Full opinion text
NORGLE, District Judge. The court adopts Magistrate Judge Pall-meyer’s Report & Recommendation. The court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. #292) on Counts II and III but denies the motion on Count I. Defendants’ objections (Doc. # 331) and Plaintiffs’ objections (Doc. #335) are overruled. Plaintiffs’ fraud claims under Illinois common law in Count III are dismissed without prejudice so that Plaintiffs may pursue them on an individual basis in state court. ORDER Before the court are Defendants’ and Plaintiffs’ objections to Magistrate Judge Pallmeyer’s Report and Recommendation (“Report”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the court referred the motion for summary judgment to Judge Pallmeyer. Judge Pallmeyer issued a seventy-two page Report recommending that the motion be granted as to Counts II and III, and denied as to Count I. The court has completely reviewed the Report and arguments of counsel on a de novo basis. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); United States v. Rodriguez, 888 F.2d 519, 521 (7th Cir.1989). The Court finds the Report to be thorough, accurate, and the decision proper. The court further finds that the Defendants’ objection are without merit. The Plaintiffs have presented evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact on each of the elements of a claim for price manipulation under 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1)(D). Those four elements are: (1) the defendant possessed the ability to influence prices; (2) an artificial price existed; (3) the defendant caused the artificial price; and (4) the defendant specifically intended to cause the artificial price. Frey v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 931 F.2d 1171, 1177-78 (7th Cir.1991). The court also rejects Defendants’ attempt to cast Plaintiffs’ claim under Count I as one for submission of false reports. As Magistrate Judge Pallmeyer clearly explained in her Report, the Plaintiffs have asserted that as part of their scheme to manipulate prices, Defendants misled regulators about Defendants’ processing and export requirements for soybeans. In this manner, Plaintiffs contend Defendants were able to exaggerate the market’s demand for “cash soybeans” and, consequently, inflate prices. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir.1971) (recognizing that floating false rumors which affect prices is a common manipulative device). Plaintiffs’ contention that they should be able to proceed on the common law fraud claim (Count III) based on a “fraud-on-the-market” theory, without proof of individual reliance, is also without merit. As Defendants accurately indicate, evidence of individual reliance is required to surmount a motion for summary judgment. Good v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 751 F.Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D.Ill.1990); see also Schwartz v. System Software Assoc., Inc., 813 F.Supp. 1364, 1368 (N.D.Ill.1993). Accordingly, the Court adopts and incorporates Magistrate Judge Pallmeyer’s Report and Recommendation and the holdings contained therein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION PALLMEYER, United States Magistrate Judge. Plaintiffs, two subclasses of buyers and sellers of soybean futures, have filed a consolidated amended complaint against Fer-ruzzi Finanziaria, S.p.A. and subsidiaries Ferruzzi Trading U.S.A., Inc., Ferruzzi Trading International, S.A., and Central Soya Company, Inc. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, collectively referred to as the “Ferruz-zi Parties,” reaped unlawful gains from the July and August 1989 soybeans futures markets by: (1) manipulating futures prices in violation of Section 9(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), 7 U.S.C. § 13(a); (2) engaging in “excessive speculation” in violation of Section 4a of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6a; and (3) perpetrating common-law “fraud-on-the-market.” Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all three claims. For the reasons set forth below, the court recommends that Defendants’ motion be denied as to Count I because there are unsettled issues of material fact. Defendants’ motion should be granted as to Counts II and III, however, because Plaintiffs lack standing and a cognizable cause of action. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs’ lawsuit arises from the same set of events that led the Chicago Board of Trade (“CBOT”) to issue an emergency order on July 11,1989 directing the Ferruzzi Group to liquidate its holdings in the July 1989 soybean futures market. Although the CBOT’s actions and its investigation into this matter are not directly at issue here, the court has found it helpful to rely on documents prepared by the CBOT and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), as well as other materials prepared and submitted by the parties in their Local Rule 12(m) and 12(n) statements. Other pertinent factual issues will be discussed in later sections of this report, as appropriate. A. Overview of commodity futures market A futures contract (or “future”) is a specialized form of a forward contract, in which the parties agree to the price, quantity, quality, and date of delivery of a particular good in advance of the actual delivery. Chicago Board of TRADE, Commodity Trading Manual at 2, 4, 369 (7th ed. 1989). The distinguishing feature of the futures contract is that the contract terms are all standardized in order to facilitate the buying and selling of the contracts. Id. at 13, 369-70. The only remaining variable is the price, which is determined in an auction-like process by buyers and sellers of the futures who negotiate in organized commodity exchanges. Id. The party selling the future — that is, the party promising to make delivery- — is called a “short” and is said to hold a “short open position,” whereas the party buying the future — i.e., promising to take delivery — is the “long” and holds a “long open position.” Id. at 372, 377; Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1156-57. The longs and shorts do not interact directly; rather, they buy from (or sell to) the commodity exchange, which acts as a third-party clearinghouse to settle accounts, clear trades, regulate delivery, and ensure that market participants fulfill their contractual commitments. Commodity TRAding Manual, supra, at 15. A party holding a future must satisfy (or “liquidate”) her obligation in one of two ways: (i) she may make an equal and opposite transaction (an “offset”) in the futures market prior to the expiration of trading on that contract; or (ii) she may take (or make) delivery of the commodity itself, as specified in the contract. Id. at 372, 374; Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1156; Volkart Bros., 311 F.2d at 55-56. As a practical matter, the majority of futures obligations are offset in the futures market — fewer than one or two percent of all futures transactions are settled through actual delivery of the commodity, according to some sources. Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1156 n. 2, 1157; Chioago BOARD of Trade, Emergenoy Action July 1989 Soybeans: The Story Behind the Action (hereinafter “Emergency Aotion”) at 8 (1990) (P.Ex. 20). The reason for this seeming imbalance is that the futures market is not intended to be the place to arrange for physical delivery of the commodity. Emergency Action, supra, at 8. Delivery takes place in the “cash market,” and the physical commodity is often referred to the “cash commodity.” Commodity Trading Manual at 12-13, 364. The primary purpose of the future market, on the other hand, is to provide a form of insurance against adverse changes in the price of the commodity prior to delivery. Id. This practice, called “hedging,” requires that the trader take a position in the futures market equal and opposite to the position she expects to take in the cash market. Commodity Trading Manual, supra, at 14, 89-91. For example, a soybean processor may enter into a contract to deliver a certain quantity of soybean oil to a food producer in six months and at a fixed price. If the soybean processor is worried that prices of his raw material will rise before he delivers on his contract, the processor will purchase an offsetting number of futures contracts, i.e., take a long position or adopt a long hedge. Id. at 376. Because prices in the cash and futures markets tend to move in the same direction, an increase in prices for cash soybeans will likely be accompanied by an increase in the price for soybean futures. Id. at 13-14. Thus, if prices do rise by the time the soybean oil contract comes due, the processor can sell his futures at a profit in order to offset the cost of procuring his needed supplies of soybeans in the cash market. Id. at 90-91. Conversely, a merchant who purchases soybeans to resell at some later date may wish to avoid the risk that prices will fall. The merchant will sell futures, i.e., take a short position or adopt a short hedge, and cover any losses he subsequently suffers in the cash market with the profits he can make by buying the lower-priced futures. See Volkart Bros., 311 F.2d at 54. Of course, prices do not always move as one anticipates, which is why the market attracts speculators. Speculators assume the risks that hedgers avoid in order to make a profit from unexpected price movements. Id. at 15, 109-10, 377. Although hedging is the main purpose of the futures market, hedgers benefit from the presence of speculators in the market. Speculators add liquidity and capital to the futures markets; bridge price gaps between longs and shorts; dampen extreme price movements by assuming risk and adding to demand; and facilitate market entry and exit by increasing trading volume. Id.; Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1158. Because they fulfill such different roles, hedgers and speculators are subject to different rules. In particular, the CFTC, which regulates and monitors the futures markets, limits the size of speculative positions that a party may hold in order to prevent excessive volatility and other problems in the market. Hedgers, on the other hand, can be exempted from these limits, provided they can demonstrate that they are engaged in bona fide hedging and agree to liquidate their positions in an orderly and commercially reasonable manner as their futures contracts come due. Emergenoy Aotion, supra, at 5. The CFTC may revoke a hedging exemption when it is being used to camouflage what is actually a speculative position. Id. The CFTC is charged with preventing other market abuses, including artificial manipulation of market prices. More will be said about manipulation in the Discussion section below. For now, two forms of manipulation require explanation — the “corner” and the “squeeze.” Although these terms lack precise definitions, in general a party is said to “corner” a market when it has a net long position and owns all or substantially all of the deliverable supply of a particular commodity. See Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1161-62; Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan (hereinafter “Great Western”), 201 F.2d 476, 478-79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997, 73 S.Ct. 1140, 97 L.Ed. 1404 (1953); EMERGENCY ACTION, supra, at 10. A “squeeze” is a lesser form of a corner, in which the manipulator has a dominant long position but does not have an actual monopoly of the cash commodity; rather, the cash supply is limited due to drought, unexpectedly heavy demand, or other natural or economic forces that are not necessarily within the manipulator’s control. Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1161-62; Frey v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 931 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir.1991). In either case, the manipulator is in a position where he could force the shorts to pay artificially high prices as the delivery date approaches in order to settle their accounts. Id. at 1161-62; Frey, 931 F.2d at 1175; EMERGENCY Action, supra, at 10. B. The 1988 drought and the 1988-89 soybean markets In this case, Defendants are accused of pursuing a long manipulative squeeze of the soybeans futures market, as well as trading in excess of the CFTC’s speculative limits and engaging in common-law fraud. Although Plaintiffs’ claims focus on the July and August 1989 soybean futures contracts, the seeds of this conflict were sown at least a year earlier. In 1988, the United States experienced its most severe drought in over 50 years, one that sharply reduced its production of soybeans and other agricultural commodities. (Schnittker Aff. ¶¶4^6, D.Ex. A.) Compounding this problem were continued high demand for soybeans after the 1988 harvest and persistent weather-related concerns through the first half of 1989. (Id, ¶¶ 7-11.) As a result, public and private forecasters predicted that the domestic supply of soybeans — already the lowest in over a decade— would be virtually depleted before the 1989 harvest, which would necessitate the import of soybeans from other nations if the U.S. were to meet its demands. (Id. ¶¶5, 6.) Yet America’s major foreign sources for soybeans — Brazil and Argentina — were experiencing similar drought concerns in early 1989. Argentina’s 1989 soybean harvest was 24% below what it had been in 1988. (Id. ¶ 13.) Although the drought ultimately avoided Brazil, that nation’s ability to export soybeans was limited by dock strikes and other economic problems that kept its soybean stocks off the market. (Id. ¶¶ 12-15.) These events put added pressure on U.S. soybean stocks through the middle of summer 1989 and, consequently, on prices in the cash and futures markets. (Id. ¶¶ 15-19.) C. The Ferruzzi Parties’ strategy These and other related events were of direct interest to the Ferruzzi Group (or “Ferruzzi”), an affiliated group of companies that by 1989 had become one of the world’s largest processors and exporters of soybeans and other grains. (Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter “Defs.’ Mem. Supp.”) at 5, 7-8.) Defendants represent the Ferruzzi Group’s two main components — specifically, Central Soya is one of the Group’s agri-industrial companies, and Ferruzzi Trading International (“FTI”) and Ferruzzi Trading U.S.A. (“FUSA”) are among its international grain merchandising and trading companies. (Id. at 7.) Defendant Ferruzzi Finanziaria S.p.A. is the holding company for the Group and owns 100% of FUSA and FTI. (Defs.’ 12(m) Statement ¶ 9.) Although it does not directly own Central Soya, the results of Central Soya’s operations are consolidated into the financial statements of Ferruz-zi Finanziaria. (Pis.’ 12(n) Statement ¶ 147; Defs.’ 12(m) Reply ¶¶ 20, 147.) Each Defendant, then, had a different role to play in the Ferruzzi Group’s response to shortages in the soybean market. Defendants’ version of events. Not surprisingly, the parties to this action describe the Ferruzzi Group’s response to these conditions in very different terms. Defendants insist that forecasts of tight supplies and high prices for soybeans presented real risks that exporters, such as FUSA and FTI, and processors, such as Central Soya, would be unable to obtain the soybean supplies they needed if they did not act early to protect their interests. (Defs.’ 12(m) Statement ¶ 15; Defs.’ Mem.Supp. at 11.) Central Soya was particularly vulnerable to supply shortages, according to Defendants, because in 1988 and 1989 its business activities were dependent solely on soybean processing, and its processing plants were located in states where the drought hit hardest and soybean stocks are typically the first to be depleted. (Defs.’ Mem.Supp. at 8-10, 12-13.) Accordingly, the Ferruzzi Parties assert that they developed a two-part strategy to meet their legitimate processing and export needs. First, by spring 1988 Central Soya began to bid aggressively for soybeans in both its traditional supply areas and more distant locations in order to ensure that it would continue to have adequate supplies throughout the 1988-89 crop year. {Id. at 13-14.) Defendants claim that this plan enabled Central Soya to continue to earn substantial revenues later in the crop year after many of its competitors were forced to curtail their operations due to the lack of supplies. (Id.) Defendants also insist that Central Soya’s inventory and available supplies continued to be lower than they had been in the past, despite its efforts to purchase soybeans throughout the year. (Id. ¶ 20; Defs.’ 12(m) Reply ¶¶31, 36, 82, 95-98, 102, 105, 119, 129, 157.) The Ferruzzi Group’s senior management approved Central Soya’s plans in the fall of 1988. (Defs.’ Mem.Sup. at 14.) At approximately the same time, they also allegedly agreed on the second half of their strategy, in which they directed their trading companies — including FUSA and FTI — to establish and maintain long positions in soybean futures to hedge their own anticipated export commitments and Central Soya’s unfilled requirements. (Id.; Defs.’ 12(m) Statement ¶ 13.) The trading companies were also to give Central Soya rights of first and last refusal to purchase from their stocks of cash soybeans and, according to Defendants, they did in fact supply Central Soya with substantial quantities of soybeans in 1989. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.) Defendants also assert that Fer-ruzzi’s senior management assigned control of Central Soya’s hedge to the trading companies, yet FUSA and the other trading companies did not reveal their long positions to Central Soya, nor did Central Soya have any input into the structuring of these positions or any of the trading companies’ other activities, other than informing FUSA of its own processing and purchasing activities. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 16, 17; Defs.’ 12(m) Reply ¶¶ 30, 92, 97, 99-100.) Plaintiffs’ version. Plaintiffs dispute Defendants’ version of events, arguing instead that the Ferruzzi Parties deliberately took advantage of the shortage of soybeans and their positions in the cash and futures markets in order to manipulate soybean prices to their advantage. Plaintiffs assert that the Ferruzzi Parties had been deliberately purchasing large long positions in the soybean futures markets since 1987 — the year before the drought struck. (Pis.’ 12(n) Statement ¶ 4.) Rather than offset these transactions, however, Defendants allegedly took the “unusual steps” of standing for delivery of the soybeans on some portions of their long contracts; refusing to retender the warehouse receipts they received (i.e., “strong stopping”); deliberately “rolling forward” the remaining portions of their long positions into later months; and shipping more than 100,-000 tons of soybeans (approximately 4 million bushels) out of Chicago in order further to constrict the available cash supply. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 107, 108.) In this manner, Defendants allegedly were able to acquire large positions and control in the cash and futures markets through 1988 and 1989. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendants deny all these assertions. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants’ stated need to hedge against Central Soya’s processing requirements was but a ruse to mislead the commodities market and its regulators. Plaintiffs maintain that Central Soya neither wanted nor needed the warehouse receipt soybeans acquired by the Ferruzzi trading companies on its behalf. (Pis.’ 12(n) Statement ¶¶31, 105, 107, 109.) Plaintiffs also claim that by October 1988, Central Soya was holding 4.4 million bushels of soybeans that it did not need, and in June 1989 entered into an agreement with FUS A to store some 6.7 million bushels of unneeded beans in its warehouses. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 95-98.) Plaintiffs argue that these facts indicate not only the size of Defendants’ cash holdings but also show that Defendants’ “hedge” position far exceeded their actual unfilled needs. Thus, Defendants were not entitled to maintain their hedge exemption and were trading in excess of the speculative limits in the CFTC regulations, according to Plaintiffs. Similarly, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants misled regulators by overstating their export commitments to the former Soviet Union. It is undisputed that in 1988 the Ferruzzi Parties entered into two contracts to export soybeans to the Soviet Union — an August contract for 250,000 metric tons and a November contract for 200,000 tons. (Defs.’ 12(m) Reply ¶ 44.) Defendants reported these and other export contracts to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), which collects and disseminates such information to the agricultural markets. (Id. ¶ 45.) In December 1988, however, the Soviet Union canceled the November contract. (Id. ¶ 55.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants never informed the USDA of the cancellation of this contract; rather, they continued to file reports that exaggerated their exports by some 200,000 tons. (Pis.’ 12(n) Statement ¶56.) The USDA allegedly (and unwittingly) disseminated this false information until at least April 1989. (Id. ¶¶ 58-59.) Plaintiffs argue that by misleading regulators — and through them, the market — about their true demand for soybeans, Defendants were able artificially to prop up soybean prices, which would have declined had news of the cancellation been made public. (Id. ¶¶ 57, 60.) Such an assertion, if true, may also indicate that the Defendants’ long position was not entirely a bona fide hedge against the Ferruzzi Group’s export needs. Defendants deny all of these assertions and any implication that their long position was not a bona fide hedge against their legitimate processing and export needs. In particular, Defendants deny that their export reports were in any way inaccurate, explaining that the export contracts in question were between the U.S.S.R. and FTI, which is not obligated to inform the USDA of its export activity because it is not a U.S. company. (Defs.’ 12(m) Reply ¶¶ 11, 45, 55-57, 59-61.) Defendants further assert that there is no reliable evidence that news of the contracts or their cancellation had or would have had any effect on prices. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 57, 60.) Also, Defendants dispute any assertion that Central Soya did not want or need the beans further and insist that Central Soya had no knowledge of or involvement in the Ferruzzi Group’s futures trading activities. (Defs.’ 12(m) Statement ¶¶ 16, 17; Defs.’ 12(m) Reply ¶¶ 30, 31, 36, 92, 95-100, 105, 119, 157.) D. Defendants’ position in the May 1989 futures Whatever Defendants’ original motivations, it is generally undisputed that by May 1989 the Ferruzzi Parties had acquired substantial holdings in both the soybean cash and futures markets. The record indicates that by mid-May 1989, the Ferruzzi Parties held long positions of approximately 16-17 million bushels in May 1989 soybean futures — about 90% of the long open interest — and approximately 13 million bushels in July futures. (Pis.’ 12(n) Statement ¶77; Letter from David Kaas, CFTC, to Colm Cronin, FUSA, of 5/16/89, P.Ex. 2; Letter from John Mielke, CFTC, to Cohn Cronin, FUSA, of 5/16/89, P.Ex. 60; CFTC Interview Report of 5/15/89, included in P.Ex. 2.) Furthermore, by May 15, Defendants owned at least 14.5 million bushels of cash soybeans in Chicago and Toledo. (CFTC Interview Report of 5/15/89, included in P.Ex. 2.) Defendants contend that their cash holdings from May 4 to July 14 constituted approximately 73% to 92% of the total stocks held in CBOT registered warehouses; Plaintiffs claim this figure was 94% to 100%. (Defs.’ 12(m) Reply ¶ 67; Pis.’ 12(n) Statement ¶67.) It is also undisputed that by May 1989 the Ferruzzi Parties’ holdings had attracted the attention of the CFTC and the CBOT. On or about May 16, 1989, the CFTC informed FUSA that it was concerned by the Ferruzzi Parties’ large long position in May futures, which exceeded the available supply of cash soybeans and therefore could have a “substantial impact” on whether the price of May futures became artificial. (Letter from Kaas to Cronin of 5/16/89, swpra.) Apparently unsatisfied with the Ferruzzi’s response and concerned about the orderly liquidation of the May contract, the CFTC sent another letter to FUSA two days later, this time revoking FUSA’s hedging exemption and ordering liquidation of its holdings that exceeded the three-million-bushel speculative limit. (Letter from Mielke to Cronin of 5/18/89, supra.) Defendants maintained (and continue to maintain) that their long position was a legitimate hedge against their anticipated processing and export requirements. (Defs.’ 12(m) Reply ¶ 69.) They also state that neither the May 16 or May 18 letter had any practical effect because they already had decided to liquidate their May futures position and had made substantial progress in doing so. (Defs.’ Mem.Supp. at 18 n. 3, citing Cronin Dep. at 734-35; see also Mielke memo to files of 5/24/89 re: May 1989 soybeans, P.Ex. 60.) A senior CBOT official testified that the May contract expired without serious problems (Defs.’ Mem.Supp. at 18 n. 3, citing Weisenborn Dep. at 79-80), and the CBOT itself would later report that the May contract was liquidated in an orderly — if not entirely voluntary — manner. (EMERGENCY Aotion, at 9.) E. Defendants’ position in the July and August 1989 futures In the eyes of regulators, however, the underlying problem had only been postponed, not resolved. The CBOT explains that rather than liquidating its long position in May futures outright, Ferruzzi exchanged its May futures for July futures, thus transferring its controversial holdings from one delivery month to the next. (Id.) Plaintiffs maintain that between May 5 and June 12, Defendants purchased 18 million bushels in July 1989 futures, which, when combined with their previous accumulation of 13 million bushels, gave Defendants a total of more than 30 million bushels in July futures. (Pis.’ 12(n) Statement ¶ 77.) This position, according to the CBOT, was nearly double the position in May futures that the Ferruzzi Group had been ordered to liquidate only a few weeks earlier. (EMERGENCY ACTION, at 9.) Furthermore, Defendants allegedly purchased nearly 15.5 million bushels of August 1989 futures during the same period of time; as a result, Defendants allegedly tripled their cumulative holdings in July and August futures to more than 39 million bushels of soybeans. (Pis.’ 12(n) Statement ¶¶ 77, 78.) Defendants dispute Plaintiffs assertions as unsupported by the record, and they further maintain that they were engaged in bona fide hedging against their anticipated needs, as they had informed regulators at the time. (Defs.’ 12(m) Reply ¶¶77, 78, 82.) The CBOT itself explained that in early June 1989, it was not necessarily worried about the Ferruzzi Group’s large cash and futures positions, because such large hedge positions are not uncommon, and there remained eight weeks prior to the expiration of the July contract. (EMERGENCY ACTION, supra, at 9.) Also, through meetings and letters during the second half of the month, Central Soya and FUSA sought to reassure the CFTC and CBOT about their anticipated requirements and the legitimacy of FUSA’s long hedge position. {See Defs.’ 12(m) Statement ¶ 82; Memo to files from Glenn Schmeltz, CFTC, of 6/15/89, included in P.Ex. 2; Memo to files from Harold Hild, CBOT, of 6/6/89, included in P.Ex. 11; Letters from Mielke, CFTC, to Lockwood Marine, Central Soya, of 6/19/89 and 6/23/89, P.Ex. 2, D.Ex. 21; Letter from Marine to Mielke of 6/30/89, D.Ex. 20; Letter from Colm Cronin, FUSA, to Wallace Weisenborn, CBOT/BCC, of 6/30/89, included in P.Ex. 11.) Both Central Soya and FUSA also indicated that they would bid aggressively for cash soybeans — Central Soya because it was supposedly having difficulty obtaining sufficient quantities to meet its own needs, and FUSA because it had promised to liquidate its July long position in an orderly manner and on a “bushel for bushel” basis. {Id.) Despite these assurances, the CBOT and CFTC continued to monitor Ferruzzi’s activities, particularly their impact on the orderly liquidation of the July 1989 futures market. (Letter from Wallace Weisenborn, Chairman, CBOT/BCC, to Colm Cronin, FUSA, of 6/27/89, P.Ex. 68.) During the month preceding July 11, regulators repeatedly asked the Ferruzzi Group to bid competitively for soybeans and reduce voluntarily its large position in July futures. (Emergenoy Aotion, at 17-18; General Accounting Office, Chicago Futures Market: Emergency Action Procedures at 4 (April 1990), P.Ex. 21.) Although Defendants assert that Central Soya was bidding more aggressively for cash soybeans in 1989 than it had in 1988 (Defs.’ 12(m) Reply ¶¶ 98,106), the CBOT apparently found few signs that the Ferruzzi Group seriously intended to liquidate its holdings— rather, the Group’s long positions remained virtually unchanged; it had made only minor purchases of cash soybeans; and its cash bids had been substantially below market price. (Emergency Action, at 15,19; Letter from Weisenborn to Agostini of 7/7/89, supra.) Consequently, in a letter dated July 7, 1989, the CBOT informed Ferruzzi of its “extreme concern” regarding its July position and ordered it “to commence substantial daily reductions of its position immediately,” which the CBOT explained should be of the order of 3 million bushels per day. {Id. (emphasis in original).) Although the Committee warned that this was Ferruzzi’s “last chance to demonstrate the firm’s good faith and to begin to honor its obligations as a member of the Exchange” {id.), FUSA officials responded that it would continue to hold its long positions unless it were able to obtain sufficient quantities of cash soybeans. (Letter from Colm Cronin and Edward Varin, FUSA, to Wallace Weisenborn, CBOT, of 7/10/89, included in P.Ex. 11.) FUSA also warned that if the CBOT prevented it from holding its hedge position in July futures, Ferruzzi would use whatever means necessary to recover damages incurred by such action. (Id.) F. CFTC’s July 11 letter and CBOT’s emergency order Before the CBOT could respond to the Ferruzzi’s letter, the CFTC exercised its own authority on this matter. In a letter dated July 11, 1989 and addressed to Central Soya and copied to FUSA, the CFTC reminded Defendants that their long position in soybeans may be classified as a bona fide hedge “only to the extent that it represents unfilled anticipated requirements for processing” and “[a]t no time should your long hedging position for unfilled requirements exceed the actual amount of your unfilled anticipated requirements.” (Letter from Jean Webb, CFTC, to Lockwood Marine, Central Soya, of 7/11/89, P.Ex. 70, D.Ex. 26; EMERGENCY Action, supra, at 19.) The CFTC then expressed its concern that the orderly liquidation of the July and August 1989 soybeans futures market was being threatened by the Ferruzzi Group’s large cash and futures holdings and the shortage of available soybeans. (Id.) Consequently, the CFTC ordered the Ferruzzi Group not to hold any hedge positions in excess of the three-million bushel speculative limit during the last three days of trading on the July and August 1989 contracts. (Id.) Defendants seek to downplay the significance of the CFTC’s order, describing it as only a “relatively minor adjustment” to the existing rules on anticipatory hedges. (Defs.’ Mem.Supp. at 19.) Defendants also interpret the CFTC’s letter to mean that the Commission approved Central Soya’s description of its anticipated requirements and acknowledged that the Ferruzzi Group was maintaining an anticipatory hedge of Central Soya’s unfilled requirements. (Defs.’ 12(m) Statement ¶¶ 26, 27.) Neither assertion appears explicitly in the letter, however. Rather, the CFTC stated only that Central Soya’s data submission met the requirements in the relevant regulations; there was no specific statement as to the accuracy of the data or the legitimacy of Central Soya’s stated needs. Furthermore, any attempt to infer that the CFTC “acknowledged” that the Fer-ruzzi Group was maintaining a hedge position must be viewed in light of the warnings, reminders, and orders that form the major portion of this letter. (See Pis.’ 12(n) Statement ¶¶ 155-58.) The CFTC transmitted its order to Defendants the morning of July 11. (Emergenoy Action, supra, at 19.) In the afternoon of the same day, the Chicago Board of Trade also elected to take action. (Id.) The CBOT issued a rare emergency order, in which it directed any party holding a July futures position in excess of the three-million bushel speculative trading limit to liquidate those positions in an orderly manner. (Id. at 3, 20; Memo to the Commission from Division of Trading and Markets, CFTC, of 9/7/89, at 7-13, included in P.Ex. 37.) The CBOT also imposed a specific timetable for liquidation, under which an affected party’s long position had to be reduced 20% per day until it reached no more than three million bushels as of July 18 and no more than one million bushels as of July 20. (Emergenoy Action, supra, at 3, 20.) Although the CBOT did not specifically name the Ferruzzi Group in its order, the Group was the only entity affected by the terms of the order. (Id. at 3.) The CBOT states that as of July 10, 1989, the Ferruzzi Group’s long position in July futures was 22 million bushels, which accounted for 53% of the contract’s total open interest and was five times larger than the position held by the market’s next largest participant. (Id. at 3, 13.) At the same time, the Ferruzzi Group owned over 85% of the deliverable supply of cash soybeans but was making no evident attempt to liquidate or offset its large futures position, according to the CBOT. (Id. at 3, 15.) Ferruzzi, however, held that the emergency order was unnecessary and had unnee-essarily disrupted the market. (Transcript of remarks by David Swanson during Fer-ruzzi press conference of 7/24/89, included in P.Ex. 2.) Ferruzzi also explained that it had received the CBOT’s order before it could act on the CFTC’s July 11 letter, which forced Ferruzzi to exit the market in a very unusual way, causing heavy losses to the company and to many others. (Id.) This lawsuit was filed in September 1989, approximately two months after the CBOT’s emergency order. The CBOT also investigated the matter and ultimately dismissed charges of manipulation and market demoralization against Ferruzzi. (Defs.’ Mem.Supp. at 6.) The remaining charges, including excessive speculation and attempted manipulation, were settled prior to a hearing or decision by the CBOT’s Board of Directors. (Id.) DISCUSSION Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all three of Plaintiffs’ claims — unlawful manipulation of the soybean futures market (Count I), excessive speculation (Count II), and common-law fraud (Count III). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A defendant moving for summary judgment must prevail if the plaintiff fails to establish an essential element of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden is on the movant to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, id., and the court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Overview of private claims under the Commodity Exchange Act Two of Plaintiffs’ three claims — manipulation and excessive speculation — arise under the Commodity Exchange Act, so the court will address the threshold issue of the availability of private remedies under the CEA. Congress did not address private rights of action when it passed the CEA’s predecessor in 1921, nor did Congress make any mention of private remedies in any of the amendments that followed during the next sixty years. Congress’ silence did not prevent the courts from recognizing certain implied rights of action under the CEA, however, a position the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982). Less than twelve months after the Curran decision, Congress enacted Section 22 of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1994 supp.), in which Congress authorized certain private rights of action. Section 22 has two major components. Of particular interest to this suit is subsection 22(a), 7 U.S.C. § 25(a), in which Congress enumerated the private remedies available to a plaintiff harmed by a person or corporation that violated the CEA. In subsection 22(b), 7 U.S.C. § 25(b), Congress authorized private parties to bring suit against any contract market, board of trade, or related organization for injuries resulting from that organization’s violation of or failure to enforce any regulation or rule arising under the CEA. The range of private remedies provided by Congress was not unlimited, however, an issue that will be taken up later in this Report. After Section 22 took effect, the Seventh Circuit reexamined the scope of private remedies under the CEA in American Agricul ture Movement, Inc. v. Board of Trade (hereinafter “American Agriculture”), 977 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.1992), a case that arose from the same events as the present action. In that case, the plaintiffs — a national association of farmers — sued the Chicago Board of Trade for violating its duty to prevent manipulation of futures prices. Id. at 1152. Relying on Curran and related case law, the plaintiffs argued that Section 5 granted them an implied right of action against the CBOT. The Seventh Circuit held otherwise, finding that Section 22 of the CEA “extinguished” the implied private rights of action that the Supreme Court had previously recognized in Curran. Id. The court’s decision rested on the language of Section 22(b), which states that the private rights of action against the exchanges enumerated therein “ ‘shall be the exclusive remedy available to any person who sustains a lost as a result of a violation of the CEA or an exchange rule by a contract market or one of its officers or employees.” Id. at 1153 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 25(b)(5), emphasis added). The court concluded that because the plaintiffs had not been injured in the course of trading on the contract market, as required under Section 22(b), their claim had to be dismissed. Id. American Agriculture did not specifically address Section 22(a) or the availability of private remedies against persons other than the exchanges. Id. at 1152. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is relevant to the current action, because the same reference to “exclusive remedies” that guided the court’s interpretation of Section 22(b) appears in Section 22(a) as well. Specifically, Section 22(a), like Section 22(b), states that the private remedies enumerated therein (and in a few other subsections not relevant to this litigation) “shall be the exclusive remedies under this chapter available to any person who sustains loss as a result of any alleged violation of this chapter.” 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, under American Agriculture, unless Plaintiffs’ two claims for violations of the CEA — manipulation and excessive speculation — are cognizable under Section 22(a), 7 U.S.C. § 25(a), they must be dismissed. The private remedies available under Section 22(a) are as follows. A person (other than an exchange, board of trade, or related organization) may be held liable for actual damages that were caused by its violation of the CEA and that resulted from one of the following four transactions: (i) the plaintiff bought futures from or sold futures to the defendant, where the defendant’s “violation [of the CEA] constitutes a manipulation of the price of any such contract or the price of the commodity underlying such contract,” 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (emphasis added); (ii) the plaintiff received trading advice from the defendant for a fee; (in) the plaintiff bought or sold a futures contract through the defendant; or (iv) the plaintiff bought or sold an option or leverage contract or commodity pool interest from or through the defendant. Id. See also Grossman, 706 F.Supp. at 230-31. Clearly, Plaintiffs’ claim for unlawful price manipulation (Count I) is among the rights of action authorized in Section 22. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1)(D). Plaintiffs’ second claim for excessive speculation is more problematic, however, so it is to this claim that the court will now turn. I. Excessive speculation (Count II) In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that the Ferruzzi Parties violated Section 4a of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6a, which prohibits a party from trading in excess of the speculative limits fixed by the CFTC. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have no standing to bring such a claim under either Section 4a or Section 22. The court agrees and recommends that this claim be dismissed. As Defendants point out, Section 4a itself does not define excessive speculation or set forth any speculative limits; rather, Congress directed the CFTC to set and enforce limits on the positions a party may hold and the amount of trading it may conduct, with exemptions available for bona fide hedging. 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a)-(c). Neither Section 4a nor Section 22 authorize private enforcement of CFTC regulations, nor have the courts been willing to recognize such a claim. See Davis v. Coopers & Lybrand, 787 F.Supp. 787, 799 (N.D.Ill.1992) (dismissing claim because “the exclusive private remedy under CEA § 22 does not include a cause of action for violations of CFTC Regulations”); Khalid Bin Alwaleed Found. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 709 F.Supp. 815, 820 (N.D.Ill.1989) (finding that “Congress did not intend that the rules promulgated by the CFTC should give rise to a private cause of action”). Moreover, Defendants assert that under this set of facts, Plaintiffs’ claim of excessive speculation satisfies none of the four “transaction conditions” required to bring a claim under Section 22(a), 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1). The only possible condition of relevance is manipulation, id. § 25(a)(1)(D), yet if Plaintiffs are arguing that Defendants’ alleged violation of the speculative limits caused prices to be manipulated or was part of a manipulative scheme, Plaintiffs are describing two components of the same claim, not bringing two separate claims under the CEA. Defendants have made some powerful legal arguments, yet Plaintiffs have made no effort to rebut these arguments on their merits. Rather, Plaintiffs rely solely on the “law-of-the-case” doctrine, which holds that a court’s decision regarding a rule of law should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages of the same litigation in order to promote efficiency and fairness. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816-17, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2177-78, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988). Plaintiffs assert that this court, having once denied Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on Counts II and III, must continue to recognize these two claims. (See Pis.’ Mem.Opp. at 45^48.) While the court fully respects the law-of-the-case doctrine and the purpose it is intended to serve, there are a number of reasons why it does not apply in this case. As Defendants point out, a court’s decision constitutes the law of the ease only if the court “actually decided” the issue, either expressly or by “necessary implication.” PaineWebber, Inc. v. Farnam, 870 F.2d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir.1989). If an issue was not decided in actuality or by implication, then the prior ruling does not constitute the law of the case. Id. Here, Judge Norgle denied Defendants’ motion in a brief three-paragraph order, which addressed only the factual standards of the motion but none of the legal issues raised by Defendants. See Pruitt v. Ferruzzi Finanziaria, No. 89 C 7009 (N.D.Ill. August 4, 1994) (Norgle, J.). It is impossible to find, then, that the court ever decided — either explicitly or implicitly— whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring a claim for excessive speculation. Furthermore, the law of the case is most commonly invoked upon remand from an appellate ruling on a question of law or applied by federal courts to orders issuing from state courts. Id. at 1290-91. In matters involving interlocutory orders, such as motions to dismiss, or matters that have not been taken to judgment or determined on appeal, the Seventh Circuit has made clear that the district courts have the discretion to reconsider their decisions at any time. See Cameo Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Percy, 800 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir.1986); Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227-28 (7th Cir.1995) (law-of-the-case doctrine “is no more than a presumption, one whose strength varies with the circumstances; it is not a straightjacket”). In Cameo, for example, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the plaintiffs argument that the district court’s earlier refusal to dismiss the case precluded the court from later granting summary judgment against plaintiff. Id. Although the Cameo decision was motivated in part by a change in the law, the principle enunciated by the court has merit in this case, where the parties are still engaged in the pre-trial stages of litigation. Finally, the law-of-the-case doctrine expresses only a general practice of the courts not to reopen decisions, but it is not a limit to their power, especially when the circumstances justify it. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817, 108 S.Ct. at 2178. Here, this court has had the opportunity to analyze thoroughly the question of Plaintiffs’ standing and rights of action under the CEA, and concluded that summary judgment should be granted on this claim. The court’s recommendation rests in large part on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in American Agriculture, 977 F.2d at 1152-53. By revisiting an earlier conclusion that the Seventh Circuit likely would have overturned on appeal, the court believes it is serving the broader goals of the law-of-the-case doctrine to promote “finality and efficiency of the judicial process.” See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 816, 108 S.Ct. at 2177. Plaintiffs respond that if this court were to “improperly revisit[ ]” its standing to bring a claim for excessive speculation, then the court should reconsider the arguments they had advanced in their earlier Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Against Counts II and III. Plaintiffs’ arguments do not require a great deal of discussion. In their earlier brief, Plaintiffs relied primarily on the implied rights of action recognized in Curran, but, as explained earlier, the Seventh Circuit has made clear that Section 22 “extinguished” such implied private remedies. See American Agriculture Movement, 977 F.2d at 1152. Other cases cited by Plaintiffs in their earlier brief involved claims that had arisen before enactment of Section 22; thus, these cases are inapplicable in light of the Seventh Circuit’s later decision in American Agriculture. Finally, to the extent that Plaintiffs argue that excessive speculation should be recognized as a form of price manipulation, Count II should be merged with Count I and not continue as a separate claim. In the light of the foregoing, there is no need to visit Defendants’ arguments that they were engaged in bona fide hedging and not excessive speculation. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count II should be granted and the claim dismissed. II. Price manipulation (Count I) In contrast to their claim for excessive speculation, Plaintiffs’ second claim under the CEA — price manipulation — is expressly included among the transactions that can give rise to a private right of action under Section 22. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a). Rather than challenge Plaintiffs’ standing on this claim, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish certain factual elements essential to the success of their claim, and on this basis have moved for summary judgment on Count I. The court recognizes that manipulation cases generally have not fared well with either the CFTC or the courts. See In re Abrams, 1992-94 Comm.Fut.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,237 at 42,041 (CFTC Sept. 15, 1994) (citing cases); Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices — The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 281, 356-58 (1991). Nonetheless, Defendants bear a heavy burden on this motion. At a minimum, of course, Defendants must show there are no genuine issues of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Yet Defendants’ task is made more difficult by the fact that there is a “dearth of settled caselaw” on price manipulation; as a result, the courts and the CFTC are still struggling to define the basic elements of the claim and to differentiate between fair means and foul in futures trading. Abrams, supra, at 42,041 n. 39 (quotes omitted). Markham, supra, at 282-85, 352-58. In other words, Defendants must contend not only with complex factual and legal issues but also with the absence of “fixed standards or tests,” Utesch, 947 F.2d at 327, which complicates the application of any principles or precedents that may seemingly appear in earlier manipulation cases. One of the reasons for the Defendants’ — and the court’s — difficulty is that “manipulation” is not defined anywhere in the CEA, despite the fact that the CEA subjects price manipulation to both private and administrative enforcement. Section 22(a) simply states, without further explanation, that a party may recover damages resulting from trading futures with the defendant if the defendant manipulated the price of the futures contract or the underlying commodity. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1)(D). Similarly, Section 9(a)(2) (formerly Section 9(b)) of the CEA states, again without definition, that it is a felony— to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity [in the cash or futures markets], or to corner or attempt to corner any such commodity or knowingly deliver or cause to be delivered ... false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce.... 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (emphasis added). Congress’ decision to prohibit manipulation without defining it apparently arose from the concern that clever manipulators would be able to evade any legislated list of proscribed actions or elements of such a claim. See Markham, supra, at 360. Thus, the task of defining manipulation and its elements has fallen to the CFTC and the courts, yet they generally agree that manipulation defies easy description. As a result, manipulation cases tend to be characterized by fact-specific, ease-by-case analysis. See, e.g., Frey v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 931 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir.1991) (opining that the “‘know it when you see it’ test may appear most useful” in manipulation cases); Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir.1971) (explaining that the test of manipulation “must largely be a practical one” because the “methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of man”); cert. denied sub nom., Cargill, Inc. v. Butz, 406 U.S. 932, 92 S.Ct. 1770, 32 L.Ed.2d 135 (1972); In re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Assoc., Inc. (hereinafter “Indiana Farm Bureau”), [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm.Fut.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶21,-796 at 27,281 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982) (task of defining manipulation or attempted manipulation “has fallen to case-by-case judicial development”). Nonetheless, there are some common elements that run through manipulation cases, among them being a general definition that manipulation is intentional conduct that has “resulted in a price which does not reflect basic forces of supply and demand.” Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1163. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has defined manipulation as “an intentional exaction of a price determined by forces other than supply and demand,” Frey, 931 F.2d at 1175, or “the creation of an artificial price by planned action, whether by one man or a group of men,” General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220, 231 (7th Cir.1948), quoted in Indiana Farm Bureau, supra, at 27,281 and Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1163. In addition, the courts and the CFTC generally have adopted a practical, four-part test for manipulation, in which the accuser must show that: (1) the defendant possessed the ability to influence prices; (2) an artificial price existed; (3) the defendant caused the artificial price; and (4) the defendant specifically intended to cause the artificial price. Frey, 931 F.2d at 1177-78; In re Cox, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,786 at 34,063 (CFTC July 15, 1987). See also Great Western, 201 F.2d at 480. This framework is occasionally modified to fit the specific facts of a particular case, and there is some question to what extent these elements should be treated as separate and independent or whether they are factually and legally interdependent. Nevertheless, this framework is the one adopted by the parties and, given its widespread application, it will be adopted by this court as well. Having agreed on a framework, Defendants proceed to argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish any of the first three elements — ability to influence prices, existence of artificial prices, or causation — against the Ferruzzi Parties collectively, nor can Plaintiffs establish the final element — intent— against Central Soya individually. The court disagrees, however, finding that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to each element such that Defendants’ motion on Count I should be denied. A. Ability to influence prices Defendants’ motion raises questions of both law and fact regarding the first element of Plaintiffs’ manipulation claim. Not only do the parties dispute whether Plaintiffs can show that Defendants had the ability to influence the prices of the July and August 1989 soybean futures, they also disagree over what test Plaintiffs must employ to establish this element. 1. Question of law: Plaintiffs’ “Manipulation-by-false-reports” theory Defendants argue that to show that the Ferruzzi Parties were able to manipulate the prices of the July and August 1989 soybean futures, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants controlled the shorts’ ability to meet their contractual obligations. As explained earlier, the shorts have only two options to meet their obligations — they must either deliver the cash commodity itself or purchase an offsetting number of futures. Thus, under Defendants’ theory, Plaintiffs must show that the Ferruzzi Parties controlled both the cash and futures markets in order to show that they could influence futures prices. Defendants draw their theory from several prominent cases of alleged manipulation by holders of long positions. In Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1164-65, the court concluded that the defendant had the ability to influence wheat prices because it owned “practically all” of the deliverable supply of cash wheat and 62% of the futures open interest; thus, it effectively controlled both of the shorts’ options. By contrast, in Frey, 931 F.2d at 1177, and Cox, supra, at 34,062, fact-finders concluded that the defendants lacked the ability to influence wheat prices because they did not control the deliverable cash supply. Defendants’ interpretation of these cases is essentially correct, but the test they propose is too narrow to fit this set of facts. Cargill, Frey, Cox, and other prominent cases of manipulation focused on the alleged manipulator’s market power, that is, his ability to influence prices by controlling the futures and cash markets. While this kind of alleged long manipulative squeeze forms the backbone of Plaintiffs’ claim as well, Plaintiffs also raise an issue that was not present in any of these other cases. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants were able to inflate prices by misleading regulators about their processing and export requirements, thus exaggerating the market’s demand for cash soybeans and thereby artificially inflating prices. Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations become even more significant in light of the fact that their misconduct allegedly spanned a period of several weeks or months, whereas in Cox, Frey, Indiana Farm Bureau, and Cargill, the defendants’ alleged manipulative conduct occurred only on the last day or days of trading. Given the fact that manipulation claims tend to be ad hoc and fact-specific, as explained earlier, this court should adopt a more flexible test of Defendants’ ability to manipulate prices than that which would be suggested by reading Cargill, Cox, Frey, or other cases in isolation. Defendants scoff at Plaintiffs’ theory of “manipulation-by-false reports,” asserting that “[n]either the CFTC nor the courts have recognized such a hybrid claim.” (Defs.’ Reply at 8-11.) Defendants are correct in pointing out that neither Section 9(b) nor Section 22(a) of the CEA provides a private right of action for the filing of false market information, nor have the courts in this district been willing to recognize private claims for violations of CFTC regulations. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 13(b), 25(a); Davis, 787 F.Supp. at 799; Khalid Bin Alwaleed Found., 709 F.Supp. at 820. Yet this is not the substance of Plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs are not suing Defendants for false reporting per se; rather, they are asserting that the false reports played a part in Defendants’ alleged manipulative scheme. There is some precedent for finding that disinformation can affect prices and thus form part of a manipulative scheme. Congress recognized that false rumors may affect commodity prices when it drafted Section 9(b), in which it prohibited not only price manipulation but also dissemination of “false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce .... ” Id. § 13(b) (emphasis added). As noted above, Section 9(b) does not authorize a private right of action, but its construction lends credence to Plaintiffs’ theory that false information can create or contribute to the ability to influence market prices. Courts have reached a similar conclusion. For example, in Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1163, the Eighth Circuit referred to “the floating of false rumors which affect futures prices” as “one of the most common manipulative devices.” Similarly, in General Foods, 170 F.2d at 224, the Seventh Circuit observed in dicta that “deceit [and] trickery through the spreading of false rumors” and other forms of fraud are among “the common criteria usual in manipulation or corner eases.” Also, in Moore v. Brannan, 191 F.2d 775 (D.C.Cir.1951), aff'g In re Moore, 9 Agric.Dec. 1299 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860, 72 S.Ct. 88, 96 L.Ed. 647 (1951), the D.C. Circuit affirmed a finding by the Secretary of Agriculture that the defendant had “knowingly made false reports concerning market information” as part of a scheme to manipulate the price of lard. In United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int’l Corp., 311 F.Supp. 1375, 1380-83 (S.D.N.Y.1970), a district court found that the defendant had knowingly disseminated false information regarding imports of fresh eggs from Spain in order to inflate estimates of the available supply of cash eggs and thereby drive down prices. Although none of these cases involved a private claim under Section 22(a), the courts’ discussions of the effect of false reports on market prices are illuminating. There is also a collection of old administrative actions by the U.S. Department of Agriculture involving allegations of manipulation by dissemination of false information. For example, in In re Winn & Lovett Grocery Co., 14 Agric.Dec. 561, 562 (1955), and In re Butler, 14 Agric.Dec. 429, 430-33 (1955), the defendants disseminated false information in order to manipulate the prices of potatoes and soybeans, respectively. In In re McGuigan, 5 Agric.Dec. 249, 250 (1946), the defendant disseminated advice on futures transactions in order to encourage traders to pursue one course of action, while secretly taking opposite positions in order to profit from t