Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM and OPINION GOLDBERG, Judge: Usinor Sacilor, Unimetal and Ascometal (“Usinor Sacilor” or “Usinor”), and Inland Steel Bar Company (“Inland Steel”), bring this consolidated action pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1988) to contest the final determination by the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (“ITA” or “Commerce”), in Certain Hot Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products From, France, 58 Fed.Reg. 6221 (Jan. 27,1993) (“Final Determination ”). In this consolidated action, Usinor Sacilor and Inland Steel each seek judgment upon the agency record pursuant to USCIT Rule 56.2. The court exercises its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1988). I. BACKGROUND A. Subject Matter of Commerce’s Investigation. In general terms, Commerce’s investigation in this ease addressed various facets of a restructuring program undertaken by the government of France (“GOF”) beginning in the late 1970s to bolster France’s steel industry and, specifically, Usinor Sacilor and its predecessors, Usinor and Sacilor. The period of investigation (“POI”) is calendar year 1991. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6222. Seven components of the restructuring program are at issue in this case. These components are as follows: (1) “préts á caractéristiques spéciales” (“PACS”) or “loans with special characteristics” received by Usinor and Sacilor; (2) “Fonds d’Intervention Sidérurgique” (“FIS”) or the “Steel Intervention Fund” through which Usinor and Sacilor were able to issue bonds guaranteed by the GOF to the public; (3) the GOF’s practice between 1982 and 1986 of making shareholder advances to Usinor and Sacilor to finance revenue shortfalls; (4) the conversion of Usinor’s and Saeilor’s PACS and FIS instruments and shareholder advances to common stock; (5) the 1990 consolidation of loans that Usinor and Sacilor received through the GOF’s “Fonds de Développment Economique et Social” (“FDES”); (6) the 1991 consolidation of loans that Usinor and Sacilor received through the GOF’s “Caisse Francaise de Développement Industriel” (“CFDI”); and (7) the 1991 consolidation by Crédit National, a financial institution controlled by the GOF, of outstanding loans held by Usinor Sacilor. See id. at 6224-27. After investigating these aspects of the GOF’s restructuring program and others not pertinent to this action, Commerce determined that Usinor Sacilor received countervailable benefits totalling 23.11 percent ad valorem. For purposes of clarity, the court will set forth the relevant details of each facet of the GOF’s program under review in this case. B. Components of the GOF’s Restructuring Program. 1. PACS Instruments: The first aspect of the GOF’s plan relevant to this case is the PACS instrument system. This system allowed Usinor and Sacilor “to reconstitute equity through the conversion of debt into PACS.” Public Record Document Number (“Pub. Doc.”) 107, Confidential Record Document Number (“Confid. Doc.”) 19 at 5. Such conversion enabled the companies to exchange their former obligations on loans and bonds for new obligations based on the PACS. See Final Determination, 58 Fed. Reg. at 6224. The responses that Commerce received during the investigation indicated that the PACS instruments were “akin to redeemable subordinated nonvoting preferred stock.” Id. The responses also showed that the PACS instruments had the following characteristics: (1) a 0.10 percent remuneration for the first five years and 1.0 percent thereafter, (2) no schedule of reimbursement but in the event the steel companies became profitable, the PACS holders could elect to redeem their PACS or share in profits according to a predetermined formula, and (3) PACS were subordinated to all but the common stock. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6224. The responses further revealed that Usinor and Sacilor accounted for the PACS instruments as shareholders’ equity on their balance sheets. Id. Between 1978 and 1991, Usinor Sacilor and its predecessors used the PACS program to refinance debt on several occasions. Specifically, “[i]n 1978, Usinor and Sacilor converted 21.1 billion French francs (FF) of debt into PACS. From 1980 to 1981, Usinor and Sacilor issued FF8.1 billion of new PACS.” Id. The companies subsequently converted “PACS in the amount of FF13.8 billion, FF12.6 billion and FF2.8 billion ... into common stock in 1981,1986 and 1991, respectively.” Id. Commerce’s treatment of the PACS conversions depended upon Usinor Saeilor’s equityworthiness at the time of the conversions. The rationale for this treatment stems from the ITA’s conclusion that “any benefits to Usinor Sacilor occurred at the point when these instruments were converted to common stock.” Id. Commerce found Usinor Sacilor to be unequityworthy from 1981 through 1988 and therefore “consider[ed] the conversion of PACS to common stock in 1981 and 1986 to constitute equity infusions on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.” Id. In contrast to the 1981 and 1986 conversions, Commerce determined that “the PACS to equity conversion in 1991 was consistent with commercial considerations” because Usinor Sacilor was equityworthy by that time. Id. 2. FIS Instruments: The second GOF program at issue is the “Fonds dTntervention Sidérurgique” (“FIS”), or Steel Intervention Fund, created by the GOF in 1983. The FIS, in conjunction with the 1981 Corrected Finance Law, allowed Usinor and Saeilor to issue convertible bonds. The companies “issued convertible bonds to the FIS, which, in turn, with the GOF guarantee, floated bonds to the public and to institutional investors.” Final Determination» 58 Fed.Reg. at 6224. Similar to the PACS, the FIS instruments carried “a nominal 0.1% rate of return and a profit-sharing component.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 3. The bonds also “established a fixed schedule of fifteen annual principal repayments, with the GOF agreeing to make the first one or two of the ... repayments and the issuing company being obligated to make the remaining ... repayments.” Defendant’s Brief at 10 (footnote omitted). “In 1983, 1984, and 1985, Usinor and Saeilor issued convertible bonds to the FIS. These FIS bonds were converted to common stock in 1986 and 1988.” Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6224. Based upon its unequityworthiness findings for the years 1981 through 1988, Commerce “considered] the conversion of FIS bonds to common stock in 1986 and 1988 to constitute equity infusions on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.” Id. 3. Shareholder Advances: The third pertinent component of the GOF’s restructuring plan is the GOF’s practice of making shareholder advances to Usinor and Saeilor to finance revenue shortfalls. This practice, which began in 1982, enabled the companies to receive interest free cash infusions upon request. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6224; see also Plaintiffs’ Bñef at 3. “These shareholders’ advances carried no interest and there was no precondition for receipt of these funds.” Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6224. The GOF ended the practice in 1986 at which time the companies converted the amount of funds received through the advances to common stock. Id. In its Final Determination, Commerce determined that “shareholders’ advances constitute eountervailable grants at the time they were received as no shares were distributed in return for these advances when they were made to Usinor and Saeilor.” Id. at 6225. 4. FDES and CFDI Loans: The fourth element of the GOF’s plan relevant to this action is the loan program established by the Law of July 13, 1978. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6225. This law “created participative loans ... which were by law available to all French companies. Under these loans, which were issued by the FDES and the [CFDI], the borrower paid a lower-than-market interest rate plus a share of future profits according to an agreed upon formula.” Id. According to Commerce, “[t]hese loans were obtained by either Usinor, Saeilor, or their subsidiaries.” Id. In 1990 and 1991, Usinor Saeilor consolidated the outstanding principal on its predecessors’ FDES and CFDI loans, respectively. Id. Commerce determined that both the FDES and CFDI consolidated loans were new loans. Id. With respect to the FDES consolidated loans, Commerce determined that they are de facto limited because the GOF provided insufficient information regarding the loans’ specificity. Id. Consequently, Commerce that concluded the FDES loans “are countervailable to the extent that they were provided on terms more favorable than the benchmark financing.” Unlike the FDES consolidation, Commerce determined that the 1991 CFDI consolidation did not provide any eountervailable benefits during the period of investigation; however, the ITA also concluded that the original CFDI loans did confer such benefits. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6225. Commerce based its determination regarding the 1991 consolidated CFDI loans on the fact that Usinor Saeilor would not pay any interest on the loans until 1992 and, therefore, the new loans would not have any cash flow effect until after the period of investigation. Id. In contrast, the ITA determined that the old CFDI loans, which were still outstanding during a portion of the period of investigation, conferred eountervailable benefits during the POI. Id. Commerce based this determination on its finding that the evidence adduced by Usinor Sacilor did not demonstrate that the old CFDI loans were nonspecific. Id. As a result, the ITA concluded that the old CFDI loans are de facto limited and are countervailable to the extent they were provided on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations. Id. 5. Consolidation of Credit National Loans: In 1991, Credit National consolidated numerous loans that it had made to Usinor Sacilor. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6226. Similar to its determination regarding the consolidation of Usinor Sacilor’s outstanding FDES loans, Commerce determined that the consolidated Credit National loans constituted new loans because they had new terms and conditions. Id. In contrast to the FDES consolidated loans, however, Commerce determined that the Crédit National consolidated loans were not countervailable because they “were not provided to a specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries.” Id. at 6227. II. DISCUSSION Usinor challenges Commerce’s Final Determination on eight separate grounds. Specifically, Usinor contests Commerce’s determinations that: (1) the PACS and FIS instruments received by Usinor and Sacilor were debt upon issuance; (2) Usinor Sacilor and its predecessors were not equityworthy in 1986 and 1988; (3) the countervailable benefits inuring to Usinor Sacilor and its predecessors as a result of the conversion of PACS and FIS instruments to common stock equalled the face value of the remaining principal on the instruments; (4) shareholder advances made by the GOF to Usinor and Sacilor were non-recurring grants; (5) Usinor Sacilor’s consolidated FDES loans, as well as its outstanding CFDI loans, conferred countervailable benefits upon the company; (6) the benchmark discount and interest rate in the years in which Usinor Sacilor was uncreditworthy is the IMF’s long-term rate for France; (7) the amortization period for the non-recurring grants and equity infusions that Usinor Sacilor received is 15 years; and (8) the sales denominator used in computing Usinor Sacilor’s net subsidy must exclude sales of the company’s non-French produced merchandise. Defendant and Inland Steel oppose each of plaintiffs’ contentions. Inland Steel contests three aspects of Commerce’s Final Determination. Specifically, Inland Steel challenges Commerce’s determinations that: (1) Usinor Sacilor was equityworthy in 1991; (2) shareholder advances made by the GOF to Usinor and Sacilor were grants; and (3) no countervailable benefit inured to Usinor Sacilor in 1991 when Credit National consolidated the company’s outstanding loans. Defendant and Usinor Sacilor oppose each of the challenges raised by Inland Steel to the Final Determination. In reviewing a determination made by Commerce, this court must decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record and is otherwise in accordance with law. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B) (1988). “Substantial evidence is something more than a ‘mere scintilla,’ and must be enough reasonably to support a conclusion.” Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A v. United States, 10 CIT 399, 405, 636 F.Supp. 961, 966 (1986) (citations omitted), aff'd, 5 Fed.Cir. (T) 77, 810 F.2d 1137 (1987). This court must also accord substantial weight to the agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers. American Lamb Co. v. United States, 4 Fed.Cir. (T) 47, 54, 785 F.2d 994, 1001 (1986) (citations omitted). “An agency’s ‘interpretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which the court views as the most reasonable.’ ” ICC Indus., Inc. v. United States, 5 Fed. Cir. (T) 78, 85, 812 F.2d 694, 699 (1987) (citation omitted). Where “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (footnote omitted). The agency must not, however, “contravene or ignore the intent of the legislature or the guiding purpose of the statute.” Cerámica Regiomontana, 10 CIT at 405, 686 F.Supp. at 966 (citations omitted). “As long as the agency’s methodology and procedures are reasonable means of effectuating the statutory purpose, and there is substantial evidence on the record supporting the agency’s conclusions, the court •will not impose its own views as to the sufficiency of the agency’s investigation or question the agency’s methodology.” Id., 636 F.Supp. at 966 (citations omitted). A. Usinor Sacilor v. United States. 1. Characterization of PACS and FIS Instruments Upon Issuance: The first issue before the court is whether Commerce’s determination that the PACS and FIS instruments were debt upon issuance is supported by substantial evidence on the record and is otherwise in accordance with law. With respect to the PACS instruments, questionnaire responses received by Commerce indicated that the instruments had the following characteristics: (1) a 0.10 percent remuneration for the first five years and 1.0 percent thereafter, (2) no schedule of reimbursement but in the event the steel companies became profitable, the PACS holders could elect to redeem their PACS or share in profits according to a predetermined formula---- Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6224. The FIS instruments similarly carried a 0.10 percent rate of return and a profit-sharing component. Pub. Doc. 55, Confid. Doc. 3, Exs. 20A, 20B. In addition, the FIS instruments established a fixed schedule of fifteen annual principal repayments, with the GOF agreeing to make the first one or two of the repayments and the issuing company being obligated to make the remaining repayments. Defendant’s Brief at 10; see also Pub. Doc. 55, Confid. Doc. 3, Exs. 20A, 20B. Commerce determined that the PACS and FIS instruments were debt because they both carried repayment obligations. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6228. The ITA emphasized the fact that these obligations terminated only when the GOF and the companies converted the instruments into common stock. Id. Commerce noted that the instruments produced a cash flow effect while they remained outstanding insofar as they allowed the companies to pay reduced interest rates for the use of the funds. Id. The ITA further reasoned that upon conversion of the instruments to common stock, the cash flow effect was that of a grant. Id. As the methodology that Commerce employed in this investigation treats equity investments in unequityworthy companies like grants, and the ITA found Usinor Sacilor and its predecessors to be unequityworthy when the 1981, 1986 and 1988 instruments-to-stoek conversions occurred, the ITA determined that these conversions constituíed countervailable grants. Id. at 6223, 6227-28; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(ii)(III) (1988) (“The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sustained by a specific industry” constitutes a subsidy if provided “by government action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries.... ”). Usinor opposes Commerce’s characterization of the instruments as debt and maintains that Commerce should have concluded that the instruments were equity upon issuance. Usinor emphasizes the fact that the PACS “were subordinated to all other secured and unsecured credit of the Company, ... had no fixed repayment schedule or maturity date[,] ... [and] contained no unconditional repayment obligation—only a potential for an unlimited supplemental return and/or repayment of the face value of the PACS out of the Company’s profits.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 3 (emphasis omitted). As for the FIS instruments, Usinor claims they represent “a permanent commitment of funds by the GOF to Usinor Sacilor.” Id. at 16. Usinor notes that although the FIS agreements did contain nominal repayment schedules, the GOF agreed to meet the schedules until [ ]. See Plaintiffs’ Brief at 16-17. Usinor adds that “the nominal amortization schedules for the FIS instruments did not in fact create any real obligation of repayment” because “any repayment was tied to the uncertain prospect of improved future performance.”' Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief at 4 (emphasis omitted). In sum, Usinor asserts that the GOF “was paying its own agency under FIS instruments issued by the Company to that agency. The only funds changing hands were within the [GOF], and the funds invested in the Company through the FIS instruments remained in the Company.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 17. Finally, Usinor notes that the companies “never made any payments under the repayment schedules.” Id. (footnote omitted). Usinor’s arguments fail to establish that Commerce unreasonably determined the PACS and FIS instruments were debt. Undisputed record evidence demonstrates that Usinor Saeilor and its predecessors owed repayment obligations on the PACS and FIS instruments from the date of their issuance to the time of their conversion to common stock. See Pub. Doc. 55, Confid. Doc. 8, at 5; id., Exs. 20A, 20B. Although the interest owed on the instruments was nominal and the companies’ reimbursement obligations depended upon the companies’ profitability, the fact remains that the companies were subject to liabilities on these instruments. Cf. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 558, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 2130, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990) (noting that under the bankruptcy code a party is subject to a “claim” or a “right to payment” whether or not such right is liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, or unmatured). Because the companies faced such liabilities from the time the instruments originally issued, the court finds that Commerce had a reasonable basis upon which to determine that the instruments constituted debt upon issuance. In addition, because these liabilities lasted until the instruments’ conversion, the contingent nature of the liabilities does not, as Usinor maintains, eviscerate Commerce’s conclusion that the instruments were debt upon issuance. Accordingly, the court concludes that Commerce’s determination that the PACS and FIS instruments were debt upon issuance is supported by substantial evidence on the record and is otherwise in accordance with law. This aspect of Commerce’s Final Determination is therefore sustained. 2. Usinor Sacilor’s Equityworthiness in 1986 and 1988: The next issue before the court is whether Commerce’s determination that Usinor Saeilor and its predecessors were unequityworthy in 1986 and 1988 is supported by substantial evidence on the record and is otherwise in accordance with law. Commerce determined that the companies were unequityworthy from 1982 through 1988 because they reported substantial losses; their stockholders’ equity was negative in every year except 1986; and, certain of the companies’ financial indicators were negative prior to their restructuring in 1986. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6222. Commerce also concluded that “a prudent investor would not assess the reasonableness of investing in the newly restructured company without taking into consideration the tremendous financial difficulties of both companies prior to the restructurings or the reasons for those difficulties.” Id. Plaintiffs oppose Commerce’s equityworthiness determination, claiming that Usinor and Saeilor were equityworthy by 1986. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 7. As evidence of the companies’ equityworthiness Usinor points to record evidence which, it maintains, shows the companies had cut costs and raised profits significantly by the time they reclassified their PACS and FIS instruments. See id. at 8-9. Usinor argues that the ITA ignored this evidence entirely and relied instead on the companies’ financial performance in years prior to restructuring. Id. at 9. Moreover, Usinor faults Commerce for refusing to consider the companies’ earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (“EBITD”) as a measure of return on equity when record evidence showed that French investors relied upon EBITD in analyzing the equityworthiness of a company. Id. at 9 n. 32. The court finds Usinor’s position untenable. First, the guidelines that Commerce ordinarily considers in ascertaining whether a company is equityworthy militate against plaintiffs’ suggestion that the ITA should have placed more reliance on Usinor’s and Sacilor’s prospective performance. These guidelines require Commerce to determine whether, from the perspective of a reasonable private investor examining the firm at the time the government equity infusion was made, the firm showed an ability to generate a reasonable rate of return within a reasonable period of time. In making this determination, the Secretary may examine the following factors, among others: (i) Current and past indicators of a firm’s financial health calculated from that firm’s statements and accounts, adjusted, if appropriate, to conform to generally accepted accounting principles; (ii) Future financial prospects of the firm, including market studies, economic forecasts, and project or loan appraisals; (iii) Rates of return on equity in the three years prior to the government equity infusion; and (iv) Equity investment in the firm by private investors. Proposed Regulations, 54 Fed.Reg. 23,366, 23,381 (May 31, 1989) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.44(e)(2)(i)-(iv)) (emphasis added). While Usinor does not challenge the reasonableness of the foregoing guidelines, it does assert that Commerce erred by not considering the companies’ post-restructuring performance. The Final Determination, however, clearly indicates that Commerce did consider the firms’ “future financial prospects” by analyzing a study of the firms prepared by McKinsey & Company. See 58 Fed.Reg. at 6222. In addition, to the extent that Usinor claims the ITA should have accorded the McKinsey study greater weight, the court finds such a claim without merit. The ITA’s decision to place greater or less weight on the evidence presented to it is clearly within its discretion as the fact finder and does not undermine the reasonableness of its determination. See Negev Phosphates, Ltd. v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 12 CIT 1074, 1092, 699 F.Supp. 938, 953 (1988) (“This Court lacks authority to interfere with [the agency’s] discretion as trier of fact to interpret reasonably evidence collected in [an] investigation.” (citations omitted)). Second, the Proposed Regulations also support Commerce’s reliance on Usinor’s and Sacilor’s economic performance in the years prior to the 1986 restructuring. The guidelines contained in the Proposed Regulations expressly state that the agency may consider “past indicators of a firm’s financial health” and, in the case of government infusions, “[r]ates of return on equity in the three years prior to the ... infusion[s].” 54 Fed. Reg. at 23,381 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.44(e)(2)(i), (iii)). Commerce’s consideration of Usinor’s and Sacilor’s economic performance in the years prior to the 1986 restructuring is clearly in accordance with the foregoing language. Moreover, to the extent that Usinor contends that Commerce should have placed less emphasis on the companies’ past economic performance, the court rejects this challenge to the ITA’s discretion as trier of fact. See Negev Phosphates, 12 CIT at 1092, 699 F.Supp. at 953 (citations omitted). Third, contrary to Usinor’s suggestion, the fact that the companies had cut costs and raised profits significantly by the time they reclassified their PACS and FIS instruments does not demonstrate that Commerce’s determination was unreasonable. See Plaintiffs’ Brief at 8-9. The record in this case is replete with evidence which establishes that the companies were in a critical financial condition prior to and during the time of the 1986 and 1988 reclassifications, and supports a conclusion that the companies were unequityworthy. Thus, despite the fact that the evidence cited by Usinor could be interpreted to indicate that the companies experienced some recovery, the record contains substantial evidence supporting Commerce’s determination that the companies were unequityworthy. Cf. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966) (“[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.”) (citations omitted). Finally, the court finds that Commerce had a reasonable basis for not applying the return on equity methodology urged by Usinor. The EBITD methodology, which measures a company’s return on equity based on the company’s earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation, is distinguishable from the methodology employed by Commerce which examines earnings after interest, taxes and depreciation. See Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6222. Even assuming, as Usinor argues, that French investors rely on the EBITD measure in analyzing the equityworthiness of a company, under Commerce’s Proposed Regulations the rate of return on equity is only one factor the ITA might consider. See 54 Fed.Reg. at 23,381 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.44(e)(2)). Therefore, even if the EBITD measure were to show a positive return, the critical financial condition apparent from the totality of all of the factors that Commerce considered pursuant to the Proposed Regulations provides a reasonable basis for Commerce’s determination. Moreover, this court cannot discern any basis in the Proposed Regulations for limiting Commerce to measuring a firm’s return on equity using the methodology ordinarily relied upon by investors in the country under investigation. Although the standard contained in the Proposed Regulations requires Commerce to examine a company from the perspective of a reasonable private investor, the bases for measuring a company’s return on equity are simply not limited to the methodologies ordinarily applied in the country under review. Rather, the ITA need only apply a methodology which reasonably effectuates the purpose of the statute under which it operates. Cerámica Regiomontana, 10 CIT at 405, 636 F.Supp. at 966 (citations omitted). In this investigation, Commerce declined to apply the EBITD methodology because “[w]hile potential investors may consider EBITD, it is not as accurate a reflection of the potential return on an investment as a measure which is net of interest, taxes, and depreciation, i.e., net income.” Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6222. Usinor has not suggested any basis for finding Commerce’s chosen methodology unreasonable other than the fact that French investors frequently apply the EBITD methodology. Plaintiffs’ position clearly does not address the substance of the “net income” methodology that Commerce adopted. Because the court finds that the “net income” methodology provides a reasonable measure of the companies’ return on equity, the court concludes that its application in this investigation is proper. For all of the foregoing reasons, the court holds that Commerce’s determination that Usinor Sacilor and its predecessors were not equityworthy in 1986 and 1988 is supported by substantial evidence on the record and is otherwise in accordance with law. Accordingly, this aspect of Commerce’s Final Determination is sustained. 3. Valuation of Benefits from the Conversion of PACS and FIS Instruments: The next issue before the court is whether Commerce’s determination, that the countervailable benefits arising from the conversion of PACS and FIS instruments equalled the face value of the remaining balance on the instruments, is supported by substantial evidence on the record and is otherwise in accordance with law. In its Final Determination, the ITA abandoned the rate of return shortfall (“RORS”) methodology prescribed by the Proposed Regulations for measuring the benefit of equity investments in unequityworthy firms. See Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6223. Under the RORS methodology, Commerce would measure[] the benefit of equity investments in “unequityworthy” firms by comparing the national average rate of return on equity with the company’s rate of return on equity during each year of the allocation period. The difference in these amounts, the so-called rate of return shortfall (RORS), is then multiplied by the amount of the equity investment to determine the countervailable benefit in the given year. Id.; see also Proposed Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. at 23,385 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.49(e)(1)). Under RORS, Commerce would also subtract from the amount of a firm’s countervailable benefits any dividends paid during the year under examination that were not included in the firm’s rate of return. Proposed Regulations, 54 Fed.Reg. at 23,385 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.49(e)(1)). Commerce rejected the RORS methodology in the Final Determination because it found that the methodology does not accurately measure the benefit of government equity investments in unequityworthy firms. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6223. Specifically, Commerce concluded that an equity investment in an unequityworthy firm is tantamount to a grant and should be valued as such without any offset for subsequent dividends. See id. at 6229. Commerce explained: When [Commerce] finds that a company is unequityworthy and, hence, that the government’s equity investment is inconsistent with commercial considerations, we are effectively finding that the company could not attract share capital from a reasonable investor. When a company is in such poor financial condition that it cannot attract capital, any capital it receives benefits the company as if it were a grant and no earnings of the company in subsequent years should be used to offset the benefit. Id. at 6223. Commerce also determined that the RORS approach “is inadequate because it necessarily reflects the subsequent performance of the company.” Id. at 6229. According to the ITA, “potential subsidies arise from the equity investment and not what happens to that equity subsequently.” Id. Usinor contends that the ITA erred in abandoning the RORS methodology. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 10 n. 34. Usinor claims that “[b]y equating an equity infusion into a supposedly unequityworthy company with a grant, the ITA has ignored the simple fact that, unlike receiving a grant, there is a cost to the firm of issuing equity, which is accurately measured by RORS.” Id. Plaintiffs also assert that “[b]y treating equity infusions as grants, the ITA overvalue[d] the benefit to the firm” by failing to account for subsequent dividends. Id. at 10-11. Usinor maintains that the ITA should have valued the benefits using the present value of the forgiven obligations rather than their face value. Id. at 11. According to Usinor, because the 1986 and 1988 reclassifications effectively eliminated contingent obligations that were worthless due to the companies’ unequityworthiness, the elimination conferred no countervailable benefits on the companies. Id. at 11-13. Usinor’s arguments fail to establish that Commerce’s valuation methodology was improper in this case. First, the court rejects Usinor’s argument that Commerce should have relied on the present value of the PACS and FIS instruments rather than on the face value of the instruments’ remaining principal, because it ignores the fact that the PACS and FIS instruments constituted debt upon issuance which obligated the companies to make repayments once they became profitable. Usinor simply fails to acknowledge that the contingent nature of the liabilities does not affect the conclusion that the liabilities constituted debt. Cf. Davenport, 495 U.S. at 558, 110 S.Ct. at 2130. Although the PACS and FIS instruments clearly indicate that the companies’ unprofitability might delay the companies’ repayment obligation, such unprofitability does not excuse the obligations. Consequently, the extent to which the companies’ unprofitabiiity might have delayed repayment on the instruments is irrelevant to an analysis of whether and to what extent the instruments’ conversions conferred countervailable benefits on the companies. The court concludes, therefore, that Commerce had a reasonable basis for determining that the countervailable benefits attributable to the conversion equal the face value of the remaining principal on the instruments. See British Steel Corp. v. United States, 10 CIT 224, 240, 632 F.Supp. 59, 71 (1986) (“[T]he commercial and competitive benefit of the subsidy to the recipient is the measure of the value of the subsidy. In the case of debt forgiveness, the commercial and competitive benefit to the recipient is debt extinguishment.”). Second, Usinor fails to establish that Commerce unreasonably focused upon the economic benefits inuring to the companies instead of on the value of the PACS and FIS instruments in the hands of the GOF. Because Commerce properly determined that the benefit of the subsidies attributable to the instruments’ conversion equals the debt extinguished by the conversion, the court concludes that the ITA reasonably valued the subsidies in terms of the actual value realized by the companies from the debt forgiveness rather than the potential value foregone by the GOF. Third, the court disagrees with Usinor’s contention that Commerce’s revised methodology overvalues the benefits of the investments made by the GOF, by not taking into account subsequent dividends paid by the companies to the GOF. Commerce had a reasonable basis for denying the companies an offset for such dividends because the dividends represented a return on the GOF’s investment rather than a payback to the GOF for its investment. In other words, the dividends did not reduce the actual benefits the companies received from the instruments’ conversion. Consequently, Commerce’s methodology provides a reasonable measure of the actual commercial and competitive benefits attributable to the conversion of the PACS and FIS instruments. For all of the foregoing reasons the court concludes that Commerce’s determination, that the countervailable benefits arising from the conversion of the PACS and FIS instruments equalled the face value of the remaining balance on the instruments, is supported by substantial evidence on the record and is otherwise in accordance with law. This aspect of Commerce’s Final Determination is therefore sustained. 4. Shareholder Advances as Non-Recurring Grants: The next issue before the court is whether Commerce’s determination that shareholder advances made by the GOF to Usinor and Sacilor were non-recurring grants is supported by substantial evidence and is otherwise in accordance with law. At the outset, the court will address Inland Steel’s threshold argument that the shareholders’ advances were not grants upon issuance. In its Final Determination, Commerce determined that the advances constitute countervailable grants at the time that they were received because no shares were distributed in return for these advances. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6225. Commerce treated the advances as grants as of the time of receipt because it found “no evidence showing that the parties contemplated that the shareholders’ advances carried a repayment obligation.” Id. at 6229. Commerce’s verification report for the GOF states that GOF officials informed the ITA that [ ] Confid. Doc. 19 at 8. Commerce’s verification report for Usinor Sacilor further indicates that company officials [ ] Confid. Doc. 20 at 9. Notwithstanding the fact that [ ] led Commerce to conclude that the grants were not “loans that were subsequently converted to equity or loans that were cancelled.” Final Determination, 58 Fed. Reg. at 6229. Inland Steel contends that the advances were clearly debt and, therefore, the question of whether the advances were recurring-grants is irrelevant. Defendant-Intervenor’s Response Brief at 18-19. Specifically, Inland Steel points to Usinor Sacilor’s statement in its questionnaire response characterizing the advances as “loans” that are repayable on demand. Id. at 18 (quoting Pub.Doc. 68, Confid. Doc. 6, at 7). Inland Steel also relies on the fact that Usinor treated the advances as liabilities in its financial statements and tables compiled for Commerce. Inland Steel’s R.56.2 Brief at 24 (citing Pub.Doc. 68, Confid.Doc. 6, Exs. H, M). Moreover, Inland Steel maintains that the advances could not have been equity when issued because they were converted into common stock in the 1986 restructuring. Id. at 24r-25 (citing Pub.Doc. 108, Confid.Doc. 20, at 9-10; Pub. Doc. 55, Confid.Doc. 8, Ex. 27 at 2; Pub.Doc. 107, Confid.Doc. 19, at 9). Therefore, according to Inland Steel, it was unnecessary for Commerce to decide whether the advances were recurring. Defendantr-Intervenor’s Response Brief at 18-19. The items of record cited by Inland Steel fail to establish that Commerce did not base its determination upon substantial evidence on the record. As noted, Commerce concluded that the advances were not loans upon issuance after determining that the record failed to show that the parties contemplated that these shareholders’ advances carried a repayment obligation. The items upon which Inland Steel relies provide only some conflicting evidence of a repayment obligation. Compare Pub.Doc. 71, Ex. M. at 10-11 (translated audited 1982 consolidated financial statement for Sacilor noting that the advances were “for the purpose of a subsequent capital increase”) with Pub.Doc. 68, Confid.Doc. 6, at Ex.' H (Usinor Sacilor group’s condensed balance sheet [ ]). When record evidence gives rise to conflicting inferences, both of which are supported by substantial evidence, the decision as to the credibility of the evidence and the inference to be drawn therefrom lies with the fact finder. As fact finder in this case, the decision is well within the province of Commerce and this court will not disturb it. See Timken Co. v. United States, 12 CIT 955, 962, 699 F.Supp. 300, 306 (1988), aff'd after remand, 8 Fed.Cir. (T) 29, 893 F.2d 337 (1990). The court now turns to the question of whether the shareholders’ advances were recurring. Under Commerce’s past practice, the question of whether a particular program is recurring is relevant for purposes of deciding whether to allocate the benefit arising from the program’s payments to the year of receipt or over time. Live Swine and Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork Products from Canada, 50 Fed.Reg. 25,097, 25,101 (June 17, 1985) (final determination) (“Live Swine”) (“In the case of recurring programs, [Commerce] would allocate the benefit to the year of receipt; in non-recurring programs, [Commerce] would allocate the benefit over time.” Id.). Commerce generally considers three factors in determining whether a program confers recurring benefits. These factors are: (1) whether the program providing the benefit is exceptional; (2) whether the program is of long standing; and (3) whether there is any reason to believe that the program will not continue into the future. Proposed Regulations, 54 Fed.Reg. at 23,376 (citations omitted). In order to decide whether a program is “exceptional,” the ITA will ascertain whether the program has been established for a period of years, or was designed as a “ ‘one-time, shot-in-the-arm’ subsidy program.” Live Swine, 50 Fed.Reg. at 25,101. In the instant investigation, Commerce examined the availability of the shareholders’ advances. Specifically, the ITA noted that Usinor and Sacilor received the advances from the GOF from 1982 until 1986, at which time the GOF and the companies converted the advances to common stock. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6224. Commerce also indicated that the advances carried no interest and that the GOF did not place any preconditions on their receipt. Id. As noted, [ ] Confid.Doc. 19 at 8. Commerce ultimately determined that the advances “should be treated as non-recurring grants.” Id. at 6229. The ITA provided the following rationale for its determination: Although Usinor and Sacilor received shareholders’ advances on a regular basis during the years 1982 through 1986, each advance required specific shareholders’ approval. Moreover, these shareholders’ advances were made to cover operating losses. Repeated shareholders’ advances made to keep a company from dissolving are “exceptional” events, within the meaning of [Live Swine, 50 Fed.Reg. at 25,101]. Therefore, under the Department’s methodology, we are treating the shareholders’ advances as non-recurring. Id. Commerce thus determined that the advances “constitute countervailable grants at the time they were received as no shares were distributed in return for these advances when they were made to Usinor and Sacilor.” Id. at 6225. In accordance with its conclusion that the advances were non-recurring, Commerce allocated the advances over a 15-year period and did not allow the company to expense the advances in the year of receipt. See id. at 6230 (describing the 15-year allocation period which Commerce applied to the subsidies at issue). Usinor contends that the advances were recurring grants under Commerce’s usual methodology for testing grants. Specifically, Usinor claims that the advances “were not exceptional because they were provided repeatedly to cover losses regularly incurred.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 18. Usinor also points to the fact that [ ]. Id. (quoting Confid.Doc. 19 at 8). Plaintiffs further maintain that the advances “were longstanding, as they were provided for five consecutive years,” and were likely to continue into the future due to the company’s poor economic performance. Id. at 18-19. In light of these attributes, plaintiffs charge that Commerce had no basis for concluding the advances were non-recurring. Id. at 19-20. Usinor’s arguments fail to establish that Commerce did not base its determination upon substantial evidence on the record. Although the evidence cited by Usinor clearly indicates that the advances lasted for five years and, therefore, may have been longstanding, other record evidence amply supports Commerce’s determination that the grants were exceptional. This evidence establishes that the GOF provided the advances on an essentially ad hoc basis, and was under no obligation to provide such advances. The ad hoc nature of the grants is apparent in the fact that provision of the grants depended upon the monthly losses realized by the companies and the approval of the Bureau Chief of the French Ministry of Treasury. See Pub.Doc. 107, Confid.Doc. 19, at 8; cf. New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail, From Canada, 54 Fed.Reg. 31,991, 31,-996 (Aug. 3, 1989) (final determination) (Canadian government’s provision of grants found to be exceptional in part because the government likely would have discontinued the grants if the recipient were to turn a profit). In sum, although the GOF may have provided the advances over a somewhat lengthy period of time, the conditions under which the companies received the advances provides a reasonable basis for concluding that the advances amounted to a series of “one-time, shot-in-the-arm” subsidies. In addition, although the record contains conflicting evidence as to whether the GOF and the companies had an agreement pertaining to the advances, to the extent such an agreement may have existed, it appears only to have created a mere expectation that the companies would receive the advances. See Pub.Doc. 107, Confid.Doc. 19, at 8 (indicating GOF officials told Commerce verifiers that the companies and the GOF had an agreement pursuant to which the companies [ ]). Despite the statements by the GOF which might support a different interpretation, the court finds that the totality of the record evidence reasonably supports the conclusion that the grants were exceptional. For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that Commerce’s determination that shareholder advances made by the GOF to Usinor and Sacilor were non-recurring grants is supported by substantial evidence and is otherwise in accordance with law. This aspect of Commerce’s Final Determination is therefore sustained. 5. FDES Consolidated Loans and Outstanding CFDI Loans Conferred Countervailable Benefits: The next issue before the court is whether Commerce’s determination that the consolidation of Usinor Sacilor’s FDES loans conferred a countervailable benefit upon the company, as did outstanding CFDI loans during the period of investigation, is supported by substantial evidence and is otherwise in accordance with law. As noted, beginning in approximately 1978, Usinor, Sacilor, or their subsidiaries obtained “participative” FDES and CFDI loans. These loans carried below market interest rates and required borrowers to pay a share of future profits. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6225. In 1990, the outstanding principal on FDES loans to Usinor and Sacilor was consolidated into multiple long-term loans. Id. In 1991, outstanding CFDI loans to Usinor Sacilor were similarly consolidated. Id. Commerce determined that the consolidated FDES loans were countervailable after concluding that the loans were de facto limited. Id. The ITA reached this conclusion upon finding that the information submitted to it pertaining to the availability of the consolidated loans was deficient. Specifically, Commerce states that the GOF provided the total distribution of participative FDES loans for 1981 through 1990. It does not appear that the new 1990, consolidated loans for Usinor Sacilor are included in this information. The information provided only seems to relate to participative loans rather than the types of loans obtained by Usinor Sacilor in 1990. Indeed, the information provided indicates that the consolidated amounts exceeded the total amount of FDES loans distributed to all sectors of the economy for the years 1987, 1988, and 1989 combined. Id. Because it lacked information as to whether the loans were limited to a specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries, Commerce concluded that the loans were de facto limited. Id. Commerce’s determination with respect to the CFDI loans differed. First, the ITA determined that consolidation of the CFDI loans produced no cash flow effect during the period of investigation and, therefore, did not provide any countervailable benefits during that time. Final Determination, 58 Fed. Reg. at 6225. In contrast to the consolidated CFDI loans, however, Commerce did find that Usinor Sacilor’s old CFDI loans created a potentially countervailable cash flow effect during the POI. Id. After determining that such a cash flow effect existed, the ITA considered whether the CFDI loans were limited to a specific enterprise and, therefore, countervailable. Commerce determined that the CFDI loans were de facto limited to a specific enterprise because the evidence adduced by plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the loans were non-specific. Id. As a result, Commerce concluded that the CFDI loans are de facto limited and “are countervailable to the extent that they were provided on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.” Id. The specificity inquiry that Commerce undertook in the instant investigation arises from 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5). This statutory provision directs Commerce, in considering whether a domestic subsidy exists, to “determine whether the ... subsidy in law or in fact is provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1988). This provision also indicates that “[njominal general availability, under the terms of the law, regulation, program, or rule establishing a ... subsidy, of the benefits thereunder is not a basis for determining that the ... subsidy is not, or has not been, in fact provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group thereof.” Id. This standard “focuses on the de facto case-by-case effect of benefits provided to recipients rather than on the nominal availability of benefits.” Cabot Corp. v. United States, 9 CIT 489, 498, 620 F.Supp. 722, 732 (1985), appeal dismissed, 4 Fed.Cir. (T) 80, 788 F.2d 1539 (1986). Usinor challenges Commerce’s specificity determinations concerning the GOF’s provision of the old CFDI loans and the consolidated FDES loans. With respect to the consolidated FDES loans, Usinor argues that the ITA erroneously found these loans to be de facto specific because the consolidation did not materially alter the terms of the original loans. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 21-22. In support, Usinor states that “the ITA verified that the terms of the consolidated loans were designed to match, on average, the maturity and interest rates on the original loans.” Id. at 21. According to plaintiffs, because “the consolidation did not materially alter the terms of the original loans, the only reasonable method of determining whether the FDES loans were de facto specific would have been to compare the amounts of the loans originally granted to Usinor Sacilor with those contemporaneously granted to other sectors of the French economy.” Id. at 21-22 (footnote omitted). Such a comparison, contend plaintiffs, “demonstrates that the loans to Usinor Sacilor were not defacto specific, as they comprised a small fraction of the loans granted to other sectors of the economy.” Id. (footnote omitted). Plaintiffs also argue that Commerce’s specificity determination must fail because Commerce improperly compared the availability of consolidated FDES loans with the availability of the original FDES loans. Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief at 12. Upon review, the court finds Usinor’s arguments unavailing. Usinor’s assertions, while ultimately attacking the validity of Commerce’s specificity determination, target the ITA’s assumption that the consolidated loans were new loans that may constitute countervailable subsidies. See Confid.Doc. 16 at 9 ([ ]). By arguing that this assumption is invalid, Usinor effectively shifts the focus away from Commerce’s specificity determination and toward the more fundamental question of whether a subsidy could have arisen by virtue of the consolidation. Simply put, the record in this case belies Usinor’s position. It is clear that the terms of the consolidated FDES loans differ from the terms of the original FDES loans. See, e.g., Confid.Doc. 6 at 6 ([ ]); see also id., Ex. D at 1 (noting that the original loans were [ ]). Furthermore, although Commerce’s verification report indicates that GOF officials stated that the consolidated loans had terms designed to match those of the original loans, this does not demonstrate such matching actually occurred. Neither GOF officials nor Usinor sought to demonstrate through calculations or otherwise that the terms of the consolidated loans actually matched those of the original loans. Thus, even assuming that the matching of terms was intended, such an assumption does not negate Commerce’s conclusion that the consolidated loans did in fact have new terms and, therefore, should be regarded as new loans. Accordingly, the court rejects plaintiffs’ argument that the consolidated FDES loans did not contain new terms, and finds that Commerce’s determination that the consolidated loans could have conferred subsidies upon Usinor Sacilor is reasonable and is supported by substantial record evidence. This aspect of Commerce’s Final Determination is therefore sustained. The court finds Usinor’s challenge to Commerce’s specificity determination equally without merit. Usinor premises its challenge on a misapprehension of the facts. In short, Usinor claims that Commerce should have addressed only the availability of the original FDES loans because, in its view, the 1990 consolidated loans were not new loans and, consequently, could not have conferred any countervailable subsidy. See Plaintiffs’ Brief at 21-22. As noted, however, the record in this case supports Commerce’s conclusion that the 1990 consolidated loans were new loans. Thus, because the 1990 consolidated loans formed the basis of Commerce’s FDES inquiry, Commerce properly considered data relating to the consolidated loans, including data pertaining to the availability of such loans. As a result, the court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Commerce’s determination that the consolidated FDES loans were specific and, therefore, countervailable, is unsupported by substantial evidence on the record or not otherwise in accordance with law. Accordingly, this aspect of Commerce’s Final Determination is sustained. With regard to the old CFDI loans, Usinor contends that the record clearly establishes that these loans were not de facto specific. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 22. Specifically, plaintiffs point to a letter written by the president of CFDI which indicates that the CFDI loans were not limited to a specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries. Id. (citing Confid.Doc. 20, Ex. 31). Plaintiffs maintain that this letter amply demonstrates that the loans were not de facto specific, and thus precludes the conclusion reached by Commerce that Usinor failed to provide adequate evidence to establish the character of the loans. Id. Plaintiffs also fault Commerce for assuming that the CFDI loans were de facto specific based on Usinor Saeilor’s failure to provide additional evidence demonstrating that the loans were generally available. Id. Upon review, the court finds plaintiffs’ arguments unavailing. In their submissions to this court, plaintiffs cite two items on the record in support of their position. The first item is a listing of outstanding CFDI loans transferred to Usinor Sacilor. Pub.Doc. 68, Confid.Doc. 6, Ex. D at 36. This listing, however, simply does not indicate whether CFDI loans were generally available throughout the French economy. The second item, a letter from the president of CFDI to plaintiffs’ former counsel, is equally uninstructive. The pertinent translated portion of this letter reads: [ ] Confid.Doc. 20, Ex. 31. The general nature of this lone statement clearly renders it an inadequate basis for determining whether the CFDI loans were non-specific. Indeed, the letter is devoid of any factual support for plaintiffs’ assertion that the CFDI loans were generally available and, therefore, non-specific. Accordingly, the court finds that Commerce reasonably concluded that this letter failed to substantiate Usinor’s position regarding the availability of the CFDI loans. For the foregoing reasons, the court rejects plaintiffs’ claim that Commerce was provided with evidence which demonstrated that the loans were generally available and, therefore, non-specific. The same reasons also compel the court to find that plaintiffs have failed to establish that Commerce improperly assumed the CFDI loans were defacto specific. Finally, the court finds plaintiffs’ claim, that Commerce lacked substantial evidence for its determination, similarly without merit. In the instant investigation, Commerce noted that plaintiffs failed to submit information “on the terms of [Usinor Sacilor’s old CFDI loans] or whether these loans were limited to a specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries.” Preliminary Determination, 57 Fed.Reg. at 42,979. In the absence of such information, Commerce determined it would apply best information available (“BIA”). Id. Similarly, in the Final Determination, Commerce determined that the CFDI loans were de facto specific based on a lack of supporting evidence from plaintiffs regarding the availability of the loans. Final Determination, 58 Fed.Reg. at 6225. It is apparent from both the Preliminary Determination and the Final Determination that Commerce sought but did not receive information bearing on the availability of the old CFDI loans and that the absence of such information prompted the ITA to conclude these loans were defacto specific. While it is unclear whether Commerce intended to reaffirm its reliance on BIA in the Final Determination, the rationale underlying the BIA rule unquestionably supports Commerce’s CFDI determination. BIA is a rule of adverse inference which allows Commerce to avoid “rewarding the uncooperative and recalcitrant party for its failure to supply requested information.” Allied-Signal Aerospace Co. v. United States, 11 Fed.Cir. (T) -, -, 996 F.2d 1185, 1192 (1993). This rule exists in recognition of the fact that “the ITA cannot be left merely to the largesse of the parties at their discretion to supply the ITA with information____ Otherwise, alleged unfair traders would be able to control the amount of ... duties by selectively providing the ITA with information.” Olympic Adhesives, Inc. v. United States, 8 Fed.Cir. (T) 69, 76, 899 F.2d 1565, 1571-72 (1990) (citations omitted). Commerce’s application of the rule “fairly places the burden of production on the importer, which has in its possession the information capable of rebutting the agency’s inference.” Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 8 Fed.Cir. (T) 61, 67, 899 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (1990). In this ease, plaintiffs failed to provide Commerce with sufficient information pertaining to the availability of the old CFDI loans. The language of the Preliminary Determination clearly placed plaintiffs on notice of the need to submit information in this regard. Preliminary Determination, 57 Fed.Reg. at 42,979. Rather than argue no such information existed, plaintiffs responded by submitting the items previously discussed, i.e. the listing of CFDI loans and the letter from the CFDI president. These items, however, could not reasonably be expected to satisfy the submission deficiency that Commerce identified in the Preliminary Determination. Because plaintiffs failed to provide Commerce with information that was materially probative of whether the old CFDI loans were industry non-specific, when plaintiffs were in the best position to do so, the ITA had a reasonable basis for inferring that such information would have demonstrated that the loans were de facto specific. Cf. Rhone Poulenc, 8 Fed.Cir. (T) at 67, 899 F.2d at 1190 (the ITA’s presumption that the highest prior dumping margin was the best information of current margins “reflects a common sense inference that the highest pri- or margin is the most probative evidence of current margins because, if it were not so, the importer, knowing of the [BIA] rule, would have produced current information showing the margin to b