Full opinion text
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM “WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge: Defendants are thirty New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (“Commission”) inspectors who have pled guilty to extortion. They accepted bribes in exchange for overlooking defects and for certifying inspections for taxicabs that were never inspected. Some of the defendants were line inspectors who conducted the fraudulent inspections, others were senior inspectors who condoned the corruption, and yet others were supervisors who furthered the scheme by manipulating work schedules to ensure that the corrupt line inspectors were on the same inspection team. All shared in the profits. Sentencing here involves a key objective: corruption in government agencies charged with protecting public safety must be deterred by loss of liberty to the offender. In imposing punishment the court must nevertheless consider the fact that the endemic extortion was due in large measure to incompetence of high officials in the city government, that some of the inspectors were drawn unwillingly into this cesspool of corruption and that some cooperated fully in exposing the dirty details. I. FACTS All defendants have pled guilty to conspiracy to commit extortion by accepting illegal payoffs. Section 1951(a) of Title 18, the federal extortion statute, provides: (a) “Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be [guilty of a felony.] 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The maximum penalty for a violation of section 1951 is twenty years imprisonment, id., and a fine of $250,000. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3). The Commission was created in 1971 to improve taxi and limousine service in New York City. It is responsible for establishing standards for taxicab safety and air pollution. Its regulations require that taxicabs be inspected to ensure structural and mechanical safety and appropriate exhaust emission levels. Since 1989 all safety and emissions inspections have taken place at the Safety and Emissions Division in Woodside, Queens. An estimated 200 taxicabs are inspected at that site each day. All the inspectors worked at the Woodside facility. Taxicabs must be inspected three times a year. Additionally, field inspectors may issue “notices of violation” to taxicabs in the street that do not conform with Commission regulations. Failure to pass inspection or to correct a violation promptly can result in the suspension of the right to operate the taxicab until the defect is repaired, resulting in a significant loss of revenue to the owner and operator. At the time most of these inspectors were arrested, the top position in the Safety and Emissions Division was vacant. The division was run by the Assistant Commissioner for Safety and Emissions and the Deputy Director of the Safety and Emissions Division; neither of them has been prosecuted criminally. Immediately below them were defendant chief supervising inspector Nicola De-Riggi and defendants supervising inspectors Andrew Komonski and Anthony Barone. All three received bribes and participated in the extortion conspiracy. Seven senior inspectors reported to the supervising inspectors. Three of those senior inspectors participated in the payoff scheme and are defendants. Forty-four line inspectors were employed. Twenty-four of them are defendants. Inspection lanes are equipped with computerized testing equipment. There are six inspectors on each lane. Inspectors who were receiving illegal payoffs generally worked together on one lane. The roles played by supervising inspectors DeRiggi, Komonski and Barone were critical to the success of the corruption scheme because they were responsible for assigning personnel to the various inspection lanes. Corrupt inspectors were grouped together and assigned to particular positions to facilitate the scheme. The senior inspectors were also essential to the success of the plan because they were present during the performance of the inspections, had immediate supervisory responsibility for the line inspectors.and acted as conduits for payoffs to the supervising inspectors. Methods of evading or disabling the inspection tests were devised. The inspector in position 1 was responsible for inspecting the credentials and other paperwork for the taxicab; this position offered little opportunity for illegal manipulation. The inspector in position 2 was responsible for checking the emission system of the taxicab; in order to get a false passing result, the inspector would run the taxicab for an excessive period of time before measuring the emission, or would manipulate the way the measuring probe was placed in the tailpipe. The inspector in position 3 was responsible for wheel alignment; the inspector would run the rear wheels over the test plate twice instead of running both the front and rear wheels over the plate so that the taxicab would appear to be properly aligned. The inspector at position 4 was responsible for testing headlights; the inspector would manipulate the testing apparatus until the computer registered a passing mark. The inspector at position 5 was responsible for testing brakes; the inspector would test the rear brakes twice instead of testing the front brakes which were usually in worse condition. The inspector in position 6 was responsible for visually inspecting the undercarriage of the taxicab; the inspector would ignore defects. One inspector on a corrupt lane would serve as the “treasurer” or “banker” of the day, responsible for collecting and disbursing the payoffs. Money was divided among the six line inspectors and inspectors who directed the taxicabs to the corrupt lane. The scheme also involved inspections designed to verify that defects cited by field inspectors had been corrected. Compliance was checked in a special lane with four inspectors. If a taxicab passed, a “condition corrected receipt” was issued. Corrupt inspectors received payoffs in exchange for issuing for receipts for taxicabs that had not been repaired and -for some that had not even been brought into the Woodside facilities, referred to as “phantoms” by defendants. There was a schedule of bribes. It costs between $50 and $100 to pass a routine inspection. Overlooking notices of violation cost less, about $20 per notice. Often, however, the field inspectors would find several things wrong with' one taxicab and would issue multiple notices of violation resulting in bribes of $100 or more. Payments were made in many ways. Cash was left in ashtrays, behind visors, between car seats, in packages of cigarettes and passed through a nearby coffee stop. The government cannot specify with certainty the total amount the corrupt inspectors received. Its conservative estimate is $208,000. That figure was calculated by averaging the inspectors’ estimates of their weekly payoffs on a “low” week. The average was divided by five to reach a payoff per day; using time and attendance records, that figure was multiplied by the number of days each inspector was assigned to an inspection line where payoffs were received. The government calculates that the average inspector received about $250 a week in bribes, although some admitted that they received more than $600 each week. Inspectors also received non-cash bribes such as auto parts, narcotics and illegal guns. In December of 1990, .the New York City Department of Investigation (“DOI”) was notified by a Commission employee that taxicabs were receiving passing certifications without inspections taking place. Two months later DOI received information from a former inspector that employees were soliciting bribes in exchange for overlooking defects. The DOFs investigation lasted more than a year. It included a covert operation with the cooperation of active inspectors. As a result of the DOI investigation and the prosecution of these defendants, Mayor Dinkins appointed an Advisory Panel to review the procedures of the Safety and Emissions Division of the Commission. The panel’s report included a number of recommendations such as changes in hiring, promotion and termination procedures and enhanced training. Computerized testing has been modified to inhibit manipulation. Taxi drivers are no longer allowed in the inspection lanes. Inspection reports are now routinely reviewed by Commission officials for indications of abuse. There are random double checks of inspections. Staffing rotations are systematic. The Commission contends that it has been cooperating with DOI in identifying and correcting additional corruption hazards. See, e.g., Procedural Review of the Taxi and Limousine Commission Centralized Inspection Facility, July 1993; Letter from Paul E. Krazanoff, Assistant Corporation Counsel to court, March 22, 1994; Letter from Fidel F. Del Valle, Chairman of Commission, to court dated March 25, 1994. There is strong evidence that taking cocaine was widespread and, as one defendant put it, “normal” among inspectors. This suggests the need for considering required testing for drugs in the future. Cf. Matter of Gary Delaraba v. Nassau County Police Department, 83 N.Y.2d 367, 610 N.Y.S.2d 928, 632 N.E.2d 1251 (1994); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education of Patchogue-Medford Union Free School District, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 70, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 462, 510 N.E.2d 325, 331 (1987). Unless city officials take corruption more seriously it is doubtful that these current changes will keep this operation clean except in the short run. Experience in this court with corruption demonstrates that the general deterrent effect of criminal sanctions is usually short-lived. II. PUNISHMENT A. The Sentencing Statutes Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, sentencing is generally governed by three related statutory provisions. Section 3551 of Title 18 mandates that the court impose sentences to achieve a number of purposes listed in section 3553(a) in light of the particular case: Authorized sentences. (a) In general. — Except as otherwise specifically provided, a defendant who has been found guilty of an offense described in any Federal statute ... shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of this chapter so as to achieve the purposes set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of section 8553(a)(2) to the extent that they are applicable in light of all the circumstances of the case. 18.U.S.C. § 3551 (emphasis added). Section 3553(a) specifies the manifold purposes of sentencing, including promoting respect for the law, achieving just punishment and general deterrence, protecting the public against recidivism and providing the defendant with rehabilitation and treatment. The section enumerates seven factors that a court must weigh when sentencing. A key provision embodies the concept of “parsimony,” a principle of the American Bar Association standards for criminal justice. See Ariierican Bar Association, Standards For Criminal Justice, Chapter 18, "Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures", 18-3.2(111) ("Parsimony in the use of punishment is favored. The sentence, imposed should therefore be the least severe sanction necessary to achieve the purposes for which it is imposed ") (1993). See also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Lessons for State and Federal Reformers, 6 Federal Sentencing Reporter 123, 124 (1993). This principle, when applied to interpretation of criminal statutes, is known as lenity. "The Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to wha~t Congress intended." United States v. Granderson, - U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 1259, -, 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994) quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980) quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178, 79 S.Ct. 209, 214, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958) (inner quotation marks omitted). In the context of sentencing it requires that, to the extent practicable, the sentence be neither more nor less harsh than required to achieve the sentencing objectives appropriate for the particular case. This rule of appropriateness is incorporated explicitly in the statute as follows: Imposition of a Sentence.' (a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.-The court shall impose a sentence sufficien~4 but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider [the factors set out in (1) and (2) quoted below.] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (emphasis added). Each case and each defendant must be considered in light of special. circumstances and characteristics of the defendant and of the offense: (1)the nature and the circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant [must be considered] .... Id. (emphasis added). As already .noted, the sentencing goals as specified- in section 3553(a)(2) are “applicable in light of all the circumstances in the ease.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a). Repetition in section 3551(a) and 3553(a)(1) of the primacy of “circumstances” of the particular case stresses the importance of individualized sentencing. Sentencing goals include general and specific deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution, and uniformity. The provision requires that the Sentencing Guidelines be considered as one-but only one-of the factors in carrying out the statutory goals. The court must take account of: (2) the need for the sentence imposed- (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentences and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the [sentencing] guidelines ...; ' (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission ...; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. Id. Section 3553(b) of Title 18, which must be construed with the rest of section 3553, provides further direction with respect to the use of the Sentencing Guidelines. It states in relevant part: The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to [by the Guidelines] unless the court finds that there exists aggravating or mitigating circumstances of the kind, or to the degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.... 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Read alone, this provision would appear to give ruling weight to the Guidelines, but, as already pointed out, such an interpretation would ignore the thrust and design of related provisions. An analysis of how a sentencing court should apply the three provisions quoted is detailed in United States v. Concepcion, 795 F.Supp. 1262, 1275-81 (E.D.N.Y.1992). It concludes: As a first step, under sections 3551 and 3553(a), the court must consider how, given the circumstances of the ease, the various purposes of sentencing can best be served. It is aided in this inquiry by considering whether any or all of the seven factors listed in section 3553(a) are applicable and what their relative weight should be. As part of this first-step inquiry, courts must determine whether the Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines and Policy Statements ought to control a given case to the exclusion of all other factors. In this regard, courts will tend to rely on the Guidelines where the case is typical of many like situations and is susceptible to the statistical analysis and compilation techniques used by the Commission in developing the Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 5 (Nov. 1991) (“The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a “heartland,” a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes.”). The experience of trial judges in determining whether a case is run-of-the-mill or presents unusual problems or local variations necessarily will inform this decision. If the conclusion of the first-step analysis is that the Guidelines and Commission Policy Statements ought to apply to the exclusion of other factors, the court proceeds to the second step, which is to follow the directive of section 3553(b) and apply the Guidelines and Policy Statements according to their terms. In this endeavor the court will look to the published work of the Commission, seeking to construe the terms of the [applicable] Guidelines Manual to determine the appropriate Guidelines sentencing range. The court’s third step is to consider (a) the sentencing options provided, if any— e.g., imprisonment or probation — and (b) whether any exceptions recognized by statute or the Guidelines themselves apply— e.g., not adequately considered aggravating or mitigating factors. Even in a case where the court must sentence under step one because the Guidelines do not control, it will be desirable in many instances to go through steps two and three so that the court can reconsider its step one conclusion by cheeking it against the national averages in the closest analogous cases. Id. at 1279. B. Applying the Analysis Required By the Statutes 1. The Goals of Sentencing In This Case The primary goal of sentencing in this case is to deter future corruption of the staff of the Commission and other government agencies that have responsibilities to the public to enforce safety standards. There is also a need in this case to avoid unnecessary sentence disparities except on some principled ground because many of the defendants played similar roles in the scheme and have similar backgrounds. Levels of responsibility for control of the inspection lines, differences in backgrounds of defendants, degrees of participation in the fraudulent scheme and cooperation with investigators must also be considered. The Guidelines are of marginal utility in the instant case, although they are of some use as indicators of how other courts have treated other cases of fraud. See Concepcion, 795 F.Supp. at 1271. The Guideline ranges are based primarily on statistical averages of sentences imposed in the past. The national experience with individual cases of many types of fraud is not particularly helpful in assessing the appropriate sentences for the participants in 1) a corruption scheme that took place in a municipal setting where corruption was endemic and was allowed to continue unchecked by municipal officials and 2) the prison terms required by the Guidelines would be unnecessarily destructive of defendants, their- families and their communities. The court has thoroughly explored the factual background of the crimes and of each defendant. It has carefully observed each defendant in court on repeated occasions in the company of friends, relatives, children and attorneys, and has questioned each in detail about his role in the scheme and his background. Each of the factors set out in section 3558 has been separately considered in arriving at each defendant’s sentence. The sentences imposed under the particular circumstances of this case have required particular emphasis on the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), the nature and circumstances of the offense; section 3553(a)(2)(A), the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to promote respect for the law; section 3553(a)(2)(B), the need for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; and section 3553(a)(6), the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 2. The Sentencing Guidelines Even though the Guidelines are not binding in this case, the court finds it instructive to consider the Guideline ranges along with the other pertinent statutory factors. The Guidelines suggest terms of imprisonment, probation with terms and conditions, supervised release, fines, restitution and payment of costs of imprisonment or probation. The Guideline applicable to the offense in this case is section 2E1.5 which in turn refers to section 2C1.1. That Guideline sets a base offense level of 10, Section 201.1(a), and requires that additional points be added if the value of the payments received, the benefit received in return for the payment or the loss to the government exceeds $2,000. Section 201.1(b). The higher the dollar value of the fraud, the higher the offense level. The offense level and the defendant’s criminal history essentially determine the recommended sentence. Section 5E1.1 provides for the restitution of ill-gotten gains and section 5E1-.2 contains a table for the imposition of fines corresponding to offense level. The Guideline recommendation as calculated by the United States Probation Department for each defendant is considered in Part 111(B) of this opinion. Those calculations assume that each defendant is responsible for the entire $208,000 gained from the fraudulent scheme. If the Guidelines as written and interpreted by probation and the government were applied to these defendants by the court, the defendants who were not in positions of authority and who played the most minor role in the scheme would be held responsible for the total amount of money received by all conspirators, not the small amounts they personally received in bribes. Since a number of the minor defendants received no 5K1.1 letter — even though they sincerely tried to cooperate — and the most culpable received such a letter — being in a position to know and reveal details of the entire scheme — the least culpable would end up with the highest prison terms. It is significant that the United States Attorney objected only to the leniency afforded the least culpable on the ground that this was the required Guideline result. This patently absurd result could not have been the Congressional plan even though, arguably, it is what the Guidelines require. 3. Departures From the Guidelines Even in cases where the Guidelines are the primary consideration, courts may depart upward or downward from the Guidelines recommendation. Section 5K1.1 provides that the court may depart from the Guidelines upon a motion from the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person. The court may also depart from the Guidelines as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), if the court finds that aggravating or mitigating factors exist that were not adequately taken into account in the fashioning of the Guidelines. The court’s freedom to depart from the Guidelines is limited by Guideline section 5H1 which lists factors that a court, should not consider as bases- for departing. In each instance where a departure is not authorized by a 5K1.1 letter a downward departure is warranted in the instant case by the special circumstances of the crime and the defendant that were not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission. Thus, even were the Guidelines decisive here — which they are not — the sentences imposed would be appropriate. 4. Restitution The City of New York and the Commission has asked that, as part of their sentences, the defendants be ordered to pay back the salaries they earned while they participated in the corrupt scheme. They argue that the City was grievously harmed by the conspiracy because the City’s efforts to improve traffic safety and air quality were thwarted by the corrupt inspectors and that the defendants accepted wages for work not performed. They also argue that the corruption undermined the public’s trust in its government. Restitution is required, but to a lesser extent than the City requests. III. INDIVIDUAL SENTENCES A. In General The court heard from each of the defendants, their attorneys and in many cases additional witnesses. Each defendant was sworn and testified about his background and his role- in the scheme. The defendants, all male, are working class people, most of whom support wives and children. They were all released on bail after their arrests, and although they lost their inspection jobs as a result of this prosecution, most have found other work. Many have participated in community activities such as the boy scouts or church affairs. They have received high school diplomas, some went on to college and most had additional technical training and are skilled mechanics. Some of the defendants were organizers and instigators of the corruption; These defendants, who cultivated contacts in the taxicab industry and recruited other inspectors — or even coerced them — to join the scheme, are more culpable than some others who, though not free from blame, may be characterized as followers. The testimony of the defendants at the allocution described an occupation in which corruption was pervasive. One worker’s corruption fed another’s. Several defendants testified that they were intimidated and threatened by fellow workers when they showed resistance to the scheme — tires were slashed, cars were scratched and physical violence was threatened. One inspector testified that he reported the corruption to a supervisor, only to find out that the supervisor was part of the conspiracy. Because of their positions, the supervisors and senior inspectors bore a special responsibility to the public and to the City to put an end to the corruption. Here, as in the welfare fraud cases detailed in Concepcion, supra, a large portion of the blame lies with the public officials who should have prevented the corruption. Poor management by the Commission was said to be well known in New York City. See, e.g., Emily Sachar, Big Yellow Taxi Troubles, No Brakes On: Too Few Inspect Yellow Fleets, New York Newsday, Sunday, March 13,1994 at 6. It should have been obvious to city officials years ago that the inspection system was rotten to its core, jeopardizing the public. Yet none of the officials were prosecuted criminally. Nor were any of the taxicab companies or their representatives charged with their crimes, though their guilt is clear. The court has no control over whom the United States prosecutes. All the defendants must receive a sentence that includes some form of loss of liberty in order to deter corruption in governmental agencies charged with protecting public health and safety. Each defendant will be required to pay restitution in the amount that he received in illegal payoffs. Fines are also appropriate. The City’s suggestion that the defendants pay back their salary for the time they participated in the scheme is not adopted since city officials allowed the corruption to continue and some useful services were rendered. Payment of ill-gotten gains through restitution to the city provides the equivalent payback in the form of fiduciary surcharges. The government has rated the defendants on a scale from one to five, in its view five being the most culpable and one the least. The ratings reflect the government’s assessment of where the defendants fit in the overall corruption scheme based on their 1) position in the hierarchy, 2) depth of involvement, 3) length of involvement, 4) degree of aggressiveness in soliciting bribes, and 5) aggravating and mitigating factors. See Letter from Gordon Mehler, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney, to court, January 7, 1994. The position of the defendant in the inspector hierarchy is a critical factor in determining an appropriate sentence. The supervisors and senior inspectors had special responsibilities as a result of their positions of authority. They held positions of public trust that created a duty to block corrupt schemes such as this one that threatened public safety. The supervisors and senior inspectors not only condoned the corruption, they encouraged and participated in it. They used their authority to further the scheme and to prevent it from being detected by other government officials. The chief supervising inspector will receive thirty-six months of imprisonment; he would have received the maximum sentence had he not cooperated with thé government. The two supervising inspectors will receive 24 and 30 months imprisonment. The three senior inspectors will receive 18, 15 and 13 months imprisonment. The line inspectors will receive between 6 and 12 months imprisonment with the exception of one defendant with a prior criminal record who will receive 15 months imprisonment, and several defendants who played extremely minor roles who will be incarcerated in a community treatment facility or in home confinement. In the main, the persons who will feel the most pain from the sentences are not the defendants, but the defendants’ families. The effect on the children, spouses and others cannot be ignored. A parent’s role in supervising children and in providing support is particularly important in these times when uncontrolled children of broken families burden our courts and social institutions and add to welfare rolls. Courts cannot ignore the fact that close to 50% of children in this city are born out of wedlock and most lack paternal guidance. See Single Parent Crisis: ‘Disappearing Dads’, New York Post, April 20,1994, at 27 (45.7% as of 1991).. See also k Million Children Said To Live in ‘Distress’, New York Times, April 25, 1994, at BIO (“Nearly four million American children are growing up in neighborhoods with high rates of poverty, absent fathers, unemployment and reliance on welfare;” large proportion in New York State.) The court should avoid being party to further breakdown of stable two-parent families unless long imprisonment is unavoidable. Factors that affect a community in which a judge sits must be considered by the sentencing judge. What is particularly striking about these defendants is that they were among the best of our skilled and reliable working people. Many letters to the court attest to the facts that they came from stable backgrounds and have led useful lives. Most of the defendants live in working class, often minority neighborhoods. The effect of the sentences on their communities must be considered. Large numbers of the men in the defendants’' communities are currently incarcerated. These defendants have educated themselves and worked hard throughout their fives. Their presence in the community helps create a more stable environment and a model of the work ethic that is vital to the health of New York’s neighborhoods. Excessively long terms of incarceration for these defendants would have a detrimental local effect. B. Individual Sentences 1. Nicola DeRiggi Nicola DeRiggi is twenty-eight years old. He is single and has no children. He fives with his mother, a librarian for the Brooklyn Public Library, and his youngest sister, who is a student at Brooklyn College. He was chief supervising inspector while he participated in the corrupt scheme. He took illegal payoffs over an 18 month period beginning in February 1991 and could be charged with all payoffs to those under his supervision — $208,000. As chief inspector he had a greater opportunity than the other inspectors to influence the course of the conspiracy. He manipulated the assignments of corrupt inspectors to maximize the amount of bribes that were paid to him and other inspectors. He also received an illegal handgun from a taxi fleet manager in lieu of a cash bribe. Defendant and his two sisters were reared by both parents in a middle income family. His father held two jobs, as a custodian at the Brooklyn Public Library and as an independent contractor. His mother stayed at home. Defendant graduated from New Utrecht High School in Brooklyn in 1982. He attended the College of Staten Island for one semester and earned fourteen credits. Defendant is a skilled auto mechanic. He has been working with cars from the age of ten, and completed a work-study program in mechanics while in high school. Work for the Commission by' defendant began in August 1984 as an inspector. After eight months he was promoted to senior inspector. After another four and one half years he was promoted to chief supervising inspector. He held that position from September 1990 to July 1992 when he resigned as a result of this prosecution. He is currently employed as a chief mechanic in a gas station. The relevant Guidelines call for 37 to 46 months in prison, two to three years of supervised release, a fine of $7,500 to $75,000, restitution and a $50 special assessment. Because of his substantial assistance to the government, it has suggested a downward departure. The government on a scale of one to five puts his culpability at five. Nicola DeRiggi is sentenced to 36 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He is ordered to pay restitution to the City of $10,000, a fine of $7,500 and a special assessment of $50. 2. Andrew Komonski Andrew Komonski is thirty years old and lives with his wife, a clerical worker at the Department of Transportation, and his two and one half year old daughter. His father, who is an unemployed machinist, his brother, and his brother’s wife live next door. Mr. Komonski was a supervising inspector while he participated in the corrupt scheme. He took a total of $3,650 in illegal payoffs over a nineteen month period beginning in January 1991. He actively solicited bribes from the taxi industry and aggressively pursued line inspectors for a portion of the bribes. In addition, on several occasions he received cocaine in lieu of a cash payoff. He also participated in the sale of illegal guns with some of his co-workers. Defendant and his brother were raised in Brooklyn, New York by both his parents in a middle-income home. His mother died in 1989 after suffering a stroke. Defendant graduated from Automotive High School in Brooklyn in June of 1981. He attended the New York City Technical College for two semesters and earned ten credits. He also attended the State University of New York at Farmingdale but received no credits. From June 1983 to September 1984, defendant was employed as a mechanic at an auto shop in Jackson Heights, New York. From October 1984 to November 1985, he worked as a mechanic for an air conditioning company in Great Neck. He began working for the Commission in November 1985 as an inspector. In June 1986 he was promoted to senior inspector. In August 1989 he was promoted to supervising inspector and he held that position until he resigned in October 1992 as a result of this prosecution. Since that time Mr. Komonski has been working as an auto-diesel mechanic for an airline contractor. The relevant Guidelines call for 33 to 41 months in prison, two to three years of supervised release, "a fine of $7,500 to $75,000, restitution and a $50 special assessment. In viéw of his substantial assistance to the government, it has suggested a downward departure. It places his culpability at five. Because of the aggravating circumstances of the illegal gun transaction and taking cocaine as a payoff, Andrew Komonski is sentenced to 30 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He is ordered to pay restitution to the City in the amount of the bribes he received, $3,650, a fine of $7,500 and a special assessment of $50. 3. Anthony Barone Anthony Barone is twenty-nine years old and lives with his wife, a school teacher, and his newborn daughter. He was a supervising inspector while he participated in the corrupt scheme. He took a total of $3,000 in illegal payoffs over a sixteen month period beginning in April 1991. He did not actively solicit payoffs, but he allowed the corruption to flourish under his supervision and he accepted bribes. He also obtained an illegal gun from a taxi fleet manager at the direction of his boss, defendant DeRiggi. Defendant was the youngest of four children raised by middle-class parents in Brooklyn, New York. He graduated from Bishop Ford Central Catholic High School in Brooklyn in 1982. After working for a year he attended Brooklyn College for four semesters. He attended Kingsborough Community College part-time for three years until he was arrested on this offense. Employment of defendant by the Commission began in 1986 as an inspector. After fourteen months, he was promoted to senior' inspector. In June of 1988 he was promoted to supervising inspector and he held that position until he was discharged as a result of this prosecution. Mr. Barone is .presently working as an apprentice carpenter. The relevant Guidelines call for 33 to 41 months in prison, two to three years of supervised release, a fine of $7,500 to $75,000, restitution and a $50 special assessment. Because of his substantial assistance to the government, it has suggested a downward departure. The government has categorized his culpability at four. Anthony Barone is sentenced to 24 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He is ordered to pay restitution to the City in the amount of the bribes he received, $3000, a fine of $7,500 and a special assessment of $50. 4. Jai Gurdyal Jai Gurdyal is thirty-nine years old. He is married and has three children who reside with his wife in Florida. Defendant lives in a one-bedroom apartment in New York with his parents and two siblings. He was a senior inspector while he participated in the corrupt scheme. He took $12,560 in illegal payoffs over a twenty month period beginning in December 1990. On several occasions he received cocaine in lieu of cash. Defendant also actively directed taxicabs desiring preferential treatment to corrupt line inspectors. Defendant was born in Guyana into á family that was financially stable. When he was ten years old he was sent to Ontario, Canada to live with his aunt. He graduated from the Institute of Technical Trades in Ontario in 1975. In 1975, defendant immigrated to the United States to live with his uncle. The rest of his family joined him here nine years ago. The defendant became a naturalized citizen in 1983. In 1988, the defendant purchased a house for his family in Hollywood, Florida. He sent them there so they could have a better lifestyle. He remained in New York to work. The Fashion Institute of Technology was where defendant studied from 1982 to 1983. He completed a 625 hour course in General Auto Mechanics at the Apex Technical School-in New York City in 1983. In the early 1980’s defendant was employed by various auto body shops as a mechanic. After work as a line inspector, in June 1988 he was promoted to senior inspector. He held that position until October 1992 when he resigned pursuant to his plea agreement. The relevant Guidelines call for 30 to 37 months in prison, two to three years of supervised release, a fine of $6,000 to $60,000, restitution and a $50 special assessment. As a result of his substantial assistance to the government, it has suggested a downward departure. The government put him in culpability category four. Because he took cocaine as a payoff, and because of his substantial role in the scheme, Jai Gurdyal is sentenced to 18 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He is ordered to pay restitution to the City in the amount of the bribes he received, $12,560, a fine of $6,000 and a special assessment of $50. 5. Benny Chao Benny Chao is forty-five years old. He lives with his wife, two daughters, ages fifteen and thirteen, a four-year-old son and his seventy-seven-year-old mother. The defendant is unemployed and is his ailing mother’s primary caretaker. His wife works in a garment factory. Mr. Chao was a senior inspector while he participated in the corrupt scheme. He took $9,250 in illegal payoffs over a ten month period beginning in October 1991. He was not as active a participant as the other senior inspectors. He rarely directed taxis to corrupt lanes and he never failed taxis to coerce bribes. He did manipulate staffing to group corrupt inspectors on the same lane. He also oversaw payments to his supervisors. Defendant was born in Hong Kong in 1948. He graduated from the Far East High School in Hong Kong in 1967. He left Hong Kong that year to attend the Airwork Service Training College in Perth, Scotland. In 1970 he entered the United States on a student visa. In June 1974 he earned an Associate Degree from the Academy of Aeronautics in New York City. From 1976 to 1983 the defendant was the operations manager of a restaurant. He became a naturalized citizen in 1982. Work as an inspector began in 1985. He was promoted to senior inspector and held that position during the time of the conspiracy- The relevant Guidelines call for 30 to 37 months in prison, two to three years of supervised release, a fine of $6,000 to $60,000, restitution and a $50 special assessment. Because of his substantial assistance to the government, it has suggested a downward departure. The government characterizes his culpability as category three. Benny Chao is sentenced to 15 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He is ordered to pay restitution to the City in the amount of the bribes he received, $9,250, a fine of $6,000 and a special assessment of $50. 6. William Kruczowy William Kruczowy is forty-three years old. He lives with his wife and two children, ages seventeen and two years old. Defendant was a line' inspector ■ during his participation in the fraudulent scheme. He took $10,500 in illegal payoffs over a period of twelve months. There is no evidence that the defendant intentionally failed taxis or directly received payoffs from the taxi industry representatives. Although he has admitted to a past cocaine problem, there is no evidence that he received cocaine as a payoff or that he used drugs while on the job. Defendant was born in New York City. He had three siblings. His father, now deceased, was an insurance salesman. His mother was a homemaker. Defendant’s sister and surviving brother reside in Queens, New York. Defendant married his present wife in 1972. She is a homemaker. Their family lives in Queens. Defendant graduated from Newtown High School in Queens in 1969. He worked for thirteen years for a company that manufactured watch cases, first as a general helper and later as a floor foreman supervising manufacturing lines. He began working for the Commission in 1989 as an assistant stock handler. He was promoted to an inspector’s position in September 1990. He was terminated as a result of this case in July of 1992. Mr. Kruczowy has two prior convictions, putting him in a criminal history category of II. The relevant .Guidelines call for 27 to 33 months in prison, two to three years of supervised release, a fine of $5,000 to $50,000, restitution and a $50 special assessment. Because of his substantial assistance to the government, it has suggested a downward departure. The government categorizes his culpability as level two. William Kruczowy is sentenced to 15 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He is ordered to pay restitution to the City in the amount of the bribes he received, $10,500, a fine of $5,000 and a special assessment of $50. 7. Victor Smith Victor Smith is thirty-four years old. He is single and the father of a thirteen-year-old girl for whom he provides child support and whom he. visits regularly. Defendant was a senior inspector during the time of his participation in the corrupt scheme. He took $16,650 in illegal payoffs over an eighteen month period. He dealt directly with taxi industry representatives, passed taxis that were never inspected and he intentionally failed taxicabs in order to receive additional bribes. He supervised a lane of five line inspectors who participated in the payoff scheme and he directed bribes to his supervisors. He also received drugs from taxi industry representatives as bribes in lieu of cash. Defendant participated in an earlier DOI investigation of corruption in the Commission. He wore a wire in that investigation in order to help obtain evidence, but the investigation was not productive. Despite his earlier cooperation and knowledge of the investigation, he continued to take bribes. The defendant was born in Queens and raised in various parts of New York City. His parents were divorced when he was quite young, and throughout his childhood he was physically abused by a number of caretakers' including his father, his grandparents and his stepfather. A child was born to defendant out of wedlock! He supports the child without court order. He has used marijuana and cocaine in the past. He appears to be depressed and has shown high levels of carbon dioxide in his blood as a result of his work. Mr. Smith attended William Bryant High School in Woodside, New York through the eleventh grade. He received his general equivalency diploma while attending the College of Human Services in New York City where he earned twenty-four credits. The defendant has completed occupational training in automotive mechanic skills and has completed the General Motors Apprentice Program. From 1985 to 1987 defendant worked as an auto mechanic at an automotive store in Queens. He was employed by the Commission as a taxi inspector from March 12, 1984 to December 10, 1992, at first as a line inspector and later as a senior inspector. The relevant Guidelines call for 30 to 37 months in.prison, two to three years of supervised release, a fine of $6,000 to $60,000, restitution and a $50 special assessment. As a result of his substantial assistance to the government, it has suggested a downward departure. The government assessed his culpability as category four. Victor Smith is sentenced to 13 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He should receive drug and psychological treatment in prison. He is ordered to pay restitution to the City in the amount of the bribes he received, $16,650, a fine of $6,000 and a special assessment of $50. 8. Alfred Abbadessa Alfred Abbadessa is thirty-nine years old. He lives with his wife, a dental assistant, his three sons ages fifteen, eleven and eight, and his four-year-old daughter. He was a line inspector at the time of his participation in the corrupt scheme. He took $18,840 in illegal payoffs over a period beginning in the fall of 1989. He had extensive dealings with taxi operators, was instrumental in luring other inspectors into the scheme and aggressively solicited payoffs. He also purchased an illegal gun from one of his fellow inspectors. Defendant is one of four children raised by his parents in a middle-class Brooklyn home. He dropped out of New Utrecht High School after completing the ninth grade. In 1979 he received his high school general equivalency diploma through the State University of New York. He attended St. John’s University and completed twenty-one credits. He has a certificate in emissions equipment inspection programs from the New York City Department of Environmental Protection and another in dispensing and handling motor fuel from the New York City Fire Department. In the Navy from 1974-1977, defendant received an other than honorable discharge with the rank of Seaman Apprentice. In the early 1980’s defendant was employed as a film technician for a film laboratory and as a mechanic for a rental car company. From 1984-1986 he did not work .due to a disability. From 1986-1989 he was a fleet mechanic for a cable company. Work as a line inspector began in August 1989. He held that position until his arrest for this offense in July of 1992. The relevant Guidelines call for 24 to 30 months in prison, two to three years of supervised release, a fine of $5,000 to $50,000, restitution and a $50 special assessment. The government has not suggested a downward departure. The government characterizes his culpability as category five. Because of his substantial role in the corruption scheme, Alfred Abbadessa is sentenced to 12 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He is ordered to pay restitution to the City in the amount of the bribes he received, $18,840, a fíne of $5,000 and a special assessment of $50. 9. Michael Antonucci Michael Antonucci is forty-seven years old. He is married, and his only son is employed by the New York City Police Department. He is the brother of defendant Joseph Antonucci. Michael Antonucci was a line inspector while he participated in the corrupt scheme. He took $15,900 in illegal bribes over a period beginning in the fall of 1989. He had extensive dealings with taxi operators, was instrumental in luring other inspectors into the scheme and aggressively solicited payoffs. Defendant was born in Brooklyn, New York, the youngest of three children raised by his parents in a middle-class home. He was born with nerve deafness in both ears that causes a slight speech impediment. He completed the eleventh grade at the High School of Communication Arts in Manhattan. He received his general equivalency diploma in 1990. He admits to a prior heroin addiction stemming back to the late 1960s. He took methadone treatment from 1971 to 1974, and has remained drug-free since then. From 1963 to 1980, defendant worked as a skilled printer in the specialized area of fine printing. From 1981 to 1989, defendant held various jobs as an auto mechanic at auto repair shops. He also worked as a cable installer. Work for the Commission began in August of 1989 as a line inspector. He resigned in October 1992 as a result of this prosecution. The relevant Guidelines call for 24 to 30 months in prison, two to three years of supervised release, a fine of $5,000 to $50,000, restitution and a $50 special assessment. The government has not suggested a downward departure. The government calls his culpability level five. Because of his substantial role in the corruption scheme, Michael Antonucci is sentenced to 12 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He is ordered to pay restitution to the City in the amount of the bribes he received, $15,900, a fine of $5,000 and a special assessment of $50. 10. Raymond Quinones Raymond Quinones is twenty-six years old. He lives with a companion in an apartment in his parents’ home. He is in the process of a divorce from his wife with whom he has a child he supports and visits regularly. Defendant was a line inspector at the time of his participation in the fraudulent scheme. He received $5,500 in illegal payoffs over a nineteen month period. Defendant collected money directly from representatives of the taxi industry both at the Wood-side facility and at off-site garages. Other inspectors have reported that he failed taxis that should have passed inspection in order to generate additional payoffs. Defendant lied to the government about his involvement. Defendant either took cocaine while working as an inspector or received cocaine in lieu of cash payoffs. Mr. Quinones was born in New York City, the eldest of two children. His father worked for General Motors. His mother works as the director of after-school programs at the Holy Family parochial school. His sister graduated from the Berkley Business School. The family fives in the Bronx. Defendant married in 1989 and has a four-year-old-son from that marriage. He has no children with his current companion. Defendant graduated from Alfred E. Smith High School in the Bronx in 1986. He attended the Ohio Diesel School- from 1986-1988, and received a certificate in diesel automotive technology. Defendant worked as a truck driver while he was attending school. After graduation he worked as a mechanic with an equipment leasing company and with Greyhound Bus Lines. He also worked as a bodyguard for a security company and as a tow truck operator for a towing company. He worked as a line inspector for the Commission from April 1990 until he resigned in October 1992 because of this case. Defendant has since been employed as a tow truck operator.- Depending upon how the relevant Guidelines are construed, they call for either 24 to 30 months in prison, two to three years of supervised release, a fine of $5,000 to $50,-000, restitution and a $50 special assessment, or 6 to 12 months in prison, two to three years of supervised release, a fine of $2,000 to $20,000 and a $50 spécial assessment. The government has not suggested a downward departure. The government characterizes his culpability as level three. Raymond Quinones is sentenced to 11 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He is ordered to pay restitution to the City in the amount of the bribes he received, $5,500, a fine of $5,000 and a special assessment of $50. 11. Salvatore Cariola Salvatore Cariola is thirty-four years old. He is married, but is separated from his wife and infant child and is in the process of a divorce. Defendant was a line inspector during his participation in the corrupt scheme. He took $16,950 in illegal payoffs over a thirty-six month period. He received money directly from taxi industry representatives and picked up money both on and off-site. He also received payoffs when he was the sole inspector working on a special lane that evaluated the under carriage of the taxi. Defendant either shared cocaine with coworkers or received cocaine as a payoff in lieu of cash. Mr. Cariola was born in Cattania, Italy and immigrated to the United States in 1962 with his parents. He is a naturalized citizen. His father owns a barber shop and his family is middle-class. Defendant was married in April 1990 and separated from his wife only recently. Defendant graduated from Grover Cleveland High School in Queens, New York. He completed a six-month course in general automotive mechanics at the Roberts Technical School. Defendant has been part-owner of an auto body shop, manager of a gas station, and part-owner of an auto repair shop. Defendant worked for the Commission as an inspector from 1987 until 1992 when he was dismissed following his arrest. Defendant has reported a chronic substance abuse problem dating back to 1985. He disclosed to the Probation Department that in 1985 he began freebasing cocaine and smoking marijuana, spending between $150-200 a day on his habit. This habit continued until 1991 when the defendant voluntarily entered a drug treatment program. Defendant stated that after the treatment he was able to abstain from drugs for several months until he relapsed due to his arrest in this case. At the time of his pre-sentence interview he stated that he continues to use cocaine and. marijuana, spending approximately $100 per day on his habit. The relevant Guidelines call for 24 to.30 months in prison, two to three years of supervised release, a fine of $5,000 to $50,000, restitution and a $50 special assessment. As a result of his substantial assistance to the government, it has suggested a downward departure. The government characterizes his culpability as level three. Salvatore Cariola is sentenced to 10 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He is ordered to pay restitution to the City in the amount of the bribes he received, $16,950, a fine of $5,000 and a special assessment of $50. It is recommended that while he is incarcerated he participate in a substance abuse program. 12. Lawrence Lazewski Lawrence Lazewski is twenty-seven years old. He is married and lives with his wife, his three-year-old son and fifteen-month-old daughter. Defendant was a line inspector during his participation in the fraudulent scheme. He received $13,000 in illegal payoffs over a twenty-five month period. He was one of only a few inspectors who accepted bribes for two years or more. By the conclusion of the investigation, the defendant was receiving between $250-500 a week in payoffs. He also received drugs in lieu of cash. Defendant was born in Brooklyn and raised in Ozone Park, New York by both his parents. He has one brother. His mother works in the payroll office of a laundry and his father works as a file clerk in a bank. Defendant married in 1989. He resides with his wife and children ages three and fifteen months with his wife’s parents in Nassau County. Defendant dropped out of high school in 1985 before graduating. He received his general equivalency diploma in January of 1988 through John Adams High 'School. From 1986 -to 1988 he was employed with a window blind company as a delivery man and an installer. He then worked until 1989 as an auto mechanic in a gas station. In 1989 he began as a line inspector with the Commission, where he worked until November of 1992 when he was discharged because of this case. Mr. Lazewski reports that he has had a problem- with alcohol in the past. His wife stated in an interview with the Probation Department that he spent all of the fraudulently earned money on drink. The defendant admits to also having used both cocaine and marijuana.. He claims that he has not used drugs for the last four years. Defendant states that he occasionally attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and sought help in 1991 through an Employee Assistance Program. He reports that he now only drinks occasionally. His urine tested negative for all drugs. ■ The relevant Guidelines call for 24 to 30 months in prison, two to three years of supervised release, a fine of $5,000 to $50,000, restitution and a $50 special assessment. As a result of his substantial assistance to the government, it has suggested a downward departure. The government characterizes his culpability as level three. Lawrence Lazewski is- sentenced to 10 months in prison where he should receive assistance with drug and alcohol abuse. This is to be followed by two years of supervised release. He is ordered to pay restitution to the City in the amount of the bribes he received, $13,000, a fine of $5,000 and a special assessment of $50. 13. Joseph Antonucci Joseph Antonucci is fifty-seven years old. He is married and has four grown children ages twenty-one to thirty. He lives with his wife, a bookkeeper, and his mother-in-law. He provides partial support for three of his children. He is the brother of defendant Michael Antonucci. Joseph Antonucci was a line inspector at the time he participated in the corrupt scheme. He received $18,-540 in illegal payoffs over a period that began in January 1991. He was an active participant in the scheme, although not as active as his brother. He received money directly from industry representatives, and he failed, or threatened to fail, taxicabs when payments were not forthcoming. The eldest of three children, defendant was raised in a middle-income home by both his parents in Brooklyn, New York. He graduated from East New York Vocational High School in Brooklyn in 1954. From 1963 to 1989, defendant worked in the printing industry as a lithographer for a firm that went bankrupt in 1989. Defendant is hearing impaired and wears a hearing aid. He also suffers from chronic obstructive lung disease, and has had a polyp removed from his throat.' Work for the Commission began in April of 1990 as a line inspector. He worked in that position until July 1992. He was called back to work for the Department of Traffic in August of 1992. Defendant was injured while trying to prevent a tire from falling on him. He did not return to work. He was. terminated because of this prosecution in October 1992. The relevant Guidelines call for 24 to 30 months in prison, two to three