Full opinion text
DECISION AND ORDER LARIMER, District Judge. Agencies of the Government — just like ordinary citizens — must comply with the law regardless of whether it is inconvenient or burdensome to do so. Because I believe that the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense acted contrary to a statute recently passed by Congress governing the closure or realignment of military installations, I hereby issue an injunction in order to guarantee compliance with the law. This is an action for declaratory and in-junctive relief involving claims under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (“BRAC”), Pub.L. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 & 706(2), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army (sometimes collectively “the Secretary”) from taking any actions in connection with the elimination and reduction of missions or functions at the Seneca Army Depot (“SEAD” or “the base”) in Romulus, New York that would result in the elimination of hundreds of civilian positions at the base. This action was precipitated by the Secretary’s decision to change the nature of the work performed at SEAD. This change by any analysis is a major one which would eliminate approximately 70 percent of the authorized civilian positions at the base. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin this unilateral action by the Secretary on the grounds that the defendants acted in violation of BRAC and NEPA. In essence, plaintiffs claim that the Secretary is “realigning” SEAD without complying with the rigid procedures established by Congress in BRAC for the closure or realignment of military installations. Defendants oppose this action on the grounds that their actions are not subject to judicial review, and, alternatively, that BRAC and NEPA do not apply to the actions occurring at SEAD. Pending before me now is plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiffs’ motion is granted and a preliminary injunction will issue to bar the Army and the Department of Defense from carrying out the reductions at SEAD. HISTORY OP SEAD SEAD, which was built in 1941 and known originally as the Seneca Ordnance Depot, is an Army depot under the command of the Depot System Command (“DESCOM”), one of the subordinate commands of the Army Material Command (“AMC”). DESCOM is responsible for all the Army depots in the United States and abroad, and AMC is the major Army command responsible for the research, development, acquisition, and logistics for Army material. Historically, SEAD has had two primary missions or functions relating to: (1) special weapons; and (2) the rehabilitation of industrial plant equipment (“IPE”). The special weapons mission required SEAD to store, issue, maintain, and supply special weapons, such as ground-launched nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery shells, and conventional munitions, including bullets, bombs, and shells. There are 442 civilian and 387 military personnel positions associated with this mission. The IPE rehabilitation mission required SEAD to maintain and store industrial equipment, which consists, generally, of large machine tools used by the Department of Defense (“DOD”) industrial organizations and contractors, including depots, arsenals and ammunition plants. There are 143 civilian personnel positions associated with this mission. In addition, the 833d Ordnance Company, a munitions maintenance unit, was a tenant organization stationed at SEAD. Between 1990 and 1991, the DOD and the Army made several decisions that were intended to restructure SEAD. First, in 1990, the DOD planned a gradual reduction in its special weapons that was to start in 1991 and end in 1998. In March 1991, DOD determined the number of special weapons that it wanted to retain. Based on this determination, the Army concluded that its depot system’s special weapons missions should be reduced accordingly. AMC therefore ordered DESCOM to design a plan to consolidate the Army’s special weapons mission at a single site. The report submitted by DESCOM recommended the consolidation and storage of special weapons at a depot other than SEAD. Next, on July 25, 1991, Assistant Secretary of Defense Colin McMillan issued a memorandum ordering that all depot IPE maintenance functions be consolidated in Defense Logistics Agency (“DLA”) facilities. SEAD was not such a facility. DLA was scheduled to take the lead in coordinating with the Army the transfer of all IPE depot maintenance workloads to DLA facilities. The consolidation of IPE maintenance was expected to result in the elimination of 122 civilian positions at SEAD by October 1, 1992. Finally, the 833d Ordnance Company was scheduled to be inactivated on September 14, 1992. The inactivation was expected to result in the loss of approximately 75 military positions at SEAD. In light of the proposed actions, on August 27, 1991, AMC directed DESCOM to conduct a study under Army Regulation (“AR”) 5-10, which specified the procedures that had to be followed and the documentation that would be required before the Army reduced its civilian employment by 50 persons or 10%, whichever was less. The study’s focus was on the DESCOM missions and workloads that would be affected by a reduced special weapons mission, a consolidation of IPE rehabilitation work, and the inactivation of the 833d Ordnance Company. A study team was subsequently organized to begin collecting data. Not long after the study began, however, President George Bush made a significant announcement concerning this country’s use of nuclear weapons. This announcement, which reflected historic international agreements with the Soviet Union, would have significant impact on this country’s arsenal of nuclear weapons. President Bush announced “a series of sweeping initiatives affecting every aspect of our nuclear forces on land, on ships, and on aircraft.” Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion (“Defendants’ Mem.”) at 13 (quoting Address to the Nation on Reducing U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Weapons (Weekly Comp.Pres.Doc.) 1346, 1349 (Sept. 27, 1991)). As part of these initiatives President Bush directed that “the United States eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched ... nuclear weapons.” Id. (alterations in original). Following President Bush’s announcement, defendant Richard Cheney, the Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum dated September 28, 1991, directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Undersecretaries of Defense and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control Communications and Intelligence to implement the President’s decision. The memorandum ordered that the following actions be completed as soon as possible: 1. The United States armed forces shall eliminate its inventory of ground-launched theater nuclear weapons. 2. Tactical nuclear weapons shall be removed from all surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft bases. 3. United States strategic bombers shall stand down from their alert postures and their nuclear weapons shall be removed and stored in secure areas. 4. The United States intercontinental ballistic missiles scheduled for deactivation under the terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty shall stand down from alert. 5. Development of the mobile Peacekeeper ICBM rail garrison system and the mobile portions of the small ICBM program shall be terminated. 6. The nuclear short-range attack missile program (SRAM-II) shall be terminated. 7. A unified Command Plan with a United States Strategic Command to which all elements of the U.S. strategic deterrent are to be assigned shall be submitted to [the Secretary]. Declaration of Robert O. Frantz, Ex. A. As a result of the President’s announcement and the Secretary’s implementing directives, the prior decisions concerning the realignment of SEAD’s special weapons mission were scrapped. It was then determined, according to defendants, that rather than “realign” the special weapons mission, the mission or function was to be eliminated completely. Consequently, AMC ordered DESCOM to change the focus of the AR 5-10 study that had been ordered earlier to account for this change concerning the special weapons mission at SEAD. DESCOM’s study team submitted a preliminary AR 5-10 report on October 31, 1991. According to defendants, AMC found that the report was not properly conducted according to Army regulations. Consequently, AMC compiled additional information and performed further, analysis to ensure that the final report conformed to all AR 5-10 requirements. Defendants claim that as part of this analysis, AMC’s Base Realignment and Closure Office analyzed whether BRAC procedures had to be followed. The decision was that BRAC did not apply to the proposed actions for SEAD. AMC subsequently completed the AR 5-10 report and submitted it to the Army on December 16, 1991. The Army reviewed the final report and performed additional analysis. It concurred in the report’s findings and recommendations. In addition, according to defendants, Congressman Frank Horton of New York requested that the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) review the Army’s proposals concerning SEAD before a final decision was made. The GAO reviewed the proposal and, allegedly, concurred with it. On July 2, 1992, the Secretary of the Army approved the recommendations which changed the functions and missions of the base, with the resulting immediate termination of approximately 560 civilian employees. The Army’s plan included the elimination of the special weapons mission at SEAD and a large-scale reduction and relocation of the IPE rehabilitation function. The elimination of the special weapons mission resulted in the elimination of 442 civilian and 387 military positions at SEAD. In addition, SEAD was scheduled to be downgraded from a “depot” to a “depot activity.” According to plaintiffs, as a result of this downsizing, the number of civilian personnel authorized at SEAD will drop from 847 to 285 — a reduction of nearly 70 percent — and the number of military employees will drop from 487 to 3. Also on July 2, 1992, defendant Susan Livingstone, an Assistant Secretary of the Army, briefed a delegation of New York Congressmen on the AR 5-10 study and the Army’s plans to eliminate civilian positions at SEAD. The Army also advised SEAD civilian employees of their rights under reduction-in-force (“RIF”) procedures, and it notified those employees who would be adversely affected by the RIFs of their entitlement to participate in the Priority Placement Program (“PPP”), and voluntary assistance programs. In addition, the Army obtained approval to allow early retirements under the Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (“VERA”), and communities affected by a RIF would be allowed to participate in a number of assistance programs sponsored by the federal government. According to defendants, as of June 30, 1992, the movement of all special weapons from Europe was complete, and as of July 30, 1992, the special weapons storage mission of SEAD was eliminated. The Army is currently in the process of phasing out military positions associated with SEAD’s special weapons mission. PROCEDURAL HISTORY . Plaintiffs • commenced this action and moved for a preliminary injunction by an Order to Show Cause on September 9, 1992. Oral argument on plaintiffs’ motion was held on October 1, 1992. Then, on October 6,1992, President Bush signed into law the 1993 Defense Appropriations Act (“Appropriations Act”). Pub.L. No. 102-396 (1992). The Senate Report that accompanied the Appropriations-Act, S.Rep. No. 408, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1992), contained the following language concerning the Army’s actions at Seneca: The committee is concerned by the piece-by-piece dismantlement of Seneca Army Depot. Therefore, the Committee prohibits the use of any DOD funds to plan for, or implement, the transfer, realignment, alteration, or downsizing of any mission or activity at Seneca Army Depot except as part of the base realignment and closure process. The joint Conference Report, however, did not contain any language about SEAD, nor did the Appropriations Act itself. The parties were directed to brief the issue as to whether the language in the Senate Report had any effect on the pending litigation. On October 9, 1992, apparently in response to the language in the Senate Report, defendant Michael Stone, Secretary of the Army, issued a press release declaring that the civilian reductions-in-force scheduled to be effective at SEAD on November 13,1992 instead would be effective no earlier than February 11, 1993. The Court held argument after issuance of the press release to clarify its ramifications. Defendants’ counsel confirmed that the RIF would be postponed to a daté no earlier than February 11, 1993, and that the time within which to select early retirement would be similarly postponed, although no exact date for selection was set. Defendants also asserted that participation in the PPP could not be postponed or deadlines extended for those who elected to participate because the program was in effect nationwide and employees at SEAD could not be given a preference. DISCUSSION 1. Contentions of the Parties. Plaintiffs claim in this action that defendants cannot reduce the civilian work force at SEAD on such a large scale without following the process and procedures established by BRAC. Plaintiffs also contend that even if defendants were not bound by BRAC, their actions were still improper because they failed to comply with the requirements of NEPA. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that defendants were required to assess and study the impact their actions would have on the human environment and were obligated to -mitigate such impact. Defendants, in response, contend that their actions are not subject to judicial review. Specifically, defendants contend that their decision that the provisions of BRAC do not apply, and the decisions taken as a result of that are not subject to judicial review because such review would unduly interfere with the duties and responsibilities of the President as Commander-In-Chief. Therefore, the defendants argue, this action presents a nonjusticiable political question. Defendants further contend that Congress intended to preclude judicial review in the circumstances that exist here. On the merits, defendants contend that their determination that BRAC does not apply is clearly correct because the reductions do not fit within the statutory requirements or are exempt under BRAC’s provisions. Therefore, defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction. 2. History of the Base Closure and Realignment Process: In 1990, in response to the need for a fair and timely process for closing and realigning military installations, Congress enacted BRAC. BRAC is the latest in a series of congressional attempts to regulate the complete or partial closure of military installations. It is the interpretation of BRAC that is at the heart of the dispute between the parties. Congress’s first legislative attempt to permanently regulate the process occurred in 1977, when it enacted 10 U.S.C. § 2687. At that time, section 2687 prohibited the Secretary of Defense from closing or realigning any military installation, unless he first: (1) notified the Senate and House Armed Services Committees of the installations selected for closure or realignment; and (2) submitted to those committees an evaluation of the consequences of the closure or realignment. The Secretary had to wait at least 60 days before taking action on the closures, during which time Congress could act to prevent the closure or realignment. Congress enacted this provision, in part, because many Congressmen had come to believe that the Executive branch was using its base-closure power to punish uncooperative legislators. See 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President (hereinafter “1991 Commission Report”) at 1-1. Under the 1977 version of section 2687, however, no bases were closed for the next eleven years. Because of the deadlock created by section 2687, Congress, in 1988, enacted the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988) (the “1988 Act”), the immediate predecessor to BRAC. Under the 1988 Act, the Secretary of Defense no longer had the power to unilaterally choose which bases to close or realign. Instead, that power was vested in an independent commission that was to recommend bases for closure and realignment, and present those recommendations to the Secretary to either accept or reject the entire list of bases selected. If the Secretary approved the recommendations, Congress had 45 days within which to overrule the Secretary and reject the base closure recommendations. The 1988 Act, however, did not establish a permanent process for closing or realigning military installations. Rather, it created a one-time exception to the process created in 1977 by section 2687. In 1990, the Secretary of Defense proposed another round of closures. The Secretary’s recommendations, however, raised some suspicions in Congress “about the integrity of the base closure selection process.” H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 923, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 705, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2931, 3110, 3257. In fact, the House Report went so far as to note that “Secretary Cheney’s announcement of candidates for base closure on January 29, 1990, was an example of the wrong way to close bases.” H.Rep. No. 665, 101st Cong, 2d Sess. 341-42, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2931, 3067. As a result, Congress enacted BRAC in 1990. Its stated purpose was “to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations in the United States.” BRAC § 2901(b). Under BRAC, there are scheduled to be three rounds of base closures and realignments, commencing in the years 1991, 1993, and 1995. The procedure for closure and realignment are similar to the procedures created in the 1988 Act. An independent commission is required to convene in the years scheduled for base closures, and it is to review a list of installations that the Secretary has recommended for closure or realignment. In addition, the Secretary is required to submit to Congress and the Commission, for the fiscal years 1992,1994, and 1996, a six-year force structure plan based on the assessment of probable threats to national security, § 2903(a). The Secretary is also required to publish in the Federal Register, for public notice and comment, criteria to be used by DOD in making its recommendations for base closure or realignment. § 2903(b). Once the Commission receives the recommendations of the Secretary, it is required to conduct public hearings. § 2903(d)(1). The Commission can deviate from the recommendations of the Secretary if the Secretary’s proposal deviates from the force structure plan, and the Secretary’s final criteria. § 2903(d)(2)(B). The Commission must then transmit its recommendations, along with a report explaining the recommendations that differ from those proposed by the Secretary, to the President for his review. §§ 2903(d)(2)(A) & (d)(3). The President must then transmit to the Commission his report either accepting or rejecting, in whole or in part, the Commission's recommendations. § 2903(e)(1). If the President approves the Commission’s recommendations, he must also transmit to Congress a copy of the recommendations. § 2903(e)(2). If the President disapproves the recommendations, the Commission must then submit a revised recommendation to the President for his consideration. § 2903(e)(3). If the President approves the revised list, he must transmit a copy of the revised recommendations to Congress. § 2903(e)(4). If the President fails to send his list of recommended base closures to Congress by September 1 of any year in which the Commission sent him recommendations for closure, the base closure process for that year is terminated and no bases may be closed. § 2903(e)(5). Also, the Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment recommended by the Commission if Congress enacts, within 45 days after the President transmitted the recommendations to it, a joint resolution disapproving such recommendations. § 2904(b). BRAC, like the 1988 Act, contains a provision exempting the participants in the BRAC process from the requirements of NEPA. BRAC provides that: “The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) shall not apply to the actions of the President, the Commission, and except as provided in paragraph (2), the Department of Defense in carrying out this part.” § 2905(c)(1). The exception referenced in the above section provides that: The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall apply to actions of the [DOD] under this part (i) during the process of property disposal, and (ii) during the process of relocating functions from military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation after the receiving installation has been selected but before the functions are relocated. § 2905(c)(2)(A). The base closure and realignment process under BRAC for 1991 began in April, 1991, when the Secretary submitted to the Commission his list of military installations that he recommended should be closed or realigned. SEAD was not one of the installations on the Secretary’s list. After the Secretary’s recommendations were reviewed by the Commission, it transmitted its list of bases recommended for closure or realignment to President Bush, who approved all the recommendations. SEAD was not included in this list either. A proposal to disapprove the Commission’s recommendations was defeated in Congress. Consequently, the Secretary was then authorized to commence closing and realigning the installations recommended by the Commission. 3. Justiciability. The threshold issue in this action is one of justiciability. Defendants contend that this Court lacks authority to review their actions. They contend that the matters in dispute relate to the conduct of foreign and military affairs and are, therefore, not reviewable by the judiciary since those functions are peculiarly within the province of the Executive branch. Defendants suggest that plaintiffs’ remedy, if any, lies in either the Legislative or Executive branch of Government and that plaintiffs should seek redress there rather than through the judicial process. Implicit in this argument is defendants’ reliance on the so-called political question doctrine. I am not persuaded by defendants’ contentions that this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the dispute between these parties. The dispute essentially involves an interpretation of an act of Congress. There may well be certain decisions made by the President and the independent Commission that are not subject to judicial review, but the decision at issue here, that is, the Secretary’s unilateral decision that BRAC did not apply, is certainly subject to judicial review. It is certainly true, as defendants argue, that “unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.” Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530, 108 S.Ct. 818, 825, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988). Issues bearing directly on our national security and foreign policy have long been recognized as within the “province and responsibility of the Executive.” Id. at 529, 108 S.Ct. at 825 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 2775, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981)). This deference to the Executive in his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and to a lesser extent to Congress with its “power of the purse,” is premised on the recognition that judgment-calls or policy decisions on issues relating to national security or foreign policy are best left to those with expertise in the area and to the “branches of government which are periodically subject to electoral accountability.” Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 2446, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). See also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14-5, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 2326, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972). “The Judiciary,” the Supreme Court has noted, “is particularly ill suited to make such decisions, as ‘courts are fundamentally undere-quipped to formulate national policies or develop standards for matters not legal in nature.’ ” Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (quoting United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1379 (D.C.Cir.1981) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 999, 102 S.Ct. 1630, 71 L.Ed.2d 865 (1982)). But certainly not every matter concerning the military or touching on politics requires the judiciary to stay its hand. Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230, 106 S.Ct. at 2866. Although executive decisions relating to foreign relations are generally not subject to judicial review, “[i]t is ‘error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.’ ” Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 82 S.Ct. 691, 707, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). Similarly, “[t]he fact that one facet of a decisionmak-ing process involves an exercise of discretion concerning military affairs does not insulate all aspects of that process from judicial review.” Specter v. Garrett, 971 F.2d 936, 954 (3d Cir.1992), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3266 (Sept. 17, 1992) (No. 92-485). See also Falk v. Secretary of the Army, 870 F.2d 941, 944 (2d Cir.1989) (noting that it is now agreed that the judiciary has jurisdiction to decide whether the Secretary of the Army exceeded or disregarded the powers Congress has delegated to him). Furthermore, it has long been recognized that “when presented with claims of judicially cognizable injury resulting from military intrusion into the civilian sector, federal courts are fully empowered to consider claims of those asserting such injury; there is nothing in our Nation’s history ... that can properly be seen as giving any indication that actual or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military would go unnoticed or unremedied.” Laird, 408 U.S. at 15-6, 92 S.Ct. at 2327. Indeed, the power of the Judiciary to review activities of the military that are alleged to be in direct violation of the law exists even if the military believes it was acting lawfully in times of war. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 66 S.Ct. 606, 90 L.Ed. 688 (1946) (Habeas corpus petition granted in favor of civilian petitioners imprisoned pursuant to military trials held during period of martial law, in the then Territory of Hawaii, following attack on Pearl Harbor because the military exceeded its authority by closing the civil courts), and Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 12, 93 S.Ct. at 2446. The mere fact that the Executive is acting in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, without more, is an insufficient basis to bar review of a claim that the actions were unlawful. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (upholding injunction against President Truman’s seizure of the nation’s steel mills). When the issues presented by an action involve interpreting congressional legislation and protecting rights believed to have been infringed by an administrative agency’s failure to comply with that legislation, the Judiciary is empowered to review the controversy. See 5 U.S.C. § 702. Indeed, in a matter such as the one involving SEAD, which revolves essentially around issues of statutory interpretation, the controversy is especially appropriate for review, for “it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts.” Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230, 106 S.Ct. at 2866. The Judiciary’s role is not curtailed simply because the statute in question touches on matters traditionally regarded as belonging in the province of the Executive. Once Congress, acting within the bounds of its constitutional authority, enacts legislation that prescribes or prohibits certain conduct on the part of an administrative agency, it is within the power of the Judiciary, under the right of review granted under the APA, to address whether the agency has complied with the requirements established by Congress. In Japan Whaling, the Supreme Court squarely addressed this issue. There, the Court was confronted with the question whether under the Pelly and Packwood Amendments, the Secretary of Commerce was required to certify that Japan’s whaling practices diminished the effectiveness of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling because Japan’s annual harvest exceeded the quotas established under the Convention. Petitioners, the Japan Whaling Association, challenged the Court’s authority to even address the question, on the ground that the issue was a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court rejected petitioners argument noting that, “under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones.” Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230, 106 S.Ct. at 2866. In the context of BRAC, the issue of justiciability was discussed at length by the Third Circuit in Specter v. Garrett, 971 F.2d at 953, a decision relating to the closure of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. Plaintiffs in that case claimed, in part, that the Government failed to follow proper procedures under BRAC in arriving at the decision to close the installation. Defendants, a group that included the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense, argued that the court was barred from reviewing the matter because the plaintiffs’ claims were nonjusticiable political questions. The Third Circuit, relying on Japan Whaling, disagreed, noting that “while it is not the role of the courts to disturb policy decisions of the political branches, the question of whether an agency has acted in accordance with a statute is appropriate for judicial review.” Specter, 971 F.2d at 954. The issues raised here, like those in Specter, concern whether or not the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army have acted in accordance with BRAC. Plaintiffs contend that defendants were required to go through the base closure and realignment process established by BRAC before implementing the reductions at SEAD. Defendants, in response, contend that BRAC does not apply because of the nature of the reductions and because of the changes in functions at SEAD. In defendants’ view, because the so-called special weapons function has been eliminated pursuant to President Bush’s directive, BRAC’s procedures do not apply. Thus, at bottom, this action calls upon the court to engage in the quintessential judicial function of statutory interpretation; namely, whether BRAC applies to the defendants’ actions, and, if so, whether defendants have acted in violation of the Act. As was the case in both Japan Whaling and Specter, the issues raised by this case are appropriate for judicial review. 4. Judicial Review Under the APA. I turn next to defendants’ contention that this court lacks the authority to hear this action because Congress intended to preclude all judicial review under BRAC. Defendants contend that Congress’s intent to preclude review is demonstrated not only by the legislative history of the Act, but also by the Act’s objectives and the structure of the statutory scheme it created. Defendants focus, in particular, on the fact that BRAC represents a delicate compromise between the Executive and Legislative branches. They contend that this “balance” would be upset if the Judiciary were allowed to intervene. I disagree. Judicial review under the APA was intended to address precisely the type of alleged non-compliance with specific statutory provisions which plaintiffs argue exist here, see Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675-77, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 2138-39, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (attack on validity of administrative regulation was reviewable), and defendants have not overcome the presumption of judicial review created by the APA. Not only have defendants failed to point to any expressed intent by Congress in BRAC or its legislative history to bar review of the type of claims brought here, but the statutory scheme created by BRAC weighs in favor of, and not against, allowing judicial review. If the Department of Defense were allowed to circumvent the base closure and realignment process simply by asserting that its actions do not fall under BRAC, the Act would be rendered meaningless, and the balance between the Legislative and Executive branches would be destroyed. I find that the APA does apply to this action. First, the actions of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army constitute the actions of their respective agencies. See Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. at 2866 n. 4. In addition, because defendants have already begun the process of reducing SEAD, there has been final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy at law. Finally, plaintiffs’ action is essentially one to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be — arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” or, alternatively, “without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A) & (D). “The ‘right of action’ in such cases is expressly created by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which states that ‘final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in court [is] subject to judicial review,’ § 704, at the behest of ‘[a] person ... adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action.’ ” Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. at 2866 n. 4. (alterations in original). No separate indication of congressional intent to create a private right of action is necessary. Id. Rather, there is a presumption in favor of judicial review that can be rebutted only if there is “clear and convincing” evidence of legislative intent to preclude review. See e.g. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2453, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984). The clear and convincing evidence requirement is not meant in the strict evidentiary sense, but rather as “a useful reminder to courts that, where substantial doubt about the congressional intent exists, the general presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is controlling.” Id. at 351, 104 S.Ct. at 2456. The presumption in favor of judicial review is strong and well-established. The Supreme Court has noted that “judicial review of a final agency action will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the intent of Congress.” Bowen, 476 U.S. at 670, 106 S.Ct. at 2135 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (citing cases)). Indeed, as the Court noted in Bowen, Committees of both Houses of Congress have endorsed this view. During the congressional term that resulted in the passage of the APA, the Senate Judiciary Committee commented: Very rarely do statutes withhold judicial review. It has never been the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its own statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of authority granted or to the objectives specified. Its policy could not be otherwise, for in such a case statutes would in effect be blank checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or board. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 670, 106 S.Ct. at 2136 (quoting S.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)). These sentiments were echoed by the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, which stated: The statutes of Congress are not merely advisory when they relate to administrative agencies, any more than in other cases. To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure to provide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent to withhold review. 476 U.S. at 671, 106 S.Ct. at 2136 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946)). . “Whether and to what extent a particular statute precludes judicial review is determined not only from its express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved.” Block, 467 U.S. at 345, 104 S.Ct. at 2453. In addition, congressional intent to preclude review may be inferred from contemporaneous judicial construction barring review and congressional acquiescence in it. Id. at 349, 104 S.Ct. at 2455. Thus, the task at hand is to examine BRAC's express language, legislative history, objectives, and statutory scheme “to determine whether Congress precluded all judicial review, and, if not, whether Congress nevertheless foreclosed review to the class to which the [plaintiffs] belong.” Id. at 345-46, 104 S.Ct. at 2454 (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S.Ct. 832, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, J.)). In Specter, the Third Circuit considered whether Congress intended to preclude all review under BRAC. The Court engaged in an extensive issue-specific analysis of the availability of judicial review under BRAC. The Third Circuit began its discussion by noting two types of decisions under BRAC that were not subject to review. “We think it can be said with confidence,” the court wrote, “that Congress intended no judicial review of decisions under the Act prior to the effective date of the President’s decisions ...” and “of the manner in which the President has exercised his discretion in selecting bases for closure.” Specter, 971 F.2d at 945-46. But, the fact that review was precluded under certain portions of the Act did not foreclose review under other portions of the Act; the Court then proceeded to conduct an issue-specific analysis of reviewability. Id. The Specter Court ultimately concluded that “[w]here the plaintiffs ask the court to substitute its political and military judgment for that of the Secretary and the Commission, their claims are not reviewable,” but that “the plaintiffs do, however, ask for judicial review of issues that the judiciary is entirely competent to address.” Id. at 953. The claims that the court found reviewable included the claim that the Commission violated the provisions of the Act by holding closed-door meetings with the Navy before deciding which bases to recommend for closure, and the claim that the Secretary of Defense failed to meet his statutory obligation to create and transmit to the Commission and the GAO an administrative record containing all of the information he relied upon in making his recommendations. I find the analysis and holding in Specter to be persuasive. A review of BRAC reveals that there is nothing in its express language that would preclude review in this case, and defendants do not contend otherwise. Nor is there anything in BRAC’s legislative history that would suggest that Congress intended to foreclose all judicial review of actions relating to the BRAC process. The reference in the House Conference Report to certain decisions which are beyond judicial review is, as the court in Specter found, certainly not clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent to preclude all review under the Act. At most, a “fair reading [of the Report] reveals only an intent to preclude judicial review to the extent that there is not yet ‘final agency action’ to review.” Specter, 971 F.2d at 949. Defendants contend that Congress’s failure to include a specific judicial review provision in BRAC indicates an intent to preclude review. According to defendants, Congress was aware that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had held in June 1990, in National Federation of Federal Employees v. U.S. (“NFFE”), 905 F.2d 400, that plaintiffs in that action did not have standing to challenge the decision of the Secretary and the Commission to close or realign bases under the 1988 Base Closure and Realignment Act. This contention is without merit. Although defendants are correct that an intent to preclude review can be inferred from a contemporaneous judicial decision barring review and congressional acquiescence in it, the reviewability issue raised in NFFE and the issue raised in this action are sufficiently different that even if I were to assume that Congress acquiesced in the NFFE decision, I could not infer that Congress intended to bar review here. In NFFE, unlike the situation in this action, the decision on the base closures and realignments that plaintiffs were challenging were made properly in accord with the procedures of the 1988 Act. Thus, in NFFE the plaintiffs’ APA claim would have required the court to decide whether the Commission’s recommendations were sound. In other words, in that case, “judicial review of the decisions of the Secretary and the Commission would necessarily involve second-guessing the Secretary’s assessment of the nation’s military force structure and the military value of the bases within that structure.” 905 F.2d at 406. In this case, however, the issue is not whether the Secretary’s decision is militarily sound, but whether it was made in accordance with the requirements of BRAC. The distinction is crucial, because even if Congress intended to bar the type of claims raised in NFFE, that fact alone does not give rise to clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to bar claims of noncompliance with the Act itself. Finally, contrary to defendants’ contention, the statutory framework created by BRAC reflects Congress’s intent to allow judicial review of the type of claims raised here. When Congress enacted BRAC, the House Conference Report noted that there were two principal failures with the old system of base closures and realignments. The conferees prescribe a new base closure process because closures and realignments under existing law have two failings. First closures and realignments take a considerable period of time and involve numerous opportunities for challenges in court. Second, the list of bases for study transmitted by Secretary Cheney on January 29, 1990, raised suspicions about the integrity of the base closure selection process. A new process involving an independent, outside commission will permit base closures to go forward in a prompt and rational manner. H.R.Conf. No. 923 at 705, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2931, 3257. In addition, BRAC itself states that “[t]he purpose of the this part is to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.” § 2901(b) (emphasis added). These concerns led Congress to create a statutory scheme that prescribed specific procedural requirements for the base closure and realignment process. These procedural requirements gave the Secretary, the President, an independent BRAC Commission, and Congress some degree of discretion in the process. But it also stripped the Secretary of his unilateral authority to recommend military installations for closure and stripped Congress of its ability to block individual closures and realignments. Thus, two of BRAC’s consequences were to create a system of shared power in which the ability of the Secretary to unilaterally decide to close or realign a base or of Congress to thwart the closing of a base was diminished, and to create an exclusive means for closing and realigning bases. Plaintiffs claim here that, in spite of the balance of power created by BRAC, the Secretary unilaterally decided to virtually close SEAD after having determined that BRAC did not apply to the SEAD situation. In other words, plaintiffs contend that the Secretary illegally circumvented the BRAC process. Thus, unlike the case in which the Secretary uses the BRAC process and is then challenged on the ground that he did not comply with all of the procedural requirements of BRAC — which is, in part, what the plaintiffs in Specter charged— this action presents an even more basic question: were the defendants required to go through the exclusive BRAC process before taking the actions they did concerning SEAD. Nothing in the Act or the legislative history even remotely suggests that judicial review in such a circumstance would be precluded. Indeed, it would be contrary to the purposes of the APA to allow the actions of an administrative agency, such as the Department of Defense, to escape judicial review simply because the agency declared that it had complied with its statutory obligations or that the statute did not apply at all. The APA’s review provision was intended to ensure agency compliance with relevant statutory obligations. In challenging defendants’ actions, plaintiffs seek to protect the integrity of BRAC and to prevent defendants from circumvénting the procedures and requirements of BRAC. Allowing judicial review in this case would ensure that the Secretary acted within his statutory authority. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. S.E.C., 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C.Cir.1979) (judicial review under NEPA will ensure SEC’s statutory duties are implemented). In sum, defendants have failed to demonstrate that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of the type of claims raised in this action. Therefore, I find that this court has the authority to review this action under the APA. 6 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) and (D). 5. The Merits. I turn finally to the issue that lies at the heart of this motion: whether defendants should be preliminarily enjoined from proceeding with the restructuring at SEAD, and the concomitant reductions in civilian personnel. The standard for granting a preliminary injunction in this Circuit is, of course, well-known and long standing. “The issuance of a preliminary injunction requires the showing of ‘(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.’ ” Communications Workers of America v. Nynex Corp, 898 F.2d 887, 891 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam)). A; Irreparable Harm Plaintiffs contend that they will suffer irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is not granted because hundreds of civilian employees will be discharged or forced to transfer to jobs outside of Seneca County, local businesses will lose government contracts and income generated by SEAD, and SEAD will lose the opportunity to obtain new missions, thereby assuring that it will be downsized without having been fairly assessed in the BRAC process. Plaintiffs also contend that if defendants are not now enjoined from proceeding with the reductions, this Court will be unable to render a meaningful decision on the merits. Defendants disagree arguing that preliminary relief will not prevent the harm that plaintiffs allege they will suffer, nor preserve the status quo because SEAD’s special weapons mission was eliminated on July 31, 1992, Declaration of James Davidson (“Davidson Deel.”) at ¶ 18, SEAD is no longer receiving any new IPE rehabilitation work, and, in their view, neither mission can be revived. Defendants also contend that the threat of irreparable harm from the reduction-in-force has been diminished, if not eliminated, because the effective date of the RIF has been postponed by order of Secretary Stone to a date no earlier than February 11, 1993. In addition, defendants note that preliminary injunctive relief is generally inappropriate in Government personnel cases, and that plaintiffs have an adequate and exclusive remedy for their challenge to the. RIFs under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”), Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. Ill et seq. (codified, as amended, in various sections of 5 U.S.C.). Finally, defendants contend that plaintiffs have exaggerated both the extent of any harm that they may suffer and the extent to which a preliminary injunction can provide relief. “An injunction should issue only where the intervention of a court of equity ‘is essential in order effectually to protect property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable.’ ” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1803, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456, 39 S.Ct. 142, 143, 63 L.Ed. 354 (1919)). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction,” the Eleventh Circuit has noted, “is to prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits.” United States v. State of Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450, 1459 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1287, 94 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). “ ‘Perhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a demonstration that if it is not granted the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered.’ ” Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co. Corp., 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir.1983) (quoting 11 Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2948 at 431 (1973) (footnote omitted)). Accord Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir.1990). Whether a particular harm is irreparable turns on its imminence and the lack of an adequate remedy at law. See Reuters, 903 F.2d at 907 (citations omitted) (“Irreparable harm must be shown by the moving party to be imminent, not remote or speculative, and the alleged injury must be one incapable of being fully remedied by monetary damages.”). Finally, “[i]n making the determination of irreparable harm, both harm to the parties and to the public may be considered.” Long Island R.R. Co. v. International Assoc. of Machinists, 874 F.2d 901, 910 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1042, 110 S.Ct. 836, 107 L.Ed.2d 831 (1990). Although courts have traditionally expressed a reluctance to issue a preliminary injunction in Government employee discharge cases, see Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 84, 94 S.Ct. 937, 950, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974), there are circumstances that “may so far depart from the normal situation that irreparable injury might be found.” Id. at 92 n. 68, 94 S.Ct. at 953 n. 68. This case, which is much more involved than the usual garden-variety employee-discharge case, presents such an extraordinary circumstance. Several factors support this conclusion. First, although the RIF has been postponed, there is no indication that it will be cancelled. Moreover, despite the postponement, offers under the DOD’s priority placement program are still continuing. Under the PPP, civilian employees registered to participate in the program were or soon will be required to decide, within 72 hours of receiving a job offer, whether they will accept the offer. If an employee declines the offer she will lose a variety of benefits, including severance and unemployment benefits, and, in some cases, the right to further participate in the PPP program. Similarly, many civilian employees will be forced to decide, sometime before the RIF becomes effective, whether they will participate in the voluntary early retirement program. The civilian employees who will be faced with these decisions clearly face the threat of irreparable harm. Cf. Chalk v. U.S. District Court Central District of California, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.1988) (teacher diagnosed as having AIDS suffered irreparable harm when he was reassigned to administrative position because harm went beyond question of compensation). The decision that these employees must make are life-altering decisions. “[Cjivilian employees are now being forced to make decisions as to whether they will leave their community, sell their homes, take their children out of schools and seek other employment within 72 hours,” and also as to whether “they are going to leave the employment of the Department of Defense entirely and take early retirement incentives.” Affidavit of Bernard W. Hauf, Jr. (“Hauf Aff.”) at 1111 5 & 6. Many employees are facing the possibility of accepting a job they do not want or of losing valuable benefits. This is an injury that is real and imminent to the civilian employees, see Affidavit of Laurence Orndorff (“Orndorff Aff.”) at 1159, and one that goes beyond mere financial loss. Second, the local community will suffer irreparable harm. According to the Affidavit of Eugen Baer (“Baer Aff.”), the Chairman of the Seneca County Board of Supervisors, the reductions “will have a significant and dramatic negative impact on Seneca County.” Baer Aff. at 112. Baer calculates that the RIF will result, inter alia, in a 30 percent drop in student enrollment in the Romulus Central School District, id. at 1113, an emigration from Seneca of approximately 15 percent of its current population of 32,000, id. at 1112, and a significant drop in property value. Id. at 15. Third, and perhaps most significantly, if defendants continue to downsize SEAD, any final relief that plaintiffs may obtain could be rendered meaningless. Through this action, plaintiffs seek to prevent the personnel reductions and partial closure of SEAD on the grounds that the decision to do so was made in violation of BRAC. If plaintiffs prevail, defendants will be prevented from continuing with the restructuring and the RIF unless they comply with the BRAC process. In that case, SEAD will retain its civilian personnel and remain a functioning army depot. But if defendants are allowed to continue to restructure SEAD by dismantling its administrative structure, removing equipment, discharging the civilian employees, and downgrading it to a depot activity during the pendency of this action, plaintiffs’ victory will be a hollow one. Although SEAD’s special weapons mission has been eliminated and its IPE rehabilitation mission has been relocated, SEAD is slated to perform 100 “work years” of demilitarization work associated with the elimination of the United States’s ground-launched nuclear missiles. Plaintiffs contend that SEAD could attract new missions if it is not downgraded to a depot activity, including additional demilitarization work, which it has performed in the past. Orn-dorff Aff. at ¶ 6. However, if defendants are allowed to continue to drastically alter SEAD, its ability to attract these new missions will be severely undermined, and the relief that could be afforded to plaintiffs would be short lived. The reality of this harm is made evident by Laurence Orndorff, the Chief of Special Weapons at SEAD. . According to Orn-dorff: If SEAD is to survive, it will be necessary for it to receive other military missions. The defendants’ announcement that SEAD is being downgraded from depot to depot activity is having a detrimental effect on SEAD's ability to receive other missions. Attached hereto as Exhibit V is a June 18,1992 Draft Memorandum (from Headquarters AMC discussing a mission involving demilitarization of depleted uranium munitions. The recommendation of such memorandum is that such activity should be directed to SEAD or Sierra. However, because of the downgrading of Seneca from depot to depot activity, Seneca may lose this- opportunity. Attached hereto as Exhibit W is a August 12, 1992 Memorandum for the Record prepared by Kenneth P. Muehl, DESCOM. In such memorandum Mr. Muehl states ‘SEAD will become a depot activity under Letterkenny Army Depot. The concept of Depot Activities operation is long-term storage with minimal receipt, issue, maintenance, and dem-il. Certainly not assigning a new unique mission to a depot activity.’ Therefore, Mr. Muehl recommends that SEAD not receive this important new mission. Orndorff Aff. at 11 60. Finally, if defendants are allowed to continue with planned activities during the pendency of this action that are ultimately found to be in violation of BRAC, allowing them to do so would serve only to undermine the integrity of the BRAC process, which, in turn, would ultimately harm the public interest. For the BRAC process to work as intended, the Secretary cannot deplete a military installation of its equipment and missions before it is evaluated by the BRAC commission. Yet, if defendants are allowed to continue to downsize SEAD, but plaintiffs ultimately prevail, SEAD will never have been fairly evaluated under the BRAC process, and Congress’s intent would have been frustrated. I am, of course, mindful of the possible harm that defendants may sustain as a result of issuing a preliminary injunction, and that such harm is relevant to the analysis. In this case, however, it is clear that the threat of harm to plaintiffs if an injunction is not issued far outweighs the harm to defendants in maintaining the status quo during the pendency of this action. In sum, I find, based on the affidavits and other materials submitted by plaintiffs, that they have made a showing of irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued now. B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits or Sufficiently Serious Questions Going to the Merits 1. Application of BRAC The question at the heart of this action is whether BRAC applies to the types of reductions authorized by the Secretary at SEAD. In order for plaintiffs to prevail on their claim under BRAC, they must establish that defendants are required to go through the BRAC process before they start the drastic reductions planned at SEAD. Plaintiffs contend that the Act applies because its numerical threshold has been met. Defendants strenuously disagree, arguing that the Act does not apply because the number of civilian personnel positions reduced as a result of the “realignments,” as that term is defined in BRAC and 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (“section 2687”), has not reached the numerical threshold that would require BRAC’s application. After reviewing the relevant language in BRAC, section 2687, the legislative history of each statute, and the many documents submitted by the parties, I find that plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claim under BRAC. The reduction in civilian personnel that will be caused by the Secretary’s actions at SEAD is sufficiently large that BRAC’s numerical threshold has been easily satisfied. See 10 U.S.C. § 2687(a)(2). The elimination of the special weapons mission, the consolidation of the IPE maintenance function at DLA facilities, and the plan to downgrade SEAD from a depot to a depot activity will reduce the number of authorized civilian personnel by 562 positions, which is a reduction of nearly 70 percent of the 847 civilian personnel authorized to be employed at SEAD, Complaint at Ex. F; that drastic reduction is sufficient to trigger BRAC. In my view, it is precisely this kind of action that prompted Congress to enact BRAC in the first place. The task of resolving whether BRAC applies here “begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.” U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). If the “statute speaks with c