Full opinion text
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION TO STRIKE EXPERTS, AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RULING IN ADVANCE OF TRIAL BENNETT, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I.INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND . 1424 II.THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 1426 A. Standards For Summary Judgment. 1426 B. Findings Of Fact. 1427 1. Undisputed facts . 1427 2. Disputed facts. 1429 C. Legal Analysis. 1430 1. The retaliatory discharge claim. 1431 a. Recognition of the public policy exception under Iowa law_ 1431 b. Discharge interfering with workers compensation rights. 1433 c. Reedy’s retaliatory discharge claim. 1434 2. The “bad faith” claim. 1435 a. The bad-faith cause of action under Iowa law. 1435 b. Jury question or question of law?. 1437 c. Reedy’s bad-faith claim. 1439 3. The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 1440 a. Elements of the tort. 1440 b. The outrageousness of defendant’s conduct. 1441 c. Sufficiency of plaintiffs emotional distress. 1443 D. Conclusion. 1444 III. THE MOTION TO STRIKE EXPERTS. 1445 A. The Proffered Experts . 1445 B. Legal Analysis. 1446 1. Standards for expert witnesses . 1446 2. Admissibility of the proffered experts’ opinions. 1447 C. Conclusion. 1448 IV. THE MOTION FOR RULING IN ADVANCE OF TRIAL. 1448 A. Background. 1449 B. Legal Analysis. 1449 1. Admissibility of administrative findings generally. 1449 2. Admissibility of the Industrial Commission reports. 1450 C. Conclusion. 1451 V. CONCLUSIONS. 1451 This diversity action under Iowa law compels the court once again to navigate the increasingly explored, but still largely uncharted and sometimes treacherous waters of Iowa’s common-law cause of action for first party bad faith. Here, a former employee alleges wrongful or retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy by his employer in an attempt to interfere with or retaliate for the employee’s right to claim workers compensation benefits, bad faith termination of workers compensation benefits, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendant employer has moved for summary judgment on all claims. The employer asserts that the plaintiff has no wrongful discharge claim, because the plaintiff was legitimately terminated for misrepresentation of his physical condition and health history; that the plaintiff has no “bad faith” claim for coverage, because workers compensation coverage in such circumstances was “fairly debatable” and because the employer sought advice of counsel before terminating coverage; and that there has been no outrageous conduct attributable to the employer upon which to found an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The employer has also moved to strike two of plaintiffs proffered experts as insufficiently qualified to give expert testimony in this matter. Plaintiff has moved for a ruling in advance of trial on the admissibility of findings in the state administrative procedures pertaining to his claim for workers compensation benefits. I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff Larry Reedy, an Iowa resident, filed this diversity action on March 28, 1991, against his former employer, White Consolidated Industries, Inc. (WCI), a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in Cleveland, Ohio. Reedy worked for WCI’s Laundry Division, which has a facility in Hamilton County, Iowa, but was discharged on June 21, 1990. In Reedy’s original complaint, Division I, Count I, Reedy alleged wrongful and retaliatory discharge in an attempt by the employer to interfere with or retaliate for Reedy’s right to claim workers compensation benefits. In Count II of that Division, Reedy sought punitive damages. In Division II of the original complaint, Count I alleged bad faith refusal to pay workers compensation benefits, and Count II sought punitive damages on the bad faith claim. WCI answered the original complaint on April 29, 1991. On July 15, 1992, the Hon. Donald E. O’Brien, now Senior Judge of this court, certified two questions to the Iowa Supreme Court. Those questions were as follows: 1. Is an action against a self-insured employer for bad-faith failure to pay a worker’s compensation claim for medical benefits recognized in Iowa? 2. If the Iowa courts were to recognize the existence of a Bad Faith Action, must the employee first litigate his workers compensation claim before the Iowa Industrial Commission and exhaust all appeals before such a Bad Faith Action is ripe for adjudication? Upon joint motion of the parties, this matter was stayed on August 3, 1992, until the determination of the questions certified to the Iowa Supreme Court. On July 22, 1993, the Iowa Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative. Reedy v. White Consol. Ind., Inc., 503 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 1993). However, in light of that decision, on September 15, 1993, the court granted a further stay until an adjudication was made on the appeal of the decision of the Iowa Industrial Commissioner. On October 31, 1994, finding that the proceedings before the Iowa Industrial Commissioner had been concluded, and finding further that the parties agreed that the stay should be lifted, Chief Magistrate Judge John A. Jarvey entered an order lifting the stay and establishing a schedule to bring this matter to trial. That order established, inter alia, a deadline of November 15, 1994, for motions to amend, a deadline of February 15, 1995, for the designation of expert witnesses, and a deadline of May 1,1995, for all disposi-tive motions. On December 8,1994, Judge Jarvey granted Reedy’s motion for leave to amend his complaint. The amended complaint adds, as Division III, two further counts. Count I of the new division alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress as the result of WCI’s failure to provide workers compensation benefits. Count II of this new division seeks punitive damages on Reedy’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. WCI answered the additional counts of the amended complaint on January 20, 1995. On April 25, 1995, Judge Jarvey granted an extension until May 22,1995, for the filing of dispositive motions. WCI therefore timely filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims in Reedy’s amended complaint on May 22, 1995. Also on May 22, 1995, WCI moved to strike two of plaintiffs experts designated on November 14, 1991. Presumably because of the stay in this matter, WCI did not depose two of these experts, Leonard Weaver and John J. Puk, until March 21, 1995. WCI requested oral arguments on both motions. Reedy resisted both the motion for summary judgment and the motion to strike experts on June 5, 1995, but joined in the requests for oral arguments on these motions. The court therefore set telephonic oral arguments on both motions for June 30, 1995. On June 8,1995, Reedy moved for a ruling in advance of trial on the admissibility of findings in the administrative procedures pertaining to his claim for workers compensation benefits. The parties were requested to prepare oral arguments on this motion for June 30, 1995, as well. At the oral arguments on June 30, 1995, plaintiff Larry Reedy was represented by counsel Tito Trevino of the Trevino Law Office in Fort Dodge, Iowa. Defendant WCI was represented at oral arguments by counsel Stephen D. Turner and David W. Centner of Law, Weathers & Richardson, P.C., in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The court found the briefs and oral arguments of the provided by counsel to be of unusually high quality and consequently most helpful in disposition of these motions. Finding these matters fully submitted, the court turns to disposition of the various motions. II. THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WCI has moved for summary judgment on each of Reedy’s claims. As to the retaliatory discharge claim, WCI asserts that the record is absolutely clear that Reedy was fired for misrepresenting his medical condition on his application for employment with WCI, not in an attempt to interfere with or retaliate for Reedy’s right to seek workers compensation benefits. WCI points to what it calls Reedy’s “admissions” in deposition that he has no evidence that he was fired in retaliation for seeking workers compensation benefits, and “admissions” that Reedy misrepresented his condition on the application forms. Reedy counters that, far from admitting that he intentionally misled WCI, his deposition generates a genuine issue of material fact as to his belief that the application form asked only about his present medical condition. Reedy also asserts that the application form and his pre-employment medical check-up with a doctor selected by WCI put WCI on notice of his history of back problems. He argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not WCI fired him for seeking to claim workers compensation benefits, because WCI ignored indications of his past medical history until he actually notified WCI of an injury likely to run up medical bills and generate a workers compensation claim. As to the “bad faith” claim, WCI argues that although the Iowa Supreme Court settled the question of whether Reedy may pursue such a claim in Reedy v. White Consol. Ind., Inc., 503 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 1993), there is no genuine issue of material fact that Reedy cannot prove the elements of such a claim. WCI asserts that the record demonstrates that it had a reasonable basis for denying Reedy’s workers compensation claim, Reedy’s misrepresentations of his medical history in his job application, and that coverage in this case was therefore “fairly debatable.” Furthermore, WCI argues that it relied on advice of counsel in concluding that coverage was “fairly debatable” in these circumstances. Reedy argues that coverage was not “fairly debatable,” and that WCI cannot assert an “advice of counsel” defense, because WCI consulted counsel with the pre-conceived intent to terminate his workers compensation benefits. Finally, as to Reedy’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, WCI asserts that Reedy has not alleged any outrageous conduct by its employees or agents. Rather, WCI reads Reedy’s complaint as asserting outrageous conduct by a nurse associated with Reedy’s own doctor, not with any doctor employed by WCI. Reedy argues that his complaint is founded in part on the outrageous conduct of a nurse who humiliated him over the non-payment of his bill, when WCI was responsible for that payment, but, more importantly, Reedy alleges that WCI’s outrageous conduct was to require him to see various physicians chosen by them, then to deny payment of those physicians’ bills. Reedy asserts that the outrageousness of this latter conduct was aggravated by the fact that while WCI was requiring Reedy to obtain treatment, it was compiling his medical records and preparing to terminate his workers compensation benefits. The court turns first to the standards applicable to disposition of WCI’s motion for summary judgment. A. Standards For Summary Judgment The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes “that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine issues of fact away from juries.” Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1990). On the other hand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have authorized for nearly 60 years “motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, “summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ ” Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir.1992). The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: Rule 56. Summary Judgment (b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move for summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof. (c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon.... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) & (c) (emphasis added); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1325 (8th Cir.1995); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir.1994); Roth v. U.S.S. Great Lakes Fleet, Inc., 25 F.3d 707, 708 (8th Cir.1994); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.1993); Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir.1990); Wadun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here Reedy, and give him the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir.1994); Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1994); Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 545 (8th Cir.1993); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1991); Coday v. City of Springfield, 939 F.2d 666, 667 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.Ed.2d 416 (1992). Procedurally, the moving party, here WCI, bears “the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for [its] motion and identifying those portions of the record which show lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553); see also Reed v. Woodruff County, Ark., 1 F.3d 808, 810 (8th Cir.1993). WCI is not required by Rule 56 to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim. Id. “When a moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(e), its opponent must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1355. Reedy is required under Rule 56(e) to go beyond the pleadings, and by affidavits, or by the “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir.1995); Beyerbach, 49 F.3d at 1325. Although “direct proof is not required to create a jury question, ... to avoid summary judgment, ‘the facts and circumstances relied upon must attain the dignity of substantial evidence and must not be such as merely to create a suspicion.’ ” Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir.1985) (quoting Impro Products, Inc. v. Herrick, 715 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026, 104 S.Ct. 1282, 79 L.Ed.2d 686 (1984)), cert. denied sub nom. Metge v. Bankers Trust Co., 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S.Ct. 798, 88 L.Ed.2d 774 (1986). The necessary proof that the nonmoving party must produce is not precisely measurable, but the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1994). In Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, and Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56, the Supreme Court established that a summary judgment motion should be interpreted by the trial court to accomplish its purpose of disposing of factually unsupported claims, and the trial judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there' is a genuine issue for trial. Johnson v. Enron Corp., 906 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir.1990). The trial court, therefore, must “assess the adequacy of the nonmovants’ response and whether that showing, on admissible evidence, would be sufficient to carry the burden of proof at trial.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 396 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552). If Reedy fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim with respect to which he has the burden of proof, then WCI is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Woodsmith, 904 F.2d at 1247. However, if the court can conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmovant, then summary judgment should not be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Burk, 948 F.2d at 492; Woodsmith, 904 F.2d at 1247. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that “summary judgment should seldom be used in employment-discrimination eases.” Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1994) (citing Johnson v. Minnesota Historical Soc’y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir.1991); Hillebrand v. M-Tron Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 782, 102 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989)); see also Hardin v. Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262 (8th Cir.1995) (“summary judgments should only be used sparingly in employment discrimination cases,” citing Haglof v. Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d 492, 495 (8th Cir.1990); Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 364). Summary judgment is appropriate only in “those rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion.” Webb v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 51 F.3d 147, 148 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244); Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244). The court reasoned that “[b]ecause discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant.” Id. (holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment); Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244. With these standards in mind, the court turns next to the facts not in dispute between the parties, and those as to which the parties assert there is a genuine issue. B. Findings Of Fact 1. Undisputed facts On January 22, 1990, Reedy applied for employment with WCI’s Laundry Division in Hamilton County, Iowa. In response to the question, “Have you ever drawn workers’ compensation?” Reedy marked the box to answer yes, then elaborated by stating “1984 — cracked rib — returned to work in approx. 4 wks.” Above the signature line, the application form bore the following: PLEASE READ CAREFULLY THE STATEMENT BELOW I understand that any employment with the Company is voluntarily entered into and, if employed, I may resign at any time for any reason. Similarly, the Company may terminate the employment relationship at any time for any reason. I authorize the investigation of all statements contained in this application, and further authorize the company to contact my past employers. My present employer [] May [] May Not Be Contacted. I certify that all statements and information are true, and acknowledge that any falsification of these facts is cause for separation from the company’s service. Recognizing that a physical examination may disclose matters which would adversely interfere with the performance of my work, I agree to such an examination by a company-designated physician, and understand that my employment is contingent upon that examination. Reedy acknowledges that he read and understood the application form. On January 29, 1990, prior to a pre-em-ployment physical examination, Reedy completed a WCI Laundry Medical Information Form giving details of his medical history. In response to an extensive list of items under “Medical History,” including back trouble or back pain, broken bones or bone disease, and numbness in a limb, among many other items, Reedy marked “yes” only as to “Operations.” In the space provided to explain any affirmative answers, Reedy wrote, “Injured in Viet Nam 1968.” In answer to the question requesting that he list all surgical operations, Reedy wrote, “Abdominal area (Viet Nam) chest, back.” Reedy indicated that he had no physical complaints at that time. Reedy identified as the only time he had been admitted to a hospital, “Viet Nam 1968-1969,” indicated that he believed his present health was “good,” and' that he had been injured at work in 1983 and had missed work for approximately four weeks as the result of a cracked rib. Just above the signature line, which Reedy signed, was the following: I certify the information herein to be true and correct and understand that any misstatement or misrepresentation/omission of facts provides cause for rejection or dismissal. Reedy’s statements in these forms notwithstanding, in addition to the near-fatal injuries Reedy suffered to his abdomen, lungs, stomach, rectum, chest, shoulders, arms, and back as the result of the nearby explosion of two land mines during his tour in Viet Nam in 1968, Reedy had an extensive medical history. Reedy’s medical history included an automobile accident in 1969, resulting in a fractured pelvic bone, facial lacerations, and contusions to the head; back injuries in 1979 or 1980 from heavy lifting in the course of his employment requiring treatment from a chiropractor and other medical doctors; back injuries in 1982 or 1983, resulting in the filing of a workers compensation claim with Mid-Continent Lumber; diagnosis of a ruptured disc and other damage at the L3-L4 lumbar region of his back in 1984 resulting in a lumbar laminectomy in June of 1984; a fall of approximately 14 feet from the second level of a warehouse in 1984 resulting in a cracked rib, as well as back and head injuries, for which Reedy ultimately received a workers compensation settlement of $20,-000; and aggravation of back pain as a truck driver in 1987 or 1988. In addition to these employment related health matters, Reedy injured his back in 1987 while moving his television set, resulting in medical attention from his own physician. In addition to the health problems described above, Reedy testified in deposition to rectal bleeding, leg problems, and constipation. On January 29, 1990, Reedy had a pre-employment physical examination with Dr. Latella, a physician designated by WCI. Dr. Latella did not report that Reedy had any history or other indications of back problems. Reedy was therefore hired by WCI as a general laborer and began working for the Laundry Division on February 5, 1990. On February 15, 1990, while attempting to lift a piece of solid plate steel, Reedy experienced a “ripping sensation” in his lower back. However, Reedy was laid off work that day, so that he did not report the injury to his employer until some time later. Reedy sought treatment for back pain and pain running down both legs on February 22, 1990, from the local hospital and then from the Veterans Administration Hospital. Reedy reported this back injury in mid-February to his employer only in early March of 1990 when he returned to work at the WCI Laundry Division plant. On June 13, 1990, Reedy again injured his back at work, this time while attempting to lift a box weighing about 30 lbs. Reedy was treated for this injury by Dr. Latella, WCI’s company physician. During this treatment, Reedy and Dr. Latella had a confrontation over whether Reedy had disclosed his prior back problems to the doctor during the pre-employment physical examination. Dr. La-tella advised WCI that he had not been informed of these problems. WCI terminated Reedy on June 21, 1990. Reedy’s termination letter, from R.C. Kennedy, Manager, Employee Relations, states that Reedy’s termination “had become necessary due to our discovery that during your pre-employment application, interview, and physical process a number of facts pertinent to the hiring decision were deleted, falsified and/or misrepresented.” Kennedy’s letter identified the following inaccurate disclosures: “[pjrevious employment related back surgery,” “[pjrevious hospitalization for back surgery,” “10% permanent partial disability rating,” and “[mjedical restrictions which precluded work that involved heavy lifting, forward bending, and prolonged sitting or standing.” The summary judgment record does not reveal when or how, or even if, WCI was formally advised of Reedy’s injury and intent to seek workers compensation benefits. In his deposition, Reedy states that he completed a form concerning his injury for a nurse in Dr. Latella’s office that included questions about “what happened, how I hurt myself, where I was working, what I was doing.” Reedy Deposition, pp. 110-112. However, that form is not in the summary judgment record, and the court is unable to determine whether it was a notice of injury form referred to by counsel for the parties at oral argument. Nonetheless, although Reedy’s employment had been terminated, it is undisputed that WCI initially authorized medical treatment for Reedy’s back injury sustained on June 13, 1990, as a work-related injury. However, Reedy was notified that his workers compensation benefits would terminate on August 16, 1990. WCI did in fact terminate those benefits and withdrew its authorization for any further medical treatment. Reedy sought administrative relief from the termination of his workers compensation benefits through the Iowa Industrial Commission and then in judicial review of those administrative proceedings in Iowa District Court for Polk County. Reedy did not appeal the negative determination of the Iowa District Court. During the pendency of the administrative proceedings, Reedy filed this lawsuit. 2. Disputed facts Reedy asserts a number of disputes of fact that he contends are material to the disposition of this lawsuit. Reedy asserts that he has never “admitted” that he intentionally misled WCI concerning his past medical condition. Rather, Reedy asserts that he understood the application form and medical history form to be seeking information only about his present health condition. Reedy also asserts that he provided WCI with notice of his back problems, both by indicating back injuries in Viet Nam in 1968, and by discussing his back problems with Dr. Latella. Specifically, Reedy states that he explained the long, straight surgical scar on his back, which is different from the pockmark scars caused by his shrapnel wounds, as resulting from disc surgery. Dr. Latella vehemently denies any knowledge or discussion of Reedy’s back injuries prior to June 13, 1990. Reedy asserts that it is unreasonable to believe that Dr. Latella could have mistaken the laminectomy scar for a sear from a shrapnel wound. Reedy asserts that Dr. Latella, who was also a Viet Nam veteran, simply became more caught up in reminiscing with Reedy than in making a complete medical report. Reedy asserts that WCI fired him before contacting counsel for any advice. WCI contends, however, that it contacted counsel concerning termination of Reedy’s workers compensation benefits prior to doing so. Reedy asserts that even if WCI contacted counsel concerning termination of his benefits, it was not a good faith consultation, because WCI had already begun gathering Reedy’s medical history and had already decided to terminate his employment. There is no dispute that WCI did not contact counsel until after Reedy had been terminated. The record is less clear regarding when WCI contacted counsel concerning termination of Reedy’s workers compensation benefits. In deposition, the counsel contacted by WCI, Robert Landess, testified that he had no independent recollection of any contact with WCI concerning Reedy between June and August, and that although he believes he had discussions with WCI about terminating Reedy’s benefits, he cannot state with certainty the timing of those discussions in relation to Reedy’s filing of a workers compensation claim and the termination of Reedy’s workers compensation benefits. See Landess Deposition, pp. 19-21, 36, 50-56. Reedy asserts that termination of his benefits was outrageous, because he had been treated by physicians of WCI’s choosing and at their behest. Reedy also alleges that an altercation he had with a nurse over his unpaid medical bills, which he asserts was humiliating, was the direct result of WCI’s refusal to pay benefits. Finally, Reedy disputes any suggestion that he suffered from “chronic” back pain, as WCI has from time-to-time characterized his back problems. He also denies making any statement that driving a truck aggravated his back pain. WCI’s reply brief attempts to rebut any suggestion that genuine issues of material fact exist, or, that if disputes of fact exist, that they are material. First, WCI argues that whether or not Reedy intentionally misled WCI is not a material issue; the fact that Reedy signed an application and medical history form each containing demonstrably false information concerning Reedy’s history of back problems is enough to establish that his termination was reasonable. WCI also argues that there is no evidence, apart from Reedy’s assertions, that he ever discussed his back problems with Dr. Latella prior to June 13, 1990. WCI points out that the report generated by the pre-employment physical examination does not indicate any back problems. WCI next asserts that the record demonstrates that it contacted counsel prior to terminating Reedy’s workers compensation benefits, and that Reedy cannot show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not WCI relied on counsel’s advice. Finally, WCI asserts that it had no authority over the nurse who allegedly humiliated Reedy over his unpaid bills, even if her conduct was outrageous. The court will consider in the pertinent place whether any of the disputes of fact pressed by the parties creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56; Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 396. C. Legal Analysis (Including Some Further Findings Of Fact) WCI has moved for summary judgment on Reedy’s claims of retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy, bad faith denial of workers compensation benefits, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court will consider WCI’s grounds for summary judgment on each of Reedy’s claims seriatim. 1. The retaliatory discharge claim a. Recognition of the public policy exception under Iowa law The Iowa Supreme Court was slow to recognize a cause of action for the wrongful discharge of an at-will employee, instead relying on the general rule that an at-will employee may be terminated at any time, for any reason. See Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Iowa 1978); Harper v. Cedar Rapids Television Co., Inc., 244 N.W.2d 782, 791 (Iowa 1976); Allen v. Highway Equip. Co., 239 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Iowa 1976). In Northrup v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 1985), the court stated that [t]his court has never expressly recognized a public policy exception [to the employment at will doctrine], although we recently noted its increasing acceptance in other jurisdictions. [Citations omitted]. While we hinted in Abrisz that, under proper circumstances, we would recognize a common-law claim for a discharge violating public policy, we did not apply it there because the facts did not establish such a violation. We observed, moreover, that “[c]ourts should not declare conduct viola-tive of public policy unless it is clearly so.” Abrisz, 270 N.W.2d at 456. It has been observed, in fact, that successful common-law claims for wrongful discharge have been based in large part on violations of independent statutory policy, not those established by court decisions. See Note, Protecting At-Will Employees [Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith], 93 Harv.L.Rev. at 1822-23. Northrup v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Iowa 1985). The court then went on to find an express public policy prohibiting discharges for “disabilities,” but held that a claim of wrongful discharge based on a disability was preempted by the exclusive remedies of Iowa Code Ch. 601A (now Iowa Code Ch. 216). Id. As in Abrisz, the court again refused to recognize a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy in Haldeman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1985), because “we simply observe that this case would not fall into such an exception.” 376 N.W.2d at 105. In Haldeman, the plaintiffs claim of wrongful discharge was based on her discharge as a cashier following discovery of “unexplained shortages.” Id. In Cross v. Lightolier Inc., 395 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1986), the Iowa Supreme Court recognized that jurisdictions were split on whether an action for wrongful discharge under a mandate of public policy is a contract or tort action. 395 N.W.2d at 849. However, the court upheld the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs claim of breach of an oral contract was a contract and not a tort claim, and reiterated that “[ejmployment at will ... cannot be used as a basis for an action for wrongful discharge or breach of employment contract.” Id. (quoting Haldeman, 376 N.W.2d at 105). It was not until 1988 that the Iowa Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for discharge that frustrates a well-recognized and defined public policy of the state in the case of Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., Inc., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988) (hereinafter Springer 7). However, the court considered the cause of action to be one of tortious interference with a contract of hire. Springer I, 429 N.W.2d at 560. The court later concluded that this characterization “may have been misleading,” and cited cases clarifying the court’s development and refinement of the tort. Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., Inc., 475 N.W.2d 630, 632-33 (Iowa 1991) (hereinafter Springer II). The court has construed Springer I as holding that if the discharge of an employee at will is in violation of public policy, the employee has a cause of action in tort against the employer. Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1990); see also Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 637 (Iowa 1990) (in Springer I, “the court recognized an at-will employee’s right to compensation for wrongful discharge in violation of a ‘clearly articulated public policy of this state’ ”); Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa 1989) (citing Springer I for the same proposition). As the law now stands in Iowa, the general rule is still that an at-will employee may be discharged at any time, for any reason, or no reason at all. Borschel v. City of Perry, 512 N.W.2d 565, 566 (Iowa 1994); Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Iowa 1994); French v. Foods, Inc., 495 N.W.2d 768, 769 (Iowa 1993); Grahek v. Voluntary Hosp. Co-op. Ass’n of Iowa, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Iowa 1991); Fogel, 446 N.W.2d at 455. The court has recognized two exceptions to this general rule in which a cause of action for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee will lie: The first is where the discharge is in clear violation of a “well-recognized and defined public policy of this state,” and the second is where a contract is created by an employer’s handbook or policy manual. Borschel, 512 N.W.2d at 566; French, 495 N.W.2d at 769-70; Fogel, 446 N.W.2d at 455; see also Clarey v. K-Products, Inc., 514 N.W.2d 900, 902 (Iowa 1994) (court has recognized exception to at-will employment where discharge occurs for reasons contrary to public policy); Lara, 512 N.W.2d at 782 (case involved “one of the exceptions,” discharge in violation of public policy); Grahek, 473 N.W.2d at 34 (“termination of an employment at-will is generally not actionable in the absence of discrimination or a public policy violation.”); Vaughn, 459 N.W.2d at 638 (public policy exception only discussed); Niblo v. Parr Mfg., Inc., 445 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Iowa 1989) (public policy exception only discussed); Vaughn v. City of Cedar Rapids, 527 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (citing Fogel for exceptions of violation of public policy and creation of contract in handbook). The public policy exception is based on the theory that the law should not allow employees to be fired for reasons that violate public policy. Borschel, 512 N.W.2d at 567 (citing 82 Am.Jr.2d, Wrongful Discharge § 15, at 687 (1992)). Under the public policy exception, the Iowa Supreme Court has recognized causes of action for tortious discharge where an employer’s retaliatory discharge would conflict with certain legislatively declared goals. Lara, 512 N.W.2d at 782. Such policies may be expressed in the constitution and the statutes of the state, Borschel, 512 N.W.2d at 567 (citing 82 Am.Jr.2d, Wrongful Discharge § 19, at 692 (1992)), although enforcement of the tort based on some policies is preempted by enforcement under the statutes embodying those policies themselves: The legislature may explicitly prohibit the discharge of an employee who acts in accordance with a statutory right or duty. See, e.g., Iowa Code ch. 216 (1993) (civil rights statute transferred from Iowa Code ch. 601A). Discharge of an employee because of age, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion, or disability is an unfair employment practice. Iowa Code § 216.6. Remedies are provided employees who are discharged in violation of the statute. See Iowa Code § 216.15. Our civil rights statute, however, preempts an employee’s claim that the discharge was in violation of public policy when the claim is premised on discriminatory acts. Hamilton v. First Baptist Elderly Hous. Found, 436 N.W.2d 336, 341-42 (Iowa 1989). Borschel, 512 N.W.2d at 567-68. The Borschel court then identified the circumstances in which Iowa courts had found a public policy basis for the tort: In the absence of an express prohibition, the court of appeals found an implied cause of action for wrongful termination when the reason for discharge is the employee’s failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment. Wilcox v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 458 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Iowa App.1990). The court of appeals found that the violation of a statute prohibiting an employer from requiring an employee to take a polygraph examination was a violation of public policy, thus a private cause of action existed. Id. at 872. At the time the claim arose the statute did not expressly allow for a cause of action. This statute was later amended to so provide. Id. Also we have found an implied prohibition against retaliatory discharge based on an employee’s exercise of a right conferred by a clearly articulated legislative enactment. See Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Iowa 1994) (discharge in retaliation for filing partial unemployment claim); Niblo v. Parr Mfg., Inc., 445 N.W.2d 351, 358 (Iowa 1989) (employee discharged because she threatened to file a workers’ compensation claim); Springer [I], 429 N.W.2d at 560 (cause of action exists when the employee’s discharge serves to frustrate the public policy expressed in the workers’ compensation statute). Borschel, 512 N.W.2d at 568. A wrongful or retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy is therefore an intentional wrong committed by the employer against an employee who chooses to exercise some substantial right. Niblo, 445 N.W.2d at 355 (citing Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1366 (3d Cir.1979)). The remedy for the tort should be for the employee’s complete injury, including out-of-pocket loss of income and causally connected emotional harm. Id. b. Discharge interfering with workers compensation rights The case in which the Iowa Supreme Court first recognized a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine was in fact a case in which the plaintiff claimed to have been discharged for filing a workers compensation claim. Springer I, 429 N.W.2d at 560. It is not necessary under Iowa law that the plaintiff ever actually file a workers compensation claim, if the termination interferes with the employee’s right to file such a claim. Niblo, 445 N.W.2d at 353. In Niblo, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a jury could deduce that the plaintiff was fired for merely wanting to or threatening to file a workers compensation claim where the representative of the company told the employee that he was not going to pay workers compensation benefits for a skin condition that was allegedly work-related, that he did not believe that the employee’s skin problem was his fault or “factory related,” and that he was not going to pay to have the employee’s face worked on at all, and, at the conclusion of this outburst, the representative fired the employee. Niblo, 445 N.W.2d at 353. Similarly, the court found the evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on plaintiffs claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers compensation claim where plaintiff submitted evidence of tardy payment of workers’ compensation benefits by K-Produets, disparaging comments by company officials concerning claims for workers’ compensation, and the testimony of several employees that they had been harassed following their filing of workers’ compensation claims. Also, evidence that K-Products gave inconsistent reasons for her discharge supported the plaintiffs theory, and there was testimony by the company’s doctor that he believed the company was intentionally “slowing things down” in processing workers’ compensation claims. Clarey, 514 N.W.2d at 902. In Springer II, the Iowa Supreme Court identified the elements of the public policy exception claim when based upon discharge in retaliation for seeking workers compensation benefits as follows: Plaintiff must prove all of the following propositions: 1. Plaintiff was an employee of defendant. 2. Defendant discharged plaintiff from employment. 3. Defendant discharged plaintiff because she filed a workers compensation claim. 4. The discharge was a proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. 5. The nature and extent of the damage. If the plaintiff has failed to prove any of these propositions, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages. If the plaintiff has proven all of these propositions, then the plaintiff is entitled to damages. Springer II, 475 N.W.2d at 633 (citing Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 3100.1). The court recognized further that a growing number of courts and legislatures have recognized a public policy exception to an employer’s right to discharge an at-will employee for asserting statutory workers compensation rights. Id. (citing Annotation, Recovery for Discharge from Employment in Retaliation for Filing Workers’ Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221 (1984); Note, Employment at Will in Iowa: Is it the Rule or the Exception% 39 Drake L.Rev. 157, 160 (1989-90)). c. Reedy’s retaliatory discharge claim In the present case, WCI asserts that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Reedy, whether intentionally or not, made false statements on his application and health forms, and that WCI terminated Reedy for making those misrepresentations, not for seeking workers compensation benefits or appearing likely to do so. Reedy vehemently denies that he intentionally misrepresented his health condition, asserting a genuine issue of material fact as to his intent on the ground that he understood the application and health form to be asking only about his present condition. Certainly, Reedy’s assertion of a genuine issue of material fact on intentional misrepresentation misses the point, but the court does not agree that there is no genuine issue of material fact presented by the record such that summary judgment may be entered in favor of WCI. The element of his claim Reedy must prove, and on which the court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact, is that WCI fired Reedy to interfere with his workers compensation rights or in retaliation for his seeking workers compensation benefits. Springer II, 475 N.W.2d at 633 (citing Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 3100.1). Like the plaintiff in Niblo, Reedy has presented evidence that he was fired when he first indicated a need or desire for workers compensation benefits. Niblo, 445 N.W.2d at 353. Like the plaintiff in Clarey, Reedy has also presented evidence of tardy payment of workers’ compensation benefits by his employer. Clarey, 514 N.W.2d at 902. Furthermore, Reedy has presented evidence that WCI did have some notice of his back problems, evidence WCI itself disputes, but took no action to discipline him for any misrepresentations in his application and health forms until he actually appeared likely to run up medical bills and seek workers compensation benefits. One implication of any delay after receiving notice of misrepresentations in the application or health forms is that WCI decided to ignore those misrepresentations until health problems for which it might be required to pay manifested themselves. Metge, 762 F.2d at 625 (“direct proof is not required to create a jury question”). Reedy has met his burden under Rule 56(e) to go beyond the pleadings, and by affidavits, or by the “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir.1995); Beyerbach, 49 F.3d at 1325, by pointing to his health form, which does indeed indicate operations to his “back,” although somewhat vaguely, and his deposition testimony that he discussed his back surgeries extensively with Dr. Latella during his pre-employment examination. The court believes it is for the jury to decide which reason, misrepresentations or seeking workers compensation benefits, prompted WCI to discharge Reedy. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510 (nonmoving parties’ burden is only to produce sufficient evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”); Allison, 28 F.3d at 66. WCI is not entitled to summary judgment on Reedy’s claim of retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy as an attempt to interfere with or retaliate for Reedy’s right to claim workers compensation benefits. The court therefore turns to consideration of WCI’s grounds for summary judgment on Reedy’s second claim. 2. The “bad faith” claim WCI asserts two grounds for summary judgment on Reedy’s claim of bad faith failure to pay workers compensation benefits: first, that the claim was “fairly debatable,” and therefore WCI was entitled to debate it; and, second, that WCI obtained the advice of counsel before terminating Reedy’s benefits, thus establishing that the termination was in good faith. Reedy denies the validity of either ground. He argues that WCI cannot show that WCI had a reasonable basis for denying benefits on the basis of his alleged misrepresentations on his application and health forms, and that there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not WCI contacted counsel in good faith concerning termination of his benefits, or whether they contacted counsel with the preconceived intention to terminate his benefits. a. The bad-faith cause of action under Iowa law In Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1988), the Iowa Supreme Court recognized a first-party bad faith cause of action. Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 203 (Iowa 1995); Stahl v. Preston Mut. Ins. Ass’n, 517 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Iowa 1994); White v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 514 N.W.2d 70, 77 (Iowa 1994); Dolan, 431 N.W.2d at 791. Insurance contracts, the court has held, contain an implied covenant of good faith that “neither party will do anything to injure the rights of the other in receiving the benefit of the agreement.” Johnson, 533 N.W.2d at 207; Kooyman v. Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Iowa 1982). The court adopted the tort, because “ ‘traditional damages for breach of contract will not always adequately compensate an insured for an insurer’s bad faith conduct.’” Stahl, 517 N.W.2d at 203 (quoting Dolan, 431 N.W.2d at 794; and citing Nassen v. National States Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 231 (Iowa 1992), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1846, 123 L.Ed.2d 470 (1993)). The court explained that “the nature of the contractual relationship between the insurer and insured” justified this conclusion. Dolan, 431 N.W.2d at 794. Though we declined to recognize a fiduciary relationship in first-party situations, we determined that a bad faith tort would serve to redress the “inherently unequal bargaining power” between the insurer and the insured. Id. Stahl, 517 N.W.2d at 203. The court has also noted that the unequal bargaining power in question arises from the fact that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion. White, 514 N.W.2d at 77; Dolan, 481 N.W.2d at 794. The Iowa Supreme Court has specifically recognized a cause of action for bad faith denial of workers compensation benefits. Squealer Feeds v. Pickering, 530 N.W.2d 678, 683 (Iowa 1995) (citing Brown v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1994)); White, 514 N.W.2d at 77 (citing Boylan v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 1992)); Brown v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Iowa 1994); Boylan v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 1992). Such a claim accrues when the claimant receives notice of the insurer’s refusal to pay. Squealer Feeds, 530 N.W.2d at 683; Brown, 513 N.W.2d at 764. Bad faith failure to pay workers compensation claims is not a continuing tort, Squealer Feeds, 530 N.W.2d at 683; Brown, 513 N.W.2d at 764, although a denial may be supportable at the time it is made, but later lack a reasonable basis in the light of subsequent information. Squealer Feeds, 530 N.W.2d at 683; Dirks v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Iowa 1991). In the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court upon certified questions from this court in this case, the court held that bad-faith liability may also extend to self-insured employers. Reedy v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 503 N.W.2d 601, 603 (Iowa 1993); see White, 514 N.W.2d at 77 (citing Reedy for this proposition). Implicit in the adoption of the tort as applicable to self-insured employers is “the idea that employees of qualified self-insured employers suffer from the same unequal bargaining power prompting [the court’s] decision in Dolan.” White, 514 N.W.2d at 77 (explaining Reedy, 503 N.W.2d at 602-03). In order to prevail on a first-party bad faith claim as that tort has been adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court, the plaintiff insured must show the following: (1) the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the insurance coverage; and (2) that the defendant insurer knew or had reason to know that its denial was without basis. Morgan v. American Family Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 92, 96-97 (Iowa 1995); Stahl, 517 N.W.2d at 201; White, 514 N.W.2d at 77; Wetherbee v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 508 N.W.2d 657, 661-62 (Iowa 1993); Reuter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Iowa 1991) (explaining history of this two-part test under Iowa law); Central Life Ins. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 466 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Iowa 1991); Dirks v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Iowa 1991); Kiner v. Reliance Ins. Co., 463 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Iowa 1990); Dolan, 431 N.W.2d at 794. Where an insurance claim is “fairly debatable,” the bad faith claim must fail. Morgan, 534 N.W.2d at 96-97; Stahl, 517 N.W.2d at 203; Clark-Peterson v. Independent Ins. Assoc., 514 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Iowa 1994); Reuter, 469 N.W.2d at 253-54 (“[W]e have consistently stated that where a claim is ‘fairly debatable,’ the insurer is entitled to debate it,” citing cases applying this standard both before and after the adoption of the first-party bad faith tort in Dolan)-, Wetherbee, 508 N.W.2d at 662 (“A reasonable basis to deny a claim exists when the claim is fairly debatable”); Dirks v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 857, 861 (Iowa 1991); Kiner, 463 N.W.2d at 12; Kirk v. Farm & City Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 906, 910 (Iowa 1990); Dolan, 431 N.W.2d at 794. An insurer is entitled to debate a “fairly debatable” claim whether the debate concerns a matter of fact or law. Central Life Ins. Co., 466 N.W.2d at 263; Dolan, 431 N.W.2d at 794. A claim may initially be “fairly debatable,” and thus the insurer may have a reasonable basis for denial of the claim, but the insurer may become aware at a later date that the claim is no longer “fairly debatable,” and that it no longer has a reasonable basis for denying the claim. Dirks, 465 N.W.2d at 862 (but finding that insurer in that case still had sufficient basis to dispute liability even in light of additional information). The “fairly debatable” test used by the Iowa Supreme Court from the adoption of the tort in Dolan has “required the plaintiff to establish to the satisfaction of a reasonable fact finder that [the insured’s] decision [to deny benefits] was not based on an honest and informed judgment.” Nassen, 494 N.W.2d at 236; see also Kiner, 463 N.W.2d at 12 (issue of whether claim was “fairly debatable” was for the jury, where a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the insurer failed to exercise an honest and informed judgment in denying the claim, and thus, could conclude that the insurer’s denial was not fairly debatable, but finding the “fairly debatable” test in Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 86 Wis.2d 675, 692, 271 N.W.2d 368, 377 (1978), the seminal case upon which Dolan relied). Thus, in Nassen, the court determined that the defendant insurer’s investigation of the claim, including examining its own claims file and proffered information from the plaintiff insured, was relevant to deciding whether the claim was “fairly debatable.” Id. The Iowa Supreme Court has held, however, that in order to prove the crucial element of knowledge, “an improper investigation, standing alone, is not sufficient cause for recovery if the insurer in fact has an objectively reasonable basis for denying the claim.” Stahl, 517 N.W.2d at 203; Reuter, 469 N.W.2d at 254-55. b. Jury question or question of law? Who decides whether the defendant had a “reasonable” basis for denial of the claim, the court as a matter of law or the jury, and the circumstances under which the decision properly belongs to the court or the jury, are vexing questions under Iowa law. For example, in Wetherbee, the court stated baldly that “[wjhether a claim is fairly debatable in any given situation is appropriately decided by the court as a matter of law.” Wetherbee, 508 N.W.2d at 662. The court found that the claim for benefits in that case was “fairly debatable,” and therefore upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer on the insured’s bad faith claim. Id. Similarly, in Reuter, the court held that “[i]f an objectively reasonable basis for denial of a claim actually exists, the insurer, as a matter of law, cannot be held liable for bad faith.” Reuter, 469 N.W.2d at 254. The court agreed with the trial court that the claim in question was “fairly debatable,” and therefore the insurer had an objectively reasonable basis for not paying the claim. Id. at 255. The court held that the trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of the insurer where the insured had failed to produce sufficient evidence that the insurer had no reasonable basis for refusing to pay the claim. Id.; see also Central Life Ins. Co., 466 N.W.2d at 263 (reversing jury determination of bad faith, finding that insurer had an objectively reasonable basis for its denial, and judgment should therefore have been entered for the insurer as a matter of law); Dirks, 465 N.W.2d at 862 (trial court properly granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that there was no substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denying the insured’s claim, where claim was initially denied for valid reasons, including conflicting information about accident, thus making claim “fairly debatable.”). These decisions must be contrasted, for example, with the decision in Nassen, 494 N.W.2d at 236. In Nassen, the court found that where the insurer had ignored crucial information in the company’s own claims file, and had “shunned any information that plaintiffs representatives sought to provide on this question,” the question of bad faith was for the jury to decide. Nassen, 494 N.W.2d at 236; see also Kiner, 463 N.W.2d at 12 (issue of whether claim was “fairly debatable” was for the jury, where a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the insurer failed to exercise an honest and informed judgment in denying the claim, and thus, could conclude that the insurer’s denial was not fairly debatable). Two recent decisions of the Iowa Supreme Court support the conclusion that whether a claim is “fairly debatable” is indeed a question for the court to decide as a matter of law. In Clark-Peterson v. Independent Ins. Assoc., 514 N.W.2d 912 (Iowa 1994), the Iowa Supreme Court held that, where the claims in an action constitute bad-faith claims, the matter could properly be determined as a matter of law. In a bad-faith action, where “an objectively reasonable basis for denial of a claim exists, the insurer, as a matter of law, cannot be held liable for bad faith.” Reuter v. State Farm, Mut. Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Iowa 1991). That is, where coverage is “reasonably debatable” the insurer is free to debate it. This is true because the insurer has the right to have its rights adjudicated without being subject to tort claims. See Hilde v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 184 Ga.App. 611, 612, 362 S.E.2d 69, 71 (1987). Clark-Peterson, 514 N.W.2d at 914. This decision seems to support the conclusion that the court may decide as a matter of law that where coverage is “reasonably debatable,” or “fairly debatable,” the insurer has an objectively reasonable basis for denial of a claim, and may be granted summary judgment, because it cannot be held liable for bad faith refusal to pay benefits. The most recent decision of the Iowa Supreme Court suggests even more plainly that whether a claim is “fairly debatable” is a question for the court. In Morgan v. American Family Insurance, 534 N.W.2d 92 (Iowa 1995), the court, citing Wetherbee, reiterated that “[wjhether a claim is fairly debatable is appropriately decided by the court as a matter of law.” Morgan, 534 N.W.2d at 96-97. The court continued, The absence of a reasonable basis for denying the claim is an objective element. Reuter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Iowa 1991). Where an objectively reasonable basis for denial of a claim actually exists, the insurer cannot be held liable for bad faith as a matter of law. Id. Id. In this case, the court noted that the parties agreed that the evaluations of medical doctors provided a reasonable basis for denial at the time of trial, but disagreed as to whether there was any reasonable basis at the time the claim was denied. Id. Based on undisputed evidence that the plaintiff had not sought medical treatment for seventeen months, and at the time of the accident had n