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UNITED STATES v. CONLEY, CR91-178 (W.D.PA): INDEX TO SEPTEMBER 3, 1993 MEMORANDUM OPINION introduction. 1124 THE INDICTMENT.1124 Introduction.1124 Count One: The Conspiracy.1126 The Conspiracy and its Objects.1126 Manner and Means of the Conspiracy.1126 Overt Acts.1128 Count Two: Illegal Gambling Business.1128 DISCUSSION.1128 DEFENDANT THOMAS “BUD” MCGRATH’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I... 1128 Double Jeopardy.1128 The Statutes.1134 Prohibition of Illegal Gambling Business, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 . 1134 Laundering of Monetary Instruments, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i).1136 Legislative History of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i).1141 S. 572, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). S. 1385, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 1143 S. 1335, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 1144 Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.1145 Comments on S. 572 and S. 1385. 1145 Comments on the Administration Bill, S. 1335 . 1148 S. 2683, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) . 1152 Conclusions Drawn from Legislative History.1155 Conclusion with respect to Defendant Thomas “Bud” McGrath’s Motion to Dismiss Count I .1156 The Remedy.1158 DEFENDANT SHEILA SMITH’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT JACK CONLEY’S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION: MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I AND II.1158 Vagueness, Facially and as Applied.1158 Adequacy of the Statement of Illegal Gambling Business Object and Offense.1160 Conclusion.1162 ORDER OF COURT.1162 MEMORANDUM OPINION LEE, District Judge. Before the Court are Defendant Thomas “Bud” McGrath’s Motion to Dismiss Count I (Document No. 388), Defendant Sheila F. Smith’s Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 381), Defendant John Francis “Jack” Conley’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion: Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 374, in-part), Defendant Mark A. Abbott’s Motion to Dismiss on the Grounds of Duplicitous Indictment or, in the Alternative, to Elect (Document No. 252) and Defendant Thomas “Bud” McGrath’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Elect or Force the Government to Divide Count I on the Grounds of Duplicitous Indictment (Document No. 389). Before addressing the motions, the Court will summarize the pertinent parts of the Indictment. THE INDICTMENT Introduction The Indictment contains an Introduction section before Count I begins. The introduction alleges that Duffy Conley was the owner and operator of Duffy’s Vending and/or Three Rivers Coin, which had the primary purpose of facilitating an illegal gambling business based on video poker machines. The illegal gambling business was carried on by Duffy Conley “and his associates and employees.” The Introduction identifies the remaining Defendants and their roles as follows. William C. Curtin was the general manager of Duffy’s Vending, assisting Duffy Conley in daily operations. Sheila Smith was an office manager, accountant and bookkeeper for Duffy Conley, also supervising employees who placed, moved and serviced video poker machines. Jack Conley recorded service calls from locations and facilitated the movement, repair and servicing of video poker machines. Bud McGrath, Duffy Conley’s employee, marketed and secured locations for Duffy Conley’s video poker machines. Mark Abbott, Duffy Conley’s employee, marketed, moved and secured locations for Duffy Conley’s video poker machines. The Introduction alleges that certain Defendants assisted Duffy Conley by facilitating the placement and use of illegal gambling devices at various locations under their control as follows: Thomas Rossi William Steinhart Roberta Fleagle Robin Spratt Monica Kail William Reed Joanne Smith Kenneth “Ron” Goodwin Lawrence “Neudy” Demino, Sr. William Rusin Carnegie American Legion Carnegie American Legion Terry’s Snack Shop Terry’s Snack Shop Kail’s Coffee Corner Idlewood Inn The Coffee Pot The Coffee Shop, and Bloomfield Snack Shop The Sunny Farms Deli Mugshots, and Cruisin II The Introduction alleges that Duffy Conley employed Chris Kail, Joseph Devita, Frank Garofalo, Thomas Ciocco, Michael Sukaly, Phillip “Mike” Ferrell, Anestos “Naz” Ro-dites and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury as collectors whose duties included going to machine locations and collecting the proceeds of video poker machine gambling. The Introduction alleges that William Ru-sin was an “associate” of Duffy Conley, who entrusted Rusin with depositing proceeds of the illegal gambling business into Pittsburgh National Bank account # 2-680118, the Duffy’s Vending Account. The Introduction alleges two “essential parts” of the illegal gambling business. Paragraph 8 of the Indictment alleges: 8.) The placement and use of the video poker machines as illegal gambling devices at various locations, such as taverns, sandwich shops, fraternal clubs, restaurants and convenience stores, in the Western District of Pennsylvania and other places was an essential part of the illegal gambling business that was run by JOHN F. “DUFFY” CONLEY and his associates and employees. Indictment, ¶ 8 (Document No. 1). Paragraph 18 of the indictment alleges: 18.) It was an essential part of the illegal gambling business run by JOHN F. “DUFFY” CONLEY that the proceeds of this unlawful activity be collected from the various locations where the video poker machines were in use as illegal gambling devices. To accomplish this collection activity, Duffy’s Vending and/or Three Rivers Coin maintained a group of employees whose primary job was to travel to the locations, divide the proceeds from the illegal gambling activity with a person at each location, collect the share of the proceeds owed to Duffy’s Vending/Three Rivers Coin and in turn deliver that money to another employee of JOHN F. “DUFFY” CONLEY or deposit the money into a designated bank account which was ultimately controlled by JOHN F. “DUFFY” CONLEY. Indictment, ¶ 18 (Document No. 1) (emphasis added). Count One; The Conspiracy Count One, the conspiracy count, is set forth in three sections: “The Conspiracy and its Objects,” “Manner and Means of the Conspiracy” and “Overt Acts.” “The Conspiracy and its Objects” Paragraph 21 of the Indictment constitutes “The Conspiracy and its Objects,” stating: 21.) Beginning on or around 1984 through and including September 20th of 1991, in the Western District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, the defendants ... knowingly and unlawfully did conspire, combine, confederate and agree together and with each other and with other persons both known and unknown to the grand jury, to commit offenses against the United States, that is: (a) It was a part and object of the conspiracy that the above named defendants, and other persons known and unknown to the grand jury, did knowingly and unlawfully conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct and own all or part of an illegal gambling business involving video poker machines in violation of the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [Title 18, Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, Section 5513], the state in which the illegal gambling business was conducted. This illegal gambling business involved five (5) or more persons who conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed and owned all or part of the business, remained in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty (30) days, and had a gross revenue of more than $2000 for a single day, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1955. (b) It was further a part and object of the conspiracy that the above named defendants, and others known and unknown to the grand jury, did knowingly and unlawfully conduct or attempt to conduct financial transactions affecting interstate or foreign commerce, which transactions involved the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, that is, illegal gambling with video poker machines, knowing that the property involved in such financial transactions represented the proceeds of the illegal gambling activity, and with the intent to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful activity, illegal gambling with video poker machines, that is, during the period November 1986 through September 1991 cash proceeds from illegal gambling involving video poker machines was [sic] received, transferred, delivered, deposited or otherwise transacted by the defendants in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956. Indictment, ¶ 21 (Document No. 1) (emphasis added). “Manner and Means of the Conspiracy” The “Manner and Means of the Conspiracy” is set forth in paragraphs 22 through 37. This section of the Indictment alleges as follows. Between June, 1986 until at least April of 1991, Duffy Conley, Curtin, McGrath and Abbott sought locations in which to place video poker machines. From June of 1986 through December, 1989, Sheila Smith received requests for video poker machines and supervised the placement of them in various locations. From June of 1986 through December, 1989 Sheila Smith and Jack Conley and others received calls for servicing of machines and dispatched Duffy Vending employees to perform the services. From May, 1989 through December, 1989 Duffy Conley and Curtin conducted periodic meetings during which employees of Duffy Vending were taught to instruct location operators how to use the “knock-off’ and “meter” features on video poker machines and otherwise use the machines for illegal gambling. From June of 1986 through December of 1989, employees of Duffy Conley, including Chris Kail, Devita, Garofalo, Ciocco, Sukaly, Ferrell and Rodites, collected the proceeds of video poker machines from various locations. Locations were maintained where video poker machines were used as illegal gambling devices. Persons placed money in the machines, played the machines and received cash payoffs if they accumulated forty or more points. The “Manner and Means of the Conspiracy” section reiterates the locations operated by various defendants, adding only the allegation that Monica Kail operated the Sheridan Coffee Shop, previously known as the Original Snack Shop, in addition to Kail’s Coffee Corner. Paragraph 28 alleges the procedure used to collect from locations the proceeds of the illegal gambling, stating: 28.) It was further a part of the conspiracy that during the time period November 1986 through December 1989 those persons working as collectors on behalf of JOHN F. “DUFFY” CONLEY would go to the various locations that had video poker machines used for illegal gambling and cheek the accounting information contained in each video poker machine to determine the total amount of money played and the total number of “hits”, or the amount of money paid out of the machine, since the last collection period. The collector would then either actually open the machines and collect the proceeds from the machine or would confer with a representative of each location and review the accounting for the period of time since the last collection. Based on that accounting the collector would collect the amount of proceeds due to JOHN F. “DUFFY” CONLEY and either or both of them would count the same to determine a total amount of the collection. Some part of the proceeds were then deposited to the bank accounts of Duffy’s Vending and/or Three Rivers Coin at various branches of Pittsburgh National Bank. Indictment, ¶ 28 (Document No. 1). From 1986 through early 1989, Duffy Conley purchased from a wholesaler of video games in Imperial, PA video poker machines equipped to be used as illegal gambling devices with proceeds of the illegal gambling business in the form of cash and cheeks. The wholesaler sold the machines to Duffy Conley and delivered them to his employees. Duffy Conley and William Curtin used cash proceeds from the illegal gambling business to pay Duffy Vending employees, and to supplement their paychecks with envelopes of cash. William Rusin deposited into Duffy Vending’s Robinson Township Pittsburgh National Bank account proceeds of the illegal gambling business in the form of cash and checks. In January 1990 Duffy Conley instructed an employee to purchase property in McKees Rocks, Pa. to be used as a facility to service the poker machines that had previously been serviced by Duffy’s Vending. Duffy Conley gave the employee money to purchase the property and told the employee whom to hire as service technicians. This business for the servicing of video poker machines was called Matrix. In January of 1990 Duffy Conley and others created three entities. Duffy Conley and Ciocco created T D Amusements. Duffy Conley and Ferrell created S & M Vending. Duffy Conley and an unindicted co-eonspirator known to the grand jury created Charti-ers Vending. From 1988 through 1990 Duffy Conley attempted to expand his illegal gambling business to areas outside the state of Pennsylvania by sending employees and machines to other states. “Overt Acts” The conspiracy count alleges sixty-eight (68) overt acts were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Roughly one-third of the overt acts alleged are acts most directly related to procuring, setting up and maintaining video poker machines at various locations. See Overt Act Nos. 1-5,10-13, 16-25, 63, 65, 67, 68. Several relate to pay-offs being made. See Overt Act Nos. 53-56. Numerous overt acts relate to actions by defendants depositing in, holding or withdrawing from Duffy Conley’s bank accounts the proceeds of the illegal gambling business. In Overt Act Nos. 14, 15, 30 & 31, Sheila Smith is alleged to have prepared proceeds for deposit in Duffy Conley’s accounts, deposited them there and written checks upon the proceeds. In Overt Act Nos. 33-39, 41 & 43, Duffy Conley is alleged to have possessed in his bank accounts proceeds of the illegal gambling business, which had been deposited by his employees. Rusin is alleged to have made deposits into Duffy Conley’s accounts in Overt Act Nos. 40 and 42. Numerous overt acts allege that persons made payments to Matrix by way of checks drawn upon various banks. Duffy Vending employees Ferrell and Ciocco, as well as Duffy Conley himself, are alleged to have made such payments by check. Overt Act Nos. 46, 47, 50-52. Location operators Goodwin, Fleagle and Spratt are also alleged to have made payments to Matrix by check. Overt Act Nos. 48, 49, 58-61. Numerous Defendants are identified as having committed acts related to the collection, division and distribution of the proceeds of the illegal gambling business. Such overt acts are alleged to have been committed by Duffy Conley, and Duffy Vending employees Sheila Smith, Sukaly, Devita, Chris Kail, Ga-rofalo, Ciocco, Ferrell and Rodites, and location operators Rossi, Steinhart, Reed and Monica Kail. Overt Act Nos. 6-8, 26-29, 32, 57, 65 & 66. Finally, Overt Act Nos. 9 and 62 allege that Rossi and Joanne Smith, respectively, cashed checks to enable players to gamble on video poker machines in their establishments. Count Two: Illegal Gambling Business Count Two, the illegal gambling business count, charges all Defendants as follows: The grand jury further charges: Beginning on or around June of 1984, and continuing to on or around September 1991 in the Western District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, the defendants ... along with others known and unknown to the grand jury did unlawfully and knowingly conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct and own all or part of an illegal gambling business involving video poker machines in violation of the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [Title 18, Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, Section 5513], the state in which the illegal gambling business was conducted. This illegal gambling business involved five (5) or more persons who conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed and owned all or part of the business, remained in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty (30) days and had a gross revenue of more than $2000 for a single day. All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1955 and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. Indictment, at 34-35. DISCUSSION DEFENDANT THOMAS “BUD” McGRATH’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I (DOCUMENT NO. 388) Defendant Thomas “Bud” McGrath, in his Motion to Dismiss Count I (Document No. 388), raises a challenge to Count One on the basis that charging the money laundering object of the conspiracy in addition to the substantive illegal gambling business in Count Two violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy in that Congress did not intend multiple convictions and punishments for the conduct alleged in the two counts. In doing so, McGrath also raises the issue of the proper relationship between illegal gambling business offenses and money laundering offenses. He states: Clearly, the crime of money laundering is aimed at conduct that “was not previously punished criminally”, and that “follows in time” the underlying crime. -Contrary to Congressional intent, the alleged money laundering activity in this case does not “follow in time” the activity of conducting an illegal gambling business. In fact, the money laundering activity charged in this case is temporally and statutorily the same activity necessary to conduct an illegal video poker gambling business. McGrath’s First Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Count 1, at 13 (Document No. 628) (quoting United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 3037, 120 L.Ed.2d 906 (1992)). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb ... U.S. Const.Amend. V, has been interpreted to provide three forms of protection. “The Double Jeopardy Clause ‘protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 281 (3d Cir.1986) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054, 107 S.Ct. 927, 93 L.Ed.2d 978; 481 U.S. 1018, 107 S.Ct. 1899, 95 L.Ed.2d 505 (1987). As Defendant McGrath’s double jeopardy challenge arises in the context of a single indictment, the protection against multiple prosecutions does not apply. Only the protection against multiple punishments applies in this ease. The Double Jeopardy Clause’s protection against multiple punishments in a single case ensures only that a court does not impose punishment in excess of the punishment intended by the legislature. “With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.” Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). This Court’s inquiry begins with the question of whether-the legislature — in this case, Congress — intended each violation of separate statutes to be separate offenses. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 2411, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985). The starting point in determining whether Congress intended the violation of separate statutes to be the “same offense” is the so-called “Blockburger test.” In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the Supreme Court restated its test for determining whether violation of two distinct statutes by way of a single act constituted the “same offense.” It said: The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Id. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. The Court has made clear, however, that “[t]he rule stated in Blockburger was applied as a rule of statutory construction to help determine legislative intent.” Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778-79, 105 S.Ct. at 2411; see also Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368, 103 S.Ct. at 679; Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1143, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1437-38, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). Although a determination that violation of two statutes is the “same offense” under the Blockburger test raises a presumption that Congress did not intent multiple punishments, that presumption must yield to a clearly expressed contrary intent. As the Hunter Court explained: In Whalen we ... noted that Blockbur-ger established a rule of statutory construction in these terms: “The assumption underlying the rule is that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. Accordingly, where two statutory provisions proscribe the ‘same offense,’ they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.” 445 U.S., at 691-92, 100 S.Ct., at 1437-1438 (emphasis added). We went on to emphasize the qualification on that rule: “[W]here the offenses are the same ... cumulative sentences are not permitted, unless elsewhere specially authorized by Congress.” Id., at 693, 100 S.Ct., at 1438 (emphasis added). Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366-67, 103 S.Ct. at 678. In short, determining whether Congress intended to permit multiple punishments entails “an analysis of the substantive criminal law.” Gillespie v. Ryan, 837 F.2d 628, 632 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 833, 109 S.Ct. 90, 102 L.Ed.2d 66 (1988). Defendant McGrath’s double jeopardy challenge is two-fold. First, he contends that the conspiracy to launder money is the same offense as the substantive illegal gambling business charge. Second, he implicitly contends that an illegal gambling business is a lesser included offense of laundering the “proceeds” of an illegal gambling business, despite his being charged with substantive illegal gambling but not substantive money laundering. The Court concludes that Congress intended multiple punishments for a conspiracy to launder money and violation of the substantive illegal gambling business prohibition. The elements of conspiracy include an agreement. While violation of the illegal gambling business prohibition requires participation of five or more persons, an agreement is not an element of the offense. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 788, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1295, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975). Likewise, to violate the illegal gambling business prohibition, one must actually engage in such a business. An agreement to launder the “proceeds” of an illegal gambling business does not require operation of the illegal gambling business. One could agree first to operate the business and then to launder its “proceeds” without actually engaging in either activity. A conspiracy to launder money and a substantive violation of the illegal gambling business prohibition are not the “same offense” under Blockburger. McGrath’s second argument has more substance. For an agreement to constitute a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the object of the agreement or the means of effectuating it must be illegal. If, as Defendant McGrath contends, Congress did not intend that the conduct alleged in the money laundering object of the conspiracy be money laundering, the money laundering object of the conspiracy fails to state an offense. If violation of the illegal gambling prohibition is a lesser included offense of money laundering and Congress’s intent to impose multiple punishments is not clear, the propriety of alleging a “lesser included object” as a separate object must be addressed. If Congress intended the facts alleged to be covered by both statutes, with multiple punishments, a conspiracy alleging both objects is properly charged. Defendant McGrath contends that the money laundering object of the conspiracy is the “same offense” as the illegal gambling business object of the conspiracy under Blockburger, citing United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1213. In Edgmon, a father and son were convicted of conspiracy to convert and converting cattle securing a Farmers Home Administration loan, and the father was convicted of laundering the proceeds of the conversion with the intent to conceal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)®. Id. at 1208. The cattle, owned by the son, was sold in the father’s name. The father purchased land and a tractor with the money from the sale, obtained a loan using his purchases as collateral and paid an amount equivalent to the price of the cattle to his son from the borrowed funds. Id. at 1210-11. The father challenged his conviction for money laundering on the grounds that it was a second punishment for the same offense under Blockburger. As the government in Edgmon did not dispute the father’s contention that the conversion and the money laundering failed the Blockburger test, the Edgmon court stated that it would assume that they did. Nonetheless, discussing Garrett, the court stated, “As in the present case, the two offenses [in Garrett ] ‘failed’ the Blockburger test because one served as an element of the other.” Id. at 1213 (emphasis added). Noting that the Blockburger test is not determinative, the court went on to reject the father’s contention, concluding that Congress intended punishment for the specified unlawful activity and, in addition, the money laundering activity- The court now turns to the application of the Blockburger test to Sections 1956(a)(1)(A)® and 1955. Sections 1956(a)(1)(A)® and 1956(c)(7) provide in relevant part: s 1956. Laundering of monetary instruments (a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity — (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; * ifs H* Hs shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. * * * * X * (c) As used in this section— (7) the term “specified unlawful activity” means— (A) any act or activity constituting an offense listed in section 1961(1) of this title except an act which is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31; 'Jfi * * * * * 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) & (c)(7) (emphasis added). The requirement that a “financial transaction” must “in fact involve[ ] the proceeds of specified unlawful activity” imposes on the Government the burden of showing a “specified unlawful activity” in fact occurred. That is, the money laundering statute requires proof of a specified unlawful activity without expressing its elements in the statute. Before concluding that the money laundering statute and “specified unlawful activity” fail the Blockburger test, two points give the Court pause. First, while the Indictment alleges that the specified unlawful activity in this case is conducting an illegal gambling business, the statute does not require that this particular crime furnish the required specified unlawful activity. Second, an implied, shared element of offenses standing in the relationship of greater and lesser included offenses is the identity of the perpetrator. The money laundering statute does not require that the person conducting the financial transaction be the person who committed the specified unlawful activity. For instance, a “smurf’ — -a person who structures transactions to avoid reporting requirements by depositing less than $10,000 at a time — with no connection to a drug sale can be convicted of laundering the money obtained in exchange for the drugs. The first point, regarding the money laundering offense’s capacity to be predicated upon “specified unlawful activity” other than an illegal gambling business, is controlled by precedent. In Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1977) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that robbery was a lesser included offense of felony murder, notwithstanding the felony murder statute’s specification of the predicate offense of “a felony,” rather than the elements of robbery. Therefore, successive prosecution for one would not lie after trial on the other. Accord Payne v. Virginia, 468 U.S. 1062, 104 S.Ct. 3573, 82 L.Ed.2d 801 (1984) (per curiam). In Whalen, a multiple punishment case, the Court, construing a statute passed by Congress for the District of Columbia as incorporating the Blockburger test, reached the same conclusion with respect to felony murder and rape. The Court stated, “[P]roof of rape is a necessary element of proof of the felony murder, and we are unpersuaded that this case should be treated differently from other cases in which one criminal offense requires proof of every element of another offense.” Whalen, 445 U.S. at 694, 100 S.Ct. at 1439. In the recent successive prosecution case of United States v. Dixon, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), five justices supported the principle of Harris, but not its application to orders of court predicate to criminal contempt proceedings. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, set forth the interpretation: In this situation, in which the contempt sanction is imposed for violating the order through commission of the incorporated drug offenses, the later attempt to prosecute Dixon for the drug offense resembles the situation that produced our judgment of double jeopardy in Harris- There we held that a subsequent prosecution for robbery with a firearm was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, because the defendant had already been tried for felony-murder based on the same underlying felony. We have described our terse per cu-riam in Hards as standing for the proposition that, for double jeopardy purposes, “the crime generally described as felony murder” is not “a separate offense distinct from its various elements.” Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420-421, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2267, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980). Accord Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 694, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1439, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). So too here, the “crime” of violating a condition of release cannot be abstracted from the “element” of the violated condition. The Dixon court order incorporated the entire governing criminal code in the same manner as the Harris felony-murder statute incorporated the several enumerated felonies. Here, as in Harris, the underlying substantive criminal offense is “a species of lesser-included offense.” Dixon, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2857; see also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 528, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2097, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have departed from Blockburger’s exclusive focus on the statutory elements of crimes in only two situations. One occurs where a statutory offense expressly incorporates another statutory offense without specifying the latter’s elements”), overruled, Dixon, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2859-65; Borchardt v. United States, 469 U.S. 937, 941, 105 S.Ct. 341, 344, 83 L.Ed.2d 276 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). This interpretation of Harris focuses exclusively on the elements of the compound statute, including the elements of the alternative underlying statute that is in fact charged. Dixon, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2861. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Thomas and O’Connor, believed that Harris was misapplied by Justice Scalia because the contempt statute in Dixon made no express reference to any other statute. Regarding the interpretation of Harris, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: Close inspection of the crimes at issue in Harris reveals ... that our decision in that case was not a departure from Block-burger’s focus on the statutory elements of the offenses charged. In Harris, we held that a conviction for felony murder based on a killing in the course of an armed robbery foreclosed a subsequent prosecution for robbery with a firearm. Though the felony-murder statute in Harris did not require proof of armed robbery, it did include as an element [of] proof that the defendant was engaged in the commission of some felony.... We construed this generic reference to some felony as incorporating the statutory elements of the various felonies upon which a felony-murder conviction could rest.... The criminal contempt provision involved here, by contrast, contains no such generic reference which by definition incorporates the statutory elements of assault or drug distribution. Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2867 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment in part) (citations omitted). Chief Justice Rehnquist further explained the Harris principle by example, stating, “Taking the facts of Harris as an example, a defendant who commits armed robbery necessarily has satisfied one of the statutory elements of felony murder.” Id. (emphasis added). Section 1956(a) requires that the financial transaction “in fact involve the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,” and “specified unlawful activity” is defined with reference to other statutes, without enumeration of the elements of each of the statutes. When a particular defendant commits a particular “specified unlawful activity,” that defendant “necessarily has satisfied one of the statutory elements” of a Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) violation. That money laundering could be predicated upon proof of one of a host of specified unlawful activities other than conducting an illegal gambling business does not serve to prevent the illegal gambling business from being a “a species of lesser included offense” of money laundering, if it is the elements of the illegal gambling business upon which the Government seeks to rely to prove “specified unlawful activity.” The Court concludes that the second point, regarding the implied identity of actors in lesser and greater included offenses, should be resolved by analogy to the first point. If the Government alleges that the specified unlawful activity and the money laundering were committed by the same person, the specified unlawful activity should be considered “a species of lesser included offence.” Just because the implied identity of actors will not necessarily hold in another case should not prevent the specified unlawful activity from being a lesser included offense of money laundering. When a particular defendant commits a particular “specified unlawful activity,” that defendant “necessarily has satisfied one of the statutory elements” of a Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) violation. In this case, the conspiracy count is alleged in such a manner that each Defendant is alleged to have conducted an illegal gambling business and laundered the proceeds thereof. An illegal gambling business is the alleged “specified unlawful activity,” and all defendants are alleged to have participated in both the gambling business and the money laundering. The Court concludes that in such circumstances the illegal gambling business charge and the money laundering charge fail the Blockburger test. Therefore, absent a clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary, the Court must presume that Congress did not intend multiple punishments in the same trial. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366-67, 103 S.Ct. at 679. In understanding the intent of Congress with respect to the relationship between “specified unlawful activity,” particularly conducting an illegal gambling business, and the money laundering offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i), some background regarding the two statutes will be useful. The Court will first discuss the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses and its interpretations. It will then turn to the money laundering statute and the intent of Congress in passing it. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1955(a) & (b) prohibits “illegal gambling businesses,” stating: Prohibition of Illegal Gambling Businesses (a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (b) As used in this section— (1) “illegal gambling business” means a gambling business which— (i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted; (ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own all or part of such business; and (iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day. (2) “gambling” includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein. (3) “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) & (b). Section 1955 itself is a broad statute. It can be determined from the statute itself that for the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses to apply substantively, the participation of “five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own all or part of such business” is required. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 772, 782 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1287, 1292 n. 15, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975). “Major gambling activities were a principal focus of congressional concern. Large-scale gambling enterprises were seen to be both a substantive evil and a source of funds for other criminal conduct. See S.Rep. No. 91-617, pp. 71-73 (1969). [footnote omitted]. Title VIII [including Section 1955] thus was enacted ‘to give the Federal Government a new substantive weapon, a weapon which will strike at organized crime’s principal source of revenue: illegal gambling.’ Id., at 71.” Id. at 787-88, 95 S.Ct. at 1295. The requirement that a gambling business have five or more participants was intended “to restrict federal intervention to cases in which federal interests are substantially implicated.” Id. at 789, 95 S.Ct. at 1296. Not only is it clear from the statute itself that participation of five or more persons is required, it is also clear that the offense is a continuing, course of conduct offense. One alternative means of qualifying as an “illegal gambling business” under Subsection 1955(b)(l)(iii) is for the gambling business to be “in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days.... ” 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(l)(iii). Section 1955 brought within the scope of articulated federal power “gambling businesses” involving five or more participants that engaged in activities illegal under state law. Although the federal offense is a felony with a maximum sentence of imprisonment of not more than five years, the subject of the gambling business need only be “a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted.” 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(l)(i); cf. United States v. Berent, 523 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir.1975) (violation of civil gambling regulations will not support a Section 1955 indictment). That is, gambling activity constituting only a misdemeanor under state law nonetheless can support a felony conviction under Section 1955 of the participants in a gambling business. Although the gambling activities of the illegal gambling business must be in violation of the law of the place where they occur, Section 1955 does not make the gambling activities themselves a federal offense. Rather, Section 1955 prohibits the illegal gambling business. “The allowable unit of prosecution under § 1955 is defined as participation in a single ‘illegal gambling business.’ Congress did not assimilate state gambling laws per se into the federal penal code, nor did it define discrete acts of gambling as independent federal offenses.” Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2182, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978). Section 1955’s prohibiting illegal gambling businesses, not discrete violations of local law, has important ramifications for the nature of the federal illegal gambling business offense. First, the illegal gambling business is the “allowable unit of prosecution,” and a single illegal gambling business must be charged in a single count, even though it operates in violation of more than one local law. Id. at 65-66 nn. 19 & 20, 98 S.Ct. at 2179 nn. 19 & 20. Stated in the parlance of the conspiracy law, such a gambling business is one offense with multiple objects. Second, a defendant may incur federal criminal liability by participating in any manner in an illegal gambling business, even though his own activity was not in violation of local law. Id. at 70 & n. 26, 98 S.Ct. at 2182 & n. 26; see also United States v. Riehl, 460 F.2d 454 (3d Cir.1972) (“A street runner for a numbers business ‘conducts’ that business in the sense that he carries it on”). Third, the elements of 1955(b)(1) are jurisdictional and need only be proved with respect to the gambling business, not individual defendants. Id. 437 U.S. at 68 n. 22, 70 & n. 26, 98 S.Ct. at 2181 n. 22, 2182 & n. 26. The Court now turns to the money laundering statute, which states in pertinent part: s 1956. Laundering of monetary instruments (a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity— (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part— (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law, shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. * * * * * * (c) As used in this section— (1) the term “knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity” means that the person knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or foreign law, regardless of whether or not such activity is specified in paragraph (7); (2) the term “conducts” includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating, or concluding a transaction; * * 'Jfi * * * (7) the term “specified unlawful activity” means— (A) any act or activity constituting an offense listed in section 1961(1) of this title except an act which is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31; * * * * * (d) Nothing in this section shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in this section. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp.1993). An illegal gambling business meets the definition of “specified unlawful activity” under Subsection 1956(c)(7)(A) because it is included in the definition of “racketeering activity” under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1961(1). Unlawful activity other than money laundering itself appears three times in the section of the money laundering statute pursuant to which the Defendants are charged in this case. The pertinent section of 1956 states: (a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity — (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)®. “[T]he term ‘knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity’ means that the person knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or foreign law, regardless of whether or not such activity is specified in paragraph (7), [enumerating ‘specified unlawful activities’].” Id. § 1956(c)(1) (emphasis added). The requirement that the money laundering transaction “in fact involve[] the proceeds of specified unlawful activity” strongly suggests that the specified unlawful activity precedes and is separate from the money laundering transaction. In the typical case— for instance, a distribution of a controlled substance in violation of 21 Ü.S.C. § 841(a)— the specified unlawful activity is committed uno actu. Money then in the criminal’s hands is clearly “proceeds” of a completed criminal act. Where illegal gambling is the specified unlawful activity, the meaning of the requirement that the “financial transaction” must “in fact involve the proceeds of specified unlawful activity” is not similarly clear. An illegal gambling business is not only a continuing, course-of-conduct offense, it is an offense requiring the participation of five or more persons. The illegal gambling business offense is very broad; a defendant can be convicted upon a showing of knowing participation in any manner in the illegal gambling business. Yet, the gambling business itself, not the discrete state law violations, is the unit of the federal offense. Due to the breadth of the illegal gambling business offense, acts within its scope can also meet the definition of a “financial transaction” under Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i). In this case, the proper application of Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) to the money laundering object of the conspiracy count is not clear. The money laundering object of the conspiracy count states: (b) It was further a part and object of the conspiracy that the above named defendants, and others known and unknown to the grand jury, did knowingly and unlawfully conduct or attempt to conduct financial transactions affecting interstate or foreign commerce, which transactions involved the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, that is, illegal gambling with video poker machines, knowing that the property involved in such financial transactions represented the proceeds of the illegal gambling activity, and with the intent to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful activity, illegal gambling with video poker machines, that is, during the period November 1986 through September 1991 cash proceeds from illegal gambling involving video poker machines was [sic] received, transferred, delivered, deposited or otherwise transacted by the defendants in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956. Indictment, 121(b) (Document No. 1) (emphasis added). As the money laundering object of the conspiracy is alleged, the single illegal gambling business fills all three “unlawful activity” roles in the Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) charge. The Defendants are alleged to have known that the property-involved — the cash — was the proceeds of the illegal gambling business. The specified unlawful activity from which the cash in fact was derived is alleged to be the illegal gambling business. And the specified unlawful activity in furtherance of which the money laundering transaction is alleged to have been made is the same illegal gambling business. The Government must prove that the Defendants conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed or owned an illegal gambling business, as defined in Section 1955(b), as a necessary predicate to money laundering. Due to the breadth of the crime of participating in an illegal gambling business, the conduct of knowingly receiving, transferring, delivering, depositing or otherwise transacting the cash taken from video poker machine activity illegal under local law, if proved, would satisfy the “conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own” element of a Section 1955 illegal gambling business offense. Yet, this same conduct is alleged to constitute financial transactions with the intent to promote the carrying on of the illegal gambling business. Notwithstanding the requirement that the subject of the “financial transaction” must “in fact involve the proceeds” of the joint, continuing offense of participating in an illegal gambling business, the money laundering object of the conspiracy alleges — as money laundering — conduct clearly within Congress’ definition of participation in an illegal gambling business. The Government contends that it is the clear intent of Congress that money, once wagered by being fed into a video poker machine operated in violation of state law, be considered “proceeds” of an illegal gambling business. As noted above, however, Section 1955 does not make discrete state gambling law violations a federal offense. The essence of the federal offense is the joint, continuous operation of an illegal gambling business. Moreover, the Government’s interpretation of the money laundering statute also results in certain elements of the money laundering statute being rendered superfluous. Congress, in one phrase of the statute, incorporates by reference the elements of some “specified unlawful activity,” in this case illegal gambling. Irrespective of the actual intent of Congress regarding multiple punishments for the offenses, the illegal gambling business offense is a species of lesser included offense of Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i). In addition to the elements of the specified unlawful activity, Congress required that other elements be present before the offense of money laundering under Section 1956(a)(1)(A)® is proved. In addition to the requirement that the “financial transaction” must “in fact involve[ ] the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,” Section 1956(a)(1)(A)® requires that two knowledge or intent requirements be met. First, the Defendants must know that the property involved in the financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of felony. Second, the financial transaction must be undertaken with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. The definition of “financial transaction” is the source of further elements to be proven. A financial transaction can be shown one of two ways. First, there can be a disposition of property, the disposition affecting in any way or degree interstate or foreign commerce involving the movement of funds by wire or other means, involving one or more monetary instruments, or involving the transfer of title to real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft. Second, there can be a transaction involving a financial institution engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree. The Government’s position is that the literal scope of the statutes in question overlap, and where they overlap Congress clearly intended multiple punishments. The illegal gambling business offense can be shown through participation in any way in the operation of the business, including activities that meet the definition of financial transactions under Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i). To show money laundering, however, that participation must take the form of “financial transactions.” Conduct falling within the greater offense of money laundering, therefore, would be a subset of conduct falling within the lesser included offense of participating in an illegal gambling business. As the illegal gambling business offense is a species of lesser included offense of money laundering under Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i), this is neither remarkable nor surprising. With the overlap thus set forth, the Government’s position follows from the dictionary definition of the word “proceeds” as “what is produced by or derived from something (as a sale, investment, levy, business) by way of total return: the total amount brought in: YIELD, RETURNS....” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) 1807 (P.B. Gove ed. 1971) (emphasis added). As soon as the money is deposited into a video poker machine, it is derived from the illegal gambling business by way of total (gross) returns. Because just about anything done with the money so deposited qualifies both as a “financial transaction” and participating in an illegal gambling business, the Government’s position is that its allegations satisfy the requirement that the “financial transaction” must “in fact involve the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” Once conduct is alleged or shown to constitute both the “financial transaction” and the “specified unlawful activity” at the same time, it follows that the remaining intent elements of a Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) violation are established. In fact, it necessarily follows that the remaining intent elements of a Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) violation are made out, and therein lies the difficulty with the Government’s position. Where “specified unlawful activity” is a joint, continuing offense defined so that it can be carried on by activity also qualifying as “financial transactions,” proof establishing one tier of the three tier structure of Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) — that a defendant conducted “a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity”— necessarily includes proof establishing the other two. Proof that a defendant engaged in the specified unlawful activity necessarily means that the defendant knows from what crime the money has been derived — the first tier — and that the defendant had the actual intent to engage in specified unlawful activity — which surely includes the “intent to promote the carrying in of specified unlawful activity.” If the conduct of engaging in “specified unlawful activity” is the same conduct constituting the “financial transaction,” proof of the specified unlawful activity, and the additional characteristics of the specified unlawful activity that qualify it as a “financial transaction,” necessarily satisfies all three tiers of the money laundering statute— though these requirements are found in but one of the tiers. It is particularly suggestive of a problem with the Government’s position that the portions of the money laundering statute rendered superfluous are elements of intent. If the conduct to which the elements of intent relate — the financial transaction — is the same conduct as the specified unlawful activity, the elements of intent will always be satisfied and rendered superfluous by proof of specified unlawful activity. If Defendant McGrath is correct, and Congress intended to require proof of two elements of intent, specified unlawful activity, and a financial transaction not within the scope of specified unlawful activity, the elements of intent will never be satisfied and rendered superfluous by proof of specified unlawful activity without more. If the statute is read to require a financial transaction in addition to and separate from specified unlawful activity, proof of additional conduct is required and the elements of intent further define the additional, prohibited conduct. Thus, an equally rational interpretation of the requirement that the “financial transaction” must “in fact involve[ ] the proceeds of specified unlawful activity” is as a device to limit the scope of the money laundering statute. Under such a reading the money laundering statute does not extend its reach into the already illegal “specified unlawful activity” to punish the same conduct under two statutes. Rather, the money laundering statute punishes separate conduct that was not readily punishable before its passage. This interpretation avoids rendering two of the three tiers of Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) superfluous. The Department of Justice has recognized this problem of interpretation in the related context of financial crimes and fraud. In an October 1, 1992 “Bluesheet” updating the United States Attorneys’ Manual with respect to money laundering prosecutions and forfeitures, Robert S. Mueller, III, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, states: B. Consultation Requirement in Certain Cases In the following instances, the United States Attorney’s Office must consult with the Money Laundering Section prior to the filing of an indictment or complaint.... ****** 3. Cases Involving Financial Crimes: In any case where the conduct to be charged as “specified unlawful activity” under §§ 1956 and 1957 consists primarily of one or more financial or fraud offenses, and where the financial and money laundering offenses are so closely connected with each other that there is no clear delineation between the underlying financial crime and the money laundering offense, no indictment or complaint may be filed without prior consultation with the Money Laundering Section. Explanation: Sections 1956 and 1957 both require that the property involved in the money laundering transaction be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity at the time that the transaction occurs. The statute does not define when property becomes “proceeds,” but the context implies that the property will have been derived from an already completed offense, or a completed phase of an ongoing offense, before it is laundered. Therefore, as a general rule, neither § 1956 nor § 1957 should be used where the same financial transaction represents both the money laundering offense and a part of the specified unlawful activity generating the proceeds being laundered. October 1, 1992 Bluesheet, updating. USAM 9-105.000, ¶6.3 (emphasis in original). Consistent with Defendant McGrath’s position, several courts, in other contexts, have interpreted the money laundering statute as not directly applying to “specified unlawful activity.” The Second Circuit has stated, “Section 1956 creates the crime of money laundering, and it takes dead aim at the attempt to launder dirty money. Why and how that money got dirty is defined in other statutes. Section 1956 does not penalize the underlying unlawful activity from which the tainted money is derived. ” United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 691 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1982, 118 L.Ed.2d 580 (1992); see also id. (“The statute was designed to create a new federal crime, rather than to further penalize the underlying conduct”). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has stated, “Congress aimed the crime of money laundering at conduct that follows in time the underlying crime rather than to afford an alternative means of punishing the prior ‘specified unlawful activity.’ ” United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1213-14; accord, United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 569-70 (10th Cir.1992); United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1042 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 169, 121 L.Ed.2d 117 (1992); see also United States v. Smith, 818 F.Supp. 132, 133-34 (D.Maryland 1993); United States v. Dimeck, 815 F.Supp. 1425, 1429-30 (D.Kan.1993). The Third Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir.1993) is not to the contrary. Although that ease held that a financial transaction could be in furtherance of already concluded “specified unlawful activity,” it does not stand for the proposition that the money laundering financial transaction and the specified unlawful activity may be one and the same act. The Paramo court specifically noted that the “specified unlawful activity,” mail fraud, was “legally completed” prior to the financial transaction charged as money laundering. As Paramo is like Edgmon in this regard, see supra not