Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ORENSTEIN, United States Magistrate Judge: The plaintiffs in this action, former employees of the Town of North Hempstead, challenge the termination of their employment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, hereinafter “RICO”), and common law fraud. Plaintiffs bring this action against the Town of North Hemp-stead, the former town supervisor, members of the Town Council, other former town officials, the president of the town Civil Service Employees Association and the town supervisor’s political fund-raising organization and its treasurer. Plaintiffs assert that they were terminated from their positions as public employees solely on the basis of their political affiliation and in retaliation for their political activities. (Compl. ¶2.) Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 12(c), and 9(b). Defendants Town of North Hempstead, Benjamin L. Zwirn, May Newburger, Anthony D’Urso, Gerard Cunningham, Richard Middlemark, William Biamonte, and Lawrence Nedelka (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Municipal” or “Town” defendants) move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) 12(b)(6) or in the alternative pursuant to FRCP 9(b) for failure to plead allegations of fraud with particularity. Defendant Paul Nehrich as “President of the Town of North Hempstead Civil Service Employees Association” (hereinafter “CSEA”) moves to dismiss all claims pursuant to FRCP 12(c). (CSEA Mem. of Law at 1.) Defendant “Friends of Ben Zwim” also moves to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(c). BACKGROUND Plaintiffs are former employees of the Town of North Hempstead who were discharged during the period of December 31, 1991 to April 10, 1992, although ten of the thirteen plaintiffs were discharged on December 31, 1991. (Compl. ¶¶ 5-17.) All plaintiffs are registered Republicans. (Compl. ¶¶2, 5-17.) All defendants, except Cunningham, are members of the Democratic Party. (Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs allege that defendants met secretly and targeted for termination, Town employees who were active in Republican politics or had family members who were active Republicans. (Id.) It is alleged that the targeted employees were pressured by the defendants to disavow their Republican affiliation in exchange for their jobs. (Compl. ¶47.) Plaintiffs claim that defendants’ stated reasons and motive for the dismissals, that they were necessary due to a fiscal crisis and resulting budget cuts, are pretextual. (Compl. ¶¶ 48-50.) Thomas Rini was Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent of Highways. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Diane O’Donnell was a Traffic Technician I. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Richard E. Ryan was also a Traffic Technician I. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Edward Winrow was Administrative Assistant to the Commissioner of Community Services. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Barbara Laumenede was a Payroll Supervisor. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Lawrence Ragona was a Laborer II. (Compl. ¶ 10.) John Infranca was a Recreation Aide. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Helen Delaney Harris was an Investigator Aide. (Compl. ¶ 12.) John CiborowsH was a Laborer I. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Vincent Anthony was Chief Research Assistant. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Rhoda Becker was Commissioner of Planning and Research Development of the Town of North Hempstead. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Giacomo Ciccone was a Labor Supervisor I. (Compl. ¶ 16.) Charles O’Connor was a Multiple Residence Inspector I. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Eight of the plaintiffs were elected members of the Nassau County Republican Committee. (Compl. ¶¶ 5-17.) Plaintiffs further allege that defendants knew these plaintiffs to be active Republicans. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Benjamin L. Zwirn was Supervisor of the Town of North Hempstead, and a member of the Town Board; he is a Democrat. (Compl. ¶ 19.) May Newburger, Anthony D’Urso, and Barbara Johnson were Town Board members and are Democrats. (Compl. ¶¶ 20-22.) Gerard Cunningham was a Republican Town Board member. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Richard Middlemark was the Executive Assistant to the Supervisor. (Compl. ¶24.) Paul Nehrich is an employee of the Town of North Hempstead (Compl. ¶25), and is Unit President of the North Hemp-stead Unit of Local 830, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, which Unit on May 1, 1993, became part of Nassau County Municipal Employees Local 882 of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. (Answer of Defendant Nehrich, Individually, at ¶ 26.) William Biamonte was Administrative Assistant to the Supervisor and Director of Legislative Affairs. (Compl. ¶ 26.) Lawrence Nedelka is Commissioner of Finance. (Compl. ¶ 27.) The Town of North Hempstead (“Town”) is a municipal corporation according to the laws of the State of New York. (Compl. ¶ 28.) Friends of Ben Zwirn was and is an unincorporated political committee formed to promote the election of defendant Zwirn. (Compl. ¶ 29.) Alice Peckelis is Treasurer of Friends of Ben Zwirn. (Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiffs are suing all defendants in their official and individual capacities except Cunningham and Peckelis, who are being sued in their official capacities only. (Compl. ¶32.) Plaintiffs allege that Zwirn and defendants Middlemark, Nedelka, and Biamonte created a budget for the Town as well as to engagfe] in a scheme and conspiracy to defraud the Town, as well as plaintiffs and other Republicans and the Nassau County Civil Service Commission through the use of implied extortion, strong-armed tactics and other threats and harassing measures for the purpose of demonstrating to Town employees who were members of the Republican Party that in the event they did not disavow their loyalties to the Republican Party and/or switch their registration from Republican to another, they would be terminated. (Compl. ¶44.) Plaintiffs claim that defendants’ true motivation in terminating them was so that the defendants would be free to hire individuals associated with them or the Democratic Party and who contributed to them or the Democratic Party without regard to the competence of said individuals and without regard to the various Civil Service laws, regulations and other requirements for hiring of Town employees. (Compl. ¶ 45.) It is alleged that Zwirn “and/or his agents” told Republican employees at various Town forums that they would be terminated, as Zwirn did not intend to continue to employ individuals who had worked under the previous Republican Town administration. (Compl. ¶ 46.) Plaintiffs claim they had “implied knowledge ... that all active Republican Town employees were being targeted for termination.” (Compl. ¶ 47.) DISCUSSION On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true. Leatherman, v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination,—U.S.-,-, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1161, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Bolt Electric v. City of New York, 53 F.3d 465, 469 (1995); Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 11 F.3d 21, 22 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied—U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 572, 130 L.Ed.2d 489 (1994). In addition, the court will draw all inferences in plaintiffs’ favor. Ferran, 11 F.3d at 22. Thus defendants must demonstrate that plaintiffs’ claims cannot succeed under any interpretation of the facts. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232-33, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir.1991). The complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief against the defendants based upon violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) through violations of the plaintiffs First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendment rights, and common-law fraud. I. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS Plaintiffs’ fourth and fifth causes of action allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the loss of their employment on the basis of their political affiliation. (Compl. ¶¶ 112, 120.) The fourth cause of action alleges violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments; the fifth cause of action alleges violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth amendments. (Compl. ¶¶ 112,120.) Each defendant moves to dismiss the § 1983 claims for failure to state a claim. A MUNICIPAL DEFENDANTS’ LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY Each Town Board member, including Zwirn, is named in their official and individual capacity except Cunningham, who is named only in his official capacity. The Complaint alleges that plaintiffs’ employment was terminated by implementation of the 1992 Town budget. (Compl. ¶¶ 45, 49.) The Town Board members move to dismiss the complaint against them in all respects, asserting legislative immunity from suit. (Municipal Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, hereinafter “Mun.Defs.’ Mem. of Law” at 21.) The common-law doctrine of official immunity governs civil liability for public servants acting in their legislative capacity. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731-32, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1974, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980) (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951) (recognizing legislative immunity of state legislators in § 1983 suits for both damage and equitable relief)); see also Star Distributors, Ltd. v. Marino, 613 F.2d 4, 6-7 (2d Cir.1980). Absolute legislative immunity has been extended to regional legislators. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1179, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979). A majority of circuit courts have held that local legislators are also entitled to legislative immunity, by finding no distinction between the policy of applying legislative immunity to state, regional or municipal legislators. Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1992) (collecting cases). The Second Circuit concurs in this holding. Orange Lake Assoc., Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214, 1224 (2d Cir.1994) (Town Board members); Goldberg, 973 F.2d at 72-73 (dicta); see also Orange v. County of Suffolk, 830 F.Supp. 701, 704 (E.D.N.Y.1993) (applying legislative immunity to county executive and county legislators). This Court holds that the legislators of the Town of North Hempstead are entitled to legislative immunity for acts within the scope of their legislative authority. However, it is well settled that the municipal entity has no claim to § 1983 immunity. See Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 11 F.3d 21, 23 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) and Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.1992)), cert. denied,—U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 572, 130 L.Ed.2d 489 (1994). 1. Official-Capacity Claims The Municipal defendants assert that the claims should be dismissed against them in all respects on the basis of their legislative immunity. (Mun.Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 21.) Granting such a motion would presumably include the claims made against them in their official-capacity. However, a public officer named as a defendant in his/her official-capacity in a § 1983 suit is not entitled to assert personal immunity defenses, but only the immunities available to the governmental entity. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-27, 112 S.Ct. 358, 362, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3106, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980)); Goldberg v. Whitman, 740 F.Supp. 118 (D.Conn.1989) (denying motion to dismiss official-capacity suits on basis of legislative immunity), aff. sub. nom Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.1992); Herbst v. Domkas, 701 F.Supp. 964, 969-70 (D.Conn.1988) (same). As the Town of North Hempstead cannot claim immunity under § 1983, Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 11 F.3d at 23, the Town defendants in their official capacity cannot assert immunity. Nevertheless, “official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 n. 55, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A plaintiff who prevails in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity as the real party in interest. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 23-25, 112 S.Ct. at 361; Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105. Where the governmental entity can itself be held liable for damages as a result of its official policy, a suit naming the legislators in their official capacity is redundant. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67 & n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 3105-06 & n. 14; Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471, 105 S.Ct. 873, 877-78, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985) (official capacity claim against public officer is claim against the office held by that person, rather than against the particular individual who occupies that office at the time the claim arose). Here the claimed injury is allegedly the result of a policy of the municipality, i.e., the passage of a budget reduction plan. (Compl. ¶ 119.) Therefore, claims against its officers in their official capacities are in reality claims against the Town of North Hemp-stead itself. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3104-05. Consequently, the official-capacity claims against Zwirn, both as Supervisor and Board Member, and Newburger, D’Urso, Johnson and Cunningham, as Town Board Members, must be dismissed, not because these parties have immunity but merely because the Town is the real party in interest. See e.g., Orange v. County of Suffolk, 830 F.Supp. at 706-07 (official-capacity claims redundant because claim is made against local governmental entity) (citing Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir.1991) and Kohn v. Muda, 776 F.Supp. 348 (N.D.Ill.1991); cf. Goldberg v. Whitman, 740 F.Supp. at 120-21 (motion to dismiss official-capacity claims on legislative immunity denied); Dusanenko v. Maloney, 560 F.Supp. 822, 827-28 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (finding immunity from personal liability for individual defendants but no immunity for the municipality), aff'd, 726 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.1984). Similarly, the official capacity claims against each of the appointed Town officials must be dismissed. This includes official capacity claims against Middlemark as Executive Assistant to the Supervisor, Biamonte as Director of Legislative Affairs, and Nedelka as Commissioner of Finance. Each of these Town employees are named because of their involvement as legislative aides in developing the plan to eliminate the plaintiffs’ positions. (Compl. ¶¶57, 58.) Therefore, any official-capacity § 1983 claim against these town employees is a redundant method of stating a claim against the Town itself. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 n. 55, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). 2. Individual-Capacity Claims The Municipal defendants also move to dismiss all claims against them in their individual capacity based upon legislative immunity. (Mun.Defs.Mem. of Law at 21.) These defendants maintain that because the complained of actions involve the approval of resolutions effecting budget cuts, they are “absolutely immune from suit.” (Id.) a. Individual Board Members Legislative immunity protects a legislator from being sued under § 1983 in his/her individual capacity for legitimate legislative acts. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377, 71 S.Ct. 783, 788, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951); Orange Lake Assoc, v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d at 1224 (town board members); Goldberg, 973 F.2d at 72-73 (same); Orange v. County of Suffolk, 830 F.Supp. 701, 704 (E.D.N.Y.1993) (county executive and county legislators); Dusanenko, 560 F.Supp. at 827 (town board members). The Supreme Court has endorsed a “functional” analysis to determine whether legislative immunity is available. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). A court identifies and analyzes the “nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and ... evaluated] the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions.” Id. Here, the plaintiffs claim that their positions were eliminated by resolutions passed by a majority of the Town Board (Compl. ¶ 49.) Defendants argue that such budgeting decisions are properly within the legislative function of a Town Board under New York Town Law §§ 51, 60, 64, 106-109 (McKinney 1987). The plaintiffs, relying on Forrester, argue that employment decisions are administrative, not legislative, and therefore not entitled to immunity. (Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, hereinafter “Pls.Mem. in Opp’n” at 23.) In the alternative, plaintiffs argue it is premature to determine the nature of the exercise here. (Id.) The alleged facts establish that budget lines for many civil service positions of the Town were eliminated by the vote of the Town Board. (Compl. ¶ 49.) As a result of this official act, the plaintiffs’ employment was terminated. The decision to hire or fire any particular employee within a position is arguably administrative. See Visser v. Magnarelli, 542 F.Supp. 1331 (N.D.N.Y.1982) (decision to deny rehiring particular former city employee, even though by vote of city council, administrative function); Detz v. Hoover, 539 F.Supp. 532, 543 (E.D.Pa.1982) (“whether defendants’ failure to rehire plaintiff was an administrative or legislative function does not admit to facile resolution. However, we believe that a municipality’s employment decisions whether they regard hiring, firing or a failure to reinstate, are essentially administrative in nature”); contra Dusanenko v. Maloney, 560 F.Supp. 822, 827 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (members of town board acted in legislative capacity in failing to reappoint deputy town attorney and reducing salary of supervisor’s confidential secretary). However, the elimination of the position itself is a legislative act, notwithstanding that the employee who holds that position is then terminated or otherwise adversely effected. See Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir.) (elimination of city employees positions by budget resolution “uniquely legislative function”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815, 111 S.Ct. 56, 112 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990); Rateree v. Rockett, 852 F.2d 946, 950 (7th Cir.1988) (elimination of certain jobs by budgetary decision “quintessential legislative function, reflecting the legislators’ ordering of policy priorities in the face of limited financial resources”); Drayton v. Mayor and Council of Rockville, 699 F.Supp. 1155 (D.Md.1988) (defendants entitled to legislative immunity for budgetary elimination of plaintiffs position notwithstanding claims of discriminatory motive), aff'd, 885 F.2d 864 (4th Cir.1989); Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1983) (elimination of assistant building inspector position by enacting ordinance was legislative function); Orange, 830 F.Supp. at 705 (adoption of budgetary resolution which eliminated plaintiffs’ positions was legislative act); Herbst, 701 F.Supp. at 968 (elimination of police lieutenant’s position by budget reduction resulting in demotion of plaintiff “clearly a legislative action”). The plaintiffs argue that immunity should be unavailable, notwithstanding that the positions were eliminated, because the plaintiffs lost their jobs and their functions were assumed by employees in remaining positions. (Pls.Mem. in Opp’n at 23.) This argument is of no avail. In Rateree, the Seventh Circuit found the defendant City Commissioners absolutely immune from suit for voting to eliminate funding for the plaintiffs’ positions, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ claim that they were first harassed and then discharged based on their political views rather than budgetary considerations. 852 F.2d at 951. The Rateree court held that the fact that individuals lost their jobs did not transform a legislative act to one of an administrative nature. Id. at 950. In fact, the very policy underlying legislative immunity is premised on the fact that [bjecause government officials are engaged by definition in governing, their decision will often have adverse effects on other persons. When officials are threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant to their official duties, they may well be induced to act with an excess of caution or otherwise skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their conduct. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223, 108 S.Ct. at 542. Therefore, this Court finds that plaintiffs’ § 1983 cause of action against the Town Board members personally, must be dismissed. The Town Board members acted within the scope of their legitimate legislative capacity in voting to eliminate the funding for plaintiffs’ positions. Even assuming an illegitimate motive in voting for the budget resolutions, the Board members are entitled to personal immunity for these legislative acts. See e.g. Rateree, 852 F.2d at 951; Orange, 830 F.Supp. at 705. b. Zwirn as Town Supervisor Also relying on Forrester, plaintiffs assert that Zwirn, as chief executive of the Town, is not a legislator and therefore not entitled to assert legislative immunity. (Pls.Mem. in Opp’n at 24.) Presumably plaintiffs are analogizing the dictum of Forrester that state executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official acts to the same extent as the President of the United States. See 484 U.S. at 226, 108 S.Ct. at 543-44. However, the Municipal defendants do not assert Zwim’s immunity as an executive, but only with respect to his participation in approving legislated Board resolutions. (Mun. Defs.Mem. of Law at 21.) Although defendant Zwirn is chief executive of the Town, he has legislative responsibilities in his dual capacity as a Town Board member. N.Y.Town Law §§ 60, 63 (McKinney 1987); see also Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that a mayor, although the executive officer, may still have legislative functions); Orange, 830 F.Supp. at 706 (county executive entitled to legislative immunity for act of signing resolution eliminating county civil service positions). Active participation in the legislative process entitles an executive to absolute immunity. Aitchison, 708 F.2d at 99. Zwirn is therefore entitled to legislative immunity and therefore the § 1983 claims against him personally must be dismissed. c. Town Legislative Aides The Court holds that Middlemark, Biamonte, and Nedelka are also extended legislative immunity in their individual capacities for the § 1983 claims. As noted above, these three individuals are named in the complaint as a result of their capacity as high-level advisors to the supervisor and Board with respect to the development of the planned elimination of the plaintiffs’ positions by Board resolution. (Compl. ¶¶57, 58.) The official immunity available to legislators is extended to legislative aides “insofar as the conduct of the [aide] would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself.” Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2623, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). This “legislative aide” immunity has been extended to both state and local government officials. Hudson v. Burke, 617 F.Supp. 1501, 1509-10 (N.D.Ill.1985), aff'd, 913 F.2d 427 (7th Cir.1990) (city finance committee chairman); Aitchison v. Raffiani 708 F.2d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir.1983) (borough attorney acting as legal aide in the course of legislative drafting); Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 371 (8th Cir.1980) (“committee counsel” to state senatorial committee members). Although the Municipal defendants, which include these three particular defendants (Mun.Defs.Mem. of Law at 2), do not explicitly assert the legislative privilege with respect to Middlemark, Biamonte, and Nedelka, it nevertheless follows from the assertion of the argument in favor of the individual Board members (Mun.Defs.Mem. of Law at 21), that for the reasons stated, the aides are entitled to legislative immunity in that the complaint questions their conduct in the course of their duties in assisting to develop this legislation. Therefore the individual-capacity § 1983 claims against Middlemark, Biamonte, and Nedelka must be dismissed. B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE § 1983 CLAIMS Plaintiffs allege that the elimination of their positions, resulting in termination of their employment, was solely based on their political affiliation. ■ (Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs assert that these terminations violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Compl. ¶ 112), and the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. (Compl. ¶ 120.) The defendants argue that the First Amendment § 1983 causes of action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because the defendants were not “fired” but that their positions were merely eliminated by a policy-based, large-scale budget cut, and therefore no constitutional claim can arise. (Mun.Defs.Mem. of Law at 16.) As to the other constitutional claims, the defendants argue that they are simply “makeweight.” (Id. at 17.) 1. First Amendment Claim a. Town of North Hempstead Plaintiffs argue that these budget cut job eliminations were conceived in a manner which violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the trilogy of Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980), and Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990). (Pls.Mem. in Opp’n at 14-15.) The sum of this trilogy of cases is that a governmental employment decision based upon political patronage may be actionable as a First Amendment violation. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 69-71, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 2734-35, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990) (discussing Branti and Elrod). The Municipal Defendants assert that the § 1983 causes of action should be dismissed because the above noted cases do not apply to the facts here. (Mun.Defs.Mem. of Law at 15.) Defendants attempt to distinguish each of the above referenced cases and the instant circumstances based on the fact that the Elrod trilogy involves political patronage employment decisions regarding existing positions, whereas here the positions were eliminated altogether by budget resolutions. (Id. at 16.) The defendants assert that the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim is thus one of first impression and does not fall within the doctrine first articulated in Elrod. (Mun.Defs.Mem. of Law at 14.) The Municipal defendants argue that no First Amendment claim arises because the plaintiffs were not “fired,” but that their positions were merely eliminated by “large scale, unconditional, and unaltered elimination of government jobs.” (Mun.Defs.Mem. of Law at 16.) The defendants further argue that the First Amendment is not implicated as under Elrod, Branti, or Rutan, because no plaintiff alleges their position was lost to a Democrat. (Mun.Defs.Reply Br. at 16.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has previously recognized a § 1983 cause of action where a public employee asserted that his position was eliminated by legislative action in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. Vezzetti v. Pellegrini, 22 F.3d 483 (2d Cir.1994); Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.1992); see also Herbst v. Daukas, 701 F.Supp. 964, 967 n. 2 (D.Conn.1988). This district, on facts very similar to those presented here, also recognized a § 1983 cause of action based on the First Amendment where civil service positions were eliminated by legislation. Orange v. County of Suffolk, 830 F.Supp. 701 (E.D.N.Y.1993). In addition, the Third and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, and lower courts in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have also formd similar claims cognizable in the face of budget reduction defenses. Rateree v. Rockett, 630 F.Supp. 763, 772-73 (N.D.Ill.1986) (denying motion to dismiss § 1983 claim against city for alleged politically motivated budget cuts eliminating plaintiffs’ positions), aff'd, 852 F.2d 946 (7th Cir.1988); Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir.1983) (substantively recognizing claim against municipality for ordinance abolishing plaintiffs position, but dismissing complaint on statute of limitations grounds); Lupo v. Voinovich, 858 F.Supp. 699, 703-04 (S.D.Ohio 1994) (upholding claim of politically motivated abolishment of position); Rabkin v. Dean, 856 F.Supp. 543, 548-49 (N.D.Cal.1994) (recognizing allegation of politically motivated legislated salary reduction against city). The defendants’ attempt to distinguish Elrod and its progeny on the basis of a budget induced abolishment of the positions, as opposed to dismissal, fails to acknowledge the thrust of the plaintiffs’ allegation; that the particular positions selected for elimination were selected based upon a bad faith motive to retaliate against the individuals holding those positions for their notable support for the prior political administration. This allegation brings the complaint within Elrod and its progeny. See Vezzetti, 22 F.3d at 488 (claim of job elimination cognizable under Branti-Elrod where there exists evidence of political retribution). Moreover, actionable political patronage decisions are not contingent upon the allegation of a dismissal per se. In Rutan, the Supreme Court extended the holdings of Elrod and Branti to government employment determinations less severe than dismissal, yet still motivated by patronage. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 75, 110 S.Ct. at 2737. The Rutan Court rejected the view that only patronage practices which are the “substantial equivalent of a dismissal” are actionable as First Amendment violations in holding an executive order invalid which prohibited hiring, filling of vacancies, and creation of new positions without first examining political factors. Id.; see also Lieberman v. Reisman, 857 F.2d 896, 900 (2d 1988) (denial of earned comp and vacation time based on opposition political campaign for office); Herbst, 701 F.Supp. at 967 (demotion). The key to plaintiffs’ position is the allegation that the defendants have attempted to shield their improperly motivated employment decision by pretexually formalizing it within budget resolutions. (Compl. ¶ 45.) The plaintiffs allege that the defendants created a list of active Republicans, from which the plaintiffs’ positions were selected for budget elimination. (Compl. ¶¶ 60, 66.) Plaintiffs assert that the only basis for selecting their particular positions for elimination is that the individuals holding those positions were known to be especially active Republican supporters. (Compl. ¶ 66.) The defendants assert that plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights were not infringed because elimination of their positions for budgetary reasons is a permissible policy decision. Even if the plaintiffs have no “right” to their positions, and “even though the government may deny [plaintiffs] the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely.” Elrod, 427 U.S. at 360-61, 96 S.Ct. at 2683 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972)). Therefore, at this preliminary stage of the proceedings, the plaintiffs’ sufficiently allege a First Amendment violation to sustain their § 1983 claim against the Town. Moreover, even assuming that the defendants are correct in arguing that to state a claim the plaintiffs must allege that their positions were filled by members of the opposing party, the plaintiffs still allege a valid claim on the basis of political retaliation. Retaliatory state action aimed at a person’s exercise of their First Amendment rights is actionable under § 1983. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1158 (5th Cir.1991) (allegation of retaliatory political discharge not subject to threshold “public concern” requirement); Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1189 (7th Cir.) (allegation that police investigation was conducted in retaliation for protected First Amendment conduct actionable under § 1983), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968, 109 S.Ct. 497, 102 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988); Lieberman v. Reisman, 857 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.1988) (retaliation for partisan opposition political campaign actionable as First Amendment violation under § 1983); Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir.1986) (“State action designed to retaliate against and chill political expression strikes at the heart of the First Amendment” (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972)), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1054, 107 S.Ct. 928, 93 L.Ed.2d 979 (1987). The plaintiffs allege they were approached by representatives of the Zwim administration and offered a choice to either renounce their support for the Republican party or lose their jobs. (Compl. ¶¶ 69-71.) In retaliation for their refusal to renounce their Republican support, their jobs were eliminated. The plaintiffs’ allegation infers that had they openly renounced their support for the Republican Party their particular positions would not have been subjected to the budget cuts. Therefore, the plaintiffs have alleged a prima facie claim against the Town under § 1983 for retaliation for their exercise of First Amendment rights. See Elrod 427 U.S. at 359, 96 S.Ct. at 2682-83 (threat of dismissal for failure to provide political support inhibits protected belief and association, and dismissal penalizes its exercise). b. Non-Town Defendants Plaintiffs broadly allege their First Amendment § 1983 cause of action against all defendants, including those not officially affiliated with the Town such as Nehrich, Friends of Ben Zwirn (“Friends”), and Peckelis. Section 1983 liability may he against a private party who willfully conspires with government officials under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 2824-25, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984) (allegation of conspiracy with state officials includes adequate allegation of conduct under color of state law); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1605, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (it is enough that he is a willful participant) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966)); see also Conway v. Village of Mount Kisco, 750 F.2d 205, 214 n. 12 (2d Cir.1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.1985), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 84, 107 S.Ct. 390, 93 L.Ed.2d 325 (1986). To sustain such a claim, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor. Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,—U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 66, 121 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992). i. Nehrich and the CSEA Here plaintiffs claim the Municipal defendants were able to single-out their positions based on information provided about the plaintiffs’ activity on behalf of the opposition political party. Plaintiffs allege that Nehrich provided lists of town employees and identified which town employees were politically active. (Compl. at ¶¶ 59-60, 64-66.) This allegation states sufficient facts to sustain the § 1983 cause of action against Nehrich. See Spear, 954 F.2d at 68. Moreover, as a private individual, Nehrich may not rely on any common law form of immunity. See Tower, 467 U.S. at 920-23, 104 S.Ct. at 2824-26 (only congress may establish immunities to § 1983 liability not found at common law). The plaintiffs also name Nehrich as a defendant in his capacity as President of the Town of North Hempstead Civil Service Employees Association (hereinafter “CSEA”). However, the plaintiffs fail to name the CSEA as a defendant. The CSEA has moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that none of Nehrich’s alleged acts are said to be performed in his official capacity, and therefore cannot be attributed to the CSEA. (CSEA Mem.Law at 2.) Presumably the intent of naming Nehrich as a union official is to obtain relief against the CSEA. However, the Court finds that there is no allegation in the complaint which would indicate that Nehrich was acting within the scope of his capacity as a union official, or that his alleged acts were ratified or even known to the CSEA. Therefore, the issue is whether the CSEA can be held liable for Nehrich’s acts by a theory of agency or respondeat superior. The plaintiffs do not indicate what legal entity they seek relief from; whether the CSEA local or the national parent, whether an unincorporated association or a corporation. If the entity from which plaintiffs seek relief is an unincorporated association, plaintiffs must allege facts that demonstrate that Nehrich had apparent authority for his acts. Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1279-81 (2d Cir.1991) (rejecting requirement for total membership ratification theory of liability in § 1983 suits against unincorporated association). In addition, the plaintiffs must allege facts which indicate that Nehrich’s acts were “done on behalf of the union.” Jund, 941 F.2d at 1280 (citing American Bridge Div., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 772 F.2d 1547, 1551 (11th Cir.1985). Jund and the cases cited therein may also be distinguished by the fact that these cases presented the courts with ample facts to support a finding of such authorization. 941 F.2d at 1280 (“ample evidence connecting numerous Committee members to the coercive contribution scheme”). Here, no connection is alleged as to how the CSEA, local or otherwise, is in any way connected to Nehrieh’s alleged acts. The CSEA national has answered that they are a not-for-profit corporation. (CSEA Mem. of Law at 2.) The CSEA, relying on Rojas v. Alexander’s Dept. Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 809, 112 S.Ct. 52, 116 L.Ed.2d 30 (1991), argues that they cannot be held liable for Nehrich’s acts because there is no respondeat superior liability for corporations under § 1983. This overstates the case. Under Rojas, corporate liability for the constitutional torts of an employee is dependent on a showing that the acts were in furtherance of an impermissible corporate policy. See Rojas, 924 F.2d at 409 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981)). The complaint contains no allegation of any causal relationship between Nehrieh’s alleged acts and any policy of the CSEA. Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend that they were injured by the improper basis upon which their positions were selected for elimination. Thus any § 1983 liability for the CSEA would require a showing that the CSEA “conspired” with the Municipal defendants to violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. On the facts alleged, no such inference can be drawn, as the plaintiffs have failed to plead that the principal (CSEA) is responsible for the acts of its purported agent (Nehrich). Instead, plaintiffs have alleged only that Nehrich individually conspired with the Town to violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Therefore, the civil rights claims against Nehrich in his capacity as “President of the Town of North Hempstead CSEA” fails to state a claim and is dismissed. Plaintiffs have failed to name the appropriate entity, and have failed to state any facts alleging liability of CSEA whether by Nehrich’s apparent authority with acts on behalf of the union, or by demonstrating acts in furtherance of an impermissible CSEA policy. Moreover, the fundamental purpose of a public employer labor union is to collectively bargain on behalf of civil service employees and not to contribute to their discharge from employment. Therefore, this Court views it as highly unlikely that the plaintiffs can show that Nehrich’s alleged acts were in furtherance of a CSEA policy to terminate civil service employees on the basis of political patronage, or that the CSEA held Nehrich out as having the authority to do such acts and that such acts were on behalf of the CSEA. Nevertheless, although this Court is doubtful of plaintiffs’ ability to support an amended pleading, plaintiffs are granted leave to file an amended complaint which names the proper CSEA defendant and plead sufficient allegations to demonstrate that the entity, in whatever legal form, is liable for the constitutional torts of Nehrich. ii. Friends of Ben Zwirn and Peckelis Similarly, plaintiffs’ civil rights claims include the political committee Friends of Ben Zwirn (“Friends”), and its treasurer Alice Peckelis. (Compl. ¶¶29, 31.) To state a claim against a private entity under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the private party willfully conspires with government officials under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. at 920, 104 S.Ct. at 2824-25; Spear, 954 F.2d at 68. Friends moves to dismiss for failure to state such a claim. The complaint contains one paragraph which identifies Friends or Peckelis as a participant in these alleged acts. (Compl. at ¶89.) The plaintiffs allege that Friends served as a repository of campaign support, including financial support ... which financial contributions manifested to defendants the TOWN employees who were now supporting defendants and the administration of defendant, Zwirn. (Id.) This allegation is wholly insufficient to establish the liability of Friends or Peckelis under § 1983. Spear, 954 F.2d at 68. Nothing in paragraph 89, or anywhere else in the complaint, establishes that Friends acted under color of state law. Id. Nor is there any possible set of facts which could demonstrate that Friends or Peckelis acted as willful participants in the creation of legislation, allegedly based upon political animus, simply by being a repository of campaign contributions. Therefore the § 1983 claims against Friends and Peckelis are dismissed with prejudice. Therefore, the fourth cause of action, based upon a First Amendment § 1983 claim, is sustained against the Town and Nehrich in his individual capacity. The First Amendment § 1983 cause of action is dismissed against all other defendants, officially and individually. The plaintiffs are granted leave to replead this cause of action against the proper CSEA entity. 2. Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendment Claims The plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action alleges that the elimination of their positions violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments under § 1983. (Compl. ¶ 120.) The plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action must be dismissed with prejudice, as the allegations can under no circumstances establish a violation of these provisions of the Bill of Rights. a. Fourth Amendment Although the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the plaintiffs have alleged no facts that implicate a Fourth Amendment right. The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures where there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Searches and seizures of public employees’ personal property are subject to the restraints of the Fourth Amendment. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1496, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987). However, “the question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 718, 107 S.Ct. at 1498. Here the plaintiffs do not allege a search or seizure, or any conduct which implicates the Fourth Amendment. Therefore the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment allegation does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action. See e.g. Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir.) (affirming dismissal of Fourth Amendment § 1983 cause of action in context of employment termination on failure to allege facts implicating Fourth Amendment rights), cert. denied,—U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 73, 130 L.Ed.2d 28 (1994). b. Fifth Amendment The plaintiffs also allege a Fifth Amendment due process violation. (Compl. ¶¶ 120, 121.) The plaintiffs’ right to due process of law with respect to action by a state or any of its subdivisions is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment in and of itself pertains only to actions of the federal government. As the plaintiffs have not alleged any acts by the federal government, or an act by any defendant associated with the federal government, the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment § 1983 claim must be stricken. See e.g., Heath v. Highland Park Sch. Dish, 800 F.Supp. 1470, 1475 (E.D.Mich.1992); Three Rivers Cablevision Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 502 F.Supp. 1118, 1134 (W.D.Penn.1980). c. Ninth Amendment The plaintiffs eonclusorily allege a Ninth Amendment violation as an additional basis for a § 1983 claim. (Compl. at ¶ 120). This claim must also be stricken. Section 1983 claims must be based upon a specific constitutional guarantee. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) (dismissing § 1983 claim for failing to indicate specific constitutional guarantee safeguarding the allegedly infringed interest). The Ninth Amendment is recognized as a rule of construction, not one that protects any specific right. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 11-3, at 774-75 (2d ed. 1988). No independent constitutional protection is recognized which derives from the Ninth Amendment and which may support a § 1983 cause of action. See Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 537 (6th Cir.1991) (Ninth Amendment claim has no applicability in suit under § 1983); Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir.1991) (section 1983 Ninth Amendment claim meritless as not independently securing any constitutional rights), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951, 112 S.Ct. 1514, 117 L.Ed.2d 650 (1992); Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir.1986) (Ninth Amendment has never been recognized as independently securing any constitutional right, for purposes of pursuing a civil rights claim) (citing cases). Moreover, the Ninth Amendment has not been interpreted to be incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore has no applicability to the allegations against these non-federal actors. See Tribe, § 11-2, at 772-73. Therefore, the fifth cause of action, which is based upon the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments is dismissed with prejudice. II. SECTION 1985 CLAIMS In the sixth count of the complaint, plaintiffs claim that the defendants conspired to violate their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). (Compl. at ¶¶ 124-30.) Plaintiffs maintain that as members of the Republican Party they are a protected class. (Compl. ¶ 125.) The defendants move to dismiss upon the ground that members of the Republican party do not comprise a protected class for the purposes of § 1985 liability. (Mun. Defs.Mem. of Law at 19); (Friends Mem. of Law at 9.) The Municipal defendants also move to dismiss the § 1985(3) claims against them in their individual capacity on the grounds of immunity. (Mun.Def.Mem. of Law at 18.) To plead a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) the plaintiffs must allege four elements: 1) a conspiracy; 2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the law; and 3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; 4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. at 828-29, 103 S.Ct. at 3356 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798-99, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971)). A PROTECTED CLASS The defendants’ challenge to the plaintiffs’ status as a class under the second required element of Scott and Griffin squarely raises the question of the viability of the Second Circuit’s decision in Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.1983). In Keating, the court held that the allegation that the defendants discriminated against him because of his membership in a political party satisfied the class requirement under § 1985(3). Id. at 388 & n. 18. Plaintiffs rely on Keating for the proposition that their membership in the Republican Party qualifies for protected class status, and that a § 1985 cause of action may be based upon political animus. (Pl.Mem. in Opp’n at 22.) The defendants assert that in light of Scott, section 1985 is limited to protecting race-based animus, and therefore, the plaintiffs do not qualify for § 1985(3) protection. (Mun.Defs.Mem. of Law at 19); (Friends Mem. of Law at 9.) In Scott, the Supreme Court held that nonunion employees were not a protected class, and continued the narrow interpretation of protected classes under § 1985 which began in Scott, 463 U.S. at 830, 103 S.Ct. at 3357. The Scott Court consciously avoided a broad reading of the scope of § 1985 so to avoid creating a “general federal tort law” by reaffirming the Griffin requirement of “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Scott, 463 U.S. at 834, 103 S.Ct. at 3359 (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798). The Court explicitly held that § 1985(3) did not reach economic or commercial animus, but left unanswered the meaning of the phrase, “perhaps otherwise class-based.” Scott, 463 U.S. at 837, 103 S.Ct. at 3360-61. (“Even if the section must be construed to reach conspiracies aimed at any class or organization on account of its political views or activities, ... we find no convincing support ... for the proposition that the provision was intended to reach conspiracies motivated by bias toward others on account of their economic views, status or activities.”) (emphasis in original). Similarly, in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,—U.S. -,-, 113 S.Ct. 753, 759, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993), the Court was faced with the argument that women, as a class, qualified for protection under § 1985(3). However, the Bray Court declined to answer that question because it rejected the claim that groups opposed to abortion reflected an animus toward women generally.—U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 759. The Court found that the classification at issue was a “definitional ploy.” Id. In Keating, the Second Circuit reviewed the legislative and historical context of the enactment of § 1985(3), and noted that the Ku Klux Klan was not merely a racist organization but also a political organization intent on intimidating others, particularly northern Republicans (“carpetbaggers”). 706 F.2d at 387 & n. 17. In holding that a conspiracy based on political animus was actionable under § 1985(3), the court stated that “Congress did not seek to protect only Republicans, but to prohibit political discrimination in general.” Id. Consequently, the Keating Court held that members of a political party qualify as a protected class under § 1985(3). Id. at 388. In Scott, the Court stated, in dicta, we find difficult the question of whether § 1985(3) provided a remedy for every concerted effort by one political group to nullify the influence of or do other injury to a competing group by use of otherwise unlawful means. To accede to that view would go far toward making the federal courts ... the monitors of campaign tactics in both state and federal elections, a role that the courts should not be quick to assume. 463 U.S. at 836, 103 S.Ct. at 3360. The defendants urge this Court to follow this dictum and reject the holding of Keating, as the Seventh and Fourth Circuits have done. Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir.1985); Harrison v. KVAT Food Mgt. Inc., 766 F.2d 155 (4th Cir.1985); contra Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543 (6th Cir.1987). However, despite the cautionary wording of Scott, and the holdings of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, this Court is bound by the holding in Keating which is still the law of this circuit. Therefore, as the complaint alleges that the defendants were motivated by plaintiffs’ membership in the Republican Party, this Court finds that the plaintiffs comprise a protected class under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE § 1985 CLAIMS The plaintiffs claim that the Municipal defendants acted in concert with Nehrieh and Friends to deprive them of employment on the basis of their political affiliation and in an effort to intimidate or chill the remaining employees’ opposition political activity. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 45, 65.) 1. Municipal Defendants The Municipal defendants assert that the § 1985 claims must fail with respect to them because an “agreement between the Town and its own officers and employees cannot constitute a conspiracy.” (Mun. Defs.Mem. of Law at 21.) In essence, they invoke the “intracorporate conspiracy” doctrine which is premised on the concept that a corporation generally cannot conspire with its employees or agents as all are considered a single legal entity. See Girard v. 91th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.) (applying intracorporate immunity to § 1985 cause of action), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974, 96 S.Ct. 2173, 48 L.Ed.2d 798 (1976)); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir.1972) (same). This is particularly so where the officers and employees are alleged to be acting within the scope of their employment. Herrmann v. Moore, 576 F.2d 453, 459 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003, 99 S.Ct. 613, 58 L.Ed.2d 679 (1978). Intracorporate immunity has also been extended to the context of conspiracies between a public entity and its employees. See Wintz v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 551 F.Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (section 1985 would not apply unless plaintiff could show that external parties were involved) (citing Girard, 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.1976)); Davidson v. Yeshiva University, 555 F.Supp. 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (employees of university could not conspire with university under § 1985) (also citing Girard); Liebemian v. Gant, 474 F.Supp. 848 (D.Conn.1979) (intracorporate immunity where each of the defendants acted within scope of their official position), aff'd, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.1980); see also Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 868 F.2d 1364, 1371 (4th Cir.) (police commissioner could not conspire with police department under § 1985 in allegedly unlawful employment determination), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850, 110 S.Ct. 147, 107 L.Ed.2d 106 (1989); Rum After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347, 354 (8th Cir.1985) (members of tribal council could not, under § 1985, conspire with themselves or council as an entity in taking official action); Rabkin v. Dean, 856 F.Supp. 543, 551 (N.D.Cal.1994) (city council members could not conspire with city to deny plaintiff salary increases for political reasons); Roybal v. City of Albuquerque, 653 F.Supp. 102, 107 (D.N.M.1986) (citing cases); Gladden v. Barry, 558 F.Supp. 676 (D.D.C.1983); Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F.Supp. 722, 729 (N.D.Ohio 1980); but see Rebel Van Lines v. City of Compton, 663 F.Supp. 786, 791 (C.D.Cal.1987) (declining to extend intracorporate immunity to context of § 1985). Here it is alleged that the Municipal defendants conspired to develop and approve a budget reduction plan which eliminated plaintiffs’ positions. Regardless of the motive or intent supporting the legislation, these are acts within the scope of their official duties. Therefore, the § 1985 claims against the Municipal defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed, as a matter of law, as the allegation that their acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were solely within the scope of their duties as officials or employees of the Town. See Davidson, 555 F.Supp. at 79-80 (employees and agents cannot independently conspire with principal where allegation that defendants acted in official capacity only). The intracorporate immunity doctrine is similar to the rationale under which the Municipal defendants are entitled to assert legislative immunity under a § 1983 claim. The basis thereof is that the acts by these defendants which allegedly infringed the plaintiffs constitutionally protected rights, are within the scope of their official duties. Some courts have simply applied the doctrine of official legislative immunity to individual capacity claims against local legislators under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. See e.g., Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1983); City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1256-57 (5th Cir.1976); Rabkin v. Dean, 856 F.Supp. 543, 551 (N.D.Cal.1994). In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372, 71 S.Ct. 783, 786, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951), the Supreme Court held that legislative immunity applied to individual state legislators for acts “in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act” for a claim under both 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3). However, the extension of the doctrine of official legislative immunity to local legislators has explicitly been drawn in the context of § 1983 only. See Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979); Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1992). 'Although legislative immunity may be properly applied to the individual Municipal defendants for the claims under § 1985, this Court does not rely on that rationale. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the § 1985(3) individual capacity claims against the Municipal defendants, the allegations that the officials and employees of the Town, as representatives of the Town (official capacity claims), conspired with Nehrich and Friends to develop and enact a policy which officially deprived plaintiffs of their first amendment rights, does sufficiently allege a § 1985(3) cause of action against the Town. See Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F.Supp. 722, 729 (N.D.Ohio 1980) (municipality may be liable under § 1985 as an entity if engaged in conspiracy through policy or custom). Here the plaintiffs allege that the Town infringed their constitutional right of association via enactment of the legislated policy of elimination of their positions based on their political affiliation and activity. (Compl. ¶ 119.) 2. Nehrich and the CSEA As to Nehrich, the plaintiffs allege that he provided the Town officials with the information about which Town employees were active in the Republican party. (Compl. ¶¶ 59-60.) Plaintiffs further allege that Nehrich personally met with these officials to select which positions would be eliminated based upon the political activities of the individual holding that position. (Compl. ¶ 61.) It is important to note that the intracorporate immunity doctrine does not apply to Nehrich although plaintiffs state that Nehrieh is an employee of the Town. (Compl. at ¶ 25.) None of the allegations regarding Nehrich pertain to his duties as an employee of the Town. For example, Nehrich’s alleged presence at the policy meetings had no relation to his duties as an employee of the Town. This is unlike Middlemark, Biamonte, and Nedelka, all of whom were policymaking officials whose presence at a meeting to develop a proposed budget plan would be within the normal course of their duties as Town employees. Ther