Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER STIEHL, District Judge: This matter is before the Court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is in state custody under two sentences of capital punishment. The record before the Court is extensive, including the petition, answer, briefs and oral argument of the parties, and the transcripts, briefs and complete factual reeord compiled in the state court proceedings. The Court now decides the merits of this § 2254 petition. I. BACKGROUND On June 8, 1979, petitioner Andre Jones was indicted in the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, St. Clair County, Illinois, on three counts of murder, three counts of armed violence, and three counts of armed robbery, stemming from the killings of Richard Stoltz, Samuel Nersesian, and Debra Brown on April 30, 1979. Indicted with Jones was a codefendant, Freddie C. Tiller, Jr. The public defender was appointed to represent both Tiller and petitioner, but was forced to withdraw from representation of petitioner on July 20, 1979, and Robert Gagen was appointed by the state court to represent petitioner. On August 23, 1979, petitioner withdrew his pleas of not guilty and pleaded guilty to the three murder counts. At the time of his plea, the trial judge advised petitioner of his right to a trial by jury and to confront witnesses; the right to be presumed innocent and the state’s obligation to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the right to put on a defense and to call witnesses to testify on his behalf; and the rights to remain silent, and to consult with his attorney. (R., Vol. I, C-64 to C-66). In addition, the judge fully apprised petitioner of his possible sentence, including the death penalty. (Vol. I, C-59 to C-64). In fact, the judge stated: Also for each one of these murders, if you enter a plea of guilty, I want you to understand that if certain factors are present, you could be sentenced to death, on each one of them____ [I]f the factors which are necessary ... are present, I wouldn’t hesitate to sentence you to death. I wouldn’t want to. I have never wanted to sentence anybody to death, but I wouldn’t hesitate because that would fall under the general covering of part of my duties, carry [sic] out the law in the State of Illinois. (Id. at C-60). Further: THE COURT: And I want you to understand, and believe me when I tell you, that I had hoped that this particular chore would never come to me but it does and I won’t shirk from my responsibilities. So if there’s any thought in your mind that by pleading guilty I might give you natural life, I want to erase that thought from your mind. Because if they prove the factors like in the commission of a felony crime described by the Statute as Armed Robbery being one of them, two murders being another one, I won’t hesitate to sentence you to death. You understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir. (Id. at C-62-63). The court also explored whether the petitioner had decided to enter his guilty pleas as a result of any improper coercion. THE COURT: Has anyone used any threats to get you to come in here and indicate through your attorney that you would enter a plea of guilty, anybody threaten you or said, if you do it we’ll let you do this, we’ll recommend that. Any kind of promises or threats whatsoever? Did anyone make them to you? THE DEFENDANT: No sir. (Id. at C-67-68). The judge asked petitioner if he had any questions. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Well, there’s one thing, if I understood Mr. Kuehn correctly, he said that the death penalty will be asked for even on a plea of guilty, if I’m not mistaken. THE COURT: That’s correct. THE DEFENDANT: I understand the natures of the offenses which I have been charged with. That’s it sir. (Id. at C-69). The court accepted Jones’ pleas of guilty and adjudged him guilty on all three counts. On October 5, 1979, a hearing was held on petitioner’s motion to waive the jury for the sentencing. (Id., C-87-93). Petitioner, who took the stand at the hearing, clearly knew of his eligibility for the death penalty, and that without a jury at the sentencing phase, the judge would be imposing the penalty. On October 11, 1979, Gagen moved for a continuance of the sentencing and for a psychiatric examination of petitioner based on a six-page statement which he had made concerning his participation in the slayings of an elderly East St. Louis couple, the Wallaces. The Wallace homicides were unrelated to the charges to which he had plead. Gagen sought the psychiatric exam because he was concerned about the content of the statement. (Id., C-97). Gagen further indicated that he would be filing a motion in limine to prohibit the state from using the six-page statement. (Id., C-97-98). Petitioner’s sentencing hearing was held on April 14 and 15,1980, although the record is silent as to the reason for the change to a jury hearing. Defense counsel moved in limine to keep out evidence of plaintiffs confession. (Vol. IV, 16). At the sentencing hearing, the state presented evidence, inter alia, of the confession that Jones had given as to the Wallace murders. (Vol. V, 343). Further, extensive evidence was offered as to the Wallace murders by the St. Clair County coroner and East St. Louis police officer John Thurman. Before the confession was admitted, Gagen objected that reference to the confession would violate petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (Vol. V, 401-02). The trial judge overruled the motion on the grounds that petitioner voluntarily gave his confession. Petitioner did not testify at the hearing. Outside the hearing of the jury, the decision not to testify, and the fact that Gagen advised him to testify, were placed on the record. (Vol. V, 411-12). The jury returned a verdict of death by electrocution on each of the three murder convictions. A direct appeal was taken, and the convictions were affirmed, but the death sentence on the Stoltz murder was vacated, while the other two sentences were affirmed. People v. Jones, 94 Ill.2d 275, 68 Ill.Dec. 903, 447 N.E.2d 161 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920, 104 S.Ct. 287, 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (Jones I). Petitioner filed two post-eonviction petitions in state court, and the St. Clair County Circuit Court held an evidentiary hearing on December 22, 1987, before deciding the second petition. Both petitions were denied, and the denials were affirmed on appeal. See People v. Jones, 109 Ill.2d 19, 92 Ill.Dec. 552, 485 N.E.2d 363 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1090, 106 S.Ct. 1481, 89 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986) (Jones II); People v. Jones, 144 Ill.2d 242, 162 Ill.Dec. 15, 579 N.E.2d 829 (1991), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 3038, 120 L.Ed.2d 906 (1992) (Jones III). Petitioner then filed his petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. The petition raises several grounds for habeas relief: 1. Denial of the constitutional right to effective representation of counsel at the plea, sentencing, direct appeal, and first state post-conviction petition. 2. Violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 3. Section 9-l(e) of the Illinois Death Penalty Statute is invalid for failing to establish a standard for admission of evidence higher than relevance. 4. Certain information admitted during the sentencing hearing violated due process. II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees a criminal defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). Petitioner argues that he was denied the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at his plea, sentencing, and appeal. Throughout his plea and sentencing, petitioner was represented by court-appointed counsel, Robert Gagen. The Illinois Supreme Court appointed David Hoffman to represent petitioner on the direct appeal of his sentence. Before examining the merits of petitioner’s arguments, the Court will clarify and briefly define petitioner’s claims and the applicable standards. The Sixth Amendment right of effective assistance of counsel applies to a criminal defendant’s trial, sentencing, and the first appeal of right. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court articulated a two-part test applicable to ineffective assistance claims: the petitioner must demonstrate (1) his counsel’s deficient performance and (2) that counsel’s errors were prejudicial. On direct appeal of petitioner’s plea and sentence, Hoffman failed to argue that Gagen’s representation during the plea and sentencing was constitutionally ineffective. Because Hoffman failed to raise the issue of Gagen’s ineffectiveness, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly held that the issue was in default, and barred petitioner from raising the claim. Jones II, 92 Ill.Dec. at 554, 485 N.E.2d at 365; See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). As a result, petitioner now claims that Hoffman provided ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In other words, petitioner must first establish a successful ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim before he can assert a claim that Gagen’s representation at the plea or sentencing was constitutionally ineffective. Hoffman testified at the post-conviction hearing that he believed that petitioner had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel at trial. However, Hoffman concluded that the issue could not be raised on direct appeal because he felt that the record was insufficient to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland. Specifically, Hoffman thought that the record lacked the evidence necessary to completely show what mitigating evidence could have been presented at trial. Petitioner argues that Hoffman had no strategic reason for fading to present this issue on direct appeal, and that Hoffman should have known that he could supplement the record with affidavits. Petitioner concludes that Hoffman’s misunderstanding of the law constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. However, petitioner’s claim that Hoffinan rendered ineffective assistance of appellate counsel also fell into default, because the issue was not raised in the first state post-conviction proceeding. While there is no constitutional right to effective counsel in post-conviction proceedings, Finley, 481 U.S. at 555, 107 S.Ct. at 1993, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not waived by an attorney’s failure to raise his own ineffectiveness. People v. Gaines, 105 Ill.2d 79, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1131, 105 S.Ct. 2666, 86 L.Ed.2d 282 (1985). Because Hoffman also represented petitioner during the first post-conviction motion, he was not required to then raise a claim for his own ineffectiveness during the appeal. The Court must apply the Strickland test to petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. To summarize, petitioner claims that Hoffinan was constitutionally ineffective by failing to raise Gagen’s ineffectiveness. Thus, if Gagen’s representation at the plea or sentencing was not constitutionally defective, petitioner cannot establish prejudice in his claim against Hoffman, and as a result, cannot establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. To determine whether petitioner was prejudiced by Hoffman’s failure to raise Gagen’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal, the Court must first decide whether such claims based on Gagen’s representation would have been successful. The Court will first examine petitioner’s claims of Gagen’s ineffective assistance during the plea, and will then turn to the claims concerning Gagen’s representation at the sentencing. B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL 1. Plea Stage The two-part Strickland test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). To establish a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Hill and Strickland, [fjirst, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The first prong of the Strickland test requires petitioner to show that Gagen’s representation fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Strickland expressly decried the use of “detailed rules” in judging the reasonableness of counsel’s performance. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. This analysis must be performed on a case-by-case basis, and the Supreme Court has proclaimed that “[jjudicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The Court expounded upon this deferential standard of review, stating: It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (citations omitted). The reasonableness of counsel’s performance can also be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions. Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-67. To satisfy the second, or prejudice prong of Strickland in a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel during a plea, petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable possibility that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370. Of course, in order to show prejudice, an ineffective assistance claimant must show more than a subjective belief that he would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel’s errors. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046 n. 21, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (“It is for this reason that we attach no weight to respondent’s ... later expression of dissatisfaction (with counsel’s performance).”) The Hill Court offered guidance in applying the prejudice standard: In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial. Similarly, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the “prejudice” inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial. 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370-71. Petitioner must establish both unreasonable performance and prejudice, therefore the Court need not grade the reasonableness of counsel’s performance if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069-70. In examining whether petitioner was prejudiced by Gagen’s alleged ineffectiveness, the Court cannot focus “solely on outcome determination,” that is, the Court cannot look only to whether the result of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s errors. Lockhart v. Fretwell, — U.S. —, —, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). Rather, the prejudice inquiry must also determine whether “the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” Id. In reversing a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]o set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s error may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him.” Id. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 843. Petitioner alleges that Gagen provided ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea stage in many ways: failed to conduct discovery or file written motions; withdrew written motions filed by petitioner’s previous counsel; did not conduct investigations into the facts, a possible insanity defense, or petitioner’s psychological or drug problems; did not subpoena witnesses; generally failed to prepare for trial; failed to bargain for plea concessions; and by wrongfully encouraging petitioner to plead guilty. Petitioner has offered a litany of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the Court will examine these claims individually and by considering the totality of the evidence and circumstances surrounding each claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068-69; United States ex rel. Simmons v. Gramley, 915 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir.1990). The Illinois Supreme Court previously decided these claims in Jones III, 162 Ill.Dec. at 19-28, 579 N.E.2d at 833-42. However, in this § 2254 action, the Court must independently review the Illinois Supreme Court’s rulings on the merits of petitioner’s claims, because “both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. a. Failure to File Discovery Requests or Written Motions Petitioner asserts that Gagen did not file any discovery requests or written motions prior to the scheduled trial. Petitioner was initially represented by an assistant public defender, who withdrew on July 20, 1979. The record indicates that shortly after petitioner’s arraignment, the assistant public defender filed motions for discovery and the State fully complied with these motions. Ga-gen did not file any written motions. However, petitioner has not asserted facts or arguments showing that any additional discovery requests or motions would have aided Gagen’s representation in any manner. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that these omissions constituted deficient performance and prejudice. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.Ct. at 370. Because petitioner has not shown that filing additional discovery requests or written motions was warranted under the circumstances, or would have caused petitioner to change his plea, neither prong of the Strickland standard has been satisfied. United States v. Brown, 739 F.2d 1136 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933, 105 S.Ct. 331, 83 L.Ed.2d 268 (1984). b. Withdrawal of Previously Filed Motions Petitioner also argues that Gagen was constitutionally ineffective for withdrawing the motion to suppress filed by the public defender. The motion to suppress filed by the public defender was a pre-printed standardized form, and the only reference to petitioner contained in the motion is that his name is typed as defendant in the caption of the form. The motion does not refer to any of the particular facts surrounding petitioner’s case. At the post-conviction hearing, Gagen testified that he talked with petitioner and the officer who took petitioner’s statement concerning the April 30, 1979 murders of Richard Stoltz, Samuel Nersesian, and Debra Brown. (R., Vol. VI, 116-18). Gagen withdrew the motion to suppress because he could find no facts to support the motion. (Id.) The Sixth Amendment right to counsel certainly does not require counsel to argue meritless motions. Petitioner has shown no facts or argument indicating that the statement should have been suppressed, and therefore has failed to show deficient performance or prejudice. Hill, 474 U.S. at 57, 106 S.Ct. at 369-70. c. Failure to Investigate Facts and Subpoena Witnesses Petitioner next contends that Gagen failed to adequately investigate the facts and subpoena witnesses for trial. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Gagen testified that he reviewed the prosecutor’s investigative file, and interviewed the policeman who took petitioner’s statement, the attorney for petitioner’s accomplice in the three murders, Freddie Tiller, Laurie Elam (the woman who accompanied Tiller and petitioner), and the petitioner himself on several occasions. (R., Vol. VI, 94-97, 115, 116, 120-21). The facts surrounding the April 30 murders were not in question, and petitioner had confessed to, and still admits to committing these three murders. Because petitioner has not demonstrated that Gagen was unaware of any material facts, petitioner has not shown deficient performance or prejudice stemming from Gagen’s alleged failure to investigate the facts. Petitioner’s claim of ineffectiveness based on the failure to subpoena witnesses is also misplaced. Gagen admitted at the post-conviction hearing that he did not subpoena witnesses. (Vol. VI, 120). However, the witnesses Gagen anticipated might testify, petitioner’s grandmother, Talmedge Jones, and petitioner’s girlfriend, Laurie Elam, agreed to appear voluntarily. (Vol. VI, 143). The choice to avoid the possible intimidating effect of a subpoena, especially where those witnesses agreed to appear, is not ineffective assistance of counsel. Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 206, 107 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989). Moreover, petitioner does not identify any witnesses who should have received subpoenas, or how the testimony of such witnesses would have changed his decision to plea. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish either prong of Strickland as to the failure to subpoena witnesses. d. Failure to Investigate Available Defenses Petitioner claims that Gagen’s failure to investigate his psychological history, drug problems, or the possibility of an insanity defense prior to entering a guilty plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. On realizing that petitioner could not present an adequate factual defense to the three murders, Gagen considered raising defenses based on insanity and the influence of alcohol or narcotics. (R., Vol. VI, 96-97). However, petitioner informed Gagen that he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the murders (Vol. VI, 96), and Gagen was justified in believing petitioner’s statement. Petitioner’s own statement dissuaded Gagen from pursuing a defense based on use of alcohol or drugs, therefore, Gagen’s failure to pursue such a defense was not objectively unreasonable deficient performance under Strickland. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-67. The Court must still examine whether Gagen provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to pursue an insanity defense, or to investigate petitioner’s history of psychological and drug abuse problems. Ga-gen admits that after initially reviewing the overwhelming factual evidence against petitioner, he thought the only possible defenses would be insanity or intoxication, which petitioner had denied. (R., Vol. VI, 96-97). At the time of petitioner’s plea, Illinois law permitted an insanity defense where, as a result of a mental defect or disease, the defendant lacked cognition or volition, that is, he could not appreciate the difference between right and wrong (cognition), or could not conform his conduct to the law (volition) at the time of the offense. People v. Grant, 71 Ill.2d 551, 17 Ill.Dec. 814, 377 N.E.2d 4 (1978). Gagen testified that he met with petitioner on several occasions, and that petitioner was very cooperative, remorseful, and understood what he had done and the charges against him. (R., Vol. VI, 96, 122-23). Gagen also testified that his interview with Laurie Elam helped to persuade him that petitioner was sane at the time of the murders. (Vol. VI, 97). Before representing petitioner, Gagen had served as a public defender and as a judge in the criminal division of the St. Clair County Circuit Court. Based on his prior experience, and his interviews with petitioner and Elam, Gagen concluded that he could not present a viable insanity defense. (Vol. VI, 97, 120-23). Gagen did not request a psychiatric evaluation before petitioner’s plea. Immediately after his plea, Cheryl Prost, a psychological consultant to the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of Illinois, conducted a psychological examination of petitioner and filed a four-page report. (Vol. Ill, C-588). However, shortly after his plea and Prost’s evaluation, petitioner confessed to brutally murdering the Wallaces, and attributed the slayings to “voices” that told him to kill. On learning of the confession, Gagen requested the St. Clair County Court to order a psychiatric examination. Pursuant to court order, Dr. Peter Heinbecker, a psychiatrist, examined petitioner on November 30, 1979. (Vol. Ill, C-608). Petitioner was also examined by a clinical psychologist, Dr. T.J. Fitzgerald, on December 6, 1979. (Vol. Ill, C-603). Petitioner later informed Gagen that he concocted the story that voices told him to kill the Wallaces because that story “sounded good.” (Vol. VI, 103-04). Various reports contained in the record chronicle petitioner’s adolescence and psychological history. Petitioner was raised by his grandmother, Talmedge Jones, and at the age of 9 witnessed the murder of his great-grandfather. (Vol. Ill, C-594). Petitioner was first committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections when he was 13 years old for an armed robbery. (Vol. Ill, C-588). While committed to adolescent institutions, he was evaluated and examined by various psychologists. (Vol. Ill, C-590). After numerous arrests, petitioner was convicted of armed robbery in 1974, and served his sentence on that charge at Menard Correctional Facility until October of 1978. (Vol. Ill, C-598). While the psychological profiles of petitioner do indicate a long criminal history, no report shows that petitioner suffered from the type of psychological problems leading to a conclusion that he had been insane at any time. The reports filed by Prost and Heinbecker refute any contention that petitioner was insane at the time of the murders. Prost concluded her report by stating: [N]o pathology was found concerning psychosis or mental retardation nor significant substance abuse. What has been found is a very pathological personality disorder which has been present since childhood and which has not changed through the efforts of numerous state penal institutions. Mr. Jones [the defendant] has had poor control over his anger and impulsiveness as well as had little respect for the rights and lives of others. Jones III, 162 Ill.Dec. at 22, 579 N.E.2d at 836. Heinbecker’s summary of petitioner’s psychiatric condition opined: My diagnostic impression is that of a sociopathic personality.... I tend to be quite skeptical of the reported hallucinations .... It is my opinion that at the time of the crimes charged on April the 10th, 1979, Andre Jones did not lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. (Vol. Ill, C-611). These two reports do not support the affirmative defense of insanity, but corroborate Gagen’s conclusion that petitioner was not insane at the time of the murders. Nothing in the record suggests that petitioner actually was insane at the time of the crimes. In order to establish a claim that Gagen’s failure to investigate petitioner’s psychological background or an insanity defense was ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must show deficient performance and prejudice. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.Ct. at 370. The Jones III court ruled that neither prong of Strickland had been satisfied as to this argument. 162 Ill.Dec. at 23, 579 N.E.2d at 837. Under the performance requirement, Gagen “had a duty either to make an investigation or else ‘a reasonable decision’ that investigation was unnecessary.” Balfour v. Haws, 892 F.2d 556, 564 (7th Cir.1989), quot ing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. The Seventh Circuit has recognized that where a defendant has no defense available other than diminished capacity, an attorney’s failure to investigate could violate the Sixth Amendment. United States ex rel Rivera v. Franzen, 794 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 991, 107 S.Ct. 588, 93 L.Ed.2d 590 (1986). However, the Franzen court also noted that “[t]he Sixth Amendment does not require a defense attorney to pursue defenses that are not reasonably suggested by the apparent factual circumstances surrounding the crime charged or the subsequent demeanor and conduct of the client.” Id. at 317. Although Gagen realized after initial investigation that an insanity or diminished capacity defense might be the only defense possible, petitioner denied use of alcohol or drugs, and his subsequent demeanor and conduct did not suggest that he was insane at the time of the crime. (R., Vol. VI, 96). Petitioner was cooperative in dealing with Gagen, and expressed remorse for his crimes. (Vol. VI, 96, 122-23). Gagen’s interview with Laurie Elam, who was with petitioner shortly before and after the commission of the crimes, also convinced him that an insanity defense was not viable. (Vol. VI, 97) . Notably, petitioner’s confession to the Wallace murders was taken after the plea, and cannot be considered in grading Gagen’s performance. The factual circumstances apparent to Gagen, and petitioner’s demeanor and conduct did not suggest the need to pursue an insanity defense. Following the presumption that Gagen’s conduct was reasonable professional assistance, petitioner has not demonstrated that Franzen and Balfour require a finding of deficient performance. However, even if petitioner could demonstrate deficient performance, “it is easier to dispose of [this] ... ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. The Hill court defined prejudice in the context of a guilty plea as requiring a petitioner to show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370. Not surprisingly, petitioner argues that if Gagen had not failed to investigate, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Citing United States v. Austin, 948 F.2d 783 (1st Cir.1991), petitioner contends that Gagen’s conduct was prejudicial, because he was induced to enter a guilty plea he would not have otherwise entered. However, the proper inquiry does not turn upon petitioner’s “expression of dissatisfaction” with Gagen’s representation. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 657 n. 21, 104 S.Ct. at 2046 n. 21. Rather, the Court follows the analysis suggested in Hill for claims based on counsel’s alleged failure to investigate a defense. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370-71. Because petitioner has alleged that Gagen failed to investigate, the Court’s determination of prejudice focuses upon whether the discovery of the information regarding petitioner’s psychiatric history and drug use would have led Gagen to change his recommendation to plead guilty. Id. The Court must also “predict” whether, assuming Ga-gen had fully investigated the insanity defense, this “evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.” Id. The psychiatric reports of Heinbecker and Prost conclude that petitioner was sane at the time of the murders. Nothing in petitioner’s lengthy institutional record indicates that he was ever considered legally insane or otherwise incompetent. On the contrary, all petitioner’s psychological profiles depict a violent, sociopathie personality. If Gagen would have had petitioner examined prior to his plea, petitioner would have been evaluated as legally sane, and Gagen still would have recommended a guilty plea. Petitioner asserts that insanity was his only defense, and that Gagen also decided that insanity would be the only possible defense after learning the facts of the case. However, Gageris initial decision that insanity would be the only possible defense did not lend credence to the viability of an insanity defense, but only recognized that absolutely no factual defense existed. Simply stated, no evidence supported the insanity defense. The psychiatric and psychological evaluations of Heinbecker and Prost, and other evidence concerning petitioner’s psychological history actually rejected the insanity defense. (See R., Vol. III). Because petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by Gagen’s failure to investigate his psychological history, drug abuse, and the insanity defense, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on these grounds must fail. e. Failure to Negotiate a Plea Agreement Petitioner claims that Gagen was constitutionally ineffective by allowing petitioner to enter a guilty plea without first negotiating a plea agreement. During the plea proceedings, the State’s Attorney remarked: Mr. Gagen has talked to me from the outset, I informed Mr. Gagen and this has been for a period of months now that our position was firm that we were not going to dismiss any charges nor were we going to fall short in presenting this case as a death penalty case and seek that penalty against this defendant. (Vol. I, C-68). Petitioner claims that Gagen did not attempt to negotiate a plea bargain. However, the State’s Attorney acknowledged that he and Gagen had discussed the issue, and the statement quoted above clearly establishes that the State’s Attorney was absolutely unwilling to negotiate a plea for a sentence of anything other than death. Thus, petitioner has failed to show deficient performance or prejudice on this claim. f. Counsel Coerced Petitioner to Plead Guilty Petitioner also claims that Gagen rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by pressuring him into pleading guilty by suggesting that the sentencing judge, St. Clair County Circuit Judge John J. Hoban, would not impose the death penalty. At the December 22, 1987 post-conviction hearing, Laverne Harold, petitioner’s mother, and Lavonda Terry, a friend of petitioner’s testified that Gagen asked them to talk with petitioner and convince him to plead guilty. (Vol. VI, 20, 35). Terry and Harold testified that Gagen said that petitioner would not receive the death penalty because Judge Hoban owed him a favor. (Vol. VI, 20-21, 35-36). Petitioner testified inconsistently as to whether Gagen had told him that the judge would inform him at the plea that he could be sentenced to death. (Vol. VI, 72). Petitioner also stated that Gagen told him that he would not receive the death penalty because Judge Hoban owed Gagen a favor. Petitioner asserts that he did not want to plead guilty, but changed his mind at the eleventh hour upon the insistence of his family and Gagen. Gagen testified at the post-conviction hearing concerning his advice to petitioner and his family. Gagen testified that he informed petitioner that the evidence against him was overwhelming, that the death penalty was a possibility, and that the State’s Attorney refused to negotiate a plea bargain. (Vol. VI, 99-101). Gagen stated he advised petitioner of his options, and that petitioner ultimately decided to plead guilty. (Vol. VI, 121-22, 126). Gagen suggested that petitioner waive his right to a jury sentencing hearing, leaving Judge Hoban to sentence him. (Vol. VI, 101-02, 126-27). Gagen thought that if petitioner would plead guilty, waive his right to a jury sentencing, and testify at sentencing showing remorse for the April 30th murders, Judge Hoban would not order the death sentence. (Vol. VI, 126-27). The Court notes that at the time of the plea, petitioner had not confessed to the brutal Wallace slayings, a confession which played a significant role in the sentencing, but did not factor into the decision to plead guilty. Shortly after his plea, petitioner acted on Gagen’s advice to waive the jury sentencing and entered a waiver on October 5, 1979. (Vol. I, C-87). Later, petitioner rejected Gagen’s advice to waive a jury sentencing hearing, and chose to be sentenced by a jury. (Vol. VI, 127). The record does not refer to a court hearing on petitioner’s revocation of the waiver, but Ga-gen testified that at the time of sentencing “when we got into court ... he wanted a jury trial.” (Vol. VI, 127). While petitioner claims that Gagen boasted that Judge Hoban owed him a favor, Gagen described his rationale concerning Judge Hoban as: I thought that if Andre would testify as he had talked to me about the remorse that he had, the fact that he was sorry that this had happened, that I thought that knowing Judge Hoban as I did that I felt that we had a shot at not getting the death penalty. (Vol. VI, 127). Gagen also testified that: Well, we had many discussions, and I was very open, I thought [sic] with Mr. Jones, Andre, and told him that I had been a Circuit Judge here in St. Clair County and that for a number of years Judge Hoban [the trial judge] and I had worked very closely together and that I had known Judge Hoban for longer than the period of time that we had served as judges together. In fact, I had been a friend of his family and he of my parents for many years and that I knew that he was personally opposed to the death penalty and I explained to Andre that if we had any kind of chance, if we could give Judge Hoban any reason not to impose the death penalty, I didn’t think that he would. (Vol. VI, 98). The record also indicates that prior to petitioner’s entry of a guilty plea, Judge Ho-ban informed him of the charges and maximum sentences in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402. Judge Hoban specifically informed petitioner that “if there’s any thought in your mind that by pleading guilty I might give you natural life, I want you to erase that thought from your mind. Because if they (the State) prove the (aggravation) factors ... I won’t hesitate to sentence you to death. You understand that? The Defendant: Yes, sir.” (R., Vol. I, C-63). Judge Hoban mentioned the death sentence on three other occasions during the plea proceedings, and petitioner responded that he fully understood the judge’s admonitions. (Vol. I, C-60-68). Petitioner also stated that his plea was not a product of any promises, threats, or recommendations. (Vol. I, C-67-68). Where a habeas petitioner enters a plea upon advice of counsel, the voluntariness of that plea hinges upon whether the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was satisfied. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 369. Thus, to establish a elaim that his plea was not voluntary and intelligent, petitioner must satisfy the Strickland standard. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57, 106 S.Ct. at 369-70. Gagen’s testimony establishes that his representation satisfied the performance prong of Strickland. Gagen believed that if petitioner would waive his right to a jury sentencing and express remorse, Hoban might not order a death sentence, because Gagen believed that Judge Hoban had a personal dislike for the death penalty. The evidence against petitioner was overwhelming, and his chances for acquittal were infinitesimal. The hope of a lesser sentence and the convincing nature of the evidence are recognized factors that suggest the advisability of a guilty plea. Ga-gen testified that he explained to petitioner his options. Even if Gagen did recommend a plea, such a recommendation was a matter of trial strategy based on the hope for a lesser sentence, or the overwhelming amount of evidence, or both. Unfortunately for petitioner, this strategy was unsuccessful. Three factors attributable to petitioner collaborated to undermine Gagen’s strategy: petitioner refused to waive a jury sentencing, refused to testify at the sentencing, and subsequently confessed to the Wallace murders. Entering a guilty plea and waiving the jury sentencing may have been the strategy most likely to avoid the death penalty. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. At the very least, this strategy was tenable, in consideration of Gagen’s belief that Judge Hoban personally disliked the death penalty. However, petitioner’s decision to have a jury sentencing removed all discretion from Judge Hoban. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 9-l(g) (1979). Petitioner attacks the strategy that he himself may have destroyed, thus, the reasonableness of Gagen’s performance was substantially influenced by petitioner’s actions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-67. The Court must avoid examining Gagen’s conduct with the benefits of hindsight. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Following the “presumption that [Gagen’s] conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” id., the Court concludes that petitioner has not demonstrated that Gageris performance was objectively unreasonable or so deficient as to undermine the reliability and fairness of the plea process. See Lockhart, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 842. In addition, petitioner has failed to establish prejudice as to this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Judge Hoban and Gagen informed petitioner of the likelihood that a death sentence could be imposed, and petitioner affirmatively stated that his plea was not the product of any promises, threats, or coercion. (R., Vol. I, C-60-68). Therefore, petitioner has failed to establish this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. g. Counsel’s Lack of Preparation and Failure to Present a Defense Petitioner also claims that Gagen was constitutionally ineffective by generally failing to prepare for trial and not preparing any defense to the charges. This claim basically argues that Gagen’s general lack of diligence resulted in petitioner having no defense to assert at trial. The Court has previously rejected petitioner’s specific allegations of Gagen’s neglect. Gagen testified that he had reviewed discovery and had interviewed petitioner, Freddie Tiller’s attorney, various police officers, and petitioner’s girlfriend and grandmother. (Vol. VI, 94-97, 155-56, 120-21). At the plea proceeding, petitioner answered that he had met with Gagen on approximately six or seven occasions. (Vol. I, C-60). Gagen testified that he was prepared to try petitioner’s case even though he may have believed that petitioner would be convicted. (Vol. VI, 121). To state a successful claim of ineffective assistance, petitioner must demonstrate that Gagen’s performance fell outside the presumption of professional reasonable assistance, and that petitioner was prejudiced by Gagen’s general lack of preparation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. While other counsel may have undertaken petitioner’s representation differently, “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The Court has rejected the specific claims of neglect, and petitioner has not shown that Gagen’s general method of trial preparation constituted deficient performance. To establish that Gagen’s general lack of preparation was prejudicial, petitioner must prove that without Gagen’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370-71. In conducting the prejudice inquiry, the Court must ignore petitioner’s subjective expressions of dissatisfaction, Cronic, 466 U.S. at 657 n. 21, 104 S.Ct. at 2046, and consider factors including whether the correction of counsel’s errors likely would have changed the outcome of a trial, Hill, 474 U.S. at 59,106 S.Ct. at 370-71, and whether the “result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” Lockhart, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 842. Review of the evidence before the Court indicates that petitioner had no viable defense to the crimes charged. Gagen’s alleged preparation or lack of preparation does not change the conclusion that no defense existed. Even if Gagen’s performance is considered constitutionally deficient, the trial preparation that would have been conducted by objectively reasonable counsel could not have provided a defense for petitioner, so the likely outcome of a trial would not have been different. Petitioner undoubtedly realized that the evidence against him was overwhelming. During the plea proceedings, petitioner was repeatedly informed that the death sentence was a strong possibility and he stated that his plea was voluntary, and was not the result of promises or threats. Therefore, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his plea was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. The Court concludes that petitioner has failed to establish that Gagen’s counsel during the plea stages was constitutionally ineffective. As noted earlier, petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel stands in procedural default, Jones II, 92 Ill.Dec. at 554, 485 N.E.2d at 365; See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87, 97 S.Ct. at 2506-07, and therefore petitioner must establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to cure the procedural default. However, to demonstrate prejudice by ineffective assistance on appeal, petitioner must succeed upon his claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because petitioner has failed to prove ineffective assistance during the plea stage, he also cannot establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as to his plea. Therefore, petitioner’s guilty plea, entered on August 23, 1979, is valid, and the Court DENIES petitioner’s request to vacate the convictions. 2. Sentencing Stage Petitioner asserts three general arguments that Gagen provided ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing proceedings: (a) Gagen failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence when he knew, or should have known that such evidence existed; (b) he failed to move to suppress the Wallace confessions; and (e) he made a rambling, unreasonable, and prejudicial closing argument. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during a capital sentencing are also subject to the two-part Strickland test. In judging Gagen’s performance, the Court must follow the highly deferential presumption that counsel’s representation was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. To establish prejudice as to a sentence, petitioner must establish that “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer — including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence — would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. A “reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. In Jones III, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the same three general arguments currently before the Court. 162 Ill. Dec. at 28-33, 579 N.E.2d at 842-47. The Court must independently review the Illinois Supreme Court’s rulings on the merits of petitioner’s claims, because “both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiiy are mixed questions of law and fact.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. a. Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence Petitioner first asserts that Gagen failed to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing when he knew, or should have known, of such evidence. Petitioner’s briefs point to several examples of evidence which could have been introduced: a long history of emotional and psychological problems; low IQ; a violent and traumatic childhood; history of drug and alcohol abuse; that the murders for which he was convicted were committed while under the influence of drugs or alcohol; sincere remorse and guilt; his good behavior while in St. Clair County Jail; and a close relationship with his daughter. No mitigating evidence was presented during the sentencing proceeding. Petitioner asserts that Gagen could have called Laurie Elam, Talmedge Jones, and Cheryl Prost as witnesses. The Court rejects petitioner’s claims that Gagen should have presented evidence related to drug or alcohol use. As previously noted, petitioner informed Gagen that he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the crimes, and Gagen’s actions cannot be considered unreasonable where petitioner denied that he was under the influence of any substance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-67. In addition, evidence of petitioner’s past drug and alcohol abuse would more likely be considered aggravating than mitigating, therefore, failure to present such evidence was not deficient performance. Petitioner also contends that Gagen was ineffective for failing to investigate his psychological background, which would have produced evidence of his low IQ, violent childhood, and history of emotional and psychological problems. Counsel has a duty either to investigate a defendant’s mental history or to make a reasonable decision that investigation was unnecessary. Balfour v. Haws, 892 F.2d 556, 564 (7th Cir.1989), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-67. As the Illinois Supreme Court found, Gagen did investigate petitioner’s mental problems before the sentencing hearing. Jones III, 162 Ill.Dec. at 29, 579 N.E.2d at 843. After learning that petitioner’s confession to the Wallace murders mentioned hearing voices, Gagen requested a psychiatric examination. The psychiatric report refuted any claim that petitioner was insane, and emphasized his violent soeiopathic nature. Gagen also read the report produced by a court-employed psychologist, Cheryl Prost. While Prost’s report includes some mitigating information concerning petitioner’s background, the report is filled with information concerning his lengthy criminal record and his selfish, impulsive, and self-righteous behavior. Gagen did investigate petitioner’s psychological background, and reasonably concluded that it provided little or no mitigating evidence, and would serve to underscore petitioner’s significant criminal history, sociopathic personality, and violent nature. Petitioner also asserts that Gagen was ineffective for failing to call Prost to testify as to petitioner’s remorse and that he could be safely managed in an institution. As discussed above, Gagen read Prost’s report and spoke with her before concluding that she would not have been a good witness. Gagen was familiar with Prost from his experience as a judge and lawyer, and this experience contributed to his conclusion that she would not have been a good witness. Any assertion by Prost regarding petitioner’s good behavior while awaiting the sentencing could have been discredited by evidence of his numerous disciplinary violations while incarcerated at the Menard Correctional Center. In addition, Gagen’s decision not to rely on Prost was made under the assumption that petitioner himself would testify as to his remorse. Gagen felt that petitioner would make a good witness who could testify that he was sorry for his acts, and Gagen planned on him to be the primary mitigation witness. However, just before petitioner was to testify, he informed Gagen that he did not want to testify. Gagen was surprised by petitioner’s change of heart, and had the court place petitioner’s decision not to testify on the record. Gagen planned that petitioner would establish his own remorse, a reasonable strategy, but petitioner’s decision foiled that strategy. Resnover v. Pearson, 965 F.2d 1453, 1460 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 2935, 124 L.Ed.2d 685 (1993) (“[The defendant] deliberately absented himself from the penalty phase of the trial over the strong protestations of his counsel. [Defendant], who chose not to be present, cannot now argue that his counsel failed him in the penalty phase of the trial by refusing to introduce evidence in mitigation.”). Gagen also planned to call Laurie Elam and Talmedge Jones as mitigation witnesses. On the day of the sentencing hearing, Elam wore a necklace with the word “bitch” plainly visible across the front of it. When Gagen asked Elam to remove the necklace, she said she would not because petitioner had given it to her. Gagen then decided not to call Elam as a witness. Considering this decision without the benefit of hindsight and under the deferential scrutiny applied to trial strategy by Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-66, Gagen’s decision not to call Elam as a witness was entirely reasonable. Gagen also intended to call Talmedge Jones as a witness. Petitioner lived with Jones during his childhood, and she could have testified as to his family relationships and difficult childhood. However, much of her testimony could have been harmful, because cross-examination could have revealed petitioner’s lengthy juvenile record and that he had hidden the gun used in the Nersesian and Brown shootings at her house. However, Gagen thought that Jones was a nice lady and would have jury appeal. Yet, at the same time that petitioner refused to testify, he also refused to let Gagen call Jones as a witness. Where a defendant chooses a particular strategy at trial, he cannot later complain that his own decision forms the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Davis v. Greer, 13 F.3d 1134, 1139-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 328, 130 L.Ed.2d 287 (1994), citing United States v. Weaver, 882 F.2d 1128, 1140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 968, 110 S.Ct. 415, 107 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). In Davis, the defendant chose not to present mitigating evidence that he committed murder while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 13 F.3d at 1139. Just as the defendant in Davis chose not to present this evidence, petitioner decided not to call Jones or to testify himself as to his remorse, difficult childhood, or emotional problems, and his decision cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance claim. Id. at 1139-40; Resnover, 965 F.2d at 1460. Gagen thought that the best way for petitioner to avoid the death penalty was to waive his right to a jury sentencing, and to testify before Judge Hoban that he was remorseful for his acts. From his personal relationship with Hoban, Gagen believed, rightly or wrongly, that if petitioner would have demonstrated sincere remorse, Hoban would have sentenced him to a life term. However, shortly before the sentencing, petitioner withdrew his waiver, and decided to be sentenced by a jury. In the face of overwhelming amounts of damning evidence and a severe lack of mitigation, Gagen planned to have Elam, Jones, and most importantly, petitioner, testify in mitigation. In reliance on this strategy, Gagen made reasonable decisions not to call Prost and Elam, but petitioner forbade Gagen from calling Jones, and decided not to testify. Petitioner’s decision helped to undercut Gagen’s strategy, and his decisions cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance claim. Davis, 13 F.3d at 1139-40; Resnover, 965 F.2d at 1460. Without the anticipated testimony, Gagen pleaded for his client’s life, then a reasonable strategy. See Resnover, 965 F.2d at 1460. The Court concludes that Gagen’s performance fell within the wide range of constitutionally effective assistance. Even if the Court were to conclude that Gagen’s performance fails the first prong of the Strickland analysis, petitioner still must demonstrate prejudice. Looking at the purported mitigating evidence in a light favorable to petitioner, the evidence could have shown that petitioner had family members who cared about him, used drugs and alcohol throughout his life, and witnessed the murder of his great-grandfather when he was eight years old. However, any attempt to elicit this evidence would have been countered by additional emphasis on any number of incidents and reports which detailed petitioner’s violent criminal nature. The aggravating evidence in this ease was simply overwhelming. Along with Freddie Tiller, petitioner robbed and murdered Richard Stoltz on the morning of April 30, 1979. While committing an armed robbery later that day, petitioner murdered, execution-style, Samuel Nersesian and Debra Brown. Petitioner also confessed to the robbery and brutal murders of the Wallaces, admitting that he repeatedly stabbed Mrs. Wallace in her neck, beheaded Mr. Wallace with a buteher knife, and carried the head away from the scene. Several pictures of the various murder victims and crime scenes were introduced into evidence. The State also introduced testimony concerning petitioner’s nearly lifelong criminal history. The cumulative effect of this aggravating evidence, in particular the evidence surrounding the Wallace murders, sealed petitioner’s fate. As in Strickland, “[t]he evidence that [petitioner] says his ... counsel should have offered at the sentencing hearing would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented....” 466 U.S. at 699-700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071. Given the overwhelming amount of powerful aggravating evidence, even if petitioner established deficient performance, he has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the sentencer would have balanced the aggravating and mitigating circumstances differently. In addition, petitioner has not demonstrated that the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. See Lockhart, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 842. b. Failure to Object to the Wallace Statement Petitioner argues that Gagen’s failure to object to the introduction of the Wallace confession violated his right to effective counsel. Initially, the Court notes that Gagen did object to the admission of the Wallace confession on Sixth Amendment grounds, and the trial judge denied the motion. (R., Vol. V, 401-03). On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court denied petitioner’s Sixth Amendment argument. Jones I, 68 Ill.Dec. at 909-10, 447 N.E.2d at 167-68. However, petitioner also protests that Gagen’s objections were oral and generally insufficient, so the Court will examine whether Gagen’s objections were so inadequate as to constitute ineffective assistance. The record reflects that Gagen failed to file any written objection to the Wallace confession, even though the Court requested that constitutional objections be made in writing. (R., Vol. IV, 8). In addition, Gagen failed to object at several earlier opportunities, and made several ambiguous statements regarding the admissibility of the confession before finally stating his objection. However, during a conference in chambe