Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BENNETT, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I.INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.1356 II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.1357 III. FINDINGS OF FACT .1358 A. Undisputed Facts.1368 B. Disputed Facts.1359 IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS.1360 A. Age Discrimination And Reductions In Force. 1360 1. Fink’s Federal Age Discrimination Claim. 1360 a. Administrative prerequisites to suit under the ADEA.1360 b. The analytical framework for claims of age discrimination.1361 e. The prima facie case under the ADEA in a reduction-in-force case.1363 d. Fink’s prima facie case and showing of pretext.1364 2. Age Discrimination Under Iowa Law.1366 B. Disability Discrimination.'..1367 1. The Origins Of The ADA.1368 2. Disability Discrimination Under The ADA.1371 a. Analytical framework for ADA claims .1373 b. The prima facie case under the ADA .1373 c. Fink’s prima facie case.1376 2. Elements Of A Disability Discrimination Claim Under Iowa Law.1377 a. Protected disability. 1378 b. Fink’s disability.;.1378 C. Retaliation For Filing A Workers Compensation Claim .1379 1. Recognition Of The Public Policy Exception Under Iowa Law. 1379 2. Discharge For Filing A Workers Compensation Claim.1.1381 D. Intentional Interference With Employment Contract.1382 1. Interference With A Contract.1382 2. Interference With Business Advantages Or Relations.1382 E. Breach Of Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing.1383 F. Implied Contract.1384 1. The implied contract exception to at-will employment.1385 2. Fink’s Implied Contract Claim.1386 G. Discrimination Based On Political Affiliation Or Opinions.1387 H. Fink’s Damages Claims .1387 a. Punitive damages under Iowa Code Ch. 216 and Ch. 670 .1387 i. Punitive damages under Iowa Code Ch. 216.'.1388 ii. Municipal immunity from punitive damages under Iowa Code Ch. 670_1388 b. Liability for liquidated damages under the ADEA.1390 c. Kitzman’s liability.1391 I. Immunity Of The Grundy County Board Of Supervisors.1393 1. Standards for quasi-judicial immunity.1393 2. Quasi-judicial immunity of elected boards.1395 3. The Board’s claim of quasi-judicial immunity.1398 V. CONCLUSION .1398 In this employment discrimination case, the discharged employee has proceeded in the now typical fashion by presenting a cornucopia of federal and state statutory claims and state common-law causes of action. The employer has also responded in kind with a bounty of defenses, including the familiar employer’s incantation that the plaintiff has failed to generate a prima facie case of discrimination or failed to allege a claim supportable in law or fact. These claims and defenses must, of course, be treated with proper consideration. However, in addition to these familiar issues in employment litigation, the employer has introduced novel issues of common-law and statutory immunity of municipal employers and officials and quasi-judicial immunity of a local elected governmental board, which acted as an appellate body reviewing the employee’s grievance arising from her discharge. A former county employee has brought suit against her former supervisor, the county treasurer, as well as the county and the county board of supervisors alleging age and disability discrimination in violation of both federal and state law, plus state-law claims of retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim, intentional interference with an employment relationship, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of a covenant or implied contract to discharge only for good cause, and retaliation for political opinions or affiliations. The county board of supervisors has moved for summary judgment on the ground that it has absolute quasi-judicial immunity, because it acted only in a judicial capacity in reviewing the county treasurer’s decision to terminate the plaintiff. All defendants have moved for summary judgment asserting that the plaintiff cannot make out the necessary prima facie case on her discrimination claims, and further on the ground that they have offered an unrebutted legitimate reason, a reduction in force (RIF), for the termination. Defendants also raise specific arguments that the remaining claims are unsupportable in either law or fact, and attacking plaintiffs assertions of liability and punitive or liquidated damages against them. I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff Beverly Fink filed her petition at law in this matter in the Iowa district court in and for Grundy County on April 28, 1993, and demanded jury trial of all of the issues presented. Counsel for defendants- entered an appearance in the state court proceedings on May 5,1993, and filed a notice of removal of this action to this federal court on May 10, 1993. Defendants answered the petition at law in state court on May 13,1993, then filed a copy of the answer in federal court as a supplement to their Rule 20 list of pleadings filed in state court. On May 26, 1993, defendants also filed a jury demand on all issues presented in the petition, now properly called a complaint. Fink’s complaint is in eight counts each alleging violations of either federal or state law, or both, arising from her discharge from her position as a “motor vehicle specialist” in the Grundy County Treasurer’s Office on August 31, 1992, when she was 52 years old, after approximately twenty-five years of employment with the Treasurer’s Office. The defendants are Susan Kitzman, who was the Grundy County Treasurer and Fink’s supervisor, the Grundy County Board of Supervisors, and Grundy County, Iowa. Count I of the complaint alleges that Fink was discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and similar provisions of Iowa’s Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code § 216.6. Count II alleges disability discrimination in violation of Iowa Code § 216.6, the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-166, Nov. 21,1991,105 Stat. 1071. This count asserts that Fink’s disability is carpal tunnel syndrome, for which she underwent surgery in January of 1992. Count III alleges retaliatory discharge as the result of filing a workers compensation claim in connection with Fink’s carpal tunnel syndrome. Count IV alleges intentional interference on the part of Kitzman with Fink’s employment relationship with Grundy County. Count V alleges that Fink’s termination was in breach of an implied in fact covenant of good faith and fair dealing which required that she be discharged only for good cause. Count VI alleges that Fink’s termination was in violation of an implied in law covenant or contract of good faith and fair dealing which required that Fink be discharged only for good cause. Count VII alleges that Fink’s discharge violated an implied unilateral contract based on an ordinance of Grundy County which required that Fink be discharged only for good cause. Count VIII, the final count of the complaint, alleges that Fink was discharged in violation of a Grundy County ordinance that prohibits any discrimination based upon political opinions or affiliations. On July 18, 1994, the Grundy County Board of Supervisors filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it was entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity on Fink’s claims. The Board argues that it acted in a judicial capacity in hearing Fink’s grievance about her termination, thus serving as a board of appeal on an administrative decision. Fink resisted that motion for summary judgment on August 1, 1994, but, by leave of court, did not file a brief in support of her resistance until September 23, 1994. The Grundy County Board of Supervisors filed a reply to Fink’s resistance August 4, 1994, however. In the interim, on August 1, 1994, all defendants moved for summary judgment on all of the claims in Fink’s complaint. Fink resisted both motions for summary judgment on September 6, 1994, and filed a brief in resistance to the motions for summary judgment on September 23, 1994. On February 1, 1995, Fink moved to add additional authorities to her brief in resistance to the motions for summary judgment. On February 3,1995, this matter was reassigned to me following my appointment as a district judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa on August 26, 1994. This matter is now fully submitted, the court enters its ruling on the motions for summary judgment. II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes “that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine issues of fact away from juries.” Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1990). On the other hand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have authorized for nearly 60 years “motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, “summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ ” Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir.1992). The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: Rule 56. Summary Judgment (b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move for summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof. (c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon _ The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the ajfida-vits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) & (c) (emphasis added); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir.1994); Roth v. U.S.S. Great Lakes Fleet, Inc., 25 F.3d 707, 708 (8th Cir.1994); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.1993); Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir.1990); Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here Fink, and give Fink the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir.1994); Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1994); Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 545 (8th Cir.1993); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1991); Coday v. City of Springfield, 939 F.2d 666, 667 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.Ed.2d 416 (1992). Procedurally, the moving parties, here all defendants, Kitzman, Grundy County, and the Grundy County Board of Supervisors, bear “the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for their motion and identifying those portions of the record which show lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553); see also Reed v. Woodruff County, Ark., 7 F.3d 808, 810 (8th Cir.1993). The defendants are not required by Rule 56 to support their motions with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim. Id. “When a moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1355. Fink is required under Rule 56(e) to go beyond the pleadings, and by affidavits, or by the “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Although “direct proof is not required to create a jury question, ... to avoid summary judgment, ‘the facts and circumstances relied upon must attain the dignity of substantial evidence and must not be such as merely to create a suspicion.’ ” Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir.1985) (quoting Impro Products, Inc. v. Herrick, 715 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026, 104 S.Ct. 1282, 79 L.Ed.2d 686 (1984)), cert. denied sub nom. Metge v. Bankers Trust Co., 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S.Ct. 798, 88 L.Ed.2d 774 (1986). The necessary proof that the nonmoving party must produce is not precisely measurable, but the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1994). In Anderson, All U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, Celotex, All U.S. at 323-24,106 S.Ct. at 2553-54, and Matsushita, A15 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56, the Supreme Court established that a summary judgment motion should be interpreted by the trial court to accomplish its purpose of disposing of factually unsupported claims, and the trial judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Johnson v. Enron Corp., 906 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir.1990). The trial court, therefore, must “assess the adequacy of the nonmovants’ response and whether that showing, on admissible evidence, would be sufficient to carry the burden of proof at trial.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 396 (citing Celotex, All U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552). If Fink fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim with respect to which she has the burden of proof, then the defendants are “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Woodsmith, 904 F.2d at 1247. However, if the court can conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmovant, then summary judgment should not be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Burk, 948 F.2d at 492; Woodsmith, 904 F.2d at 1247. With these standards in mind, the court turns to consideration of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that “summary judgment should seldom be used in employment-discrimination cases.” Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1994) (citing Johnson v. Minnesota Historical Soc’y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir.1991); Hillebrand v. M-Tron Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 782, 102 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989)); see also Hardin v. Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262, 264 (8th Cir.1995) (“summary judgments should only be used sparingly in employment discrimination cases,” citing Haglof v. Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d 492, 495 (8th Cir.1990); Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 364). Summary judgment is appropriate only in “those rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion.” Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244). The court reasoned that “[bjecause discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant.” Id. (holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment); Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244. With these standards in mind, the court turns to consideration of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. III. FINDINGS OF FACT A. Undisputed Facts The record reveals that the following facts are not in dispute. In August of 1992, Fink, who was 52 years old, had been employed in the Grundy County Treasurer’s Office for approximately twenty-five years.' Although she had for some time been designated a deputy treasurer, in January of 1991, Fink and a coworker were redesignated as “Motor Vehicle Specialists” by the County Treasurer, defendant Kitzman. Kitzman was first appointed to the post of County Treasurer on May 1,1989, over other applicants to fill the position temporarily, including Fink. Kitzman was subsequently elected to the position in November of 1990. It appears from the complaint that Fink was approached as a candidate to run against Kitzman in the next election, but Fink asserts that she did not intend to run for election to the Grundy County Treasurer’s position. During her employment with the County, Fink suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. She was off work for some days in late 1991, and underwent surgery for the condition in January of 1992, during which time she also missed some days of work. However, she returned to work, with the only restriction placed upon her activities that she not lift heavy objects. This restriction does not appear to have impeded her performance of her job. Fink applied for workers compensation benefits for her carpal tunnel syndrome on the ground that such a condition was work-related. Fink did eventually obtain some workers compensation benefits. On August 31, 1992, Kitzman gave Fink notice of termination of her employment in the County Treasurer’s Office. Kitzman admits that prior to terminating Fink, she attempted to secure the voluntary retirement of the other “Motor Vehicle Specialist,” who was a few years older than Fink. Kitzman has always asserted that her decision to terminate Fink was because Kitzman believed that the Treasurer’s Office was overstaffed owing to declining workload, which in turn resulted from a decline in population in the county. However, Kitzman admits that she decided who to terminate and when that termination should take place within the space of about half-an-hour. Kitzman notified the Grundy County Board of Supervisors of her decision to terminate Kitzman. By statute, Kitzman did not need authority from the Board to terminate an employee, nor did she seek such approval. See Iowa Code Ch. 331. Fink’s position has since been eliminated by the Board and is no longer funded. No one was hired to replace Fink. Fink appealed her dismissal to the Grundy County Board of Supervisors. The Board, following an adversarial proceeding at which Fink was represented by counsel, affirmed Kitzman’s decision to terminate Fink. B. Disputed Facts There is a considerable dispute of fact over the reason or reasons for Fink’s termination. Kitzman asserts that she decided to reduce staff, without any directive from the Board, because technological and administrative changes, and a drop in the County’s population, justified such a reduction. Kitzman states that she chose to terminate Fink in order to reduce staffing in her office, as opposed to other employees, some of whom were younger and less experienced that Fink, because of Fink’s attitude, as demonstrated by Fink’s decision to take a vacation during one of the busy periods in the year for the Treasurer’s Office, and because of complaints about Fink from members of the public who had business in the treasurer’s office. Kitzman does not assert that these grounds were “good cause” for termination, only that they are the reasons Fink was chosen out of the possible employees to be terminated. Kitzman asserts that the “good cause” for her decision to terminate Fink was the need to reduce staff. Fink contends that Kitzman fired her because of her age, and because Kitzman perceived her to be disabled. Additionally, Fink contends that Kitzman fired her in retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim. Fink points to evidence that younger employees with fewer years of service were retained when she was terminated. She also points to Kitzman’s efforts to compel the only employee in the office older than Fink to retire as suggesting that Kitzman intended to remove older employees. Fink also asserts that Kitzman perceived her to be disabled because of her affliction with carpal tunnel syndrome. Fink states that Kitzman told her on more than one occasion not to attempt to get money out of the county for her carpal tunnel treatment. Kitzman counters that she did not know Fink ever obtained any money from the county, and, in fact, that it was her understanding that Fink’s worker’s compensation claim had been denied. IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS The court deems it most appropriate to address the motion for summary judgment filed by all of the defendants as to each of Fink’s claims seriatim. The court will then return to the question raised by the motion for summary judgment of defendant Grundy County Board of Supervisors, which is whether that body is entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity for its actions in affirming Kitzman’s discharge of Fink. The court’s analysis of the motion for summary judgment filed by all of the defendants therefore begins with discussion of Fink’s age discrimination claims and defendants’ proffer of a legitimate reason, a reduction in force, or RIF, for their decision to terminate Fink. A. Age Discrimination And Reductions In Force Fink has brought her age discrimination claims under both federal law, specifically, the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and under Iowa state law, found in Iowa Code Ch. 216 (formerly chapter 601A). The analysis of an age discrimination in employment claim begins with examination of the goals and prerequisites for suit under the ADEA and determination of the proper allocation of the burdens of proof on such a claim. This course is particularly appropriate, as Iowa applies the analytical framework and standards articulated in federal cases to claims under chapter 216, a matter the court will address further below. The court will therefore examine Fink’s ADEA claim first, then turn to her state age discrimination claim. 1. Fink’s Federal Age Discrimination Claim The ADEA’s goal is to “promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). Thus, the ADEA forbids employment discrimination against employees aged forty and older. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a); Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir.1993). It provides that it is unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). a. Administrative prerequisites to suit under the ADEA The ADEA requires that within 180 days of the alleged unlawful conduct by an employer, the employee file a charge outlining the unlawful conduct with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982). The EEOC then notifies the employer and seeks “to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.” Id. If the parties have not compromised after 60 days, the employee can file a civil suit under the ADEA. Id. See also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580, 98 S.Ct. 866, 870, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978) (notice must be given of the intention to sue so that the EEOC or Secretary of Labor can attempt to eliminate the alleged unlawful practice through informal methods); Brooks v. Monroe Sys. For Business, Inc., 873 F.2d 202, 205 (8th Cir.) (“The ADEA states that a civil action may not be commenced until sixty days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the EEOC,” citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853, 110 S.Ct. 154, 107 L.Ed.2d 112 (1989). Filing with the EEOC is a condition precedent to later filing a suit under the ADEA. Boge v. Ringland-Johnson-Crowley Co., 976 F.2d 448, 450-51 (8th Cir.1992) (filing of charge with EEOC is required before employee may initiate a civil suit under the ADEA); Heideman v. PFL, Inc., 904 F.2d 1262, 1265 (8th Cir.1990) (filing with EEOC is a “prerequisite” to suit under the ADEA), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026, 111 S.Ct. 676, 112 L.Ed.2d 668 (1991); Walker v. St. Anthony’s Medical Ctr., 881 F.2d 554, 556 (8th Cir.1989) (timely filing of EEOC charge is “prerequisite” to suit); Brooks, 873 F.2d at 205 (EEOC filing is a “condition precedent” to suit under the ADEA); Kriegesmann v. Barry-Wehmiller Co., 739 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.) (EEOC filing is condition precedent to suit), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984). Fink has met this prerequisite for filing suit under the ADEA. b. The analytical framework for claims of age discrimination The allocation of the burden of proof in ADEA cases has been held to be the same as in cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Eights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir.1993); Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 nn. 6 & 7 (8th Cir.1991). See also Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 888-89 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir.1990)); Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir.1993) (citing Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir.1989)); Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1425 n. 2 (10th Cir.1993) (citing MacDonald v. Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1119 (10th Cir.1991)); Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 180 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1568 (2d Cir.1989)); United States EEOC v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 957 F.2d 1446, 1450 (7th Cir.1992) (citing Karazanos v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir.1991)). Similarly, the burdens of establishing a prima facie ease of discrimination are the same under the ADEA, Title VII, and § 1983. Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 490-91 (8th Cir.1992), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Richmond v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, 957 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir.1992) (burden of showing prima facie case of discrimination is the same under Title VII, § 1981, § 1983, or the ADEA). It is axiomatic that employment discrimination need not be proved by direct evidence, and indeed, that doing so is often impossible, because, as the Supreme Court has said, “There will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.” Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir.) (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 355, 130 L.Ed.2d 310 (1994). Thus, in employment discrimination cases based on circumstantial evidence, courts apply the analytical framework of shifting burdens developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and refined in Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), and most recently in St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). Gaworski, 17 F.3d at 1108. Under McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, the employment discrimination plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by producing evidence that would entitle the plaintiff to prevail unless contradicted and overcome by evidence produced by the defendant. White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 985 F.2d 434, 435 (8th Cir.1993). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the ADEA, or § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the defendant terminated the plaintiff under circumstances which gave rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Davenport v. Riverview Gardens Sch. Dist., 30 F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir.1994); Johnson v. Minnesota Historical Soc’y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1242 (8th Cir.1991) (Title VII discriminatory discharge case). If a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing evidence that the employer made the questioned employment decision for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. White, 985 F.2d at 435. The employer’s explanation of its actions must be “clear and reasonably specific,” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. at 1096, but the employer’s burden of production has nonetheless been held to be “exceedingly light.” Batey v. Stone, 24 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir.1994) (citing Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir.1994)). If the employer meets this burden of production, the legal presumption that would justify a judgment as a matter of law based on the plaintiff’s prima facie case “simply drops out of the picture,” and the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the finder of fact that the proffered reasons are pretextual and that the employment decision was the result of discriminatory intent. St. Mary’s, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. The Supreme Court has made clear that the ultimate inquiry is whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983); White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 985 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1494 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 768, 130 L.Ed.2d 664 (1995); Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1242; Brooks v. Monroe Systems For Business, Inc., 873 F.2d 202, 204 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853, 110 S.Ct. 154, 107 L.Ed.2d 112 (1989); Washburn v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 831 F.2d 1404, 1408 (8th Cir.1987). However, if the defendant’s proffered reasons are rejected, the trier of fact may infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. St. Mary’s, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 971 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting St. Mary’s); EEOC v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 35 F.3d 356, 361 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting St. Mary’s); Gaworski, 17 F.3d at 1109 (quoting St. Mary’s); Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 2 F.3d 265, 266 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting St. Mary’s, - U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2749); Brooks, 873 F.2d at 204 (submission by the employer of a discredited reason for discharging or .failing to promote a person is itself evidence of discriminatory motive.). In two recent decisions, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has considered in more detail the plaintiff’s burden to show discriminatory intent when the employer has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. See Lidge-Myrtil v. Deere & Co., 49 F.3d 1308 (8th Cir.1995); Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, Minn., 47 F.3d 953 (8th Cir.1995). In Krenik, the court held that [t]o survive summary judgment at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of evidence of some additional facts that would allow a jury to find that the defendant’s proffered reason is pretext and that the real reason for its action was intentional discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Center, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2747. These additional facts may be limited solely to proof of pretext.... Krenik, 47 F.3d at 958; Lidge-Myrtil, 49 F.3d at 1310 (the plaintiff “must produce ‘some additional evidence beyond the elements of the prima facie ease’ that would allow a rational jury to reject [the employer’s] proffered reasons as a mere pretext for discrimination,” quoting Krenik). In Kre-nik, the court noted that the “additional facts” could be limited to evidence that would east disbelief and a suspicion of mendacity upon the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons, citing St. Mary’s Honor Center, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2749, but the court held that the plaintiff must produce “some additional evidence beyond the elements of the prima facie ease to support a finding of pretext. Thus, [plaintiff’s] argument that she was entitled to a full trial once both parties had met their initial burdens fails as a matter of law.” Krenik, 47 F.3d at 959. In Lidge-Myrtil, the court held, first, that the plaintiffs abilities alone cannot rebut the employer’s stated reasons for its action. Lidge-Myrtil, 49 F.3d at 1310. Next, the court rejected as inadequate plaintiffs “additional facts” in the form of a “single offhand hearsay comment by an unnamed co-worker” offered as proving discriminatory animus on the part of the employer. Id. at 1311. Finally, the plaintiff was unable to produce persuasive evidence of disparate treatment because she could identify no comparably situated employees not of her protected class who were treated differently. Id. The court will therefore consider, if Fink presents an adequate prima facie ease, if she has also presented “additional facts” to rebut the defendants’ proffer of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her discharge sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to discriminatory intent. However, the finding of discriminatory intent is generally for the trier of fact. Burger v. McGilley Memorial Chapels, Inc., 856 F.2d 1046, 1047 (8th Cir.1988). c. The prima facie case under the ADEA in a reduction-in-force case The importance of the prima facie showing is that it creates the inference that the employer terminated the plaintiff for an impermissible reason. Hardin, 45 F.3d at 264. However, the prima facie case criteria differ for each type of employment decision. Davenport, 30 F.3d at 944; Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223, 1231 (8th Cir.1986). Thus, in a case alleging age discrimination, the usual elements of the prima facie ease are: (1) that the plaintiff was a member of a protected group on the basis of his or her age; (2) that the plaintiff was performing his or her job at a level that met the employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) that plaintiff was discharged; and (4) that the employer replaced or attempted to replace the plaintiff with a younger person. Radabaugh, 997 F.2d at 447; Beshears, 930 F.2d at 1353; Raschick v. Prudent Supply, Inc., 830 F.2d 1497, 1499 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct. 1111, 99 L.Ed.2d 272 (1988); see also Rinehart v. City of Independence, Mo., 35 F.3d 1263, 1265-66 (8th Cir.1994) (in an ADEA case, it is not necessary that the plaintiff be replaced with a person from outside the protected class, only that the plaintiff be replaced by a younger person). However, as this case involves a discharge in the context of a purported reduction in force, a further modification of the prima facie case is necessary. In the context of a reduction in force, the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case cannot be shown because the position is not filled by another or left open, but eliminated or combined with another position. Hardin, 45 F.3d at 264; Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 364; Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (8th Cir.1985). Thus, in Holley, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff in a reduction in force ease must meet the first three requirements of the McDonnell Douglas grima facie showing and “must come forward with additional ... evidence that [race] was a factor in [the plaintiffs] termination.” Holley, 771 F.2d at 1166; see also Hardin, 45 F.3d at 264; Rinehart, 35 F.3d at 1267-68 (this “additional showing” that age was a factor in the termination is not an element of the usual prima facie case under the ADEA, only for reduction-in-force cases); Thomure v. Phillips Furniture Co., 30 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1255, 131 L.Ed.2d 135 (1995); Bashara v. Black Hills Corp., 26 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir.1994). In most reduction in force cases, the evidence generally demonstrates that the company had some kind of plan to reduce expenses by eliminating jobs. These plans generally include objective criteria by which to determine which jobs will be eliminated and often include objective evidence of a business decline. Bashara, 26 F.3d at 822; see also Hardin, 45 F.3d at 264-65 (“As we observed in Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 367, most companies implementing a RIF have a stated plan to reduce expenses by eliminating jobs and they also provide company decision-makers with objective criteria by which to determine which jobs to eliminate.”); Gaworski, 17 F.3d at 1109; Hillebrand v. M-Tron Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 363, 367. In both Hillebrand and Gaworski the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the absence of objective criteria to determine which jobs to eliminate and objective evidence of a business decline was sufficient evidence to make the additional showing that race had been a factor in the plaintiffs termination. Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 368; Gaworski, 17 F.3d at 1109-10. However, on its most recent contact with this issue in Hardin, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that “[w]hen a company’s decision to reduce its workforce is due to the exercise of its business judgment it need not provide evidence of financial distress to make it a ‘legitimate’ RIF.” Hardin, 45 F.3d at 265; Bashara, 26 F.3d at 824-25 (no requirement that a company be failing financially before embarking on a a RIF). The court went even further: [A] company does not need to provide objective criteria for determining who should be discharged to make the RIF “legitimate.” Whether criteria [are] provided does not overcome the fact that the company made a business decision to reduce its workforce and therefore had a legitimate reason for terminating qualified employees. Hardin, 45 F.3d at 265. However, even though a business judgment is sufficient to make a reduction in force “legitimate” under this standard, the employee must still show “additional evidence” that age was a factor in the employee’s discharge under the reduction in force. Id. at 265. Thus, in Hardin, the court approved the following formulation of the prima facie case of a plaintiff alleging age discrimination in the context of a RIF: 1) [the plaintiff] was at least forty years old at the time of termination; 2) [the plaintiffs] job performance met the employer’s legitimate expectations; 3) [the plaintiff] was terminated despite his performance; 4) [the plaintiffs] job continued to exist in its various parts; and 5) [the plaintiffs] age was a determining factor in defendants actions. Id.; Bashara, 26 F.3d at 823; Nelson v. Boatmen’s Bancshares, Inc., 26 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir.1994); Holley, 771 F.2d at 1165. d. Fink’s prima facie case and showing of pretext The court concludes that Fink has, at the least, generated a genuine issue of material fact on each element of her prima facie case of age discrimination in this reduction-in-force case. Plaintiff was within the protected age group at the time of her termination. Kitzman, while admitting that Fink’s performance entered into her decision to terminate her instead of other employees,' repeatedly asserts in her motion for summary judgment and supporting brief that she did not fire Fink for poor performance. Thus, at a minimum, there is a genuine issue of material fact that Fink was performing at a level that met her employer’s legitimate expectations. Fink was indeed terminated. As to the fourth element, whether Fink’s job continued in its various parts, defendants argue that Fink’s job was entirely “gone.” Plainly, this is not so. Defendants even concede as much when they agree that as the result of Fink’s termination, the remaining employees would simply have had more to do. The court is not persuaded that Fink’s job had to carry with it some unique duties for it to continue in its various parts after her termination. It is sufficient, the court believes, that the duties Fink previously performed, even if at the time she performed them other employees performed identical duties, still had to be done by someone after Fink’s termination, either by increasing the identical workload on remaining employees, or by assigning some or all of Fink’s workload as additional assignments to an employee who had not previously performed those duties. This issue was also raised in the Hardin decision. In that case, the plaintiff presented evidence that other engineers were transferred into the research and development division of the company around the same time as the plaintiff was dismissed and that there were several engineers within the division who held the same job title and had virtually the same duties and responsibilities as the plaintiff. Hardin, 45 F.3d at 265. The court concluded that this evidence generated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs job, in its various parts, continued to exist after his termination. Id. As in Hardin, the record here raises a genuine issue of material fact on whether Fink’s job continued in its various parts after her termination. Thus, the only sticking point on Fink’s prima facie case is whether or not she has shown “additional evidence” that age was a factor in her discharge under the RIF. Hardin, 45 F.3d at 265. In Hardin, the court considered allegations strikingly similar to those offered by Fink in the present case when it considered both the question of whether the plaintiff had made an adequate showing on this additional element of the prima facie ease in the context of a RIF, that age was a factor in the termination decision, and also in considering whether the plaintiff had made a showing of “additional facts” to rebut the employer’s proffered legitimate reason for the discharge. Hardin, 45 F.3d at 265-66. The court found that these allegations generated material issues of fact on both the final element of the prima facie and on the question of whether the defendant’s proffered legitimate reason was pretextual: [Plaintiff] first asserts that the cursory manner in which [the decision-maker] determined who to discharge suggests [the company] terminated him for an improper reason. [The decision-maker] acknowledged that he was free to terminate any two employees within his department from his lowest paid employees (custodial workers) to his highest paid employees. [The decision-maker] made his decision to fire [the plaintiff] and [another employee] after a thirty minute discussion with [his immediate subordinate]. [The decision-maker] found that [the plaintiff] and [the other employee] were the obvious persons to be terminated as “[t]hey had the poorest performance record, they were making the least contribution, they seemed to be the worst fit in the department, they had the least interpersonal skills, [and] they were not making a contribution to the department sufficiently to choose someone else.” [The decision-maker] made these conclusions without consulting with [the plaintiffs] direct supervisor and without reviewing [the plaintiffs] or any other employee’s personnel records. The only time [the decision-maker] had reviewed employee records was when he reviewed portions of [the plaintiffs] and other department employee’s personnel files upon being transferred to R & D in September of 1988. In the past, we have looked to an employer’s method of determining which employees to discharge for evidence of possible discriminatory intent. See Bashara, 26 F.3d at 825; Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 367. See also Christie v. Foremost Ins. Co., 785 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir.1986) (the method used by the defendant might “show that the defendant was not really trying to decide which employee had greater potential”). [The decision-maker’s] stated objective was to determine which two employees had the least potential and provided the least to the department. [The decision-maker’s] reliance on incomplete research and his failure to even consider other employees, raises the question whether [the decision-maker] was actually trying to determine which two employees had the least potential and therefore, raises a material issue of fact whether his stated reasons for choosing Hardin are pretextual. Hardin, 45 F.3d at 266. In the present case, Kitzman has acknowledged that there was no directive from the board of supervisors for reducing the workforce, nor a general plan for undertaking such a reduction, only her own view that the office was overstaffed. However, under Hardin, Kitzman’s “business judgment” that her office was overstaffed is sufficient to make a reduction in force legitimate even without evidence of financial distress or some kind of plan to reduce expenses by eliminating jobs involving objective criteria by which to determine which jobs will be eliminated and without objective evidence of a business decline. Even if Kitzman’s reduction in force was legitimate, the court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact generated in the record concerning the fifth element of Fink’s prima facie case, her showing that age was a determining factor, precluding summary judgment. Fink argues that Kitz-man made a spur of the moment decision to terminate her in an angry reaction to Fink’s taking vacation time during a busy period in the Treasurer’s Office. Kitzman argues that she decided to terminate Fink on the basis of her work performance, poor attitude, complaints from persons with business in the Treasurer’s Office, and her decision to take time off at the busiest time of the year. These allegations and counterallegations are similar to those raised in Hardin. In the present case, Kitzman retained employees with a shorter period of service and less experience with the range of tasks within the Treasurer’s Office. In this case, as in Hardin, the court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact generated by the hastiness of Kitzman’s discharge decision and the lack of consideration of other employees for discharge. Kitzman’s position is not enhanced by her statement that she first attempted to obtain the voluntary retirement of an employee even older than Fink. Her targeting of another, even older employee, as someone she urged to retire before terminating Fink suggests an age discriminatory animus, because in both that employee’s case and in Finks, it appears from the record that Kitzman did not consider terminating younger employees with fewer years of service and less experience in the office prior to urging the one employee to retire and terminating the other. There is therefore some additional showing that age was a factor in Kitzman’s decisions regarding staffing of her office and in particular in her decision to terminate Fink. Furthermore, as in Hardin, this same evidence generates a genuine issue of material fact that Kitzman’s proffered reasons are pretex-tual. Defendants are therefore not entitled to summary judgment on Fink’s age discrimination claim under the ADEA. The court turns next to consideration of Fink’s state-law age discrimination claim. 2. Age Discrimination Under Iowa Law In the past, the Iowa Supreme Court has applied federal principles and analytical framework to civil rights cases under Iowa Code Ch. 216. Landals v. George A. Rolfes Co., 454 N.W.2d 891, 893-94 (Iowa 1990) (in the past, the Iowa Supreme Court has applied federal principles and analytical framework to civil rights eases under Iowa Code Ch. 216); Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631-33 (Iowa 1989) (civil rights cases brought under chapter 601A (now 216) will be “guided by federal law” and “federal cases”); King v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 334 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1983) (same). However, the federal act does not preempt state age discrimination laws, so that the state court looks to its own act to determine if plaintiff is a protected person. Hulme, 449 N.W.2d at 631. Membership in the protected class is age-neutral under Iowa Code Ch. 216, which prohibits discrimination in employment “because of age” of an employee, with the exception that under Iowa Code § 216.6(8), persons under eighteen years of age are not covered if they are not considered by law to be adults, and under Iowa Code § 216.6(6), the employee is over forty-five years of age in an apprenticeship program. Hulme, 449 N.W.2d at 632. Under Iowa’s age discrimination law, Iowa Code Ch. 216, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie ease of age discrimination if the plaintiff shows that he or she is a member of the protected age group, the plaintiff was qualified for the job he or she was performing, the plaintiff was discharged, and the plaintiff was replaced by a younger person who had comparable or lesser qualifications. Landals, 454 N.W.2d at 894; Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446 N.W.2d 451, 453 (Iowa 1989). However, as do federal courts of this circuit in a reduction-in-force ease, Iowa courts recognize that the employee cannot rely solely on termination to establish a prima facie case when an employer makes cutbacks due to economic necessity. Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1165 (8th Cir.1985). Nor is it sufficient for an employee to show only that she was the victim of a cutback in the labor force necessitated by depressed economic conditions and that the job was combined into the duties of a younger employee to meet the requirements of a prima facie case. Sahadi v. Reynolds Chemical, 636 F.2d 1116, 1117 (6th Cir.1980). The plaintiff must come forward with additional evidence that age was a factor in her termination. Duffy [v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp.], 738 F.2d [1393,] 1395 [ (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087, 105 S.Ct. 592, 83 L.Ed.2d 702 (1984) ]. Wing v. Iowa Lutheran Hasp., 426 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Iowa Ct.App.1988). In Wing, the “additional evidence” that age was a factor in the discharge of the plaintiff despite the reduction in force was that a younger person took over the plaintiffs former responsibilities, and all of the other employees retained in her department following her departure were also younger than the plaintiff, had substantially less time on the job, and were making substantially less per hour than the plaintiff. Id. In the present case, Fink is a member of the protected class under the Iowa age discrimination statute. The court also recognizes that Fink at least arguably has shown the other elements of his prima facie case. She was qualified for her position in the Treasurer’s Office, she was discharged, and following her discharge, younger employees with less time on the job were retained. The court therefore turns to the next stage in the analysis of Fink’s state-law age discrimination claim, which, as under federal law, is consideration of the defendant’s proffered reasons for the discharge and attempts of the plaintiff to rebut that reason as pretextual. The framework for that analysis under Iowa law is the same as under federal law. Landals, 454 N.W.2d at 893-94; Hulme, 449 N.W.2d at 631-33; King, 334 N.W.2d at 601. Suffice it to say that defendants have offered, and Fink has challenged, a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Fink’s discharge. Fink need not show that age was defendants’ sole or exclusive consideration, but must prove that age made a difference or was “a determinative factor” in the employer’s decision. Hulme, 449 N.W.2d at 632 (citing Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 897 (3d Cir.1980)). As with Fink’s federal age discrimination claim, there is a genuine issue of material fact on these issues on her state-law age discrimination claim. Defendants are therefore not entitled to summary judgment on Fink’s state-law age discrimination claim. B. Disability Discrimination As with her age discrimination claim, Fink has brought her disability discrimination claims under both federal and state law. Her federal disability discrimination claim is based on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-166, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071. Her state-law disability claim is brought pursuant to Iowa Code Ch. 216. The court will consider the federal claim first, then turn to the state-law claim. 1. The Origins Of The ADA The ADA provides that no employer “shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to ... the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 12112. This language of the ADA is substantially identical to that of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which forbids discrimination “by reason of his handicap.” Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir.1995). The ADA and its attendant regulations were enacted, in part, to address perceived inadequacies in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 330 (3d Cir.1995) (describing in detail the history of Congressional efforts to attack disability discrimination). Congress and the Executive found that section 504 of the prior act simply was not working as a means of eradicating discrimination and segregation in this country. For example, Congress found that, even though section 504 had been the law for seventeen years, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). Because Congress found further that public officials historically have been among the major perpetrators of segregated services in this country, see Timothy M. Cook, The Americans With Disabilities Act: The Move To Integration, 64 Temp. L.Rev. 393, 400, 416 (identifying state laws mandating segregation of persons with disabilities and suggesting an analogy with the “Jim Crow laws” mandating racial discrimination), Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, incorporates the “non-discrimination principles” of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but extends them to state and local governments. Helen L., 46 F.3d at 331; Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 300 (3d Cir.1994). Section 202 of Title II provides as follows: [N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA was not the first attempt to address the limitations of existing legislation to eradicate discrimination on the basis of disabilities. Periodically through the mid-1980s there had been attempts to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include people with disabilities. See, e.g., H.R. 370, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). In 1983, the United States Commission of Civil Rights observed that “[hjandicap discrimination and, as a result, its remedies differ in important ways from other types of discrimination and their remedies,” therefore disability rights laws explicitly modelled on prior civil rights statutes were not necessarily effective. U.S. Comm’n On Civil Rights, ACCOmmodating The SpectRum of Individual Abilities 48, 149 (1983). A federal judge had a more blunt assessment: [T]he Title VI and Title IX models were not automatically adaptable to the problem of discrimination against the handicapped, but involved a very different undertaking. Indeed, attempting to fit the problem of discrimination against the handicapped into the model remedy for race discrimination is akin to fitting a square peg into a round hole.... Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F.Supp. 171, 206 (D.N.H.1981). Another commentator identified more specific weaknesses of prior laws that attempted to address disability discrimination: Problems involved in trying to transfer principles and legal analysis developed in race and sex discrimination cases wholesale to disability discrimination were interwoven with other difficulties and shortcomings of disability nondiscrimination statutes prior to the ADA. Experience with the application of such prior statutes, including section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, uncovered or highlighted weaknesses of such laws arising from their statutory language, the limited extent of their coverage, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, and erratic judicial interpretations. Legal commentators have extensively described and lamented the flaws in the working, interpretation, and implementation of federal disability nondiscrimination statutes prior to the ADA. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans With Disabilities Act: Analysis And Implications Of A Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 413, 430-31 (1991) (footnotes omitted). In enacting the ADA, Congress found that “[h]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and ... such forms of discrimination ... continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). Helen L., 46 F.3d 325, 332. The purpose of the ADA in light of this history of discrimination was summarized by Congressman Dellums: The history of different, separate, and unequal treatment of persons with disabilities, especially those with severe disabilities, could not be clearer. That history is in fact a stark reminder of the prejudice and misunderstanding that has characterized the treatment of minority citizens. This disparate treatment establishes an abundant factual predicáte for the relief granted by [the ADA], The Americans With Disabilities Act is a plenary civil rights statute designed to halt all practices that segregate persons with disabilities and those which treat them inferior [sic] or differently. By enacting the ADA, we are making a conscious decision to reverse a sad legacy of segregation and degradation. 136 Cong.Rec. H2599 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dellums). Almost ten years earlier, a disabled legal scholar and disability rights advocate had written that [t]he history of society’s formal methods for dealing with handicapped people can be summed up in two words: segregation and inequality. Individuals with handicapping conditions have faced an almost universal conspiracy to shunt them aside from the mainstream of society and to deny them an equal share of benefits and opportunities available to others.... At every juncture, the handicapped person has met with attempts to “push” him or her aside and to withhold that which is taken for granted from other persons. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Legal Rights Of HANDICAPPED PERSONS: CASES, MATERIALS, And Text 51 (1980). Before passing the ADA, Congress conducted fourteen hearings at the Capitol, and another sixty-three field hearings, and reviewed hundreds of discrimination diaries submitted for the legislative record by persons with disabilities. AMERICANS With Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S.933 Before the Senate Comm, on Labor and Human Resources and the Subgomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (testimony of Justin Dar, Chairman of Task Force on Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities). Congress was confronted with testimony tha