Full opinion text
ORDER TRAXLER, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION In this suit, the Plaintiffs prosecute a variety of state and federal causes of action. The federal jurisdiction is premised upon an issue of federal statutory law, and the state claims are in this court by virtue of pendant jurisdiction. The federal statute at issue is the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988). Specifically, the Complainants claim that they are entitled to recover, pursuant to CERCLA, certain costs incurred because of the Defendant’s allegedly improper waste disposal management at its landfill facility. Complimentary to the CERCLA cause of action for damages, the Plaintiffs also pray for a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1988). The Plaintiffs seek a declaration from this court delineating the duties and obligations of the Defendant arising from the alleged contamination of the landfill. The remaining causes of action, which present issues of pure state law, are the common law claims of negligence, strict liability for hazardous activity, nuisance, trespass, and inverse condemnation. This action presents a ease of first impression in this District. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the Defendant has moved the court for summary judgment as to all counts of the complaint, with the exception of the claim for physical trespass to Plaintiff Laddie Rhodes’ property. The Defendant contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there are no genuine issues of material fact. Specifically, the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead or satisfy the prima facie elements for a cause of action for recovery of costs under CERCLA. After reading the parties’ briefs, holding a hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, and reviewing the caselaw and the CERCLA statutory scheme, the court grants the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the federal claims, thereby depriving this court of federal statutory jurisdiction, and dismisses the complaint without prejudice as to the state law causes of action. II. THE FACTS Since 1974, the County of Darlington, South Carolina, has operated a municipal sanitary landfill northeast of the City of Dar-lington. The County owns the property on which the landfill is operated, and the landfill is lawfully permitted by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. Since its inception, the landfill has accepted for disposal only waste generated by households, yard debris, and certain industrial wastes that were specifically and expressly approved by the Department of Health and Environmental Control for disposal at the site. Pursuant to state regulations, groundwater tests were performed on the landfill site in 1985 and 1986. The results of these tests indicated that the upper aquifer below the downgradient edge of the landfill may possibly be contaminated because of the landfill’s operations. (See “Darlington County Landfill Phase I Groundwater Assessment,” at 2). The County, therefore, ordered that a Groundwater Quality Assessment Plan (the “Plan”) be prepared by Soil and Material Engineers, Incorporated, an environmental consulting firm. This Plan was approved by the Department of Health and Environmental Control. Accordingly, pursuant to the Plan, the County solicited Chas. T. Main, Incorporated (“Main”), another environmental consulting firm, to conduct further investigations on the quality of the groundwater. These subsequent series of tests were conducted in three phases: Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III. The Plaintiffs are landowners of real property situated to the southeast of the landfill. The property of Plaintiffs Nancy Harrison and Emily Rhodes is partially adjacent to the southern boundary of the landfill. The parcels owned by Plaintiffs Laddie Rhodes and Jane Fussell do not border the site, although they are located in the general vicinity. A. Phase I As provided for under the Plan, a Phase I Groundwater Assessment Test was performed on the landfill by Main. The activities encompassed by Phase I were fairly exhaustive and included: (1) soil test boring to a depth of sixty-five feet with soil samples collected and tested at two-and-one-half— foot (2.5') intervals for the first ten (10) feet and thereafter at five-foot (5') intervals. Quantitative analyses were performed on these samples. (2) Ten (10) earth resistivity soundings and an electromagnetic survey of 130 stations were conducted in areas both up- and downgradient of the site. (3) Two (2) surface water samples were collected from streams downgradient of the landfill and were tested for the presence of selected heavy metal, such as lead or chromium, and for pollutant volatile organic compounds, such as halogenated carbons. (4) Drilling, boring, logging, and analysis of the elements or compounds of the landfill subsurface sediment were also conducted. Additionally, geophysical surveys were performed to determine the geologic and hydrologic conditions at the site. Id. at 4-12. The chemical analyses performed on the collected samples were conducted pursuant to Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) methods. The purpose of Phase I testing was to identify areas of possible contamination, assess any possible impact on the surrounding drinking water supplies, and determine if further testing was desirable or required. The results of Phase I revealed that the groundwater under the landfill and the property downgradient from the site had been affected by the landfill’s operation. Specifically, the tests indicated high conductivity levels — ie.—that the soil samples contained a greater degree of metals in them than is normally found. Id. at 21. These high conductivity levels indicated possible groundwater contamination because of the presence of heavy metals in the soil samples. This possibly metal-rich soil formed a “conductivity plume,” which extended downgradient from the landfill in a southerly direction a maximum of 1200' feet in length and 2200' feet in width. In addition to the conductivity plume, Phase I testing also indicated that chloride, fluoride, arsenic, and selenium might be present in the groundwater. The ultimate conclusion of Phase I was that further, more-detailed testing needed to be performed on the groundwater surrounding the landfill. Thus, Phase II was implemented, which provided that groundwater sampling and chemical analysis of the samples be conducted. Id. at 21-27. B. Phase II Pursuant to the recommendations of Phase I, Phase II testing was instituted by Main at the County’s direction. The main thrust of Phase II testing was the installation of six (6) permanent monitoring wells, later increased to nine (9) permanent and four (4) temporary wells, established downgradient from the landfill. (See “Phase II Monitoring Well Locations,” at 15). These monitoring wells were to be located both on and off the landfill site. The off-site wells were placed on the property of Plaintiff Emily Rhodes, with her approval, and on other property not the subject of this suit. Like Phase I, Phase II also called for a variety of chemical qualitative and quantitative analyses to b.e performed on the samples taken from the wells and surrounding environs. The most salient experiments to be conducted involved soil testing and groundwater analysis. The soil testing experiments provided for soil permeability tests, sieve analysis, specific gravity, moisture content, unit weight, void ratio, and porosity determinations. The groundwater analysis contemplated detecting various elements and compounds from the samples collected from the wells, namely arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, selenium, silver, nickel, zinc, chloride, fluoride, nitrate, sulfate, volatile organics (carbon-based compounds), and the pH (acidity or basicity) of the water'. (See “Darlington County Landfill Phase I Groundwater Assessment,” at 25). This battery of tests was to be conducted in compliance with methods and procedures approved by the Department of Health and Environmental Control. The test results of Phase II indicated that neither arsenic, cadmium, chromium, nor selenium were present in the groundwater under the landfill, nor in the groundwater on the Plaintiffs’ property. Lead, however, was detected at its detection limit in twelve (12) of the monitoring wells. In addition to lead, nitrates, sulfates, and chlorides were also detected in the groundwater samples. Nitrate was detected in each well sampled with the exception of two (2). The levels of nitrate, however, were below the state drinking water standards for consumption and therefore posed no threat to health or safety. As with nitrates, sulfates were detected in all but two (2) of the wells. The study concluded, however, that the concentration of sulfates, like that of the nitrates, was far below the state drinking water standards. Moreover, the analysis noted that the sulfates found were probably the result of naturally occurring sulfate levels in groundwater and that even the higher levels of concentration, which complied with state safety standards, should not be a major concern. Chlorides were also detected in the well. The analysis concluded that the concentration levels of chloride detected indicated a great disparity, from three (3) milligrams per liter to 900 milligrams per liter. The state standard for chloride in drinking water is 250 milligrams per liter. Accordingly, some of the concentration levels of chloride exceeded the safety limit. (See “Phase II Analytical Results and Interpretation,” at 24-28). The Phase II testing also determined that certain volatile organic compounds (“VOC”) were detected in one (1) of the four (4) wells located on Plaintiff Emily Rhodes’ property. Id. at 2é-28.. The analysis further concluded, however, that the presence of VOC was restricted to certain portions of the site, was not widespread but confined to the upper portions of the upper clay layer of the soil and the sand aquifer, and appeared in relatively low concentrations. Id. at 27. Phase II analysis also concluded that VOC contamination was limited to the groundwater underlying the landfill and that the primary element of the plume was chloride. Chloride, like sulfate, is a naturally occurring element that may also possibly affect the downgra-dient water quality. Chloride, however, is a “Secondary Drinking Water Parameter.” Such secondary parameters affect the aesthetic qualities of water, not the quantitative level or type of toxic elements or compounds found in the groundwater. Id. at 25. As to the downgradient impact of the water at the site, Phase II determined that contamination was minimal. Significantly, while Phase II ultimately recommended that more testing and analysis of the site be conducted in a Phase III study, the results of Phase II determined that since chloride, a secondary parameter, was the prime constituent of the plume, because the VOC were localized to the landfill area, and that because the down-gradient impact was minor, no remediation was recommended. Id. at 29-30. C. Phase III Pursuant to Main’s Phase II recommendation for more testing, the County authorized a Phase III investigation of the site. The purpose of Phase III was to determine the precise dimensions of the plume and to anticipate its movement. To this end, Phase III contemplated the following: (1) performing geophysical conductivity surveys performed in the areas downgradient of the site; (2) because lead was detected in some of the wells, a resampling of the well water, using more sensitive analysis, to determine the lead content; (3) the installation of additional groundwater monitoring wells placed down-gradient of the landfill. The new well locations were situated directly downgradient from the existing wells showing traces of toxic compounds. Along with the hew wells, the water from the existing wells was to be resampled and reanalyzed; (4) monitoring off-site wells for the presence of chloride, lead, and VOC. Accordingly, Phase III was duly executed by Main. Id. at 29. (See also “Phase III Groundwater Monitoring Wells,” at 6). The results of Phase III revealed that: (1) cadmium was not detected in the groundwater above any permissible limits; (2) lead was found in wells both on and off the site, but its level was below the state’s maximum contamination level for lead; (3) trace amounts of VOC were found both on and off the site; however, there are no state, or federal standards regulating the permissible levels for VOC, with the exception of benzene, 1, 4 dichlorobenzene, and vinyl chloride. Benzene was not detected in the lower sand layer and no distinguishing differences were noted between the clay layer and the upper sand. The study, however, recommended further monitoring of the groundwater; (4) the chloride concentrations of the landfill continued to increase. While the lower sand unit did not exceed state standards for the presence of chloride, both the upper clay and sand units exceeded the state’s parameters for chloride in drinking water. (See “Phase III Groundwater Monitoring Wells,” at 11). The study finally concluded that remediation of the groundwater either on or off the landfill site was not necessary. Id. at 12. Based on the results of Phase III, Main recommended further investigation of the site, which included: (1) monitoring the former and newer wells for the presence of VOC and chloride; (2) capping the landfill with an impermeable layer of clay and/or synthetic materials to foreclose leaching of any contaminants into the groundwater. Capping the site would dilute the chlorides as they permeate the aquifer, thereby rendering remediation of the landfill nugatory; (3) installing three (3) additional monitoring wells at a deeper level in the sand unit and analyzing water samples collected from these wells for the presence of chlorides. Id. D. The Plaintiffs’ Report In their surreply, but not in their Motion Opposing the Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs submitted a report prepared by Environmental Technology Engineering, Incorporated, another environmental consulting firm. This report concluded that the concentration of benzene and chloride in monitoring well 7A exceeded EPA and South Carolina state standards .for drinking water. The report similarly concluded that vinyl chloride, ethylbenzene, toluene, chlorobenzene, and lead were below their recommended maximum concentration levels. Based on' these findings, the report concluded that “[t]he range of pH values detected in [well 7A] does not necessarily represent a contamination problem. However, the dramatic increase in the specific conductance following purging of the monitoring well may represent the presence of contamination in the well.” (See “Environmental Technology Engineering Findings,” at 3). The report also stated that the concentrations of chloride and benzene “may represent the leading edge of a leachate plume.” Id. E. The Plaintiffs’ Property Plaintiff Laddie Rhodes’ parcel is used for growing various crops and Christmas trees. Fixtures on the property include two (2) unhabitable houses, a trailer, and two (2) barns. Mr. Rhodes has never attempted to mortgage or sell his property. Significantly, only one drinking well is located on the property; and Mr. Rhodes has not had the water from this well tested since 1986. (See “Deposition of Laddie Rhodes,” at 12-20). Plaintiff Jane Fussell lives on her property, which is not adjacent to the landfill. Ms. Fussell’s water is supplied by the county system, and her property has no surface water. There are, however, wells on Ms. Fussell’s property that are used primarily for farming purposes and for watering the yard. Additionally, there are two (2) underground storage tanks on the parcel that are used for storing petroleum products. While Ms. Fus-sell has never mortgaged or attempted to sell her property, she has leased it. to a farmer for the approaching season. Approximately 100 acres are under cultivation. Significantly, Ms. Fussell has never placed monitoring wells on her parcel, nor has she any plans to do so. (See “Deposition of Jane Fussell,” at 32-33). Ms. Fussell also represented to the lessee of her property that the water on the parcel was available for use. Id. at 49. Moreover, Ms. Fussell expressly stated in her deposition that she had no qualms about using the water. (See id., “I don’t know of any concerns at this time about using it [the water]. I don’t think there were any.”). Finally, one of the wells on Ms. Fussell’s parcel was tested by the Department of Health and Environmental Control in 1986; and no problems were observed. Ms. Fussell sought treatment for her well, not based on any personal knowledge or observation concerning the quality of her water, but because there had been an article in the local newspaper concerning the landfill. Id. at 53. All of Plaintiff Nancy Harrison’s property, which is leased to others for farming, is under cultivation. (See “Deposition of Nancy Harrison,” at 11, 18-22). This parcel is partially adjacent to the southern boundary of the landfill. Neither Ms. Harrison nor her lessees reside on the parcel, and the only structures located on it are an unused tenant house and a barn. Id. at 14-15. Indeed, Plaintiff Harrison appears to have little contact with her parcel because she visits it only four (4) times per year. Id. at 23. Ms. Harrison has never attempted to sell or change the use of her property. Id. at 22, 24. Prior to this litigation, the County had never placed a monitoring well on the property; and Ms. Harrison stated that she was not aware of any surface trespass by the landfill. Id. at 26-27. Ms. Harrison has never had the water from the groundwater well tested. Currently, however, as a result of the filing of this action, Ms. Harrison recently installed a single groundwater monitoring well. Id. Like Ms. Harrison’s tract, Plaintiff Emily Rhodes’ parcel is contiguous with the southern boundary of the landfill. (See “Deposition of Nancy Rhodes,” at 11-12). Of the 170 acres of land, approximately 100 acres are leased as farmland and are currently under cultivation; the remaining seventy-one (71) acres are undeveloped. Id. at 26-29. Although no one resides on Ms. Rhodes’ property, there are various structures, such as a tool shed, a barn, and five (5) tenant houses. Id. at 21-22. On this tract, there is one drinking-water well, which has not been tested, and three (3) other monitoring wells installed by the County with Ms. Rhodes’ permission. Id. at 51, 56. Like the other Plaintiffs, Ms. Rhodes has not attempted to mortgage her property; but-she placed the parcel on the market for sale through a real estate firm. Id. at 21, 28-31. Unsatisfied with the offers she received and attributing these lower offers to the proximity of her parcel to the allegedly contaminated landfill, Ms. Rhodes withdrew her property from the market. Id. at 36-38. A private appraisal at the Plaintiffs’ behest by Douglas Brown concluded that the total of all tracts owned by the Plaintiffs had collectively diminished in value by $235,000.00. Id. at 36. The Plaintiffs ascribe this diminished value to their lack of ability to procure financing on the allegedly contaminated property and the resulting stigma of holding allegedly contaminated property. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs instituted this action against the County. As previously stated, the County operates the landfill with the Department of Health and Environmental Control’s permission. Furthermore, the Department of Health and Environmental Control inspects the site on a regular basis, although Plaintiffs allege that the landfill has violated provisions of the permit. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claim that the County has failed to provide adequate cover for the landfill, as noted in site inspection reports. The reports, however, merely state, not that the County had violated the terms of its permit, but that certain aspects of the site needed improvement. (See “South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control Bureau of Solid & Hazardous Waste Management Solid Waste Disposal Site Inspection Sheet”). The County has never claimed the contrary, but has consistently asserted that no wastes have been deposited in the landfill which have not been specifically approved by the Department of Health Control; and the Plaintiffs do not contest this assertion. In order to maintain further regulation and control over the landfill, the County, through its Administrator, has appointed a manager to the site. F. The Plaintiffs’ Alleged Response Costs The Plaintiffs’ have provided minimal explanation as to exactly what necessary response costs they have incurred. Their suit papers do nothing more than vaguely allege that the Plaintiffs have incurred response costs. The following excerpts reveal the Plaintiffs’ alleged response costs: “The Plaintiffs have incurred response costs such as investigative and testing expenses in addition to costs related to enforcement.” (“Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition To The Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment,” at 6). “The Plaintiffs have incurred preliminary investigative and enforcement costs due to this contamination.” Id. at 7. “The Rhodes family has simply begun conducting the necessary preliminary investigations, sampling and testing measures.... ” Id. “The Plaintiffs have taken the necessary preliminary steps in defining the scope and extent of contamination at the landfill and on their property.” Id. at 8. Even in their surreply, the Plaintiffs fail to state, and certainly with no specificity, what their response costs are, other than that the Plaintiffs allege that their costs are investigative: “The Plaintiffs have incurred the following costs: 1. Costs associated with the investigation of data and documentation on the nature, extent and scope of the contamination upgradient of the Plaintiffs’ property. 2. Consulting and geological fees incurred associated with the testing and analytical documentation of groundwater on the Plaintiffs’ property. 3. Attorneys fees incurred in the enforcement of Section 107 action.” (“Surreply To Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,” 7-8). The Plaintiffs have simply not stated what actual costs they have incurred nor what activity is encompassed under their investigative expenses. Equally, the Plaintiffs claim diminution in the collective value of their land by $235,000.00, lack of ability to procure suitable financing, and the stigma of owing allegedly contaminated property. As discussed below, alleged diminution in the value of land, inability to secure financing, and any putative stigma of possessing allegedly contaminated property are not necessary response costs and therefore not recoverable under CERCLA. Stripped to its essentials, this action presents a single federal claim prosecuted under CERCLA — a detailed, comprehensive, narrow, and specific Act that applies only under limited circumstances and only when five (5) specific elements have been procedurally and substantively satisfied. The gravamen of the Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint are state-law claims — claims best left to the state tribunals. The court is compelled to conclude that the Plaintiffs are attempting to invoke federal jurisdiction by asserting what are essentially state-law claims under the guise of CERCLA. CERCLA is not such a substitute action and may not be used as a mere medium for invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts. III. DISCUSSION A. Legislative History of CERCLA In the wake of “Love Canal,” the Ninety-sixth Congress in the waning days of 1980 enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub.L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988). New statutes have had a less propitious origin than the beleaguered CERCLA legislation. The Act that emerged as CERCLA was the result of compromise. Indeed, CERCLA in its original form was the precipitate of three major hazardous substance response bills originating in Congress and one from the Carter Administration, S. 1341, which died in Committee. The first of the three bills, H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., (1979), was introduced by Representative Biaggi on January 15, 1979. See H.R.Rep. No. 96-172(1), 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6212 (1979); see also 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6228 (related report). After consideration by the reporting committee, the bill was introduced to the full House, where it immediately encountered opposition from the chemical and oil industry lobby. See H.R.Rep. No. 96-172(1), 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160; see also H.R.Rep. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979 reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6207 (discussing bill history). Far from admitting defeat, however, Representative Breaux introduced a substitute bill as an amendment to H.R. 85, which had as its purpose the clean up of national waterways. See 126 Cong.Rec. 26391. This new bill established two funds financed from taxes on petroleum and chemical feedstocks. One of these funds provided for compensation for oil spills, while the other provided for the regulation and clean up of toxic chemical spills in navigable waters. Id. Moreover, the bill provided for strict liability to be imposed on the operators of vessels laden with hazardous materials. Id. Conspicuously, however, H.R. 85 did not address the issue of hazardous substances released on land. The bill, therefore, was more circumscribed and limited in scope and purpose than the present CERCLA statute. Like CERCLA’s compensation scheme, H.R. 85 did provide for the Government and private parties to recover damages for cleanup costs and certain economic injuries. While H.R. 85 survived Committee and was ultimately considered and passed by the House, the bill was tabled for further consideration pending the next legislative session. The second of CERCLA’s progenitors was H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., (1980), introduced by Representative Florio on April 2, 1980., This bill created a trust which would receive its funds not only from a tax on oil and chemicals, but also on general revenues. See H.R.Rep. No. 96-1016 (1980), 126 Cong. Rec. 26799 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120-24. Thus, H.R. 7020 provided for financing by the Government at large in addition to the taxes it imposed on the hazardous substance industry. - The purpose of this trust fund was to finance Government actions in response to releases of toxic substances from inactive hazardous waste sites. Id. In direct contravention to H.R. 85, H.R. 7020 expressly did not provide for spills on water ways, nor did compensation for economic injury fall within the bill’s ambit. Like H.R. 85, H.R. 7020 was reported out of Committee and enacted by the House. Id. This bill, H.R. 7020, was attacked as being too limited in scope and providing insufficient remedies for aggrieved parties. Ultimately, however, H.R. 7020, as amended by the Senate, developed into CERCLA. The third and final of'CERCLA’s progenitors was S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., (1979). This bill was introduced by Senators Culver, Muskie, Stafford, Chafee, Randolph, and Moynihan. Like H.R. 7020, S. 1480 provided for a broad revenue base: a $4 billion trust fund financed by general revenues in addition to particular taxes imposed on the chemical', and oil industry. See S.Rep. No. 96-848 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119. The Senate bill contemplated strict liability for owners and operators of hazardous waste sites and was not restricted to spills or releases on land or water. The bill did expressly except oil spills, however. Id. In addition to Governmental and private recovery for cleanup costs, the bill provided for numerous consequential damages, such as medical and medical surveillance expenses and health assessment costs. Id. Senate bill 1480 was attacked as too sweeping in its rights and remedies and met opposition on the floor of the Senate. The Senate, therefore, considered two compromise bills intended to strengthen the earlier House bills while diminishing the recoverable costs for personal injury and economic loss available under the Senate bill. See 126 Cong.Rec. 30935 (1980). The second of these bills, which merely amended H.R. 7020 to conform to the Senate version, became CERCLA. Thus, H.R. 7020, as amended, was eventually enacted. Interestingly, the bill retained the House file number, even though the Senate version was the one enacted. This anomaly is apparently explained by the fact that appropriations bills must originate in the House. Given its inception, CERCLA’s legislative history is far from illuminating because of the eleventh-hour, unexplained compromises that resulted from the blending of three separate bills. Aso, there is not even a committee report on the final version of the Act. Accordingly, the legislative history, to the extent any exists, is of little value in interpreting the statute because the final version of the act reflected Congressional opinions which differed markedly from those incorporated in either the House or Senate bills. CERCLA is oft-criticized for its hasty passage and lack of clarity. There is virtually no legislative history to guide the courts in interpreting the Act. The statute as originally enacted was, at best, vague and indefinite. The courts have echoed their frustration with the act: Because CERCLA as finally enacted was the product of an unusually arduous process of political compromise, it is hardly a model of concise legislative draftsmanship. CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been criticized frequently for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to its precipitous passage. Problems of interpretation have arisen from the Act’s use of inadequately defined terms, a difficulty particularly apparent in the response costs area. Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F.Supp 1269, 1277 (D.Del.1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir.1988), respectively; see also Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir.1988); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F.Supp. 1233, 1239 (M.D.Pa.1990); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F.Supp. 413, 416 (M.D.Pa.1989); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.Supp. 898, 902, 905 (D.N.H.1985); and Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F.Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D.Fla.1984) (criticizing the statute’s legislative history as “riddled with uncertainty” and enjoying a “well-deserved notoriety”). In response to CERCLA’s unwelcome reception, Congress, in 1986, amended the Act by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthori-zation Act (“SARA”), Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, finally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1988). The main thrust of SARA was to define terms and clarify issues not addressed in the 1980 CERCLA legislation. Although CERCLA is far from being a model of clarity, the purpose of the Act is clear — Congress desired a comprehensive plan to remedy hazardous waste facilities: [T]he need for an emergency Federal response to deal with abandoned waste sites and chemical spills is real, and it is immediate. We have no time to lose. Hazardous wastes are produced daily; we cannot put them on hold while we dally through deliberation. ... I believe the clear consensus is that we must clean up abandoned hazardous dump sites as soon as possible. Cong.Rec. S. 14,973, 14,977 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statements of Senators Tsongas and Danforth, respectively). New legislation was needed to address the growing threats to the environment. Indeed, Congress itself explicitly noted that the “existing law is clearly inadequate to deal with this massive problem ... the need for a strong legislative response is evident.” H.R.Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. Thus, the impetus for enacting new legislation was the inadequacy of prior legislation, namely the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), as amended by Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988), which Congress believed left “important regulatory gaps,” in providing for environmental protection. See H.R.Rep. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125. The RCRA did. not regulate the problem of abandoned waste sites. Rather, RCRA merely authorized the EPA to monitor inactive sites to the extent that they posed an “imminent hazard.” Thus, RCRA enjoyed no future application — the injury had to be incurred before triggering the provisions of RCRA. The inefficiency of such legislation, particularly when toxic substances are at issue, is blatantly apparent. Also, one of the most salient shortcomings of RCRA was its inability to allocate liability if the operators of hazardous sites met an exception for shouldering costs or simply could not be located. Responding to this concern, CERC-LA authorizes the Government to prosecute actions against other potentially responsible parties, not merely the owners of a waste facility. The Committee Reports stated that “it is the intent of the Committee in this legislation to initiate and establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.” Id. at 22, 6125, respectively. CERCLA’s primary concerns, therefore, are: (1) providing specific, uniform, Government-mandated plans for aggrieved parties to cleanup toxic sites; and (2) for conspicuous, anticipated expense schemes to provide notice to the liable-parties to finance such cleanup. With these purposes in mind, the court now addresses the issue of shouldering these costs. In addition to CERCLA’s general purpose of environmental cleanup, Congress clearly provided that the chemical industry should bear the burden of financing cleanup activity. The EPA, the administrative agency charged with implementing and administering CERC-LA, stated that [Sjociety should not bear the cost of protecting the public from hazards produced in the past by a generator, transporter, consumer, or dump site owner-operator who has profited or otherwise benefited from commerce involving these substances and now wishes to be insulated from any continuing responsibilities for the present hazards to society that have been created- [Relieving industry of responsibility establishes a precedent seriously adverse to the public interest.... S.Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119. Moreover, Senator Chafee, who co-sponsored S. 1480, stated that “Governments must have a tool- for holding liable those who are responsible for those costs.” Cong.Rec. S. 15,-003 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). The courts have likewise interpreted as placing, wherever possible, the financial burden of cleanup on the party creating the hazardous condition. See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir.1986), clarified by In re Dedham Water Co., 901 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.1990); Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 777 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 106 S.Ct. 1970, 90 L.Ed.2d 654 (1986); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F.Supp. 1269, 1276 (D.Del.1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.1988). The court in City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F.Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D.Pa.1982), aptly summarized the Act as follows: [CERCLA] is designed to achieve one key objective — to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous dump sites by providing a means of financing both Governmental and private response and by placing the ultimate financial burden upon those responsible for the danger. The liability provision is an integral part of the statute's method of achieving this goal for it gives a private party the right to recover its response costs from responsible third parties.... Thus, while CERCLA suffers from a checkered past, the general purposes of the Act remain relatively clear. B. The Substantive Provisions of CERC-LA CERCLA imposes an excise tax on petroleum, petroleum by-products, and various chemicals, the purpose of which is to supply funds for a trust, the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund, commonly referred to as “Superfund.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631-9641 (1982). Superfund monies are used to clean up releases of hazardous substances and to prevent future releases of toxic substances into the environment. The primary goals behind the trust fund are twofold: (1) to finance “Government responses” to hazardous waste facilities, which consist of either “removal” or “remedial” actions; and (2) to pay “claims,” which are demands for reimbursement made on the trust fund. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), (24). These claims may be demanded by either private parties, provided such costs are incurred in compliance with the National Contingency Plan, or by the state and federal Governments for compensation for injury to natural resources belonging to the sovereign. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2), (3). Additionally, the Act establishes strict liability for responsible parties, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), and establishes certain defenses, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). Superfund, therefore, covers cleanup costs if the site has been abandoned, if the responsible parties elude detection, or if private resources are inadequate. CERCLA also authorizes judicial action when a substantial, immediate threat or threatened release of hazardous materials poses a danger to the public health or environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606. Finally, the Act calls for the creation of a “National Contingency Plan (“NCP”).” The NCP requires in part that the President compile a list of waste facilities most in need of federal attention, the “National Priority List.” The purpose of the NCP is to reflect and execute the powers enumerated under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(B). The NCP also states that the EPA shall be responsible for proposing rules, regulations, and criteria in appropriating Superfund monies. The main thrust of the NCP is to “establish procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances.” 42 U.S.C. § 9605. Finally, in addition to damages, the NCP also calls for equitable remedies — the EPA can petition the district court for an injunction to coerce responsible parties to clean up any site that presents an imminent threat to the general welfare or the environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). These are the highlights of CERCLA. The Act also enumerates the elements needed to prevail upon a claim prosecuted pursuant to its terms, the issue to which the court now turns. C. The Elements of a CERCLA § 9607 Claim As stated, the statutory scheme of CERCLA reveals that the Act attempts to resolve the dilemma of hazardous substances being released into the environment and the appropriate response to abating and curing such threats. To effectuate these purposes, both the decisional and statutory law have enunciated the elements that a plaintiff must allege and prove to succeed on a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B): (1) The Plaintiffs must fall within one of the four categories of “covered persons.”' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). (2) There must be a release or threatened release of hazardous substances from the waste site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). (3) The costs so incurred must be necessary and appropriate costs of response. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(25). (4) The release or threatened release must have caused the complaining party to incur response costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). (5) The complaining party’s response actions must be consistent with the NCP. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). Apart from the statutory law, the caselaw accords with the proposition that these elements satisfy a private action under CERC-LA. See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir.1989), clarified by In re Dedham Water Co., 901 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.1990); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir.1989); Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir.1989); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F.Supp. 1233, 1239 (M.D.Pa.1990); Channel Master Satellite v. JFD Elec. Corp., 748 F.Supp. 373, 381 (E.D.N.C.1990); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F.Supp. 1269, 1278-79 (D.Del.1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.1988). These elements constitute the requirements a private-action CERCLA plaintiff must satisfy in order to prove a prima facie ease under the Act. These elements will be discussed in turn. 1. Covered Persons Section 9607(a) holds four (4) classes of persons liable for the release or threatened release of hazardous materials: (1) [T]he owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States) or a facility, (2) [A]ny person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) [A]ny person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and (4) [A]ny person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person. Since 1974, the County has owned and operated the landfill site. Moreover, the site uncontestedly serves as a receptacle for waste disposal. Additionally, the County has specifically accepted industrial wastes at its facility with the permission of the Department of Health and Environmental Control. The very purpose of the facility is to serve as a waste disposal center. The County, by owning and operating the site, clearly falls within the purview of a “covered person” under CERCLA. Furthermore, “facility” is defined by the Act as: [A]ny building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, im-poundment, ditch, landfill, ... or any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located. ... 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (emphasis added). By the express language of the statute, the site in the case at bar satisfies the definition of a “facility.” Indeed, a landfill is the very epitome of a “waste disposal facility.” The County cannot, and indeed does not, seriously maintain that the landfill is not a facility under CERCLA. The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that the County satisfies the first criterion under the Act and that the site is a “facility” as defined by the explicit terms of the statute. The court also notes that the decisional law has unfailingly held operators of waste disposal sites to be “covered persons” and landfills to be “facilities” under CERCLA. See Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F.Supp. at 1280-81; United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.Supp. 162, 185 (W.D.Mo.1985); United States v. Ward, 618 F.Supp. 884, 895 (E.D.N.C.1985). The Plaintiffs in the present action, therefore, have met the first criterion of a private-action CERCLA claim. 2. Release or Threatened Release of Hazardous Substances Satisfying the first element of their action, the Plaintiffs must now allege and offer evidence that a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance emanated from the landfill. Section 9601(22) defines “release” as “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment.” Clearly, this definition contemplates a broad, remedial view of how hazardous substances can find their way into the environment without their affirmative discharge by an owner or operator of a facility. Thus, only minimal thresholds are necessary to demonstrate a release. Moreover, the caselaw has liberally construed the term “release.” See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.1992); New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1038, 1045 (2d Cir.1985). The purpose of broadly construing the term is “to avoid frustrating the beneficial legislative purposes.” Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d at 1081. Indeed, a full-fledged release need not be shown to exist. If the complaining party can prove that there is merely a threat of release, then this element of a private action under CERCLA has been satisfied. See Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 711 F.Supp. 784, 793 (D.N.J.1989). In addition to demonstrating a release or threatened release, a CERCLA plaintiff must also demonstrate that at least one of the toxic materials is a “hazardous substance” under CERCLA, which defines “hazardous substance” as: (A) any substance designated pursuant to Section 311(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to Section 102 of this Act, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to Section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act ... (D) any toxic pollutant listed under Section 307(a) of the Federal Water .Pollution Control Act, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to Section 7 of the Toxic Substance Control Act.... 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). Additionally, 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1991), cites a comprehensive list of elements and compounds that are considered “hazardous substances” under CERCLA. Specifically, benzene, benzene-based compounds, and VOC are “hazardous substances” under the Act. In the case at bar, while chlorides, nitrates, and sulfates were found to exist at varying concentrations, these compounds are not considered “hazardous materials” under either 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) or 40 C.F.R. § 302.4. Equally, while lead was detected in the monitoring well, its concentration levels were below the state maximum contaminant level. While benzene was detected at the site, the Phase III report concluded that the concentration levels, save for one monitoring well, did not pose a health risk. Plaintiffs’ environmental report, however, found that benzene did exist in unsatisfactory concentrations. Therefore, construing the allegations in the Plaintiffs’ favor, the court assumes that there was a release of hazardous substances. While VOC were found in trace amounts, they formed no identifiable plume, but were localized; moreover, Phase III recommended that no remediation of the groundwater either on or off the site was necessary. A requisite element of a CERC-LA action requires that a plaintiff show that hazardous substances were released from the site. See Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F.Supp. at 1282. The Plaintiffs have offered evidence that shows a release of benzene, a hazardous substance. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1991). Phase III also recommended, however, that the groundwater undergo further monitoring to detect any increase in VOC and that additional monitoring wells be installed. Phase III results also dictated that a clay cap be placed over the landfill, which would render any possibility of remediation nugatory. These conclusions and recommendations indicate that there is also a “threat of release” of hazardous substances. Because concentrations of benzene in a single monitoring well were detected at higher levels, the possibility exists that such substances may increase in concentration. The mere threat of release is sufficient under CERC-LA. See Amland Properties Corp., 711 F.Supp. at 793. Given the discovery of the substances found through testing and their proximity to the landfill and viewing the testimony in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the court finds that the Plaintiffs meet the requirement that there is a “threat of release of hazardous substances.” Parenthetically, the court notes that the Plaintiffs are under no burden to prove that hazardous substances were disposed of at the site. As a landfill, the site squarely falls within CERCLA’s definition of a “facility.” The Plaintiffs need only demonstrate that contaminants were released from the site, as Phase III revealed was the ease. Indeed, in United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1339-41 (E.D.Pa.1983), the court held that a substance is hazardous regardless of the concentration or amount of any particular discharge; see also Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir.1989). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have met the second element in a private cause of action under CERCLA. Actual migration of hazardous substances and causation of actual contamination is not required under CERCLA See Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.1992); Dedham Water Co., 889 F.2d at 1154; Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1042-44. 3. Costs Incurred Must Be Necessary and Appropriate Costs of Response Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B), the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the costs they have incurred are “necessary costs of response.” That monies expended by private-action CERCLA plaintiffs be necessary and appropriate costs is well-grounded in the decisional law. See Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F.Supp. 1233, 1239 (M.D.Pa.1990); Artesian Water Co., 659 F.Supp. at 1285; Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F.Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D.Ohio 1984); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F.Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D.Pa.1982). Initially, the court notes that any alleged injury is not a “response cost,” much less a necessary response cost. CERCLA does not equate response costs with property damage. Response costs are themselves defined under the specific ambit of the Act, not under the generic calculus of the common law. Accordingly, the contention, as the Plaintiffs urge here, that any injury or damage is a “necessary response cost” is incorrect. Apart from the caselaw shaping these terms and the Act itself defining “removal” and “remedial” actions, the decisional law, as discussed more fully, post 1179, also reflects the distinction between response costs and damages under CERC-LA. See Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir.1986); see also Cincinnati Ins. v. Milliken and Co., 857 F.2d 979, 980 (4th Cir.1988); Continental Ins. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985-86 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821, 109 S.Ct. 66, 102 L.Ed.2d 43 (1988); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1351-42 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008, 108 S.Ct. 703, 98 L.Ed.2d 654 (1988). Although the courts concur that necessary response costs may be recovered, the courts do not accord as to what expenses fall within the ambit of being “necessary.” For example, some courts have restrictively interpreted “necessary costs of response” and limited what expenses plaintiffs may recover. The reason for curtailing certain expenses is that these courts subordinate the plaintiffs compensation to the purpose of the Act. These courts hold that the primary purpose of CERCLA is to provide for broad, liberal, remedial action in cleaning up the environment. Superfund money is, therefore, best spent on abating and curing contaminated sites. See Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F.Supp. 413, 417 (M.D.Pa.1989); Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 681 F.Supp. 651, 653 (N.D.Cal.1987); Chaplin v. Exxon Co., 1986 WL 13130 (S.D.Texas 1986). Conversely, other courts are extremely receptive to permitting recovery for costs such as medical testing and loss of water use. 'See Brewer v. Raven, 680 F.Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D.Tenn.1985); Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 621 F.Supp. 370, 376 (W.D.Tenn.1985); Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F.Supp. 283, 288-90 (N.D.Cal.1984). Although not articulated, these courts apparently hold that compensation to injured parties is of paramount importance. Fourth Circuit precedent is clear concerning the distinction between response costs and property damage. In Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir.1986), the Fourth Circuit distinguished CERCLA response costs from property damage. In Mraz, Paul and Sally Mraz owned and controlled Galaxy Chemical, Incorporated, which purchased insurance from defendant Canadian Universal Insurance. As part of its operations, Galaxy produced chemical wastes. To dispose of these wastes, Galaxy arranged to have 1300 barrels of its chemical by-products transported to a waste facility site. The arrangements for this disposal were conducted with the involvement and approval of local health department officials Id. at 1326. After the enactment of CERCLA, the EPA and the state of Maryland notified Mraz that the barrels were hazardous and violated the Act. Galaxy was therefore ordered, but failed, to clean up the site. Because of Galaxy’s inaction, the EPA and the state removed the barrels, disposed of the contaminated soil, and undertook other clean-up action. Seeking reimbursement, the United States and Maryland prosecuted an action against Galaxy and Mraz under CERCLA. The prayer of the complaint sought clean-up and removal costs plus additional administrative fees, costs, and interests. Id. Galaxy and Mraz then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that Canadian Universal had a duty to defend them. Canadian Universal moved to dismiss, asserting that there had not been an “occurrence” as contemplated by the insurance policies and that the plaintiffs had not suffered a loss of property damage. Id. The district court held that Canadian was obligated to defend Galaxy and Mraz, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the United States and Maryland’s actions were not “response costs” as contemplated by CERCLA: Response costs are not themselves property damages. An examination of CERC-LA’s provisions defining response, § 9601(23) — (25), and authorizing the President to take response action, § 9604, makes it clear that property damage and response are independent.... One cannot equate response costs with “injury to or destruction of tangible property,” this policy’s definition of property damage. Instead, response costs are an economic loss. Id. at 1329. Although Mraz was decided in the context of construing terms pursuant to an insurance policy, the court believes that its reasoning is applicable here because Mraz specifically addressed the distinction between response costs and damages under CERC-LA. Mraz, therefore, clearly demonstrates that not only is property damage not a “response cost” as contemplated by CERCLA, but also, by deduction, that not any and all actions undertaken by putative private-action CERCLA plaintiffs constitute “response costs.” Under Mraz, the Plaintiffs in the present action cannot recover, at least under CERCLA, for any property damages. The Fourth Circuit has consistently reaffirmed the Mraz holding as to CERCLA response costs. See Cincinnati Ins., 857 F.2d at 980; Maryland Cas. Co., 822 F.2d at 1352-54. Conspicuously, the party seeking reimbursement for response costs in Mraz, Cincinnati Ins., and Maryland Cas. Co., was the Federal Government, which has easier burdens and a lesser threshold in prosecuting and prevailing in CERCLA actions than private plaintiffs. See generally United States v. Ward, 618 F.Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C.1985). If the Federal Government did not properly incur response costs and meet its CERCLA burdens, the likelihood of a private party doing so is even slimmer. Other caselaw comports with the distinction between damages and response costs under CERCLA. The Artesian Water Co. court, in denying plaintiff damages, held: This outcome, however, amply demonstrates the difference between an action for response costs under CERCLA and an action for damages in tort. Limiting recovery of the costs ... ensures that responsible parties will be liable under CERCLA only for necessary costs of response. Permitting recovery in any other circumstances would invite suits for a broad range of economic losses.... Congress did not intend for CERCLA, a narrowly drawn federal remedy, to be make injured parties whole.... Artesian Water Co., 659 F.Supp. at 1299-1300. Artesian Water Co. mirrors Mraz’s ruling that any damages do not necessarily entail necessary response costs. Not all damages are, nor could be, necessary response costs. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs cannot recover, at least under CERCLA, for any alleged diminution in value to their property. The court, however, notes that investigative costs are recoverable, in certain circumstances, under CERCLA. See Amoco Oil Co., 889 F.2d at 672. As stated, not all courts accord as to what response costs are recoverable under CERCLA. The inconsistencies in the case-law are explained by the fact that CERCLA does not define or explain the term “cost of response.” The statute is frustratingly tacit on this point. The Act merely defines the concept of “response.” “Response” is defined as “remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). This definition, in turn, hinges on the definitions of “remove” and “removal” and “remedy” or “remedial action.” “Remove” or “removal,” are thoroughly defined: [T]he cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be [necessarily] taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing threatened individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this title, and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974[,] [42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.] 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). Similarly, “remedy” and “remedial action” are defined under CERCLA as: [T]hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment. The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances or contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the environment. The term includes the costs of permanent relocation of residents and businesses and community facilities where