Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ROSEN, District Judge. INTRODUCTION This matter is before the Court on cross-motions filed by several of the parties in this multi-plaintiff, multi-defendant lawsuit. Plaintiff Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service (“MPAS”) , on behalf of fourteen Plaintiffs suffering from developmental disabilities, brings this action against fourteen Defendants. MPAS claims that Defendants have violated rights secured by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (“FHAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. , and the Michigan Handicapper’s Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.1101 et seq., and for conspiracy to violate those rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and failure to prevent this conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief together with compensatory and punitive damages. STATEMENT OF FACTS In May 1988, Robin and Marie Hester (“Hesters”) decided to sell their home at 2323 24 ■ Mile Road in Shelby Township, Michigan (“the Home”). They signed an Exclusive Right-To-Sell Listing Agreement with Defendant Century 21 Town & Country (“Town & Country”). Defendant Florence Hammonds (“Hammonds”), a real estate agent employed by Town & Country, handled the listing which was to run from May 1, 1988 through August 1, 1988. In consideration for undertaking to find a purchaser, the Hesters agreed to pay Town & Country 6% of the sales price of the property as a commission. Thereafter, Hammonds began marketing the property. This effort was unsuccessful. When the first listing expired, the Hesters signed another exclusive listing agreement which ran until November 3, 1988. Again, the effort to sell the Home was unsuccessful. The Hesters then signed a third listing agreement which ran until February 10, 1989. On February 9, 1989, Hammonds offered to purchase the Home for $95,000, with a sales commission of $5700 to Town & Country. This offer was accepted. The closing took place on or about April 12, 1989 with Transamerica Title Insurance Company (“Transamerica”) providing the title work. To pay for the Home, Hammonds secured a home equity loan of approximately $21,000 and a $78,000 mortgage. Her monthly payment on this mortgage was about $1100, with the first payment due in May 1989. According to Hammonds, the assumption of this second mortgage was a substantial financial burden. Apparently, Hammonds decided to buy the Home with the intent to lease it to the State of Michigan to be used as a group home for mentally handicapped adults. In November 1988, while acting as the Hesters’ broker, she had inquired whether the Macomb-Oakland Regional Center (“MORC”) — a division of the Michigan State Department of Mental Health (“State”) — would be interested in leasing the Home if she were to purchase it. MORC was interested and a series of discussions with representatives from the State ensued. According to Hammonds, she was assured by the State in March 1988, through Don Booth, MORC’s Property Development Coordinator, that a written lease would be executed and that she would begin receiving rental payments by May 15, 1989. Hammonds claims that she bought the Home in reliance on this promise to lease. Hammonds says there were numerous delays involved in her lease negotiations with the State, including the frequent illness of her contact person. The State also refused to commit to the amount of rent which would be paid on the Home. In response to these difficulties, Hammonds called her contact person’s supervisor on or about April 28, 1989, asking him to intercede so as to accelerate the leasing process. He responded that he could not intercede, that the approval for the home had to go through different channels, including the Attorney General’s office, and that the Home would not be ready to lease until at least July 15, 1989. On May 12, 1989, Hammonds met with Booth and Dennis Bott, MORC’s first line supervisor, to discuss her concerns about the rental of the Home, including the financial burden and the negative reaction from neighbors. According to Hammonds, at the conclusion of this meeting, Booth and Bott promised to contact Lansing to determine the reason for the delays and to call her that day with a response. They did not call her. Meanwhile, on April 26, 1989, a MORC representative had sent residents in the vicinity of the proposed group home a letter informing them that the Home was to be used as a residence for five mentally retarded adults. The letter describes the program and advises interested persons to call MORC if they have any questions. In response, Defendant Peggy Babin, a resident living near the Home, called Hammonds on or about April 28,1989. She was upset about the prosect of a group home, and, along with other neighbors, wished to speak with Hammonds about it. Five neighbors met at Hammonds’s home the next day. They voiced their fears about the home and gave Hammonds a packet of negative information about group homes. Hammonds apparently assured them that the group home was a good idea and tried to assuage their fears. A group of neighbors then began to engage in activities designed to prevent the institution of the group home in their neighborhood. They apparently believed that a group home would result in a depreciation of property values and threaten neighborhood safety. According to Plaintiffs, this group initiated a petition drive opposing the Home, arranged for media coverage of their opposition drive, threatened a boycott and picket of the Town & Country office where Hammonds worked, and prepared and distributed packets of information detailing negative aspects of group homes. Plaintiffs add that Peggy Babin arranged for a public hearing on the subject of group homes to be held at the Shelby Township Hall on May 12, 1989. Peggy Babin counters that she arranged the meeting in conjunction with MORC. This meeting attracted almost 100 people, including MORC representatives, and was the scene of intense discussion and argument. On Friday, May 13, 1989, Defendant Nosh Ivanovic, who owned the house adjacent to the Home, called Hammonds and offered her $100,000 for the Home. Hammonds responded that she would think about it. On Monday, May 15, 1989, Hammonds made a counteroffer of $104,000 which was accepted. Hammonds claims that she waited until Monday because she had expected to receive a phone call from Bott or Booth on Friday, May 12, 1989, after her meeting with them. When they failed to call on Friday, as promised, and when they did not return her calls on Monday, she decided to accept the Ivanovics’ offer. The closing took place on May 19, 1989 at Transamerica. Hammonds testified that she sold the Home to the Ivanovics because she feared that the State would not timely negotiate the rental of the Home and that she would thus be unable to make the mortgage payments on the Home. Plaintiffs dispute this and contend that the sale was at least partially motivated by the public opposition to the group home and fear that the sale of the Home to MORC would negatively affect Hammonds’s employment as a broker. Nosh and Katrina Ivanovic needed approximately $5000 to consummate the purchase of the Home from Hammonds. Defendant Scott Babin gave them this sum. To recoup this disbursement, he then solicited money from some neighbors, including Defendants Paul Hebert, Thomas Fortin, Peggy Babin, Michelle Rhodes, and Alan Rhodes. Scott Babin is accused of contributing approximately $5000.00 to the Ivanovics and then soliciting money from Hebert. Peggy Babin is accused of soliciting and collecting money from the Rhodes. Hebert is accused of soliciting money as well as contributing an undisclosed amount toward the purchase of the Home. Finally, Fortin is accused of contributing $500.00 to Hebert toward the purchase of the Home. Apparently, the Ivanovics never repaid Scott Babin. MPAS filed the Complaint on January 23, 1990. On December 17, 1991 and December 19, 1991, the Court heard oral argument on the parties’ motions. On January 6, 1992, the Court entered an Order permitting supplemental briefs on the question of the constitutionality, under the Commerce Clause, of the FHAA as it pertains to the alleged activities. The Court received briefs from Plaintiffs, the United States Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, and Defendants Peggy Babin and Maguire and Shelby Township. Currently before the Court for consideration are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff MPAS and Defendants Peggy Babin, Hammonds, Nosh and Katrina Ivanovic, Kersten/Town & Country , Thomas Fortin (“Fortin”), Joseph Maguire (“Maguire”) and Shelby Township. Although the presence of cross-motions for summary judgment does not necessarily indicate that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the Court finds that the factual disputes which do exist and are noted in the statement of facts are not material to a resolution of the legal issues in this case. Therefore, the Court will rule on the legal issues presented by the parties. STANDARDS GOVERNING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Summary judgment is proper “ ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). Three 1986 Supreme Court cases — Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) — ushered in a “new era” in the standards of review for a summary judgment motion. These cases, in the aggregate, lower the movant’s burden on a summary judgment motion. According to the Celotex Court: In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. After reviewing the above trilogy, the Sixth Circuit established a series of principles to be applied to motions for summary judgment. The relevant principles can be summarized as follows: * The movant must meet the initial burden of showing “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” as to an essential element of the non-movant’s case. This burden may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case. * The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but must “present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” * The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact. * The trial court has more discretion than in the “old era” in evaluating the respondent’s evidence. The respondent must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Further, “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find” for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent’s claim is plausible. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir.1989). The Court will apply the above principles to the following discussion. FAIR HOUSING ACT CLAIMS The Complaint asserts a number of different claims against the fourteen Defendants. This Opinion will discuss these various claims by focusing on the acts that provoked them. The relevant acts can be condensed into four main categories: I. Hammonds’ sale of the Home. II. Participation of Kersten/Town & Country in this sale. III. Protest activities of the neighbors. IV. Activities of the neighbors in (a) purchasing the Home and (b) soliciting, collecting, and contributing money for the purchase of the Home. The Court will address the legal and constitutional issues implicated by the facts of this case and Plaintiffs’ claims. I. HAMMONDS’ SALE OF THE HOME Plaintiffs assert that Hammonds violated the FHAA when she sold the Home to the Ivanovics. Specifically, they say that she sold the Home for financial gain to people whom she knew were actively opposed to its use as a group home. This, they say, was a discriminatory act which violated § 3604(f)(1), § 3605, and § 3617 of the FHAA. A. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) Florence Hammonds, as the owner of the Home, is clearly within the purview of the language of § 3604(f)(1) which makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap____” However, before advancing to a substantive analysis of this section, the Court must determine whether § 3604(f)(1) applies to Hammonds or whether she is exempted from that section by § 3603(b)(1). Section 3603(b)(1) exempts from FHAA coverage single family homes that are sold or rented by the owner if: (1) the owner owns three or fewer such homes; (2) the owner does not live in, and was not the most recent occupant of, the home, and the owner has not made a similar sale within twenty-four months; (3) the home was sold or rented without the aid of a real estate broker, agent, or any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings; and (4) the home was sold or rented without the aid of a written notice which violates § 3604(c). Both the language and legislative history of § 3603(b) indicate it was an attempt to balance two important principles — the individual homeowner’s right to dispose of his private property as he sees fit without the interference of the federal government and the right of a homeseeker to be free from overt or covert discrimination. The limitations on the application of the exemption relate to the number of homes rented or sold and the use of a broker or advertising in furtherance of an attempt to sell or rent the dwelling. This indicates a congressional desire to provide an exemption only for those homeowners operating in purely nonprofessional manner — that is, not acting as professionals or retaining a professional on their behalf. Although it enacted a comprehensive anti-discrimination schema, Congress wished to guarantee an individual homeowner the control over his property. This balance is reflected in a comment by Senator Baker: First, I do not feel that the balance of equities in this country should lead us to the regimentation and the absolute control of how an individual homeowner may or may not dispose of his property. Second, I feel that it should be the express purpose of Congress and of the Government to produce equality of fair housing opportunity to the maximum possible extent, after giving credence to the idea that the individual homeowner has some right to decide how, when, and to whom he sells his house. 114 Cong.Rec. at § 2239 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1968). There is no dispute that Hammonds satisfies the first, second, and fourth conditions above. However, Plaintiffs allege that Hammonds fails to satisfy the third condition because: (1) she is a real estate agent and (2) she utilized the services of a broker by (a) seeking advice from Defendant Kersten and (b) employing the services of Kersten and Town & Country to close the sale. The Court will examine these claims seriatim. It is undisputed that Hammonds is a real estate agent. The more pertinent question, however, is whether being a real estate agent precludes her from benefiting from the exemption when, as in the instant case, she sold the Home in her personal capacity. The relevant portion of § 3603(b) provides: any such single-family house shall be excepted from the application of this sub-chapter only if such house is sold or rented (A) without the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real estate broker, agent, or salesman, or of such facilities or services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such broker, agent, salesman, or person 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1). Plaintiffs claim that, as a broker, Hammonds necessarily used a broker (herself) to consummate the sale; therefore, she may not benefit from the exemption. Under this interpretation, § 3603(b) would render, nonexempt all private transactions by persons in the real estate business. However, this would be inequitable as it would deprive these individuals of a statutory exemption solely because of their oecupation. As the Court does not believe that Congress intended that the exemption be denied a person solely because of his occupation, it will not hold that Hammonds is precluded from benefiting from § 3603(b) simply because she happens to be a real-estate agent. Plaintiffs’ next argument is that Hammonds used the services of Kersten and Town & Country to effectuate the sale. This argument actually has two parts. The first “use of services” allegedly occurred when Hammonds sought the advice of Defendant Kersten in the Town & Country office in connection with the opposition activities of the neighbors. However, review of the record indicates that Hammond’s encounter with Kersten was a brief and incidental discussion in which Kersten told Hammonds that Hammonds would have to handle the situation herself. During deposition testimony on this interaction, Kersten said: “I vaguely remember. Probably the implication was what a mess we’re in, I’m in or whatever. I was very empathetic and left it like that. Believe me, that discussion lasted fifteen seconds.” The second alleged use of services occurred when Hammonds utilized closing documents bearing the Town & Country logo. As discussed below, the relevant documents used by Hammonds were preprinted with Kersten’s signature, but were otherwise devoid of any mention of a real-estate broker. Further, neither Hammonds nor Town & Country received any commission for the sale, nor was the Home listed. In sum, there is no evidence that Hammonds operated in conjunction with Town & Country in the sale of the Home to the Ivanovies. Therefore, under § 3603(b)(1), Hammonds is exempt from § 3604(f)(1). However, even were the Court to find Hammonds nonexempt, it would still conclude that she did not violate § 3604(f)(1) because Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against her. Plaintiffs assert that Hammonds’s sale of the Home to the Ivanovics had a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory intent. The Court rejects at the outset any claim that the sale had a discriminatory effect. Although the Sixth Circuit has stated that discriminatory impact may be sufficient to violate the FHA, Arthur v. Toledo, 782 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.1986), discriminatory impact cases generally involve facially neutral policies or laws that have a significant statistical effect of disfavoring members of a protected class. See Southend Neighborhood Improv. Ass’n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1209 (7th Cir.1984) (noting that not every action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates, 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir.1984) (noting statistical impact of new all-adult policy); Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 724 F.Supp. 148, 154-55 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that rental policies had statistically disproportionate impact). See also Robert G. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law and Litigation § 10.4(2)(b) (1991) (“Schwemm”). Here, in contrast, there is no policy or law at issue. Rather, Plaintiffs complain about a single allegedly discriminatory transaction. As such, the scope of this case is too narrow to qualify as one involving a discriminatory impact. The Court will review Plaintiffs’ § 3604(f)(1) claim ás a discriminatory intent claim. In analyzing claims of discriminatory intent, courts often borrow from the analysis used in Title VII eases. Selden Apartments v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., 785 F.2d 152, 159 (6th Cir.1986); Shaw v. Cassar, 558 F.Supp. 303, 312 (E.D.Mich.1983); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1036-37 (2d Cir.1979). Under the analysis established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie showing of discrimination. If he establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must respond with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the denial of housing. If the defendant does so, the plaintiff must then prove that that reason is pretextual. Id. The Court will adopt the basic approach of the McDonnell Douglas Court and will determine whether Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of discrimination against Defendants. In Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 383 (7th Cir.1985), the Seventh Circuit established a test for determining whether a prima facie case of housing discrimination has been established. Under that test, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following: (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected class of persons; (2) the defendant was aware of it; (3) the plaintiff was ready and able to accept defendant’s offer to rent or buy; and (4) the defendant refused to deal with the plaintiff. Id. at 387. There is no dispute as to the first, second, and fourth prongs of the test. Plaintiffs are handicapped and Hammonds was aware of this. Moreover, Hammonds sold the Home to the Ivanovics and thereby denied Plaintiffs the opportunity to own the Home. However, Plaintiffs have more difficulty proving the third prong. To successfully do so, they must demonstrate that MORC was ready, willing, and able to lease the Home before May 15, 1989, the date on which the Ivanovics purchased the Home. The record demonstrates that Plaintiffs (actually, their agent) were neither ready nor able to consummate a lease on the Home. In fact, it is clear from the record that the parties never got beyond the negotiation stage. Plaintiffs admit that as of May 15, 1989, when Hammonds sold the Home to the Ivanovics, Hammonds and the State were still involved in lease negotiations. Hammonds has offered affirmative evidence, in sworn testimony, that she was never given a commitment by the State: After I purchased the House, the State began delaying the occupancy date of the group home and the date on which rental payments would begin. The State finally told me that lease payments would begin no earlier than July 15, 1989. Nonetheless, the State would not guarantee this date and the State refused to reduce any agreement to writing. The State absolutely refused to commit to any lease terms, including the amount of rent I would receive or when the payments would begin. Deposition testimony on this point similarly indicates that the State was not ready and able to purchase the Home: Q. Or tell us in your own words exactly the basis for your decision to sale [sic] to the Ivanovics. A. [HAMMONDS] I had made a commitment to refinance my home to proceed with a lease agreement with MORC. And when I realized that the lease negotiations were not proceeding in the fashion or the promised time, than I decided to sell the home because I realized that the home wasn’t marketable, it wasn’t a marketable home. And I had a ready, willing, and able buyer. And that’s when I made my decision to sale [sic ] to them. Q. Had MORC ever produced for you a written lease agreement? A. No; nor the state. Q. All right. Is that what you were asking them to provide you? A. Yes, I was. Plaintiffs have failed to submit to the Court any evidence that the MORC was ready, willing, and able to satisfy the financial conditions of the lease. Plaintiffs counter that the State was ready and able to accept Hammonds offer to rent. In support, they say: Defendant had already negotiated a sale price for the property before fulfilling her commitment to MORC. On May 9, 1989, MORC informed her that bids were required for physical plant changes for fire safety purposes. The process was ongoing as the state had accepted her offer to rent months earlier. She had affirmative duties to her lessee to enable persons with mental retardation to live at the premises. (Emphasis added.) To the extent that this statement relates to the State’s readiness to lease, Plaintiffs appear to be stating, contrary to their claim in the Complaint, that the State had already made a commitment to lease the Home and that the delay between commitment and the payment of rent was caused by necessary “physical plant changes for fire safety purposes.” This position is problematic. The record reveals that although MORC was interested in leasing the Home, it never expressed an unequivocal acceptance of Hammonds’s offer. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 57. In fact, the parties had not even reached the offer/acceptance stage. The undisputed evidence reveals that, before she purchased the Home, Hammonds had made a general proposal about the establishment of a group home to which the State responded favorably. The parties then began to focus on the feasibility of the lease in view of administrative restrictions imposed by the State on such residences. However, there is no mention in the record of a discussion between the parties of lease amounts or duration. The transaction appears to have been stymied by bureaucratic delays related to the physical configuration of the Home. In the May 9,1989 communication about physical modifications to the Home, referred to in the above quoted clause, Booth writes: We are progressing with developing a lease for your home. As part of fulfilling the lease commitment, bids are required for fire safety physical plant changes. The following contractors will be contacting you in the near future for property review as it pertains to the attached list of bid specifications. These contractors will submit to me their final bids. I will review and choose the low bidder. Work will commence when the lease has been fully approved. (Emphasis added.) This letter indicates that as of May 9 the State was only in the process of developing a lease for the Home. Before it could proceed, it needed to (a) have three listed contractors inspect the Home, (b) receive final bids from these contractors, and (c) choose the low bidder. Only at this point would the State be able to advance to the final stage of lease negotiation. In other words, as of May 9, 1989, only the preliminary steps of the leasing process had been completed. However, Hammonds claims that the State had promised that rental payments would commence by May 15, 1989. Plaintiffs have had a generous amount of time for discovery and are still unable to establish that MORC was ready and willing to lease the Home. This is an essential element of a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHAA. A seller should not be required to keep a home on the market without a contract while waiting for a prospective buyer to decide to purchase or lease it. The Plaintiffs’ status as a “protected group” does not magically alter this basic principle. As noted by the Second Circuit: A landlord in the private sector is entitled to choose whom he will accept as tenants as long as he does not discriminate on one of the statutorily condemned bases. Certainly he may seek assurance that prospective tenants will be able to meet their rental responsibilities. “[Tjhere is no requirement that welfare recipients, or any other individuals, may secure apartments ... without regard to their ability to pay.” Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d 1110, 1114 (2d Cir.) (quoting Male v. Crossroads Assoc., 469 F.2d 616, 622 (2d Cir. 1972)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896, 96 S.Ct. 197, 46 L.Ed.2d 129 (1975) (footnote and citation omitted). See also Dreher v. Rana Management, Inc., 493 F.Supp. 930, 934-35 (E.D.N.Y.1980) (noting that private landlord may enter into a superior economic arrangement even if that arrangement disproportionately affects minority tenants). The Court holds that Hammonds did not violate § 3604(f)(1). B. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 Plaintiffs next allege that the sale of the Home violated § 3605 which prohibits a person engaged in the real estate business from participating in discriminatory real estate transactions. The statute reads: It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, col- or, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3605. This statute does not apply to Hammonds. Although a real estate agent, Hammonds was acting in an exclusively personal posture when she bought and sold the Home. See supra. Section 3605, which applies to brokering, home loans, financial assistance, “redlining,” appraisals, and the secondary mortgage market, does not expand the coverage of the FHAA to reach persons acting in their personal capacity, even if those persons happen to be involved in the real estate business. Further, even if § 3605 did apply to Hammonds, the Court would not hold that Hammonds violated that section because it finds, as noted, that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against Hammonds. Thus, for the same reasons that the Court rejected the § 3604(f)(1) claim against Hammonds, it rejects the § 3605 claim as well. II. PARTICIPATION OF KERSTEN/TOWN & COUNTRY IN THE SALE Plaintiffs allege that Town & Country (1) is the real estate agency through which the Home was sold, thereby making it unavailable to Plaintiffs because of their handicaps, and (2) as a principal, is responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the allegedly discriminatory actions of Hammonds, its agent. As support for the argument that Town & Country assisted in the sale, Plaintiffs refer to the settlement statement and closing statement, both of which were printed on official Town & Country forms and were signed by John Kersten above the words, “John Kersten, Broker.” Plaintiffs add that even if the closing documents were signed in advance (which they do not admit), the forms provided official sanction for the allegedly illegal transfer. As noted, the evidence of record indicates that Town & Country did not in any way assist in the sale of the Home to the Ivanovics, and that Hammonds purchased the Home in her individual capacity. There were two distinct transactions in this case. First, the Hesters sold the Home to Hammonds (“sale 1”). Second, Hammonds sold the Home to the Ivanovics (“sale 2”). It is undisputed that sale 1 was consummated with the full assistance and participation of Town & Country. However, all evidence suggests that sale 2 was made without the participation or assistance of Town & Country. At the time of sale 2, the Home was not listed with Town & Country, Town & Country received no commission from the sale; the closing documents make no mention of Town & Country (indeed, no broker at all is mentioned). In addition, affidavits from Kersten and Hammonds indicate that neither Kersten nor Hammonds considered Town & Country to be in any way involved in the sale of the Home to the Ivanovics. The closing documents are the only evidence that Town & Country was involved in the sale. Several of these documents contain a Town & Country logo as well as the signature of Kersten. However, as noted by Town & Country, Transamerica prepared the closing documents for sale 2. Transamerica insures approximately 2000 sales per year on behalf of Town & Country, and thus the Town & Country documents are presigned by Kersten for the sake of convenience. In his affidavit, Bernard Youngblood, Detroit regional manager of Transamerica, states the following: “As a matter of course, in the numerous transactions in which our company insures title for customers of Century 21 Town & Country, John R. Kersten’s name is affixed as drafter of documents of conveyance.” This fact is further supported by the affidavit of Patricia Lisaius, manager of the Sterling Heights office of Transamerica. Plaintiffs do not dispute this point. In fact, Plaintiffs offer no solid evidence that Town & Country was involved in sale 2. Therefore, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ claim that Town & Country assisted in the sale of the Home to the Ivanovics. Plaintiffs’ next claim rests on the doctrine of respondeat superior. They say that Town & Country, as a principal, is responsible for the actions of Hammonds, its agent, whether or not it condoned or furthered this conduct. In support, Plaintiffs cite a string of cases standing for the proposition that a real estate agency (or like entity) is responsible for the discriminatory acts of its employees, even if the agency was innocent of the discriminatory acts. Green v. Century 21, 740 F.2d 460 (6th Cir.1984); Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir.1974); Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F.Supp. 291 (D.Md.1973); Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F.Supp. 1146 (N.D.Ill.1972); Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, Inc., 463 F.Supp. 27 (D.S.C.1978); Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortg. Co., 430 F.Supp. 893 (N.D.Ohio 1977). The Court agrees that a real estate agency is generally liable for the misdeeds of its agents. However, the facts of the above respondeat superior cases are distinguishable from the instant case. In the above cases, the discriminatory act occurred while the employee was acting in his official capacity as a real estate agent. In other words, liability was premised on a finding that the agent was acting within his authority and thus the agency had control over his acts. See Restatement (Second) Agency § 140; Marr, 503 F.2d at 742 (“As owner of the agency, Rife had at least the power to control the acts of his salesmen”); Bradley, 463 F.Supp. at 31 (“Thus an agent with [owner’s] authority could contract to sell a house and bind the principal”). In the instant case, however, there is no evidence to suggest that Hammonds was acting within her authority as agent when selling the Home to the Ivanovics. Nor is there any evidence that Town & Country had control over her acts. Rather, the evidence shows that Hammonds was acting wholly in her individual capacity. In this capacity, she was neither the agent of, nor controlled by, Town & Country. Therefore, the above cases are inapposite and Town & Country cannot be held liable as principal for the allegedly discriminatory act of Hammonds. Having found that Town & Country (1) did not participate in the sale of the Home to the Ivanovics and (2) was not acting as a principal in the transaction, the Court holds that Town & Country is not liable under § 3604(f)(1). III. PROTEST ACTIVITIES OF THE NEIGHBORS Plaintiffs make a series of claims against those persons living in the vicinity of the Home who engaged in protest activities and contributed money to purchase the home. This group includes: (1) Peggy Ba-bin; (2) Scott Babin; (3) Thomas Fortin; (4) Paul Hebert; (5) Nosh Ivanovic; and (6) Katrina Ivanovic. For ease of reference, the Court will refer to this group as “the Neighbors.” The Neighbors allegedly engaged in two distinct types of prohibited activity. First, they protested against the institution of a group home in their neighborhood by (a) distributing inflammatory material portraying negative incidents associated with group homes, (b) writing letters to Town & Country and MORC in opposition to the group home and soliciting others to write similar letters, (c) attempting to persuade Hammonds not to rent the Home to the State, and (d) allegedly threatening to picket Town & Country should Hammonds not desist in efforts to rent to the State. Second, they solicited, collected, and contributed money for the purpose of ensuring that the Ivanovics would purchase the Home. The Court will separately examine these activities. In this section, the Court examines only the protest activities of the Neighbors which, Plaintiffs say, violated § 3604(f)(1), § 3604(e), § 3604(c), and § 3617 of the FHA. A. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) Before addressing the substantive allegations against the Neighbors, the Court must determine whether the Neighbors are subject to claims under § 3604(f)(1). The relevant portion of § 3604(f)(1) states that it shall be unlawful to (1) discriminate in the sale or rental of a dwelling or (2) make unavailable a dwelling because of the prospective purchaser’s handicap. The first part of the section explicitly refers to those who discriminate in the sale or rental of a dwelling and therefore implicates only the owner of a dwelling or his agent. The second part of § 3604(f)(1) applies to those who “otherwise make unavailable” a dwelling. Although this phrase has been referred to as a “catchall,” Schwemm § 13.4(1), its scope is not limitless. By its terms, it is limited to those individuals who are in a position to make a dwelling unavailable. To be in this position, a person must be able to exercise influence over or control the disposition of the dwelling. Without this power, the person might be able to annoy a prospective tenant, but would be unable to make a dwelling unavailable. Plaintiffs, however, ask the Court to expand the meaning of “otherwise make unavailable” to encompass those who indirectly deprive a protected individual of housing. Under this interpretation, any person whose act eventually causes the denial of housing could be liable under the FHAA. For example, a competing buyer who outbids a member of a protected group would be liable under the statute in that he made the dwelling unavailable. Similarly, a journalist whose negative portrayal of retarded people might result in the denial of a dwelling to a retarded person would be liable in that he made the dwelling unavailable through his writing. Clearly, Congress did not intend to cause such a procrustean result. Rather, it intended the phrase “otherwise make unavailable” to cover only those persons who, though not an owner or his agent, are in a position directly to deny a member of a protected group his housing rights. Several courts have limited the application of § 3604(f)(1) to those persons who directly deprive of housing a member of a protected class. A Seventh Circuit decision, Burrell v. Kankakee, 815 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir.1987), found no FHA violation when a city allegedly failed to process rent subsidies on time. As one of several reasons, the court said: “In any event, plaintiffs claims are not cognizable under the Fair Housing Act since defendants’ conduct did not directly affect the availability of housing to minorities.” Id. at 1130-31. See also Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 784 F.Supp. 258 (E.D.Pa.1992) (noting that refusal by county to assume lease did not directly deny housing to mentally retarded adults and therefore did not violate the FHAA). In Devereux Foundation, Inc. v. O’Donnell, No. 89-6134, 1990 WL 2796, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 368 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 12, 1990), the district court discussed the reach of § 3604(f)(1). In that case, the plaintiff, a non-profit corporation providing residential and other services to handicapped persons, filed suit against, among others, the O’Donnells, a couple living adjacent to a home intended for use as a group home for five severely retarded adults. That couple had filed a petition for a Writ of Prohibition in Common Pleas court asserting that the Zoning Board, which had before it the plaintiff’s appeal of an adverse zoning ruling, should be precluded from acting on the appeal because it was untimely filed. The plaintiff alleged that the O’Donnells violated the plaintiff’s civil rights: [Bjecause of the O’Donnells’ discriminatory attitude towards retarded persons which is based upon prejudice, William and Karen O’Donnell have individually and acting as principals for the law firm of O’Donnell, Hagner and Williams, engaged in a variety of unlawful and unethical actions designed and intended to harass plaintiffs and persons doing business with plaintiffs with the purpose of preventing retarded persons from living next door to them. Id. 1990 WL 2796 at *2, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *5. The O’Donnells brought a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. They said that they were not proper parties under the FHAA. Specifically, they claimed that § 3604(f)(1) was intended to reach only those persons who rent, sell, or broker dwellings, as well as governmental agencies enforcing local laws concerning such sale or rental: “There is nothing in the FHAA, however, contend the O’Donnells and the law firm, which permits an action against them merely because they sought to prohibit the Zoning Hearing Board from acting beyond its jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s untimely appeal.” Id. 1990 WL 2796 at *5, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *9. In response, the plaintiff claimed that the O’Donnells’ action was unlawful under the FHAA because they made a dwelling unavailable because of a handicap: Plaintiff asserts that the “otherwise made unavailable” language in the statute indicates that Congress did not intend the FHAA to apply only to the sale or rental of dwellings; instead, the FHAA was intended to bar any acts which have the effect of preventing handicapped persons from residing in the community. Id. The court categorically rejected this argument and held that the O’Donnells were not subject to the proscriptions of the FHAA because their action — filing the petition with the zoning board — was not an integral part of or attendant to the sale or rental of property: The principal conduct forbidden by the original Fair Housing Act and accordingly the FHAA, however, is the refusal to sell or rent property to a person because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or a handicap. The “otherwise make unavailable” language contained in the statute has been applied by the courts to prohibit discriminatory practices attendant to the sale or rental of housing, such as discriminatory rental application procedures or advertising which encourages discrimination. Even the most expansive interpretations of the Fair Housing Act “do not extend coverage beyond entities that directly provide housing or those that are integrally involved in the sale or financing of real estate.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass’n, 674 F.Supp. 1313, 1320 (N.D.Ill.1987)). The court in Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass’n, 674 F.Supp. 1313 (N.D.Ill.1987), also examined the scope of § 3604(a). In Steptoe, a black home-seeker sued the Beverly Area Planning Association (“BAPA”), a private, not-for-profit corporation under the FHA. BAPA provided housing information only to persons making “nontraditional” moves, i.e., blacks moving to nonintegrated areas or whites moving to integrated areas. Plaintiffs contended that BAPA violated § 3604(a) by engaging in racial steering, thereby making a dwelling unavailable. The court, however, disagreed and held that BAPA did not violate § 3604(a) because it could not have affected the availability of housing: This court concludes, as a matter of law, that BAPA’s activities could not have affected the availability of housing in a manner implicating section 3604(a). First, BAPA could not have affected adversely the housing opportunities available to either blacks or whites because BAPA did not participate in or influence any commercial transactions: BAPA owns no real estate, is not a real estate agent or broker, is not associated with agents or brokers (entities that dominate the commercial housing market), and is not involved in the actual mechanics of sale or rental transactions. Steptoe, 674 F.Supp. at 1319. Although it noted that § 3604(a) is not limited to sellers of housing or their agents, the court said that that section does not reach wholly tangential entities: Cases holding that coverage under the Act is not limited to those who sell, rent, or finance real estate are not inconsistent with this conclusion. Even the most expansive interpretations of section 3604(a) do not extend coverage beyond those entities that directly provide housing or those that are integrally involved in the sale or financing of real estate. Id. at 1320. This Court agrees with the reasoning and conclusions of the Devereux and Steptoe courts. Section 3604(f)(1) covers only those actors who are in a position directly to make a dwelling unavailable — that is, a seller, his agent, or another person or entity integrally involved in the sale or financing of real estate. An expansion of the statute beyond this limit would contravene the language of § 3604(f)(1) as well as common sense. Because the Neighbors had no control over the Home, they could not and did not directly deprive Plaintiffs of housing. Therefore, they are not covered by § 3604(f)(1). The Court rejects all § 3604(f)(1) claims against the Neighbors. B. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) Plaintiffs claim that Defendants Scott and Peggy Babin, Hebert, Nosh and Katrina Ivanovic, and Thompson violated § 3604(e) by inducing or attempting to induce, for profit, the sale of the Home to the Ivanovics by representations concerning the entry of handicapped persons into the neighborhood. Section 3604(e) reads: it shall be unlawful— (e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e). Plaintiffs assert that the Babins, Ivanovics, and Hebert “profited” by maintaining their property values. Thompson allegedly tried to induce the sale to secure clients for his legal practice and generate business for his title insurance company. Congress created § 3604(e) specifically to prevent a process known as “blockbusting,” the solicitation by real estate agents of homeowners in a “transitional” neighborhood. The Sixth Circuit described blockbusting as follows: It is a well known fact that racial tensions and anxieties are generated when blacks move into previously all-white neighborhoods. It is also well known that many real estate agencies attempt to exploit such a situation by making repeated, uninvited solicitations for the sale of homes. In most instances, this activity (commonly referred to as “blockbusting”) has proven to be an effective means of stimulating the sale of homes in racially transitional neighborhoods. Heights Community Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 142-43 (6th Cir.1985), (quoting Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F.Supp. 1028, 1049 (E.D.Mich.1975), aff'd and remanded, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir.1977)) (emphasis added), cert. denied, Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. Cleveland Heights, 475 U.S. 1019, 106 S.Ct. 1206, 89 L.Ed.2d 318 (1986). To establish a § 3604(e) claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Defendants, (1) for profit, used the fear of the entrance of mentally retarded individuals into the neighborhood (2) to induce the sale of a dwelling (3) by making solicitations that would convey to the reasonable person the idea that members of a protected class are, or may be, entering the neighborhood. Heights, 774 F.2d at 141-42 (6th Cir.1985) (quoting Zuch v. Hussey, supra). Plaintiffs’ § 3604(e) claims fail because this section was intended by Congress to reach only real estate brokers and their agents. Every case addressing § 3604(e) has involved a real estate agent or a similar entity. See e.g., Heights, supra; United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S.Ct. 131, 38 L.Ed.2d 59 (1973); Steptoe, 674 F.Supp. at 1321; Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F.Supp. at 294. Congress clearly signalled this purpose by limiting the scope of § 3604(e) to inducements made “for profit.” Although the real estate agent need not actually receive a profit to fall under § 3604(e), Sanborn, 354 F.Supp. at 294 (quoting United States v. Mintzes, 304 F.Supp. 1305, 1311-12 (D.Md.1969)), the agent must intend to receive financial gain from the inducement of the sale. Schwemm § 17.2 (“The requirement [under § 3604(e) ] that the defendant’s representations be “for profit” simply means that they must be made while the salesperson was conducting business”). The Court is aware of no § 3604(e) decision in which the actual or expected profit was other than commission fees or other financial gain normally accruing to real estate brokers. Congress did not intend to reach beyond real-estate brokers and certainly did not intend that § 3604(e) be used to stifle social or political expression. “They [the words “for profit”] were evidently included in § 3604(e) to distinguish and eliminate from the operation of that subsection statements made in social, political or other contexts, as distinguished from a commercial context, where the person making the representations hopes to obtain some financial gain as a result of the representations.” Sanborn, 354 F.Supp. at 294. None of the Neighbors was operating in the commercial context. Rather, they were engaging in a social and political protest against the establishment of a group home. That one of several reasons for opposing this home was the fear of reduced property values is insufficient to convert that protest into a commercial transaction similar to that between a home seller and his real estate agent. Plaintiffs claim that Thompson benefited from the legal representation of individuals in Shelby Township and that he would benefit from the sale of property in that he owned a title company. Other than conclusory allegations, however, Plaintiffs offer no proof that Thompson benefited financially from the sale of the Home to the Ivanovics. In his affidavit, Thompson admits that he provided legal services to some of the persons involved in this lawsuit but adds that he never charged for his services. He further notes that as an owner of a title company it would be in his interest to encourage the sale of the Home to the State as this would be more likely to cause home sales in the immediate vicinity to increase. In other words, Thompson actually acted in a manner that resulted in the loss of potential profit. For these reasons, the Court finds that the Neighbors were not acting “for profit” within the meaning of § 3604(e) and therefore that their protest did not violate § 3604(e). C. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) Section 3604(c) states that it shall be unlawful: (c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). Plaintiffs charge that Peggy Babin, Scott Babin, Thompson, and Maguire violated this section. Peggy and Scott Babin prepared and distributed documents containing negative information about group homes and persons with developmental disabilities. Thompson “published opinions expressing a preference against persons with mental retardation,” presumably by speaking against group homes at the town meeting. Maguire represented to Peggy Babin, in private, that a group home would likely result in a decline in property values. Section 3604(c) prohibits the dissemination of discriminatory information “with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.” This phrase can be interpreted in two ways. It can be seen as limiting the reach of § 3604(c) only to discriminatory statements made by the owner or his agent. Under this interpretation, the phrase “with respect to” is given a narrow meaning and refers to the act of selling or renting a dwelling. However, it could also mean that the speaker need only make the statement about the house that is being sold/rented or that will be sold/rented. This second interpretation imputes a broader meaning to “with respect to.” The Court will adopt the former interpretation. Logically, only the discriminatory comments of a person selling/renting his dwelling, or an agent acting on behalf of that person, would have a direct influence on the disposition of the property. A discriminatory comment by an unrelated person, while offensive, would have little effect on whether the house was sold or rented to a member of a protected class. The purpose of § 3604(c) is to prevent expressions that result in the denial of housing, not to prevent all discriminatory expression. Stated another way, § 3604(c) prevents only potent expressions of discriminatory animus in housing. Congress cannot legislate against the discriminatory comments of those powerless over the housing transaction at issue. The administrative guideline for § 3604(c) clarifies its limited scope. The guideline says: “The prohibitions in this section shall apply to all written or oral notices or statements by a person engaged in the sale or rental of a dwelling.” Courts have generally acted consistently with this guideline by limiting the application of § 3604(c) to sellers or their agents. See Steptoe, 674 F.Supp. at 1321 n. 13 (if defendant not involved in commercial real estate transactions, his' statements cannot violate § 3604(c)); Woodward v. Bowers, 630 F.Supp. 1205, 1209 (M.D.Pa.1986) (“The legislative history indicates that by including the phrase ‘with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling’, Congress intended to reach the activities of ‘property owners, tract developers, real estate brokers, lending institutions, and all others engaged in the sale, rental, or financing of housing’ ”). In Heights Community Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 629 F.Supp. 1232 (N.D.Ohio 1983), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 774 F.2d 135 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1019, 106 S.Ct. 1206, 89 L.Ed.2d 318 (1986), the district court rejected a § 3604(c) claim against the buyer of a home on the ground that such an expansion would illogically punish a person who can do no harm to the protected buyer: Hence, section 3604(c) prohibits only statements by an owner or his agent that pertain to the selling or renting of his dwelling. The logic of distinguishing between an owner and a buyer of a dwelling is apparent. A prospective buyer of a dwelling is free to state a preference for living with persons of a particular “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” To prohibit such an utterance might deprive that person of his First Amendment right of free expression. Although his statement may reflect prejudice, the buyer is not able to impose his prejudice “with reference to the sale or rental of [that] dwelling” on others. But when an owner of a dwelling or his agent makes a statement to another person pertaining to the sale or rental of his property based on a “preference, limitation or discrimination based on race ...,” he is imposing that “preference based on race" on another person “with reference to the sale or rental of [that] dwelling.” Heights, 629 F.Supp. at 1295 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, based on precedent and common sense, the Court interprets § 3604(c) to apply only to owners and their agents. As none of the Defendants accused of violating § 3604(c) is an owner or his agent, the § 3604(c) claims will be rejected. D. First Amendment A review of the record reveals that the Neighbors expressed their opposition to the group home in a number of ways — through letter-writing, a town meeting, contact with the media, and discussions with various people in their personal or official capacities. These modes of expression implicate both free speech and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. The Neighbors protested against what they perceived to be an ill-advised decision on the part of the State to sponsor a group home in their neighborhood. The Supreme Court has consistently held that unless protest speech incites imminent lawlessness, it is protected by the First Amendment: [T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377-79, 47 S.Ct. 641, 649, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (J. Brandeis, concurring). The theory behind this “clear and present danger” test is that speech must be protected unless it deprives the listener of the ability rationally to judge the worth of the speech. This is so even if the speech attempts to persuade people to do something that the government considers harmful. See David Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 Col.L.R. 334, 335-36 (1991). The rationale underlying this theory is that unrestricted expression is crucial in a free society and should not be quelled simply because the government decides that it is undesirable. Rather, before a court may suppress undesirable expression, that .expression must be such as would result in imminent violence. Only at this point does the concern for safety supersede the concern for unrestricted expression. The Court has carefully reviewed the material used by the protesters to express their views. Although sometimes strongly worded and impassioned, it is not inflammatory and could not reasonably be construed as inciting imminent lawlessness. In reference to the April 29, 1989 meeting between Hammonds. and some of the Neighbors, Hammonds engaged in the following colloquy with Plaintiffs’ attorney: Q. Okay. What would you say the general tone of the meeting was? A. I don’t recall feeling threatened in any way. Q. Were any threats made to you at that meeting? A. No. Q. Did anybody ask you about your employer? A. No. Q. Did anybody— A. My employer was never brought up. Q. Did anybody say anything about picketing where you worked? A. Not as I recall. * * }. * ¡fc * Q. When you did read the packet later, what was your reaction? A. I don’t think I was affected by the packet at all. The Court has also had occasion to review the May 6, 1989 letter to Town & Country signed by a few of the Neighbors. That letter reads: We want you to be aware of the potential dangers of group homes. Please read the enclosed article “What to do about Billy.” Florence Hammonds recently bought a home at “2323 23 Mile Rd. and is possibly leasing the home to the State for a group home. We are appalled! We want you to be concerned. While this letter exhibits concern and perhaps misguided zeal, it cannot reasonably be termed threatening or intimidating. The only action that the writers request from Town & Country is that it be “concerned.” Another missive from the Neighbors to other persons in the neighborhood gives notice of a meeting and urges the recipients to write to MORC and Town & Country to express their concerns about the group home: Dangers of Group Homes Public Hearing May 12, 1989 at 7:00 PM Please Help Keep Our Neighborhood Safe!!! Please take a few minutes to read the following article and letters [outlining problems associated with group homes]. After reading these you will find a list of people to write and ASAP telephone if you are op