Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER PER CURIAM: Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Georgia’s Eleventh Congressional District and seek an injunction against its further use in congressional elections. Because we find that the district violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we grant Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and will impose a revised plan in keeping with this Memorandum and Order. INTRODUCTION In 1993, the Supreme Court recognized a citizen’s right under the Equal Protection Clause to challenge a strangely shaped voting district as an impermissible racial gerrymander. See Shaw v. Reno, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). The way was thus cleared for constitutional claims against congressional voting districts in North Carolina, Louisiana, Texas, Florida, and now Georgia. Southern states have proved fertile ground for Shaw claims, as many of their legislatures labor under the long shadow of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: By that law, certain states or political subdivisions are prohibited from enforcing “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” unless they (1) obtain a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia that such change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” or (2) have submitted the proposed change to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has precleared it. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b-c (1993). This procedure applies to redistricting plans, 28 C.F.R. § 51.13 (1993), and it is intended to police those regions of the United States that had, as of certain dates, maintained voting “tests or devices” serving to disenfranchise minority voters. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b. Many Southern states were so designated. See 28 C.F.R. § 51 (at Appendix) (listing, among other areas, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and sections of North Carolina and Florida). Consequently, many southern states seek preclearance from the Department of Justice (hereinafter sometimes referred to as “DOJ”) before enacting their proposed redistricting plans. Department regulations require DOJ to decide “[wjhether the submitted change has the purpose or will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group”; if the change may be so described, DOJ will not preclear it. 28 C.F.R. § 51.52. In making its determination, DOJ is required to consider the following “important background information”: (1) The extent to which minorities have been denied an equal opportunity to participate meaningfully in the political process in the jurisdiction. (2) The extent to which minorities have been denied an equal opportunity to influence elections and the decisionmaking of elected officials in the jurisdiction. (3) The extent to which voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized and political activities are racially segregated. (4) The extent to which the voter registration and election participation of minority voters have been adversely affected by present or past discrimination. Id. § 51.58. It must also consider the following factors specific to the redistricting process: (a) The extent to which malapportioned districts deny or abridge the right to vote of minority citizens. (b) The extent to which minority voting strength is reduced by the proposed redistrieting. (c) The extent to which minority concentrations are fragmented among different districts. (d) The extent to which minorities are over-concentrated in one or more districts. (e) The extent to which available alternative plans satisfying the jurisdiction’s legitimate governmental interests were considered. (f) The extent to which the plan departs from objective redistricting criteria set by the submitting jurisdiction, ignores other relevant factors such as compactness and contiguity, or displays a configuration that inexplicably disregards available natural or artificial boundaries. (g) The extent to which the plan is inconsistent with the jurisdiction’s stated redistricting standards. Id. § 51.59. This litany makes it fairly clear that, by instruction of the United States Congress, racial concerns are DOJ’s overriding criterion for approving a redistricting plan. Shaw v. Reno holds that if a plaintiff shows that racial concerns were the overriding criterion for drafting a redistricting plan, leading to the creation of dramatically irregular district boundaries, that plan is unconstitutional, unless it survives constitutionally strict scrutiny. See Shaw, — U.S. at ---, 113 S.Ct. at 2826-27. And therein lies the problem. I. FACTS Pursuant to the results of the 1980 Decennial Census, the State of Georgia was entitled to ten seats in the United States House of Representatives. Due to population increases revealed by the 1990 Census, that number increased to eleven. This change required the reformatting of Georgia’s congressional districts, a task begun by House and Senate reapportionment committees during the 1991 session of the Georgia General Assembly. The task would prove far more onerous than anticipated. In order to clarify the drafting process, on February 28, 1991 both the House and Senate adopted redistricting guidelines. See Joint Exh. 9, 10. Both versions required public hearings, allowed for submissions by “third parties” outside the Assembly, and provided a list of drafting criteria: single-member districts only, equality of population among districts, contiguous geography, avoiding dilution of minority voting strength, following precinct lines where possible, and compliance with sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act (hereinafter sometimes referred to as ‘VRA”) 42 U.S.C. § 1973, et seq. Once these requirements were met, drafters could consider maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions, preserving the core of existing districts, and avoiding contests between incumbents. While the House and Senate surely considered these criteria a realistic tool for drafting reasonable voting districts, and while many of their members were veterans of past redistricting wars, the legislators could not have known what the DOJ would require by way of compliance with sections 2 and 5 of the VRA. A. The Preclearance Process 1. The Max-Black Plan One of the “third party” redistricting proposals submitted to the legislature in 1991 would later earn the ominous moniker, “the max-black plan.” That plan, created by Ms. Kathleen Wilde, then an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and in her capacity as advocate for the Black Caucus of the Georgia General Assembly, provided for three “majority-minority” congressional districts in Georgia: the Second, Fifth and Eleventh. Tr. IV, at 70-72, 93; Joint Exh. 4 (version of max-black plan proposed by Reps. Cynthia McKinney and Tyrone Brooks). In contrast, the then existing congressional plan had only one majority-minority district: the Fifth. Joint Exh. 15. Ms: Wilde’s drive to create three majority-minority districts came, predictably enough, from her clients, including Rep. Tyrone Brooks. Brooks made several illuminating statements during the redistrieting debate on the floor of the Georgia House: This plan [the first redistrieting proposal to be submitted to DOJ by the General Assembly] does not come close to the criteria outlined by the Attorney General last summer, when he specifically told the states covered by the Act that wherever possible, you must draw majority black districts, wherever possible. ... Obviously, it’s possible to draw three; those of us who have been working on the max plan for over a year have really not been concerned about anything other than maximizing our voting strength. We’ve not been really concerned about territory; we’ve not been concerned about voter registration numbers, we’ve been concerned about population, and black voting age population. When you start playing games with lines and numbers on voter registration and—all of these other things that really don’t matter, you are just simply wasting time. Pltf.Exh. 132, at 40. Ms. Wilde claimed that her purpose “was to draw as many districts as possible consistent with equal opportunity for black citizens in Georgia.” Tr. IV, at 71. That is, her plan attempted to secure proportional representation for the black population. Id. at 72. However, despite Ms. Wilde’s vague answers to this query at trial, id. at 73-74, it is clear that the max-black plan accounted for virtually all major concentrations of black population in Georgia. Compare DOJ Exh. 1-3 with Joint Exh. 4. Ms. Linda Meggers, Director of Reapportionment Services for the Georgia General Assembly and probably the single most knowledgeable person available on the subject of Georgian redistrieting, testified that, without including the heavy black populations present in metropolitan areas, achieving the percentages needed for a majority-minority district was impossible. Tr. I, at 97-98. Ms. Wilde accounted for all such metropolitan populations, including Atlanta, Augusta, Macon and Savannah. Her proffered restraint in not seeking “over-proportional” black representation was disingenuous; a fourth majority-minority district, of equal population to the other ten congressional districts, was probably impossible to create. The max-black plan further maximized black voting strength by pushing the percentage of black voters within its majority-black districts “as high as possible.” Tr. IV, at 72-73 (testimony of Ms. Wilde). Indeed, race was “certainly an overriding factor,” id. at 81, 97, in designing Ms. Wilde’s district boundaries, as she believed was required by the Voting Rights Act and Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). Significantly, she also thought that the proper measure of “compactness,” a venerable districting consideration directly relevant to the resulting shape of voting districts, was a “functional” measure, not one grounded in geographical assessments. Tr. IV, at 79. That is, while geography was a “component” of compactness, the more important element was whether people were “able to know what district they’re in, know who their representative is and be able to have that person represent them.” Id. Ms. Wilde agreed “[t]o some degree” with Rep. Brooks, who told the Georgia House: So those of us who are promoting the max plan are drawing the lines sometimes in funny ways to cut us in, because we’ve never really been fully in. So simply as I say to you today to adopt the max-black congressional plan, I say to you it’s not really the appearance of the district; it’s the content of the district. Id. at 95; Pltf.Exh. 132, at 43. Ms. Wilde testified that she submitted her max-black plan to DOJ several times during the redistrieting process. We now turn to the connection between that plan and the one ultimately approved by the Department of Justice. 2. ACLU Advocacy and DOJ Preclearance Requirements The Court realizes that the motivations of the State of Georgia are the legally relevant motivations in this ease, and not those of the ACLU or the DOJ. We consider the behavior of the latter parties, however, because it is inextricably linked to the redistricting decisions of the General Assembly. The actions of the legislature have much less significance when removed from their context, a. ACLU-DOJ Cooperation During the redistricting process, Ms. Wilde was in constant contact with both Keith Borders and Thomas Armstrong, the DOJ line attorneys overseeing preclearance of Georgia’s redistricting efforts. See Tr. IV, at 39, 231. There were countless communications, including notes, maps, and charts, by phone, mail and facsimile, between Wilde and the DOJ team; those transactions signified close cooperation between Wilde and DOJ during the preclearance process. The Court was presented with a sampling of these communiques, and we find them disturbing. It is obvious from a review of the materials that Ms. Wilde’s relationship with the DOJ Voting Section was informal and familiar; the dynamics were that of peers working ■ together, not of an advocate submitting proposals to higher authorities. See, e.g., Pltf. Exh. 57H, 571. DOJ was more accessible— and amenable—to the opinions of the ACLU than to those of the Attorney General of the State of Georgia. See Pltf.Exh. 52, 54, 57, 57A-M, 165; Tr. V, at 3-4. It is clear from our proceedings that Ms. Wilde discussed with DOJ lawyers the smallest details of her plan, constantly sending revisions, updates, and data throughout the period from October, 1991 to April, 1992; she occasionally sent documents to DOJ lawyers “per your request.” Ms. Wilde worked with DOJ in other ways: During the reapportionment process for Georgia’s House districts, DOJ attorney Nancy Sardison told Mark Cohen, the Senior Assistant Attorney General for Georgia, to meet with Ms. Wilde to revise a majority-black House district. Mr. Cohen had presumptuously thought the district satisfactory, but was dutifully informed by Ms. Sardison that Ms. Wilde was “still having some problems with it.” Tr. V, at 3. Contrary to Mr.' Armstrong’s claims at trial, the max-black proposal was not merely “one of the alternatives [DOJ] considered,” and Ms. Wilde was not simply one of various advocates. Her work was of particular importance to DOJ lawyers, whose criteria for and opinions of Georgia’s submissions were greatly influenced by Ms. Wilde and her agenda. Alas, it is true that none of the DOJ attorneys testifying at trial admitted to the influence of Ms. Wilde and her max-black plan on their preclearance deliberations. This Court finds it' distressing that Messrs. Borders and Armstrong lacked any significant memory of important elements of the 1991-92 preclearance saga. Both of them—especially Mr. Borders—intimately involved with the redistricting for months, just “don’t recall” basic details of either important meetings or the preclearance process. See, e.g., Tr. IV, at 8-51; 145-150. Those in far more peripheral roles had no great difficulty remembering the events central to our inquiry. Frankly, based on the factual record and trial testimony, the Court finds Borders’ and Armstrong’s professed amnesia less than credible. Luckily, the surrounding evidence speaks quite clearly. Beyond the working relationship noted above, evidence of the link between Ms. Wilde and DOJ’s preclearance requirements is provided by simply comparing the max-black plan with DOJ’s demands of the General Assembly. While DOJ’s policy of minority vote maximization had been in force before the 1991-92 preclearance process, the effect of Ms. Wilde’s efforts on Georgia’s redistricting fortunes is evident on the face of the precleared plan. Before comparing that plan to the max-black proposal, we first review the stages of Georgia’s quest for DOJ approval. b. Round One After a special session beginning in late August, 1991, the General Assembly submitted a congressional redistricting plan for preclearance on October 1 of that year. The plan, Joint Exhibit 3, contained two majority-minority districts, the Fifth and Eleventh, and a third district, the Second, where blacks comprised an influential but submajority percentage of the voting age public.* See Pltf. Exh. 1, at 8-10. This plan, like most redistricting efforts, was the culmination of committee meetings, public hearings, examination of various districting proposals, and many hours spent with an extremely sophisticated computer. Rep. Robert Hanner, Chairman of the Georgia House reapportionment committee, and Senator Eugene Walker, Chairman of the Georgia Senate reapportionment committee, worked closely with Linda Meggers to hammer out Georgia’s first submission. Neither Ms. Meggers, a central figure in construction of all Georgia districting plans submitted to DOJ, nor Senator Wayne Gamer, the Majori- ty Leader of the State Senate during the reapportionment process, found any evidence of acts or statements by Rep. Hanner, Senator Walker, or other legislators indicating an intent to discriminate against minority voters. The Court finds no evidence prompting us to doubt that conclusion. The first submitted plan did not garner universal support within the General Assembly; a version of the max:blaek plan had been proposed in the Georgia House, but could not attract enough votes for stretching the new-Eleventh District to Savannah. Tr. Ill, at 248-50; Pltf.Exh. 6A-B. More importantly, the plan garnered no support from DOJ, which rejected it by letter dated January 21, 1992. Pltf.Exh. .2. In that letter,' John Dunne, then Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, noted a “concern” that the Georgia legislative leadership had decided to “limit” black voting potential to two majority-minority districts. Throughout the preclearance process, from this first objection letter to the final submission, DOJ relied on versions of the max-black plan to argue that three majority-minority districts could indeed be squeezed out of the Georgia countryside. Tr. IV, at 115 (testimony of T. Armstrong). Ms. Wilde’s triumph of demographic manipulation became DOJ’s guiding light. Though DOJ denied that the max-black plan was the “benchmark” against which Georgia’s efforts were compared, its role as such soon became obvious to the General Assembly, and is now obvious to this Court. Mr. Dunne also observed that, while the submitted plan properly utilized black voting potential in Atlanta and east-central Georgia, it did not “recognize” concentrations of minorities in the south-west region of the state. He then assured Mark Cohen that “[sjection 5 considerations certainly do not dictate that the state adopt any particular configuration,” but went on to “note” the “exclusion” from the Eleventh District of black populations in adjacent Baldwin County. Pltf.Exh. 2. Mr. Dunne ultimately found himself unable to conclude that the Eleventh District, 60.63% black, with a black voting age population of 56.61%, and using nearly unpopulated land bridges to rope in black concentrations in DeKalb and Richmond counties, satisfied the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. Apparently finding that this district—and the plan generally—“ha[d] the purpose or will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race,” Mr. Dunne refused to preclear the submitted plan. Id. c. Round Two No one in the General Assembly doubted that any revised submission must include the changes “suggested” by DOJ. Though counsel for the United States objected to Plaintiffs’ “characterization that the Justice Department ‘suggested’ things,” Tr. IV, at 120, it is disingenuous to submit that DOJ’s objections were anything less than implicit commands. No one in the General Assembly— including the Black Caucus—thought so, and DOJ lawyers did nothing to dissuade legislators of that notion. A few prescient souls were already convinced that any successful Georgia submission would have to “have the highest percentage of black population that we could get, irregardless [sic] of where we have to go.” Tr. Ill, at 210. Senator Garner was convinced that, though “distasteful,” “to get a plan passed the Justice Department and get us out of here and on to these elections, that district is going to have to go to Savannah.” Id. Having convinced the State Senate of this political reality, that body passed a plan extending the Eleventh District to Chatham County. Id. at 211-12; DOJ Exh. 76. The House, however, refusing to tack Savannah to the Eleventh until DOJ forced them to do it, did not pass the Senate bill. Tr. Ill, at 213, 250. The final version, submitted on March 3, 1992, did not contain the Savannah extension. DOJ Exh. 76. It did, however, contain a Second District in which black voting strength had been increased to 45.01%, and a Fifth and Eleventh District where blacks comprised close to 60% of the voting age population. Pltf.Exh. 3A In the Eleventh, faithful to DOJ’s first objection letter, the General Assembly split Baldwin County to “recognize” the black populations that had previously been “excluded” from that district. Many black representatives voted for the plan, more in the Senate than in the House. Pltf.Exh. 6A-B. Predictably, DOJ rejected the plan, since, after all, someone—here the Senate relying on versions of the max-black proposal—had come up with a scheme for packing even more minority voting strength into the Second, Fifth and Eleventh Districts. And so, despite the fact that the second submission addressed the criticisms levelled at the first, DOJ sent the plan back to the General Assembly yet again, and this time with new demands. Since it was geographically possible to extend the Eleventh District to Savannah, Mr. Dunne, by letter dated March 20,1992, made it a requirement for preclearance: [T]he submitted plan minimizes the electoral potential of large concentrations of black population in several areas of the state. Specifically, we note that alternatives, including one adopted by the Senate, included a large number of black voters from Screven, Effingham and Chatham Counties in the 11th Congressional district. However, due to unyielding efforts on behalf of House members, this configuration was abandoned and no legitimate reason has been suggested to explain the exclusion of the second largest concentration of blacks in the state from a majority black Congressional District. Pltf.Exh. 4, at 3. The first rejection letter never mentioned this extension to Screven, Effingham and Chatham Counties. Mr. Dunne then noted that “[ajlthough the submitted plan has increased the black percentage in the 2d Congressional District, it continues the exclusion of large black population concentrations in areas such as Meriwether, Houston, and Bibb Counties from this district.” Id. Of course, DOJ was aware that the only way to transfer the dense black population of Bibb County from the Eleventh District to the Second District and still maintain the Eleventh as a majority-minority district was to extend the Eleventh to Savannah, where dense black populations in that city would make up for the loss of black voters in Bibb County. Georgia Attorney General Michael Bowers made the observation himself in the second plan submitted to DOJ. Attorney General Bowers also explained why the state had declined to follow that course: The reason the General Assembly chose not to adopt a configuration for the 2nd District which would have altered the 11th District in this fashion is two-fold. First, if the 11th District extends from the Atlanta area in DeKalb County into the metropolitan areas of Richmond, Bibb, and Chatham Counties, a candidate to be successful will have to run in four major media markets in Georgia. This would likely present a significant problem for any minority candidate in the 11th District, as recognized even by the proponents of the “Brooks-McKinney” [max-black] plan____ Second, it is clear that even if the population percentage is increased several more points in the 2nd District ... the 2nd District -will still be no more than an influence district for minority voters. Black voter registration in this area has been historically low____ In addition, the extension of the 2nd District into Bibb County and the corresponding extension of the 11th District into Chatham County, with all of the necessary attendant changes, violate all reasonable standards of compactness and contiguity. Pltf.Exh. 3A, at 8. The Macon/Savannah “trade” was the linchpin of Ms. Wilde’s max-black plan and all the versions of it submitted to the Assembly; Ms. Wilde had been marketing it since at least October 15, 1991, describing the switch to DOJ as the “key to drawing a third black district.” Pltf.Exh. 57 (facsimile from Ms. Wilde to Sheila Delaney, DOJ Voting Section). It was the centerpiece of her advocacy for the General Assembly Black Caucus: MR. PARKS: The advocacy that you met [sic] with the Department of Justice was to move Bibb County—the black population of Bibb County to the Second? MS. WILDE: That’s right. MR. PARKS: And replace them by dropping the Eleventh all the way down to Savannah? MS. WILDE: That’s correct. MR. PARKS: And excise out of Savannah black population? MS. WILDE: I took majority black precincts in Savannah and put them in my district, which is how you draw a majority black district. MR. PARKS: And intentionally excluded white population? MS. WILDE: Again, I did that because that is how you draw a majority black district. Tr. IV, at 83. See also id. at 82. It is from Ms. Wilde’s plan and its progeny that DOJ lifted the concept for its own objection letters. It “was the evidence relied upon for the three minority district proposition.” Tr. IV, at’115 (testimony of T. Armstrong). Armstrong refused to admit that Mr. Dunne’s second objection letter was beholden to the max-black plan, observing that Ms. Wilde’s plan was but one of many alternatives presented to DOJ. Id. at 116. The Court notes, however, that the necessary kernel of a viable three-district plan—the Maeon/Savannah trade—originated with Ms. Wilde. Her plan was premised upon it, and was the foundation of the first three-district plan proposed in the General Assembly. Other plans presenting three majority-black districts were in turn based on that one. Any such proposal reviewed by DOJ switched Macon from the Eleventh to the Second District and drew Savannah into the Eleventh, and it owed that crucial element to Ms. Wilde’s original version. d. Round Three It was now clear to the General Assembly that preelearanee would not be forthcoming without adopting this raison d’etre of the max-black proposals. This goal dominated the creation of the third Georgia submission. Linda Meggers admitted that, when drafting the proposal, the max-black plan was her “benchmark,” Tr. I, at 65, and that she “fine tuned” the plan to “get to those numbers.” Id. at 102. The result of these efforts was a congressional districting plan with three majority-minority districts: the Second, with 52.33% black voting age population, the Fifth, with 57.47%, and the Eleventh, with 60.36%. The plan passed by one vote—Speaker Thomas Murphy “held [his] nose and shut [his] eyes and put one elbow in one ear and voted for it and passed it to get something to keep the courts from doing it.” Dep. of Spkr. Murphy, at 31. Ms. Meggers came as close as she could to copying the max-black percentages. She was prevented from exact duplication by the need to construct eight other districts around the majority-minority districts, and her efforts to “clean up” the max-black plan to minimize the number of split counties. Compare Joint Exh. 1 with Joint Exh. 4. Ms. Wilde herself thought that Georgia’s third plan was a fairly successful recreation of her proposal: MR. PARKS: [T]he result was the creation of three minority districts that achieved the percentage benchmarks that the Max Black plan advocated? MS. WILDE: Yes, that’s what the State of Georgia decided to draw. Tr. IV, at 100. Rep. Brooks agreed. See Tr. IV, at 229. The latest redistricting plan bore all the signs of DOJ’s involvement: The black population of Meriwether County was gouged out of the Third District and attached to the Second District by the narrowest of land bridges; Effingham and Chatham Counties were split to make way for the Savannah extension, which itself split the City of Savannah; and the plan as a whole split 26 counties, 23 more than the existing congressional districts. Joint Exh. 1. The dense population centers of the approved Eleventh District were all majority-black, all at the periphery of the district, and in the case of Atlanta, Augusta and Savannah, all tied to a sparsely populated rural core by even less populated land bridges. Extending from Atlanta to the Atlantic, the Eleventh covered 6,784.2 square miles, splitting eight counties and five municipalities along the way. DOJ precleared the plan, which was hand delivered to DOJ by Mark Cohen. During his visit, Keith Borders opined that even this plan did not go far enough, voicing objections that Ms. Wilde and Rep. Brooks were even then faxing to the Voting Section. On April 2, 1992, however, Mr. Cohen was finally able to leave Washington with a letter of preclearance from Mr. Dunne. Pltf.Exh. 6. B. The Ramifications of DOJ Involvement 1. DOJ Methods a. The Use of Informants During our hearings it became clear that the Department of Justice had cultivated a number of partisan “informants” within the ranks of the Georgia legislature, including at least one State Senator—a congressional candidate no less—and an aide to Lieutenant Governor Howard. See Response of United States To Plaintiffs’ Statement Concerning Confidential Informants, July 7, 1994. DOJ regularly received from them information on the General Assembly’s redistricting sessions. DOJ apparently read federal regulations as condoning this behavior, but misconstrued the spirit of those provisions. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.29. They were intended to facilitate outside notification to DOJ of impending changes in voting procedure in jurisdictions covered by section 5, since DOJ could not closely monitor all such areas on a continual basis. The regulations require DOJ to respect requests for anonymity, in order to encourage individuals to report. The events in this case do not reflect the regulations’ intended purpose. Politicians and other parties in interest found a discrete forum. Here, “whistleblowers” became “secret agents.” They reported to DOJ throughout the section 5 review process. DOJ used that information even to question the integrity of State legislators who could not know then-accusers. Keith Borders testified that “allegations are brought to our attention and then we go back and ask individuals about those allegations.” Tr. IV, at 9. One of DOJ’s informants informed Mr. Borders that State Senator Eugene Walker was a “quintessential Uncle Tom,” and “the worst friend of blacks in Georgia.” Tr. IV, at 27. During the first meeting between a Georgia delegation and Voting Section lawyers, there was a confrontation involving Borders and Walker, although Borders “doesn’t recall” whether he challenged Senator Walker with those unattributable comments. However, either these anonymous “allegations” or some other suggestion so offended Senator Walker that he refused to attend further meetings with DOJ staff. DOJ’s agents provided an irrebuttable source of intelligence of which the General Assembly was completely unaware. We find this practice disturbing. b. The Use of Alternative Plans Thomas Armstrong testified that DOJ used alternative plans submitted by special interests as means .with which to question the configuration of Georgia’s submitted plans, i.e., if an alternative proposal had found some clever means of further boosting African-American voting strength in Georgia, why hadn’t the Assembly adopted it? See, e.g., Tr. IV, at 140-41. For DOJ, if these alternative plans had discovered heretofore untapped wells of racial voting power absent from the submitted plan, the inescapable conclusion was that the State’s proffered reasons for the submitted configurations were “pretextual” ones. There is a problem with this position: It apparently did not occur to DOJ that increased “recognition” of minority voting strength, while perhaps admirable, is properly tempered with other districting considerations. The ACLU and Reps. Brooks and McKinney were concerned only with racial percentages. They could afford such a narrow focus. The General Assembly leadership was concerned with passing redistricting legislation affecting all Georgians, and contended with numerous factors racial, political, economic, and personal. As the lawmaking body for the entire state, the General Assembly could not afford such a narrow focus. Consequently, its submissions reflected many influences, and the ACLU’s reflected only race. Of course DOJ could then compare Georgia’s plans to the max-black plan and find the latter a more effective means of magnifying the minority vote. The max-black plan reflected nothing but its drafters’ concerns: race and technical contiguity. DOJ’s mistake was in assuming that Georgia’s plan must be so conceived. As one legislator quipped: [I]t’s very difficult, it seems, to get them to realize that maybe there’s a little bit more to reapportionment than black and white or minority areas; that there should be some alignment between the areas so they can work together for the next ten years. Pltf.Exh. 143. Difficult indeed. 2. ACLU Involvement It is unclear whether DOJ’s maximization policy was driven more by Ms. Wilde’s advocacy or DOJ’s own misguided reading of the Voting Rights Act. This much, however, is clear: the close working relationship between Ms. Wilde and the Voting Section, the repetition of Ms. Wilde’s ideas in Mr. Dunne’s objection letters, and the slow convergence of size and shape between the max-black plan and the plan DOJ finally precleared, bespeak a direct link between the max-black plan formulated by the ACLU and the preclearance requirements imposed by DOJ. Succinctly put, the considerable influence of ACLU advocacy on the voting rights decisions of the United States Attorney General is an embarrassment. A poignant example: in a notable faux pas, DOJ’s second objection letter arrived at the Office of the Attorney General of Georgia only after members of the Georgia Black Caucus were already discussing it with the press. DOJ had notified the ACLU of its impending objection; the ACLU then notified the Black Caucus. This unfortunate spate of gossip created the impression that the ACLU and the Black Caucus wielded significant influence with DOJ’s Civil Rights Division and significant control over Georgia’s redistrieting efforts. The State’s leaders were understandably nonplussed. The ACLU was exuberant. Georgia officials and citizens were mystified. We are simply troubled by the result. It is surprising that the Department of Justice was so blind to this impropriety, especially in a role as sensitive as that of preserving the fundamental right to vote. That right is vital to citizens of a democracy, and of poignant importance to African-Americans. For many blacks Jim Crow is living memory, and the presence of black luminaries and ordinary citizens at our hearings is a testament to their concern. This Court does not underestimate the emotional investment in our decision of blacks still resisting the vestiges of racial discrimination, and we have been placed in the unenviable position of depriving black citizens of a privilege the Justice Department never had the right to grant: maximization of the black vote, whatever the cost. sf: :K * * * Elections were held -under the new congressional redistrieting plan on November 4, 1992. Black candidates were elected to the United States Congress from all three majority-minority districts. Cynthia McKinney, running in the Eleventh, became Georgia’s first black congresswoman. On January 13, 1994, Plaintiffs filed this action. II. LAW A Shaw v. Reno Though initially daunting, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Shaw v. Reno, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993), is a bit less than a riddle wrapped in an enigma. We begin with some general observations, and then continue with an analysis of the Eleventh District. The majority opinion in Shaw is premised on the uncontroversial proposition that race-based redistrieting should be treated like any other race-based legislation. From there, the argument is straightforward: (1) racial classifications, per the Fourteenth Amendment, are “presumptively invalid, and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.” Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954); (2) in light of the Voting Rights Act, race is obviously a valid consideration in redistrieting, but a voting district that is so beholden to racial concerns that it is inexplicable on other grounds becomes, ipso facto, a “racial classification;” (3) if a district may be so described, it must have an “extraordinary justification,” that is, it must survive constitutionally strict scrutiny, in order to be upheld. The above analysis begs the question: How to determine if a district is so founded upon race that it warrants constitutional notice? By examining the shape of the district itself: if its contours are so contorted as to permit no other conclusion than that it was drawn along racial lines, the Supreme Court says those lines are clear—if circumstantial—evidence that the legislature “purposefully distinguish[ed] between voters on the basis of race.” Shaw, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2826. This analysis is made a bit easier by the existence of defined and recognized “traditional districting principles” that influence nearly all redistrieting efforts. The nonexclusive list includes contiguity, compactness, protecting the integrity of political subdivisions, cognizance of “communities of interest,” negotiating geographic barriers, and protecting incumbents. If the shape of the district advertises “disregard” for these considerations in favor of race-based line drawing, the district is a racial classification and subject to strict scrutiny. There is an important, if subtle, distinction to make here. Under Shaw, the shape of the district is “objective” evidence of the legislature’s intent in drafting that district. Id. Discovering discriminatory intent is necessary to a successful Equal Protection claim. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (discussing “discriminatory purpose” in Fifteenth Amendment cases). The shape of the district is not a “threshold” inquiry preceding an exploration of the motives of the legislature. That is, the court does not assess, on first principles, whether the district looks “bizarre,” and then, if it does, proceed to an Equal Protection analysis. A determination that the district looks dramatically irregular is the beginning of an Equal Protection analysis; the strange district is the “smoking gun,” revealing the racial intent needed for an Equal Protection claim. We take pains to clarify this point because some have misinterpreted Justice O’Connor’s observation that “reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter.” Shaw, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2827. Yes, appearances do matter, but in two extremely particular ways: (1) as a proxy for direct evidence of the legislature’s intentions, and (2) as a harm adequate to meet the constitutional criteria for standing to sue. The former idea is not a wholly new one. As the High Court notes, there are intellectual precursors to the Shaw opinion making it a logical extension of past practice. See Shaw, — U.S. at---, 113 S.Ct. at 2825-26 (reviewing cases). See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982) (deferring to district court finding that sum of evidence supports inference that voting scheme was maintained for discriminatory purposes). The latter concept, however, is a bit of an innovation. 1. Standing to Bring a Shaw Claim In both Shaw and the instant case, the plaintiffs suffered no individual harm; the 1992 congressional redistricting plans had no adverse consequences for these white voters. Under the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements, this lack of concrete, individual harm would deny them standing to sue. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, — U.S. -,-, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Shaw, however, implicitly recognizes a different kind of harm, distinct from vote dilution and sufficient to state a “cognizable” Equal Protection claim: “Classifying citizens by race, as we have said, threatens special harms that are not present in our vote dilution cases. It therefore warrants different analysis.” Shaw, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2828. Those harms are systemic ones, rooted in social perception of state-sanctioned racial classifications: Justice Souter [in dissent] apparently believes that racial gerrymandering is harmless unless it dilutes a racial group’s voting strength____ As we have explained, however, reapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other ways. It reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signalling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole____ Justice Souter does not adequately explain why these harms are not cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. It is this distinct kind of damage that enables the Court to distinguish Shaw from a group of white plaintiffs’ failed vote dilution claim in United Jewish Organizations, et al. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) (hereinafter “UJO”)-, in that case, the districts were regularly shaped. See id. at 167-68, 97 S.Ct. at 1010-11 (opinion of White, J.). Shaw explicitly reserves any thoughts on whether the deliberate creation of a majority-minority district, “without more,”—meaning without a dramatically irregular shape—gives rise to an Equal Protection claim. Shaw, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2828. Shaw v. Reno’s expanded notion of harm liberalizes the standing requirement. The Eastern District of North Carolina, analogizing principally from Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2743, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978), articulates the standing requirement for a Shaw claim as a showing that a redistricting plan has assigned a potential plaintiff to a district at least in part because of her race. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F.Supp. 408, 426 (E.D.N.C.1994). The North Carolina court pursues an exhaustive discussion of Shaw v. Reno’s implications for the standing requirement, and we do not repeat it here. We feel that even that court’s interpretation may not be as expansive as Shaw v. Reno intended, but are content to note that standing in this case is not in doubt: Plaintiffs occupy a position virtually identical to those challenging North Carolina’s congressional redistricting plan in Shaw v. Reno, and in that case standing was not in doubt. 2. The Required Level of Racial Motivation in Redistricting There has been some debate over the necessary prominence of race in legislative deliberations before it can be found that the redistricting plan is “unexplainable on grounds other than race,” and thus subject to strict scrutiny. There are three possible solutions. Defendants in the instant case, along with some district courts, argue that race must have been the sole motivation behind a particular district shape before strict scrutiny is appropriate. Defendants cite language from Shaw in support: “[strict scrutiny is applied if the plan] is so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters ... because of their raee[.]” Shaw, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2832. See also Bridgeport Coalition v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that a lower court order “did not transgress Shaw because it did not instruct the City Council to redistrict solely on racial grounds) (emphasis added); DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.Supp. 1409 (E.D.Cal.1994) (stating, for example, “Shaw held when districts are drawn in such an extremely irregular fashion as to be unexplainable, other than being based solely on race, a claim under the Equal Protection Clause for racial gerrymandering can be stated.”) (emphasis added). A second school teaches that race need only have been a recognizable factor—not the sole or dominant one—before a redistricting plan is constitutionally suspect. See Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F.Supp. 1188, 1202, 1214 (W.D.La.1993) (majority opinion and concurring opinion) (hereinafter “Hays I”). Shaw v. Hunt similarly holds that, in keeping with prior Equal Protection precedents, districts should be subject to strict scrutiny merely upon a showing that the state’s use of race was deliberate. Shaw v. Hunt, supra, 861 F.Supp. at 429, 431. This test is necessarily met by proof that the plan’s lines were deliberately drawn so as to create one or more districts in which a particular racial group is a majority, even if factors other than race are shown to have played a significant role in the precise location and shape of those districts. Id., 861 F.Supp. at 431. Specific intent is needed; the test is not met by demonstrating merely that the legislature was aware of a districting plan’s racially discriminatory impact. In order to avoid condemning to “constitutional invalidity” all majority-minority voting districts drawn pursuant to Voting Rights Act requirements, the court states that while this test will subject practically all majority-black districts to strict scrutiny, the strict scrutiny standard should be applied “in a way that is sensitive not only to the state legislatures’ statutory obligation [to give effect to minority voting potential under the VRA], but also to the special compromises that they must make in order to pass plans that draw such districts.” Id., 861 F.Supp. at 434. There is an analytical problem with applying strict scrutiny while remaining “sensitive” to the plight of legislatures. Essentially, strict scrutiny tempered to accommodate legislative realities is not “strict scrutiny;” it is some lower standard designed to accommodate legislative realities. We feel that a better approach is to remove completely from constitutional suspicion those VRA-mandated redistricting plans that, as Plaintiffs say, “do it right.” The proper interpretation of Shaw v. Reno’s “race-based” requirement is that, in order to invoke strict scrutiny, it must be shown that race was the substantial or motivating consideration in creation of the district in question. That term requires that the legislature (a) was consciously influenced by race, and (b) while other redistricting considerations may also have consciously influenced the district shape, race was the overriding, predominant force determining the lines of the district. If race, however deliberately used, was one factor among many of equal or greater significance to the drafters, the plan is not a racial gerrymander/racial classification subject to strict scrutiny. We arrive on this middle ground after considering fundamental aspects of Equal Protection jurisprudence. After Washington v. Davis, intent is an indispensable element of successful discrimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff must show some discriminatory purpose impelling the legislature before strict scrutiny will be applied to the law in question. See 426 U.S. at 240, 96 S.Ct. at 2047-48. The Supreme Court has expounded on this intent requirement, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when race is a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in legislative decision-making. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing, 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (clarifying Washington v. Davis); City Schl. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (adding word “substantial”). Decisions such as Arlington Heights are vital to properly reading Shaw v. Reno: Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged aetion rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the “dominant” or “primary” one____ When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, ... judicial deference is no longer justified. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66, 97 S.Ct. at 563. In the context of Equal Protection claims based on voting districts, the VRA is the kind of “broad mandate” intended by the Court under the Arlington Heights standard. Further, the phrase “unexplainable on grounds other than race,” which the Shaw v. Reno majority frequently mentioned, is from the Arlington Heights opinion: “Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 564. See Shaw v. Reno, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2825. The intent requirement extends to voting eases, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982), and Shaw discusses certain voting precedents at length. Shaw v. Reno, — U.S. at---, 113 S.Ct. at 2825-27 (reviewing Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926, 59 L.Ed. 1340 (1915), Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960), and Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 603, 11 L.Ed.2d 512 (1964)). These cases clarify Shaw. For example, in Wright, minority plaintiffs brought suit under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, claiming that several congressional districts in New York City were “irrationally” shaped and contrived to segregate voters on the basis of race. Wright, 376 U.S. at 53, 84 S.Ct. at 603-04. A three-judge panel, presented with maps, statistics and other indirect evidence, dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiffs had “failed to prove that the New York Legislature was either motivated by racial considerations or in fact drew the districts on racial lines.” Id. at 56, 84 S.Ct. at 605. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, observing that while “[i]t may be true ... that there was evidence which could have supported inferences that racial considerations might have moved the state legislature, ... we agree [with the lower court] that there also was evidence to support [a] finding that the contrary inference was ‘equally, or more, persuasive.’ ” Id. at 56-57, 84 S.Ct. at 605. That is, the circumstantial evidence did not show that the New York congressional lines were influenced predominantly by race—other, equally plausible “inferences” could be drawn from the maps and charts. So it is in Shaw v. Reno, but the standard is a bit tougher. In Wright, the congressional districts were upheld, but without the patina of legitimacy cast by the VRA, and despite “[defendant] New York’s frank concession that it is not possible to say ‘that race is irrelevant to redistrieting.’ ” Id. 376 U.S. at 61, 84 S.Ct. at 608 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Shaw concedes that latter point, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2826, thus elevating the finding needed for a successful Equal Protection challenge. When we read Arlington Heights and progeny in conjunction with Wright, we surmise the following: Where it cannot be shown that race was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind a voting district by demonstrating that racial eoncerns are the only ones plausibly to be inferred from the district’s lines, there is no valid Equal Protection claim. In contrast to Hays I and Shaw v. Hunt, race can be a factor for the legislature, meaning one factor given no more prominence than various others, without triggering strict scrutiny. The legislature may intentionally consider race in redistrieting—and even alter the occasional line in keeping -with that consideration—without incurring constitutional review. It is the abuse of that privilege, exposed to the world via perverse district shapes “unexplainable on grounds other than race,” that sparks further examination. We think the race-saturated requirements of the Voting Rights Act require this result. Without such an allowance, and considering the present attitude of the Department of Justice, every state and local government in the United States subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act will be buried under Shaw litigation every time it passes a redistrieting plan. Since each plan must survive strict scrutiny—a factual inquiry—many lawsuits will result in full trials. We are reluctant to conclude that the Supreme Court intended voting rights litigation to sweep the country at ten-year intervals. Race also need not be the sole motivation behind a redistrieting plan before it is subject to further review. This is clear from a reading of Arlington Heights. 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 563-64. A Shaw claim is an Equal Protection claim; if the Supreme Court were drastically narrowing the Fourteenth Amendment intent requirement articulated in Washington v. Davis and subsequent decisions—specifically for a subset of voting rights cases—it would have said so. More importantly, the standard would be nearly impossible to meet: if race is admittedly one of many valid districting concerns, Shaw, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct, at 2826, then plaintiffs could never show that it was the “sole” concern behind a districting plan. A state legislature could always trot out some other traditional districting principle minimally served by the shape in question. Cf. Hays I, 839 F.Supp. at 1202. The path most useful for negotiating the intricacies surrounding Shaw v. Reno and the Voting Rights Act is the middle one. Both the Supreme Court and Congress have already admitted that the Constitution is not genuinely “color-blind,” but it does severely limit the race-based lengths to which a state may go. The document does not suffer racial classifications gladly. B. Determining if Race was the Overriding Consideration in Creation of the Eleventh District 1. Methods of Proof: Indirect and Direct Evidence The Supreme Court’s use of a district’s shape as circumstantial evidence of legislative intent implies that proof might be made by other means. The Shaw v. Hunt court arrived at the same conclusion, finding that proof can be made “by any means, including state concession, bizarre shape, or some combination of the various factors typically used to prove the “intent” element of an Equal Protection claim under Arlington Heights [.]” Shaw v. Hunt, supra, 861 F.Supp. at 431. The Western District of Louisiana concurs: “If everyone—or nearly everyone—involved in the design and passage of a redistricting plan asserts or concedes that design of the plan was driven by race, then racial gerrymandering may be found without resorting to the inferential approach approved by the Court in Shaw.” Hays I, 839 F.Supp. at 1195 (footnote omitted). See also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 564 (“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.”). This is clearly the correct approach. Defendants argued early in these proceedings that evidence of the legislature’s intent to gerrymander must be inferred from the shape of the Eleventh District itself, and not from direct testimony of those involved with the process. This view finds little support in Shaw v. Reno. The purpose of scrutinizing a district’s shape is to glean the intent of the legislature by working backwards: if the district appears uninfluenced by accepted districting principles, as evidenced by its shape, then it must have been influenced by unaccepted ones. The Supreme Court explicitly approved this inferential approach because legislative intent is notoriously difficult—if not logically impossible—to ascertain, and in redistricting eases, the district itself may provide the only firm evidence, albeit circumstantial, of that intent. What the Supreme Court did not do is imbue geography with constitutional significance; the requirement for a successful Equal Protection claim is still intent, however proved. Foreclosing production of direct evidence of intent until Plaintiffs convince the Court that a district looks so weird that race must have dominated its creation is not what Shaw intended. That approach would make district shape a (previously unheard of) threshold to constitutional claims. 2. The Eleventh Congressional District This stage of our analysis is the easiest to resolve. The amount of evidence of the General Assembly’s intent to racially gerrymander the Eleventh District is overwhelming, and practically stipulated by the parties involved. a. Indirect Evidence The current configuration of the Eleventh District appears in Joint Exhibit 1. For our purposes, the most significant elements of the Eleventh are the “land bridges” to Dekalb, Richmond and Chatham Counties. On a purely visual level, it is exceedingly obvious to us, and more importantly, to the public, that extraordinary efforts were made to reach those areas for a specific purpose; narrow appendages reach out from the core of the Eleventh to grasp certain goals—the cities of Atlanta, Augusta, and especially Savannah. Land bridges are not the only bridges which support the Eleventh District’s march. The Eleventh soars 18 stories over the water upon the spine of the suspension bridge at Savannah to spill itself over uninhabited Hutchinson Island (which many travelers think is in South Carolina). From Hutchinson the district goes northwest across the marshes, a wildlife refuge, and the river again (this time without a bridge) to a mere point of contiguity with Effingham County. By this means most of the Port facilities are left within the First (historically coastal) District. The surrounding evidence implies that the aforementioned purpose behind all these bridges, sometimes the only purpose, was race. From intact Screven County, the Eleventh suddenly narrows to a bridge at points barely contiguous and averaging less than two miles in width, until it reaches the City of Savannah, where it branches out to encompass particular sections of that community. See Joint Exh. 1; DOJ Exh. 10, 16-17. Effingham County is actually a growing area, but the part of it within the Eleventh District is largely swamp. In most of that strip, the population is literally “zero.” Tr. I, at. 107 (testimony of Linda Meggers). In Savannah itself, the sections within the Eleventh are heavily populated—with blacks. DOJ.Exh. 17. Chatham County is 38% black; that part of it within the Eleventh is 84% black. Majority white areas of Savannah are circumvented by the district boundaries. Id.; Tr. I, at 115-16. The Court has not been presented with an adequate non-racial rationale for this spectacle. The extension to Savannah is not compact by any credible definition of that term, it was not necessitated by natural geographic boundaries, there was no incumbent served by it, there was no economic or political interest thereby enhanced, it split two counties, and it was not necessary to comply with the constitutional one person/one voté requirement. It was urged that many of the district lines follow precinct lines, thus providing a “political,” non-racial, explanation for their configuration. While the boundaries of the Eleventh do indeed follow many precinct lines, this is because Ms. Meggers designed the Eleventh District along racial lines, and race data was most accessible to her at the precinct level. Tr. II, at 271-72. The Court was also plied with testimony about “communities of interest” involving the black populations of Savannah and other majority-black areas, e.g., Tr. VI, at 26 et seq. (testimony of Rev. Mitchell), 137 et seq. (testimony of Dr. Marsha Darling), that allegedly provide a nonracial justification for the district’s current configuration. Here the Defendants and Intervenors faced a Sisyphean task. Initially, the desire to bolster amorphous “communities of interest” could not be sufficient justification for the drafting gymnastics involved in bringing the Eleventh District to Savannah. Second, we remain unconvinced that the poor black populations of