Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER REVERCOMB, District Judge. The Court has before it three post-verdict motions on behalf of defendants Kevin F. Williams-Davis, Anthony T. Nugent, Alba D. Restrepo, Darryl D. Williams, and Joyce W. Boyd. These motions are, respectively, 1) a Motion to Dismiss, Or in the Alternative, For New Trial, in which all five defendants join; 2) a Motion for New Trial, And/Or Judgment of Acquittal, N.O.V., filed by defendant Joyce W. Boyd; and 3) a Motion to Dismiss, filed by defendant Darryl D. Williams. Each motion pertains to what has come to be known as the first “R Street trial.” I. BACKGROUND This trial grew out of a lengthy investigation of a drug trafficking conspiracy known as the “R Street Organization,” which operated chiefly in northeast Washington, D.C., between 1983 and March 26, 1991. On September 25, 1991, a federal grand jury returned a 115-count superseding indictment naming 24 defendants as members of this conspiracy. The indictment charged each defendant with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (“RICO”), conspiracy to violate RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 846. Four defendants—Kevin F. Williams-Davis, Anthony T. Nugent, Darryl Williams, and Jeffrey Williams—were also charged with operating a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 et tseq., the so-called “drug kingpin” statute. Each defendant was also named in two asset-forfeiture counts. Finally, each defendant was charged with one or moi’e substantive crimes, which included narcotics distribution, possession with intent to distribute narcotics, murder, armed robbery, money laundering, and various other offenses associated with drug trafficking. The R Street case represented the first attempt by the United States Attorney to use federal racketeering laws against a neighborhood drug gang in the District of Columbia. The unprecedented use of RICO against so many defendants in a single indictment and the massive amount of evidence accumulated by the government guaranteed that any trial would be a lengthy one. The demands on the justice system in terms of cost and expenditure of time would be heavy. To avoid some of the case management problems associated with “megatrials,” the Court on December 13, 1991, severed the case into four trials. After lengthy hearings on numerous pretrial motions, the first group of five defendants proceeded to trial in February, 1992. The Court conducted voir dire and impaneled a jury on February 18 and 19, 1992. The first R Street trial proved not only lengthy, but acrimonious as well. Relations between several defense counsel and the lead prosecutor grew increasingly strained as the trial wore on. Counsel for Anthony Nugent in particular resorted almost daily to vitriolic attacks upon the integrity and professionalism of the government investigators and law enforcement officers, including the lead prosecutor in the case, the tone and decibel level of which are not fully reflected in the trial record. The lead prosecutor was occasionally provoked to respond in kind. Personality conflicts among certain members of the jury panel also surfaced at different times during the trial. When the jurors proved unable to resolve these conflicts, the Court, after consulting with all counsel on the record, obtaining their agreement, and interviewing the individual jurors in question, and as a last resort to avoid a mistrial, excused two members of the panel during the course of the trial. Other jurors had to be excused during the trial for medical or other personal reasons. After a trial lasting over four months, the jury was instructed and began deliberations on July 6, 1992. Unanimous verdicts were returned on July 21, 1992, and July 23, 1992. The jury acquitted on the RICO and RICO conspiracy counts and on several specific substantive counts, but otherwise convicted each of the five defendants of drug conspiracy and the other drug trafficking and money laundering counts with which he or she had been charged. In addition, defendants. Kevin Williams-Davis, Anthony Nugent and Darryl Williams were convicted of the CCE violation alleged in Count 4 and of second-degree murder for the death of Leon Clea. The jurors were individually polled and each assented to the verdicts as read by the foreperson. II. THE POST-VERDICT MOTION ON JURY CONTAMINATION Before the jury was discharged, several defense counsel requested permission to speak to the jurors about the trial. The Court responded by advising jurors that they were free not to speak to anyone about the trial if they chose but that there would be no prohibition on speaking either. See Tr. July 23, 1992, at 89. Defense counsel subsequently obtained affidavits from jurors Shalita Isaac, Wayne Scott, and Frank Garnett, and from alternate jurors Cheri Dews and Pearl Fleming. This joint post-verdict motion followed. Defendants seek a new trial on grounds of juror misconduct, which they allege was rife throughout the trial. As discussed in the conclusion below, the Court believes, on the basis of juror statements to the press after the trial, that these allegations of misconduct are motivated in no small measure by unease on the part of these jurors over the substantial sentences defendants are likely to receive if their convictions are upheld. Nevertheless, relying chiefly on allegations contained in the five juror affidavits, defendants claim that the following instances of misconduct occurred and irretrievably tainted the verdicts: 1) That the jurors read and discussed two articles in the Washington Post containing information about the R Street Organization not in evidence. 2) That, prior to deliberations, two jurors visited the R Street and Lincoln Road area, the site of many of the illegal acts at issue in this trial. 3) That one juror failed to disclose, in response to a question at the initial voir dire, that he had once lived in the R Street and Lincoln Road neighborhood. 4) That another juror, subsequently elected foreperson, failed to disclose, in response to a question at the initial voir dire, that she had a criminal record, verbally threatened and abused other jurors during deliberations, distorted communications between herself and the Court, and refused to make inquiries requested by other jurors. 5) That this same juror engaged in a predeliberation “campaign” to have nonconforming jurors struck from the jury. 6) That the jury foreperson discussed the trial with her husband and conveyed to other jurors his view that the jury should “nail” the defendants and send them to jail. 7) That the jury foreperson took notes during the trial and consulted a dictionary for a definition of the word “enterprise,” allegedly to convince other jurors that an enterprise existed. 8) That the Marshals blocked the requests of some jurors to inform the Court of their complaints about the foreperson and other jurors, and that improper communications otherwise occurred between the Marshals and the jurors. 9) That the jurors regularly discussed the case throughout the trial, contrary to the Court’s repeated instructions. 10) That one juror was put in fear about the trial because she perceived that her home was under surveillance. 11) That, during deliberations, a sitting juror discussed with an alternate the foreperson’s views of the RICO charges, his own attempts to contact the Court, and the alternate’s views of forfeiture. 12) That the Court committed error in dismissing, on medical grounds, a sitting juror against his will after deliberations began and at a time when the jury was alleged deadlocked on defendants’ guilt. The Court will review each of these allegations below. Before doing so, however, it is important to recall the general principles that guide post-verdict inquiries into allegations of jury misconduct. A. Scope of the Inquiry Post-verdict inquiries into juror misconduct must balance the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by an impartial jury with the long-established policy, rooted in the common law, prohibiting the admission of juror testimony to impeach a jury verdict. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117-27, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 2746-51, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987). Among the purposes for this strong policy are the promotion of finality of jury verdicts, the discouragement of harassment of jurors, the reduction of incentives for jury tampering, and the encouragement of free and open discussion among jurors. See id. at 119-20, 107 S.Ct. at 2747-48; United States v. Brooks, 677 F.2d 907, 913-24 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148 (3d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 1119, 47 L.Ed.2d 323 (1976). In adopting Fed.R.Evid. 606(b), Congress struck the balance by limiting juror testimony about the validity of a verdict to “whether extraneous prejudicial information was improj>erly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.” Fed. R.Evid. 606(b); see also Tanner, 483 U.S. at 121-25, 107 S.Ct. at 2748-50 (reviewing in detail the legislative history of Rule 606(b) and noting that Congress considered and rejected broader versions of the Rule). As our court of appeals has explained, this Rule aims “to preserve the integrity of jury deliberations by confining claims of error to events or conditions that are “improperly brought to the jury’s attention” and involve a calculated, intentional attempt to affect their outcome.” Brooks, 677 F.2d at 913-14 (citing 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence § 606[03] (1981)). In determining what is an “extraneous influence” that would fall within Rule 606(b)’s exception, this Circuit has followed the Third Circuit’s guidance: “Extraneous influence” has been construed to cover publicity received and discussed in the jury room, consideration by the jury of evidence not admitted in court, and communications or other contact between jurors and third persons, including contacts with the trial judge outside the presence of defendant and his counsel. By contrast, evidence of discussions among jurors, intimidation or harassment of one juror by another, and other intra-jury influences on the verdict is within the rule, rather than the exception, and is not competent to impeach a verdict. Gereau, 523 F.2d at 149-50 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C.Cir.1982) (quoting this passage from Gereau) United States v. Wilson, 534 F.2d 375, 378-79 (D.C.Cir.1976) (same). Thus, to impeach a jury verdict, a defendant must first establish the existence of adequate grounds to attack the verdict and come forward with competent evidence with which to do so. See Gereau, 523 F.2d at 148. Even if these burdens are met, however, the defendant is not entitled to a new trial unless there is some further showing of prejudice from the misconduct of the jury. See United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 258 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 849, 111 S.Ct. 139, 112 L.Ed.2d 106 (1990); United States v. Bruscino, 687 F.2d 938, 940 (7th Cir.1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1205, 75 L.Ed.2d 446 (1983), and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228, 103 S.Ct. 1235, 75 L.Ed.2d 468 (1983); Brooks, 677 F.2d at 913; Gereau, 523 F.2d at 148. As Judge Henry Friendly put it in a seminal opinion: The touchstone of decision in a case such as we have here is thus not the mere fact of infiltration of some molecules of extra-record matter, with the supposed consequences that the infiltrator becomes a “witness” and.the confrontation clause automatically applies, but the nature of what has been infiltrated and the probability of prejudice. United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 1373, 28 L.Ed.2d 646 (1971). When jurors have been exposed to extraneous material, the legal standard to be applied is whether there is a “reasonable possibility” that such material could have affected the verdict. See United States v. Ortiz, 942 F.2d 903, 913 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2966, 119 L.Ed.2d 587 (1992); United States v. Maree, 934 F.2d 196, 201 (9th Cir.1991); Bruscino, 687 F.2d at 940; accord Campbell, 684 F.2d at 151 (stating that a jury verdict will be upset only when “extraneous influences” ... may have improperly influenced the verdict” (emphasis added)). When the misconduct concerns juror dishonesty or an ex parte contact, a heightened standard applies and a new trial will be granted only upon a finding of “actual bias” or “actual prejudice” to the defendant. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-17, 102 S.Ct. 940, 945-46, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982); United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 634 (D.C.Cir.1992); Maree, 934 F.2d at 201 (citing United States v. Madrid, 842 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 912, 109 S.Ct. 269, 102 L.Ed.2d 256, 257 (1988)). Once these initial determinations have been made, it is the government’s burden to rebut the showing of prejudice by demonstrating that the misconduct was harmless to the defendant. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954) [Remmer I]; Butler, 822 F.2d at 1195 & n. 2. District courts have broad discretion in selecting the appropriate procedures to determine whether colorable allegations of juror misconduct have been made and, if so, whether the requisite showing of prejudice has been met. See Boylan, 898 F.2d at 258; United States v. Butler, 822 F.2d 1191, 1196 (D.C.Cir.1987); Campbell, 684 F.2d at 151. The judge may, but need not, hold a full evidentiary hearing. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 216-18, 102 S.Ct. 940, 945-47, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1981); Boylan, 898 F.2d at 258-59; Butler, 822 F.2d at 1196. Should a hearing be appropriate, the judge may, but need not, question all the jurors. Compare Boylan, 898 F.2d at 259 (all jurors interviewed) with United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1233 (2nd Cir.1983) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S.Ct. 2344, 80 L.Ed.2d 818 (1984) (only five jurors interviewed). The trial judge may, but need not, permit counsel to question and cross-examine jurors. Compare United States v. Ianniello, 740 F.Supp. 171, 180 (S.D.N.Y.) (Judge permitted defense counsel to question jurors at post-verdict hearing), rev’d on other grounds, 937 F.2d 797 (2nd Cir.1991) with Boylan, 898 F.2d at 259 (Judge did not permit direct attorney questioning at the hearing) and United States v. Caro-Quintero, 769 F.Supp. 1564, 1570 (C.D.Cal.1991) (same). The trial judge need not hold a hearing at all when there is no “clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence ... that a specific, nonspeculative impropriety has occurred which could have prejudiced the trial of a defendant.” Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234; accord United States v. Sanders, 962 F.2d 660, 669, 673-74 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 262, 121 L.Ed.2d 192 (1992); Ortiz, 942 F.2d at 912-13; Campbell, 684 F.2d at 151. In short, “[i]n these and other aspects of this problem the trial judge has broad discretion to fix the exact procedures by balancing the need to make a sufficient inquiry against the concern that the inquiry not create prejudicial effects by unduly magnifying the importance of an insignificant occurrence.” Butler, 822 F.2d at 1196. After reviewing defendants’ joint motion and the government’s opposition, the Court concluded that further investigation was required on several allegations of misconduct. These allegations, which will be discussed in greater detail below, were that the jury foreperson’s husband had made statements to her about the defendants’ guilt which she then relayed to other jurors, that another juror failed to disclose' his familiarity with the R Street and Lincoln Road area at the initial voir, dire, and that the same juror had visited that area with an alternate juror at some point during the trial. The Court held a hearing, in the presence of all counsel and the five defendants, on March 29, ■ 1993, at which the two jurors in question, Janet Jellison (the foreperson) and Carl Biggs testified under oath. In its Order to counsel scheduling the hearing, filed March 9, 1993 and subsequently amended, the Court gave notice of the procedures it intended to follow and which it did follow: the hearing was to be an evidentiary hearing limited to the specific allegations mentioned above concerning these individual jurors; counsel and defendants were to be present but would not be permitted to question the jurors; counsel were permitted, however, to submit questions in advance for the Court to ask, many of which the Court did ask; .and counsel would be permitted to make arguments and objections only after the jurors were excused. The Court believed then, and believes now, that a full-blown, evidentiary hearing, in which all the jurors would be examined by counsel and subject to cross-examination, is unnecessary in view of the specific allegations of misconduct raised by defendants, would only lead to juror harassment, and would risk the creation of “prejudicial effects by unduly magnifying the importance of ... insignificant oecurrence[s].” Id. The Court accordingly overruled the objections of defense counsel as to' the hearing’s scope and procedures. Viewed in light of Rule 606(b) and related case law, the various allegations of misconduct contained in the juror affidavits can be grouped into five categories and analyzed accordingly. The Court will first consider those allegations that the jurors were exposed to extraneous material or information prejudicial to defendants. B. Alleged Exposure to Prejudicial Extraneous Material 1. Juror Exposure to Media , Coverage of the Trial The first R Street trial attracted considerable attention in the local media. The Court regularly warned jurors as a group not to read, listen to, or watch reports about the proceedings and, when necessary, conducted individual voir dire of them after reports about the trial appeared. Nevertheless, defendants contend that two articles in the Washington Post injected extraneous prejudicial information into the deliberative process, prompting the jurors to fear for their safety and thereby improperly influencing the verdict. The first of these articles, which the Post published on its front page on March 13, 1992, reported that two prosecution witnesses had received death threats and that rambling, unsigned notices had been posted on telephone poles near R Street and Lincoln road warning other potential witnesses against “snitching.” The article ran a photograph of the notices and reported that they had been quickly removed from the telephone poles by agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). Shortly after the jurors assembled that morning, the Court undertook the following measures. See Tr. Mar. 13, 1992 (Sealed Portion). First, the jury room was inspected by the Marshals to ascertain if there were any copies of that day’s edition of the Post present (there were not). Next, the Court conducted a voir dire of each juror individually at the bench. The Court asked each juror whether he or she had read or heard any recent reports about the trial. Most said they had not. Two jurors indicated they had heard a report about threats and the Court questioned them closely about what they had heard. In response to the Court’s inquiries, both jurors stated that the reports would not affect their ability to be fair and impartial and that they would disregard what they had heard. All jurors were asked whether they would continue to avoid press reports about the trial and all indicated they would. All jurors were asked if they would base their verdict solely upon witnesses heard in the courtroom and the exhibits admitted into evidence and all indicated that they would. On May 18, 1992, the Washington Post ran a story on its front page with the headline “Enforcers Are D.C.’s Dealers of Death,” which defendants also claim tainted the jury’s verdict. This article was not about the R Street Organization as such, but rather focused in general on turf battles between rival drug gangs and the role of drug gangs in the city’s homicide rate. The article, however, did mention defendant Anthony Nugent by name and alluded to three other defendants in this case as examples of “enforcers” who had allegedly committed homicides to advance their drag trafficking activities. The specific references to R Street defendants appeared in one paragraph on page A6 and summarized, in the most general terms, allegations that had already been made in open court and in the indictment. That morning, before the trial resumed, counsel for Mr. Nugent addressed the Court in detail about the Post article and moved for a mistrial, in which three other defendants joined. See Tr. May 18, 1992, at 2-9. Once again, the Court conducted voir dire at the bench in the presence of one of the prosecutors and one of the defense counsel. Each juror was brought in individually and asked whether he or she had heard or read anything recently which they related in any way to the trial. None stated that he or she had. Once again, the Court asked each juror if he or she would continue to avoid reading or hearing reports about the case and would base the verdict solely upon the evidence admitted at trial. Each said that he or she would. After the last juror returned to the jury room, the Court stated on the record that it accepted the jurors’ statements that they had seen nothing in the press about the trial. The Court then denied the motion for a mistrial. See id. at 17-19. When the jury was subsequently brought into the courtroom, but before trial resumed, the Court advised them as a group that should any of them inadvertently see or hear anything that they would relate to the trial, they should bring it to the Court’s attention. See id. at 24. The five juror affidavits on which defendants rely contain statements claiming that the jurors read and discussed these articles notwithstanding their denials to the Court. However, only one affiant, Frank Garnett, claims to have read either of the two Post articles himself, in sharp contrast to his voir dire responses at the time the articles appeared. See Garnett Aff. ¶¶ 3, 5. Alternate jurors Dews and Fleming and jurors Isaac and Scott claim only that others read and discussed the articles in question. See Dews Aff. ¶ 3; Fleming Aff. ¶ 5; Isaac Aff. ¶ 3; Scott Aff. ¶ 3. The Court does not believe that the jurors’ declarations on this issue meet the evidentiary burdens to warrant either further inquiry by the Court or a finding that the articles could have affected the verdict. First, the Court finds credible the jurors’ individual responses to its voir dire questions. The Court conducted individual voir dire promptly after the publication or airing of the stories in question and well before counsel had the opportunity to approach individual jurors about the trial. The Court observed the demeanor of each juror closely at the time and is satisfied that each answered truthfully. Indeed, the Court attaches great weight to each juror’s unequivocal assurances, made in response to repeated and direct questions from the Court, that he or she would rely solely on the evidence at trial in reaching a verdict. For the reasons set forth in the conclusion below, the Court views as particularly unreliable juror Garnett’s statements to the contrary in his affidavit. See Garnett Aff. ¶ 3, 5. It should be noted that courts have found individual voir dire to be “the preferred method to determine ‘what extra-record infoimation was conveyed [to the jury] and the manner of its conveyance.’ ” United States v. Small, 891 F.2d 53, 56 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 139-40 (3d Cir.1987)); see also Caro-Quintero, 769 F.Supp. at 1573 (finding juror’s individual voir dire statements to be more credible than his post-verdict declarations). Second, neither article contained extraneous, extra-judicial information about defendants that could have prejudiced their right to a fair trial. The March 13,1992 Washington Post article would have told the jurors nothing about defendants that they hadn’t learned already from the testimony of Rosalind Cherry and other witnesses or from the prosecutor’s opening statement. Moreover, the article does not suggest that defendants were the source of the alleged threats to witnesses and prospective witnesses. Prior' to the publication of the May 18, 1992 Washington Post article, the jury had heard extensive testimony about the involvement of Anthony Nugent, Kevin Williams-Davis and Darryl Williams in the shooting death of Alton Clea. They had heard the prosecutor and other witnesses characterize the fight that led up to the killing of Mr. Clea as having arisen over a “turf’ dispute between defendants and a rival drug gang. The jurors had also heard the government’s allegations that the 1989 shoot-out at the Maryland Avenue auto body shop owned by Rick Bailey, involving Anthony Nugent and Kevin Williams-Davis and resulting in the death of Francis Scrivner and the wounding of others, was in retaliation for the death of Mr. Nu-gent’s brother Sean Martin and a result of an ongoing turf battle in the drug trade between the R Street Organization and a rival drug gang allegedly led by members of the Bailey family. Contrary to defendants’ assertion in their Motion, the May 18 article does not say that Mr. Nugent was a suspect in three additional murders unconnected with the R Street trial, but rather states that he was “a suspect in three other attempted killings,” as indicated in the indictment and the prosecutor’s opening statements concerning the Maryland Avenue shoot-out. Washington Post, May 18, 1992, at A6. In short, neither of these articles contained “ ‘massively inflammatory revelations of prior felony convictions, past criminal conduct, [or] admitted and alleged improprieties’ typical of news accounts deemed to be prejudicial.” United States v. Boylan, 698 F.Supp. 376, 389-90 (D.Mass.1988) (quoting United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1117 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911, 90 S.Ct. 2201, 26 L.Ed.2d 565 (1970)), aff'd, 898 F.2d 230 (1st Cir.1990); see also Dowling, 814 F.2d at 138 (“Information about prior criminal convictions or activities is the kind of information that carries great potential for prejudicing the jury”). The focus of the March 13 article concerned no issues that were material to defendants’ guilt or innocence. See United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1185 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845, 111 S.Ct. 130, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). “To resort to the metaphor that the moment a juror passes a fraction of an inch beyond the record evidence, he becomes ‘an unsworn witness’ is to ignore centuries of history [of the trial jury] and assume an answer rather than to provide the basis for one.” McMann, 435 F.2d at 817. What little extra-judicial information each article did contain about defendants was merely duplicative of evidence already introduced in open court: Exposure to such information, when it occurs, has been found by a number of courts of appeals, including ours, to be harmless. See Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 700 (9th Cir.1990); Frank v. Brookhart, 877 F.2d 671, 675 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1027, 110 S.Ct. 736, 107 L.Ed.2d 754 (1990); United States v. Guida, 792 F.2d 1087, 1094 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Treadwell, 760 F.2d 327, 339 (D.C.Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064, 106 S.Ct. 814, 88 L.Ed.2d 788 (1986). Third, the statements in each affidavit that jurors became fearful as a result of reading these articles or for other reasons fall squarely within Rule 606(b)’s prohibition on juror testimony that purports to describe each juror’s subjective state of mind or emotions. See Brooks, 677 F.2d at 913 (Rule 606(b) bars jurors from testifying about the subjective effects that outside influences may have had upon them). These statements are thus inadmissible. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, the Court does not believe that the likelihood of prejudice has been shown so as to shift the burden to the government to establish harmlessness. See Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377, 379-80, 76 S.Ct. 425, 426-27, 100 L.Ed. 435 (1956) [Remmer II] (Finding a presumption of prejudice based upon “the paucity of information relating to the entire situation” and the “kind of facts alleged,” i.e., a bribe); Boylan, 898 F.2d at 260 (Applying Remmer to different kinds of facts and finding no presumption of prejudice). Even if a showing of prejudice could be found on the facts as alleged, however, the Court believes that the government has established harmlessness based upon the content of the articles as discussed above and the overwhelming weight of the evidence against defendants. See Caro-Quintero, 769 F.Supp. at 1574 (citing Hughes, 898 F.2d at 700). In view of these considerations, the Court is satisfied that the procedures it employed were sufficient and that no post-verdict hearing on media coverage during the trial is warranted. 2. Juror Use of a Dictionary In their joint motion, defendants recite numerous instances of alleged misconduct by the jury foreperson, most of which will be discussed later in this Opinion. One alleged instance of misconduct, however, should be mentioned here. Relying on the affidavit of juror Frank Garnett, defendants claim that, during deliberations, the foreperson consulted a dictionary definition of the term “enterprise” and read that definition to the other jurors to convince them that an enterprise existed. See Defs.’ Mot. at 20; Garnett Aff. ¶ 14. A jury’s unauthorized use of a dictionary is error, but it is not prejudicial per se. See United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1251 (6th Cir.) (citing United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 866 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871, 100 S.Ct. 148, 62 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837, 106 S.Ct. 114, 88 L.Ed.2d 93 (1985). Unlike the situation in which jurors improperly consider facts or materials not in evidence, in this instance “the danger [is] that jurors will,use the dictionary to construct their own definitions of legal terms which do not accurately or fairly reflect applicable law.” United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 671 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 943, 104 S.Ct. 1926, 80 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984), and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 863, 105 S.Ct. 200, 83 L.Ed.2d 131 (1988); see also United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566, 568 (8th Cir.1988) (stating that the use of a dictionary impinges on the court’s function at trial and that therefore “it remains within the province of the judge to determine whether this conduct distorted the jury’s understanding of the law to the prejudice of the defendant”). Although the Court can find no case in this circuit discussing juror use of a dictionary, there is no reason to think that our court of appeals would apply a standard at variance from those courts of appeals which have considered the problem. See Treadwell, 760 F.2d at 339 (citing Dallago v. United States, 427 F.2d 546, 553, 560 (D.C.Cir.1969)). In deciding whether to uphold a trial court’s determination on the issue of prejudice, therefore, courts in review have paid careful attention to the entire circumstances surrounding the disclosure that a juror or jurors may have considered dictionary definitions of terms during deliberations, including the legal significance of the terms in question. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 936 F.2d 221, 226 (6th Cir.1991) (jurors may have looked up “manager,” “organizer,” and “supervisor” during deliberations resulting in convictions for conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine and aiding and abetting in the importation of cocaine); Cheyenne, 855 F.2d at 567-68 (jurors looked up “callous” and “wanton” during deliberations resulting in conviction for second-degree murder); Griffith, 756 F.2d at 1250-51 (jurors looked up “organization” and “organize” during deliberations resulting in conviction for CCE); Duncan, 598 F.2d at 866 (jurors looked up “motive” and “intent” during deliberations resulting in conviction for electronic eavesdropping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b), conspiracy and misapplication of bank funds). In this instance, determination of the legal significance of the term in question disposes of the question of prejudice. There was no prejudice to defendants because the jury acquitted them on the only charges for which the term “enterprise” was legally significant. Both RICO and RICO conspiracy require proof of the existence of an “enterprise” and the term is expressly defined by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The Court instructed the jury on the statutory definition of “enterprise” while instructing them on the first element of a RICO offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). See Tr. July 6, 1992, at 46. The Court referred the jury to this definition in its instructions on RICO conspiracy. See id. at 69. Whether a dictionary definition of the term was at variance with the statute or not became moot once the jury acquitted the four defendants of RICO and RICO conspiracy. In contrast, “enterprise” is not a legally significant term in connection with the CCE charges against defendants Nugent, Williams-Davis and Darryl Williams on which the jury returned guilty verdicts. Although the statute codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848 is titled “continuing criminal enterprise,” it has no “enterprise” element and the jurors were given no instructions that they had to find that a separate enterprise as such existed. See Tr. July 6, 1992, at 87, 92. Rather, the jurors were instructed inter alia that they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the defendants charged in the CCE count committed a “continuing series of violations” of federal drug laws that included the drug conspiracy charged in Count Three. The jury verdict forms clearly indicate that the jurors found such a series of violations. Thus, “enterprise” is simply not a legal term when considered in the context of a CCE charge and juror consideration of a dictionary definition of that word does not implicate the dangers usually associated with this form of juror misconduct. Accordingly, the Court can find no prejudice to defendants on this issue. 3. Unauthorized Inspection of the R Street and Lincoln Road Areas The final credible allegation of juror exposure to extraneous material is found in the affidavit of Shalita Isaac. She states as follows: ... Around the second month of trial, Carl LBiggs] drove me to R Street, P Street and around to where Rayful Edmond sold his drugs because I didn’t know where it was at. Carl used to live in 11 R Street. As we drove, he would say this is where Kevin [Williams-Davis] used to live, this is where [Anthony] Nugent used to live. Carl could place their faces from growing up on R Street. Isaac Aff. ¶ 12. The references to P Street and Rayful Edmond pertain to other drug organizations or conspiracies not involved in this trial. Nevertheless, the statement raises two kinds of concerns about the jury which the Court believed required further investigation: Whether, during .the trial, two jurors visited an area of Washington, D.C. in which many of the criminal acts that were the subject of the trial were alleged to have occurred; and whether juror Biggs failed to disclose his familiarity with the R Street and Lincoln Road area at voir dire during jury selection. The first concern goes to whether these jurors were exposed to prejudicial extraneous information about the defendants and will be addressed here; the second goes to juror bias and will be discussed later. Both concerns involving juror Biggs were the subjects of inquiry at the March 29 hearing. Drawing on questions previously submitted by counsel and the Court’s own questions, the Court had the following exchange with juror Biggs about the allegation that he and juror Isaac had visited an area where many of the crimes in the first trial were alleged to have taken place: Q. Mr. Biggs, after your selection as a juror in this case, did you at any time go to the R Street neighborhood or Lincoln Road neighborhood? A. Yes.' Q. When did you visit the area and did you visit it with one of the other jurors sitting in the case? A. One evening after leaving court, I was taking one of the jurors which was Shalita Issacs [sic], we were out riding, and I took her all over D.C. I was out riding that evening, and we stopped and had food and I took her home. Q. Did you visit the Lincoln Road and R Street area at that time? A. Yes, we rode through the area. Q. Did you visit the area on more than one occasion? A. No. Q. To the extent that you can, what were your reasons for visiting the R Street area with another juror during the trial? A. She wanted me to take her out in D.C. and r[ide]. She wanted me to go out with her that evening after leaving court so I dropped her off home afterwards. Q. Do you believe that your—and I’ll ask you this again—do you believe that your visit to the R Street neighborhood during the trial had any negative or adverse effect on your ability as a juror to render a fair and impartial verdict? A. No. Q. Do you believe, notwithstanding your visit to the R Street neighborhood, that you were able to follow the court’s instructions and to base your verdict on the evidence and the court’s instructions? A. Yes. Q. What was your conversation with the other juror during your ride through that area? A. I told her, I said I’m taking you for a ride this evening and I will drop you off at home. Do not go into these areas because when I first came to this area, Washington area, my cousin instructed me on the days that I was off not to be in certain areas of D.C. Hearing Tr. Mar. 29, 1993, at 10-12. Having observed his demeanor during this colloquy, the Court found Mr. Biggs to be a credible witness. Although there are few published decisions analyzing unauthorized visits by jurors to the scene of the crime, this species of misconduct plainly falls in the category of exposure to extraneous information and should be analyzed accordingly. Defendants having shown that error of this kind occurred, the Court must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that juror Biggs’s visit could have improperly influenced the verdict. See Campbell, 684 F.2d at 151; Caro-Quintero, 769 F.Supp. at 1574. The Court is satisfied that there is no such possibility of prejudice to defendants from this incident. The incident consisted of a single visit by two jurors to the R Street and Lincoln Road area during the course of a long trial. The visit consisted of a “ride through” the area during an evening’s outing “all over D.C.” that included a stop for a meal. Ms. Isaac’s affidavit indicates that Mr. Biggs did nothing more than point out where individual defendants lived as they drove thi’ough the neighborhood. There is no evidence that they conducted their own investigation to test the credibility of key witnesses or reenacted any of the crimes they had heard about during the trial. See Hill v. United States, 622 A.2d 680 (D.C. Mar. 30, 1993) (holding that a juror’s visit to scene of crime to make his own test of lighting conditions bearing on reliability of a police officer’s identification of defendant tainted the verdict); People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 423 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463, 399 N.E.2d 51, 53 (1979) (discussing cases in which the jurors had engaged in similar conduct or reenactments, which were deemed inherently prejudicial). Given that, during the trial, the jurors had repeatedly viewed enlargements of aerial photographs and street photographs of R Street as it appears today, it is hard to see how they could have learned any new, material fact potentially prejudicial to defendants from simply driving down the street. The Court does not accept defense counsel’s characterization of Mr. Biggs’s concluding comment about not going into “certain areas of D.C.” as reflecting bias toward defendants, see Hearing Tr. Mar. 29, 1993, at 27, especially in view of his testimony that his visit to the area did not adversely affect his ability to be fair and impartial and that he was able to base his verdict on the evidence and the court’s instructions. “[Sluch testimony is not ‘inherently suspect.’ ” Butler, 822 F.2d at 1197 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. at 946 n. 7) (emphasis in original). As for Ms. Isaac, she was later excused from the jury and did not deliberate. In short, the Court discerns no likelihood of prejudice to defendants from this incident. 4. Juror Discussions of the Trial Prior To Deliberations The juror affidavits indicate that, contrary to the Court’s repeated instructions, the jurors frequently discussed the case during the trial. See Dews Aff. ¶ 6; Fleming Aff. ¶ 2; Isaac Aff. ¶¶ 3, 5, 8; Garnett Aff. ¶ 10; Scott Aff. ¶ 5. Defendants argue prejudicial error from these discussions under the rubric of consideration of extra-judicial information. See Defs.’ Mem. at 13-15. Yet, with one exception, the portions of the affidavits devoted to these discussions refer to no specific extra-judicial information material to defendants’ guilt or innocence. The exception is the reference in juror Isaac’s affidavit to a Washington Post article published April 23, 1992. The article was concerned solely with the previous day’s testimony about defendants’ spending habits and lifestyles, and included testimony about a pair of alligator shoes costing approximately $2,000 which were suggested to have belonged to Kevin Williams-Davis. The contents of the article are merely duplicative of evidence previously presented at trial. Because no prejudice could have occurred from this newspaper article, and because the Court was concerned not to magnify the importance in jurors’ minds of news accounts that merely repeated in a neutral way what had been previously stated or entered into evidence in open court, no voir dire was conducted after the publication of the article and no further investigation is necessary. Otherwise, the affidavits clearly indicate that what the jurors talked about during breaks and on other occasions during the trial was based on what they observed in court. Defendants nevertheless argue that such conversations, within the jury itself, constitute “improper, extraneous -influence” by one juror over another. See Defs.’ Mem. at 14. It should be noted that defendants do not cite a single case in support of this proposition. Our court of appeals has firmly rejected the argument that evidence of intrajury discussions or pressure is admissible as an extraneous influence under the exception to Rule 606(b): “[E]vidence of discussions among jurors, intimidation or harassment of one juror by another, and other intra-jury influences on the verdict is within the rule, rather than the exception, and is not competent to impeach a verdict.” Campbell, 684 F.2d at 151 (quoting Wilson, 534 F.2d at 378-79). The fact that these conversations took place prior to deliberations does not transform them into extraneous influences or otherwise render them admissible absent indications that truly extraneous material was discussed. See United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1382-83 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 978-79 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 2030, 60 L.Ed.2d 395 (1979); see also Tan ner, 483 U.S. at 120-22, 107 S.Ct. at 2747-49 (applying the external/internal distinction of Rule 606(b) to misconduct prior to deliberations). For that reason, most of the juroraffiants’ statements about pre-deliberation conversations about the trial are inadmissible and further investigation at a hearing is uncalled for. 5. Removal of Alternate Juror Fleming A final instance of juror exposure to extra-judicial information, according to defendants, pertains to the excusal of alternate juror Pearl Fleming on April 29, 1992. Both Ms. Fleming and defendants now assert that her excusal from the jury was the result of a pre-deliberation “campaign” or “plan” by juror Janet Jellison to remove nonconforming jurors. See Defs.’ Mem. at 4, 17; Fleming Aff. ¶ 3. At the outset, it must be reiterated that her testimony as to harassment or intimidation is not admissible to impeach the verdict. See Campbell, 684 F.2d at 151. In any case, the assertions about the circumstances of her excusal are meritless. The trial record clearly shows that Ms. Fleming was excused because, after receiving complaints from other jurors about her continuing abusive and discourteous conduct toward them, counsel and the Court believed a mistrial would result if she remained. See Tr, Apr. 29, 1992 (Sealed Portion). The Court advised all counsel of problems involving Ms. Fleming after receiving a letter to the Court, drafted by Ms. Jellison on behalf of other jurors, which recounted in detail specific recent incidents of abusive behavior on the part of Ms. Fleming in addition to her repeated use of foul language directed at members of the jury. The letter further indicated that relations between this alternate and other members of the panel were “reaching a breaking point.” Id. at 2. The letter was shown to all counsel. All counsel who spoke at the bench conference agreed that the document evinced belligerence on the part of Ms. Fleming toward her fellow jurors. Several counsel voiced concerns about a mistrial and the possibility that future confrontations involving this alternate could become physical. See id. at 5-6. No doubts were expressed at the time about the seriousness or sincerity of the allegations contained in the letter and there were no objections to the Court’s interviewing, and excusing, Ms. Fleming. See id. at 7-10. Ms. Fleming herself confirmed that she had been involved in confrontations and arguments with other jurors. See id. at 11. She attributed this friction, however, to other female jurors being “jealous” of her and another juror, and to those other jurors “[t]alking about us and things like that, calling names and stuff.” Id. at 11, 12. Although Ms. Fleming stated she could get along with the rest of the jury, the Court concluded that she must be excused to avoid the real possibility of a mistrial. See id. at 12-14. Although Ms. Fleming’s words and demeanor confirmed some of the allegations contained in the letter, there was not the slightest hint that disagreements over the guilt or innocence of defendants were in any way connected to complaints about her behavior. None of the other juror affiants so much as suggests that the excusal of Ms. Fleming was contrived at by Ms. Jellison or concerned substantive matters at trial. It must be remembered, moreover, that Ms. Fleming was an alternate juror and would not have deliberated. There is no likelihood, therefore, that her removal could have been prejudicial to defendants. Thus, the Court finds there to be no credible evidence that Ms. Fleming was excused because she was a nonconforming juror as regards the guilt or innocence of defendants or that her removal was the fruit of a strategem on Ms. Jellison’s part. Having been informed at the time about juror complaints concerning Ms. Fleming, having investigated the matter during the trial, and having observed her demeanor during voir dire at the bench, the Court is firmly of the view that her assertions now to the contrary are quite simply incredible. See Fleming Aff. ¶¶ 2, 3. Rather, the sole reason for excusing Ms. Fleming, as the record shows, was to avoid a mistrial occasioned by abusive behavior which her fellow jurors were no longer able to tolerate. This incident, in other words, in no way involved an inquiry into divisions among the jurors over the merits of the government’s case or otherwise implicated well-settled principles concerning jury coercion. See United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1365-66 (11th Cir.) (citing cases), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907, 109 S.Ct. 3192, 105 L.Ed.2d 701 (1989). C. Alleged Prejudicial Ex Parte Contacts Involving Jurors A second category of juror misconduct claimed by defendants involves allegedly prejudicial extraneous influences on the jury, such as those involving ex parte contacts with third persons. Such influences do not involve “any fact in controversy or any law applicable to the case,” Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 121, 104 S.Ct. 453, 457, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (per curiam), and thus do not involve the risk that a juror may become an “unsworn witness” whom the defendant cannot confront. See McMann, 435 F.2d at 817-18. For this reason, courts are not to grant a new trial unless it is determined that the ex parte contact resulted in actual prejudice to the defendant. See Madrid, 842 F.2d at 1093-94 (discussing Rushen, supra, and Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. at 945). 1. Improper Communications between Jurors and Marshals Defendants claim that improper communications occurred between the Marshals and jurors in several respects. First, they claim that the Marshals Office failed to inform the Court that some jurors had read the May 18, 1992 Washington Post article in which Anthony Nugent was identified as a gang enforcer. See Defs.’ Mem. at 20. Second, defendants claim that the Marshals refused to pass notes from individual jurors to the Court complaining of the foreperson’s conduct. See id. at 20-21. Third, defendants complain that the Marshals failed promptly to notify the Court that juror Isaac had spoken to a person purporting to be a cousin of the defendants. See id. at 21-22. Put simply, none of these examples involves an improper, ex parte contact between the jurors and the Marshals. None involved, for example, a Marshal’s expression of his opinion to the jurors about the character of any of the defendants, see McMann, 435 F.2d at 816 (citing cases), or a Marshal telling the jury “that it will be locked up till it renders its verdict, however long that may take.” Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 949 F.2d 914, 917 (7th Cir.1991). Moreover, no prejudice could have resulted from any of these incidents. In the first instance, as discussed at length above, the Court ascertained on individual voir dire that exposure to the May 18 article was minimal at best and that each juror would disregard media reports of the trial. Second, even though the Marshals kept the Court well-informed as to discontents and personality conflicts among individual jurors, complaints about the foreperson’s supposedly abusive conduct toward other jurors pertain to internal jury matters and, as such, are inadmissible in considering whether defendants must receive a new trial. See Campbell, 684 F.2d at 151. Third, the Marshals did alert the Court to Ms. Isaac’s contacts with the third party and the Court interviewed her about them. Tr. July 6,1992 (Sealed Portion), at 2, 8-11. There appeared to be no basis for the claim that this third person, with whom Ms. Isaac at one time had a relationship, was a cousin of any of the defendants or otherwise known to them. See Tr. July 6, 1992 (Sealed Portion), at 9, 13-14. The opinions of this third person which Ms. Isaac states in her affidavit she recounted to juror Scott—that defendant Darryl Williams’ I.Q. really was 67 as his attorney alleged and that the government’s allegations about the R Street defendants weren’t true—would if anything aid defendants rather than prejudice them. See Isaac Aff. ¶ 14; Scott Aff. ¶ ll. Any effect of these remarks on juror Isaac herself is irrelevant because she was excused later that day and did not deliberate. See Tr. July 6, 1992 (Sealed Portion), at 18. 2. Alleged Surveillance .of a Juror’s Home Defendants assert that an “extraneous influence” occurred as a result of the alleged surveillance of juror Isaac’s home. See Defs.’ Mem. at 15. Juror Isaac’s affidavit recounts one incident during this lengthy trial when some unidentified person in an unidentified car parked in front of her house for unknown reasons. See Isaac Aff. ¶ 6. Defendants have come forward with no competent evidence to link this incident to the trial and Ms. Isaac merely states that she was scared. Any inference, therefore, that Ms. Isaac was somehow being threatened in connection with her service as a juror in the case is purely speculative. Even if a connection to the trial could be established, however, no prejudice could occur because this juror was excused prior to deliberations and defendants have not shown how the incident could have influenced any sitting juror. 3. Contacts with Alternate Jurors During Deliberations Juror Isaac also claims that she spoke with juror Carl Biggs by telephone during deliberations and discussed juror Biggs concerns about the influence of the jury foreperson. See Defs.’ Mem. at 23. During this conversation, Ms. Isaac claims that Mr. Biggs disclosed the foreperson’s position on the RICO counts. See Isaac Aff. ¶ 13. She further states that “I told Carl not to take their houses and cars during the forfeiture because Nugent has children and they needed something to live in. Carl said he was going to do the best he could.” Id. Such ex parte contacts are clearly error. Defendants argue, however, that the error in this instance was tantamount to allowing an alternate juror into the jury room during deliberations and thus is plain error under the per se rule followed in the Second, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which require an automatic declaration of a mistrial. See Defs.’ Mem. at 23-24 (citing United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Nash, 414 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940, 90 S.Ct. 375, 24 L.Ed.2d 242 (1969); Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d 313 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 802, 87 S.Ct. 10, 17 L.Ed.2d 49 (1966); United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir.1978); United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964)). But this rule is no longer the law. In United States v. Olano, the Supreme Court rejected arguments that the mere presence of an alternate juror during deliberations, while a clear violation of Fed. R.Crim.P. 24(c), either affected substantial rights per se or was inherently prejudicial. See United States v. Olano, — U.S. -, ---, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1779-83, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). The Supreme Court held instead that “[t]he presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations is not the kind of error that ‘affects substantial rights’ independent of its prejudicial impact.” Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1779. Hence, it was error for the court in review (in this case, a panel of the Ninth Circuit) to reverse convictions when defendants had “made no specific showing that the alternate jurors in this case either participated in the jury’s deliberations or ‘chilled’ deliberation by the regular jurors.” Id. at —-—, 113 S.Ct. at 1781. In any event, the analogy urged by defendants is severely strained. The Court believes that, even if the rule followed in the Virginia Erection Corporation line of cases were still good law, it would be inapposite here. As in Olano, supra, those cases involved situations in which an alternate juror was permitted to retire with the other jurors and be present during deliberations, in violation of Rule 24(c). See Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 124 [7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867, 102 S.Ct. 332, 70 L.Ed.2d 169 (1981). The contact alleged here involved a single telephone call between a sitting juror and Ms. Isaac after she had been excused and was no longer participating in the proceedings. Ms. Isaac was at no time present in the jury room during deliberations and her contact was limited to a single juror rather than to the jury as a whole. Although juror Biggs may have divulged to her what he understood some of the foreperson’s views to be, there was no intrusion by a stranger in violation of the privacy and secrecy of the jury’s deliberations that would trigger the analysis of a Rule 24(c) error set forth in Olano. See Olano, — U.S. at —, —-—, 113 S.Ct. at 1779, 1781; accord Johnson, 650 F.2d at 124-25 (stating that the privacy and secrecy of the jury is protected so as to foster free debate among the jurors). The Court, therefore, rejects defendants’ argument that any plain error rule could apply to these facts. In short, the analysis of this ex parte contact is the same as it would be had Mr. Biggs discussed the case during deliberations with a friend, or a family member, or a spectator, or the judge. That is, the Court should not grant a new trial unless the contact resulted in actual prejudice to the defendants. See Maree, 934 F.2d at 201. And here there was none. Ms. Isaac’s affidavit indicates that her only discussion of the merits involved the RICO counts and her suggestion that the jury not vote that Anthony Nugent’s house and car be “taken.” Isaac Aff. ¶ 13. The jury acquitted on the RICO counts. The Court, prior to deliberations, dismissed the government’s forfeiture case involving the only house in which Mr. Nugent was alleged to have an interest and the jury, contrary to Ms. Isaac’s suggestion to juror Biggs, unanimously voted that the Mercedes-Benz automobile belonging to Mr. Nugent was subject to forfeiture. See Tr. July 23, 1992, at 82. 4. The Foreperson’s Dismission of the Trial loith Her Husband The other credible allegation of an ex paite contact concerns the jury foreperson. Four of the juror affiants state that, prior to deliberations, he or she heard juror Jellison state that her husband had told her to “nail” the defendants and send them to jail, or words to that effect. See Dews Aff. ¶7; Isaac Aff. ¶ 5; Scott Aff. ¶3; Garnett Aff. ¶ 10. From these allegations, defendants argue that Ms. Jellison’s husband influenced the jury’s verdict. See Defs.’ Mem. at 23. Because extensive, active discussions between a juror and a third party about a defendant’s guilt have been found, in certain circumstances, to amount to actual prejudice, see Maree, 934 F.2d at 202, the Court believed that further investigation of these allegations was required. Accordingly, Ms. Jellison was ordered to appear at the March 29 hearing, at which she responded under oath to questions put to her by the' Court. Although Ms. Jellison admitted to having discussed certain aspects of the trial with her husband on one occasion, she denied that he ever told her that the jury should convict or “nail” defendants. See Hearing Tr. Mar. 29, 1993, at 13-14. The relevant portion of the Court’s colloquy with Ms. Jellison went as follows: Q. You say you discussed the trial. Was it the trial or the news articles that you discussed with your husband? A. It was the evidence that I discussed with my husband and the personalities of the jurors. Q. And the personalities of the jurors and the evidence? A. And the evidence. Q. How many times did you do this? A. Just once, Your Honor. Q. Once? A. Yes, sir. Q. You discussed the trial on one occasion with your husband? A. That’s correct. Q. The evidence and the jurors. A. Personalities. Q. Was it during your travel to or from the courthouse or at home that this occurred? A. At home. Q. Did your husband during the trial ever make comments to you about the trial that you recall? A. No, he did not. Q. Simply did your husband ever suggest to you that the defendants should be convicted or the jury should nail the defendants? A. No, he did not. Q. Do you recall any comments he made to you? A. My husband does not even talk that way, and he knows that I have good judgment. The only thing I spoke to my husband about was the evidence, mostly the guns and the cocaine because I’ve never been that close to it, and the personalities of the jurors. And he just told me just try to be as diplo