that was filled twice in the span of a few months. There is a question of material fact as to these two positions regarding whether the two white males who were hired to fill the position were equally or less qualified than Luddington. The defendant states that Luddington’s law degree was irrelevant because it was not a requirement for the position, but the plaintiff cites his experience with Indiana Bell in comparison with the two candidates who were chosen, which appéars to be more extensive and would make him more qualified. Thus, the failure-to-promote claims as to these two positions survive summary judgment. Luddington fails to support his allegations regarding position l(v) Manager (Personnel). He asserts that Elaine Lucas, a white female, was “promoted” to the position after he was told that his application would not be considered because no promotion would be made. However, Luddington fails to cite to any portion of the record that supports his assertion that Lucas was promoted. The plaintiff cannot make unsupported allegations in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. Thus, Luddington may not raise a failure-to-promote claim regarding the position l(v) Manager (Personnel). The plaintiff fails to raise a sufficient claim regarding the position l(w) Manager (Marketing). He makes unsupported allegations and speculations that do not overcome summary judgment. Luddington testified in his deposition that after he inquired about the job, his supervisor reported to him shortly thereafter that the position had already been filled by a lateral Level 2 manager who appeared on a list of Level 2 “surplus” managers. There is nothing in the record that refutes this. Luddington speculates that such a list is nonexistent and merely a pretext to cover unlawful discrimination and retaliation. However, speculation is insufficient to overcome summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Luddington’s failure-to-promote claim regarding position l(x) Manager (Marketing) is wholly insufficient. He alleges, without any evidentiary support, that he was performing this Level 1 job, which involved duties similar to those duties characteristic of Level 2. When his supervisor asked him if he wanted to remain in the position, Luddington responded that he would accept the job only if it was re-classified as a Level 2 position. Indiana Bell had no plans to elevate the job from Level 1 to Level 2, and no one subsequently was promoted to that position as a Level 2 manager. Luddington cannot expect Indiana Bell to create a new Level 2 management position in marketing simply because he thinks that they should and then successfully allege discriminatory treatment when Indiana Bell does not do so. In summary, this court finds that the plaintiff has not established a section 1981 failure-to-promote racial discrimination claim as to twelve of the fifteen promotion openings. Thus, the plaintiff’s only remaining claims under this theory are the following: 1(1) Specialist-Personnel; l(t) Manager (Network); and l(u) Manager (Network). b. Retaliation claims The plaintiff has alleged that he had conversations at different times with three Indiana Bell management employees — Sy Butler, William Overby and Phil Junker — who made retaliatory comments along the lines that his pursuit of racial discrimination claims against Indiana Bell may limit his future at the company. Assuming that these comments were made, Luddington must show that these individuals participated in the decision-making process regarding the Luddington’s job applications. See La Montague v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1412 (7th Cir.1984). However, the record does not reveal that any of the individuals participated in the decision-making process nor discussed Luddington’s applications for the jobs with the decision-makers, with the exception of two job openings in which Junker was involved. Luddington alleges that he talked with Junker in the fall of 1985 when Junker told him that he was perceived as a high risk due to his previous litigation. Junker was involved in the decision-making process as to the job openings l(m) Temporary Specialist-Personnel and l(v) Manager (Personnel). It also appears from the record that both of these positions were filled in the fall of 1985. This temporal sequence establishes a sufficient causal link to survive summary judgment. Therefore, the section 1981 retaliation claim may be raised as to these two job positions, but not as to the others. B. Title VII Indiana Bell argues that all of the claims brought pursuant to Title VII should be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) those claims involving actions prior to April 12, 1985, were not timely filed; (2) those claims not included in an administrative EEOC charge may not be pursued in this court; and (3) any remaining claims fail on the merits. i. Statute of limitations Title VII claims brought in Indiana are generally subject to a 300-day period of limitation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The statute of limitations runs from when the employee is notified of a discriminatory employment decision, not from when the employee is affected. Dugan v. Ball State Univ., 815 F.2d 1132, 1134 (7th Cir.1987). Furthermore, a claim that a discriminatory act occurred prior to the statute of limitations, but had an effect that occurred during the limitations period, is not timely. Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 2261, 104 L.Ed.2d 961 (1989). In this case, Indiana Bell cites twelve promotion jobs and six transfer jobs that involve Title VII claims that are barred by the 300-day statute of limitations. Luddington does not contest that these claims fall outside of the 300-day time period, but argues that these are “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge” so as to be properly brought before this court. The Seventh Circuit has stated that “the judicial complaint in a Title VII case can embrace not only the allegations in the administrative charge but also ‘ “discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations” ’ ” Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1312 (quoting Hemmige v. Chicago Pub. Schools, 786 F.2d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 1986)). In Malhotra, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s claim regarding racial harassment was barred in the Title VII action because he had only alleged failure to promote, not racial harassment, in his administrative charge. However, the Court went on to hold that the plaintiff’s failure to include retaliation in his administrative charge was not fatal and adopted the general ruled that “a separate administrative charge is not prerequisite to a suit complaining about retaliation for filing the first charge.” Id. at 1312. The doctrine of “like or reasonably related,” however, has nothing to do with the statute of limitations, but rather the substantive scope of the lawsuit. In this case, unlike Malhotra, the plaintiff is trying to pursue claims that fall outside of the statute of limitations. While these claims that are outside of the statute of limitations may or may not be “like or reasonably related” to those claims in the EEOC charge, Luddington cannot use this doctrine to avoid a statue of limitations bar. As Judge Shadur stated in Proffit v. Keycorn Elec. Publishing, 625 F.Supp. 400, 408 (N.D.Ill.1985), the plaintiff cannot use the “ ‘like or reasonably related’ standard to work backward in time, thus circumventing the statutory filing deadlines. Carried to its logical extension, [this] argument would abolish the whole notion of limitations — for any new act of discrimination would dredge up and render actionable every long-outlawed historical occurrence of the same kind.” Therefore, the plaintiff’s EEOC claims regarding the following job openings are barred by the 300-day limitations period: Promotions: 1(a) Specialist-Personnel 1(b) Manager (St. Rate Case Support) 1(c) Associate, Network of the Future 1(d) Specialist, Personnel 1(e) District Manager-Network Planning 1(f) Manager (Comptroller) 1(g) Manager (Comptroller) 1(h) Manager (Network) 1® Public Affairs l(j) Director, Federal Regulatory l(n) Manager (Labor Relations) l(o) District Manager-NECA Transfer 2(b) Scan Alert/Packet Switching 2(c) Staff Associate, Regulatory 2(d) Rate Associate, Regulatory 2(e) Staff Associate, Comptroller 2(f) Bell Independent Relations 2(g) Tariff/ Costs-Rate Associate This leaves the plaintiff with EEOC claims as to twelve promotions and one transfer that are not barred by the statute of limitations. ii. Claims included in the EEOC charge The filing of charges with the EEOC and the receipt of a right to sue letter are necessary prerequisites to pursuing any Title VII claim in federal district court. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); Movement for Opportunity & Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235, 1238 (7th Cir.1980). The nature of the charge before the EEOC affects the scope of the court’s jurisdiction. “Allowing a complaint to encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would circumvent the EEOC’s investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the charged party of notice of the charge____” Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 863 (7th Cir.1985). The only claims that are cognizable are those in the EEOC charge and those that are “ ‘like Or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.’ ” Id. at 864 (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 506, 50 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)); see also Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124, 127 (7th Cir.1989); Gamble v. Birmingham S. R.R. Co., 514 F.2d 678, 687-89 (5th Cir.1975); Flesch v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Inst., 434 F.Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.Pa.1977). Thus, while the extent of an EEOC investigation may help define the scope of the charge, it will not necessarily defeat a complaint where the complaint contains allegations that are like or reasonably related to the EEOC charge. Schnellbaecher, 887 F.2d at 127. Luddington filed a charge with the EEOC on January 15, 1986, regarding the following jobs: l(k) Claims Representative; l(m) Temporary Specialist-Personnel; l(p) Attorney; l(t) Manager (Network); l(u) Manager (Network); and l(w) Manager (Marketing) or l(x) Manager (Marketing). The defendant argues that all other claims not cited in the EEOC charge are, therefore, barred. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that his EEOC charge alleged that Indiana Bell denied him consideration for promotional opportunities due to his race and retaliated against him for having protested its discriminatory employment practices. Thus, the plaintiff argues that all of his claims, including those not specifically mentioned in the charge, are “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge” so as to be properly brought before this court. See Flesch v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Inst., 434 F.Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.Pa.1977). This court must determine what EEOC investigation could reasonably be expected to grow from the original charge. See Schnellbaecher, 887 F.2d at 127. There are five promotion and two transfer job claims that are not specifically included in Luddington’s EEOC charge and that are not already barred by the 300-day statute of limitations. All of the jobs involve allegations of race discrimination and/or retaliation in the promotion or transfer of the plaintiff. However, all of these job openings and the alleged accompanying discriminatory acts occurred before the filing of the charge. Thus, this not like a situation in which the Title VII plaintiff is attempting to include a claim that was not included in the EEOC charge because the alleged discriminatory acts were in response to the filing of the EEOC charge. See Flesch, 434 F.Supp. at 970. This is also not like a situation in which we have an unsophisticated plaintiff who is unfamiliar with the EEOC process or who is inarticulate and unable to thoroughly describe the discriminatory practices. Cf. Jenkins, 538 F.2d at 167-68 (noting that Title VII is to be construed broadly because EEOC charges are in “layman’s language,” unassisted by trained lawyers); Gamble, 514 F.2d at 688-89 (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 463 (5th Cir.1970)) (“We must ever be mindful that the provisions of Title VII were not designed for the sophisticated or the cognoscenti, but to protect equality of opportunity among all employees and prospective employees. This protection must be extended to even the most unlettered and unsophisticated.”). Luddington has filed previous EEOC charges, which are not the subject of this law suit, and he is an attorney himself. Thus, this court finds that the Title VII challenges regarding those jobs not listed in the EEOC charge are not sufficiently related to the claims in the EEOC charge and are therefore barred. Furthermore to the extent that the plaintiff is trying to introduce a harassment theory or a disparate impact theory, this would unduly expand the substantive scope of this lawsuit beyond the claims in the EEOC charge, and therefore, both theories are also barred. iii. Merits of remaining claims not already discussed under the section 1981 merits Finally, this court must decide if summary judgment is appropriate on the merits as to the remaining Title VII claims. As already noted, in most instances the methods and burdens of proof are the same for claims under section Title VII and section 1981. See Randle, 876 F.2d at 568. This court has analyzed the merits of those claims brought pursuant to section 1981 that were not barred for other reasons. To the extent that the same claims are also brought pursuant to Title VII and not otherwise barred by Title VII’s statute of limitations, the analysis of the merits would not change. Accordingly, this court will only analyze the merits of those claims involving job openings that were not analyzed in the section 1981 portion of this entry and that are not barred for other reasons already discussed. With regards to job position l(k) Claims Representative, the plaintiff does not offer any material evidence that the reasons given in deposition testimony by Richard Creedon, Indiana Bell’s in-house Claims Attorney, for Creedon’s decision to hire William Wermund and not Luddington were pretextual. Thus, Luddington’s Title VII racial discrimination claim as to job position l(k) Claims Representative is not viable. Similarly, since Luddington fails to present any evidence that a person in the decision-making process with respect to this job made a retaliatory statement, his Title VII retaliation claim also fails. The last position that this court must review as to the merits involves the transfer to job 2(a) Law Clerk. There is a question of material fact as to when the plaintiff inquired about the 2(a) Law Clerk position, i.e., before or after he graduated from law school, and the plaintiff meets his burden to survive summary judgment because he alleges that only lower qualified, white law students were hired to fill the position. The defendant states that no attorneys have ever been hired as 2(a) Law Clerks, but Luddington states in his deposition that he was willing to take a cut in pay for the experience. Thus, Luddington’s Title VII racial discrimination claim as to the 2(a) Law Clerk opening survives summary judgment. However, as stated above, Luddington does not make out a claim of retaliation because he fails to allege that a decision-maker with respect to this job made retaliatory statements. In summary, Indiana Bell’s summary judgment motion will be granted as to twelve promotions and six transfers because the claims regarding those position fall outside Title VII’s 300-day statute of limitations. This court will grant summary judgment as to five promotion openings and one transfer opening because these were not included in the EEOC charge. As to the remaining claims, this court will grant summary judgment as to six promotions and one transfer on the plaintiffs retaliation theory and as to five promotions on the plaintiff’s racial discrimination theory. As the chart below indicates, this leaves the plaintiff with Title VII racial discrimination claims as to two promotions and one transfer and with a Title VII retaliation claim as to one promotion. III. Conclusion Based on all of the aforementioned reasons, this court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In order to aid the parties and this court in keeping track of the claims that are and are not barred, the first table summarizes this court’s holdings as to Luddington’s section 1981 claims. The second table summarizes this court’ holdings as to Luddington’s Title VII claims. Those job openings with an “X” beside them are barred in whole or in part for the reason set forth by the particular column in which the “X” is placed. SECTION 1981 Promotion Patterson 2-Year No No Refusal Statute of Retaliation to Promote Limitations Claim Claim 1(a) Specialist-Personnel X 1(b) Manager (St. Rate Case Support) X 1(c) Associate, Network of the Future X 1(d) Specialist, Personnel X 1(e). District Manager-Network Planning X X 1(f) Manager (Comptroller) (# 95) X 1(g) Manager (Comptroller) (# 69) X 1(h) Manager (Network) X X 1® Public Affairs X X l(j) Director, Federal Regulatory X l(k) Claims Representative X (# 24) 1(1) Specialist-Personnel (#36) X l(m) Temporary Specialist-Personnel X l(n) Manager (Labor Relations) X l(o) District ManagerNECA X X l(p) Attorney X X l(q) Manager (Labor Relations) X X l(r) Supervisor, Tax Research & Planning X X l(s) Manager, Affirmative Action & EEO X X l(t) Manager (Network) X Promotion Patterson 2-Year Statute of Limitations No Retaliation Claim No Refusal to Promote Claim l(u) Manager (Network) X l(v) Manager (Personnel) (#57) X l(w) Manager (Marketing) (# 138) X X Manager (Marketing) l(x) X X Transfer Patterson 2-Year Statute of Limitations Retaliation Refusal to Promote 2(a) Law Clerk X 2(b) Scan Alert/Packet Switching X 2(c) Staff Associates, Regulatory 2(d) Rate Associate, Regulatory 2(e) Staff Associate, Comptroller 2(f) Bell Telephone Relations X 2(g) Tariff/ Costs X TITLE YII Promotion No EEOC Charge 300-Day Statute of Limitations No Retaliation Claim No Failure to Promote Claim 1(a) Specialist-Personnel X 1(b) Manager (St. Rate Case Support) X 1(c) Associate, Network of the Future 1(d) Specialist, Personnel X 1(e) District Manager-Network Planning ■ X 1(f) Manager (Comptroller) (#95) X 1(g) Manager (Comptroller) (#69) X 1(h) Manager (Network) X l(i) Public Affairs X l(j) Director, Federal Regulatory X l(k) Claims Representative (#24) X X 1(Z) Specialist-Personnel (# 36) ' l(m) Temporary Specialist-Personnel X l(n) Manager (Labor Relations X l(o) District ManagerNECA X l(p) Attorney X X l(q) Manager (Labor Relations l(r) Supervisor, Tax Research & Planning X l(s) Manager, Affirmative Action & EEO X l(t) Manager (Network) X l(u) Manager (Network) X Promotion No EEOC Charge 300-Day Statute of Limitations No Retaliation Claim No Failure to Promote Claim l(v) Manager (Personnel) (#57) X l(w) Manager (Marketing) (# 138) . X X l(x) Manager (Marketing) X X Transfer No EEOC Charge 300-Day Statute of Limitations No Retaliation Claim No Failure to Promote Claim 2(a) Law Clerk X 2(b) Scan Alert/Packet Switching X X 2(c) Staff Associates, Regulatory X 2(d) Rate Associate, Regulatory X 2(e) Staff Associate, Comptroller X 2(f) Bell Telephone Relations X 2(g) Tariff/Costs X This leaves the plaintiff with viable claims involving the following jobs under the theories indicated. Failure-to-Promote Theory l(i) Specialist-Personnel l(t) Manager (Network) l(u) Manager (Network) Racial Discrimination l(t) Manager (Network) l(u) Manager (Network) 2(a) Law Clerk Section 1981 Retaliation Theory l(m) Temporary Specialist-Personnel l(v) Manager (Personnel) Title VII Retaliation Theory l(m) Temporary Specialist-Personnel ON MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER I. Introduction This cause comes before the.court on two motions to reconsider this court’s Entry Granting In Part And Denying In Part Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment issued April 23, 1990. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is happy with the ruling, though each obviously has a different view as to why portions of the entry are incorrect. This entry will first give a relatively brief review of the plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims regarding over thirty job opportunities and this court’s ruling on the defendant’s summary judgment motion. Second, I will assess the defendant’s motion to reconsider, since it was filed first, and third, I will address the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. II. Background While the plaintiff’s discrimination claims are more fully set forth in the April 23,1990, entry, this court will restate briefly the plaintiff’s allegations. Plaintiff George J. Luddington, a black employee of Indiana Bell Telephone Co., filed a two-count complaint against his employer for its alleged actions and inactions with respect to his promotion and transfer opportunities. In count I, Luddington ■ alleged race discrimination and retaliation by Indiana Bell in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e — 2000e-17. In count II, Luddington alleged that Indiana Bell denied Luddington the same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens of the United States in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Altogether, Luddington alleges that Indiana Bell did not select him for promotion to twenty-eight job positions and for seven transfers because of his race and/or in retaliation for previous charges of discrimination that he had filed. In the April 23, 1990, entry, this court discussed the plaintiff’s section 1981 claims in light of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and held that most of the job denials were not actionable because they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, they were no longer viable in the wake of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), or they were not meritorious. This court then analyzed the plaintiff’s Title VII claims and held that most were not actionable because they were barred by the statute of limitations, they were not included in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge, or they were not meritorious. This court concluded that the plaintiff was left with viable claims involving the following jobs under the theories indicated. Section 1981 Failure-to-Promote Theory l(i) Specialist-Personnel l(t) Manager (Network) l(u) Manager (Network) Racial Discrimination l(t) Manager (Network) l(u) Manager (Network) 2(a) Law Clerk Retaliation Theory l(m) Temporary Specialist-Personnel l(v) Manager (Personnel) Title VII Retaliation Theory l(m) Temporary Specialist-Personnel Both parties filed motions to reconsider the rulings as to specific jobs. As stated above, this court will first address the defendant’s arguments and then the plaintiff’s. One table set forth immediately below provides information regarding the specific jobs that are the subject of reconsideration. Another table in the conclusion of this entry provides information regarding applicable rulings on the motions to reconsider; it is an abridged version of the table provided in the April 23, 1990, entry, except for any changes that reflect this court’s rulings on the motions to reconsider. Promotions IBT Employer Mgmt. Level Other BOC Employer Date Filed 1(e) District Manager-Network Planning 3 BOC 04/10/84 l(i) Public Affairs 3/4 BOC 10/01/84 l(k) Claims Representative (# 24) IBT 1 09/24/85 l(i) Specialist-Personnel (# 36) IBT 2 07/01/85 l(m) Temporary Specialist-Personnel IBT 2 08/05/85 l(o) District Manager-NECA 3 BOC 09/24/84 l(p) Attorney IBT 4 05/85 l(q) Manager (Labor Relations) 2 BOC 01/01/86 l(r) Supervisor, Tax Research & Planning 3 BOC 04/01/86 l(s) Manager, Affirmative Action & EEO 3 BOC 12/01/86 l(t) Manager (Network) IBT 2 10/01/85 l(u) Manager (Network) IBT 2 12/15/85 l(v) Manager (Personnel) (#57) IBT 2 09/16/85 2(a) Law Clerk IBT N/A 1984-85 III. Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider The defendant requests reconsideration of the rulings regarding eight of the jobs. I will address each job in the order listed in the chart at the conclusion of this entry, unless the defendant presents identical arguments regarding more than one job, in which case I will deal with all of those jobs in one subsection. Similarly, when the defendant challenges the section 1981 and the Title VII rulings as to the same job, both theories will be addressed in the same subsection. A. Job 1(e) District Manager-Network Planning The defendant moves for reconsideration of the section 1981 ruling regarding 1(e) District Manager-Network Planning. In the April 23, 1990, entry, this court granted summary judgment on Luddington’s section 1981, failure-to-promote and retaliation claims as to job 1(e) because he did not meet his burden of proof on the merits. The defendant agrees with this holding, but contends that the claims also should have been dismissed because they were barred by the two year statute of limitations applicable to section 1981 claims. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987); Bailey v. Northern Indiana Public Serv. Co., 910 F.2d 406 (7th Cir.1990); Movement for Opportunity & Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir.1980). The plaintiff filed his complaint on November 3, 1986; thus, this court held that any acts occurring prior to November 3, 1984, were barred from consideration. Indiana Bell contends that job 1(e) was filled on April 10, 1984. As explained in the earlier entry, however, the plaintiff stated in his affidavit that this date was the projected date that the opening would be filled. The actual employment selections for the “vast majority” of the posted vacancies, according to Luddington, were often made up to six months after the date printed on the job announcements. Plaintiffs Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for a Summary Judgment, ¶1 ¶ 8-10. Thus, the plaintiff argued that the allegedly discriminatory employment decisions occurred later than the dates listed in some circumstances. Even accepting this position as true, the defendant argues that job 1(e) was filled no later than six months after April 10, 1984, which would have been October 10, 1984. Thus, the defendant argues that job 1(e) is barred by the section 1981 statute of limitations. With regards to job 1(e), however, Luddington stated in his affidavit that “on or about November 15, 1984, my supervisor, Robert D. Wilson, Jr., informed me that defendant (upper management) declined to submit my application to the related company for enhanced employment opportunity consideration.” Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for a Summary Judgment, ¶ ll.a. Luddington did not state that all of the job openings were filled within six months of the dates listed. Furthermore, he specifically alleged that a discriminatory action took place regarding job 1(e) within the two year time period. Construing these facts most favorably for the non-moving party, this court reaffirms its holding that the section 1981 claims regarding job 1(e) arose after November 3, 1984, and, thus, were not barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, this court DENIES the defendant’s motion to reconsider the section 1981, statute of limitations holding as to job 1(e), but notes that this court’s grant of summary judgment on the merits as to job 1(e) still stands unless the plaintiff is successful in his motion to reconsider. B. Job 1(1) Specialist-Personnel. Job l(t) Manager (Network) Job l(u) Manager (Network) With respect to job 1(1), the court concluded that the plaintiff’s section 1981, failure-to-promote claim survived summary judgment. With respect to jobs l(t) and l(u), this court concluded that the plaintiff’s section 1981, failure-to-promote claims and his Title VII racial discrimination claims survived. The defendant moves this court to reconsider the