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TABLE OF CONTENTS Facts.991 Discussion.1009 A. Renewed Motion to Dismiss Counts One and Two of the Redacted Second Superseding Indictment.1009 1. The Decision in Reves.1009 2. Statute of Limitations.1013 3. Charges of Frontrunning.1014 B. Objections to the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions Testimony and Documents.1014 1. Bertoli’s Objections to the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions In Their Entirety.1017 2. Bertoli’s Objections to Specific Testimony From the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions.1021 a. Deposition of Coleman.1022 b. Deposition of Rodney Bond.1023 c. Deposition of Gillooly.1025 d. Deposition of Duggan.1025 e. Deposition of Sheree Ebanks.1026 f. Depositions of Chan-A-Sue and Bechard.1026 g. Deposition of Meyeroff.1026 3. Government’s Objections to Specific Testimony From the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions.1026 a. Deposition of Coleman.1026 b. Deposition of Rodney Bond.1027 c. Deposition of Duggan.1027 d. Deposition of Lundie .1027 4. Bertoli’s Objections to Documents From the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions .1027 a. Documents of Greenshields.1029 b. Documents from the Coleman Deposition.1032 c. Documents of Euro Bank.1033 5. Government’s Objections to Documents from the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions.1034 Objections to the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions Testimony and Documents.1035 1. Bertoli’s Objections to Specific Testimony From the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions — Deposition of Ebanks .1035 2. Government’s Objections to Specific Testimony From the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions. 1036 a. Deposition of Ebanks.1036 b. Deposition of Burgess .1036 c. Deposition of Rodney Bond.1036 Pre-Trial and Trial Motions and Objections by Bertoli.1036 D. 1. Motion to Sequester Government Witnesses .1036 2. Motion to Suppress Use of Cayman Islands Documents By the Government Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3505 . 1038 3. Motion to Turn Over Personnel Files of Government Witnesses and Agents.. 1039 4. Motion to Suppress or, in the Alternative, to Obtain Letters of Request to Take the Testimony of Euro Bank Personnel Ebanks and Burgess.1041 5. Objection to Reading of Redacted Second Superseding Indictment to Jury.. 1042 6. Motion to Question Eisenberg Regarding Charges Pending Against Him When He Pleaded Guilty.1044 7. Motions for a Mistrial.1047 8. Objection to Admission of Cayman Islands Documents After Beginning of Trial.1049 9. Objections to the Government’s Use of Summary Charts and Demonstrative .1050 a. Summary Charts. .1053 b. Demonstrative Charts. .1054 c. Admission of Charts. .1056 10. Objections to Evidence of Other Acts: Rule 404(b). .1060 a. The 1977 Suit by Executive Securities Against Bertoli and Bertoli’s Filing for Bankruptcy. .1063 b. The SEC Investigation and the SEC Action. .1064 e. The SEC’s 1979 Bar of Bertoli from Association with Broker-Dealers. .1065 d. Other 404(b) Evidence. .1065 i. Unindicted Stock Manipulation Schemes. .1066 ii. The Government’s Chart Evidence. .1067 iii. Berco Trust Financial Statements and Corporate Records. .1067 iv. The Swiss Bank Documents. .1067 11. Objection to Special Verdict Sheet. .1069 12. Objection to Hard Copy of Jury Charges and Hard Copy of Trial Transcript Being Submitted to Deliberating Jury. .1072 13. Objection to Submission of Jury Books to Jury. .1073 14. Objection to Subsequent Charges to Jury. .1076 Pre-Trial and Trial Motions and Objections by Government. E. .1076 1. Motion to Preclude Bertoli From Presenting a Defense Based on Selective or Vindictive Prosecution or Governmental Misconduct. .1080 2. Motion to Quash Bertoli’s Subpoena of Government’s Case Agent. . 1087 3. Motion to Preclude Bertoli From Presenting Any Evidence That Charges Were Dismissed in This Case. 4. Motion to Preclude Bertoli From Introducing Evidence That Certain Government Witnesses Used Narcotics or Alcohol. tOO o Post-Trial Proceedings. 05 00 o 1089 1. Bertoli’s Motions for a New Trial Based on Allegations of Juror Misconduct During Trial. a. Jury Misconduct as a Basis for Granting a New Trial .1094 b. Right of Defendants to Be Present During Court’s Interview of Juror for Misconduct.1100 i. Fifth Amendment Right to be Present.1100 ii. Right to be Present Pursuant to Rule 43.1101 iii. Right to Have Counsel Present.1104 c. The Riepe Letter.1104 2. Bertoli’s Motion for New Trial Based on Allegations of Juror Misconduct During Voir Dire.1108 a. Voir Dire.1108 b. The Lawsuit against Juror Six.1109 c. Motion for a New Trial Based on Answers to Jury Voir Dire.1110 3. Bertoli’s Motion to Recuse Court from Sentencing.1116 a. Background.1116 b. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).1117 c. Bertoli’s Plan to Force Recusal.1119 d. Statements and Rulings of the Court.1120 4. Sentencing.1125 a. Facts.1126 i. Bertoli’s Activities at Executive Securities.1126 ii. The Stock Manipulation Schemes.1128 iii. Obstruction of Justice.1130 b. Sentencing Computation.1137 i. Applicable Guidelines.1137 ii. Grouping the Offenses.1138 iii. Calculating the Offense Level.1144 Group One.1144 Sections 2J1.2 and 2X3.1 .1144 Section 2F1.1.1146 Sections 2J1.7 and 3B1.1 .1149 Group Two.1151 Group Three.1151 The Total Offense Level.1152 iv. Criminal History Category.1152 v. Monetary Penalties.1153 Ability to Pay.1155 5. Bertoli’s Motion for Bail Pending Appeal.1155 a. Background.1156 b. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b).1157 i. The Risk of Flight.1158 ii. Danger to the Community.1161 iii. Substantial Question of Law or Fact.1162 Conclusion —.-.-.1164 Appendix A: List of Pleadings and Related Documents.App.l Appendix B: Transcripts of Depositions and Proceedings in Cayman Islands .App.78 Appendix C: Transcripts of Trial Testimony.App.79 Appendix D: Objections to Specific Testimony From the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions .App.102 Appendix E: Objections to Specific Testimony From the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions.App.138 OPINION LECHNER, District Judge. This is a criminal action which originated on 16 June 1989 when an indictment (the “Indictment”) was returned against defendants Richard O. Bertoli (“Bertoli”), Richard S. Cannistraro (“Cannistraro”) and Leo M. Eisenberg (“Eisenberg”). On 29 September 1989, a six count superseding indictment (the “Superseding Indictment”) was returned. On 21 January 1992, the Government returned an eight count second superseding indictment (the “Second Superseding Indictment”) against Bertoli and Cannistraro (collectively the “Defendants”). Eisenberg is not a defendant in the Second Superseding Indictment although he is listed as a co-conspirator. Following a conviction on two counts of the Redacted Second Superseding Indictment, Bertoli filed numerous post-trial motions, including one for bail pending appeal of his conviction. In moving for bail pending appeal, Bertoli has raised several contentions of error and other issues regarding the trial and pre-trial proceedings. The following opinion addresses these issues and Bertoli’s other post-trial motions and is intended to facilitate the appeal. Facts The facts of this case have been set forth at length in other opinions, most recently in Cannistraro, 800 F.Supp. 80; see also United States v. Cannistraro, 799 F.Supp. 410 (D.N.J.1992); United States v. Cannistraro, 794 F.Supp. 1313 (D.N.J.1992); United States v. Eisenberg, 773 F.Supp. 662 (D.N.J.1991); United States v. Eisenberg, 734 F.Supp. 1137 (D.N.J.1990). A. The Redacted Second Superseding Indictment Count One (“Count One”) of the Redacted Second Superseding Indictment charged Bertoli and Cannistraro with racketeering activities in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. Count One described the pattern of racketeering engaged in by the Defendants and others, including Eisenberg, as consisting of predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate transportation of money taken by fraud, securities fraud and obstruction of justice. Count One, ¶ 9. Specifically, the Redacted Second Superseding Indictment alleged Monarch Funding Corp. (“Monarch”), the enterprise, was a securities brokerage firm in New York City, New York, which was engaged in the business of underwriting, purchasing and selling securities primarily traded in the over-the-counter markets. Id., ¶2. Count One alleged Bertoli was the former president of a brokerage firm and controlled and had a beneficial interest in several nominee brokerage accounts' maintained at Monarch. Id., ¶ 3. These nominee brokerage accounts included accounts in the names of Bertoli family members and various Cayman Islands individuals and entities. Id. Count One further alleged Cannistraro was a securities research analyst with Wood Gundy, Inc. (“Wood Gundy”), a brokerage firm located in New York City, New York. Id., ¶4. It alleged Cannistraro controlled and had a beneficial interest in nominee brokerage accounts maintained at Monarch. Id. These nominee brokerage accounts included accounts in the names of Cannistraro relatives and various individuals and entities located in the Cayman Islands. Id. With regard to Eisenberg, Count One alleged Eisenberg was the owner and president of Monarch. Id., ¶ 5. It alleged Eisen-berg controlled and had a beneficial interest in nominee brokerage accounts maintained at Monarch, which included accounts in the names of various Cayman Islands individuals and entities. Id. Count One charged that, from about January 1982 to the present, in the District of New Jersey and elsewhere, Bertoli, Cannis-traro and Eisenberg participated in the affairs of Monarch through a pattern of racketeering activity, the object of which was to “use Monarch as a vehicle to engage in fraudulent securities trading practices and thereby obtain money and other things of value for the [Defendants ... [and] Eisen-berg.” Id., ¶¶ 7-8. It identified the victims of the racketeering activity as the purchasers and sellers of securities recommended and traded by the Defendants and Eisenberg. Id., ¶ 8. It alleged the means and methods used by the Defendants to conduct conspiracy included “attempts to conceal and coverup their fraudulent activities.” Id., ¶ 9. Count One charged the Defendants with engaging in racketeering activity through the execution of four separate fraudulent trading or concealment schemes involving the following three securities: Liquidation Control, Inc. (“LCI”), Toxic Waste Containment, Inc. (“Toxic Waste”) and High Technology Capital Corp. (“High Tech”). Id. With respect to the scheme involving LCI securities (the “LCI Scheme”), Count One charged that, between approximately October 1982 and November 1983, the Defendants and others, including Eisenberg, devised a scheme to defraud and obtain money “by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises” with respect to LCI securities. Id., ¶ 11. Count One described the LCI Scheme as one in which the Defendants and Eisenberg rigged and manipulated the market in order to raise and control the price of LCI securities and to create a greater demand for the same. Id., ¶¶ 12-13. Count One charged Bertoli with causing Monarch to underwrite the initial public offering (“IPO”) of LCI securities (the “LCI IPO”). Id., ¶ 14. It alleged Bertoli arranged for the LCI IPO to be sold in units; a unit consisted of one share of common stock and two warrants. Id., ¶ 15. It alleged the Defendants and others, including Eisenberg, caused “virtually all of the securities in the LCI IPO to be sold to individuals and entities who were controlled by them, or who were under the control of individuals who had understandings with them concerning the manner in which these securities would be traded.” Id., ¶ 16. It alleged that, as a result, the Defendants and Eisenberg controlled the LCI securities traded in the market and enhanced their own ability to fraudulently manipulate the price of the LCI securities. Id. Count One alleged that, during the LCI IPO and the first few days of aftermarket trading, the Defendants and Eisenberg purchased substantial amounts of LCI securities at minimal cost through nominee brokerage accounts, such as the brokerage account for Euro Bank Corp. (“Euro Bank”) at Monarch. Id., ¶ 17. It further alleged Defendants and Eisenberg controlled pricing by, prior to the close of the LCI IPO, making arrangements with brokers and traders for the LCI securities to be traded according to the directions of Defendants and Eisenberg. It alleged these individuals bought and sold LCI securities at times and prices determined by the Defendants and Eisenberg, rather than by market forces. Id., ¶ 18. Count One alleged Defendants and Eisen-berg bribed portfolio managers and research analysts of the M & I Growth Fund (the “M & I Fund”) and Aggressive Growth Shares, Inc. (the “Bullock Fund”). It alleged the Defendants and Eisenberg opened nominee brokerage accounts at Monarch for the benefit of the M & I Fund and Bullock Fund managers and research analysts. These accounts were used to generate large sums of money through fraudulent trading of LCI securities. Id., ¶ 19. The managers in turn bought large blocks of LCI securities for their respective funds. The research analysts caused Halswell Corp. (“Halswell”) to open an account at Monarch. Id. Count One alleged Cannistraro wrote a research report to be circulated prior to the close of the LCI IPO which recommended the purchase of LCI securities (the “LCI Report”). Id., ¶20. It alleged the Defendants caused a broker from G.K. Scott & Co., a securities brokerage firm, (“G.K. Scott”) to claim authorship of and publish the LCI Report on G.K. Scott letterhead because Can-nistraro was an officer and director and the largest shareholder of LCI. Id. It further alleged that, as part of the LCI Scheme, the Defendants and Eisenberg caused the LCI Report to be disseminated without disclosing that Cannistraro had actually authored it, or disclosing that the Defendants and Eisen-berg were engaged in a scheme to manipulate the market and that the LCI Report was part of the scheme. Id., ¶ 21. Count One alleged that, during the first five days of aftermarket trading, the Defendants and Eisenberg caused the price of LCI securities to rise from the IPO unit price of twenty-five cents to $1.25 and that, by the end of February 1988, they caused the price to rise to $1,625 per share. Id., ¶22. It alleged the Defendants and Eisenberg sold their LCI securities “without disclosing this fraudulent trading scheme” and “fraudulently obtained profits totalling at least $462,-000.” Id., ¶23. Count One identified, by date and content, four instances of mail fraud, five instances of wire fraud and one instance of securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) (“Section 10(b)”) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Securities Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (“Rule 10b-5”), all perpetrated by the Defendants and others, including Ei-senberg, in executing the LCI Scheme. Id, ¶¶ 24-26. Count One further charged that, between approximately December 1982 and October 1983, the Defendants and others, including Eisenberg, engaged in a scheme concerning Toxic Waste securities (the “Toxic Waste Scheme”). Id., ¶¶ 27-28. Count One described the Toxic Waste Scheme as one in which the Defendants and Eisenberg rigged and manipulated the market in order to raise and to control the price of Toxic Waste securities and to create a greater demand for the same, in order to ensure they could sell their Toxic Waste securities at a substantial profit. Id., ¶¶ 28-29. Count One alleged Bertoli caused Monarch to underwrite the IPO of Toxic Waste securities (the “Toxic Waste IPO”). Id, ¶ 30. It alleged Bertoli caused the securities in the Toxic Waste IPO to be sold in units, each consisting of one share of common stock and two warrants. Id, ¶ 31. It alleged the Defendants and others, including Eisenberg, caused “the securities in the Toxic Waste IPO to be sold to individuals and entities who were controlled by them, or who were under the control of individuals who had understandings with them concerning the manner in which these securities would be traded.” Id, ¶ 32. It alleged that, as a result, the Defendants and Eisenberg controlled the Toxic Waste securities being traded in the market and enhanced their ability to fraudulently manipulate the price of the Toxic Waste securities. Id Count One alleged that, during the Toxic Waste IPO and first days of aftermarket trading, the Defendants and Eisenberg purchased substantial amounts of Toxic Waste securities at minimal cost through nominee brokerage accounts in the names of Parsico Ltd. (“Parsico”) and Venture Partners “A” (“Venture Partners”) maintained at Monarch. Id, 33. It further alleged Defendants and Eisenberg controlled pricing by, prior to the close of the Toxic Waste IPO, making arrangements with brokers and traders for the Toxic Waste securities to be traded according to the directions of Defendants and Eisenberg. It alleged these individuals bought and sold Toxic Waste securities at times and prices determined by the Defendants and Eisenberg, rather than by the market forces. Id, ¶ 34. Count One alleged that, in furtherance of the Toxic Waste Scheme, Defendants and Eisenberg opened nominee brokerage accounts at Monarch for the benefit of the managers and research analysts of the M & I Fund and the Bullock Fund. Id, ¶35. It alleged the Defendants and Eisenberg bribed the managers of the M & I Fund and Bullock Fund to buy large blocks of Toxic Waste securities for their respective funds. Research analysts at the M & I Fund and Bullock Fund caused the Halswell brokerage account at Monarch to purchase large blocks of Toxic Waste securities. Id Count One alleged that, as part of the fraudulent scheme to inflate the price of Toxic Waste securities, Cannistraro wrote four research reports (the “Toxic Waste Reports”) to be circulated prior to the close of the Toxic Waste IPO. These reports recommended the purchase of the Toxic Waste securities. Id, ¶ 36. Count One alleged Cannistraro caused Wood Gundy to disseminate the Toxic Waste Reports to the investing public. Id It alleged the Defendants and Eisenberg caused the Toxic Waste Reports to be disseminated without disclosing that the Defendants and Eisenberg were engaged in a scheme to manipulate the market and that the reports were part of the scheme. Id, ¶ 37. Count One alleged that, as part of the Toxic Waste Scheme, in or about March or April 1983, Bertoli and Eisenberg caused Monarch to disseminate to brokers, research analysts, securities newsletters and Monarch customers eighteen thousand copies of one of the Toxic Waste Reports. Id., ¶ 38. Count One alleged that, in or about March or April 1983, Cannistraro caused to be prepared and disseminated to the investing public articles in the “Portfolio Letter,” dated 14 March 1983, and the securities investment newsletter “Ground Floor,” dated 22 April 1983. Id., ¶39. It alleged these articles discussed the Toxic Waste Reports and continued to recommend the purchase of Toxic Waste securities without disclosing the existence of the Toxic Waste Scheme. Id. Count One alleged that, during the first three days of aftermarket trading, the Defendants and Eisenberg caused the price of Toxic Waste securities to rise from the IPO unit price of twenty-five cents to $1.25 per share of common stock and that, between 10 March 1983 and mid-June 1983, they caused the price to rise further to $4.50 per share. Id., ¶ 40. Count One alleged the Defendants and Eisenberg sold their Toxic Waste securities “without disclosing this fraudulent trading scheme” and “fraudulently obtained profits totalling at least $4,240,000.” Id., ¶41. It identified, by date and content, eight instances of mail fraud, two instances of wire fraud, one instance of interstate transportation of money taken by fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and one instance of securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, all perpetrated by the Defendants and others, including Eisenberg, in executing the Toxic Waste Scheme. Id., ¶¶ 42-45. Count One further charged that, from approximately March 1983 to November 1984, in the District of New Jersey and elsewhere, the Defendants executed a scheme to conceal the identities of the promoter and beneficial owners of High Tech (the “Beneficial Owners Concealment Scheme”). Id., 46. It alleged that, in about March 1983, Bertoli became the promoter of High Tech, whereby he founded High Tech, appointed its officers, board of directors and advisory board, allocated the distribution of its securities and arranged for the IPO of its securities (the “High Tech IPO”), which IPO was underwritten by Monarch. Id., ¶47. Count One further alleged that, in March 1983, prior to the High Tech IPO, the Defendants and Eisenberg caused 3,100,000 shares of High Tech restricted common stock to be placed in the names of nominees while the shares were beneficially owned by the Defendants and Eisenberg. Id., ¶48. It alleged the Defendants and Eisenberg did not disclose in High Tech’s registration statements and prospectus the role of Bertoli as High Tech’s promoter and the Defendants’ and Eisenberg’s beneficial ownership of more than ten percent of High Tech’s common stock and of more than ten percent of High Tech’s outstanding stock. Id., ¶49. Count One alleged that, having concealed such information, the Defendants raised $425,000 in capital for High Tech from the investing public and were able to direct the management and policies of High Tech to the benefit of the Defendants. Id., ¶ 50. In addition, it alleged that, from approximately February 1984 to July 1984, the Defendants caused 3,100,000 shares of High Tech common stock beneficially owned by them to be sold for a profit of at least $115,000. Id., ¶ 51. It identified, by date and content, three instances of mail fraud, two instances of wire fraud and two instances of securities fraud in violation of section 17 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77g, and sections 24, 10 and Schedule A(4) and (6) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 77j(a)(1) and 77aa(4) and (6), all perpetrated by the Defendants and others, including Eisenberg, in executing the Beneficial Owners Concealment Scheme. Id., ¶¶ 52-55. Count One further charged that the Defendants and others, including Eisenberg, engaged in a scheme concerning High Tech securities from about March 1983 to about February 1984, in the District of New Jersey and elsewhere (the “High Tech Scheme”). Id., ¶ 56. Count One described the High Tech Scheme as one in which the Defendants and Eisenberg rigged and manipulated the market in order to raise the price of, control the price of and create a greater demand for High Tech securities, in order to ensure they could sell their High Tech securities at a substantial profit. Id., ¶¶ 57-58. Count One alleged Bertoli caused Monarch to underwrite the IPO of High Tech securities. Id., ¶ 59. It alleged Bertoli caused the securities in the High Tech IPO to be sold in units, consisting of one share of common stock and two warrants. Id., ¶ 60. It alleged the Defendants and others, including Eisenberg, caused “the securities in the High Tech IPO to be sold to individuals and entities who were controlled by them, or who were under the control of individuals who had understandings with them concerning the manner in which these securities would be traded.” Id., ¶ 61. It charged that, as a result, the Defendants and Eisenberg controlled the High Tech securities being traded in the market and enhanced their ability to fraudulently manipulate the price of the High Tech securities. Id. Count One alleged that, during the High Tech IPO and first few days of aftermarket trading, the Defendants and Eisenberg purchased substantial amounts of High Tech securities at minimal cost through nominee brokerage accounts maintained at Monarch in the names of Parsico, Venture Partners, VPI Ltd. (“VPI”) and Roger Rowland (“Rowland”). Id., ¶ 62. It further alleged Defendants and Eisenberg controlled pricing by, prior to the close of the High Tech IPO, making arrangements with brokers and traders for the High Tech securities to be traded according to the directions of Defendants and Eisenberg. It alleged this trading procedure allowed High Tech securities to be bought and sold at times and prices determined by the Defendants and Eisenberg, rather than by market forces. Id., ¶ 63. It charged that, as part of the High Tech Scheme, the Defendants and Eisenberg bribed a research analyst (the “Research Analyst”) in an attempt to cause the buying of large blocks of High Tech securities. Id., ¶ 64. Count One alleged the Defendants and Eisenberg allocated securities in the High Tech IPO to the Research Analyst’s nominee brokerage account at Monarch. Id. In exchange for such allocation, and in exchange for money which the Defendants and Eisen-berg provided to the Research Analyst “through the trading of LCI and Toxic Waste securities in his nominee accounts at Monarch, the [Research [A]nalyst caused the Halswell brokerage account at Monarch to purchase a large block of High Tech securities.” Id. Count One alleged that, as part of the fraudulent scheme to inflate the price of High Tech securities, Cannistraro recommended the purchase of High Tech securities to various brokers at Wood Gundy, without disclosing that the Defendants and Eisen-berg were engaged in a scheme to manipulate the market and that the recommendation was part of the scheme. Id., ¶ 65. It alleged the Defendants and Eisenberg caused the price of High Tech securities to rise in the first six days of aftermarket trading from the IPO price of $.50 to $2.25 per share of common stock; between 15 June and mid-October 1983 the price further increased to $3.25 per common share. Id., ¶ 66. Count One charged that, from about June 1983 to about February 1984, the Defendants sold their High Tech securities to the investing public, without disclosing the existence of the fraudulent trading scheme, for a profit of at least $1,720,000. Id., ¶ 67. It identified, by date and content, six instances of mail fraud and one instance of securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, all perpetrated by the Defendants and others, including Eisenberg, in executing the High Tech Scheme. Id., ¶¶ 68-69. Finally, Count One charged the Defendants obstructed justice to conceal their wrongdoing (the “Cover-Up Scheme”). Count One alleged a subpoena by a grand jury empaneled in the District of New Jersey was served on one of Cannistraro’s nominees on or about 24 January 1986, requiring the nominee to produce documents and to testify before the grand jury. IcL, ¶71. It alleged Cannistraro instructed and directed this nominee, in return for cash payments, to conceal Cannistraro’s beneficial ownership in the nominee’s Monarch account. Id., ¶ 72. Count One charged Bertoli engaged in conduct to obstruct justice and to cover up the fraudulent trading schemes by shredding and destroying documents in the Cayman Islands in June and November 1987, by removing documents and hiding the proceeds from the racketeering activities and by submitting false and fraudulent affidavits to the court. Id., ¶ 73. Count Two of the Redacted Second Superseding Indictment (“Count Two”) charged the Defendants with conspiracy to violate section 1962(c) of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), by agreeing with others, including Eisen-berg, to conduct the affairs of Monarch through a pattern of racketeering. Count Two, ¶ 2. It charged the conspiracy existed from about January 1982 to at least January 1989, in the District of New Jersey and elsewhere. Id. It alleged the pattern of racketeering consisted of the racketeering acts (the “Racketeering Acts”) charged in Count One of the Redacted Second Superseding Indictment. Id. Count Three of the Redacted Second Superseding Indictment (“Count Three”) charged Bertoli with conspiracy to obstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, in connection with (1) an investigation, beginning in July 1983, by the SEC of allegedly fraudulent and manipulative trading at LCI and Toxic Waste (the “SEC Investigation”), (2) a civil action brought in 1985 by the SEC against the Defendants, Eisenberg and Steven Cloyes (“Cloyes”), a securities broker at Monarch (the “SEC Action”), (3) the 1985-86 Grand Jury Investigations, (4) the prosecution of Cannistraro in 1987 (the “1987 Can-nistraro Prosecution”) and (5) this action. Count Three, ¶ 14. It charged the conspiracy began as early as March 1983 and continued through the date of trial. Id. Count Three described the object of the conspiracy as being “to cover-up, conceal, and eventually avoid civil and criminal liability for, the illegal racketeering activities of ... Bertoli, ... Cannistraro and ... Eisen-berg, and to prevent evidence of their ... beneficial ownership of money and accounts in the Cayman Islands, from being considered and used” in the civil and criminal actions against them. Id., ¶ 15. It alleged the conspiracy was achieved by causing brokers or nominees to lie to or to conceal evidence from investigators and the grand jury. Id., ¶¶ 16-28. As a result, Cayman Islands banks did not produce documents requested pursuant to an informal agreement between the United States Department of Justice and the Cayman Islands authorities. Moreover, Defendants concealed documents at Monarch that were subpoenaed by the grand jury, destroyed documents relating to the nominee accounts at Euro Bank, filed a false financial disclosure form with the United States Probation Office, transferred funds in the Cayman Islands and submitted false affidavits during the course of this prosecution. Id. Count Three listed thirty-three overt acts committed by the Defendants and Eisenberg in furtherance of this conspiracy between March 1983 and the return of the Second Superseding Indictment. Although these overt acts are too numerous to set forth in full in this opinion, they included several meetings and telephone calls between the Defendants and other parties and several false and misleading statements by the Defendants and other .parties. Count Four of the Redacted Second Superseding Indictment (“Count Four”) charged Bertoli with obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1502 and 1503. Count Four, ¶ 4. It alleged that, in or about June 1987, Bertoli and Eisenberg, after a grand jury returned the indictment in the 1987 Cannistraro Prosecution (the “1987 Cannistraro Indictment”), shredded and destroyed documents from the Cayman Islands which were relevant to the investigations of a separate grand jury, empaneled on 30 January 1986. Id., ¶¶2-4. Count Five of the Redacted Second Superseding Indictment (“Count Five”) also charged Bertoli with obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1502 and 1503. Count Five, ¶ 3. It alleged that, in or about November 1987, Bertoli shredded and destroyed documents in the Cayman Islands that were relevant to the investigations of a grand jury empaneled on 17 March 1987. Id., ¶¶ 2-3. Count Six of the Redacted Second Superseding Indictment (“Count Six”) charged Bertoli with obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1502 and 1503. Count Six, ¶ 2. Count Six alleged that, in or about April 1990, in the District of New Jersey and elsewhere, Bertoli and others, including Ei-senberg, “caused the racketeering proceeds and documents relating to those racketeering proceeds to be transferred from the custody and control of [a PageWBrown & Co. (“Paget Brown”)] employee and then caused the racketeering proceeds to be moved from the Cayman Islands to the Principality of Andorra in Europe.” Id. Count Seven of the Redacted Second Superseding Indictment (“Count Seven”) charged Bertoli with obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1502 and 1503. Count Seven, ¶ 5. It alleged that, on or about 6 December 1991 Bertoli “submitted three purported “Affidavits in Contemplation of Death” by Jack Isaacson (the “Isaacson Affidavits”), which stated, inter alia, that Isaacson and another individual were the sole beneficial owners of the Cayman Islands bank and brokerage accounts ... relevant to the present RICO prosecution.” Id., ¶¶ 2-3 (footnotes added). Count Seven alleged the Isaacson Affidavits were false and fraudulent and Bertoli was aware of this. Id., ¶ 4. It further alleged Bertoli was aware the Isaac-son Affidavits “had been prepared for the use of ... Bertoli and others, including ... Can-nistraro and ... Eisenberg, in attempting to fraudulently exculpate themselves_” Id. B. History of the Cayman Islands Depositions On 6 November 1989, the Government filed a motion, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 15, for depositions in the Cayman Islands (the “First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions”) and for the issuance of a request for foreign judicial assistance (the “Cayman Islands Discovery Motion”). First Cayman Discovery Opinion at 7. Defendants opposed the motion. Id. at 6-9. On 11 December 1989, Bertoli applied ex parte to the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands (the “Cayman Grand Court”) for an injunction (the “Cayman Islands Ex Parte Injunction”) prohibiting the Government from applying to the Cayman Islands for the discovery described in the Cayman Islands Discovery Motion. The Cayman Islands Ex Parte Injunction was granted on 4 January 1990. Id. at 8. On 4 April 1990, the Government filed a treaty request (the “MLA Treaty Request”) with the Cayman Grand Court seeking evidence located in the Cayman Islands pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Cayman Islands and Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (the “MLA Treaty”), S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-8, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1990). First Cayman Discovery Opinion at 3. Also on 4 April 1990, the Government filed an amended Rule 15 motion (the “Amended Cayman Islands Discovery Motion”), retaining its request to take Cayman Islands depositions but withdrawing its motion for the issuance of a request for foreign judicial assistance and advising it was proceeding under the MLA Treaty. First Cayman Discovery Opinion at 8-9. On 24 April 1990, an order was issued allowing the Government to take foreign depositions and to obtain documents in the Cayman Islands. See Order, filed 24 April 1990 (the “24 April 1990 Cayman Discovery Order”). Significantly, the 24 April 1990 Cayman Discovery Order stated: IT FURTHER APPEARING that, for the purposes of. Rule 15 only, the [Djefen-dants do not contest that the deposition testimony and documents sought in the Cayman Islands are relevant and material to the trial of this matter; and IT FURTHER APPEARING that, for purposes of Rule 15 only, [Djefendants do not contest that due to the exceptional circumstances of this case, it is in the interest of justice that the request of the United States for leave to take foreign depositions for use at trial of this matter pursuant to a[n] [MLA] Treaty Request be granted; and IT FURTHER APPEARING that [Dje-fendants consent to the issuance of this Order, and that such consent has been given, in part, in reliance upon the [MLA] Treaty Request of 4 April 1990; and IT FURTHER APPEARING that the consent of [Djefendants to the granting of this Order shall not act as a waivér of any right of [Djefendants to contest either the right of the United States to have proceeded under the [MLA] Treaty or the constitutionality of that Treaty; nor shall this consent be construed as consent of [Dje-fendants that the United States is entitled to any depositions or documents pursuant to the [MLA] Treaty Request of April 4, 1990; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [Djefendants’ consent to entry of this Order shall preclude [their] objection based on Rule 15 to the use or admissibility at trial of any evidence obtainéd hereunder, but [their] consent shall not operate as a waiver of any other rights [Defendants may have to object to the admissibility of any such evidence at trial on any other ground. 24 April 1990 Cayman Discovery Order at 2-3. On- 10 July 1990, the Defendants commenced a separate civil action (the “Cayman Civil Action”) in the Cayman Grand Court, seeking to enjoin the Government from pursuing the MLA Treaty Request. See Letter Opinion, filed 9 January 1992 (the “Second Cayman Discovery Opinion”), at 5. On the same day, the Cayman Grand Court filed an order dismissing the Cayman Civil Action (the “10 July 1990 Cayman Order”). Id. at 6. On 28 November 1990, the Cayman Islands Court of Appeals (the “Cayman Appeals Court”) affirmed the 10 July 1990 Cayman Order. Id. The Defendants then sought leave to appeal the Cayman Appeals Court’s affirmance to the Privy Council for the United Kingdom (the “Privy Council”). Id. On 5 December 1990, the Cayman Appeals Court granted the Defendants leave to appeal and stayed processing of the MLA Treaty Request pending appeal to the Privy Council. Id. On 22 April 1991, the Privy Council affirmed the order of the Cayman Appeals Court. Id. Accordingly, this case was delayed approximately one year from the issuance of the Cayman Islands Ex Parte Injunction to the decision of the Privy Council. The Cayman Central Authority (the “Cayman Authority”) scheduled document production in the Cayman Islands for the period 13 May 1991 through 21 May 1991, with the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions to commence thereafter. Id. Subsequently, the Government and the Defendants agreed to postpone document production until 15 July 1991 and to postpone the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions until 4 September 1991. Id. On 4 September 1991, the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions commenced in the Cayman Islands before presiding Judge Sir Denis Malone (“Judge Malone”). Attending the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions were the Government and Berto-li. Neither Cannistraro nor his then-counsel were present at the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions. The First Set of Cayman Island Depositions concluded on 16 September 1991. At a hearing at the start of the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions (the “MLA Treaty Hearing”), Judge Malone explained the procedure for the depositions. He stated Cayman law, rather than United States law, would be the background law, but it would not be rigidly applied. 4 September Proceedings Tr. at 16. Judge Malone also explained the “records in the proceedings will be those requested by the United States authorities.” Id. at 17. He stated the proceedings must be kept within the parameters of the MLA Treaty and that collateral issues should not be pursued widely. Id. at 33. With respect to cross-examination, he stated: “[(Questions which affect the credibility of a witness by attacking his character, but are not otherwise relevant to the actual inquiry, ought not to be asked unless there are reasonable grounds for thinking that the implication conveyed by the question is well-founded or true.” Id. Judge Malone explained issues of admissibility were matters for the trial judge in the United States. Id. at 34. He reminded the parties that Article Seven of the MLA Treaty limits the use of information obtained through the MLA Treaty. Id. During the course of the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions, the Judge Malone explained Bertoli Would not be permitted to voir dire the witnesses with respect to documents introduced by records custodians. See Duggan Dep. Tr. at 21-23. Nevertheless, during the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions, Bertoli cross-examined all of the witnesses and re-crossed document witness Beehard. At the close of the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions, Bertoli objected to the fact that the Government did not call four witnesses it had subpoenaed for depositions. 17 Sept. 1991 Proceedings Tr. at 6-7. Judge Malone explained he could not require the Government to call witnesses. Id. at 7. As a result of the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions, the Government discovered the existence of additional relevant documents in the Cayman Islands. See Second Cayman Discovery Opinion at 8. In a letter, dated 20 September 1991 (the “20 September 1991 Letter”), the Government informed the court of its intention to obtain these additional documents through a supplemental request under the MLÁ Treaty (the “Supplemental Treaty Request”). Id. In addition, the 20 September 1991 Letter indicated the Government’s intention to introduce, under 18 U.S.C. § 3505, any documents obtained through the Supplemental Treaty Request. Id. On 25 October 1991, the Government submitted the Supplemental Treaty Request to the Cayman Grand Court seeking production of corporate documents. On 31 October 1991, Bertoli responded by letter to the Supplemental Treaty Request. Letter to court, dated 31 October 1991 (the “31 October 1991 Letter”); Second Cayman Discovery Opinion at 8. The 31 October 1991 Letter objected to the Supplemental Treaty Request on the ground that it was not authorized under Rule 15 and because Berto-li had allegedly withdrawn his consent to the 24 April 1990 Cayman Discovery Order. See Second Cayman Discovery Opinion at 8-9. On 4 November 1991, and again on 7 November 1991, Bertoli requested leave to file a motion to enjoin the Supplemental Treaty Request. Id. at 15. On 15 November 1991, a scheduling conference was held at which filing dates were set for the then-proposed motion to enjoin the Supplemental Treaty Request. Id. This motion was denied on 9 January 1992. Id. at 15. In addition, following the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions, Bertoli moved in this court for leave to depose three witnesses in the Cayman Islands, all of whom had previously been subpoenaed but not called by the Government. Notice of Motion, filed 12 November 1991. On 19 December 1991, Ber-toli was given leave to depose George Ebanks (“Ebanks”), deputy managing director of Euro Bank, Joan Bond, assistant secretary of Euro Bank, and Patrick Holmes (“Holmes”), an officer at the Guardian Bank and Trust (Cayman) Limited (collectively, the “Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions”). Letter Opinion and Order, filed 19 December 1991. In February 1992, a Letter Rogatory was submitted to the Cayman Authority (the “Letter Rogatory”) requesting that the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions be conducted. As mentioned, in January 1992, the Second Superseding Indictment was returned, adding obstruction of justice charges which alleged Bertoli had shredded documents in the Cayman Islands, caused fraudulent affidavits concerning the Cayman Islands to be filed with the court and caused racketeering proceeds to be transferred from the Cayman Islands to the principality of Andorra. See supra, at 997-998. Subsequent to the return of the Second Superseding Indictment, the Defendants filed their second set of pre-trial motions seeking, inter alia, to exclude the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions from evidence at trial on several grounds. See Cannistraro, 800 F.Supp. at 65-72. Bertoli argued that, as a result of the changes in the Second Superseding Indictment, the depositions of Coleman and Rodney Bond were inadmissible because he did not have the requisite similarity of motive for cross examination required by Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1). Cannistraro, 800 F.Supp. at 65. Moreover, Bertoli sought to exclude the Coleman and Rodney Bond depositions because he was not permitted to re-cross examine those witnesses. Id. Cannistraro argued the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions were inadmissible because his right to confrontation had been violated as a result of the court’s refusal to order the Government to pay the travel expenses of his counsel and because he did not participate in the First Set of Cayman Islands Depositions. Id. Following a hearing held on 19 June 1992, the motion to preclude the First Set of Cayman Island Depositions was denied. However, because Bertoli had already been given leave to file the Letter Rogatory and to take a Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions, Bertoli was granted permission to amend the Letter Rogatory to depose Burgess and to re-cross Coleman and Rodney Bond. See id. at 68-70; see also Transcript of Proceedings of 19 June 1992 (the “19 June 1992 Tr.”) at 16-20. Although Cannistraro’s argument regarding violation of his right to confrontation was rejected, Cannistraro was directed to identify which of the witnesses previously deposed by the Government he wanted to depose. Can-nistraro was so directed because Bertoli had already been given leave to take the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions. Cannistraro, 800 F.Supp. at 70-72; see also 19 June 1992 Tr. at 19-20. After a delay of a month on the part of Cannistraro, Cannistraro indicated he wished to depose all of the previously-deposed Cayman Islands witnesses. See Letter from Cannistraro to court, dated 16 July 1992, at 2. Cannistraro was given the opportunity to depose those witnesses as part of the Second Set of Cayman Island Depositions. Cannistraro, 800 F.Supp. at 72. Following repeated objections by Bertoli to the Government’s proposed Supplemental Letter of Request to Cayman Islands (the “Supplemental Letter Request”), a hearing was held on 10 September 1992 to finalize the language of the Supplemental Letter Request. See 10 Sept. 1992 Tr. at 4-16, 23-32. On 30 September 1992, the Supplemental Letter Request was executed and an order was signed granting the Defendants leave to depose the Cayman Islands witnesses. See Supplemental Letter Request; Order, filed 30 September 1992. The Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions were originally scheduled to commence on 3 November 1992. See Order, filed 17 March 1993 (the “17 March 1993 Order”) at 2; see also Letter from Government, dated 6 October 1992 (the “6 Oct. 1992 Letter”). Nevertheless, the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions were postponed until 30 November 1992 because Defendants failed to obtain local Cayman Islands counsel, as required by the Cayman Grand Court, for the purpose of arranging for the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions. 17 March 1993 Order at 2. Defendants’ failure to obtain local Cayman Islands counsel occurred despite their having received notice on five occasions that local Cayman Islands counsel was required. See 10 Sept. 1992 Tr. at 32; Letter from Government, dated 16 September 1992; Letter from Government, dated 30 September 1992; 6 Oct. 1992. Letter; Letter from court, dated 8 October 1992. . On 15 October 1992, the Government moved to limit the scope and time of the examinations by Bertoli and by Cannistraro during the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions. See Notice of Motion, filed 15 October 1992. Following a hearing held on 27 October 1992, the Government’s motion to limit the examinations by Bertoli and Cannis-traro was granted. See 27 Oct. 1992 Order; see also Transcript of Proceedings of 27 October 1992, 30-43 (“27 Oct. 1992 Tr.”). On 27 October 1992, Bertoli informed the court that he had procured local Cayman Islands counsel. See 27 Oct. 1992 Tr. at 28. Nevertheless, despite numerous attempts by this court to expedite the taking of the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions, the conduct of the Defendants continued to delay the taking of the Depositions. See 5 Nov. 1992 Tr.; 12 Nov. 1992 Tr. at 6-15. For instance, at no point prior to his pleading guilty in March 1993 did Cannistraro obtain local Cayman Islands counsel. ■ See 5 Nov. 1992 Tr. at 2-10; Transcript of Proceedings of 12 March 1993 (the “12 March 1993 Tr.”) at 4-6. On 8 December 1992, Bertoli filed a summons (the “Originating Summons”) in the Cayman Islands, naming the Government and Cannistraro as defendants (the “Second Cayman Action”). See Letter from Government, dated 8 February 1993. The Originating Summons sought, inter alia, a determination on the allocation of costs with regard to the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions. See Originating Summons. Bertoli insisted that the Originating Summons was the proper way to effect taking of the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions. See Letter from Bertoli, dated 8 February 1993; Letter from Bertoli, dated 1 January 1993. Bertoli so stated despite the fact that the Solicitor General of the Cayman Islands (the “Cayman Solicitor General”) had indicated that (1) the Second Cayman Action was “misconceived,” (2) the Cayman Grand Court had no jurisdiction to hear the Second Cayman Action and (3) the proper method was for the Defendants to proceed, through local Cayman counsel, to process the Supplemental Letter Request. See Letter for Cayman Solicitor General, dated 27 January 1993; Letter from Cayman Solicitor General, dated 16 February 1993; see also 12 Jan. 1993 Tr. at 15-22. The Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions was next scheduled for 29 March 1993. See 12 Jan. 1993 Tr. at 15-16. On 22 February 1993, the Government and the Defendants were ordered to show cause why trial should not commence on 3 May 1993. See Order to Show Cause, filed 22 February 1993, at 2. In the meantime, the Government moved to revoke permission given to the Defendants to take the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions or, in the alternative, to set a deadline by which the depositions were to occur. See Government Cayman Brief at 16-60, 64-67. After extensive written submissions from the parties, and a hearing on 12 March 1993 (the “12 March 1993 Hearing”), it was ordered that (1) the Second Set of Cayman Island Depositions were to be completed by 16 April 1993, (2) a hearing pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 104 (the “Rule 104 Hearing”) would commence on 26 April 1993 and (3) a final pre-trial conference would be held and, immediately thereafter, trial would commence on 3 May 1993. 17 March 1993 Order at 3-7; see also 12 March 1993 Tr. at 27. During the 12 March 1993 Hearing, Bertoli indicated he would drop the Second Cayman Action and have local Cayman counsel process the Supplemental Letter Request on his behalf. 12 March 1993 Tr. at 7. Nevertheless, Bertoli contended it would be “physically impossible” to complete the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions by 16 April 1993. Id. at 28. On 15 March 1993, Bertoli moved for reconsideration of the 16 April 1993 deadline. See Letter Brief, dated 15 March 1993. Bertoli represented that he only intended to depose Ebanks, Burgess, Coleman and Rodney Bond and that he had already made application to the Grand Court to commence taking the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions. Id. Accordingly, the 17 March 1993 Order was modified to permit the Second Set of Cayman Island Depositions to continue beyond 16 April 1993, provided the deposition commenced on that date and proceeded uninterrupted until complete. See Order, filed 26 March 1993. Finally, on 15 April 1993, the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions commenced with the taking of the depositions of Burgess, Ebanks and Rodney Bond. C. Significant Pre-Trial and Trial Proceedings Given the extensive delays in scheduling the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions, on 22 February 1993, the parties were ordered to show cause why the matter should not proceed to trial on 3 May 1993. See Order to Show Cause, filed 22 February 1993. As indicated, following the 12 March 1993 Hearing, see 12 March 1993 Tr., it was ordered that (1) the Rule 104 Hearing would commence on 26 April 1993, (2) a final pretrial conference would commence on 3 May 1993 and (3) trial would commence on 3 May 1993 immediately following the final pre-trial conference. See 17 March 1993 Order. Also in March 1993, Podvey, Sachs, Mea-nor, Catenacci, Hildner & Cocoziello (“Pod-vey Sachs Meanor”) moved for a stay of an order, filed 11 February 1992 (the “11 Feb. 1992 Order”), requiring Podvey Sachs Mea-nor to serve as court stand-by counsel for Bertoli. On 25 March 1993, the motion for a stay was denied. See Order, filed 25 March 1998 (the “25 March 1993 Order”). Podvey Sachs Meanor appealed the 25 March 1993 Order and, on 8 April 1993, the Circuit granted a stay of the 11 Feb. 1992 Order insofar as it required Podvey Sachs Meanor to supply stand-by counsel to attend the Second Set of Cayman Islands Depositions. See Circuit Order, dated 8 April 1993. In all other -respects, the Podvey Sachs Meanor motion for a stay was taken'under advisement by the Circuit. See id. On Friday, 23 April 1993, at 3:20 p.m., with the Rule 104 Hearing to commence at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, 26 April 1993, the Circuit by ■ facsimile transmission to the court and to the parties granted the remainder of the Podvey Sachs Meanor motion for a stay. See Circuit Order, dated 23 April 1993. The Circuit ordered that the Rule 104 Hearing and the trial, scheduled to commence on 3 May 1993, be stayed until resolution of Podvey Sachs Meanor’s pending mandamus petition to withdraw as Bertoli’s stand-by counsel. See id. On 7 May 1993, the Circuit affirmed the 11 Feb. 1992 Order insofar as it required Pod-vey Sachs Meanor to serve as stand-by counsel for Bertoli. However, it granted the Podvey Sachs Meanor mandamus petition insofar as it required Podvey Sachs Meanor to be present in the Cayman Islands and to provide specific attorneys to serve as counsel for Bertoli should Bertoli withdraw his pro se status. See Circuit Order, dated 7 May 1993 (the “7 May 1993 Circuit Order”); Writ of Mandamus, dated 7 May 1993. The 7 May 1993 Circuit Order also dissolved the stay previously imposed by the Circuit on the Rule 104 Hearing and trial. Id. By Order, filed 10 May 1993 (the “10 May 1993 Order”), in compliance with the decision of the Circuit, Podvey Sachs Meanor was ordered to “continue to serve as stand-by counsel for Bertoli” and to “provide a competent attorney at all pre-trial hearings (other than the trial depositions in the Cayman Islands) and at trial from the time of jury selection to the return of verdict.” 10 May 1993 Order at 2. In addition, the 10 May 1993 Order scheduled the Rule 104 Hearing and trial to commence on 17 May 1993 and 1 June 1993 respectively. See id. at 2-3. The Rule 104 Hearing was held from 17 May 1993 to 19 May 1993, for the purpose of determining, prior to trial, a significant number of Bertoli’s objections to proposed exhibits by the Government. See Transcript of Proceedings of 17 May 1993; Transcript of Proceedings of 18 May 1993; Transcript of Proceedings of 19 May 1993 (collectively, the “Rule 104 Hearing Tr.”). At the conclusion of the Rule 104 Hearing,, all Government exhibits offered were ruled admissible. See Rule 104 Hearing Tr. During the first half of the Rule 104 Hearing, Bertoli was represented by H. Curtis Meanor (“Meanor”) of Pod-vey Sachs Meanor. Following the Rule 104 Hearing, final pretrial conferences (the “Final Pre-trial Conferences”) were held on 27 May 1993 and 28 May 1993. See Transcript of Proceedings of 27 May 1993 (the “27 May 1993 Tr.”); Transcript of Proceedings of 28 May 1993 (the “28 May 1993 Tr.”). During the Final Pre-trial Conferences, numerous pending motions were decided and final issues for trial discussed. See 27 May 1993 Tr. at 1-15; 28 May 1993 Tr. at 1-83; see also infra Appendix A. At the Final Pre-trial Conference held on 28 May 1993, Podvey Sachs Meanor indicated that it had hired an outside attorney, Albert Carilli, Esq. (“Carilli”), to serve as stand-by counsel for Bertoli in lieu of an attorney from Podvey Sachs Meanor. See 28 May 1993 Tr. at 2-17. After a discussion concerning the ability of Carilli to begin serving as stand-by counsel so late in the proceedings, Carilli assumed the role of stand-by counsel in lieu of an attorney from Podvey Sachs Meanor. Trial commenced with jury selection on 1 June 1993. See Minutes of Proceedings of 1 June 1993. As already discussed, Bertoli began trial representing himself pro se, with the assistance of Carilli as stand-by counsel. Id. After jury selection, opening arguments commenced on 4 June 1993. See Minutes of Proceedings of 4 June 1993. Although Ber-toli had initially stated his opening statement would last two to three hours, see transcript of hearing (the “27 April 1993 Hearing”), held 27 April 1993 (the “27 April 1993 Tr.”) at 31; 28 May 1993 Tr. at 54, Bertoli’s opening statement actually lasted more than seven hours, and spanned from 4 June 1993 to 7 June 1993. See Trial Transcript at 355-438, 511-94. On 7 June 1993, the Government commenced presenting its case against Bertoli. See Minutes of Proceedings of 7 June 1993. On 24 June 1993, the Government called Eisenberg as a witness. The Government’s direct examination of Eisenberg covered approximately two and one half days of trial. See Trial Transcript at 2247-347, 2353-475, 2492-581. Bertoli’s cross examination of Ei-senberg lasted nearly twice that time, beginning on 29 June 1993 and concluding on 6 July 1993. See id. at 2582-678, 2687-839, 2843-938, 2943-3067, 3079-155; see also Appendix C (direct examination of Eisenberg covered 311 transcript pages, while cross examination covered 543 transcript pages). Despite the excessive, repetitive and sometimes abusive nature of Bertoli’s cross examination of Eisenberg, the cross examination was not limited. On 22 July 1993, the Government rested. See Minutes of Proceedings of 22 July 1993. At that point, Bertoli moved for a one week adjournment of trial. See Trial Transcript at 4991-95. Bertoli represented that “the additional time requested would, if granted, probably end up saving substantial time by permitting the defense to focus its case and present it more succinctly.” See id. at 4991 (quoting Letter from Bertoli to court, dated 21 July 1993). Bertoli also represented that, if granted the adjournment, he would “have everything packaged, have the witnesses lined up and we can run a drill and move them very quickly.” Id. at 5128. Based on Bertoli’s representations, the adjournment was granted and trial was scheduled to recommence on 28 July 1993. See id. at 5127-30. Notwithstanding Bertoli’s prior representations, the court received notification late on the afternoon of Friday, 23 July 1993 that, for the purpose of presenting his defense case, Bertoli intended to revoke his pro se status and desired the representation of Richard Levitt, Esq. (“Levitt”). See Letter from Levitt to court, dated 23 July 1993 at 1. Levitt represented that he was “familiar with both the pre-trial and trial proceedings in this matter and therefore [would] be prepared to begin the defense ease, on schedule.” Id. at 1. Levitt also represented that his participation “[would] help focus and streamline the case, and therefore bring it to a speedier conclusion, consistent with the legitimate interests of all concerned.” Id. On 27 July 1993, a hearing was held to consider the application of Levitt to be admitted pro hac vice for the purpose of presenting Bertoli’s defense. See Minutes of Proceedings of 27 July 1993. Based upon Levitt’s representations concerning both his prior experience with the case and his ability to further focus and streamline the defense effort, Levitt was permitted to represent Bertoli. See id.; see also Trial Transcript at 5147. On 28 July 1993, despite the repeated representations of Bertoli and Levitt that the defense would be able to proceed expeditiously if granted the previously-discussed adjournment, there was yet another request for an additional adjournment to allow the defense to collect documents subpoenaed from witnesses. See Trial Transcript at 5475-89. With the stipulation that there would be no further delays or adjournments for the purpose of gathering documents or scheduling witnesses, this additional adjournment was granted until 3 August 1993. See id. at 5488-91. On 3 August 1993, the defense ease recommenced. See Minutes of Proceedings of 3 August 1993. On 5 August 1993, outside the presence of the jury, Bertoli was sworn and stated he had decided not to testify in the case. See Trial Tran