Full opinion text
ORDER SPIEGEL, District Judge. This matter is before the Court for consideration of eight separate motions. The Court conducted a hearing on these motions on April 30, 1992. BACKGROUND In May, 1987, Mignon Stone became romantically involved with Larry Jones. Ms. Stone and Mr. Jones eventually took up residence together. In April, 1989, they rented two television sets and a video cassette recorder from Rent-A-Center. Two months later, Mr. Jones illegally sold the televisions. In the early morning of October 24,1989, Mr. Jones left a bar with a Butler County woman, Janavie Mills. Ms. Mills was reported missing later that day, and, approximately ten days later, her decayed corpse was found bearing the marks of approximately eighty stab wounds. The Butler County Sheriff’s Department considered Larry Jones the prime suspect in Ms. Mills’ murder. Meanwhile, Ms. Stone believed that authorities were searching for Mr. Jones in connection with the stolen Rent-A-Center televisions. For several weeks, Ms. Stone and Mr. Jones moved around, staying at various places in Hamilton, Ohio and Northern Kentucky. On Tuesday, October 31, 1989, Ms. Stone learned that Mr. Jones was sought in connection with Ms. Mills’ disappearance (Ms. Mills’ body had not yet been discovered). Ms. Stone further learned that authorities wished to interview her as well. On Wednesday, November 1, 1989, Ms. Stone contacted Glen Ebbing to arrange a meeting with Butler County Sheriff Richard Holzberger. Mr. Ebbing is Ms. Stone’s step-father, a retired City of Hamilton detective, and a long-time friend of Butler County Prosecutor John Holcomb. Mr. Ebbing arranged for Ms. Stone, Mr. Jones and Sheriff Holzberger to meet at the Ebbing home on November 1, 1989. Mr. Jones declined to attend the meeting, but Ms. Stone met with Sheriff Holzberger anyway. When Sheriff Holzberger questioned Ms. Stone, she initially denied knowing Mr. Jones’ whereabouts, even though she had been with him less than an hour before the meeting. When Ms. Stone indicated that she no longer wanted to speak to Sheriff Holzberger and that she wanted to leave, Sheriff Holzberger (assisted by Captain Richard Carpenter) arrested Ms. Stone. Ms. Stone was taken to the Butler County Jail and interrogated. She indicated that she did not wish to make a statement and was told she was under arrest as a material witness. Ms. Stone remained in custody as a material witness without judicial review from the evening of November 1, 1989 until the late afternoon of November 6, 1989. On the afternoon of November 6, 1989, Ms. Stone was taken before Butler County Common Pleas Judge Moser. Judge Moser issued an “own recognizance” (“O.R.”) bond permitting Ms. Stone’s release. Ms. Stone was escorted back to the Butler County Jail to retrieve her clothing and personal possessions. Ms. Stone identified a cocaine canister found at the murder scene as belonging to Mr. Jones. Apparently Sheriff Holzberger believed that Ms. Stone had not been completely candid during the six days of interrogation. He then contacted the prosecutor’s office to see if he could continue to hold Ms. Stone as a material witness due to this allegedly new information. Prosecutor Holcomb informed the Sheriff that he could continue to hold Ms. Stone until the OR bond could be rescinded. By that time, it was late in the afternoon on November 6, 1989. The Butler County Court of Common Pleas was closed. Sheriff Holzberger directed his subordinates to retain Ms. Stone until court reconvened the next morning. The next day, November 7, 1989, an assistant prosecutor engaged in an ex parte, in camera conference with Judge Moser. Ms. Stone was not present nor was she informed of the conference. As a result of that meeting, Judge Moser set aside the O.R. bond and issued a $50,000 surety bond. Ms. Stone was not served with the new order, nor was she informed of the $50,000 bond. Ms. Stone remained in custody at the Butler County Jail until November 20,1989 (a total of nineteen days). She was paid the statutory rate of $25 per day. Larry Jones ultimately pled guilty to the murder of Janavie Mills. On March 5, 1990, Ms. Stone initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleges various federal and state claims against Sheriff Holzberger, Richard Carpenter, Richard Sizemore, William Pro-fitt and Terry Payer (collectively “the Sheriff’s defendants”), Butler County Prosecutor John Holcomb, Butler County, Ohio, the City of Hamilton, Ohio, and Michael T. Gmoser, Esq. In addition, Prosecutor Holcomb filed a counter-claim alleging tortious interference with a business relationship. On April 30, 1992, this Court heard oral arguments on eight motions currently pending in this matter. First, the City of Hamilton, Ohio filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. 58). At the hearing on April 30, 1992, the parties entered into a stipulation of dismissal of all claims against the City of Hamilton (doc. 155). Accordingly, the City of Hamilton’s motion for summary judgment is hereby denied as moot. Second, defendants Richard Holzberger, Richard Carpenter, Richard Sizemore, Charles Profitt and Terry Payer (“the Sheriff’s defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. 60). The plaintiff responded in opposition to the motion (doe. 84 and doc. 89), and the Sheriff’s defendants replied (doc. 104). For the reasons set forth below, the Sheriff’s defendants’ motion for summary judgment is hereby granted in part and denied in part. Third, defendant Butler County, Ohio filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. 65). The plaintiff responded (doc. 85), and Butler County replied (doc. 102). For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment on behalf of the Butler County Commissioners is hereby granted in part and denied in part. Fourth, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment against defendants Butler County and Richard Holzber-ger (doc. 67 and doc. 68). The defendants opposed the motion for partial summary judgment (doc. .81 and 82), and the plaintiff replied (doc. 105 and doc. 106). For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment against defendants Butler County (or the Butler County Commissioners) and Sheriff Holzberger is hereby granted in part and denied in part. Fifth, defendant Michael Gmoser filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. 73 and doc. 113). The plaintiff opposed the motion (doc. 83 and doe. 88), and Mr. Gmoser replied (doc. 99). For the reasons set forth below, defendant Michael Gmoser’s motion for summary judgment is hereby denied. Sixth, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim of defendant Prosecutor John Holcomb (doc. 92). Prosecutor Holcomb opposed the motion (doc. 100), and the plaintiff replied (doc. 112). For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs motion to dismiss is hereby granted. Seventh, defendant Prosecutor John Holcomb filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment (doc. 107). The plaintiff opposed the motion (doc. 117), and Prosecutor Holcomb replied (doc. 122). For the reasons set forth below, Prosecutor Holcomb’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is hereby granted. Eighth, the plaintiff filed a motion to substitute the Butler County Board of County Commissioners in place of defendant Butler County (doc. 118). Defendant Butler County opposed the motion (doc. 123), and the plaintiff replied (doc. 124). For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs motion for substitution is hereby granted. STANDARD OF REVIEW The narrow question that we must decide on a motion for summary judgment is whether there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and [whether] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court cannot try issues of fact on a Rule 56 motion,, but is empowered to determine only whether there are issues to be tried. In re Atlas Concrete Pipe, Inc., 668 F.2d 905, 908 (6th Cir.1982). The moving party “has the burden of showing conclusively that there exists no genuine issues as to a material fact and the evidence together with all inferences to be drawn therefrom must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir.) (emphasis original), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 986, 100 S.Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed.2d 415 (1979). And, “while the mov-ant’s papers are to be closely scrutinized, those of the opponent are to be viewed indulgently.” Id. at 63. “[T]he District Court [is] obligated to consider not only the materials specifically offered in support of the motion, but also all ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions’ properly on file and thus properly before [the] court.” Id. (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Summary judgment “must be used only with extreme caution for it operates to deny a litigant his day in court.” Id. The Supreme Court elaborated upon this standard, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), as follows: [T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.... Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. Summary judgment is not appropriate if a dispute about a material fact is “genuine,” that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “When a claim to qualified immunity is raised within the context of a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must allege facts sufficient to indicate that the act in question violated clearly established law at the time the act was committed.” Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1043 (6th Cir.1992). Thus, the plaintiff must satisfy two conditions when opposing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the defendant claims qualified immunity. Id. First, the plaintiff must claim a violation of clearly established law. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). Second, the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant actually committed the acts in question. Id. “At the summary judgment stage, whether the legal violation alleged was clearly established at the time of the incident, as well as whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the alleged violation occurred, are questions of law for the court.” Id. DISCUSSION There are eight motions currently pending before the Court. We will address each topic individually. Amendment of Plaintiff s Second Amended Complaint The plaintiff named Butler County, Ohio as a defendant in both the initial complaint and in the second amended complaint. Clearly, Butler County, Ohio lacks the capacity to sue or be sued except where specially authorized by statute. See Ohio Rev.Code § 301.22; Pancake v. Wakefield, 102 Ohio App. 5, 1 O.O.2d 473, 140 N.E.2d 887 (Athens Cty.1956). The plaintiff should have named as defendants the individual Butler County Commissioners in their official capacities. To correct this error, the plaintiff now moves to amend the complaint to substitute the individual Butler County Commissioners in their official capacities as defendants in place of defendant Butler County, Ohio pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the limitations period has not yet expired, this Court could simply grant leave to amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a). However, in considering a § 1983 claim, the court must apply the residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims not embraced by specific statutes of limitations of the state in which the alleged constitutional deprivation occurred. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). For civil rights actions arising in Ohio, the court must apply a two year statute of limitations borrowed from Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10. Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1989). Therefore, a two year statute of limitations applies to the § 1983 claims in the case at bar. The events Ms. Stone complains of occurred in November, 1989. Therefore, the statute of limitations has run against the parties the plaintiff now seeks to add to the complaint. Accordingly, the plaintiff may amend her complaint to name the Butler County Commissioners only if the amendment relates back pursuant to Rule 15(c). For relation back of an amendment, four requirements must be satisfied: (1) the claim sought to be amended arose out of the conduct or occurrence alleged in the original complaint; (2) the party to be added received such notice that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; (3) the party to be added “knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against [them];” and (4) the second and third requirements were satisfied within the period provided for service of the summons and complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(3) (1991 rev.); Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 2384, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986). In the case at bar, there is no question that the Butler County Commissioners had actual notice of this case at the time it was initially commenced and that the claims at issue arose from the conduct alleged in the original complaint. The issues, then, are whether the Commissioners “knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(3) (1991 rev.), and whether the individual county commissioners will be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits. In Brown v. Georgia Dept, of Revenue, 881 F.2d 1018 (11th Cir.1989), the plaintiff originally named the State Personnel Board as a defendant in his § 1983 action. Although the Personnel Board repeatedly raised the Eleventh Amendment as a defense, the plaintiff did not attempt to amend his complaint to add the individual members of the Personnel Board in their official capacities until after the two-year statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 1023. The district court allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint, and the circuit court affirmed, stating: Since the Personnel Board had been a party to the case, there was no prejudice form the late amendment naming the Board members. Since the members were sued in their official capacity, they could only assert defenses available to the state agencies, not any personal defenses. The Attorney General, who under Georgia law represents all state officials sued in their official capacity, O.C.G.A. § 45-15-3(6), represented the State Board and raised those defenses. Moreover, the fact that the Attorney General raised the Eleventh Amendment defense throughout the proceedings evidenced his awareness of the pleading mistake. In such a situation it is reasonable to conclude that the individual Board members should have known that they were the correct defendants. Id. The same conclusions apply to the case at bar. First, Butler County, Ohio has been a defendant in this action since it was initially commenced. Second, the individual Commissioners will be sued only in their official capacities. The Commissioners may not invoke any personal defenses, but must rely only upon those defenses available to the County. Here, the County is represented by experienced trial counsel who has already filed a thirty-five page motion for summary judgment raising numerous defenses on behalf of the County. Those defenses are now equally applicable to the individual Commissioners. Finally, counsel for the County has repeatedly raised its lack of capacity to be sued. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude under the circumstances that the individual County Commissioners knew that, but for the plaintiffs mistake, the action would have been brought against the individual County Commissioners in their official capacities. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint to substitute the individual Butler County Commissioners as defendants in their official capacities in place of Butler County, Ohio is hereby granted. Commissioners’ Liability for Acts of the Sheriff and Prosecutor The Butler County Commissioners contend they are not liable for the acts of Sheriff Holzberger or Prosecutor Holcomb in this case. They seem to take the extreme position that a municipal policymaker can never make municipal policy that violates the law. See doc. 65 at 16-21; doc. 81 at 8-9; doc. 102 at 5-11. If that were the case, § 1983 would almost never impose liability on a municipality. At the opposite extreme, the plaintiff takes the position that, because Sheriff Holzberger and Prosecutor Holcomb are policymakers on many issues, every act either of them has ever taken constitutes county policy thereby imposing liability on the county. See doc. 67 at 36-40; doc. 85 at 7-15; doc. 105 at 5-6. Neither of these positions accurately reflect the law. The doctrine of respondeat superi- or does not apply to impose liability on a municipality for the acts of its employees under § 1983. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Rather, a municipality is liable only where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Id. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. To establish a municipal policy, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) The municipality officially sanctioned or ordered the challenged action; (2) The actor or decisionmaker had final policy-making authority under state law; and (3) The actor or decisionmaker had final policy-making authority in the area of the municipality’s business in question. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,123,108 S.Ct. 915, 924, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (citing Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)). In addition to municipal liability for acts taken pursuant to municipal policy, § 1983 imposes liability on the municipality “for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. To impose municipal liability, a custom must be “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1613-14, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). In addition, the custom must have the acquiescence of a policymaker. Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). State law (including local law) governs the determination as to who has final policymaking authority. Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, 109 S.Ct. at 2723. “As with other questions of state law relevant to the application of federal law, the identification of those officials whose decisions represent the official policy of the local governmental unit is itself a legal question to be resolved by the trial judge before the case is submitted to the jury.” Id. (emphasis in original). An unconstitutional governmental policy may be “inferred from a single decision taken by the highest officials responsible for setting policy in that area of the government’s business.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123, 108 S.Ct. at 924. Of course, the policymakers must have the authority to make final policy. Id. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926. When an official’s discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that official’s making, those policies, rather than the subordinate’s departures from them, are the act of the municipality. Similarly, when a subordinate’s decision is subject to review by the municipality’s authorized policymakers, they have retained the authority to measure the official’s conduct for conformance with their policies. If the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final. Id. The County Commissioners rely on this language to contend that, because the Sheriff’s and Prosecutor’s actions allegedly violate the law, the Sheriff and Prosecutor are not making final policy because a higher authority (the lawmakers) has constrained their actions. Such reliance is misplaced. Under Ohio law, the Sheriff and the Prosecutor are the officials who make policy for Butler County with regard to the operation of their offices and discharge of their duties. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484-85, 106 S.Ct. at 1300-01; Conklin dep. at 9. In fact, Mr. Conklin, the County Administrator, testified at his deposition that the County Commissioners have no authority to override the decisions of the Sheriff or the Prosecuting Attorney except in budgetary matters. Conklin dep. at 9 and 13; see also Holzberger dep. at 13-14 and Holcomb dep. at 13. Therefore, Sheriff Holzberger and Prosecutor Holcomb possess final policymaking authority in the discharge of their duties. Accordingly, their decisions made in the discharge of their duties constitute county policy, and the county is liable for actions taken pursuant to those decisions. Commissioners’ Liability for Acts of Those Other than the Sheriff or Prosecutor As established above, Sheriff Holzberger and Prosecutor Holcomb are the official policymakers with respect to the actions at issue in this case. Therefore, the County Commissioners contend, they are not liable for actions taken by anyone other than the Sheriff and Prosecutor. A county is liable for the actions of employees other than policymakers where a policymaker ratifies the employees’ decision, where the employee acts at the direction of a policymaker, or where “a series of decisions by a subordinate official manifested a ‘custom or usage’ of which the supervisor [policymaker] must have been aware.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130, 108 S.Ct. at 928. To infer the existence of a municipal policy from the isolated misconduct of a single low-level employee would amount to the application of respondeat superior which the Supreme Court rejected in Monell. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 831, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2440, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In the case at bar, the plaintiff alleges that certain lower level county officers performed certain acts for which liability cannot be imposed on the county. This Court agrees that those employees are not county policymakers and their decisions do not necessarily represent county policy. However, the plaintiff contends that those employees acted at the direction of or in conformity with county policy established by Sheriff Holzberger or Prosecutor Holcomb. If so, the county is liable for their acts. Therefore, there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment on the Commissioner’s liability for acts taken by individual police officers and assistants to the prosecutor. The November 1, 1989 Arrest Sheriff Holzberger and Captain Carpenter contend that they had probable cause to arrest Ms. Stone as a material witness. Therefore, they claim, they are entitled to summary judgment on Count One of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. In the alternative, Sheriff Holzberger and Captain Carpenter claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity for Ms. Stone’s arrest. In addition, the Butler County Commissioners also move for summary judgment on Count One of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Government officials “are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Stated another way, an official is immune if a reasonable person would have believed the action was lawful in light of the clearly established law and the information the official possessed at the time he acted. Hunter v. Bryant, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991); Long v. Norris, 929 F.2d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 187, 116 L.Ed.2d 148 (1991). “When the official’s claim of immunity turns on deci-sional law, this court must focus on whether, at the time of the officers’ acts, the right asserted was ‘clearly established’ by looking to the decisions of the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.” Hall v. Shipley, 932 F.2d 1147, 1150 (6th Cir.1991). On December 20, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in White by Swafford v. Gerbitz, 892 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.1989). In White, the court concluded that an officer was immune from liability for the war-rantless arrest and detention of a murder witness pursuant to a Tennessee statute very similar to Ohio’s material witness statutes, Ohio Revised Code § 2937.18 and § 2941.48. In doing so, the court specifically stated: Although we agree that, if confronted by the issue, Tennessee courts would recognize the authority to arrest and detain a material witness, the current state of the law on this issue is not sufficiently established to have put Detective Angel on notice that he was violating clearly established constitutional or statutory rights. White by Swafford v. Gerbitz, 892 F.2d 457, 461 n. 3 (6th Cir.1989); see also White, 892 F.2d at 464 (Jones, J. dissenting) (“The court correctly notes that White could not establish a constitutional violation ensuing from Officer Angel’s actions because courts have not yet determined what constitutes probable cause to arrest and detain a material witness to a crime.”). Ms. Stone was arrested nearly two months before the court issued the White decision. At that time, as both the majority and the dissenting judges concluded, the law on this issue had not yet been sufficiently established to place an arresting officer on notice that he was violating the arrestee’s clearly established constitutional or statutory rights. Therefore, the arresting officers are entitled to qualified immunity for claims arising out of Ms. Stone’s arrest. ,In addition, the Sheriff’s defendants and the Butler County Commissioners contend that Sheriff Holzberger and Captain Carpenter had probable cause to arrest Ms. Stone. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has enunciated the probable cause standard as follows: [A]rrest without a warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment if probable cause exists for the arresting officer’s belief that a suspect has violated or is violating the law.... The Supreme Court has defined “probable cause” as the “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” ... Probable cause requires only the probability of criminal activity not some type of “prima facie” showing.... If the circumstances, viewed objectively, support a finding of probable cause, the arresting officer's actual motives are irrelevant. Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir.1988) (citations omitted). To be subject to arrest as a material witness, the witness must possess information material to the investigation of a crime, and his statements or behavior must make it “reasonably unlikely that he would appear at the suspect’s trial.” White by Swafford v. Gerbitz, 892 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.1989) (construing Tennessee witness statute similar to Ohio’s). Thus, to have probable cause to arrest a material witness, the arresting officers must possess knowledge of facts or circumstances sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious officer to believe that the witness possesses information material to the criminal investigation and is reasonably unlikely to appear to testify. In the case at bar, Sheriff Holzber-ger and Captain Carpenter arrested Ms. Stone as a material witness to the murder of Janavie Mills. Ms. Stone's long-time boyfriend was the primary suspect in the murder.- Ms. Stone admitted being with Mr. Jones an hour before her arrest, and she and Mr. Jones had been moving from place to place to avoid police detection. Although Ms. Stone never specifically refused to appear to testify, her statements indicated that her primary loyalty was to her boyfriend, Larry Jones. Further, even though she came to the Ebbing home voluntarily on November 1, 1989 to speak to Sheriff Holzberger, she attempted to leave before the conversation had concluded. Sheriff Holzberger understandably feared that, because Ms. Stone had no residence, he would be unable to locate her in the future, and Ms. Stone would probably not appear to testify. In addition, Ms. Stone indicated that she possessed substantial information pertinent to the murder investigation. . Therefore, Sheriff Holzberger had probable cause to arrest Ms. Stone. Accordingly, the Sheriff’s defendants’ motion and the Butler County Commissioners’ motion for summary judgment on Count One of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint are hereby granted. Detention from November 1, 1989 until November 6, 1989 The Sheriff’s defendants claim they had no duty to promptly afford Ms. Stone a hearing. Therefore, they claim, they are entitled to summary judgment on Count Two of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. In the alternative, the Sheriff’s defendants claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity because Ms. Stone had no clearly established right to a prompt judicial hearing. However, Ms. Stone claims she did in fact have a clearly established right to a prompt hearing upon her arrest. Accordingly, she moves for summary judgment against Sheriff Holzberger and the Butler County Commissioners on her Fourth Amendment claim for incarceration without a hearing from November 1, 1989 to November 6, 1989. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const.Amend. 4. The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. Amend. 14. With respect to criminal suspects, the Fourth Amendment “requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 863, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). Generally, absent an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance, a criminal arrestee should receive a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991). Therefore, if Ms. Stone had been arrested on suspicion of a crime, there is no doubt that the arresting officer would have been required to ensure she received a hearing before November 6, 1989. The issue, then, becomes whether a person arrested on suspicion of criminal activity is entitled to more favorable treatment then a material witness arrestee who has committed no crime. This Court concludes that she is not. We further conclude that no reasonable law enforcement officer could believe that a criminal arrestee is entitled to higher constitutional protections than a witness arrestee. “Haste in the production of a person before a committing magistrate is of special importance when the only reason for his detention is as a material witness.” Houston v. Humboldt County, 561 F.Supp. 1124, 1126 (D.Nev.1983), aff'd sub nom., Houston v. Bryan, 725 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.1984). As The Honorable Nathanial Jones accurately recognized in his dissenting opinion: [O]ne proposition should be apparent: the arrest and detention of a citizen as a material witness requires a showing of probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because under the Fourth Amendment “the essential element is the physical restraint placed upon the person, not the purpose behind the restraint.” White by Swafford v. Gerbitz, 892 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.1989) (Jones, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 942 (9th Cir.1971)). In addition, the Ohio Revised Code recognizes a witness’ right to Fourth Amendment protections by requiring prompt entry of a recognizance, with or without a surety, before an arrestee witness is committed to the county jail. See Ohio Rev.Code § 2941.48 (Page’s 1987). Specifically, Ohio Revised Code § 2941.48 provides in part: In any case pending in the court of common pleas, the court, either before or after indictment, may require any witness designated by the prosecuting attorney to enter into a recognizance, with or without surety, in such sum as the court thinks proper for his appearance to testify in such cause. A witness failing or refusing to comply with such order shall be committed to the county jail until he gives his testimony in such case or is ordered discharged by the court. Ohio Rev.Code § 2941.48 (Page’s 1987) (emphasis added). Therefore, it is apparent to this Court that a person arrested as a material witness is entitled to, at the very least, the same Fourth Amendment protections afforded to a person arrested on suspicion of criminal conduct. Further, the witness’ right to Fourth Amendment protection was clearly established prior to 1989, and a reasonable police officer was clearly on notice that such right existed. In the case at bar, Sheriff Holzberger arrested Ms. Stone as a material witness to the murder of Janavie Mills on November 1, 1989. No arrest warrant was obtained, and Ms. Stone was incarcerated for five days before she received a probable cause hearing. Sheriff Holzber-ger offers no explanation for the five day delay. If such actions are permitted, police officers could randomly arrest and detain innocent citizens for five day periods without ever demonstrating any reason for doing so. Clearly, such actions violate the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Sheriff Holzberger violated Ms. Stone’s Fourth Amendment rights by failing to present her to a magistrate promptly after her arrest. Because Sheriff Holzberger violated Ms. Stone’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights, he is not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Ms. Stone is entitled to summary judgment against Sheriff Holzberger and the Butler County Commissioners on Count Two of her second amended complaint. Sheriff Holzberger’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is hereby denied. As the arresting officer, Sheriff Holzberger had the burden of ensuring that Ms. Stone was taken before a magistrate without unreasonable delay. See Ohio Rev.Code § 2935.05 (Page’s 1987). Accordingly, the remaining Sheriff’s defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Failure to Release Ms. Stone on November 6, 1989 The Sheriff’s defendants claim that they relied on the prosecutor’s advice and the November 7, 1989 order from Judge Moser in failing to release Ms. Stone on November 6, 1989. Therefore, they contend, the Sheriff’s defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count Three of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. In addition, Ms. Stone claims that she is entitled to summary judgment against Sheriff Holzberger and the Butler County Commissioners on this claim. The plaintiff “agrees with defendant Sheriff that he enjoys qualified immunity from suit in connection with the decision, advised by the Prosecuting Attorney, not to release plaintiff from jail after her O.R. bond was granted on November 6.” Doc. 106 at 11. Accordingly, because all parties agree that the Sheriff’s defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in deciding not to release Ms. Stone on November 6, 1992, the Sheriff’s defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Three of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint is hereby granted. The plaintiff repeatedly asserts that qualified immunity protects an official from liability only in his personal capacity. This is true. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). However, even if the plaintiff prevails against an official in his official capacity, liability may not be imposed on the named defendant. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). The United States Supreme Court explained the distinction between individual-capacity and official-capacity actions as follows: Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law_ Official-capacity suits, in contrast, “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” ... As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.... It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only against the official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself. Id. at 165-66, 105 S.Ct. at 3105 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In the case at bar, the Sheriffs defendants are qualifiedly immune from liability for failing to release Ms. Stone on November 6, 1989. Thus, Ms. Stone may impose liability against the Sheriff’s defendants only in their official capacity, i.e., against Butler County’s assets. However, the Butler County Commissioners are already parties to this action in their official capacities as representatives of Butler County, Ohio. Accordingly, it is redundant to discuss Sheriff Holzberger’s liability in his official capacity. As to the liability of the Butler County Commissioners for Sheriff Holzberger’s failure to release Ms. Stone on November 6, 1989, genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on that issue. The November 7, 1989 Bond Hearing The plaintiff has moved for summary judgment against Sheriff Holzberger and the Butler County Commissioners regarding the ex parte, in camera hearing on November 7, 1989. However, the hearing has not been pled as the basis for liability. In Count Six of the plaintiff’s twenty-count second amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Holzberger and Prosecutor Holcomb conspired with others to deprive plaintiff of constitutional rights. The plaintiff simply alleges that the November 7, 1989 hearing constituted an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, no claim is made for alleged constitutional deficiencies at the hearing itself. Conspiracy The Sheriff’s defendants contend that there is no evidence of a conspiracy to violate Ms. Stone’s civil rights. Therefore, they claim, the Sheriff’s defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count Six of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. The County Commissioners also move for summary judgment on Ms. Stone’s conspiracy claim. To impose liability for a conspiracy under § 1983, “plaintiff must allege and prove both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of rights; mere proof of conspiracy is insufficient to establish a section 1983 claim.” Landrigan v. Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir.1980) (quoting Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 622 (7th Cir.1979)). “The gist of the [section 1983] cause of action is the deprivation and not the conspiracy.” Id. (quoting Lesser v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538, 540 n. 2 (7th Cir.1975)). A municipality is liable for conspiracy if it, through a policymaker, agrees to combine with others to deprive an individual of her constitutional rights. Fisher v. City of Cincinnati, 753 F.Supp. 681, 691 (S.D.Ohio 1990). According to Prosecutor Holcomb, he and Sheriff Holzberger entered into an agreement with Mr. Ebbing (Ms. Stone’s step-father) providing that Ms. Stone would remain in jail for as long as necessary for the Mills murder investigation and, in return, Ms. Stone would not be charged with stealing the Rent-A-Center televisions. See Holcomb dep. at 46-47. There is no evidence that Ms. Stone was involved in or informed of the agreement. In fact, Prosecutor Holcomb stated, “I don’t know that I had any specific agreement with Mignon. I had the specific agreement with her father and mother and Sheriff Holzberger.” Id. at 86-87. There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Ms. Stone’s constitutional rights have been violated by the ex parte, in camera O.R. bond revocation, and in failing to inform her of the existence of the newly imposed $50,000 bond. In view of Prosecutor Holcomb’s statements, there are also genuine issues of material fact regarding the existence of a conspiracy to violate Ms. Stone’s constitutional, rights and the County’s involvement in the alleged conspiracy. Accordingly, the Sheriffs defendants’ motion and the Butler County Commissioners’ motion for summary judgment on Count Six of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint are hereby denied. Detention from November 7, 1989 to November 20, 1989 On November 7, 1989, Judge Moser of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas set Ms. Stone’s bond at $50,000 and committed her to the Butler County Jail upon her failure to comply with the bond. See Ex. B to doc. 82. The Sheriff’s defendants contend that, because they relied on Judge Moser’s facially valid order, they are quali-fiedly immune from liability for detaining Ms. Stone from November 7, 1989 to November 20, 1989. The plaintiff, to the contrary, contends that such detention violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Therefore, she claims, she is entitled to summary judgment on Count Four of her second amended complaint. As this Court concluded above, Sheriff Holzberger had a duty to ensure that a person he arrested as a material witness was promptly afforded a judicial hearing. In effect, on November 6, 1989, Sheriff Holzberger re-arrested Ms. Stone as a material witness. Therefore, he again had a duty to ensure that she was afforded a hearing without unnecessary delay. A probable cause hearing may be combined with the arrestee’s bond hearing. See generally Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). On November 7, 1989, Ms. Stone was given a bond hearing. Although Sheriff Holzberger did not personally ensure that she was afforded a prompt hearing, Ms. Stone did in fact receive a bond hearing less than twenty-four hours after her re-arrest. Such hearing satisfied Sheriff Holzberger’s obligation to bring Ms. Stone before the Court. In addition, Judge Moser issued a $50,000 recognizance bond on November 7, 1989. Judge Moser had the authority to issue such a bond and the bond was facially valid. See Ohio Rev.Code § 2937.18 and § 2941.48; see also Ex. B to doc. 82. Therefore, Sheriff Holzberger was entitled to rely upon such bond in detaining Ms. Stone from November 7, 1989 to November 20, 1989, and is insulated from liability for Ms. Stone’s detention from November 7, 1989 to November 20, 1989. See, e.g., Doe v. McFaul, 599 F.Supp. 1421, 1431-32 (N.D.Ohio 1984). Accordingly, the Sheriff’s defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Four of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint is hereby granted. Ms. Stone’s motion for summary judgment against Sheriff Holzberger on that claim is hereby denied. Failure to Inform Ms. Stone of the $50,000 Bond The Sheriff’s defendants’ contend that it was not their duty to inform Ms. Stone of the $50,000 bond. Therefore, they claim, they are entitled to summary judgment on Count Five of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. To the contrary, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on this claim against both Sheriff Holzberger and the Butler County Commissioners. There are genuine issues of material fact surrounding this issue and summary judgment is therefore inappropriate. Accordingly, both the Sheriff’s defendants’ motion and the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on Count Five are hereby denied. Search of Ms. Stone’s Former Apartment In Count Fourteen of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint, Ms. Stone alleges that her apartment was searched in violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The first search of these premises was performed pursuant to a facially valid search warrant signed by Judge Moser on October 30, 1989. The plaintiff admits that the Sheriff’s defendants are not liable for the execution of a facially valid search warrant, and that search is not the subject of Ms. Stone’s claim. Rather, the plaintiff alleges, subsequent to that search, the Sheriff’s defendants searched the same premises as many as five times without a warrant. It is these warrantless searches of which the plaintiff now complains. The Sheriff’s defendants and the Butler County Commissioners contend that, by the time these subsequent searches were performed, Ms. Stone had voluntarily abandoned the premises. Therefore, they claim, she had no possessory interest in the apartment and lacks standing to assert an unlawful search claim. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches of their “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. ConstAmend. 4. However, a person does not have standing to object to a search of his property once the property has been voluntarily abandoned. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960); State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 18 O.O.3d 472, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 822, 102 S.Ct. 107, 70 L.Ed.2d 94 (1981); State v. Brown, 20 Ohio App.3d 36, 20 OBR 38, 484 N.E.2d 215 (Hamilton Cty.1984). In the case at bar, Mignon Stone and Larry Jones rented the apartment in question for $25 per week from the owner of the property, James Kerby. There was no written lease agreement, and Mr. Kerby did not require any sort of deposit. Ms. Stone and Mr. Jones remained current on their rent until the trouble with Mr. Jones began. There is no dispute that Ms. Stone left this apartment at least ten days prior to her arrest and never returned. Ms. Stone did, however, leave some of her possessions in the apartment, and continued to receive mail at that address. In addition, Mr. Kerby, the owner of the property, had no key to the apartment, and considered the apartment rented to Ms. Stone at the time of the searches in question. Kerby dep. at 19. Therefore, the Court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Ms. Stone had voluntarily abandoned the apartment prior to the warrantless searches. Accordingly, the Sheriff’s defendants’ motion and the Butler County Commissioners’ motion for summary judgment on Count Fourteen of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint are hereby denied. The Right to Vote Ms. Stone was incarcerated as a material witness from November 1, 1989 to November 20, 1989. During that time, the state conducted a general election. There were no federal issues on the ballot. In Count Eighteen of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint, Ms. Stone claims that she asked Captain Carpenter if she could vote in the November election, and he refused to allow her to vote. The Sheriff’s defendants deny that this occurred, but contend that, even if the facts are as plaintiff alleges, there is no federal constitutional right to vote in a purely state and local election. Therefore, they claim, they are entitled to summary judgment on Count Eighteen of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. The case upon which the Sheriff’s defendants rely, Piper v. Swan, 319 F.Supp. 908 (E.D.Tenn.1970), is inapposite. In Piper, the plaintiff claimed a Tennessee statute making it a misdemeanor to distribute campaign literature within 100 feet of a polling place violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Id. at 909. The district court in Piper, in noting that federal courts do not generally intervene in state elections, stated, “Participation in state elections is not considered a federally protected right.” Id. at 910 (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944)). However, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), the plaintiffs claimed that the malappor-tionment of the Alabama Legislature deprived them and others similarly situated of rights. The voters brought suit against various state election officials. Id. at 537, 84 S.Ct. at 1368. There, the United States Supreme Court specifically stated, “Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections. A consistent line of decisions by this Court in cases involving attempts to deny or restrict the right of suffrage has made this indelibly clear.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1377-78, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Therefore, we conclude that Ms. Stone had a federally protected right to vote in the November, 1989 election. Accordingly, the Sheriffs defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Eighteen of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint is hereby denied. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Against the Butler County Commissioners As the plaintiff concedes, the individual Butler County Commissioners, in their official capacities, are immune from damages liability on plaintiff’s pendent state claims. See Ohio Rev.Code § 2744.02(A)(1); see also doc. 85 at 20. Accordingly, the Butler County Commissioners’ motion for summary judgment on Counts Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, Fourteen (as to violation of Ohio law only), Fifteen, Seventeen and Twenty of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint is hereby granted. False Arrest and False Imprisonment The Sheriff’s defendants contend that probable cause existed for both Ms. Stone’s arrest and her detention. Therefore, they claim, they are entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Stone’s claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. As discussed above, the Sheriff’s defendants had probable cause to arrest Ms. Stone and are entitled to summary judgment on claims arising from Ms. Stone’s arrest. Thus, the Sheriff’s defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Seven (false arrest) of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint is hereby granted. As for false imprisonment, “The tort of false imprisonment arises when one is confined intentionally, for any appreciable time, against his will and without lawful justification.” Uebelacker v. Cincom Systems, Inc., 48 Ohio App.3d 268, 275, 549 N.E.2d 1210 (Hamilton Cty.1988). However, the Ohio Supreme Court recently stated: Because of the continuing nature of the false imprisonment tort, it is clear that a person who intentionally confines another cannot escape liability by arguing that he or she was initially privileged to impose the confinement. Once the initial privilege expires, the justification for continued confinement expires and possible liability for false imprisonment begins. Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation & Correction, 60 Ohio St.3d 107, 109, 573 N.E.2d 633 (1991). Of course, “An action for false imprisonment cannot be maintained where the imprisonment is in accordance with the judgment or order of a court of competent jurisdiction, unless such judgment or order is absolutely void.” Tymcio v. State of Ohio, 52 Ohio App.2d 298, 303, 6 0.0.3d 310, 369 N.E.2d 1063 (Franklin Cty.1977). This Court concluded above that Sheriff Holzberger is insulated from liability for Ms. Stone’s incarceration from November 6, 1989 to November 20, 1989. Accordingly, the Sheriff’s defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Eight (false imprisonment) of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint is hereby granted. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress The Sheriff’s defendants contend that Ms. Stone has failed to establish the required elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, they claim, they are entitled to summary judgment on Count Nine of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Pursuant to Ohio common law, “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes serious emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.” Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 369, 6 OBR 421, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983) (syllabus). Liability will be imposed “only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. at 375, 6 OBR 421, 453 N.E.2d 666. In addition, the emotional injury must be serious and of a nature that no reasonable person would be expected to endure it. Pyle v. Pyle, 11 Ohio App.3d 31, 34, 11 OBR 63, 463 N.E.2d 98 (Cuyahoga Cty.1983). In the case at bar, Dr. Julia Haw-good testified in her deposition that Ms. Stone suffers from chronic, post-traumatic stress disorder. Hawgood dep. at 100 and 119. In addition, the plaintiff has presented evidence that, since the events in question, Ms. Stone has lost substantial weight, cannot sleep, has persistent recurring nightmares and has experienced significant personality changes. See Stone dep. I at 168 and Stone dep. II at 157; see also S. Ebbing dep. at 129 and 171. Accordingly, the plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact regarding severe emotional injury. The issue, then, is whether the alleged emotional injury was intentionally or recklessly caused by the Sheriff’s defendánts’ extreme and outrageous conduct. The plaintiff has presented evidence that she was held in a cell which smelled so bad a visitor gagged, had no hot water, and was unbearably cold. See Wilmer dep. at 10 and 15. Further, there is evidence that the Sheriffs defendants, during lengthy interrogations, compared her to a Charlie Manson follower, showed her pictures of Ms. Mills’ severely decayed, nude corpse, asked numerous questions about her sexual habits and proclivities, and threatened her with extended incarceration of an indefinite length, criminal charges and strip searches if she failed to cooperate. Holzberger dep. at 224 and 233; Carpenter dep. at 152-53; Stone dep. II at 141 and 155. We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Sheriff’s defendants are liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the Sheriff’s defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Nine of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint is hereby denied. Ohio Revised Code § 2935.16 The Sheriff’s defendants contend that they owed no duty to Ms. Stone under § 2935.16. Therefore, they contend, they are entitled to summary judgment on Count Ten of plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Ohio Revised Code § 2935.16 provides: When it comes to the attention of any judge or magistrate that a prisoner is being held in any jail or place of custody in his jurisdiction without commitment from a court or magistrate, he shall forthwith, by summary process, require the officer or person in charge of such jail or place of custody to disclose to such court or magistrate, in writing, whether or not he holds the person described or identified in the process and the court under whose process the prisoner is being held. Ohio Rev.Code § 2935.16 (Page’s 1987). The plaintiff acknowledges that defendants owed her no duty under Ohio Rev.Code § 2935.16, and does not contest dismissal of that claim. Doc. 84 at 30. Accordingly, the Sheriff’s defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Ten of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint is hereby granted. Ohio Revised Code § 2935.07 The Sheriff’s defendants contend that Ms. Stone was advised of the reason for her arrest shortly after she was taken into custody. Therefore, they contend, they are entitled to summary judgment on Count Fifteen of the plaintiff's second amended complaint. Ohio Revised Code § 2935.07 requires an arresting officer to inform an arrestee of the reason for the arrest and the authority upon which the arrest is based. The Ohio Supreme Court, in interpreting § 2935.07, stated, “Where probable cause exists for an arrest by a police officer, the failure to notify the accused of the cause of his arrest does not render the arrest illegal if he is notified of the offense with which he is charged soon after he is taken into custody.” State v. Fairbanks, 32 Ohio St.2d 34, 35, 61 0.0.2d 241, 289 N.E.2d 352 (1972) (syllabus para. 4). At her deposition, Ms. Stone admitted that Sheriff Holzberger told her the reason for her arrest shortly after she was taken into custody: Q. And you indicated he never , told you that night what you were under arrest for or why you were being held. A. Later that night, yes. Q. What did he tell you? A. Something ... aft * * sis * * Q. Maybe my question was so simple that you didn’t understand it. Would you read the question back to her? (Record read by reporter) A. I believe that night after we were at the Sheriffs Department that he told me that he was going to hold me as a material witness. Stone dep. I at 63-64. Therefore, Sheriff Holzberger satisfied his obligation to inform her of the basis for her arrest. Accordingly, the Sheriffs defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Fifteen of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint is hereby granted. Intimidation of a Witness The Sheriff’s defendants and the Butler County Commissioners contend that Ohio Revised Code § 2921.03 is inapplicable to the case at bar. Therefore, they claim, they are entitled to summary judgment on Count Seventeen of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Ohio Revised Code § 2921.03 provides, “No person, knowingly and by force or by unlawful threat of harm to any person or property, shall attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder a public servant, party official, or witness in the discharge of his duty.” Ohio Rev.Code § 2921.03(A) (Page’s 1987). Violation of this section is a third degree felony. Ohio Rev.Code § 2921.03(B). This statute is indeed inapplicable to the case at bar. First, § 2921.03 is a criminal statute. There is no automatic civil liability for violation of a criminal statute. Second, the Sheriff’s defendants did not attempt to hinder Ms. Stone in the discharge of her duty as a witness. If the plaintiff’s allegations are true, the defendants used inappropriate means in an attempt to force Ms. Stone to discharge her duties as a witness. Such conduct, if outrageous enough, may be actionable as intentional infliction of emotional distress, but § 2921.03 simply does not impose civil liability under these circumstances. Third, in opposition to the Sheriff’s defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim, the plaintiff simply states, “It plainly is unlawful for law enforcement personnel to make groundless threats of criminal prosecution against a witness, if the witness does not ‘tell us what we want to hear.’ ” Doc. 84 at 28