Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER LAKE, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. Introduction 1335 II. Parties, Posture, and Pending Pleadings 1336 A. All Roads Lead to Houston 1336 1. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., No. H-94-1337 1336 2. Jorge Cárcamo v. Shell Oil Co., No. H-94-1359 1337 3. Rodriguez v. Shell Oil Co., H-94-3248 1338 4. Erazo v. Shell Oil Co., H-94-3451 1338 5. Valdez v. Shell Oil Co., H-95-1356 & Isae Cárcamo v. Shell Oil Co., H-95-1407 1339 B. Common Contentions and Uncommon Questions 1340 1. Issues concerning the propriety of removal 1340 2. Issues concerning dismissal of parties and actions 1341 III. Removal and Remand 1341 A. Standard of Review 1341 B. Removal by Dead Sea 1342 1. Fraudulent joinder 1342 2. Prematurity 1343 a. What law governs? 1343 b. When does a defendant’s right to remove mature? 1343 c. Did Dead Sea have a mature right to remove? 1344 C. Removal by Shell 1346 1. Medical monitoring 1346 2. Treaty rights 1347 3. Foreign relations 1348 D. Is Remand Warranted? 1349 IV. Dismissal Motions 1351 A. Which Dismissal Motion Should Be Resolved First? 1351 B. Have Defendants Waived the Right to Seek Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal? 1351 1. Have defendants waived the right to seek dismissal by relying on Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 71.031 as a basis for federal jurisdiction? 1351 2. Have defendants waived the right to seek dismissal by pursuing transfers of several cases to this court from other districts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)? 1352 3. Did Dow waive the right to seek dismissal by initiating a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas? 1353 4. Have defendants waived the right to seek dismissal by participating in discovery? 1355 C. Forum Non Conveniens 1355 1. Standard of review 1355 2. Availability of an adequate alternative forum 1356 a. Availability 1356 b. Adequacy 1357 i. Burkina Faso 1358 ii. Costa Rica 1358 iii. Dominica 1359 iv. Ecuador 1359 v. Guatemala 1361 vi. Honduras 1361 vii. Ivory Coast 1361 viii. Nicaragua 1362 ix.Panama 1362 Page 1362 x. The Philippines 1365 xi. Saint Lucia 1365 xii. Saint Vincent 1365 c. Conclusion 1365 3. Private interest factors 1365 a. The relevant deference 1366 b. Balancing the interests 1366 i. Relative ease of access to sources of proof ii. Availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses and the costs of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses t-CD CO in. Possibility of view of premises 00 CD CO 1368 iv. Other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive 1369 v. Will a foreign judgment be enforceable? 1369 vi. Was defendant’s motion to dismiss filed in a timely manner? 1369 c. Conclusion 1370 4. Public interest factors 1370 a. Balancing the interests 1370 i. Localized controversies 1370 ii. Interest in having diversity cases tried by a court that is “at home” with the law that must govern the action 1371 iii. The avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law 1371 iv. The unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty 1371 b. Conclusion 1372 V. Conclusion and Order 1372 A. Issues Concerning the Propriety of Removal 1372 1. FSIA jurisdiction 1372 2. Defects in removal procedure 1372 3. Remand and retention 1372 B. Issues Concerning Dismissal of Parties and Actions 1372 1. Forum non conveniens 1372 a. Dismissal 1373 b. Injunctive relief 1375 c. Return 1375 2. Other motions I. Introduction This action is a consolidation of several personal injury suits filed in various Texas courts pursuant to Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.031. All but a few of the thousands of plaintiffs are citizens of twelve foreign countries who seek damages for injuries stemming from alleged exposure to a nematoeide, dibromochloropropane (DBCP), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. Since their inception the eases have been mired in disputes concerning the parties’ choice of forum. Plaintiffs seek to have all of the cases remanded to various Texas state courts where they were originally filed so that their claims may be adjudicated there. Because each ease was commenced before September 1, 1993, each is controlled by the Texas Supreme Court’s decision “that the legislature ... statutorily abolished the doctrine of forum non conveniens in suits brought under section 71.031.” Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 679 (Tex.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024, 111 S.Ct. 671, 112 L.Ed.2d 663 (1991). Defendants seek to have a federal court maintain jurisdiction and then to dismiss the cases on the basis of forum non conveniens. To avoid this result plaintiffs have carefully sculpted their lawsuits to avoid federal jurisdiction. To the uninitiated the fact that these cases have now reached federal court might signify that defendants have achieved their objective. However, the plot in this drama is much more complicated than can be appreciated by viewing just the first act. Therefore, before addressing the pending motions and the numerous and complex issues they raise, the court will first identify the players and describe the scene changes that have occurred to date. II. Parties, Posture, and Pending Pleadings A. All Roads Lead to Houston 1. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., No. H-94-1337 Plaintiffs in Delgado are residents of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama. They originally filed suit in the 212th District Court of Galveston County, Texas, against Shell, Chiquita Brands, Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co., Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Dow Chemical Co., Occidental Chemical Corp., Standard Fruit Co., and Standard Fruit & Steamship Co. Defendants’ initial attempt to remove the case to the Galveston Division of this district was rejected on April 20,1993. Rodriguez v. Shell Oil Co., 818 F.Supp. 1013 (S.D.Tex.1993) (Kent, J.) (remand required because plaintiffs’ claims, even if preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodentieide Act (FIFRA), did not present a removable federal question). On January 7, 1994, the 212th District Court consolidated Delgado with another DBCP case pending in Galveston County, Aguilar v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-CV-0658 (56th Dist. Ct., Galveston County, Texas). Aguilar was an uncertified class action on behalf of “[a]ll persons (and their spouses) in Costa Rica who have been adversely exposed to any nematoeide containing the compound l-2-Dibromo-3-Chloropropane designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, or sold by one or more of the Defendants ... [except] any person who has already commenced an individual civil action.” On February 14, 1994, Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., filed its original answer. Pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 38, on March 15, 1994, Del Monte filed and served a third-party petition impleading Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd. (Dead Sea), an Israeli company that is a “foreign state” within the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), and Dead Sea’s American affiliate, Ameri-brom, Inc. Del Monte’s third-party petition alleged that Dead Sea manufactured and sold, and Ameribrom sold, DBCP to which plaintiffs may have been exposed. Dead Sea promptly removed the action to the Galveston Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). The case was assigned to Judge Kent as Civil Action No. G-94-193. Judge Kent re-cused and the case was transferred to the Houston Division where it was assigned to the undersigned judge. The other defendants joined in the removal and (with the exception of Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A.) filed cross-claims against Dead Sea, Ameribrom, and in some cases, each other. In response to plaintiffs’ motion to remand defendants argued that federal subject matter jurisdiction was provided by the presence of Dead Sea in the ease and by the existence of complete diversity of citizenship and federal questions. Shell also filed supplemental notices of removal asserting that plaintiffs’ most recent amended petitions and other papers recently filed by plaintiffs raised new, removable, federal questions. In a June 30, 1994, Memorandum and Order the court concluded that Dead Sea, as a foreign sovereign, had a right to remove the case, but declined to decide whether Dead Sea’s presence conferred subject matter jurisdiction until Dead Sea had an opportunity to fully present its sovereign immunity arguments. The court also deferred deciding whether alternative bases for subject matter jurisdiction existed until the parties submitted additional materials demonstrating the citizenship of Standard Fruit Co. 2. Jorge Carcamo v. Shell Oil Co., No. H-94-1359 Plaintiffs (including intervenor-plaintiffs) in Jorge Carca/mo are residents of Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua, Panama, the Philippines, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent. They advance, as an uncerti-fied class, claims on behalf of themselves and all others “exposed to DBCP, or DBCP-con-taming products, designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed or used by Shell Oil Company, Dow Chemical Company, Occidental Chemical Corporation ... or used by Standard Fruit Company, Standard Fruit and Steamship Co., Dole Food Company, Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Company, Chiquita Brands, Inc., and Chiquita Brands International, Ine., between 1965 and 1990,” not only in their home countries but also in Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Tanzania, Thailand, and Venezuela, with the exception of anyone who is already a plaintiff in any of selected other DBCP cases already pending. On April 5, 1994, Dow Chemical Co. filed a third-party petition against Dead Sea, Ameribrom, and the Del Monte entities. Because the petition was filed more than 30 days after Dow had filed its answer, Tex. R.Civ.P. 38 obligated Dow to obtain leave of court to serve the petition. Although Dow had not yet obtained the required leave from the 23rd District Court of Brazoria County, Texas, Dead Sea nevertheless promptly removed the case to the Galveston Division where it was assigned to Judge Kent as Civil Action No. G-94-238. Judge Kent recused on April 12, 1994, and the case was transferred to the Houston Division where it was assigned to Judge Hittner. As in Delgado, defendants in Jorge Carco-mo joined in Dead Sea’s removal, asserted additional bases of federal subject matter jurisdiction, and filed cross-claims, and Shell filed supplemental notices of removal. Plaintiffs’ motions for remand raised two procedural arguments not implicated in Delgado. Plaintiffs argued that Dead Sea’s removal of Jorge Carcomo was procedurally defective because Dead Sea was never properly joined as a third-party defendant in state court due to Dow Chemical’s failure to obtain leave to implead it. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that the court lacks jurisdiction because plaintiffs’ Seventh Amended Petition (expressly renouncing any intention to pursue claims against Dead Sea or its affiliated companies) rendered Dead Sea’s joinder fraudulent. Unlike Delgado the complexity of issues in Jorge Carcamo continued to grow as new parties were added. On June 10,1994, Magistrate Judge Crone granted Dow Chemical’s motion for leave to serve an amended third-party complaint impleading not only Dead Sea, Ameribrom, and the Del Monte entities, but also AMVAC Chemical Corp., Saint Lucia Banana Growers Association, Saint Vincent Banana Growers Association, Dominica Banana Growers Association, and Programa Nacional de Banano, as additional third-party defendants. On June 21, 1994, third-party defendant Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., filed a fourth-party complaint impleading Bromine Compounds Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Dead Sea. Although Jorge Carcamo stood in this posture on June 30, 1994, when the court granted Shell’s unopposed motion to consolidate Delgado with Jorge Carcamo, the entry and exit of parties continued. On November 18, 1994, the court dismissed third-party defendants Dominica Banana Growers Association, Saint Lucia Banana Growers Association, and Saint Vincent Banana Growers Association after defendants conceded they could not present facts justifying continued opposition to dismissal. On March 21, 1995, the court granted the motion of Miguel A. Lazo Ama-ya, and other domiciliarles of Honduras, to join the action as a second group of interve-nor-plaintiffs in Jorge Carcamo. Finally, on May 24, 1995, the court dismissed third-party defendant Programa Nacional de Ban-ano for lack of personal jurisdiction. 3. Rodriguez v. Shell Oil Co., H-94-3248 Plaintiffs in this action are citizens of Honduras and, with the exception of one Texas resident and one Michigan resident, are residents of Honduras. Defendants are the same as those in Jorge Carcamo. On April 6, 1994, Shell and the Chiquita entities filed third-party petitions against Dead Sea and Ameribrom. On April 7, 1994, before the 229th District Court of Jim Hogg County, Texas, had granted leave to serve the third-party petitions, Dead Sea removed the case to the Laredo Division of this district where it was assigned to Judge Kazen as Civil Action No. L-94-49. Defendants joined in the removal, articulated additional bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction, and filed cross-claims against Dead Sea, and Shell filed supplemental notices of removal. Plaintiffs moved to remand for the same reasons articulated in Delgado and Jorge Carcamo. On September 23, 1994, Judge Kazen granted Shell’s motion to transfer the ease to the Houston Division where it was assigned to the undersigned judge. On December 20, 1994, the court entered an order consolidating the case with Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, and the next case in the litany, Erazo. 4. Erazo v. Shell Oil Co., H-94-3451 On August 24, 1993, Manuel Antonio Bald-eramos Erazo, a citizen of Honduras, commenced a DBCP action against Shell in the 206th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas. Shell’s initial attempt to remove the action to the McAllen Division of this district met the same fate as the counterpart initial removal in Delgado. On April 6, 1994, Shell filed a third-party petition against Dow Chemical Co., Occidental Chemical Corp., Dead Sea, Ameribrom Inc., and AMVAC Chemical Corp. Before the state court had granted leave to serve the third-party petition, Dead Sea removed the case to the McAllen Division where it was again assigned to Judge Hinojosa as Civil Action No. M-94-055. Defendants joined in the removal, articulated additional bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction, and filed cross-claims against Dead Sea, and Shell filed supplemental notices of removal. Plaintiffs moved to remand for the same reasons articulated in Delgado and Jorge Carcamo. On September 29, 1994, Judge Hinojosa granted Shell’s motion to transfer the case to the Houston Division where it was assigned to the undersigned judge. The court’s December 20, 1994, Order consolidated this case with Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, and Rodriguez. 5. Valdez v. Shell Oil Co., H-95-1356 & Isae Carcamo v. Shell Oil Co., H-95-1407 Plaintiffs in Valdez are citizens of Burkina Faso, Dominica, Ecuador, Honduras, Ivory Coast, the Philippines, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent. Defendants are the same as those in Jorge Carcamo. On April 5, 1994, Dow Chemical Co. filed a third-party petition against the Del Monte entities, Dead Sea, and Ameribrom. On April 6, 1994, before the 276th District Court of Morris County, Texas, had granted leave to serve the third-party petitions, Dead Sea removed the case to the Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas, where it was assigned to Judge Steger as Civil Action No. 2-94CV-69. Defendants joined in the removal, articulated additional bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction, and filed cross-claims against Dead Sea, and Shell filed supplemental notices of removal. Plaintiffs moved to remand for the same reasons articulated in Delgado and Jorge Carcamo. On April 25, 1994, Shell moved to consolidate Valdez with Isae Carcamo, another DBCP case that had been removed to the Marshall Division of the Eastern District. On June 3, 1994, Judge Steger referred all pretrial motions to Magistrate Judge Rad-ford. On March 23, 1995, Judge Radford granted Dow’s motion for leave to serve an amended third-party complaint impleading Dead Sea, Ameribrom, the Del Monte entities, AMVAC Chemical Corp., Saint Lucia Banana Growers Association, Saint Vincent Banana Growers Association, Dominica Banana Growers Association, and Programa Nacional de Banano, as third-party defendants in Valdez, In light of that ruling and Dead Sea’s waiver of sovereign immunity Judge Radford found that federal subject matter jurisdiction existed over both Valdez and Isae Carcamo, and he denied plaintiffs’ motions to remand in both cases. Judge Radford also denied Shell’s motion to transfer venue to the Houston Division of the Southern District. After considering defendants’ objections to Judge Radford’s denial of Shell’s motion to transfer venue, Judge Steger vacated the order, granted Shell’s motion, and transferred the action to this court on April 26, 1995, where it was assigned to Judge Werlein. On May 17, 1995, the undersigned judge entered an order consolidating Valdez (and Isae Carcamo) with Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Rodriguez, and Er-azo. B. Common Contentions and Uncommon Questions The decision to consolidate these cases was premised on the prevalence of common parties and issues. Notwithstanding the number of common issues in the cases, there are some issues that are shared by fewer than all of the cases and some issues that are unique to each case. As the court explained during the December 16, 1994, scheduling conference, the consolidation of these cases does not result in complete unification. Each case retains its distinct substantive and procedural character. The list of issues is therefore lengthy. The nuances distinguishing the manner in which an issue is implicated (and the reasons a particular issue is not implicated) in each case are also subtle and complex. The following prologue to the court’s discussion merely categorizes the bulk of the issues and establishes the order in which the court will address them. 1. Issues concerning the propriety of removal Plaintiffs argue that all of the cases must be remanded to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) either because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or because the removals were procedurally defective. As detailed above, each case was removed to federal court by Dead Sea and Shell. In M & O I the court held that Dead Sea was capable of properly removing Delgado to this court because it was a foreign sovereign. Since then Dead Sea has expressly waived the defenses of sovereign immunity and lack of in personam jurisdiction for purposes of these cases only. Notwithstanding these developments plaintiffs argue that Dead Sea was incapable of removing any of the cases, including Delgado, because Dead Sea had been fraudulently joined. Plaintiffs also argue that Dead Sea was incapable of properly removing Jorge Carcamo, Rodriguez, Erazo, and Valdez because when Dead Sea removed those cases it had not yet been joined as a party. These arguments require the court to determine whether Dead Sea properly removed the cases. If Dead Sea’s removal was improper in any of the cases the court must also determine whether Shell’s supplemental removal was proper. DELGADO v. SHELL OIL CO. Cite as 890 F.Supp. 1324 (S.D.Tex. 1995) 2. Issues concerning dismissal of parties and actions Plaintiffs alternatively argue that even if Dead Sea was not improperly joined, it and its affiliated companies should be dismissed from these cases because under Texas law defendants cannot state a meritorious claim for contribution or indemnity against Dead Sea or any of its affiliates. Once Dead Sea’s dismissal is accomplished, plaintiffs urge the court to remand the cases to state court by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the underlying suits between plaintiffs and defendants. Defendants counter that before determining whether Dead Sea should be dismissed the court must determine whether the defendants’ contribution and indemnity claims will be governed by Texas law or some other law. Defendants argue that the law governing the underlying suits between the plaintiffs and the defendants should also provide the rule of decision concerning the contribution and indemnity claims. Defendants argue that they have valid and extant claims for contribution and indemnity against Dead Sea under the laws of a number of the plaintiffs’ home countries. Finally, defendants argue that, after resolving all of the issues concerning removal, the court should apply the doctrine oi forum non conveniens and dismiss all of the cases. III. Removal and Remand A. Standard of Review “Section 1447(c) provides two grounds for remand: (1) a defect in removal procedure and (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Burks v. Amerada Hess Corp., 8 F.3d 301, 303 (5th Cir.1993). When considering a motion to remand the removing party bears the burden of showing that removal was proper. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir.1988), appeal after remand, 915 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.1990), aff'd, 503 U.S. 131, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992). “This extends not only to demonstrating a jurisdictional basis for removal, but also necessary compliance with the requirements of the removal statute.” Albonetti v. GAF Corporation-Chemical Group, 520 F.Supp. 825, 827 (S.D.Tex.1981). Because removal jurisdiction “raises significant federalism concerns,” Willy, 855 F.2d at 1164, courts must construe removal statutes “narrowly, with doubts resolved in favor of remand to the state court.” Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Harvey, 788 F.Supp. 282, 283-84 (E.D.La.1992). If there is any doubt that a right to removal exists, “ambiguities are to be construed against removal.” Samuel v. Langham, 780 F.Supp. 424, 427 (N.D.Tex.1992). Notwithstanding its duty to interpret removal statutes narrowly, a “District Court exceed[s] its authority in remanding on grounds not permitted by the controlling statute.” Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345, 96 S.Ct. 584, 590, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976). The Fifth Circuit has recently clarified the permissible grounds for remand: Generally, the remand of a case that has been removed to federal court is governed by statutory provisions found at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c) and 1447(c). Under these two sections, the district court has general authority to remand a case under any of the following circumstances: 1) it has discretion to remand state law claims that were removed along with one or more federal question claims; 2) it must act on a timely motion to remand based on a defect in removal procedure; and 3) it must remand a case over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction. No other authority to remand a case is established by statute, but ... one additional jurisprudential authority for discretionary remand does exist. Buchner v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir.1993). “[A] district court has discretion to remand to state court a removed ease involving [only] pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate.” Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357, 108 S.Ct. 614, 623, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988). B. Removal by Dead Sea 1. Fraudulent joinder Plaintiffs argue that the court should ignore the fact that Dead Sea’s presence in these lawsuits confers federal jurisdiction upon the actions because Dead Sea was “fraudulently joined.” The question of fraudulent joinder typically arises when a diverse defendant removes an action on the basis of diversity jurisdiction despite the presence of one or more non-diverse defendants. The removing party will often attempt to convince the court to ignore the instate defendant by arguing that it was fraudulently joined. “[T]o establish that an instate defendant has been fraudulently joined, the removing party must show either that there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court; or that there has been outright fraud in the plaintiffs pleadings of jurisdictional facts.” B. Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir.1981). The question of fraudulent joinder to defeat the right to remove an action to federal court is not implicated in these eases. The cases present the different issue of whether the removing defendants improperly attempted to create a right to remove them by collusively joining a third-party defendant. The eases thus raise the analytically distinct question whether the court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1359, which provides that “[a] district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in whieh any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.” Section 1359 is designed to prevent the litigation of claims in federal court by suitors who by sham, pretense, or other fiction acquire a spurious status that would allow them to invoke the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts. The purpose of the statute is to prevent the manipulation of jurisdictional facts where none existed before .... Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 962, 111 S.Ct. 1587, 113 L.Ed.2d 651 (1991). See also 14 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3637 at 90-94 (1985). In Harvey Construction Co. v. Rdbertson-Ceco Corp., 10 F.3d 300 (5th Cir.1994), the court differentiated between the collusive manipulation of jurisdictional facts and the collusive manipulation of facts that merely affect the outcome of the case. Although we note, without so finding, that there may be some truth to the allegations of collusion, we cannot sustain the jurisdictional dismissal of the indemnity claim. Whether the settlement [between the original plaintiff and the current plaintiff seeking indemnity] was collusive or not goes only to the merits of the action and does not affect the jurisdiction of the district court. We hold that the district court erred in dismissing Harvey’s indemnity claim for want of subject matter jurisdiction. On remand, if the district court determines that diversity exists between [the original plaintiff] and [the current defendant], it must find that the assignment of [the original plaintiffs] claims ... did not create collusive jurisdiction .... Id. at 303-04 (emphasis in the original). Plaintiffs do not suggest that Dead Sea’s status as a foreign sovereign was collusively manufactured to establish federal jurisdiction. Nor do they argue that defendants could never have stated a claim for contribution or indemnity against Dead Sea. stead, plaintiffs argue that their pleadings, filed either immediately before or soon after removal, disclaiming any further intention of seeking recovery for damages caused by exposure to product manufactured, marketed, or sold by Dead Sea, together with post-removal settlement agreements between plaintiffs and Dead Sea, establish that Dead Sea was collusively joined. The court is not persuaded by plaintiffs’ arguments because they relate to the merits of the third-party actions; they do not undermine any jurisdictional facts providing Dead Sea a right to remove these cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). Accordingly, the court concludes that § 1359 is not an impediment to jurisdiction in any of the consolidated cases. In- 2. Prematurity Plaintiffs argue that Dead Sea improperly removed Jorge Carcamo, Rodriguez, Erazo, and Valdez because the state courts never authorized the impleading defendants to serve third-party petitions on Dead Sea. According to plaintiffs, this means that Dead Sea’s removal was defective because Dead Sea was not yet a “defendant” in the cases when it removed them. Although the question is not entirely free from doubt and a rule of general applicability is not easily stated, a review of precedent convinces the court that plaintiffs’ position is correct. a. What law governs? “The right to remove a ease from state to federal court derives solely from the statutory grant of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1441....” Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d at 1164. Because “[t]he legislature or the judiciary of a state can neither defeat the right given by a constitutional act of congress to remove a case from a court of the state into ... [a] court of the United States nor limit the effect of such removal,” Goldey v. Morning News of New Haven, 156 U.S. 518, 523, 15 S.Ct. 559, 561, 39 L.Ed. 517 (1895), federal law governs the decision whether Dead Sea had a mature right to remove these actions. b. When does a defendant’s right to remove mature? 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) affords a foreign sovereign the right to remove “[a]ny civil action brought in a State court against [it].... ” Professor Moore interprets the identical language in the general removal provision, § 1441(a), to mean that “a civil action, to be removable, must have been ‘brought’ in a state court, ie., some proceeding ... must be pending before removal is in order; and until that time the petition for removal is premature.” 1A James W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice (Moore’s), ¶ 0.157[4. — 10] (footnote omitted). See Goldey v. Morning News of New Haven, 156 U.S. at 525, 15 S.Ct. at 562 (“[T]he suit must be actually pending in the state court before it can be removed....”). Whether a case has been “brought” or is “pending” is not always easy to determine. “If an action is commenced in a state court in accordance with its usual and normal procedure, then, of course, the action may be properly regarded as ‘brought’ for removal purposes. But ... something less than regular commencement will [sometimes] suffice.” 1A Moore’s, ¶ 0.157[4. — 10] (footnote omitted). Professor Moore synthesizes the body of precedent examining when an original defendant’s right to remove matures as establishing that a person not yet technically a defendant under state law can nevertheless remove the action provided that “the state’s judicial machinery is set in motion against the defendant.” 1A Moore’s, ¶ 0.157[4. — 10] (footnote omitted). Thus, one impressed with a successful ex parte application for a temporary restraining order has a mature right to remove even before process is issued on the underlying action for an injunction. The Fifth Circuit has applied the same rule to successful ex parte writ of attachment proceedings and, recently, to a situation that had not yet ripened into formal state contempt proceedings where there would be “no meaningful delay between a party or witness’ refusal to comply with a subpoena and the state court’s right to hold the party or witness in contempt.” In FDIC v. Loyd, 955 F.2d 316 (5th Cir.1992), the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in sua sponte remanding a ease 21 months after it had been removed on the ground that the removal was procedurally defective because it was not timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). One of the questions before the Fifth Circuit was “[w]hen did the case first become removable by the FDIC?” Id. at 326. The court resolved this question by stating that [b]ecause only the presence of the FDIC in the ease provides federal jurisdiction, it would certainly appear that the FDIC first had to be a party before the case was removable to federal court.... [W]e hold that the FDIC cannot be considered a party for the purposes of § 1446(b) until it has made an appearance, voluntary or involuntary, in the state court case. Id. at 326-27. The court also provided guidance concerning similar situations not involving the FDIC by stating that [cjommon sense and the practicalities of pleading dictate that no non-party to a state court proceeding has a mature right to remove that proceeding to federal court_ We cannot imagine that a private person who was not a party to the state court action could nevertheless remove the case to federal court. There is nothing to suggest such an indiscriminate right. Id. In a later footnote the court added that “it should be clear, as a general principle, that the right to remove a case does not mature, or even come into being, until one claiming the right has become a party to that case.” Id. at 327 n. 12. c. Did Dead Sea have a mature right to remove? Plaintiffs argue that when Tex.R.Civ.P. 38 requires leave of court to serve a third-party petition, the putative third-party defendant’s removal right cannot mature until leave is granted because, absent leave of court, a third-party defendant cannot be subjected to the judicial machinery of the state. In FDIC v. Klayer, 519 F.Supp. 889, 891 (E.D.Ky.1981), the court adopted a similar argument in granting a motion to remand. The Counterclaim-Cross Claim [a pleading stating a counterclaim against FDIC and commencing a third-party action against a federal official] was not pending in the state court.... At the time the petition for removal was filed, the FDIC was resisting the filing of the Counterclaim-Cross Claim in the state court, and there is no assurance that the state court would have permitted it to be filed and process to issue thereon. It is undisputed that Dead Sea does not meet the test established in Loyd: Until the state court granted a third-party plaintiffs’ motion for leave to implead Dead Sea it had no right to appear voluntarily and it could not have been forced to appear involuntarily as a third-party defendant. Relying on Rodriguez v. Transnave, Inc., 8 F.3d 284 (5th Cir.1993), defendants argue that Dead Sea should nevertheless be allowed to remove these cases within 30 days after it received a courtesy copy of a pleading naming it as a third-party defendant because a third-party foreign sovereign should not have to take the risk that it may lose the right to remove if the state court fails to rule on the motion seeking leave to implead within that time. Although Transnave, Inc. does not involve improper removal defendants’ argument merits discussion. Defendants’ argument rests on the rule that the time for removal ordinarily begins upon receipt, “through service or otherwise” of the pleading first evidencing removability. According to defendants, this rule means that a third-party defendant may lose the right to remove unless the state court rules on the motion for leave to implead within 30 days after the third-party defendant receives a copy of the third-party petition. To avoid that possibility defendants argue that Dead Sea was entitled to remove when it received a copy of the third-party petition against it without waiting for the state court to act. This potential inability to remove is not unique, however. For a number of reasons the time for removal may be triggered and expire before a particular defendant has an opportunity to remove the case. For example, in eases involving multiple defendants the time for removal begins when the first defendant’s removal right matures. If the first defendant to be served fails to remove timely, later-served defendants may lose the right to remove. Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481-82 (5th Cir.1986). It would therefore not necessarily be unjust to hold that a foreign sovereign, third-party defendant can similarly lose the right to remove if it fails to correctly determine when the right to remove matures. Furthermore, Congress foresaw that time delays inherent in instituting actions against foreign entities might hinder prompt action by foreign sovereign defendants. Thus, “[wjhere removal is based upon [§ 1441(d) ] the time limitations of section 1446(b) ... may be enlarged at any time for cause shown.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). In Texas, where leave of court to serve a third-party petition is sometimes required, a foreign sovereign that receives no more than a courtesy copy of a third-party petition might not know whether the removal clock had begun ticking. The remover bears the burden of proving that removal was proper, however, and this burden includes the task of determining, upon receipt of a variety of papers, whether the right to remove has ripened. Cf § 1446(b) (placing burden to discover whether a case is removable upon the defendant by providing that the removal clock can be triggered by “service of summons ... if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on defendant_”). In Jorge Carcamo, Rodriguez, Erazo, and Valdez inquiries by Dead Sea would have revealed that it could not be subjected to the judicial machinery of the state (and therefore that Dead Sea could safely ignore the third-party petitions) until a state court granted leave to implead Dead Sea. Dead Sea’s removal right would not mature (and the removal clock would not begin) until Dead Sea received a paper, through service or otherwise, indicating that the court had granted leave to serve a third-party petition on Dead Sea. Because Dead Sea did not have a mature right to remove Jorge Carcamo, Rodriguez, Erazo, or Valdez when it removed them, the court concludes that Dead Sea’s x-emoval of these cases was premature. C. Removal by Shell The conclusion that Dead Sea prematurely removed Jorge Carcamo, Rodriguez, Erazo, and Valdez is not dispositive of the overall question whether the cases were properly removed because in each case Shell filed supplemental removal notices. Although it is undisputed that Shell’s removal notices were filed more than 30 days after the first defendant received plaintiffs’ initial pleadings in each case, Shell advances three arguments why its supplemental removal notices were proper. In general, [tjhere are two different contexts in which delayed removal is permissible. In one, the plaintiff, after commencing suit in state court, takes some action that makes a previously unremovable case removable. In the other, the initial pleading is incomplete in a way that conceals its removability, but the process of litigation reveals its removability. Gruner v. Blakeman, 517 F.Supp. 357, 361 (D.Conn.1981). Shell’s arguments implicate both of these contexts. 1. Medical monitoring Shell first argues that these cases were properly removed because plaintiffs’ Sixth Amended Petitions in Jorge Carcamo and Delgado and plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Petition in Rodriguez added claims relating to medical monitoring costs which, for the first time, sufficiently implicated the federal common law of foreign relations to confer federal question jurisdiction on the entire action. For this proposition defendants principally rely on Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 61 (S.D.Tex.1994). Plaintiffs in Se-quihua prayed for the creation of a trust fund and for court supervision of “a medical monitoring scheme of unknown cost, scope or duration for as many as 500,000 Ecuadoran citizens over the protest of the government of Ecuador.” Id. at 63. Plaintiffs in the instant cases, on the other hand, simply pray for “judgment against Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, for general and special damages ...” including the costs of “medical testing, evaluation, examination, and other related expenses.” Regardless of whether the substantive law ultimately-applied to plaintiffs’ claims will afford such a remedy, amendments that accomplish nothing more than the addition of a prayer for the recovery of a sum of money to compensate for this type of damages do not change the nature of plaintiffs’ claims to give rise to a newly discoverable federal question. Accordingly, even if the court were to conclude, as defendants have consistently argued, that plaintiffs’ petitions include claims arising under the federal common law of foreign relations there is nothing sufficiently different about these amended pleadings to warrant the commencement of a new removal period. The court concludes that Shell’s removal, insofar as it is predicated on the existence of plaintiffs’ claims for medical monitoring, was fatally defective because the amendments do not present a newly removable federal question. 2. Treaty rights Shell also argues that plaintiffs’ response to Dow’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in another DBCP ease, Borja v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-320-F (116th District Court of Dallas County, Texas), was the first “litigational” paper that clarified plaintiffs’ case in a way that allowed Shell to determine that all of these cases raised removable federal questions. Although admitting that early versions of plaintiffs’ petitions in each case stated causes of action under Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 71.031 and that a plaintiff cannot avail himself of § 71.031 without showing that his home country has “equal treaty rights” with the United States, Shell argues that plaintiffs’ response to Dow’s Motion to Dismiss in Borja first identified the existence of federal questions relating to “the existence, interpretation, effect, and/or validity of treaties between the United States and [numerous] nations ... as well as the alleged applicability of certain multilateral agreements.” Shell argues that all of these cases therefore fall squarely into the second category of cases allowing delayed removal. Shell’s argument is not new. A nearly identical argument was advanced and rejected in Lozano v. GPE Controls, 859 F.Supp. 1036 (S.D.Tex.1994), and in Deaker v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. H-94-2387 (S.D.Tex. Sept. 21, 1994). Once again the court is not persuaded by this argument. For purposes of the pending motion to remand only, the court assumes without deciding that prosecution of state law claims by citizens of foreign countries pursuant to § 71.031 presents a federal question. See Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F.Supp. 525, 531 (S.D.Tex.1994) (“If no treaty exists or if Plaintiffs contend they are not relying on a treaty, they lack standing to sue. If there is a treaty, its construction permits removal based on federal question jurisdiction.”). The Lozano court held that where “defendants were clearly aware of the foreign citizenship of the plaintiffs and the foreign situs of the explosion on which th[e] action is based when they were initially served with the complaint in 1988 ... defendants had sufficient knowledge of the applicability of the Texas treaty statute to plaintiffs’ claims to assert the Texas treaty statute as a[ ] basis for removal ... in 1988.” 859 F.Supp. at 1038. The court held that removal in July of 1994 was untimely. Similarly, in Deaker, the court explained that receipt on May 26, 1994, of plaintiffs admission that he had never been a citizen of the United States sufficiently clarified plaintiffs status as either a citizen of a foreign country or a stateless person to place defendants on notice that the action had become as removable as it would ever be. Accordingly, the court held that removal effected on July 13, 1994, was untimely. Defendants cannot dispute that early versions of plaintiffs’ petitions clearly identified that most of the plaintiffs claimed foreign citizenship and that all of their alleged injuries arose abroad. Neither can defendants dispute that the first defendant received these petitions many more than 30 days before Shell attempted to remove the cases. Moreover, the court cannot help noticing that the very paper Shell asserts provided the first indication of removability belies Shell’s claim. In that paper plaintiffs state that Dow has filed a motion to dismiss the claims of the Guatemalan plaintiffs in this case on the ground that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. Certain other defendants adopted Dow’s motion. Dow contends that under ... § 71.031, a plaintiff bringing suit in Texas must come from a country which has “equal treaty rights” with the United States. If no such equal treaty rights exist, Dow argues, then the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims. Dow contends that the United States and Guatemala do not share “equal treaty rights.” It is obvious from this paper that defendants were aware of the dispute over the existence, interpretation, effect, and validity of treaties between the United States and other countries well before they received plaintiffs’ response. Because Shell has failed to demonstrate that this knowledge arose less than 30 days before its removal notice was filed, the court concludes that Shell’s attempt to predicate removal of these cases on the dispute over treaty rights was untimely. 3. Foreign relations Finally, Shell argues that the existence of a removable federal question was first revealed by statements of the Ambassadors to the United States from Costa Rica and Honduras contained in letters to the court and to Secretary of State Warren Christopher. According to Shell these letters give rise to federal question jurisdiction because they indicate that the foreign relations of the United States will be affected by the decisions in these cases. While it is true that “the body of law which pertains to ... issues of international dimension may be classified as federal common law,” and that federal question “§ 1331 jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin,” not every claim implicating the international law of foreign relations will give rise to federal question jurisdiction. Defendants must still demonstrate that plaintiffs’ claims arise under federal law — i.e., that they satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Aquafaith Shipping, Ltd. v. Jarillas, 963 F.2d 806, 808 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 413, 121 L.Ed.2d 337 (1992) (“Defense counsel’s erudite arguments about the federal common law of foreign relations are foreclosed by the familiar well-pleaded complaint rule.”); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F.Supp.1421, 1426 (C.D.Cal.1985) (“Plaintiffs’ international law claims, like their treaty claims, must ‘arise under’ the ‘laws of the United States’ for jurisdiction to he.”). Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ petitions satisfy the weh-pleaded complaint rule because plaintiffs’ claims should have included allegations attacking the sufficiency of the programs and regulations adopted by their own governments to protect them from the injuries they suffered or to compensate them after they were injured. The court is not persuaded by this argument. Because plaintiffs’ § 71.031 claims seek nothing but damages, defendants’ argument amounts to no more than the fear that a state court might impose liability for actions taken abroad that did not violate local government regulations. To the extent that defendants seek to pursue a defensive strategy alleging that at least some of their actions should be insulated from liability because those actions were taken in compliance with regulations, programs, and policies of the United States government or one or more foreign governments, this strategy is insufficient to transform the plaintiffs’ claims into federal questions. Thus, although important issues of international significance might be implicated by the decisions made by a state court in this case, because no removable federal question implicating the international law of foreign relations necessarily appears in any claim within plaintiffs’ well-pleaded petitions, the court concludes that Shell’s second supplemental removal notice fails to establish the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction. D. Is Remand Warranted? Defendants, using the last removal arrows in their quiver, argue that Jorge Carcamo, Rodriguez, Erazo, and Valdez should not be remanded even if Dead Sea’s removal of these cases was premature. They argue that “by virtue of the power granted under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(a) and 1448, the court] can grant ... leave to serve Dead Sea, thus eliminating plaintiffs’ complaint and allowing this litigation to proceed to an efficient conclusion.” Once again the parties have identified an issue that defies a categorical response, for the same case that instructs this court to evaluate a party’s “power to remove ... at the time of removal,” also applied 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2) retroactively to cure jurisdictional defects that existed when the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) effected its removal. FSLIC v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 696 (5th Cir.1991). Defendants do not cite, and the court’s independent research has failed to uncover, a single case employing § 1447(a) or § 1448 (or any of the federal statutes that are the predecessors of these sections) retroactively to correct a private party’s premature removal. The court need not plumb these uncharted waters with respect to Rodriguez or Erazo, however, because even if §§ 1447(a) and 1448 empower the court to do so, neither these statutes nor Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a) compels that result. The court is persuaded that it should not grant leave to serve third-party-petitions on Dead Sea in either Rodriguez or Erazo. In addition to amending their pleadings and filing stipulations reflecting their intention not to pursue relief from injuries arising from Dead Sea’s products, plaintiffs have also entered settlement agreements with Dead Sea. Under these circumstances the court is unwilling to usurp the state courts’ authority to examine, in the first instance, whether Dead Sea should be implead-ed into the case at this point in the litigation. Cf. International Primate Protection League v. Tulane Educational Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 86-89, 111 S.Ct. 1700, 1709-10, 114 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991) (remanding action against federal agency instead of upholding dismissal for plaintiffs’ lack of federal constitutional standing because post-remand determination whether federal agency is an indispensable party and whether plaintiffs should be allowed to substitute an individual federal official for the federal agency would be determined by state law). Accordingly, the court concludes that Rodriguez and Erazo should be remanded. In Jorge Cárcamo and Valdez, however, the question is more complex. In these cases federal courts allowed Dow to file an amended, third-party complaint against Dead Sea pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a). Were the court to remand these actions in their current posture plaintiffs would be powerless to delay Dead Sea from immediately exercising its presently mature right to again remove the actions to federal court. The court will not subject the parties to the unnecessary expense and potential delay inherent in such circularity of litigation. Accordingly, while the court concludes that Rodriguez and Erazo must be remanded because Dead Sea removed them prematurely, the court concludes that Jorge Carcomo and Valdez may remain in federal court. IV. Dismissal Motions A. Which Dismissal Motion Should Be Resolved First? Plaintiffs ask the court to dismiss defendants’ third-party actions against Dead Sea because they lack merit or to sever the third-party actions and then to remand the remainder of the actions to various state courts. Defendants ask the court to dismiss all of the actions in their entirety by declining to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens (f.n.c.). The court is persuaded that it must examine defendants’ motion first in order to avoid the possibility of remanding any of the actions to an equally inconvenient state forum. See Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d at 1069-70 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that “a federal court [should] remand rather than dismiss when a case is removed from a state court jurisdiction that would not dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds” because “[i]t would be anomalous to conclude that while a district court may properly invoke the federal law of forum non conveniens to decline jurisdiction over a properly removed case, it must order the case to be reinstituted in an equally if not more inconvenient forum”). Before addressing the merits of the motion to dismiss these actions for f.n.c., however, the court must first determine whether defendants have waived or should be estopped from asserting that this court is an inconvenient forum. B. Have Defendants Waived the Right to Seek Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal? 1. Have defendants waived the right to seek dismissal by relying on Tex.Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 71.031 as a basis for federal jurisdiction? Plaintiffs argue that defendants are not entitled to assert the federal law of forum non conveniens because they affirmatively asserted that federal question jurisdiction is provided by the “equal treaty rights” clause of § 71.031(a)(3). Without citing any authority plaintiffs urge the court to bind defendants to an application of the “anti-forum non conveniens dismissal provision” of that Texas statute. The court declines to do so because it is aware of no exception to the rule that “a federal court ... is required to apply the federal law of forum non conveniens when addressing motions to dismiss a plaintiffs case to a foreign forum ... in all cases regardless of their jurisdictional bases or subject matter.” In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1159, 1163 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc) (emphasis in the original), vacated sub nom. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032, 109 S.Ct. 1928, 104 L.Ed.2d 400, relevant holding reinstated, 883 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.1989) (en banc). Alternatively, to the extent that such an exception might exist in an appropriate case, the court is persuaded that the cases before it do not fall within the ambit of any exception. The crux of plaintiffs’ argument is that defendants waived the right to seek f.n.c. dismissal by asserting that plaintiffs’ § 71.031 causes of action present removable federal questions. To succeed in that assertion defendants would have to demonstrate that plaintiffs’ state-law causes of action nevertheless “arise under” federal law because a question of federal law is an essential element of those claims. Viewed in this light the conclusion plaintiffs urge is illogical; surely defendants did not waive the right to seek application of federal f.n.c. law by attempting to demonstrate that federal law is an essential element of plaintiffs’ state-law causes of action. 2. Have defendants waived the right to seek dismissal by pursuing transfers of several cases to this court from other districts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § im(a)? Citing Insurance Co. of North America v. Ozean/Stinnes-Linien, 367 F.2d 224, 226-27 (5th Cir.1966) (reversing f.n.c. dismissal where f.n.c. motion was prosecuted only after defendant’s motion to transfer from New Orleans to Savannah had been granted), plaintiffs argue that defendants waived the right to pursue f.n.c. dismissal in all of these eases when they sought transfer of Valdez and Isae Carcamo from the Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas to this court. The Ozean/Stinnes-Linien court predicated its decision on the inequitable conduct of the defendant: The transfer to the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division ... was “[flor the convenience of the parties and witnesses” and presupposes that the ease would be tried on its merits in the district court at Savannah.... The libelant lost his choice of forum and had to prepare for trial in Savannah. The respondent cannot now be permitted to contend that, after all, Savannah is not the most appropriate place for a trial on the merits and, upon such contention, to have the libel dismissed. Id. at 222-27. Accordingly, the court held that the language in defendant’s brief in support of the motion to transfer amounted to a waiver of the right to later prosecute f.n.c. dismissal. Id. at 227. Assuming arguendo that the holding of Ozean/Stinnes-Linien was not disturbed by the fact that in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno 454 U.S. 235, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) “the United States Supreme Court ... upheld, without any discussion of estoppel, a district court’s dismissal under forum non conveniens even where the case had previously been removed to federal court and transferred to a different federal forum under § 1404(a),” the transfer of Valdez and Isae Carcamo to this court was accomplished under very different circumstances from those present in Ozean/Stinnes-Linien. In addition to filing a motion to consolidate Valdez and Isae Carcamo on April 25, 1994, Shell moved to transfer both cases to this court. Of particular relevance to plaintiffs’ current argument, the motion stated that “[w]hile no United States forum is truly convenient for these claims ... transfer of the consolidated case to the Houston Division, where two other related cases are currently pending, would be less inconvenient for both the parties and ttie witnesses.” Four days later, on Apnb29, 1994, the Chiquita entities joined Shell’s motion. Shell’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response and Opposition to Shell's Motion to Transfer, filed on May 27, 1994, notified plaintiffs and the court that “Shell does not intend by prosecuting this Motion to waive any forum non conveniens challenge or any other legal right it or other defendants might have” and explained that transfer would further the interests of justice because “common issues in the related cases, such as federal jurisdiction, remand to state court, and forum non conveniens, should be dealt with at one time by one judge.” Although the motions were denied by Magistrate Judge Radford, Shell and the Chiquita entities sought review in the district court by filing objections to that order. Among the arguments advanced by Shell and Chiquita for reversal of Judge Radford’s order was the fact that submission of defendants’ motion to dismiss for f.n.c. was soon to be filed in all of the cases that had been consolidated in this court. “To avoid unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources in ruling on essentially identical motions to dismiss for forum non-conveniens, this case should be transferred to the Southern District, Houston Division for consolidation with the other four DBCP cases pending there.” A transfer order issued under the circumstances present in Valdez and Isae Carcamo is not the equivalent of the transfer order in Ozean/Stinnes-Linien. Plaintiffs lost their initial forum choice when Judge Radford denied their motions to remand the actions to state court before Judge Steger transferred the cases to this court. Moreover, defendants’ actions could not have given plaintiffs the false impression that transfer to this court would be followed by a trial on the merits in this court without further pretrial motions. Defendants repeatedly and vigorously asserted that they intended to seek f.n.c. dismissal of all cases once transfer was accomplished. The court is therefore persuaded that defendants did not waive the right to seek such dismissal in any of the papers relating to the motion to transfer in Valdez and Isae Carcamo. 3. Did Dow waive the right to seek dismissal by initiating a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas? Plaintiffs argue that by commencing a declaratory judgment action in the Northern District of Texas in 1993 asserting, inter alia, that plaintiffs’ claims against Dow are preempted by FIFRA, Dow waived its right to seek f.n.c. dismissal because it essentially admitted “that (1) federal district court in Texas [is] a convenient forum in which to litigate these claims; and (2) American law [is] applicable to Dow’s conduct.” A waiver occurs when one voluntarily or intentionally surrenders a known right. Although “[generally, waiver is a fact question turning on the question of intent[,] ... the issue of waiver becomes a matter of law ... whe[n] material facts and circumstances are undisputed or clearly established and there is no room for argument or inference.” It is undisputed that the state