Full opinion text
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction.............................................................1308 II. Procedural History.......................................................1310 III. Evidentiary Background..................................................1311 A. Texas Demography Related to Redistricting............................1311 B. Pertinent History Related to Redistricting in Texas.....................1312 C. The 1991 Congressional Redistricting Process..........................1313 1. General Background..............................................1313 2. Voting Rights Act Considerations..................................1314 a. Racial Polarization............................................1316 b. History of Discrimination......................................1317 3. Incumbents’ Interests.............................................1317 4. Use of Racial Data...............................................1318 5. Congressional District 30..........................................1319 6. Congressional Districts 18 and 29.................................. 1323 7. Congressional District 28.......................................... 1325 8. Other Congressional Districts......................................1326 D. Expert Testimony....................................................1328 E. Other Districting Plans...............................................1330 TV. Factual Findings and Legal Conclusions...................................1331 A. The Voting Rights Districts...........................................1337 1. Congressional District 30.......................................... 1337 2. Congressional Districts 18 and 29.................................. 1339 3. Narrow Tailoring to Achieve a Compelling State Interest?...........1341 4. Congressional District 28.......................................... 1344 B. Other Congressional Districts.........................................1344 V. Conclusion...............................................................1345 Special Concurrence......................................................1345 Appendix (Maps of Districts 18, 29, 30).................................... 1348 Order...................................................................1351 Before JONES, Circuit Judge, HITTNER and HARMON, District Judges. OPINION EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge: I. INTRODUCTION The Voting Rights Act of 1965 at one blow demolished the obvious devices that southern states had used to disenfranchise African-American voters for decades. The Act marked the full maturity in American political life of the Founders’ idea that “all men are created equal” and the Rev. Martin Luther King’s hope that his children would be judged by the content of their character, not the color of their skin. The meaning of equality—as also enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “equal protection of the laws”—is the subject of this lawsuit. It is no longer disputed that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody a right to ballot box equality among American citizens of different races or ethnic backgrounds. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960). The Fourteenth Amendment also prohibits government from invidiously classifying persons because of their race. Repeatedly and in the strongest terms, the Supreme Court has condemned intentional racial discrimination by state agents or bodies. Where official discrimination is found to exist, the burden is on the governmental body to justify it by no less than a compelling governmental interest. One year ago, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that intentional racial discrimination is offensive to the Equal Protection Clause when it occurs as part of legislative redistricting. See Shaw v. Reno, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). In Shaw, the Court held that “redistricting legislation [is unconstitutional if it] is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification.” Id. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2824. In 1991, the State of Texas deliberately redrew its Congressional boundary lines following the 1990 census with nearly exact knowledge of the racial makeup of every inhabited block of land in the state. This insight, worthy of Orwell’s Big Brother, was attainable because computer technology, made available since the last decennial census, superimposed at a touch of the keyboard block-by-block racial census statistics upon the detailed local maps vital to the redistricting process. Not only did the state know the precise location of African-American, Hispanic, and Anglo populations, but it repeatedly segregated those populations by race to further the prospects of incumbent officeholders or to create “majority-minority” Congressional districts. The result of the Legislature’s efforts is House Bill 1 (“HBl”), a crazy-quilt of districts that more closely resembles a Modigliani painting than the work of public-spirited representatives. The challenged plan (HBl) was passed in the second called session of the 72nd Texas Legislature and signed into law by the Governor on August 29,1991. See Plaintiff Exh. 1. On November 18, 1991, the Texas Congressional Redistricting Plan received § 5 preelearance from the Attorney General. See United States Exh. 1007; Stip. 37. Notwithstanding the preclearance, the Attorney General expressed fundamental reservations about the redistricting plan: While we are preclearing this plan under Section 5, the extraordinarily convoluted nature of some districts compels me to disclaim any implication that the proposed plan is otherwise lawful or constitutional. United States Exh. 1007 at 2. The plaintiffs in this case are six Texas voters who reside in Congressional Districts 18, 25, 29, and 30. In a pretrial stipulation, they alleged that 24 of the state’s 30 Congressional Districts are the product of racial gerrymandering or intentional racial discrimination. The question before this court is whether any of the 24 challenged Congressional Districts, many of whose boundaries were clearly affected by racial considerations, can be sufficiently explained by legitimate redistricting criteria other than race. See Shaw, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2824. For reasons that follow, we conclude that Congressional Districts 18, 29, and 30 as presently drawn are not so explainable. They were conceived for the purpose of providing “safe” seats in Congress for two African-American and an Hispanic representatives. They were scientifically designed to muster a minimum percentage of the favored minority or ethnic group; minority numbers are virtually all that mattered in the shape of those districts. Those districts consequently bear the odious imprint of racial apartheid, and districts that intermesh with them are necessarily racially tainted. Other challenged Texas Congressional Districts are disfigured less to favor or disadvantage one race or ethnic group than to promote the reelection of incumbents; they are not unconstitutionally segregated. We do not hold that the state may only draw Congressional boundaries with a blind eye toward race, a goal which would be impossible, nor that it is altogether prohibited from creating majority-minority districts. But when the State redraws the boundaries of Districts 18, 29, and 30 and contiguous districts, it can and must exhibit respect for neighborhoods, communities, and political subdivision lines. As the Supreme Court put it, appearances do matter. Id. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2827. In appearance and in reality, these three districts were racially gerrymandered. Racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional, but it is also morally wrong, inconsistent with our founding tradition and Martin Luther King’s vision. The color of a person’s skin or his or her ethnic identity is the least meaningful way in which to understand that person. To elevate racial classification as a basis for political representation inevitably defeats the principle of equality because it causes all of society to become more, not less, race-conscious. Justice William 0. Douglas put this point well: When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek not the best representative but the best racial or religious partisan. Since that system is at war with the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67, 84 S.Ct. 603, 611, 11 L.Ed.2d 512 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoted in Shaw, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2827). II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The plaintiffs are six registered voters who reside in Congressional Districts 18, 25, and 29 (located in whole or in part in Harris County), and in District 30 (most of which is located in Dallas County). See Complaint at 4 ¶7. Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Declaratory Judgment and Motion for Preliminary Injunction on January 26, 1994 against the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of State as well as the Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives. The complaint alleged that the 1991 Congressional Redistricting Plan for the State of Texas “represents an unconstitutional effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting: (1) without regard for traditional districting principles, including compactness, contiguousness [sic], consistency with existing political, economic, societal, governmental or jurisdictional boundaries; (2) without sufficiently compelling justification; and (3) without ‘narrow tailoring’ as required by the United States Constitution.” Complaint at 2 ¶ l. Candidate qualifying for the March 8, 1994 primary elections in Texas closed on January 3, 1994 and early voting began on February 16. On March 2, 1994, the court enteied an order denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and their motion for consolidation and expedited hearing and set trial for June 28, 1994. Also on March 2, 1994, the court granted the motion of the United States to participate as amicus curiae in the case. On March 14,1994, the state defendants in this action filed their answer to the complaint. On May 5, 1994, the court granted the motion to intervene of six African-American registered voters represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (“Lawson Intervenors”). On May 20, 1994, the court granted the motion of the United States to intervene. A week later, on May 27, 1994, the court entered an order granting intervention to both The League of United Latin American Citizens (“LULAC”) and seven Hispanic registered voter members of the organization. On June 13,1994, the United States filed a motion to bifurcate trial; the court denied the motion on June 17, 1994. On June 16, 1994, the court conducted the pretrial conference. At the pretrial conference, the court set the pretrial schedule and directed the plaintiffs to file a statement narrowing the districts to which they asserted challenges and eliminating any claims not supported by substantial evidence or case law. In response, on June 16,1994, the plaintiffs filed a statement dismissing their § 2 and state constitutional claims and identifying six districts that they did not challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. In a subsequent filing, the plaintiffs dismissed their Fifteenth Amendment claims. Trial was held June 27-30 and concluded on July 1, 1994. To expedite matters, this court limited the parties’ trial time while permitting them to submit virtually unlimited additional documentary and deposition evidence. The parties liberally accepted this offer. The court has reviewed all of the evidence brought before us. The record references below highlight and summarize the testimony. III. EVIDENTIARY BACKGROUND A. Texas Demography Related to Redistricting Congressional redistricting in Texas operated against a backdrop of important demographic changes throughout the state. Population growth from 1980 to 1990 was largely attributable to significant population growth among Hispanics and African-Americans. Of particular interest is the enormous increase in Hispanic population state-wide. Thus, what follows are the Census figures chronicling minority-led population growth in Texas during the 1980’s. According to the 1980 Census, Texas’ total population was 14,229,191, of whom 2,985,824 (20.98%) were Hispanic, 1,692,542 (11.89%) were non-Hispanic African-American, and 9,350,297 (65.7%) were Anglo. See Stip. 7. By the 1990 Census, Texas’ total population had increased to 16,986,510, of whom 4,339,-905 (22.55%) were Hispanic, 1,976,360 (11.-63%) were non-Hispanic African-American, and 10,291,680 (60.59%) were Anglo. The increase in population from 1980 to 1990 (2,757,319 persons) entitled Texas to three additional seats in the United States House of Representatives, increasing the size of the delegation from 27 to 30. See Stip. 8. Based on the 1990 Census, the ideal size of a Texas Congressional district is 566,217. See Stip. 17. Under the 1980 Census, Texas’ voting-age population was 9,923,085, of whom 1,756,971 (17.71%) were Hispanic, 1,095,836 (11.04%) were non-Hispanic African-American, and 6,932,894 (69.87%) were Anglo. See Stip. 9. By 1990, Texas’ voting-age population had increased to 12,150,671, of whom 2,719,586 (22.38%) were Hispanic, 1,336,688 (11.0%) were non-Hispanie African-American, and 7,828,352 (64.43%) were Anglo. See Stip. 10. Taking citizenship into account alters these percentages. Under 1990 figures, the total citizen voting age population is only 11,313,-641, of whom 2,085,857 (18.4%) were Hispanic, and 1,315,860 (11.6%) were non-Hispanie African-American. See State Exh. 14, Appendix 1. Even a cursory review of the foregoing Census data reveals the significant growth experienced by minority communities, and, in particular, the explosive population growth among Hispanics in Texas. The Hispanic population in the state grew from 1980 to 1990 by 1,354,081 persons, or 45.4%; the African-American population in the state grew from 1980 to 1990 by 283,818 persons, or 16.8%; and the Anglo population in the state grew from 1980 to 1990 by 941,383 persons, or 10.1%. The growth in Hispanic population accounted for a remarkable 49.1% of the increase in Texas’ total population from 1980 to 1990. See Stip. 11. The four counties "with the largest growth in population from 1980 to 1990 in number of persons gained are Harris, Tarrant, Dallas, and Bexar Counties. As noted below, the growth in the Hispanic and African-American population in these counties accounted for a significant proportion of the increase in population in each of these counties: a. The total population of Harris County increased by 408,652 persons from 1980 to 1990. The Hispanic population in the county increased by 275,858 persons, accounting for 67.5% of the growth in total population in the county. The African-American population increased by 58,674 persons, accounting for 14.4% of the county’s growth. See Stip. 12. According to the 1990 Census, there are 644,935 Hispanic persons in Harris County, of whom 405,735 are of voting age. See Stip. 13. Furthermore, there are 527,964 African-American persons in the county, of whom 359,248 are of voting age. See Stip. 14. b. The total population of Tarrant County increased by 309,223 persons from 1980 to 1990. The Hispanic population in Tarrant County increased by 72,247 persons, accounting for 23.4% of the growth in total population in the county. The African-American population in Tarrant County increased by 37,765 persons, accounting for 12.2% of the county’s growth. See Stip. 12. c. The total population of Dallas County increased by 296,420 persons from 1980 to 1990. The Hispanic population in the county increased by 161,069 persons, accounting for 54% of the growth in the total population of the county. The African-American population increased by 76,343 persons, accounting for 25.8% of the county’s growth. See Stip. 12. In Dallas County, there are 362,130 African-American persons of whom 243,918 are of voting age. See Stip. 15. d.The total population of Bexar County increased by 196,594 persons from 1980 to 1990. The Hispanic population in Bexar County increased by 128,269 persons, accounting for 65.2% of the growth in the total population of the county. The African-American population in Bexar County increased by 13,326 persons, accounting for 6.8% of the county’s growth. See Stip. 12. Significant increases in Hispanic population occurred between 1980 and 1990 in several other counties: a. The Hispanic population of Cameron County increased by 51,341 persons between 1980 and 1990. b. The Hispanic population of Hidalgo County increased by 96,760 persons between 1980 and 1990. c. The Hispanic population of Webb County increased by 34,227 persons between 1980 and 1990. See Stip. 16. B. Pertinent History Related to Redistricting in Texas Texas did not redistrict Congressional Districts at all between 1933 and 1957. See United States Exh. 1071 at 7. Following the 1960 Census, the state “redistricted” by creating a new at-large Congressional seat. See State Exh. 23, ¶ 6. This approach to redistricting allowed all incumbents’ existing districts to remain intact and meant that the at-large candidate had to campaign across and represent the entire state. Also in the 1960’s, Texas created the now infamous District 6—often known as “Tiger” Teague’s district—which ran from Fort Bend County through rural east Texas into the southern ends of both Tarrant and Dallas Counties. See State Exh. 41. The 1971 round of Congressional redistricting was notable at least in part because of the great lengths to which the state legislature went to solicit the views of incumbent congressmen. The Senate Congressional Redistricting Subcommittee actually flew to Washington to meet with the Texas delegation as a group and on an individual basis. See State Exh. 23, ¶8. In the 1980’s, the Texas Legislature managed to put together a plan despite two novel facts—the first Republican governor elected in Texas since Reconstruction and the applicability of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act to Texas Congressional redistrieting. See United States Exh. 1071 at 14; Plaintiff Exh. 28A (Map of 1980’s Plan C001). C. The 1991 Congressional Redistricting Process 1. General Background The Texas Constitution requires the Texas Legislature to redraw Congressional Districts after each Decennial Census. See Tex. Const, art. Ill, § 26. The Texas Legislature is a bicameral body consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. See Stip. 4. In 1991, the Texas Senate had 31 members, elected from single member districts. See Stip. 5. Of the 31 members of the 1991 Senate, 22 were Democrats and nine were Republicans, two were African-American, five were Hispanic and 24 were Anglo. All of the African-American and Hispanic members were Democrats. See State Exh. 1. The Texas House of Representatives had 150 members, also elected from single-member districts. See Stip. 6. Of the 150 members of the 1991 Texas House, 93 were Democrats and 57 were Republicans, 13 were African-Americans, 20 were Hispanic, and 117 were Anglo. As in the Senate, all of the African-American and Hispanic House members were Democrats. See State Exh. 2. The following committees and subcommittees of the Texas Legislature were involved in the task of redistrieting in 1990 and 1991: the Senate Select Committee on Legislative Redistrieting, chaired by Senator Bob Glasgow; the House Committee on Redistrieting, chaired by Representative Tom Uher; the Senate Committee of the Whole on Redistricting, chaired by Senator Chet Brooks, which had two subcommittees—the Subcommittee on Congressional Districts, chaired by then-State Senator Eddie Bernice Johnson, and the Subcommittee on Legislative Redistricting chaired by Senator Bob Glasgow; and the Senate Committee of the Whole, chaired by Senator Chet Brooks. The Senate Select Committee on Legislative Redistrieting and the House Redistricting Committee held joint regional outreach hearings throughout the state. Specifically, the committee heard and received testimony from individuals and organizations concerned about redistrieting in the following cities: Austin (February 28,1990); Lubbock (March 16,1990); Amarillo (March 17,1990); Corpus Christi (April 6, 1990); El Paso (May 18, 1990); Midland/Odessa (May 19, 1990); Houston (June 1, 1990); Beaumont (June 22, 1990);' Tyler (June 23, 1990); Fort Worth (July 13,1990); Dallas (July 14,1990); Laredo (July 27,1990); Edinburg/Harlingen (July 28, 1990); San Antonio (August 25, 1990); and Austin (September 28, 1990). In 1991, the Senate Committee of the Whole on Redistricting held its own public outreach hearings on a more limited scale in Houston (April 5, 1991), Brownsville (April 26, 1991), and San Antonio (May 1, 1991). See United States Exh. 1086. The transcripts and/or summaries of these numerous regional hearings are voluminous. What role these hearings ultimately played in Congressional redistrieting is difficult to ascertain. At least one Texas House member, Representative Kent Grusendorf, testified that the regional outreach hearings— often ill-attended by legislators—“essentially had no effect on the outcome of the redistricting process.” 6/27/94 TR. at 96. Grusendorf further observed: “At the time I think I thought it was serious, but in hindsight I think for the most part it was show.” Id. Nevertheless, the state relied strongly on citizen participation in these hearings when it justified its plan to the United States Department of Justice. The Texas Legislative Council advised the Texas Legislature on legal issues of concern in drafting Congressional redistrieting legislation. See Dep. of Archer at 7. Jeff Archer, lead lawyer for the Council on redistricting, made presentations to committee members at the regional public outreach hearings on various legal issues to be considered in the redistrieting process. See id. at 87-88. In addition, the Council published a series on redistrieting—dubbed the “gray books”— that together served as a more comprehensive statement of state and federal law applicable to redistrieting. See Plaintiff Exhs. 13A, 13B, 13C. The Legislative Council also developed and had jurisdiction over REDAPPL (a/k/a “Red Apple”), which was the primary software used in drawing maps during the Congressional redistrieting process. See Dep. of Archer at 30. The challenged redistrieting plan (HB1) generated litigation before it was even passed. On May 24, 1991, Republican plaintiffs in Terrazas v. Slagle, 821 F.Supp. 1162 (W.D.Tex.1993), brought an action under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act against various officials of the State of Texas and the Texas Democratic Party. In their First Amended Original Complaint, filed after the adoption of HB1, the plaintiffs in Terrazas challenged the 1991 Texas Congressional Redistrieting Plan as unconstitutional and violative of the Voting Rights Act and alleged that it sacrifices the rights of racial and political minorities to enhance the reelection chances of Anglo Democrat incumbents by fragmenting and concentrating the population centers of Hispanics and Republicans, diminishing the likelihood that candidates of their choice can be elected from within their communities. United States Exh. 1005. The court in Terrazas ruled that the 1991 Texas Congressional Redistrieting Plan did not dilute the voting rights of racial, ethnic, or political minorities in violation of the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act. See Terrazas v. Slagle, 821 F.Supp. 1162 (W.D.Tex.1993). The implementation of the challenged plan did increase the minority composition of the Texas Congressional Delegation. During the consideration of redistrieting by the Texas Legislature in 1991, the Texas Congressional Delegation had 27 members, of whom 18 were Democrats, nine were Republicans, one was African-American, four were Hispanic, and 22 were Anglo. See Stips. 46-47. As a result of the 1990 Census, the Texas Congressional Delegation increased to 30 members. See Stip. 48. Of the 30 members of the Texas Congressional Delegation elected in 1992 after the 1991 redistrieting—20 Democrats and ten Republicans—two are African-American, five are Hispanic, and 23 are Anglo. See Stips. 49-50. 2. Voting Rights Act Considerations The Legislature embarked upon Congressional redistrieting against the legal backdrop of the Voting Rights Act. As described swpra, the Texas Legislative Council through the “gray books” attempted to summarize Voting Rights Act concerns for the Texas Legislature. Further, Jeff Archer, the Council’s lead lawyer on redistricting, frequently testified before the Legislature’s committees on the Voting Rights Act requirements. For instance, Archer told the Senate Committee of the Whole on Redistricting that “mere lack of proportional representation is not enough” to establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act, but is “strong evidence.” Plaintiff Exh. 16 at 10. The Legislature also heard from concerned citizens and organizations about the Voting Rights Act considerations relevant to Congressional redistricting. For example, George Korbel, director of litigation for Texas Rural Legal Aid and former regional director of the Mexiean-Ameriean Legal Defense Fund, testified before the Senate Committee of the Whole on Redistricting that “unless there is [sic] at least two additional Hispanic Congressional districts and one additional Black Congressional district, ... the reapportionment of the Congress is not going to pass the Department of Justice.” United States Exh. 1086 (4/5/91). Once the redistricting legislation had passed, the Voting Rights Act considerations in HB1 were set forth in a September 1991 attachment to the State’s § 5 submission entitled Narrative of Voting Rights Act Considerations in Affected Districts prepared by the Texas Congressional Redistricting Staff. See Plaintiff Exh. 4C. As the document sets forth in its introduction, the Narrative functions to “give an overview of the efforts made to address Voting Rights Act concerns.” Id. at 1. The Narrative begins by noting the legislative agreement that the three new Congressional seats apportioned to Texas should be configured in such a way as to allow members of racial, ethnic, and language minorities to elect Congressional representatives. Accordingly, the three new districts include a predominantly black district drawn in the Dallas County area and predominantly Hispanic districts in the Harris County area and in the South Texas region. In addition to creating the three new minority districts, the proposed Congressional redistricting plan increases the black voting strength of the current District 18 (Harris County) by increasing the population to assure that the black community may continue to elect a candidate of its choice. Id. After making these initial observations, the Narrative analyzes the three new minority districts as well as District 18 in greater detail. The Texas Legislature agreed that a new “safe” African-American district should be drawn in Dallas County. See id. at 2. The African-American community in Dallas County insisted on a 50% total African-American population for the district “which the community felt was necessary to assure its ability to elect its own Congressional representative without having to form coalitions with other minority groups.” Id. Meeting the threshold 50% figure meant that more compact alternative proposals for District 30 had to be rejected. See id. Texas legislators were aware that the failure to draw an African-American majority district in Harris County in 1991 might be interpreted as retrogression under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See 6/30/94 TR. at 4-31; United States Exh. 1047. Therefore, in order to keep District 18 as a “safe” African-American district, “additional black population was taken from adjacent districts thereby increasing the total African-American population to 50.9% and decreasing the total Hispanic population to 15.3%.” Plaintiff Exh. 4C at 5. The remaining Hispanic population was placed in District 29—the new “safe” Hispanic district—consisting of a 60.6% Hispanic population and a 10.2% African-American population. See id. The Narrative concludes that the changes in District 18 and the configuration of District 29 “result in the maximization of minority voting strength for this geographical area.” Id. In the heavily Hispanic South Texas area, the Legislature faced no major problems concerning minority voting strength or adjustments of population totals. See id. District 28—the new “safe” Hispanic district in South Texas—was drawn with the constant input of the minority leadership in Bexar County and the Rio Grande Valley. See id. The location of District 28 in the northern portion of South Texas was determined in part by the historical north-south configuration of Congressional Districts 15 and 27. This was the result of attempts to remedy a January 29, 1982 Section 5 objection which expressed concern that the original east-west configuration of Districts 15 and 27 resulted in packing of the Hispanic population. See United States Exh. 1065 at 9; 6/29/94 TR. at 3-169. a. Racial Polarization In configuring Congressional District 30 in Dallas County, the African-American community sought 50% total African-American population as the minimum necessary to assure that a candidate of choice would be elected. The 50% figure was deemed significant because “[tjhere is little evidence of coalition voting between blacks and Hispanics in Dallas County” and reaching the threshold 50% would obviate any need to form coalitions. Plaintiff Exh. 4C at 3. In Harris County, University of Houston political scientist Dr. Richard Murray observed that the political alliance that had been forged between blacks and Hispanics in the 1960’s began to break down. Open electoral conflicts became more common. Relations were especially strained in 1989 when, in a contest for an open at-large seat on Houston’s city council, and [sic] African American, Sheila Jackson Lee, upset the favored Hispanic, former city controller Leonel Castillo. Hispanics returned the favor in 1991 when Grade Guzman Saenz unseated a black incumbent in another at-large election. And in a hard-fought mayoral race in 1991, African Americans rallied behind black Texas Representative Sylvester Turner, given [sic] him 97% of their votes in a runoff. Hispanics supported the Anglo winner, Bob Lanier, by a nearly three to one margin. Lawson Exh. 26 at 15. This breakdown of past coalitions prompted Hispanic strategists to argue that Hispanics and African-Americans should not be combined in a new Harris County Congressional district. See id. As Houston City Councilman Ben Reyes testified at an outreach hearing held in Houston, combining minority groups in nearly equal numbers in a new Harris County district would be the “worst scenario” because “they will vote for members of their own ethnic group, making it more likely that a non-minority candidate will win.” Plaintiff Exh. 15H at 18. In general, some racial or ethnic polarization occurs in majority-minority districts in Texas. See Plaintiff Exh. 36 at 23-27. The analysis of Dr. Allan J. Lichtman, an expert for the State of Texas, concluded that Anglos usually bloc-voted against Hispanic candidates in the majority-Hispanic districts. In each of four categories, a mean of 21% or fewer Anglo voters voted for Hispanic candidates. See State Exh. 14 at 21 (Table 5). For the African-American majority districts, Dr. Lichtman similarly concluded that Anglos usually bloc voted against African-American candidates. In each of four categories, a mean of 34% or fewer Anglo voters voted for African-American candidates. In all categories but the legislative (which included only one election for each district), a mean of 25% or fewer Anglo voters voted for African-American candidates. See id at 22. Dr. Ronald Weber, an expert for the plaintiffs, conceded some racial or ethnic polarization, but concluded that it is “not legally or politically consequential.” Plaintiff Exh. 36 at 27. b. History of Discrimination Texas has a long, well-documented history of discrimination that has touched upon the rights of African-Americans and Hispanics to register, to vote, or to participate otherwise in the electoral process. Devices such as the poll tax, an all-white primary system, and restrictive voter registration time periods are an unfortunate part of this State’s minority voting rights history. See United States Exh. 1065 at 3; State Exh. 17 at 6. The history of official discrimination in the Texas election process—stretching back to Reconstruction—led to the inclusion of the State as a covered jurisdiction under Section 5 in the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. Since Texas became a covered jurisdiction, the Department of Justice has frequently interposed objections against the State and its subdivisions. See United States Exh. 1095. 3. Incumbents’ Interests As has historically been the case, Congressional incumbents were actively involved in the redistricting process. The Texas Democratic Congressional Delegation formed a redistricting committee which began work in late 1989 or early 1990. See Lawson Exh. 3, ¶4. Congressman Ron Coleman, a Demoerat from El Paso and head of the Redistricting Committee, asked Democratic incumbents what areas they wanted to represent; to the extent their preferences overlapped, Coleman mediated between incumbents. See id The committee’s “overriding objective,” however, was incumbency protection. Id at ¶10. The Delegation played a significant role in determining the configuration of the Congressional districts, developing their own alternative plans and presenting those plans to state legislators. See Lawson Exh. 3, ¶ 9. As Congressman Coleman observed: “We drew our own plans and presented them to the Legislators, and various members of the Delegation met with [Ljegislators in Austin to discuss the incumbents’ needs and preferences. The Delegation was definitely a force in the process.” Id Not surprisingly, Republican incumbents were active in the redistricting process as well. For instance, Congressman Joe Barton urged the joint redistricting committees to protect as many incumbent congressmen as possible. See Plaintiff Exh. 15H at 25. In short, as a general rule, incumbents sought to influence the Legislature to draw districts that would maximize their chances for reelection. Furthermore, members of the Legislature openly acknowledged the role of incumbents on the redistricting process. See United States Exh. 1092 (Senate Committee of the Whole, transcript dated 8/24/91, at 17) (statement of Senator Eddie Bernice Johnson: The incumbents “have practically drawn their own districts. Not practically, they have.”); Plaintiff Exh. 23 at 21 (statement of Representative Uher: “Well, I think that not just a congressman but a large majority of the Congressional delegation have endorsed the basic plan that we started with, and that’s the reason that we’re still adhering to that basic plan, is because of a majority of support of the Congressional delegation and not just necessarily one individual congressman’s support.”). Incumbency protection would by definition at minimum require that incumbents not be paired against each other. Plan C657 reflects a successful effort to avoid this result. See Stip. 52. As shown by the various maps making up State Exh. 9B, incumbent residences repeatedly fall just along district lines. Congressman Lamar Smith’s residence lies in an inlet in Bexar County in the last voter tabulation district (“VTD”) before his Congressional District 21 ends at the northern boundary of Congressman Henry B. Gonzales’ District 20. Congressman Gonzales’ residence in turn lies in the last VTD before his district ends at the southern boundary for District 21. In Dallas County, Congressman Frost’s residence lies in a small indentation jutting into a part of District 30, and Congressman Bryant’s residence lies just barely on the other side of a dividing line between District 5 and District 30. Finally, in Harris County, small indentations permit Congressman Jack Fields’ residence to remain in District 8 and Congressman Andrews’ residence to remain in District 25. At least as measured by 1992 election results, the incumbents experienced great success in redistricting to assure incumbency protection. Each incumbent member of Congress—except Albert Bustamante, an Hispanic Democrat who represented District 23—was reelected to Congress in 1992. Bustamante was defeated in the 1992 General Election by Henry Bonilla, an Hispanic Republican. See Stip. 51. Additional specific instances of incumbent interests will be detañed infra in the analysis of particular Congressional Districts. 4. Use of Racial Data As with incumbency interests, particular instances in which racial data were used in redistricting are hereafter detaüed in discussing individual Congressional Districts and their shapes. However, some general observations about racial/ethnie information widely avaüable to legislators are appropriate. Redistricting data were available to all members of the Legislature and their staffs as well as to any groups and individuals sponsored by members of the Legislature. See Plaintiff Exh. 13D at 1. The primary software used for map drawing in Congressional redistricting—REDAPPL—was readily avaüable on work stations in the redistricting offices of the Texas Legislative Councü. See id. The feature of REDAPPL of most interest is the system’s ability to provide racial and ethnic data at both the VTD and block level. REDAPPL software allowed the operator to work at the VTD level and call up racial/ethnic information in addition to other types of information such as population, voting age population, incumbent location, and street names. See 6/29/94 TR. at 173. Election contest information was avaüable at the VTD level, see id., but REDAPPL did not aüow the operator to work with multiple elections simultaneously on a screen. Indices of partisanship such as the NCEC Index, prepared at a national level for the use of Democrats, involved multiple elections, but they could not be accessed on a REDAPPL screen. See id. at 175. The critical feature of REDAPPL is that it allowed the operator to “split” a VTD and work on a block-by-block level. See id. at 176. Racial/ethnie breakdown was avaüable on a block level on REDAPPL. See id. at 177. By contrast, no election contest information was avaüable at the block level on the REDAPPL software. See id. In sum, REDAPPL aUowed the user to work with racial/ethnic data at even the block level; election information was simply unavaüable at that level through REDAPPL. If the Legislature intended to allocate voters on the basis of race, REDAPPL certainly provided a readüy avaüable, efficient means of doing so. In fact, because the software constantly displayed racial and ethnic data on the screen anytime an operator used the system, a would-be map drawer would affirmatively have to ignore the data. See 6/30/94 TR. at 81. But as Chris Sharman, the principal computer technician/map drawer involved in Congressional redistricting, testified: The problem is when you draw on this computer, it tells you the population data, racial data. Every time you make a move, it tabulates right there on the screen. You can’t ignore it. Id. 5. Congressional District 30 Describing the boundaries of Congressional District 30 is no easy task. Even the State of Texas has difficulty analyzing the contours of this extraordinarily oddly-configured, sprawling district. See Appendix (Map of District 30). Dan Weiser, an expert employed by the United States, prepared a map isolating Congressional District 30 and breaking it down into a “core” and no less than seven segmented portions. See State Exh. 33. Even under the State’s analysis, the “core” of District 30 accounts for only 50% of the district’s voting age population. See id. The “core” of the district includes what is generally known as South Dallas, Fair Park, and portions of South Oak Cliff and Pleasant Grove in southeast Dallas. See United States Exh. 1070 at 9 (declaration of Dr. Paul Waddell). The district then moves northeast from its core and splits into a northern and a western extremity. See id. at 10. The western extremity proceeds to incorporate much of West Dallas before it branches off to the north and south. The southern portion gathers the “older core” of Grand Prairie, while the northern portion moves “through mostly undeveloped land between Irving and Arlington, and into the DFW Airport.” Id. at 11. The northern extremity includes a portion of the district to the northeast of the Central Expressway characterized as “particularly complex” by the State’s land use expert, Dr. Paul Waddell. Id. at 12. As even a cursory glance at the map of District 30 in isolation reveals, the district can really only be described here in the most general terms as its meanderings are too complicated and frequent to detail. See State Exh. 33. Thus, the remainder of the discussion of Congressional District 30 in this portion of the opinion will focus exclusively on the intent of the Texas Legislature in drawing the convoluted boundaries of District 30. According to the Narrative of Voting Rights Act Considerations in Affected Districts, an attachment to the State’s § 5 submission, the Texas Legislature agreed that a “safe” African-American Congressional District would be drawn in Dallas County. See Plaintiff Exh. 4C at 1-2. The African-American community insisted upon a 50% total African-American population in order to assure a “safe” African-American district in Dallas County. See id. at 2. The community succeeded, as Congressional District 30 configured under Plan C657 had a total African-American population of 50.0% and a total Hispanic population of 17.1%. See id. The trial testimony of District 30 Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson in Terrazas v. Slagle—a previous challenge to C657 under the Constitution and Voting Rights Act—is consistent with the plainly stated conclusion in the Narrative that the Texas Legislature intended to create a safe African-American district in Dallas County. In response to a question about whether a dominant goal existed in redistricting Congressional Districts in Dallas County, Johnson— who at the time of redistricting chaired the Senate Subcommittee on Congressional Districts and was a representative of Dallas County in the Texas Senate—replied: Yes. I had made a commitment to that Black community, that they would have a safe district, as had been mandated and expected for a number of years, and I did not intend to go home without that. Plaintiff Exh. 8B at 231. In explaining the boundaries of the district, Congresswoman Johnson testified that the district was drawn this way as a result of two competing tensions—namely that the district was intended to be a “safe” African-American district and the African-American population in Dallas County had over time dispersed from its previous “core” location. The following exchange is particularly informative: Q: When you say they deteriorated, what do you mean in that respect, Mrs. Johnson? A: Well, the population had moved— started to move out; there were lot of boarded up houses. The whole core of that area was moving out. There had been a deterioration of about 40 to 45 to 50 percent in certain areas of voters in a 10 year period. In addition to that, there were a large number of persons there who were felons, who could not vote. So, though they were over 18, it substantially deteriorated their voting strength. We then attempted to locate where that population shifted to. And in attempting to trail that—to trace that population, we could see that it was moving outer and around. It was going into the Grand Prairie area and into the Pleasant Grove area. And then there were pockets of persons who had lived here, and then this was moved— Q: Who lived in the Black core district? A: —who lived in the core district, and also in the north end of Dallas County, into Collin County. Those were performing voters who expressed a desire to be in the minority district____ Q: Well, to the extent then that we see fingers of the ... district going off in the north—north Dallas County, and even into southern Collin County, I suppose, we are talking about these are Black migration areas that you were attempting to bring into the district; is that correct? A: That is correct. Id. at 233-35. In sum, Congresswoman Johnson testified in Terrazas that the shape of Congressional District 30—including the various “finger”-like extensions that are common northeast of the Central Expressway—• can be understood as a conscious effort to pick up African-American voters who had dispersed from the core area. When asked about the influence of incumbent Congressmen Martin Frost and John Bryant on the shape of District 30, Congresswoman Johnson testified that her sole focus in drawing the district was on looking out for African-American voters: Q: All right. Now, was anything done in the course of the creation of this map, Mrs. Johnson, that you could tell us about, to aid Congressman Bryant or Congressman Frost? Or did this map just happen this way? A: I got beat up so many times because I wouldn’t do anything but look out for Black voters. Id. at 247. Johnson—the principal architect of District 30—proceeded to testify that in drawing the district she was able to pick and choose the “performing” African-American voters she wanted to include, leaving the “nonperforming” African-American voters for Bryant and Frost. See id. at 248. Representative Fred Blair’s testimony at trial in Terrazas is consistent with Congresswoman Johnson’s view expressed in that same ease that the shape of the district can be explained as an effort to locate and select “performing” African-American voters in order to guarantee the African-American community a safe African-American seat. Blair—a Texas House member from Dallas— observed that District 30 was crafted in a manner that we sought to pick up those precincts, those communities, those areas that we thought were stable areas that would present an opportunity to elect an African-American____ [I]n looking at developing a Congressional Plan, we wanted to find those areas that we thought were stable areas. Homeowners were very important to us. We wanted to make sure we included a significant number of those within a district because just to lump in African-Americans and say we have an African-American district that may have a number of apartments where there is a lot of movement going on, we thought we had to be very sure, very careful, in drawing lines so that we could create a district that we thought was winnable with a 50 percent. Plaintiff Exh. 8D at 108-09. Furthermore, his testimony directly linked this effort to find “stable areas” with the irregular shape of the district. See id. at 109. The testimony submitted in this racial gerrymandering case is at first glance starkly at odds with the explanation for the district’s severely contorted boundaries offered in Terrazas, which was of course not a racial gerrymandering case. The most prominent example is the testimony offered by Congresswoman Johnson in this case. Unlike Terrazas, where she did not acknowledge that Congressmen Frost and Bryant had a role in determining the district’s boundaries, Congresswoman Johnson testified for purposes of this case that District 30 did not include some portions of the area encompassed by her senate district because the incumbent congressman in District 5—John Bryant—wanted the area: “[Five] wanted voters that they had previously represented, just as 24, just as 6, just as 5, just as everybody that had a stake in it. Everybody wanted as much of what they had previously represented as possible on both sides of the political spectrum.” Dep. of Johnson at 82. Johnson further testified that a more compact African-American majority district could have been drawn in the Dallas area if she did not have to address the concerns of incumbents. See Dep. of Johnson at ISO-32, 142. Other testimony in this case emphasized the role of incumbents in the shaping of District 30’s bizarre boundaries. Ted Lyon, a former member of the Texas House and Senate involved in Congressional redistricting in 1980 and again in 1990, described in general terms the active role of incumbents in drawing District 30: In focusing on the incumbent congressmen in the Dallas area, it became clear almost immediately that there would be a fight between Congressmen Frost and Bryant, on the one hand, and Senator Eddie Bernice Johnson, on the other, over the African-American voters who had previously resided in Districts 3 [sic] and 5. Frost and Bryant were not concerned about the race of these voters. They just wanted to hold onto enough Democrats to assure reelection. Senator Johnson was trying to take both minority and Democratic voters from what had previously been Districts 24 and 5 in order to construct a majority-black district that would satisfy the Voting Rights Act. Conflict arose, of course, because Democratic populations and African-American populations are often the same. The redistricting process became a no holds barred political fight, and fangs were out. Lawson Exh. 14, ¶8. Lyon also testified about the specific impacts of incumbency protection on the contours of the district. For instance, he attributed the “irregular” shape of District 30 in Oak Cliff and Grand Prairie to fighting between Frost and Johnson eventually settled by essentially splitting the areas between Districts 24 and 30. See id. at ¶ 9. Lyon also attributed in part some of the irregularity in the district’s eastern shape to incumbency protection—namely keeping Congressman Bryant’s East Dallas neighborhood in District 5. See id. at ¶ 11. Apparently, Democratic incumbents in Dallas County were quite interested in keeping African-American voters in their newly configured districts. Congresswoman Johnson testified that Congressman Frost was “looking for voters [in the urban areas of Dallas county] that were going to vote in the Democratic Primary, and clearly he was more likely to be sure of it if they were black.” Dep. of Johnson at 129-130. Quite telling is an August 28,1991 letter written by then-Senator Johnson to John Dunne, then the head of the Civil Rights Division at the Department of Justice, in which the Senator requested a review of proposed Districts 12 and 24 and their potentially dilutive effect on the minority community in Tarrant County. See Plaintiff Exh. 6E6. In the first paragraph of this letter, Senator Johnson explains why African-American voters were so attractive to incumbents fighting over district boundaries: For primary elections, approximately 97% of the total votes cast by Blacks in the Dallas/Fort Worth metroplex area are cast in the Democratic primary. Because of the consistency of this voting pattern, Democratic incumbents generally seek to include as many Blacks as possible into their respective districts. Throughout the course of the Congressional redistricting process, the lines were continuously reconfigured to assist in protecting the Democratic incumbents in the Dallas/Fort Worth metroplex area by spreading the Black population to increase the Democratic party index in those areas. Id, In other words, incumbent protection in Dallas County involved the allocation of African-American voters among the districts. Again in contrast to her prior Terrazas testimony, Congresswoman Johnson described in her deposition in this case a variety of nonraeial factors that went into the drawing of District 30’s boundaries. For instance, she testified that the district mappers “made an effort to put communities of interest together in this district. We made an effort to identify voters that would support the same kinds of major issues in the same manner, notwithstanding their color.” Dep. of Johnson at 32. Johnson further asserted that she and her staff considered the result of certain votes in deciding whom to include in District 30: We looked at a couple of referenda votes for the Dallas area rapid transit system. We also looked at a bond election vote for the Dallas independent school district trying to determine where there might be more communities of interest, where there would be support that would go beyond the color of the candidate. Dep. of Johnson at 144. Other testimony ostensibly supports Congresswoman Johnson’s suggestion that “communities of interest” were put together in District 30. In a report dated June 24, 1994, Dr. Paul Geisel, an expert for the state, proclaims that District 30 represents a community of interest that shares “one economy, one transportation system, one media/communieations system and one higher educational system.” State Exh. 18 at 7. Dr. Paul Waddell, the United States’ land use expert, in a report prepared June 21, 1994, attempts to explain the boundaries of District 30 in nonraeial land use terms. First, most of the “arms and fingers” of Congressional District 30 follow both natural and commercial land use boundaries, including industrial belts, retail areas, the Trinity River, and freeway corridors. See United States Exh. 1070 at 8. Second, District 30’s extremities encompass within their boundaries little single-family land use, but “clusters of multi-family land use.” Id. Third, the extremities of the district incorporate “substantial land use areas that are office, industrial, retail, or airport land use areas, even when these areas do not clearly serve as a bridge to other residential areas.” Id. Fourth, the district boundaries do not, upon close analysis, divide single family residential neighborhoods, but in fact encompass “multifamily areas and avoid established single family neighborhoods.” Id. Neither Dr. Waddell nor Dr. Geisel suggested that the Legislature had these particular “communities of interest” in mind when drawing the boundaries of District 30. While Fred Blair’s testimony in Terrazas suggests that the map drawers preferred to include home-dwellers over apartment-dwellers, an assertion at odds with Dr. Waddell’s conclusions, the record is otherwise void of support for any land use thesis. In sum, both reports undoubtedly accurately describe the district, but are more properly seen as post hoc descriptions of the boundaries. 6. Congressional Districts 18 and 29 According to the Narrative of Voting Rights Act Considerations in Affected Districts, the Legislature sought to create a “safe” Hispanic seat in the new Harris County Congressional District 29 as well as increase African-American voting strength in District 18 in order to assure that the African-American community could continue to elect a “candidate of its choice.” Plaintiff Exh. 4C at 1. Prior to redistricting in 1991, District 18 was underpopulated by 116,549 people and was made up of 35.1% total African-American population and 42.2% total Hispanic population. See id. at 5. To “remedy” this situation, additional African-American population was taken from adjacent districts, thereby increasing the total African-American population to 50.9%. The remaining Hispanic population was shifted over to the new Hispanic District thereby decreasing the total Hispanic population in District 18 to 15.3%. See id. For its part, District 29 consists of 60.6% total Hispanic and 10.2% total African-American population. See id. An appreciation for the precision with which this segregation of Hispanies and African-Americans in Harris County was carried out may not be had without a detailed look at the map of District 18 based on African-American population distribution by Census block and the map of District 29 based on Hispanic population distribution by Census block. See Plaintiff Exh. 55 and 53. The detail allowed by these maps highlights in District 18, for example, the “many narrow corridors, wings, or fingers that reach out to enclose black voters, while excluding Hispanic residents.” Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts, ” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaiv v. Reno, 92 Mich.L.Rev. 483, 556 (1993) (hereinafter, “Pildes & Niemi”). District 29’s border is similarly characterized by fingers reaching out to enclose Hispanies. In fact, these districts are so finely “crafted” that one cannot visualize their exact boundaries ■without looking at a map at least three feet square. The geographic dispersion of the various minority communities within Harris County is definitely an obstacle in drawing a majority-minority district each for African-Americans and Hispanies. As Dr. Ronald Weber, the main expert for the plaintiffs, testified at trial, “[T]he Hispanic community is dispersed in two quadrants about 10:00 or 11:00 o’clock on [Plaintiff Exh. 53] ... and about 5:00 o’clock” while the African-American community has three centers of concentration, “one as [sic] approximately 10:00 o’clock [on Plaintiff Exh. 55], which is to the west of the Hispanic concentration, one at about 1:00 o’clock, which is another African American concentration, and then finally at about 6:00 and 7:00 o’clock.” 6/28/94 TR. at 263. This dispersion helps account for the fact that District 29 cuts through the center of Houston to join the two Hispanic quadrants and that District 18 snakes around the city to capture the various African-American concentrations. See id. at 264; Appendix (Maps of Districts 18 and 29); see also Plaintiff Exhs. 34H8, 34H9 (small maps). In the earliest stages of the Congressional redistricting process, state Democratic and Republican leaders rallied behind the idea of creating a new Hispanic safe seat in Harris County while preserving the safe African-American seat in District 18. Also early on in the redistricting process, Texas House member Roman Martinez, an Hispanic Democrat from Houston, announced a plan for drawing the new Hispanic district while maintaining majority-minority District 18 and preserving the “Democratic nature” of Congressional District 25. See Plaintiff Exh. 9. Representative Martinez—one of two Hispanic members of the Texas House from Harris County—would play a major role in the drawing of District 29, as would another Congressional aspirant, then-State Senator Gene Green. In the press release announcing his plan, Martinez promised that what Houston’s Hispanic community has long worked for—its own Congressional district—will be accomplished. My hope is that it will be accomplished through the legislative process as we present this plan to both the House and the Senate in the State Legislature. But if this district as we envision it is not a product of the legislative process, we will enlist the help of the U.S. Department of Justice and the courts under the jurisdiction of the Voting Rights Act. ■ Id. Representative Martinez’s testimony at trial in Terrazas v. Slagle is consistent with the analysis offered in the Narrative on the creation of the two majority-minority districts in Harris County. As the primary architect of the lines in Harris County, Martinez defined his goals in redistricting: Again, the first goal was to assure no retrogression for the 18