Full opinion text
OPINION PER CURIAM. This case is currently before the Court on the following motions: (1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on all Counts in Civil Action No. S-92-510; (2) Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I (“one person, one vote” violations) in Civil Action No. S-92-510; and (3) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on all Counts in Civil Action No. S-92-1409. A hearing on all motions was held on November 19, 1993. The Court determined that a trial was necessary to resolve factual disputes concerning a potential violation of the Voting Rights Act on the State’s Eastern Shore. The trial was held on December 20 and 21, 1993; and the findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). See infra Part V.C. As to all other claims in the combined lawsuits, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). I. COMMON FACTUAL BACKGROUND Pursuant to Article III, § 5 of the Maryland Constitution, Governor William Donald Schaefer, following the 1990 federal census, undertook to develop a redistricting plan for the Maryland General Assembly that reflected the population shifts throughout the State since 1980. The Governor appointed a five-member advisory committee, the Governor’s Redistricting Advisory Committee (“GRAC”), to assist him in that task in May 1991. After acknowledging the legal criteria that would constrain its redistricting decisions and the non-legal factors that it would also take into account in the redistricting process, the GRAC held a series of public hearings during the summer of 1991 across the State to receive public comments on the process and proposals for alternative district-ing plans. After an enthusiastic public response, the GRAC worked throughout the fall of 1991 to formulate a proposed redistricting plan which was released to the public on December 2, 1991. The GRAC held a final public hearing on the proposed plan on December 10 and, after several changes made in light of testimony at that hearing, submitted the plan to the Governor on December 17. The Governor submitted a slightly modified version of the plan to the General Assembly on January 8, 1992. That plan became law on February 23, upon the General Assembly’s failure to enact its own redistricting plan. This consolidated case involves challenges by two groups of plaintiffs to Maryland’s redistricting plan. The defendants are the Governor, the State Administrative Board of Election Laws and its Administrator, and the Secretary of State. In Civil Action No. S-92-510, the plaintiffs, Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. (“MFR”) and two Republican registered voters, claim that the plan violates the “one person, one vote” requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, is an unconstitutional political gerrymander, and violates the Voting Rights Act. In Civil Action No. S-92-1409, the plaintiffs, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. (“NAACP”), seven of its constituent branches, and eight black registered voters, claim that the plan violates the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has already upheld the plan against attacks by other plaintiffs based on eight separate state and federal grounds. See Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 629 A.2d 646 (1993). Both federal suits have been consolidated to be heard by this three-judge Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284. II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate by a properly supported motion that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Because under Rule 56(a) and (b), both plaintiffs and defendants may move for summary judgment, courts are often confronted with cross-motions. In such situations, the court must consider each party’s motion individually to determine if that party has satisfied the summary judgment standard. See 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (2d ed. 1983). The moving party has the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the belief that summary judgment is warranted. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987). If the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion, it must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54. Once a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [that] party’s pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). It must show that there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find in its favor. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. This standard “mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. In determining the sufficiency of the non-moving party’s evidence, all inferences to be drawn from underlying facts should be resolved in the favor of the nonmoving party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356, but only such evidence as would be admissible at trial can be considered. See Wilson v. Clancy, 747 F.Supp. 1154, 1158 (D.Md.1990), aff'd, 940 F.2d 654 (4th Cir.1991). III. POPULATION EQUALITY A. The Legal Standards The “one person, one vote” principle was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963). That principle, which is grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the dilution of individual voting power by means of state districting plans that allocate legislative seats to districts of different populations. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1385, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), the Court held that “the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.” Requiring electoral districts to be of nearly equal population ensures that each person’s vote is given the same weight. Thus, in Reynolds, the Court required States to “make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts ... as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” Id. at 577, 84 S.Ct. at 1390. Although the Supreme Court has held that absolute population equality should be the paramount objective in plans allocating congressional districts, see Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732-33, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 2659-60, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983), the Court affords more flexibility to States in formulating districting plans for state legislative seats by requiring only “substantial” population equality. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 2329, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973). This slightly relaxed requirement for state redistricting plans recognizes that minor deviations from absolute population equality may be necessary to permit the States to pursue other legitimate state policies. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577-81, 84 S.Ct. at 1389-92; Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321-22, 93 S.Ct. 979, 983-84, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973). The Court has specifically recognized a number of state policies that justify minor deviations from absolute population equality. In the Karcher decision, a congressional redistricting case, the Court stated: “Any number of consistently applied legislative policies might justify some variance, including, for instance, making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives.” 462 U.S. at 740, 103 S.Ct. at 2663. Given the more stringent population equality standard in congressional redistricting, it is clear that any state policies that are recognized by the Court as sufficient to depart from absolute equality should also be sufficient to depart from the less stringent requirement of “substantial” population equality. See,- e.g., Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 594, 629 A.2d at 656 (applying Karcher’s list of legitimate state policies to the Maryland state legislative redistricting plan being challenged here). 1. Maximum Deviations Below Ten Percent. Because the promotion of these other important state policies will often, in combination, prevent States from attaining absolute population equality in a districting plan, the Supreme Court has established that “minor deviations” from mathematical population equality, alone, are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of invidious discrimination. Voinovich v. Quitter,- — U.S. -,-, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 1159, 122 L.Ed.2d 500 (1993); see also Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444, 87 S.Ct. 569, 572, 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967) (“De minimis deviations are unavoidable .... ”). Redistricting plans that have a maximum population deviation under ten percent fall within this category of minor deviations. Voinovich, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1159 (quoting Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 2696, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983)). Thus, a redistricting plan with a maximum deviation below ten percent is prima facie constitutional and there is no burden on the State to justify that deviation. See Holloway v. Heckler, 817 F.Supp. 617, 623 (S.D.W.Va.1992) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1378, 122 L.Ed.2d 754 (1993); Fund for Accurate and Informed Representation, Inc. v. Weprin, 796 F.Supp. 662, 668 (N.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 650, 121 L.Ed.2d 577 (1992); Gorin v. Karpan, 788 F.Supp. 1199, 1201 (D.Wyo.1992) (three-judge court); Cosner v. Dalton, 522 F.Supp. 350, 357 n. 11 (E.D.Va. 1981) (three-judge court). The defendants argue that the “ten percent rule” essentially forecloses all challenges to redistricting plans in which the maximum deviation is below that percentage. The defendants support this position with the fact that no state districting plan with a maximum deviation below ten percent has ever been struck down by a court on the basis of a population equality violation. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.J. at 4-5. Indeed, the language of a few recent decisions could be read to support this position. The Weprin decision, for example, might be read to indicate that plaintiffs who fail to demonstrate a maximum population deviation in excess of ten percent are simply unable to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional vote dilution. See Weprin, 796 F.Supp. at 668 (“[Ajbsent credible evidence that the maximum deviation exceeds 10 percent, plaintiffs fail to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under [the one person, one vote] principle sufficient to warrant further analysis by this Court.”); see also Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 597, 629 A.2d at 657 (“As long as the population disparities between legislative districts adhere to the requirements of Reynolds and its progeny — i.e. as long as maximum deviations are under 10% — disparities in the number of representatives from the various regions or political subdivisions in the State are prima facie immaterial.”). The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that there is a distinction between prima facie constitutional and per se constitutional. MFR concedes that if the maximum deviation of a redistricting plan is under ten percent, the State has no burden to justify that deviation. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ.J. at 4 [hereinafter “Opp’n Mem.”]. However, MFR argues that it could successfully challenge a plan with a maximum deviation below ten percent if it can prove that the “minor deviation” in the plan does not result from the promotion of other' legitimate state policies, but rather from an impermissible or irrational purpose. See PL’s Supplemental Letter of Nov. 24,1993, in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ.J. at 2-3. The Court concludes that a plan with a maximum deviation below ten percent could still be successfully challenged, with appropriate proof, for several reasons. First, although there is some language in several decisions indicating that plans with less than a ten percent deviation are essentially per se constitutional, none of those decisions expressly so states, and it appears that the plaintiffs in those cases did not raise any arguments that the minor deviation was the result of an unconstitutional or irrational purpose. See, e.g., Weprin, 796 F.Supp. at 668 (no claim of unconstitutional or irrational state policy). In fact, several decisions have expressly stated that redistricting plans with a minor deviation could be challenged with such a showing. See, e.g., Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 597, 629 A.2d at 657 (“Possibly, there may be room under Reynolds and its progeny for a plaintiff to overcome the 10% rule,’ if the plaintiff can present compelling evidence that the drafters of the plan ignored all the legitimate reasons for population disparities and created the deviations solely to benefit certain regions at the expense of others.”); Licht v. Quattrocchi, 449 A.2d 887, 887 (R.I.1982) (finding a maximum deviation of five percent violated the one person, one vote requirement when the deviation “negate[d] the effects of reapportionment” by enhancing the representation of two cities). Finally, if the defendants’ argument were correct, individuals whose votes are systematically diluted statewide solely to promote an unconstitutional or irrational state policy, would be without a remedy simply because the State was able to contain the maximum deviation of its plan within ten percent. For these reasons, this Court holds that a plaintiff could, with appropriate proof, successfully challenge a redistricting plan with a maximum deviation below ten percent. To prevail, though, the plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the “minor” deviation in the plan results solely from the promotion of an unconstitutional or irrational state policy. Thus, the plaintiff must demonstrate, just as the defendants must demonstrate when the State has the burden of proving that the plan is constitutional, see infra, that the asserted unconstitutional or irrational state policy is the actual reason for the deviation. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740-44, 103 S.Ct. at 2663-67. In addition, the plaintiff must prove that the minor population deviation is not caused by the promotion of legitimate state policies. 2. Maximum Deviations Above Ten Percent. If the maximum deviation of a districting plan exceeds ten percent, then the plan is prima facie unconstitutional and the larger disparities in population must be justified by the. State Voinovich, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1159; Brown, 462 U.S. at 842-43, 103 S.Ct. at 2695-96. The State has the burden of demonstrating that the plan may reasonably be said to advance a rational state policy, such as those listed in the Karcher decision, and, if so, that “the population disparities among the districts that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan [do not] exceed constitutional limits.” Voinovich, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1159 (quoting Brown, 462 U.S. at 843, 103 S.Ct. at 2696 (quoting Mahan, 410 U.S. at 328, 93 S.Ct. at 987)) (internal quotation- marks omitted). Thus, if the deviation of the districting plan exceeds ten percent, the State has the burden of justifying that deviation. The defendants have the burden of expressly identifying the specific rational state policies the advancement of which has caused the deviation. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740-44, 103 S.Ct. at 2663-67. In addition, the State has the burden of demonstrating that the deviation does not exceed constitutional limits. MFR, claiming to state the standard enunciated in Voinovich, argues that the State must demonstrate that the deviation is required in order to advance a rational state policy. See Opp’n Mem. at 6. This is simply not the standard that has been established for evaluating deviations in state legislative redistrieting plans. Rather, MFR has stated the test for congressional redistrieting cases as set out in Karcher, 462 U.S. at 741, 103 S.Ct. at 2664. The Karcher decision is applicable to state legislative redistrieting cases to the extent that it expressly recognizes several state policies that might justify deviations from population equality. The requirement in Karcher that the asserted state policy actually be the reason for the deviation is equally applicable to state redistrieting cases. However, it is well established that the one person, one vote standard for congressional redistrieting is far more demanding than the standard for state legislative redistrieting plans. See Mahan, 410 U.S. at 321-23, 93 S.Ct. at 983-85; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578, 84 S.Ct. at 1390. As the defendants correctly point out, the appropriate test to be applied in state legislative redistricting cases is more akin to a rational basis test. “ ‘So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to' the apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses of a bicameral state legislature.’ ” Mahan, 410 U.S. at 325, 93 S.Ct. at 985 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579, 84 S.Ct. at 1391) (emphasis added). Before discussing whether the State’s plan violates the population-equality requirement of the Equal Protection Clause, the arguments of both parties raise the preliminary question of whether the senate and delegate plans should be analyzed as an entire plan or separately. In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants analyze the constitutionality of the plan by discussing the senate and delegate portions of the plan separately. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.J. at 4-8. MFR asserts that this division is meaningless and that if either portion of the plan is found to be unconstitutional, then the entire plan is unconstitutional. See Opp’n Mem. at 2, 6. The Supreme Court has expressly stated that courts should be reluctant to strike down an entire apportionment plan when the constitutional infirmity could be cured by lesser means. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 137 n. 16, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 2813 n. 16, 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986) (plurality opinion); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160-61, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1878-79, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971). In this case, the delegate portion of the plan utilizes multi-member, two-member, and single-member delegate districts that are nested within specific senate districts. Thus, if the Court finds a constitutional defect in the delegate portion of the plan only, it could be remedied by redrawing the delegate district lines within the plan’s acceptable senate districts. A separate analysis of the senate and delegate portions of the plan is therefore appropriate. B. The Senate Plan .It is undisputed that the maximum variance between senate districts in the State’s redistrieting plan is 9.84%. Thus, MFR cannot, based solely on population variation, establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional discrimination, and the State need not justify the plan’s minor deviation. See Voinovich, — U.S. at ——, 113 S.Ct. at 1159; Brown, 462 U.S. at 842-43, 103 S.Ct. at 2695-96. The burden remains on MFR to prove that the deviation is the result of an unconstitutional or irrational state purpose rather than one or more of the other state policies already recognized as legitimate by the Supreme Court. MFR concedes that it has the burden to prove that the plan violates the one person, one vote requirement, but argues that it has advanced sufficient evidence of discrimination not only to withstand the State’s motion for summary judgment, but also to prevail on its own cross-motion for summary judgment. In support of this position, MFR advances two arguments. First, MFR argues that the plan is invalid because the GRAC, from the inception of the redistricting process, had the goal of containing the maximum population deviation within plus or minus five percent of the ideal population, rather than the objective of absolute population equality. See Opp’n Mem. at 7, 11. MFR’s second argument is that the redistricting plan is invalid because the GRAC had the unconstitutional purpose of providing Baltimore City with control of eight senatorial districts even though -the population of the City, alone, could not support that many districts. See id. at 9-11. 1. Utilization of a Population Window. In support of its first argument, MFR refers to a document titled “Legal Standards for Plan Development,” as well as to the deposition testimony of three members of the Committee. See Opp’n Mem. at 7, 10-12. The “Legal Standards” document provided, in part: “Deviations from the ideal Senate district or legislative subdistrict population should not exceed + 5% or - 5% (except as may be necessitated by other constitutional requirements).” See Legal Standards for Plan Development at II.A.2.(a). There is also no dispute that the members of the Committee all had the goal of containing the maximum population deviation of the plan to within ten percent. See, e.g., Aro Dep. at 138. It is therefore undisputed that the GRAC had the objective at the inception of the redistricting process of a ten percent maximum population deviation rather than absolute population equality. Far from being an unconstitutional or irrational purpose, however, this objective merely recognized the flexibility that the State had in order to accommodate other legitimate state policies. The Supreme Court has expressly provided States with a degree of flexibility, ie., a ten percent population deviation, in formulating a state legislative districting plan because of the legitimate state interests that might cause deviations from absolute population equality. See Voinovich, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1159; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577-81, 84 S.Ct. at 1389-92. A population deviation under ten percent is considered “minor” and a State’s districting plan with only a minor deviation is prima facie constitutional, or, in other words, has achieved substantial population equality in conformity with the Equal Protection Clause. See Mahan, 410 U.S. at 322-25, 93 S.Ct. at 984-85. Thus, an express objective of containing the population deviation of the plan to within ten percent demonstrates nothing more than the objective of crafting a plan with constitutional population equality. An argument similar to MFR’s was rejected by a three-judge district court in Farnum v. Burns, 561 F.Supp. 83 (D.R.I.1983), which held that, because the purpose of the ten percent rule was to give flexibility to incorporate other legitimate state policies into a redistricting plan, “it does not violate the one-person, one-vote principle merely because a population window was used in developing that plan.” Id. at 93. This Court quite agrees. Finding that the use of a plus or minus five percent population window is not an illegitimate state purpose or objective, the Court also finds that the use of that window supports no inference that the population deviation was not due to the promotion of legitimate state policies. In fact, if the use of the population window supports any inference at all, it is that the Committee had the intention, from the inception of the redistricting process, to incorporate those other court-approved state policies into the plan. 2. Discrimination in Favor of Baltimore City. MFP next argues that the senate plan is unconstitutional because one of the goals of the GRAC, from the beginning of the redis-trieting process, was to provide Baltimore City with eight senate seats, even though the population of the City, by itself, could not support eight districts and remain within the ten percent population deviation goal. There is clearly sufficient evidence to demonstrate that this was at least one of the Committee’s objectives. See Brown Dep. at 26; Glasgow Dep. at 65. It is also clear that in order to provide Baltimore with eight senate districts it was necessary to cross subdivision boundaries into Baltimore County repeatedly. See Glasgow Dep. at 76-78. As the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted in its review of this redistricting plan, whether maximizing the legislative representation of a region with waning political influence but urgent political needs should be recognized under Reynolds as a rational state policy is an interesting question. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 598 n. 19, 629 A.2d at 658 n. 19. It is clear that, as applied to Baltimore City, this was an objective of the GRAC. But, even assuming arguendo that this objective was unconstitutional, MFR is completely unable to satisfy its burden of proof of causation and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Throughout its brief, the plaintiff has argued that the Karcher decision requires the State, when it has the burden of proving the plan’s constitutionality, to demonstrate that the asserted state policy is the actual reason for the plan’s deviation. See, e.g., Opp’n Mem. at 12 (“The burden on the State is to prove that the actual reason for the deviation was a Court-approved, rational State policy.”) (citing Karcher, 462 U.S. at 741, 103 S.Ct. at 2664). Applying this same standard to the plaintiff when it has the burden of proving that the plan is unconstitutional makes perfect sense. In this context, MFR has no proof whatsoever that the incorporation of this objective into the redistricting plan was the cause of the plan’s minor deviation between the populations of senate districts across the State. The Court is unable to locate anywhere in the record any evidence, other than concluso-ry assertions, that the deviation in the senate plan was caused by this objective. The only evidence that is arguably relevant to this issue is deposition testimony of Karl Aro, Deputy Director of the State Department of Legislative Reference, and of Michel A. Let-tre, Assistant Director of the Office of Planning, that plaintiff cites in its Opposition Memorandum. That testimony indicates that a senate map could have been drawn that would have had equal district populations within fifty to one hundred people. See Opp’n Mem. at 10-12. However, this does not demonstrate that the deviation in the plan was caused by the decision to provide Baltimore City with control over eight senatorial districts. It is not even clear from that testimony whether such a map could have been drawn incorporating the numerous court-approved legitimate state policies. For these reasons, the plaintiff is simply unable to prove the necessary causation between the asserted unconstitutional state objective and the deviation in the senate plan. In addition, MFR cannot prove that the deviation was not caused by the promotion of court-approved state policies. Rather, there is evidence demonstrating that those factors were in fact considered. For example, as stated above, the “Legal Standards” document identifies several recognized state policies such as compactness, respecting political boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent representatives. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740, 103 S.Ct. at 2663. Also, in his deposition, Michel Lettre testified that the Committee had the goals of “compactness, contiguity, adherence to political subdivision lines, communities of interest and the like.” Lettre Dep. at 158. The GRAC members whose testimony was cited by the plaintiff to demonstrate that one of the objectives of the Committee was to provide Baltimore City with control over eight senate seats indicated that they also relied on other legitimate policies. Donna Felling indicated that the GRAC attempted to maintain the integrity of districts, to avoid contests between incumbents, and to comply with the Voting Rights Act. See Felling Dep. at 60. Chairman Benjamin Brown stated that the GRAC considered contiguity, compliance with the Voting Rights Act, and avoidance of contests between incumbents. See Brown Dep. at 56-59. Thus, even looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356, MFR is simply unable to demonstrate that the minor deviation in the Senate plan is not due to the promotion of court-approved legitimate state policies. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion for summary judgment on the MFR’s population-equality claim regarding the senate portion of the plan and deny MFR’s cross-motion for summary judgment. C. The House of Delegates Plan It is undisputed that the maximum variance between delegate districts in the State’s redistricting plan is 10.67%. A population deviation in excess of ten percent is prima facie unconstitutional and the burden is on the State to demonstrate that the plan may reasonably be said to advance rational state policies, such as those listed in the Karcher decision, and that the population disparities among districts that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan do not exceed constitutional limits. See Voinovich, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1159 (quoting Brown, 462 U.S. at 842-43, 103 S.Ct. at 2695-96). There are four delegate districts that deviate more than five percent from the ideal district population: District 2A in Washington County and District 35B in Cecil County are relatively small; District 27A in Prince George’s County and District 29C in Calvert and St. Mary’s Counties are relatively large. The State must first demonstrate that the variations in these districts are due to the advancement of rational state policies. See Voinovich, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1159. In Reynolds and in subsequent decisions, several state policies have been recognized that might justify deviation from absolute population equality. These include respecting the boundaries of political subdivisions, Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578, 84 S.Ct. at 1390, preserving the cores of prior districts, avoiding contests between incumbents, Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740, 103 S.Ct. at 2663, and due regard for natural boundaries, In re Legislative Districting, 299 Md. 658, 681-82, 475 A.2d 428, 440, appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 962, 103 S.Ct. 286, 74 L.Ed.2d 272 (1982). In support of their motion, the defendants have submitted the affidavit of Ronald M. Kreitner, Director of the Maryland Office of Planning. (That office provided the Committee with staff to assist it in preparing the congressional and state legislative redistricting plans. See Kreitner Aff. at ¶ 3.) In his affidavit, Kreitner described in detail the state policies that required the populations of those four delegate districts to deviate more than five percent from the ideal district size. Id. at ¶¶ 18-21. Kreitner stated that District 2A has a .deviation of — 5.52% in order to preserve the boundaries of three political subdivisions: the City of Hagerstown and Washington and Frederick Counties. Id. at ¶ 18. District 27A has a deviation of + 5.09% that Kreitner states is due to preserving county lines and the cores of prior districts where possible. Id. at ¶ 19. The deviation of + 5.24% in District 29C was necessary to avoid splitting precincts and to respect natural boundaries. Id. at ¶ 20. Finally, District 35B has a deviation of — 5.15% because it gives due regard to natural boundaries and preserves the cores of districts. Id. at ¶ 21. As noted above, all of these policies have been recognized by prior judicial decisions. MFR simply has advanced no evidence to refute that these deviations were based on legitimate considerations incident to the ef-fectuation of rational state policies. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579, 84 S.Ct. at 1390-91. Rather, it attempts to attack the sufficiency of Kreitner’s affidavit. MFR asserts that Kreitner took no part in the creation of the plan and that his statements are merely after-the-fact rationalizations. See Opp’n Mem. at 12-13. However, it is undisputed that the Maryland Office of Planning, of which Kreitner was the Director, supplied staffing to the Committee. MFR has presented no evidence in a form that may be considered in resolving a motion for summary judgment, see Wilson, 747 F.Supp. at 1158, that demonstrates that Kreitner lacks the knowledge to which he attests. For this reason, the Court finds that the defendants haye satisfied the first portion of the test enunciated in Reynolds and have demonstrated that the deviations in the four districts in question were based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of rational state policies. The defendants must next prove that the population disparities among the districts that have resulted from the pursuit of the plan do not exceed constitutional limits. See Voinovich, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1159 (quoting Brown, 462 U.S. at 843, 103 S.Ct. at 2696 (quoting Mahan, 410 U.S. at 328, 93 S.Ct. at 987)). The Court finds that this requirement is easily met here. Although the total maximum deviation of the plan exceeds ten percent, the Supreme Court has previously approved state districting plans that have had higher deviations and have been based on fewer legitimate state policies. Perhaps the best example is the Mahan decision, in which the Court validated a Virginia districting plan with a maximum deviation in excess of sixteen percent and justified only by the policy of respecting county and city boundaries. See 410 U.S. at 329, 93 S.Ct. at 987. In the present case there were numerous state policies that contributed to a maximum deviation on the delegate side just barely in excess of ten percent. For this reason, the Court finds that the defendants have met their burden under Reynolds and its progeny. Thus, we grant their motion for summary judgment regarding MFR’s population-equality claim for the delegate portion of the state plan. MFR’s cross-motion for summary judgment is, therefore, denied. IV. POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING The plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test to prevail on a claim of unconstitutional political gerrymandering. In Davis v. Ban-demer, the Supreme Court confirmed by plurality opinion that a plaintiff must “prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.” Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127, 106 S.Ct. at 2808. Although MFR could withstand the defendants’ summary judgment motion on the issue of discriminatory intent, it is clear that it cannot produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the demanding test established in Bandemer to demonstrate discriminatory effect. Thus, we grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on MFR’s political gerrymandering claim, for reasons that follow. A. Intentional Discrimination Although expressly stating that discriminatory intent must be proved, the plurality opinion in Bandemer recognized that, “[a]s long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.” 478 U.S. at 129, 106 S.Ct. at 2809; see id. at 129 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2809 n. 11. Subsequent to Ban-demer, several lower federal courts have acknowledged that the standard for establishing discriminatory intent is relatively undemanding. See, e.g., Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 955 (4th Cir.1992) (“The intent standard set forth in the Ban-demer plurality opinion is easily met....”), reh’g denied, 991 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), and cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 93, 126 L.Ed.2d 60 (1993); Badham v. Eu, 694 F.Supp. 664, 670 (N.D.Cal.1988) (stating that Bandemer’s intent requirement is easily satisfied, and focusing instead on allegations of discriminatory effects), aff'd mem., 488 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 829, 102 L.Ed.2d 962 (1989). The Supreme Court had recognized previously that any redistricting process is inherently political and that “[district lines are rarely neutral phenomena.” Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 753, 93 S.Ct. at 2331. They can well determine what district will be predominantly Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a close race likely. Redistricting may pit incumbents against one another or make very difficult the election of the most experienced legislator. The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences. Id. In fact, the Court in Gaffney went on to state that it is to be expected that those who formulate a redistricting plan seek to achieve the political ends “of the State, its constituents, and its officeholders.” Id. at 754, 93 S.Ct. at 2332. Drawing all inferences from the underlying facts in favor of the nonmóving party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356, MFR has advanced sufficient evidence, under the weak showing required by Bandemer, to defeat the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of discriminatory intent. Although several factors might be cited by the defendants to negate an inference of discriminatory intent, MFR has raised several facts that sufficiently support the inference that the plan was formulated with the intention of discriminating against Republicans and in favor of .Democrats. The evidence is undisputed that the GRAC was provided with a binder entitled “Democratic Voting Performance and Strength” which contained comprehensive information on Democratic voter distribution throughout the State and ranked each precinct by Democratic strength. See Lettre Second Dep. at 13. Michel Lettre stated in his deposition that he prepared and presented a report to the Committee from which its members could easily determine Democratic strength and preference by district. See id. at 7, 26. A top administrative aide to Senator Thomas V. “Mike” Miller, President of the Senate and a member of the Committee, was provided with a computer database (the “voter file”) that had the capability of showing any precinct’s voting history. See Landow Dep. at 19-21. Thomas Cowley, former executive director of the Maryland Democratic Party, stated that the voter file was created specifically to aid in redistricting and to give Democratic candidates a partisan advantage. See Cowley Dep. at 44. Although the voter file was created and utilized for the State’s congressional redistricting plan, it was not returned after completion of that, plan and no restrictions were placed on the Committee’s use of the file. See id. at 64-65. Finally, both the House Minority Leader and the House Minority Whip testified at their depositions' that they had been told by House Democrats that the plan was expected to diminish the relatively small number of House seats already held by Republicans. See Sauerbrey Dep. at 56; Kittleman Dep. at 79. All of these facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to MFR, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356, support a reasonable inference that the plan was intended to discriminate against Republican candidates. Because MFR has generated sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer a discriminatory intent, there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact on that issue. See id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56. However, MFR can defeat the defendants’ motion for summary judgment only if it is also able to generate a genuine dispute as to the second prong of the Ban-demer test, discriminatory effect. B. Discriminatory Effect In developing its test for establishing discriminatory effect in Bandemer, the plurality utilized previous opinions discussing claims for racial gerrymandering. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131, 132 n. 13, 136-37, 106 S.Ct. at 2809, 2810 n. 13, 2812-13. Bandemer also acknowledged that the test for establishing statewide political gerrymandering, although formulated a bit differently, was essentially the same as the tests established for challenges to individual multimember districts. “[T]he question is whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process.” Id. at 132-33, 106 S.Ct. at 2810. MFR must, therefore, produce evidence of either a continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or an effective denial to a minority of voters of the fair opportunity to influence the political process as a whole. Id. at 133, 106 S.Ct. at 2810. Because this is not a case in which it is alleged that the will of a majority of voters continues to be frustrated, MFR must be able to demonstrate that an identifiable minority of voters (i.e., Republicans) has been denied its chance to influence the political process effectively. The- ability to influence the political process as a whole is not limited to the ability to win elections. See id. at 132, 106 S.Ct. at 2810. The mere fact that a particular redistricting plan makes it more difficult for a particular group to elect the representatives of its choice does not render the plan constitutionally infirm. Id. at 131, 106 S.Ct. at 2809. Even in “safe” districts in which the majority party consistently wins elections year after year, the group of individuals who voted for the losing candidate is presumed to have as much opportunity to influence the victorious candidate as other voters in the district. Id. at 132, 106 S.Ct. at 2810; Badham, 694 F.Supp. at 670-71. In the statewide gerrymandering context, the Bandemer plurality acknowledged that because of the nature of winner-take-all, district-based elections, disproportionate election results are likely to occur whenever there is even a narrow statewide preference for one party. See 478 U.S. at 130, 106 S.Ct. at 2809. Thus, MFR must be able to demonstrate more than simply losing elections disproportionately on a statewide scale. A history of disproportionate results must appear “in conjunction with strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair representation.” Id. at 139, 106 S.Ct. at 2814. MFR must prove that Republican voters have “essentially been shut out of the political process.” Id. Although not expressly so stating, Bandemer appeared to have concentrated on two areas of inquiry: participation in the electoral process and the responsiveness of elected officials. 1. Participation in Election Process. First, the districting plan should be examined to determine to what extent the minority group is able to participate in the election process. Id. at 133, 106 S.Ct. at 2811 (plurality opinion). Relying on racial gerrymandering decisions, Bandemer noted the importance of a minority group’s ability to participate “in the slating and nomination of candidates, their opportunity to register and vote, and hence their chance to directly influence the election returns and to secure the attention of the winning candidate.” Id. The plurality opinion acknowledged that this participatory approach might not be as helpful when analyzing a claim that a plan discriminates against a minority political party. It would indeed be difficult for members of a political party to demonstrate that they are excluded from participating in the affairs of their own party or from the processes by which candidates are nominated and elected. See id. at 137, 106 S.Ct. at 2812-13. However, the electoral participation inquiry has been adapted by several lower courts, subsequent to Bandemer, to apply more appropriately to claims of political gerrymandering. In Republican Party v. Martin, the Fourth Circuit was confronted with a claim that North Carolina’s scheme for electing superior court judges discriminated against Republicans. Although the court recognized that the factors that the Supreme Court had articulated regarding racial gerrymandering did not apply particularly well to claims of political gerrymandering, the court found that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to indicate that the North Carolina scheme inhibited the ability of Republicans to participate in the election process. See 980 F.2d at 956-58. The court noted that Republicans were discouraged from running because of the high likelihood of losing, and, in turn, campaign contributions were seriously diminished because contributors were less willing to donate money to candidates who were perceived to be almost certain losers. Id. at 957. In Badham v. Eu, a three-judge district court dismissed a gerrymandering claim made by state Republicans because they were unable to demonstrate “that anyone has ever interfered with Republican registration, organizing, voting, fund-raising, or campaigning.” 694 F.Supp. at 670. The court noted that Republicans remained free to speak out on public issues and were not inhibited in any way from participating in the public debate on which our political system relies. Id. Finally, in Pope v. Blue, 809 F.Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 30, 121 L.Ed.2d 3 (1992), the district court dismissed a claim by Republicans of political gerrymandering because the complaint failed to allege any disruption of the electoral activities listed in Badham. See Pope, 809 F.Supp. at 397 (quoting Badham, 694 F.Supp. at 670). 2. Responsiveness of Elected Officials. The other factor that the Bandemer plurality emphasized in determining whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally excluded from the political process was whether the victorious elected officials were responsive to the interests of the complaining minority. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131-32, 106 S.Ct. at 2809-10. The Court’s prior decisions in the context of racial gerrymandering indicate that a court must find that the districting scheme is set up in such a way that the elected representatives do not need to be and are not in fact responsive to the interests of the minority. In White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), for example, the Court noted that a white-dominated organization (the Dallas Committee for Responsible Government) effectively controlled the Democratic Party, enabling white candidates to win elections without any support from the black community. Id. at 766-67, 93 S.Ct. at 2339-40. In addition, the Committee did not “exhibit good-faith concern for the political and other needs and aspirations of the Negro community.” Id. at 767, 93 S.Ct. at 2340 (describing the district court’s findings). However, in Ban-demer, the plurality expressly stated that courts should not presume, without specific supporting evidence, that those who are elected will ignore the interests of underrepresented groups. See 478 U.S. at 132, 106 S.Ct. at 2810. In its motion for summary judgment, the defendants argue that MFR is simply unable to identify any facts that are sufficient to satisfy the demanding test for discriminatory effect established by the Bandemer decision. MFR relies almost completely on the deposition testimony of Delegate Ellen Sauerbrey, House Minority Leader, and Delegate Robert Kittleman, House Minority Whip, arguing that their deposition testimony, if taken in the most favorable light, could demonstrate to a reasonable factfinder that without a different redistricting plan Republicans are, and will continue to be, “shut out” of the political process. MFR asserts that this testimony indicates that, at the statewide level, the Maryland General Assembly is essentially a one-party system that is unresponsive to the interests of the minority Republicans and to those whom they represent. See Opp’n Mem. at 20-22. The facts on which MFR relies, even if assumed to be true, simply do not satisfy, as a matter of law, the test for discriminatory effect established in Bandemer. MFR has indisputably demonstrated that Republicans have been, and will continue to be, underrepresented in the Maryland General Assembly. Democrats are consistently elected to the House and Senate in numbers out of proportion to their statewide vote totals or registration numbers. While Republicans constitute around thirty percent of all registered voters, they hold somewhat less than twenty percent of the total seats in the House and Senate. A mere showing of disproportionate election results is insufficient, however. The Supreme Court has expressly held that disproportionate statewide election results simply do not render a legislative districting plan unconstitutional. Such results are simply inherent in winner-take-all, district-based elections in which even a narrow statewide preference for a party can give it an overwhelming majority of seats in the state legislature. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130, 106 S.Ct. at 2809 (plurality opinion); Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 160, 91 S.Ct. at 1878. MFR must also demonstrate that this history of disproportionate election results appears “in conjunction with strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair representation.” See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 139, 106 S.Ct. at 2814 (plurality opinion). To determine whether the redistricting plan effectively denies Republicans the ability to influence the political process, this Court must apply the inquiries discussed in Bandemer and examine the effect, if any, the plan will likely have on the ability of Republicans to participate in the electoral process. In addition, this Court should analyze the extent to which Republicans play a role in the legislative process within the General Assembly and whether the majority party “entirely ignore[s]” their interests. Id. at 132, 106 S.Ct. at 2810. MFR has advanced no evidence that suggests that the redistricting plan in any way affects the ability of Republicans to participate effectively in the electoral process. There is no evidence that the plan and the alleged “advantage” that it affords to Democrats across the State has prevented or will prevent Republicans from raising money to support their campaigns. See Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d at 957. There is no evidence that because of the structure of the plan, Republicans will be discouraged from running for state office, or that the plan will discourage voters from registering as Republicans. Compare id. (relying on fact that the statewide system of electing local judges was discouraging prospective Republican candidates from running due to poor election chances). Finally, there is no evidence to support any claim that Republicans, due to the structure of the plan, will be unable to participate fully in the “ ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ ” public debate over issues of concern to voters. See Bad-ham, 694 F.Supp. at 670 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)). In fact, the testimony of Delegates Sauerbrey and Kittleman indicates that the increased press coverage of Republican viewpoints in Annapolis has enabled the public to hear more than one side of an issue. See Kittle-man Dep. at 71; Sauerbrey Dep. at 43. The fact that Republicans are elected in the numbers that they are actually supports the inference that they have not been excluded from effective participation in the electoral process. With plurality (winner-take-all) district-based elections, one can expect a party with even a narrow majority statewide to win a much larger proportion of seats than its proportion of the statewide vote. See Lichtman Aff. at ¶ 9. This phenomenon, known in the literature as the “swing ratio,” has been expressly acknowledged by the Supreme Court, which has refused to invalidate such winner-take-all elections as unconstitutional. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130, 106 S.Ct. at 2809 (plurality opinion). While Democrats enjoy a two-to-one advantage over Republicans in the number of registered voters, the “differential between votes and seats represents only a modest swing ratio or multiplier effect compared to that of most states, especially given the overwhelmingly Democratic composition of the House and Senate votes.” Lichtman Aff. at ¶ 33. One would expect Republicans to be elected in far fewer numbers if they were effectively excluded from participating in the electoral process. MFR argues that the deposition testimony of Delegates Sauerbrey and Kittleman demonstrates that Republicans have been sufficiently shut out of the political process to satisfy the effects requirement of Bandemer because it establishes that the Democratic leadership in the General Assembly is not responsive to their minority interests. Ban-demer expressly stated that there is no presumption that those who are elected by the majority will disregard the interests of disproportionately underrepresented groups. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132, 106 S.Ct. at 2810 (plurality opinion). The testimony that MFR advances establishes, at best, that the Republicans are indeed a minority party in the legislature of a predominantly Democratic State. There is no dispute that much of the business of the House of Delegates is conducted by its five standing committees and that the membership on those committees is proportional to party affiliation. There is no dispute that the position of Speaker of the House carries with it many powers, including the power to appoint members to committees and the power to control debate and voting on the floor of the House. It is only political reality that the Democratic Party, the political party with an overwhelming majority of registered voters and legislative seats, utilizes its power to control these processes in order to achieve its political agenda. Ban-demer requires more, however. MFR must be able to demonstrate that Democrats, in their control of the legislative processes, are able to, and do in fact, ignore Republican interests entirely. See id. The deposition testimony advanced by MFR demonstrates that this is simply not the case. The Republican minority is the most powerful minority within the legislature and the Democratic leadership is responsive to its interests. Delegate Kittleman testified that the Republicans are the most influential minority in the House: The leadership now has to contend with a vocal and active caucus.... [A]ny person leading any organization would as soon not have dissidence, but it is there now and it has to be recognized and it has to be considered in decisions.... [Wjhen we had sixteen members, I’d say the Republican caucus was about the third ranking body ... of minorities in the House; ... the black caucus and the women’s caucus were more effective than the Republican caucus. Now the Republican caucus is listened to more than the other two, after the Democrats, the number one dissenting group. Kittleman Dep. at 36. Based on this status, the majority leadership frequently contacts and consults the minority leadership to determine its position. See Kittleman Dep. at 37; Sauerbrey Dep. at 74. Republicans have been able to build coalitions with like-minded Democrats and other minorities to pass legislation. See Kittleman Dep. at 72; Sauerbrey Dep. at 61. Numerous bills that were sponsored by Republicans are passed by the General Assembly each year. See Defs.’ Resp. to Tiches’ Interrogs. to SABEL #25. It is clear from this testimony that due to increased public awareness of Republican viewpoints and the ability of the Republican caucus to form voting coalitions with other minorities or like-minded Democrats, the Democratic leadership is simply unable to ignore Republican interests. It is certainly true that Republicans are often outvoted both in legislative committees and on the floor. This does not mean, however, that they have been unconstitutionally shut out of the political process as a whole. There is a difference between having a voice and being listened to. Bandemer requires that Republicans have no voice in the political process, which, as demonstrated by MFR’s own witnesses, they clearly do. When, to what extent, and on which issues they are listened to are questions that are quite properly resolved by the political process, not by the courts. Finally, even if it is assumed that MFR can demonstrate that Republicans are shut out of the political process by the Democratic “super-majority” in the General Assembly, they have not demonstrated that any other alternative redistricting plan, even a plan establishing proportional representation, would significantly diminish Democratic control. Democrats constitute more than two-thirds of the total (two-party) registration in the State. See Lichtman Aff. at ¶ 33 n. 9. Although an increase in the number of legislative seats held by Republicans might make it possible for that party to affect the Democrats’ ability to pass constitutional amendments, to suspend rules, and to uphold a gubernatorial veto, even Delegate Sauerbrey concedes that proportional representation would not assure such powers to Republicans and that coalitions with dissident Democrats would probably still be required. See Sauer-brey Dep. at 53. Although MFR has advanced sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute over discriminatory intent, it cannot, assuming all of its facts as true and drawing all inferences in its favor, satisfy the demanding test for discriminatory effect. There is no evidence that the plan has interfered with the ability of Republicans to participate in the electoral process. The evidence also demonstrates that the Democratic leadership in the General Assembly is, and must be, responsive to Republican interests. The State’s motion for summary judgment will be granted because MFR is unable, as a matter of law, to satisfy the two-part test established in Bandemer. V. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT CLAIMS The plaintiffs in Civil Action No. S-92-1409 assert two Voting Rights Act claims. First, they allege that the State’s legislative redistricting plan “packs” and “cracks” minority voters statewide. Second, they allege that on the Eastern Shore the plan “submerges” a geographically compact and politically cohesive black community in two majority-white, at-large delegate districts. A. The Legal Standards 1. Section 2 Minority Vote Dilution Claims. Congress enacted § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, to help effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee that no citizen’s right to vote shall “be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1; see also Voinovich, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1154-55. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, 96 Stat. 134 (1982), provides: SEC 2. (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or [because the citizen is a member of a language minority group], as provided in subsection (b) of this section. (b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by me