Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge. This matter is before the court for a decision on the merits following a bench trial. The following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a), after having examined the entire record and after determining the credibility of the witnesses. FINDINGS OF FACT Defendant, United States of America, is the owner of the U.S.N.S. Hess,' which was operated by Military Sea Lift Command and subcontracted to L.S.C. Marine who employed plaintiff, Edward Celia, to serve thereon as the chief cook from April 20, 1987 until May 20, 1987. Plaintiffs various jobs took him to Seattle, Washington where, in approximately 1977, he accepted employment with Unisea Corporation. This position required him to relocate to Dutch Harbor, Alaska, where he was employed as a dinner chef at the Unisea Inn. During this time that the plaintiff was a chef he was approached by various captains of the fishing fleets stationed there. He accepted a position in 1978 on the fishing vessel Kona as a cook, where he also operated and manned the vessel with the five other crew members. In July, 1981 plaintiff was hired aboard the Pavlov, another fishing vessel, sailing out of Seattle. The plaintiffs duties were that of cook and deck hand. Part of cooking on the Pavlov involved bringing stores to the kitchen from below deck. To get to the lower deck and where the foods were stored plaintiff had to go through a small conning. This device was a raised protrusion from the deck, about %" steel with a plywood cover, approximately five by four, that plaintiff would lift up and use a hydraulic lever to bring the elevator up or down. Plaintiff would raise the lift to deck level, then climb over a small extension and step down into the deck. Plaintiff would then load stores and reverse the process to come back up to bring the stores one deck up to the galley. An accident occurred August 2, 1981 when the plaintiff was using the hydraulic lever. The lever had apparently been leaking hydraulic fluid. The plaintiff slipped in the hydraulic fluid and went flat on his back and was knocked unconscious for several minutes. It was three days before the plaintiff was lifted by the Coast Guard and eventually flown to a hospital in Anchorage, Alaska. Spinal films were done, which were read as normal. Plaintiff was only treated with analgesics and physiotherapy. Plaintiff returned to Indiana, where he began noticing .pain in his right eye and associated blurred vision. In September, 1981 he was seen by an orthopedic surgeon in Fort Wayne who obtained additional x-rays of the spine and continued therapy through November, 1981. Plaintiff returned to Seattle where he was seen in the Seattle Eye Clinic because of continued symptoms of blurred vision, however, all tests proved to be normal. On December 1, 1981, plaintiff was placed in traction during physical therapy, and while in traction plaintiff complained of being lightheaded and having increased neck pain. Plaintiff later became nauseated and experienced vomiting which lasted throughout the day and night. The following morning plaintiff admitted himself into the emergency room at the Seattle Public Health Hospital. Plaintiff complained to doctors that he had pain shooting up and down both arms periodically and periodically he experienced numbness in all four extremities. He also complained that after walking ten to fifteen minutes he was totally exhausted. Plaintiff admitted to severe depression relating to his inability to work and take care of his family. The hospital conducted x-rays which indicated a fracture of his C-5 cervical vertebrae, however after a re-evaluation by the orthopedic surgeon, it was determined that plaintiffs neck was stable and that no further diagnostic or therapeutic intervention should be made. For his back pain, plaintiff was given Robaxin and was told to continue physical therapy. With respect to the pain to his eyes, the neurologist suggested that if he should continue to have these complaints, a diagnosis of migraine headaches should be considered and appropriately treated. Finally, the plaintiff was seen in consultation by a psychologist, who noted that there were significant familial and marital problems and should he continue to be depressed, antidepressants should be considered in the future. The laboratory studies that were administered on the plaintiff on December 7, 1981 revealed that his blood serum levels were abnormally high. CPK, normal is 0 to 225; for the plaintiff the reading was 3,545. LDH, normal is 60 to 200; result for plaintiff was 262.' SGOT, normal is 0 to 41; plaintiffs was 89. Finally, SGPT, the normal range is 0 to 36; plaintiffs was 154. Shortly after his discharge from the hospital, plaintiff returned to Fort Wayne and on June 11, 1982 began seeing Dr. Michael Ara-ta, an orthopedic surgeon. The plaintiff informed Dr. Arata that during the preceding 6 months he had continued to have regular physical therapy three or four times weekly, however, during the preceding month before he saw Dr. Arata, he had not been under the care of a local doctor, and without the physical therapy, he felt his problems had worsened. Dr. Arata conducted a physical exam which revealed that plaintiffs cervical spinal motion in all planes was limited approximately 50%. Plaintiffs motor strength was tested, and appeared to be normal. Triceps, biceps and brachialis reflexes were all intact in the upper extremity. Dr. Arata also noted that the plaintiff had some depression and other non-medical problems that were still present and this may have entered into plaintiffs physical problems in some way. Dr. Arata recommended that the plaintiff continue with physical therapy and placed him on Oraflex, an anti-inflammatory medicine. . Dr. Arata next saw the plaintiff on June 25, 1982 and it appeared the Oraflex worked extremely well and the transcutaneous stimulation units (“T.E.N.S. unit”) allowed the plaintiff to sleep at night and provide considerable relief. Plaintiff was allowed to continue-the isometric exercises and physical therapy and was to be seen only as needed. On October 10, 1982, the plaintiff went to the emergency room at Parkview Memorial Hospital complaining of spasm in his cervical and thoracic spine, his neck and upper spine, numbness in three fingers in his right hand and numbness in his whole left arm. When Dr. Arata saw the plaintiff the conditions had subsided spontaneously and the plaintiff was doing fine. Dr. Arata then examined the plaintiff; however all tests proved negative. Dr. Arata thereafter prescribed plaintiff Flexoril, a muscle relaxer. On November 10, 1982 plaintiff called the doctor’s office, and was very upset, complaining of muscle spasms and pain in both his neck and back. He also complained of dehydration and vomiting and wanted to see the doctor or return to emergency room. Since Dr. Arata was unavailable, the nurse consulted with another doctor who gave the plaintiff permission to go to emergency room. Plaintiff was treated by the hospital doctors and released. On December 12, 1982 plaintiff visited Dr. Arata for neck spasms. Dr. Arata could not find anything objectively wrong but told plaintiff to stay in bed and gave him a strong pain killer. On February 3, 1983, the plaintiff called the office and complained of deep muscle spasm in the neck after an evening of bowling. Dr. Arata again prescribed a pain killer. On March 15,1983, plaintiff asked that Dr. Arata write a note to his lawyer recommending massage therapy. On August 3, 1983, again at plaintiffs request, Dr. Arata dictated a letter stating that plaintiff was physically fit and ready for work. On November 12, 1983, the plaintiff called to tell Dr. Arata that he had been getting along very well and that he had returned to work, but that he had been involved in a traffic accident. His symptoms did not sound severe, so Dr. Arata telephoned in a prescription for a muscle relaxant accompanied with an instruction to call the first of the week if plaintiff was having any problems. X-rays were later taken of the plaintiff on November 28, 1983. The impression of the radiologist was that plaintiff had a normal cervical spine and normal dorsal spine. On December 19, 1984 plaintiff complained of cervical pain and thoracic pain. Plaintiff felt as if there was a spasm which was causing his head to pull forward. The neurological exam was also negative and the outside x-rays were negative also. Plaintiff asked to be referred to a chiropractor. While he awaited word on his application to become a merchant marine, plaintiff worked several odd jobs in the Fort Wayne area. Plaintiff eventually received his documents in 1984. The first vessel he boarded was the S.S. Independence, a passenger cruise ship on which plaintiff was a second cook and worked as a floater, rotating through different stations that needed assistance. In 1986, plaintiff received a security clearance and was invited to worked with the Tagos operation, aboard the U.S.N.S. Contender, a classified military operation. Plaintiff was chief cook and chief steward on two different operations, which involved two back-to-back 90 day operations. Plaintiff experienced no spasms or numbness during the 180 days at sea. While aboard the U.S.N.S. Contender, plaintiff was informed that there were opportunities with the Lavino Shipping aboard the U.S.N.S. Harkness. Plaintiff was hired as chief steward, with a 21 member department and a crew of approximately 328. As chief steward, plaintiff was responsible for the entire department, including inventory, provisioning the ship for up to six months at a time, feeding the crew, which meant being responsible for all galley spaces, all inventories, the many store rooms and expediting the vessel’s passage in and out of port. Plaintiff was aboard the U.S.N.S. Harkness approximately 32 days before he bruised his hip and shoulder sliding down -a ladder. The nurse aboard the Harkness examined the bruise and advised the plaintiff to return home to get some x-rays. Plaintiff was considered unfit for duty for approximately 30 days. Plaintiff obtained a pre-board physical examination from Seafarers Medical Department in Brooklyn, New York on February 20, 1987. Plaintiff received a “fit for duty” notice, however, the report of medical history neither disclosed his pre-existing back condition nor the maladies he complained of after the accident on the Pavlov. Notwithstanding the nondisclosure of prior ailments, the court finds that plaintiff was symptom free at. the time of his physical. After notifying the company that he was fit for duty, the plaintiff was offered the position of chief cook on the U.S.N.S. Hess in April, 1987. Plaintiff was told that it was a 30 day relief job because they were unable to get a cook for the vessel. Plaintiff boarded the vessel April 20,1987 in Oakland, California at approximately 3:00 P.M. After a quick walk-through, plaintiff determined the spaces had been neglected for some time. He , observed a general disarray, with storage lying loose and unstowed in passage ways. There did not appear to be any inventory control. Plaintiff then went below to the chief steward's berth and introduced himself, indicating that he would like a berth and would like to start working. The chief steward told plaintiff that he was taking a nap and that plaintiff was to sit down in a chair and wait for him to get up. Plaintiff refused and left. He then introduced himself to the captain. Plaintiff told the captain of his plans for the running of the galley and the steward department. The captain .advised the plaintiff that his duties would be those as directed by the chief steward. Plaintiff then immediately went to work to try and put the galley in some order. On the Hess there was a 12 member crew in the steward’s department. The steward department was responsible for both housekeeping and food service. The chief steward was in charge of the of the whole department. The chief cook was in charge of the galley. He had two cooks working under him, the 'cook/baker and the assistant cook/utility. The chief cook prepared two meals with six entrees. The chief cook had authority over the two cooks and the galley and, as assigned, a roving steward assistant. The duty 'of the cook/baker was to make the baked goods and to prepare and serve breakfast. The cook/utility prepared the vegetables, kept the vegetable box clean and washed all galley utensils. Steward assistants were the clean-up crew; they made the beds, cleaned the pantry ways, helped serve the food, and worked as messmen. The entire steward department was responsible for loading stores. The deck department took the stores off the dock and placed them on ship. The steward department then situated the stores into their respective places. On the second or third day aboard the vessel, a truckload of stores was delivered to the vessel. Other than the deck crew, several steward assistants refused to assist the plaintiff in receiving the stores. Instead, they continued to check-off the stores delivered. Because the stores included perishables that needed to be handled immediately, plaintiff decided to move the goods with assistance from several members of the deck department. Plaintiff unloaded approximately four pallets, however, just as he finished, he felt his lower back give out and he fell down to the deck and laid there for approximately 15 minutes. After the pain had left, plaintiff went back to work. After his shift, plaintiff went to lay down and later that night reported to the ship’s nurse to get a couple of aspirins. On sailing day, the engineering officers went down to the engine room to bring up steam and put power to the plant. During the period in port, the first engineer; had overhauled the astern stop valve and when he put power to the throttle in the main plant, he had not correctly seated the astern stop valve and there existed enough of a leak through to generate a speed of approximately slow astern. When the steam was put to the unit, the vessel started going astern and ultimately broke its mooring lines. Plaintiff was in the galley unloading stores and when the vessel lurched, the plaintiff bumped his head on the forehead just above the hairline. After the ship had stopped, the plaintiff then sat down on the counter top and he bumped his head again and then fell backwards on his posterior. Plaintiff did not receive any treatment, the nurse was not on board and he felt he had too much work to do to stop for injuries. The steward department aboard the Hess was chaotic, and unorganized. As chief cook, plaintiff was not even given keys to access any of the galley areas; the keys were in the possession of steward William Lacy. The conditions of the department generally broke down along racial lines. Of the 12 member crew, only half of the department worked on a regular basis. The conditions of the department changed for the worse once Chief Steward Spence took over. The discipline and morale of the people he brought aboard was lacking. The stewards assistants, other than the assistant cooks, treated plaintiff with disrespect. When asked to assist plaintiff in the galley, they refused, stating they only took orders from the chief steward. On one occasion, a steward assistant told the plaintiff that the chief steward told him specifically not to do any work for the plaintiff. The chaotic conditions of the stewards department contributed to two injuries complained of by the plaintiff. In one incident, no pot washer had been assigned to the galley and the chief steward ordered cooks to wash their own pots. While lifting a 14 pound stock pot full of simmering spaghetti sauce, plaintiff lost his grip of the pan because butter had not been washed off the handle. In dropping the pot, the simmering spaghetti sauce burned his hand. Plaintiff did not seek medical attention immediately, waiting until after his shift to put sulfur iodine on the burn. The second injury occurred when the plaintiff was lifting a roaster from the oven. There were approximately 90 pounds of meat in the pan. When plaintiff attempted to removed the pan without any assistance, his back went out completely and it was very hard for the plaintiff to walk. Plaintiff saw the nurse the next day and was instructed not to do any further lifting. The nurse wanted to admit the plaintiff to sick bay, but he told the nurse he was fine and that he wanted to continue to work. The chief steward was informed that plaintiff was not to do any lifting, however, no one was assigned to assist the plaintiff. On May 8, 1987, plaintiff, the deck department, the engine department and two members of the steward department formulated a letter citing a list of complaints in response to some of the conditions on board the Hess. After plaintiff received threats to his personal safety, he tried to follow union procedures and go through the ship’s chairman, however, there was no chairman on board. The deck department delivered the letter to the chief mate, however, the letter was returned with no action. Since there was no response from the chief mate, plaintiff personally presented the letter to the captain. The captain, the chief steward and plaintiff sat down and discussed each of the points in the letter. The chief steward “jumped up and down and sweared [sic] vulgarity, ranted and raved, said it was his department hé was going to run it the way he wanted.” The captain “sat back and said ‘I’m going to back up my chief steward.’ ...” Trial Transcript, 9/12/90 at 205. Plaintiff received the letter back with his overtime sheets and was told to bring his complaints to the attention of the union. More concerned with his medical problems than the conditions of the vessel, plaintiff never pursued it. On approximately May 13, 1987 plaintiff admitted himself to sick bay. The captain was informed that the plaintiff injured himself on the 6th of May and that the nurse was going to keep him there for observation. The captain told the nurse to keep him there for the rest of the voyage because if the plaintiff had a back injury, he did not want the plaintiff to complicate it by continuing to work. On May 16, 1987 the plaintiff informed the nurse that he felt better and wanted to return back to work. However, the plaintiff was kept in sick bay until they reached port. Plaintiff was instructed to see a medical doctor to determine whether he was fit for duty. While confined to sick bay, the plaintiff was the subject of several threats from assistant stewards, specifically from William Lacy, who regularly displayed his butterfly knife while threatening the white crew members. In á conversation with Eddie Sessions, Lacy asked Sessions, “how’s your friend doing?”, referring to Mr. Celia. Sessions responded “Well; we’re doing our best to look after him.” Lacy replied, “Well, there’s a lot that can happen between here and San Francisco.” Another steward assistant, Bryan Stephens, was heard to have called plaintiff “white scumbag,” and “asshole” and stated that plaintiff “would get his when we get to port.” The captain, unaware of the specific incidents of threats against Mr. Celia, did acknowledge that he had better steward departments, however, in comparison to other ships, he thought the steward’s department on the Hess was average. On May 18, 1987, once the Hess docked in San Diego, plaintiff received a master certificate. to take ashore to receive a medical examination.. The document only made a reference to complaints of chronic back pain, however, plaintiff also complained that he was very weak, having difficulty getting up the ladder wells throughout the ship and that his appetite had disappeared completely. After plaintiff was examined at the San Diego hospital for his injuries sustained while on the Hess, the plaintiff returned to Fort Wayne and was under the care of Dr. Arata. On August 28, 1987 plaintiff reported to Dr. Arata and presented him with x-rays from his chiropractor. Plaintiff informed Dr. Ara-ta that he had injured his thoracic and lumbar spine in another accident aboard a vessel and was hospitalized for six days. Plaintiff complained of back pain with no radicular sounding symptoms. During the examination, plaintiff demonstrated some discomfort in his thoracic and lumbar region of the spine, however, tests indicated he was neurologically intact. Dr. Arata recommended a pain clinic evaluation. The x-rays from the chiropractor were of poor quality and incomplete, nevertheless, Dr. Arata thought the plaintiffs symptoms were muscular in nature and should be treated with conservative measures. Plaintiffs x-rays were reviewed by three separate doctors (associates of Dr. Ara-ta) and while all were normal, it was agreed to refer plaintiff to Dr. Louis Romain, a local physician practicing in the field of neurology. On July 21, 1988, plaintiff called Dr. Ara-ta’s office and requested Valium to relieve muscle spasms. He was dispensed a nonrefillable order of 26 tablets. Dr. Arata told the plaintiff that if they could not develop a more definite diagnosis, he would be happy to refer plaintiff to the Cleveland or Mayo Clinic. Dr. Arata also referred the plaintiff to a pain clinic because plaintiff was non-operable and had a chronic condition that was not responsive to the treatments prescribed. Plaintiff was first examined by Dr. Romain on June 3, 1988. After taking a history of the plaintiff, Dr. Romain conducted a neurological examination. Dr. Romain’s examination revealed proximal muscle weakness, two units in the right deltoid, one unit in the left deltoid in a zero to minus four schema. There was also an increase’ in reflex activity that was striking in the upper extremity, the reflexes being three units, normally only being two in a system of zero to four. He also had a positive Tinel’s sign. Plaintiffs ability to feel superficial pain and light touch in the right upper extremity decreased, specifically down the arm and into the hand over the area of the right thumb. Also there was some involuntary movements of the tongue. Additionally, the scapulae, the triangle shaped bones over the upper back, seemed to be very prominent on both sides. There was also the presence of an increase in tone in the 'muscle, adjacent to the spine in the low back, plus restrictions in movement in the lower back. Finally, Dr. Romain detected a tenderness of the muscles in the upper extremities. Dr. Romain’s preliminary diagnosis questioned whether plaintiffs ailments was some type of process originating in the brain, perhaps in the brachial plexus. The other thought was whether this was a, type of neuromuscular affliction or peculiarity, such as myofascitis. Dr. Romain also considered conditions such as collagen disease, some type of nerve or root injury, or some type of neuritis. On June 15, 1988 Dr. Romain conducted a series of tests to begin to rule out various possibilities. The first step was a myelo-gram of the spine and a complete spinal fluid analysis. Dr. Romain also repeated testing the plaintiffs muscle enzymes and'found they were elevated. Dr. Romain further determined that there was indeed some involvement of the C-6 nerve root and that there was some cervical spondylosis (vertebra stiffening). However, Dr. Romain felt this may be a portion, but not the full extent of the clinical problem. With the persistent enzyme elevations, in the thousands, Dr. Ro-main suggested that the plaintiff undergo a muscle biopsy of both the upper and lower extremities closest to the muscles of the shoulder and thigh, as well as the muscles of the middle of the body, the thorax, the abdomen and the neck. On August 1, 1988, two muscle biopsies were performed on the plaintiff, and the specimens were sent to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) in Washington, D.C. A small amount of tissue was taken for a local study by Dr. Charles M. Pan. Dr. Pan’s diagnosis was that of focal chronic interstitial myositis. Dr. Pan opined that what was found in this muscle biopsy could not be part of a more widespread condition in plaintiffs body because the biopsy was localized. He agreed that through a clinical diagnosis and a further history and examination of a patient, combined with his findings in the biopsy, another diagnosis could be made. The biopsy results from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology were the same as Dr. Pan’s. The AFIP diagnosis and report indicated that a clinical diagnosis could be consistent with polymyositis. After a review of these diagnoses, Dr. Ro-main was convinced plaintiff suffered from an inflammatory process in the muscles, a type of myositis that involved certainly not only the upper extremities but also the lower extremities. Even though plaintiff was having a bit more trouble with the arms, he was also having problems with the legs. The biopsies showed that the tissues from these different sites were almost indistinguishable, thus the process could certainly be generalized. When questioned as to his opinion regarding the cause of plaintiffs condition, Dr. Ro-main stated that although he had heard of cases of polymyositis being secondary to trauma, as a neurologist, he knew the generally accepted dogma identified plaintiffs condition as an idiopathic disorder. For that reason, Dr. Romain conducted a search of medical literature to ascertain whether there were cases that would support his conclusion that the disorder came about from the trauma and emotional stress plaintiff was subjected to aboard the Hess. . Dr. Romain found several proposed possible causes of polymyositis or polymyositis-like diseases or conditions, such as viral infections, vaccinations, some tropical diseases and systemic lupus erythematosus. However, through his physical examination, testing and history of the plaintiff, Dr. Romain was able to rule out these causes as the reason for plaintiffs condition. The medical literature further revealed that cases of polymyo-sitis are heterogenous, yet there was always a consistent but somewhat low percent of cases in which there has been some type of severe emotional or physical stress that seemed to have an etiological importance in the genesis of disease. An experimental model with marathon runners found that after a long distance run there was a remarkable increase of the enzyme CPK, among other things, into the blood stream. Muscles release these enzymes, thereby forming a link between physical stress and elevated enzymes. After some rest, the enzyme levels come back down and the muscles repaired themselves. To avoid injuries, in recent years, marathon runners have been selecting their races with extreme care; running two to three races a year. Even in good physical condition, the muscles are not able to take the torture of such physical and mental endurance very often. Dr. Romain testified that plaintiffs condition would be analogous to that of a marathon runner, through the physical exertion, .trauma, and stress he was subjected to aboard the. Hess. When plaintiff began to incur these types of muscle changes, however, unlike the marathon runner, his body was un-able to recover. Based upon all the medical evidence, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiffs condition was, in fact, caused by the trauma and emotional stress that plaintiff suffered aboard the Hess. Dr. Romain felt the appropriate plan of treatment for plaintiff was prednisone and physical therapy. Individuals with polymyo-sitis are actually allergic to some of the constituents within their own bloodstream, therefore, it is necessary to halt the inflammatory reaction in the muscle. By giving the prednisone, the inflammatory reaction is abated, allowing, the muscle to strengthen itself. The physical therapy allows muscles to be exercised, building strength within the muscle and encouraging the growth of nerves. A very mild and gentle physical therapy would allow for the removal of some of the toxins that are in the muscles, and would also allow a richer blood flow into the muscles. The muscle would hopefully regain some of the strength lost as a result of the inflammation. . - In describing the initial manifestations of the condition, Dr. Romain’s diagnosis noted that the most common complaint of polymyo-sitis was proximal muscle weakness of the muscles close to the spinal cord. The'condition also involves the muscles used in swallowing and chewing, the muscles of the neck. Polymyositis likewise adversely effects walking, especially climbing steps. Additionally, it affects the general energy level. Another hallmark of the disease is fatigue. Afflicted persons may not be terribly weak, but the most minor effort produces weakness. So the individuals may be functionally incapacitated to a very marked extent, even though they may'be able to walk around. As the treating physician, Dr. Romain opined the most likely course of treatment in plaintiffs case would be to simply “arrest the progress of the disease.” Moreover, Dr. Ro-main testified that plaintiffs disorder is life threatening, in which one-third of the patients that have the condition die. Death is caused from involvement of the muscles of the diaphragm, preventing the patient from breathing. Additionally, the medical literature introduced at trial supported Dr. Ro-main’s diagnosis, including that the mortality rate of individuals with polymyositis is four times that of the general population. In contrast to Dr. Romain’s opinion and the medical literature, Dr. Yogesh Amin, plaintiffs current physician stated that with proper treatment, plaintiffs condition is likely to remain stable and cause, no reduction in plaintiffs life expectancy. After carefully reviewing the medical testimony and the medical literature introduced, the court is convinced that the debilitating nature of the disease would decrease the plaintiffs life expectancy to a significant degree. Thus, the court finds plaintiff will have a reduced life expectancy as a result of his condition. While the court was not provided with any specific formula to calculate plaintiffs life expectancy, the court finds, based upon a review of all the evidence, the plaintiffs life expectancy will be reduced fifty percent (50%) to an age of 52.8 years. On February 15, 1989, plaintiff was diagnosed by Dr. Romain as permanently medically disabled. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Romain’s diagnosis resulted in plaintiffs total occupational disability, and is supported by the fact plaintiff was determined to be disabled by the Social Security Administration. Defendants argue, however, that this disability determination is subject to periodic review, therefore, is not dispositive, and only goes to the weight of the evidence. On this point, defendant’s are correct; however, the determination is clearly entitled to some measure of weight. Additionally, defendants assert that the testimony of Drs. VonBargen and Stephen Barkhaus support the proposition that plaintiff is not occupationally disabled, but can engage in sedentary employment. Dr. Barkhaus testified that based upon the hypothetical question asked of him, plaintiff is capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity. In his opinion, plaintiff can alternate sitting and standing for more than six hours a day, would be able to perform a limited range of light work, and could perform almost a complete range of sedentary work. This conclusion, however, is clearly a judgment as to whether plaintiff is disabled, and is inconsistent with the traditional function Dr. Barkhaus performs on behalf of the Social Security Administration. Dr. Bark-haus was held out as an expert on disability, when in fact his role is only to respond to hypothetical questions given to him by an Administrative Judge or an attorney regarding a person’s ability to perform substantial activity. In a Social Security disability proceeding, the individual’s disability is determined by the Administrative Judge after a 'careful review of the entire record, as will be done by this court. It is to be noted that in the disposition of plaintiffs claim before the Social Security Administration, the government was apparently unable to produce an expert who’s opinion was- given sufficient weight to defeat plaintiffs claim. The plaintiffs current symptoms are spasms in his back all the way down his pelvis, a pins-and-needles feeling in his hands, the arms, the legs and the feet, and he is unable to raise his arms more than 90 degrees from his side. Plaintiff also has high blood pressure and bruises easily. He has a twitching in the arms, neck, hands and upper extremities which comes and goes. He has difficulty cooking because he cannot lift heavy pots and pans. Plaintiff is on a number of medications — Zantac, Imuran, predni-sone, Parafon, Forte, Calan, amitriptyline, Talacen, salsitab, crafate and calcium tablets. Plaintiffs therapeutic equipment consists of a back brace, ice packs and a cane. He also has two T.E.N.S. units to relieve the spasms of pain. Plaintiff participates in physical therapy one to two hours a day, three times a week. He sees a medical doctor as required, visits a psychologist, and has laboratory work twice a month. Dr. Terry V. Carle, a board certified physician in physical medicine and rehabilitation, concluded plaintiff will need to continue to be under the care of his physician. In addition, plaintiff will need to see that physician on a frequent basis, probably once a month and will continue to need medication. The precise amount of medication will be at least what he is taking now and maybe more. The specifics would be for the treating physician to decide, however, plaintiff will need a number of medications to control the pathological progress of his condition. Plaintiff will also need to continue on physical therapy on a regular basis; probably three times a week to maintain the strength and activities of the muscles that are there, and also to increase their strength. As the weakness progresses, the plaintiff will be able to do less for himself and will need some assistance from other persons. At the present, he is receiving assistance in such things such as cooking, housekeeping and laundry tasks. ‘This home care assistance will need to be continued and will vary depending upon his condition and the success of the treatment. Plaintiffs need for home care will undoubtedly increase as his condition deteriorates. Based upon the foregoing and this court’s personal observation of the plaintiffs condition during the course of this trial, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled in both a medical and a vocational sense. Furthermore, but for plaintiffs physical disability, he would have a work life expectancy of age 59 and a earning capacity of $14,000.00 per year.. Moreover, plaintiffs future medical expenses will be $17,710 per year. With regard to home care, the court finds that with the debilitating effects of the disease, plaintiffs condition can not possibly be stable for approximately eighteen years and then immediately deteriorate to a life threatening condition. Consequently, based upon all the evidence regarding the plaintiffs need for home care and the medical evidence regarding the likely deterioration of plaintiffs physical condition, the court finds that, in his remaining years of life expectancy, in years 1-5, plaintiff will require 6 hours per week of home care, years 6-10, 20 hours per week of home care, years 11-15, 30 hours per week of home care and in years 16-18, 40 hours per week of home care will be required. The current cost associated with plaintiffs home care is $10.00 per hour. Based upon the evidence and the court’s personal observation of the plaintiff, the court finds plaintiff has sustained substantial pain and suffering as a result of defendant’s conduct, and further, plaintiff will continue to sustain substantial pain and suffering throughout his remaining life expectancy. Due to the debilitating effects of his condition plaintiff has been significantly incapacitated, is unable to participate in recreational activities as he had previously, and is subject to a great deal of physical as well as emotional pain and distress. The court further finds that despite the tardiness of the L.S.C. Marine payments, the medical costs associated with plaintiffs poly-myositis were essentially paid through February 15, 1989, the “maximum recovery” period for maintenance and cure. See infra, at p. 1406. Additionally, plaintiff was paid wages by the defendant for a year after the voyage concluded. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW This court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject manner of this action under general maritime law and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688. The plaintiff Edward Celia was employed by the defendant as Chief Cook aboard the U.S.N.S. Hess and was on board the Hess in furtherance of its mission and function. Plaintiff brought this suit against the defendant to recover damages sustained by him as a consequence of emotional stress and trauma he suffered while serving as chief cook aboard the defendant’s ship, the U.S.N.S. Hess. Plaintiff has grounded his complaint upon the breach of the warranty of seaworthiness under general maritime law, as well as Jones Act negligence, and entitlement to any unpaid maintenance and cure. The gravamen of plaintiffs complaint is that the muscular inflammatory condition he currently suffers from is the result of the injuries and stress sustained while aboard the U.S.N.S. Hess. The question before the court is whether plaintiffs muscular inflammatory condition, was in fact caused by the defendant’s negligence and/or the unseaworthiness of the vessel. The analysis of the law must focus on the five major issues of: (A) seaworthiness; (B) Jones Act negligence; (C) proximate cause; (D) contributory negligence; and (E) damages. A. Seaworthiness Under admiralty law, an absolute and non-delegable duty is imposed on the shipowner to furnish a vessel reasonably safe and fit for its intended purposes. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 941 (1960); White v. Rimrock Tidelands, Inc., 414 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir.1969). The seaworthiness warranty extends to the hull, decks, tools, stowage and cargo containers. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 64 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed. 561 (1944); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946). Members of the crew are also warranted as seaworthy. See Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 75 S.Ct. 382, 99 L.Ed. 354 (1955); Waldron v. Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724, 87 S.Ct. 1410, 18 L.Ed.2d 482 (1967). The duty of the owner of the vessel is not a duty to provide a perfect or accident free vessel,' but, instead, one of reasonable fitness. Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 550, 80 S.Ct. at 933. The mere fact that a seaman is injured in an accident on a vessel is not sufficient in and of itself to establish unseaworthiness and consequent liability. Id. The standard of causation for unseaworthiness is more demanding than the “featherweight” burden of Jones Act negligence, as unseaworthiness claims require proof of a direct and substantial cause. Alverez v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 674 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir.1982). In an action based on unseaworthiness, the traditional common law standard regarding proximate cause applies: the defendant’s “act or omission must be a cause which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of, and without which it would not have occurred.” Alverez, at 1043 0citing, IB Benedict on Admiralty § 28 (7th ed. 1980)). More recently, the Fifth Circuit expressed this standard as follows: To establish the requisite proximate cause in an unseaworthiness claim, a plaintiff must prove that the unseaworthy condition played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury and that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthiness. Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1352 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968, 109 S.Ct. 497, 102 L.Ed.2d 533. Plaintiff alleges the inadequacy and incompetency of the crew was the legal cause of his injuries aboard the Hess. It is undisputed that the vessel had its full compliment of crew members, according to the requirements of the union contract and the Coast Guard certification. Therefore, the court finds that the overall, crew of the Hess was adequate and seaworthy in reference to the voyage in question. Plaintiff does not dispute that he had authority over the two assistant cooks and as assigned, a roving steward assistant. Plaintiff complains, however, that there was an insufficient number of steward assistants available to assist him in performing particular tasks in a safe and prudent manner. By assigning too few crew members to assist him in these tasks, plaintiff alleges he sustained various injuries which caused his complained of condition. The first allegation of unseaworthiness complained of by the plaintiff involved the plaintiffs offloading stores during his second day aboard the vessel. Plaintiff admitted this was a job fot the entire steward department, however, after several steward assistants refused to stop their tasks, and since the stores contained perishables that needed immediate attention, plaintiff decided to do the job alone. Plaintiffs injury occurred after offloading approximately four pallets of stores. Plaintiff did not testify that he was ordered to unload stores alone, or that each box or crate was not capable of being lifted by one person. Plaintiffs only testimony was that no steward assistants were available. See generally, Thezan v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 708 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.1983) [Where officer had the authority to order men on his watch to assist him, jury rejected plaintiffs argument that the vessel was un-seaworthy because it was the chief engineer’s responsibility to specifically assign the crewman]; and Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 666 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.1982) [Court found for plaintiff on issue of unseaworthiness, where after all hands had quit, plaintiff complained to his supervisor that dredging operation should cease until additional help could be secured, however, only help offez'ed plaintiff was a galley hand with no experience or a deck hand who was blind in one eye]. Moreover, testimony was presented that while plaintiff was in'fact the only steward that helped unload stores, there were several members of the deck department that assisted him in the actual task of off loading the stores. Therefore, by plaintiffs own testimony the court finds that an unseaworthy condition did not exist for the particular task of unloading stores. There was no order to offload the stores alone. Plaintiff received assistance from fellow crew members, albeit not steward assistants. Moreover, plaintiff had full knowledge of his pre-existing back condition and just 30 days prior to coming aboard the Hess, plaintiff had been considered unfit for duty due to a bruised hip and shoulder injury. .Accordingly, with regards to the unloading of stores, plaintiff failed to establish that the injury to his back resulted from an un-seaworthy condition. Plaintiff next alleges that the vessel Was unseaworthy when the mooring lines broke, which caused him to bump his head and to be thrown backwards on his posterior. It was conceded by the government that the ship broke its mooring lines when an engineering officer had not properly seated the astern stop valve, thereby causing the ship to. go astern. Plaintiff, however, has confused liability for unseaworthiness with liability for negligence. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 362 U.S. at 550, 80 S.Ct. at 933; Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 94, 66 S.Ct. at 877. “[Liability based upon seaworthiness is wholly distinct from liability based upon negligence. The reason, of course, is that unseaworthiness is a condition, how that condition came into being— whether by negligence or otherwise — is quite irrelevant to the owner’s liability for the personal injuries resulting from it.” Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., et al., 400 U.S. 494, 498, 91 S.Ct. 514, 517, 27 L.Ed.2d 562 (1971) (emphasis in original). The plaintiffs injuries were caused by the operational negligence of an engineering officer. This single act by a crew member cannot render the ship unseaworthy, because this single act is distinct from an unseawor-thy condition. 'The Supreme Court noted this distinction in Usner, “To hold that this individual act of negligence rendered the ship unseaworthy would be to subvert the fundamental distinction between unseaworthiness and negligence_” Usner 400 U.S. at 500, 91 S.Ct. at 518. Since there was no evidence that there was a prior unseaworthy condition or that the negligence caused by the engineering officer was part of a continuous course of conduct, the Usner doctrine applies. Accordingly, with respect to the ship breaking its mooring lines, plaintiff failed to establish that the injury to his head and back resulted from an unseaworthy condition. The plaintiff further alleges that the vessel was unseaworthy when no pot washer was 'assigned to assist in the galley. Plaintiff and the assistant cooks were ordered to wash their own pots, and on one occasion plaintiff used a pot that had not been thoroughly cleaned. As a result, butter left on the handle of the pot caused the pot to slip out of the plaintiffs hands and splattered simmering spaghetti sauce, which burned his hand. Again the court finds that plaintiffs burn to his hand was caused by an individual act of negligence, and that single act did not render the vessel unseaworthy.. Focusing upon plaintiffs injuries, “the crucial consideration is whether the ship was, in all respects pertinent to the injury, reasonably fit to permit plaintiff to perform his task aboard the ship with reasonable safety.” Walker v. Sinclair Refining Co., 320 F.2d 302, 304 (3rd Cir. 1963) (citing Lester v. United States, 234 F.2d 625, 628 (2d Cir.1956) cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 983, 77 S.Ct. 384, 1 L.Ed.2d 366 (1957) (per curiam)). The court finds the ship was reasonably fit to. permit plaintiff to perform his tasks. Plaintiff offered no evidence for the position that there were insufficient or inadequate tools with which the plaintiff could perform his tasks. Plaintiff asserts only that on one occasion a pot was not thoroughly cleaned, which caused plaintiff to burn himself. Accordingly, the court finds the -Usner doctrine applies, and with regards to dirty spaghetti pot, plaintiff failed to establish that the burn to his hand resulted from an unseaworthy condition. Plaintiff next alleges that the vessel was unseaworthy when no steward assistant was assigned to assist him in removing a 90 pound roaster from the oven. In removing the 90 pound roaster alone, plaintiff sustained an injury to his back. Plaintiff was aware he had the authority to order either the first or 'second cook to assist him in the galley. The testimony at trial indicated the plaintiffs relationships with the assistant cooks were good, and that at least one of the assistant cooks was in the galley during his shift. An order to assist, directed to either cook would have been within plaintiffs authority, and within the reasonably assumed ability and charge of either cook. Plaintiff had the means of assessing his own ability in removing, the roaster from the oven, and was he aware of his pre-existing back condition. Moreover, plaintiff offered no testimony that the roaster itself was not reasonably fit for its intended use. See generally, Wilson v. Twin Rivers Towing Co., 413 F.Supp. 154 (W.D.Pa.1976) [Plaintiff, who injured her back and abdomen when she attempted to move a box of frozen meat was entitled to recover for unseaworthiness where it was clear that box was too heavy and improperly packaged]. Plaintiff was solely responsible for originally placing the meat in the roaster. Regardless of whether a roving steward assistant was available for this particular task, plaintiff knew assistance was available from his assistant cooks. The court cannot find the vessel- unseaworthy based upon plaintiffs personal decision not to utilize the readily available assistance of his assistant cooks. See supra, Thezan, 708 F.2d 175; and Comeaux, 666 F.2d 294. Accordingly, in regard to the removal of the roaster from the oven, plaintiff has failed to establish that the injury to his back resulted from an unsea-worthy condition. Plaintiff finally alleges that he suffered psychological and emotional abuse which was caused by working with an incompetent crew. This allegation stems from the overall condition of the galley as reflected in. his memo to the master. See supra, Note 6. The court will address this allegation in two parts. First, plaintiff appears to allege that perceived violations of ship and union policies and standards rendered the vessel unseawor-thy. The Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. Eagle Offshore Drilling Services, Inc., 764 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir.1985), cited it’s earlier unpublished Luneau v. Penrod Drilling Co., 720 F.2d 675 (5th Cir.1983), opinion which recognized an unsafe method of work may render a vessel unseawórthy, but added, “the mere existence of an alternative method of work or alternative equipment ... is insufficient of itself to render a vessel unseawor-thy.” Rogers, at 303 (quoting, Luneau). Moreover, plaintiff must show that the method employed was, in itself, unsafe. Rogers, at 304. In the memo to the master, plaintiff complained generally of the work habits of the chief steward and of the chief steward’s ability to properly run a steward’s department. The evidence, however, does not indicate that the chief steward’s method of running the department was unsafe or even in violation of any statutory requirements. The evidence indicates only that the, chief steward was lazy and wasteful. Accordingly, in regard to plaintiffs allegations that the ship was not functioning according to union and ship rules, plaintiff has failed to establish that the psychological and emotional abuse he suffered from resulted from an unseaworthy condition. The plaintiff also complains that the vessel was unseaworthy by reason of the disposition of the crew. In this regard, plaintiff specifically cites the threats of physical harm he received from stewards Lacy and Stephens. In Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 75 S.Ct. 382, 99 L.Ed. 354 (1955), the Supreme Court held that “[a] seaman with a proclivity for assaulting people may, indeed, be a more deadly risk than a rope with a weak strand or a hull with a latent defect.” However, the warranty of seaworthiness does not mean that the owner is liable every time a seaman gets drunk and does damage to a member of the crew, nor does it mean that the owner is liable for injuries from all the fisticuffs on board ship. Id., 348 U.S. at 339, 75 S.Ct. at 382. As Judge Learned Hand explained in Jones v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 204 F.2d 815 (2nd Cir.1953): All men are to some degree irascible; every workman is apt to be angry when a fellow complains of his work to their common superior; and some will harbor their resentment and provoke a quarrel over it even after the lapse of several hours. Sailors lead a rough life and are more apt to use their fists than office employees; what will seem to sedentary and protected persons an insufficient provocation for a personal encounter, is not the measure of the ‘disposition’ of ‘the ordinary men in the calling.’ Id., at 817, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 857, 74 S.Ct. 72, 98 L.Ed. 370 (1953). See e.g., Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 119 F.Supp. 838 (D.N.J.1954), rev’d on other grounds, 221 F.2d 559 (1955) [crewman who murdered another with a meat cleaver was not equal in disposition to those of his calling]; Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Company 325 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.1963) [assault by one seaman upon another with a dangerous weapon can be sufficient proof that attacker is not equal in disposition and seamanship to ordinary men of his calling]; and Claborn v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., Inc., 578 F.2d 983 (5th Cir.1978) [Where crewman had been drinking for several days, had gone nearly a week without sleep, had previously grabbed for bait knife with apparent intent to stab victim, and had exhibited other delirious symptoms so that his fellow crewman had handcuffed him to the stern of the vessel, and where crewman’s fatal assault upon victim with a ten-inch bait knife was unprovoked, sudden and extraordinarily savage, crewman was not equal in disposition of the ordinary seaman], cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936, 99 S.Ct. 1281, 59 L.Ed.2d 494 (1976). Compared to the aforementioned cases, the threats by stewards Lacy and Stephens tend only to support a case of two crewmen with a mean disposition, and not unequal to the disposition of the ordinary seaman. Working with men of this caliber is one of the risks that every seaman takes, Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 340, 75 S.Ct. at 385, and their presence aboard a vessel does not render the vessel unseaworthy. Accordingly, as to the unseaworthiness theory of liability, the plaintiffs injuries and psychological and emotional abuse were not due to any, condition of the vessel or its appurtenances, nor were they due to the inadequacy and competency of the crew, such as to render the vessel not reasonably fit for her intended service. B. Jones Act Liability The plaintiff next advances a negligence claim based on the Jones Act. It is uncontested that the injured seaman must bear the burden of proving that negligence on the part of the vessel owner was the cause of his injuries to recover for damages under the Jones Act. 46 U.S.C.App. § 688. See also Thorton v. Deep Sea Boasts,, Inc., 399 F.Supp. 933 (S.D.Ala.1975). However, the seaman may recover if the facts show that the defendant’s “negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury.” Chisholm v. Sabine Towing & Transportation Co., 679 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir.1982) (emphasis added) (citing Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957)); and Offshore Express, at 1352. The burden of proof the plaintiff shoulders in showing causation in a Jones Act claim is very light, even “featherweight.” Offshore Express, at 1352; Burden v. Evansville Materials, Inc., 636 F.Supp. 1022 (W.D.Ky.1986), aff'd, 840 F.2d 343 (6th Cir.1988); Landry v. Two R. Drilling Co., 511 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.1975). However, the mere fact that an injury has occurred does not automatically give rise to a Jones Act claim. Clements v. Chotin Transport, Inc., 496 F.Supp. 163 (M.D.La.1980). ' In reference to Jones Act claims, the Clements case defined negligence as the “failure to exercise the degree of care which an ordinary prudent person would use under the circumstances in discharging the duty that he owes to those who work on the vessel. The shipowner has a continuing duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work and to use ordinary care to maintain the vessel in a reasonably safe condition.” Id., at 165. The standard of proving causation in Jones Act claims is less demanding than the standard which applies in unseaworthiness claims. Offshore Express, at 1354. The causation standard in Jones Act claims has been described as a “producing cause” requirement,. while the standard for unseaworthiness is the traditional “proximate cause” requirement. Chisholm, at 62. Therefore, a defendant’s acts or omissions may be a sufficient cause of injury for liability based on the Jones Act, but the same acts or omissions might not support liability based on unseaworthiness. Offshore Express, at 1354. Although based upon separate legal theories, plaintiff presents the same set of facts in his allegation of Jones Act negligence as he did in his allegation of unseaworthiness. As to the injuries plaintiff sustained when the ship broke its mooring lines, and plaintiffs injuries related to use of the dirty spaghetti pot, in denying each of these unseaworthiness claims, the court found that the plaintiffs injuries were caused by individual acts of negligence. Liability under the Jones Act makes the employer not only responsible for his own negligence but also for the negligence of persons employed by them. Williamson v. Western Pacific Dredging Corp., 441 F.2d 65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851, 92 S.Ct. 90, 30 L.Ed.2d 91 (1971). Accordingly, the defendant’s negligence caused or contributed to the injuries plaintiff sustained when the ship broke her mooring lines, and additionally, defendant’s negligence caused or contributed to the burned hand plaintiff sustained when the spaghetti pot slipped. In regard to plaintiffs injuries sustained while offloading stores, the evidence showed that plaintiff moved the stores without assistance because he knew perishables which required proper storage were included in the shipment. While the court found there was no unseaworthy condition regarding this incident, the court does find there was negligence on the part of the defendant. Using the “even the slightest” evidence standard, Chisholm, at 62, it would not be unreasonable to infer that the non-availability of stewards was caused by the failure of the chief steward to properly assign stewards to be available when the stores were ready for offloading. Since the vessel was being prepared for voyage, it would seem only reasonable for the chief steward to properly schedule the steward’s department to receive supplies, especially since the goods contained perishables. Thus, the court finds the defendant’s negligence played at least a slight part in causing or contributing to plaintiffs injuries. The court also finds negligence on thé part of the defendant in regards to injuries plaintiff sustained while lifting the roaster from the oven. The hostility that existed between the steward assistants and plaintiff can 'be easily traced to the chief steward’s treatment of the plaintiff. Plaintiffs reluctance to seek assistance from the steward assistants was attributed to the hostile dealings he had with the chief steward and the crew. This reluctance caused the plaintiff to avoid any confrontations with the steward assistants and caused the plaintiff to unwillingly assume tasks without properly assessing his abilities, thus exposing himself to possible injuries. Therefore, the court finds the chief steward’s ineptitude in managing the steward’s department contributed to plaintiffs back injury while lifting the roaster from the oven. Finally, as to the disposition of the crew, the court finds there was negligence on the part of the defendant that caused or contributed to the psychological and emotional abuse sustained by plaintiff. The mean disposition exhibited by steward assistants, Lacy and Johnson, and other stewards was fueled by the chief steward’s open hostility toward plaintiff. The chief steward’s orders to crew members to disregard any orders or requests from the plaintiff for assistance amounted to an invitation to Lacy and Johnson that disrespect and abuse of plaintiff was acceptable. Therefore, the court finds the chief steward’s contrary orders of protocol to the members of the crew caused or contributed to the psychological and emotional abuse sustained by the plaintiff. Accordingly, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the court finds that defendant’s liability in the case at'bar is predicated on .a finding of negligence pursuant' to the Jones Act, and this negligence caused or contributed to the physical injuries and emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has sust