Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GOLD, United States Magistrate Judge. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. (“CWBeta”) and Marehon Eyewear, Inc., Marcolin U.S.A., Inc., and Rothandberg, Inc. (collectively referred to herein as “Marehon”) bring this action, charging that defendants Tura LP (“Tura”), Brodart Co. (“Brodart”) and Arthur Brody (“Brody”) (collectively referred to herein as the “Tura defendants”) infringed two patents: United States Patent 4,772,112 (the “’112 patent”) and United States Patent 4,896,955 (the “ ’955 patent”). The ’112 patent was issued on September 20, 1988. On January 30, 1990, the ’955 patent was issued as a continuation-in-part of the ’112 patent. The two patents in suit claim an eyeglass frame with components made from nickel-titanium based shape-memory alloys having highly elastic properties. Plaintiff CVI/Beta is the assignee, and plaintiff Marehon the licensee, of the suit patents. Plaintiffs contend in this action that Tura sold eyeglass frames which infringe both the ’112 and the ’955 patents, and that defendants Brodart and Brody induced Tura’s infringement. Defendants contend that the patents are invalid and were not infringed, and have in addition asserted counterclaims under the antitrust laws. This case was tried to a jury beginning on November 30, 1994. On December 22, 1994, the jury returned a verdict finding that the suit patents were valid, that defendant Tura infringed the patents but did not do so willfully, and that defendants Brodart and Brody induced Tura’s infringement. The jury awarded plaintiff Marehon $14,085,093 in compensatory damages, representing $2,944,-024 in profits on lost sales, $9,641,069 in profits lost as a result of depressed prices, and $1,500,000 in attorney’s fees. The jury awarded plaintiff CVI/Beta $3,319,000, comprised of $819,000 in lost royalties and $2,500,000 in attorney’s fees. Several matters are currently pending before the Court. Defendants have moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 or, in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. In addition, defendant Brody seeks dismissal, asserting that venue is not properly asserted over him in this district. Finally, the parties dispute the provisions appropriately included in a final judgment and order. DISCUSSION I. Construction of the Claim Term “3% Elasticity” Defendants first assert that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the accused eyeglass frames, marketed under the name Turaflex, do not infringe the patents in suit because they do not meet the elasticity requirements of the patent claims. This aspect of defendants’ motion hinges upon the meaning of the terms “3% elasticity” and “4% elasticity” as used in claims 1 and 5 of the suit patents. A. Background of the Dispute The term “3% elasticity” appears in claims 1 and 5 of the ’955 patent and in claim 5 of the ’112 patent. The term “4% elasticity” appears in claim 1 of the ’112 patent. Claim 1 of the ’955 patent describes an eyeglass frame having at least a portion thereof fabricated from nickel-titanium based shape-memory alloy, said portion being in the work-hardened pseudo-elastic metallurgical state, said portion having been subjected to work-hardening and having a low effective elastic modulus giving a soft, springy feel, said portion having greater than 3% elasticity over a temperature range from — 20°C to +40°C. 955:13:33 — 14:5 (emphasis added). Claim 1 of the ’112 patent is similar in all material respects, but refers to 4%, rather than 3%, elasticity. 112:12:14-22. Claim 5 as it appears in both the ’112 and ’955 patents describes [a]n eyeglass frame having at least a portion thereof fabricated from nickel-titanium based shape-memory alloy, ... and having a minimum of 3% heat-recoverable shape-memory, a yield strength greater than 30,000 psi and at least 3% elasticity. 112:12:33-41; 955:14:16-24 (emphasis added). The primary dispute between the parties concerns the meaning to be attributed to the terms “3% elasticity” and “4% elasticity,” particularly in connection with the construction of Claim 1 as it appears in the suit patents. For purposes of this decision, the parties’ dispute is discussed in the context of the construction to be given the term “3% elasticity.” Each party has advanced a different interpretation of the claim term “3% elasticity.” Plaintiffs assert that “elasticity” describes “the ability or tendency of a given material to recover or ‘spring-back’ to its original shape, partially or completely, after a deforming force is removed.” Pl.Mem. at 9. Defendants argue that the term elasticity describes the ability of a material to return completely and spontaneously to its precise original shape after a deforming force is released. Def.Mem. at 5. As demonstrated by the undisputed evidence at trial, metallurgists use specific techniques for measuring the elasticity of metals. Simply put, the metal being tested for elasticity is pulled, and the pulling force, or stress, is then released. Measurements are made of the degree to which the metal is strained, or stretches when pulled, and the degree to which it recovers from that strain, or returns to its original shape, after the stress is released. The parties agree that data developed by applying these measurement techniques are typically expressed in graphic form. These graphic depictions of elasticity are referred to as stress-strain curves. The stress to which the metal being tested is subjected, or the force with which it is pulled, is measured on the vertical axis of a stress-strain curve. The horizontal axis is used to plot the strain which the metal being tested exhibits at any given amount of force, or the degree to which it stretches when pulled and returns to its original shape when the pulling force is reduced or released. The strain is measured as a percentage of the tested item’s original length. For example, a metal rod 100 centimeters long which stretches to 103 centimeters when pulled with 1000 pounds per square inch of force is said to exhibit 3% strain when subjected to a stress of 1000 pounds per square inch. Similarly, if the same rod, when pulled with a force of 1200 pounds per square inch stretched to 105 centimeters, the rod would be said to exhibit 5% strain when subjected to a stress of 1200 pounds per square inch. These percentages are calculated by dividing the change in the length of the rod (3 centimeters and 5 centimeters, respectively) by the original length of the rod, which in this example is 100 centimeters. The difference in the definitions of elasticity advanced by the parties concerns the behavior exhibited when the stresses on the rod are released. Plaintiffs assert that the term 3% elasticity refers to the ability of a metal item to “spring back” or recover in an amount equal to 3% of its original length after being subjected to stress. For example, to exhibit 3% elasticity as interpreted by plaintiffs, a metal rod 100 centimeters in length, after being stretched to a length of 105 centimeters when stressed, must, when the stress is released, “spring back” by an amount equal to 3% of its original length, or 3 centimeters, to a length of 102 centimeters. According to defendants, 3% elasticity requires that a metal item return precisely to its original shape after being strained by at least 3% of its original length. In other words, to exhibit 3% elasticity as interpreted by defendants, a rod 100 centimeters in length, after being stretched to a length of 103 centimeters when stressed, would be required to recover fully and return spontaneously to its original length of 100 centimeters when the stress was released. (The behavior of the rod upon the release of stress after having been pulled to 105 centimeters is irrelevant to defendants’ interpretation.) In contrast, while plaintiffs’ definition would encompass full recovery from a 3% strain as one example of 3% elasticity, plaintiffs contend that any “springing back” of at least 3%, whether or not the component returns to its original shape, is sufficient to meet this element of the patent claims. Prior to trial, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on infringement and asserted, among other things, that defendants’ frames exhibited more than 3% elasticity over the sixty-degree temperature range required by claim 1 of the suit patents. By Memorandum and Order dated November 21, 1994, this Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and permitted the parties to proceed to trial and argue their competing contentions about the meaning of the disputed claim term to the jury. The verdict returned after trial indicates that the jury accepted plaintiffs’ definition of the term. After the trial of this case, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.Cir.1995), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 40, 132 L.Ed.2d 921 (1995). The Court held in Markman that it was improper to allow a jury to decide the meaning of disputed claim terms. Although the Court in Markman acknowledged that some of its pri- or holdings indicated that “claim construction may have underlying factual inquiries that must be submitted to a jury,” 52 F.3d at 976, it nevertheless held that the meaning of a patent claim is a question of law and, as such, must be resolved by the Court. This Court’s Memorandum and Order denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on infringement addressed the parties’ dispute over the meaning of the term 3% elasticity. After reviewing the specifications and the prosecution history of the suit patents, the definition advanced by defendants was determined to be correct. As this Court has made clear in the course of prior proceedings in this action, however, because the decision was to deny summary judgment, it has little or no precedential significance. Moreover, since rendering that decision, the Court has had the opportunity to review the specifications and prosecution history at great length, to hear testimony from experts about the meaning of technical terms, including elasticity, and to consider additional arguments made by the parties, both at trial and in connection with the motions now pending. Accordingly, the meaning of the patent terms in dispute is now reviewed de novo, without regard or reference to the discussion in the Memorandum and Order issued prior to trial. The Federal Circuit’s decision in Markman, which now requires this Court to decide the meaning of the claims in the patents in suit, offers guidance to Courts attempting to construe technical terms in a patent claim. The primary sources for determining the meaning of a patent claim are the claim language itself, the patent specification and the prosecution history. In addition, the Court in Markman specifically held that “expert and inventor testimony ... may be helpful to explain scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and terms of art that appear in the patent and prosecution history.” 52 F.3d at 979-81. B. The Language of the Patent Claims The claims of the suit patents, quoted above, use the terms 3% elasticity and 4% elasticity without elaboration. Accordingly, standing alone, the language of the patent claims is of no assistance in resolving the definitional dispute between the parties. Defendants assert that the commonly understood ordinary meaning of the term “elasticity” supports the definition they advance. In their memorandum, defendants recount the trial testimony of several witnesses, including John Krumme, Dr. Daniel Beshers, and Yuichi Suzuki, each of whom presented their own interpretation of elasticity. Def. Mem. at 6 n. 6. Defendants assert that the testimony cited in their memorandum establishes that the term elasticity is typically used to refer to the ability of a strained material to return to its original shape when the stress causing the strain is removed. The testimony relied upon by defendants, however, is taken out of context. Krumme, one of the two inventors, and Beshers, plaintiffs’ trial expert, testified that the term elasticity, particularly when used in the context of shape memory alloys like those described in the suit patents, refers to the ability of material to spring back towards its original shape, and not necessarily to return precisely to its original dimensions. Tr. 571 (Krum-me), 966-67, 1207 (Beshers). Even Suzuki, who was called as a witness on behalf of the defendants at trial, described elasticity as “mean[ing] that the recovery power for it to return to its original shape is extremely great.” Tr. 1640-41. Suzuki’s definition suggests that materials with great, but not necessarily complete, power to return to their original shape nevertheless exhibit elasticity. More importantly, the real issue of claim interpretation presented by this case is not the meaning of elasticity in the abstract, but rather the meaning of a measure of elasticity expressed as a percentage. In other words, whatever elasticity may mean, the term 3% elasticity clearly means something less than, for example, 100% elasticity. Thus, even assuming that defendants are correct in their assertion that the term elasticity refers in general to the ability of a material to return to its original shape, the question of what behavior constitutes 3% elasticity remains. C. The Specifications of the Patents in Suit As discussed above, elasticity measurements are frequently displayed in graphic form as stress-strain curves. The suit patents contain several such curves, labelled as figures 2A through 2H. The parties each contend that the graphs contained in the suit patents, as well as the patent specifications, support their respective definitions of the term 3% elasticity. Defendants point in particular to figures 2F and 2H, and to passages taken from the specifications indicating that these graphs illustrate the properties of the invention described in claim 1 of the suit patents. Figures 2F and 2H depict materials which, having been strained by approximately 6% of their original length, return completely to their original shape when the stress upon them is released. The use of these figures in the patent specifications thus lends strong support to defendants’ definition of the term 3% elasticity. Defendants further correctly assert that the patent specifications suggest that the behavior illustrated in figures 2F and 2H — spontaneous return precisely to original shape from strains of up to 6% — can be achieved by the claimed invention at temperatures as low as — 20°C. While it is certainly appropriate to consider a patent specification when construing a disputed claim term, it is not proper to read limitations into a claim from the specification. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed.Cir.1985); see also Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (noting that the specification “does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the function and purpose of the patent claims.”); Electro Medical Sys. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed.Cir.1994) (holding that “claims are not to be interpreted by adding limitations appearing only in the specification”). Figures 2F and 2H are therefore relevant only insofar as they inform the meaning of the term “3% elasticity,” and not simply because the patent specifications in the suit patents suggest — even if inaccurately — that the behavior which these curves illustrate can be achieved by the claimed invention. For this reason, it is particularly noteworthy that the specifications do not describe figures 2F and 2H as illustrating 6% elasticity. Rather, in the course of discussing a particular embodiment of the claimed invention, the specifications assert that these figures depict a “component [which] acts completely elastically up to strains of 6% or more.” 112:5:25-26; 955:6:2-3 (emphasis added). Similarly, in connection with another embodiment, the specification of the ’955 patent refers to a component which can be subjected to a “4% tensile strain and show complete elastic spring back at room temperature.” 955:6:12-14 (emphasis added). Using the language of the specifications, then, had the inventors intended to use the term elasticity as defendants argue, they would have written a claim requiring that a component behave “completely elastically” or exhibit “complete elastic spring back” when subjected to stresses causing strains of at least 3% of original length. For these reasons, this Court cannot agree that figures 2F and 2H, and the discussion of them in the specifications, compels the conclusion that 3% elasticity requires that a component return spontaneously and completely to its original shape. In fact, when carefully reviewed in their entirety, the specifications and figures in the suit patents in fact provide persuasive support for plaintiffs’ definition of 3% elasticity. This support derives in particular from the language of claim 5 and the discussion of figure 2G in the specifications. In both the ’112 and ’955 patents, claim 5 uses the same term — “3% elasticity” — which appears in claim 1 of the ’955 patent. When describing the behavior constituting 3% elasticity in the context of claim 5, the specifications use this term precisely as do plaintiffs in connection with the motions now pending before the Court. For example, the ’112 patent describes an embodiment of claim 5 which provides “a fully recoverable strain potential of at least 6%.” 112:5:45-46. In the text immediately following, it is further explained that this 6% recovery is comprised of “a minimum of 3% heat-recoverable shape-memory ... and at least 3% elasticity.” 112:5:53-55. Thus, the ’112 patent specification describes a component as exhibiting 3% elasticity even though the component retains a 3% strain recoverable only with the application of heat. Similarly, the ’955 patent, in discussing an embodiment of claim 5, describes a component which has been subjected to a 7.5% strain. This strain is completely recovered when, “upon unloading[,] the component gives 3.7% elastic spring back and imparts 3.8% shape memory recovery when heated.” 955:6:60-62. The specification further states that “[f]rom the above, it can be seen [that eyeglass frame components may be made] ... having a minimum of 3% heat-recoverable shape-memory ... and at least 3% elasticity.” 955:7:10-14. The reference to “3.7% elastic spring back” is the only behavior described in the text which could possibly support the conclusion that “from the above ... 3% elasticity [can be seen].” A second embodiment of claim 5 using similar language and providing similar support for the definition of 3% elasticity advanced by plaintiff is described at 955:6:63-955:7:9. Clearly, then, the 3% elasticity described in the cited text of the 112 patent, and the 3.7% “elastic spring back” described in the cited text of the ’955 patent, are provided as examples of the 3% elasticity required by claim 5. It is also clear that this elastic behavior must be combined with at least 3% “heat-recoverable shape-memory” behavior before the components, having been subjected to strains of 6% and 7.5%, respectively, return to their original shape. Thus, the term “3% elasticity,” as it is used in claim 5, plainly does not require that a component return spontaneously and completely to its original shape. The same claim term, 3% elasticity, is of course used in claim 1, and cannot be consistently construed to require that a component spontaneously return to zero. Defendants contend that the portions of the specifications discussed above do not support plaintiffs’ definition of 3% elasticity. Rather, according to defendants, the heat-recoverable shape-memory and elasticity described in claim 5 are separate and distinct characteristics, each of which must be measured independently by straining a component to about 3% of its original length. The cited portions of the specifications discussed above, however, demonstrate that the shape-memory and elasticity components of claim 5 are intended to operate in tandem upon an eyeglass frame subjected to strains in excess of 6% of original length. This construction of the shape-memory and elasticity elements of claim 5 is further supported by the references to figure 2G in the specifications of the suit patents. Figure 2G depicts a component which has been strained slightly less than 8%. When the deforming stress is released, the component springs back by almost 5%, with a strain of about 3% remaining. This remaining 3% strain is then recovered with heat, which returns the component to its original shape. Consistent with plaintiffs’ definition of the term 3% elasticity, the specifications describe the “spring back” of 5%, from 8% strain to the remaining 3% strain, as illustrating the component’s elastic properties. 112:3:23-24; 955:3:47-48. Furthermore, the specifications make it dear that figure 2G is intended to illustrate the behavior of a component covered by claim 5. 955:6:26, 35. As discussed above, the ’955 specification uses the phrase “spring back” to describe the behavior of a component which meets the requirement of 3% elasticity in claim 5. Moreover, the suit patents each employ figure 2G, which illustrates only a partial return toward original shape absent heat, to depict the “at least 3% elasticity” described in claim 5. It therefore follows that the term 3% elasticity as used in claim 5 refers not to the spontaneous return of a component to its original shape, but rather to the ability of a component to “spring back” by an amount equal to 3% of its original length. Moreover, the term is used in claim 5 precisely as it is used in claim 1, and there is no reasoned basis to apply different definitions to the same term used in two claims of the same patent. See Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1995), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3250 (Sept. 19, 1995) (No. 95-475); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed.Cir.1983) (holding that “evidence of the scope of a particular claim can be found on review of other claims”). This Court concludes, therefore, that the specifications support plaintiffs’ contention that the 3% elasticity requirement in the claims of the suit patents is satisfied by a component which, upon the application of force, is strained in excess of 3% of its original length, and which, when the deforming force is released, springs back by at least 3% of its original length. D. The Prosecution History Defendants next assert that the prosecution history of the suit patents supports their definition of 3% elasticity. Like a patent specification, a patent’s prosecution history may properly be considered when construing the language of a claim, but may not be used to vary the claim’s limitations. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. Accordingly, as with the specifications, the prosecution history is relevant only insofar as it indicates how the term “3% elasticity” was defined by the inventors and understood by the Patent and Trademark Office (the “PTO”). To the extent the inventors asserted during the prosecution history that their invention could achieve results even more impressive than those described in the patent’s claims, such assertions, whether accurate or not, are not in and of themselves relevant to the claim construction question defendants now raise. Defendants rely upon cited passages from several documents generated during the prosecution history in which the inventors emphasized the highly elastic properties claimed for their invention by referring to figures 2F and 2H and to the term “optimized elasticity.” Defendants argue that these passages demonstrate that the inventors attempted to persuade the patent examiners that frames made pursuant to their patent would spontaneously return to their original shape when a deforming stress was released. The documents cited by defendants, however, do not purport to define the claim term 3% elasticity or otherwise express a measure of elasticity in percentage terms. Indeed, when describing pseudoelastie behavior, the inventors did not refer to a percentage of elasticity, but instead used the phrase, “the strain will spontaneously return to zero.” PX 3 at'14. Similarly, when describing the behavior depicted in figure 2H during the prosecution history, the inventors did not describe that figure as illustrating 6% elasticity, but rather as depicting the behavior of “totally elastic” material. Id. Thus, when describing the ability of an item to return to its original shape — a behavior characteristic of pseudoelasticity and depicted in figure 2H — the inventors used terminology, such as spontaneous return to zero or total elasticity, which does not express elasticity as a percentage. The terms used by the inventors during the prosecution history thus support the conclusion that the claim terms, which do express elasticity as a percentage, do not require the complete and spontaneous return of an item to its original shape. The only discussion of elasticity expressed in percentage terms which the Court has found among the prosecution history documents cited by the parties supports plaintiffs’ definition of the term 3% elasticity. In a request for reexamination, the inventors discussed a prior art reference referred to as the “Merrier article.” The inventors described a stress-strain curve in the Mereier article as illustrating a component strained by a deforming force to 11.1% which returns, or springs back, approximately 8.1% after the deforming stress is released. The request for reexamination describes this curve as illustrating 8.1% elasticity at the expense of a 3% retained strain. PX 3 at 19. (The 3% retained strain refers to the difference between the 11.1% strain to which the component was subjected and the 8.1% spring back exhibited by the component when the stress upon it was released.) Clearly, the inventors’ statement to the PTO, describing a component which recovered only partially when stress was released as exhibiting 8.1% elasticity, supports plaintiffs’ interpretation of 3% elasticity. Defendants argue in their reply that the inventors’ discussion of Mercier was based upon an inaccurate reading of the defendants’ position during the reexamination proceeding. More specifically, defendants contend that it was their position on reexamination that the Mercier curve did not depict any retained strain. Def.Reply at 23 n. 15. Even assuming that defendants are correct in this regard, plaintiffs’ misunderstanding has no bearing on the proper construction of the claim term in dispute. The significance of the statements made by the inventors during the prosecution history about the Mercier curve does not depend upon the accuracy or persuasiveness of their arguments about the curve, but instead upon the meaning attributed by the inventors to the expression of elasticity in percentage terms. It is clear that, in the passage from the prosecution history cited above, the inventors argued to the PTO that the curve in Mercier depicted a retained strain, yet nevertheless characterized that curve as illustrating 8.1% elasticity. The description of a stress-strain curve which is understood to depict a component which only partially returns to its original shape as exhibiting 8.1% elasticity supports the definition of 3% elasticity advanced by plaintiffs. E. The Extrinsic Evidence At Trial As noted above, the Court in Markman specifically held that expert testimony may be helpful to explain scientific principles and the meaning of technical terms. 52 F.3d at 979-81. Dr. Daniel Beshers, who has been a professor of metallurgy and material science at Colombia University since 1957, testified for plaintiffs as an expert at trial. In the course of his testimony, Beshers stated that elasticity expressed as a percentage, particularly when discussing shape memory alloys, is widely understood to refer to the ability of a component to “spring back” upon the release of stress to a degree indicated by the percentage of elasticity stated. Tr. 966-67, 1157, 1160. Beshers’ expert opinion thus supports the definition of 3% elasticity advanced by plaintiffs. Defendants argue that, because Beshers is not one of ordinary skill in the art, his expert opinion should have no bearing upon the construction of the disputed claim language. Beshers, however, testified that the definition he gave at trial was “universal” and that “everybody would agree to [it],” and that it was “widely recognized” as an accurate definition in the context of shape memory alloys. Tr. 1157, 1160. Moreover, Beshers testified that he had little experience with or specialized knowledge of shape memory alloys and their properties before he was retained by plaintiffs, he devoted special study to the subject, particularly in connection with the fabrication of eyeglass frames, after plaintiffs engaged him. Tr. 949-50, 952. Presumably, one of ordinary skill in the art — a fabricator of metal eyeglass frames lacking detailed familiarity with shape-memory alloys — would undertake a similar course of study and investigation. Finally, defendants offered no evidence at trial that one of ordinary skill in the art would, by virtue of training and experience, understand the term 3% elasticity differently than did Beshers. Accordingly, I conclude that it is appropriate to consider Beshers’ expert testimony about the meaning of the term 3% elasticity. Based upon the language of the claims of the suit patents, the specifications and drawings they contain, the history of their prosecution and the extrinsic evidence at trial, this Court concludes that the term 3% elasticity is properly construed to refer to the behavior exhibited by a component which, when strained by a deforming force to a length in excess of 3% of its original length, springs back by at least 3% of its original length when the force is released. Defendants’ contention that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that their products exhibited 3% elasticity as required by claim 1 is premised upon the definition of that claim term advanced by defendants. That definition having been rejected for the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on this ground is denied. 11. Elasticity and Shape-Memory Requirements of Claim 5 Claim 5 of both the ’112 and ’955 patents describes an eyeglass frame with a component which has “a minimum of 3% heat-recoverable shape-memory ... and at least 3% elasticity.” Defendants argue that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that these claim elements were infringed. Defendants’ contention that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that the accused frames have 3% elasticity is premised upon the same construction of that claim term which is rejected in Point I of this Memorandum and Order. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, this aspect of defendants’ motion must be denied. Defendants now assert for the first time that the evidence at trial was also insufficient with respect to the heat-recoverable shape-memory element of claim 5. In two written motions dated December 12, 1994, defendants sought a directed verdict on several specifically stated grounds. Defendants did not, however, seek judgment as a matter of law on any ground related to the “3% heat-recoverable shape memory” element of claim 5. Defendants’ failure to raise this basis for relief during trial bars their post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 53-54 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1612, 128 L.Ed.2d 339 (1994) (emphasizing that the rule is designed to protect a party’s right to “notice of potential deficiencies in its proof before the case is submitted to the jury”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), Advisory Committee’s Notes to 1991 Amendment. With respect to virtually every ground on which they seek judgment as a matter of law, defendants in their post-trial motion contend that they are entitled in the alternative to a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. Although the failure to seek a directed verdict during trial does not procedurally bar a motion for a new trial, such a motion should be granted only to prevent manifest injustice. See, e.g., Baskin v. Hawley, 807 F.2d 1120, 1134 (2d Cir.1986); Russo v. State of N.Y., 672 F.2d 1014, 1022 (2d Cir.1982), modified on reh’g, 721 F.2d 410 (2d Cir.1983); 6A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 59.08[5] at 59-150—59-152. Defendants, having failed to raise their contentions at a time when plaintiffs might have cured any asserted insufficiency in their proof, have not presented arguments which warrant granting them a new trial. Finally, even if this Court were to reach the merits of defendants’ motion with respect to heat-recoverable shape-memory, the motion would be denied. Defendants’ position is premised upon a construction of this claim term which would require an accused frame component to return completely and precisely to its original shape. Def. Mem. at 33. This Court has already rejected the defendants’ contention that elasticity, expressed in percentage terms, requires a complete return to original shape. There is no reason to construe a statement of heat-recoverable shape-memory expressed in percentage terms any differently. For these reasons, defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative for a new trial, on grounds that there was insufficient proof at trial to support the jury’s verdict with respect to the elasticity and heat-recoverable shape-memory elements of claim 5, is denied. III. Infringement of Claims 1 and 5 by the Same Component The jury found that four of defendants’ frames infringe both claims 1 and 5 of the suit patents. Defendants contend that these patent claims are irreconcilably inconsistent, and that any verdict finding that an accused product infringes both must therefore be set aside. Defendants make four arguments in support of their contention that it is not logically possible for one product to infringe both claims 1 and 5 of the patents in suit. First, defendants argue that the specifications indicate that frames exhibiting the characteristics of claim 1 should be made by subjecting the frames to work-hardening and avoiding subsequent anneals, whereas frames intended to behave as described in claim 5 should be subjected to heat treatment during fabrication. Second, defendants assert that, during the prosecution of the suit patents, the inventors indicated to the PTO that the shape memory alloys best used to fabricate components intended to behave as described in claim 1 and those suitable for making frames with the characteristics listed in claim 5 have different transformation temperatures. Third, defendants point to portions of the specifications indicating that claim 1 frames have a yield strength greater than that of claim 5 frames. Finally, defendants rely upon a licensing agreement and correspondence authored by an employee of plaintiff CVI/Beta as evidence that the plaintiffs conceived of claims 1 and 5 as describing separate and distinct eyeglass frame components. The purported inconsistencies relied upon by defendants are not irreconcilable. Claim 1 does not include an element requiring or precluding anneals or heat treatments. Neither claim 1 nor claim 5 specifies the transformation temperature of the shape memory alloy from which the patented frame component is to be fabricated. Claim 1 does not require a minimum yield strength, and claim 5 does not impose a maximum. In short, defendants’ attempt to impugn the jury’s findings as irreconcilably inconsistent relies upon a reading of limitations into claims 1 and 5 from the specifications and the prosecution history of the suit patents, despite the complete absence of words in the claims themselves which would support such limitations. This is plainly improper. SRI Int’l., 775 F.2d at 1121; see also Markman, 52 F.3d at 980; Electro Medical Sys., 34 F.3d at 1054. Moreover, even assuming that plaintiffs did not contemplate manufacturing or marketing frame components which exhibited the characteristics of both claims 1 and 5, this would not render the jury’s verdicts irreconcilably inconsistent. Am inventor’s decision to exercise his patent rights by marketing separate claim-specific products in no way bars a jury from concluding that an accused product simultaneously infringes two claims of the same patent. Defendants have failed to establish that claims 1 and 5 contain irreconcilably inconsistent terms. Accordingly, the motion to set aside the jury’s verdict on this ground is denied. IV. Yield Strength Claim 5 of the suit patents requires that a frame component have “a yield strength greater than 30,000 psi.” ’112:12:40-41; ’955:14:24-25. Defendants argue that this claim term should be interpreted to require a component to exhibit the stated yield strength at a temperature at which 3% heat recoverable shape-memory and elasticity occurs, i.e., at -20°C, and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that the Turaflex frames possessed the required yield strength at that temperature. Defendants argued that claim 5 should be interpreted to require the stated yield strength at — 20°C in their motion for a directed verdict. Defendants have not presented any evidence or posed any arguments which this Court did not thoroughly consider before denying defendants’ motion for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence at trial. Tr. 2915:23-2917:16; 2926:11-19. The reasons for denying that motion are nevertheless amplified below. A. Claim Construction Although claim 1 expressly requires that a component exhibit certain characteristics over a stated temperature range, there is simply no mention of a temperature range requirement in claim 5. In light of the temperature range requirement in claim 1, it is clear that the tendency of shape-memory alloys to behave differently at different temperatures was neither overlooked by the inventors or the PTO, nor beyond their ability to address with claim requirements. The absence in claim 5 of a limitation with respect to temperature makes it clear from the plain language of the claim terms that no such limitation was intended. Defendants assert, however, that the specifications of the suit patents indicate that the yield strength requirement of claim 5 must be met at temperatures as low as —20°C. While it is “proper to use the specification to interpret what the patentee meant by a word of phrase in the claim,” it is not proper to add “an extraneous limitation appearing in the specification.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986, 109 S.Ct. 542, 102 L.Ed.2d 572 (1988). An extraneous limitation is one which is “read into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.” Id. In other words, the language contained in the patent specifications may be used only to interpret ambiguous claim terms, and not to impose additional limitations on the claims. See SRI Int’l., 775 F.2d at 1121. In this case, the phrase “a yield strength greater than 30,000 psi” as used in claim 5 clearly makes no reference to a temperature range. Accordingly, it is not proper to look to the patent specifications to determine whether or not claim 5 requires that a component possess this yield strength at any specific temperature. Moreover, the portions of the specifications cited by defendants do not require that an alloy possess the yield strength stated in claim 5 at temperatures as low as — 20°C. Defendants rely upon a statement in the specifications that work-hardening, followed by partial annealing, results in a component that, “below Ms, has a combination of higher yield strength, very springy elastic behavior, and some shape-memory characteristics.” 955:6:31-34. Although this portion of the patent specification discusses the yield strength of an alloy below its Ms temperature, there is no indication in the specification that the Ms temperature referred to is as low as — 20°C. Indeed, in discussing the shape memory features of the frame components for purposes of Claim 5, the specifications refer to figure 2G, which depicts the behavior of an alloy at some point below Ms, but in no way indicates that the alloy has an Ms temperature as low as or close to — 20°C. 955:5:37-41. The only temperature range requirement imposed by the suit patents is the -20°C to +40°C range over which claim 1 requires that a component exhibit at least 3% elasticity. The discussion of claim 1 in the specifications of the suit patents indicates that the Ms temperature does not necessarily approach -20°C. Rather, the Ms temperature depends upon the alloy selected. In discussing Claim 1, the patent specifications describe the behavior of frame components at temperatures below Ms, which may fall above -20°C. 955:5:37-40, 50-61. Thus, even if the specifications were read to impose a limitation on claim 5, they might arguably require only that a frame component possess the stated yield strength at some temperature below Ms, but not necessarily at temperatures as low as -20°C. Defendants next assert that plaintiffs implicitly conceded that Claim 5 requires an alloy to possess the stated yield strength at -20°C by seeking a finding of infringement with respect to Turaflex Model 841 under the doctrine of equivalents. The evidence at trial presented by plaintiffs established that the yield strength of this frame at — 20°C was below the 30,000 psi required by claim 5. Defendants reason that, had plaintiffs asserted that claim 5 required only that the 841 possess the requisite yield strength at any temperature, plaintiffs would have sought to prove literal infringement by relying upon tests which demonstrated that Model 841 had a yield strength of 52,000 psi at 40°C. Plaintiffs’ attempt to demonstrate at trial that the 841 exhibited the requisite yield strength at —20°C, however, does not compel this Court to read such a limitation into claim 5, which itself contains no reference to temperature which even arguably applies to yield strength. Accordingly, I conclude that claim 5 should not be construed to require that its stated yield strength requirement be met at —20°C. Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at trial that the accused frame components possessed the required yield strength at higher temperatures, nor could they. The jury, reading the plain language of claim 5, might well have concluded that the yield strength requirement stated in claim 5 need not be met at — 20°C, and relied upon Beshers’ test results at higher temperatures, indicating yield strengths well in excess of 30,000 psi. PX 20. These results provided ample support for the jury’s finding that the accused frame components infringed the yield strength element of claim 5. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence As noted above, defendants correctly assert that plaintiffs attempted to prove at trial that the frame components accused of infringing claim 5 possessed the yield strength required by that claim at temperatures as low as -20°C. Defendants contend that the proof at trial on this issue was insufficient to support the jury’s infringement finding. Even if claim 5 were interpreted to require that an alloy possess the stated yield strength at — 20°C, the evidence presented at trial by plaintiffs would be sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Plaintiffs’ proof of yield strength was presented through the testimony of Dr. Beshers, who described various tests he performed on the accused frame components. Defendants challenge all of Beshers’ findings, and in particular those at cold temperatures. Defendants assert that Beshers’ findings are unsupported and conclusory, and based upon testing techniques so flawed that no reasonable juror could have relied upon them. More specifically, defendants assert that Beshers artificially inflated the yield strength of the Turaflex samples by testing them at —20°C only after having subjected them to several tests at higher temperatures. According to defendants, these prior tests at higher temperatures themselves increased the yield strength of the tested alloy, thereby artificially inflating the results of the tests performed at -20°C. Dr. Beshers’ testimony, however, was hardly conclusory. Beshers explained the procedures he used to determine the yield strength of the Turaflex frames at great length during both his direct testimony and upon cross-examination. See, e.g., Tr. 966:2-17; 980:20-992:15, 1003:6-12, 1025:21-1026:5, 1140:18-1148:10. Moreover, plaintiffs introduced into evidence the test samples and documents reflecting the test results from which Beshers calculated the yield strength of the accused Turaflex frames. PX 8-21. The reliability of Beshers’ testing procedures was addressed in detail at trial and properly submitted to the jury. Beshers testified that the repeated testing at higher temperatures emphasized by the defendants did not significantly affect his results at —20°C. When asked on cross-examination whether he was “concerned” that performing repeated tests—three cycles at room temperature, one cycle at 40°, one cycle at 0° and finally two cycles at -20°C—undermined the accuracy of his results, Beshers responded that repeated test cycling did not change the properties of the material being tested. Tr. 1098:18-24. Even after being questioned about the differences in the tensile strengths of the sample frames after each test cycle, Beshers stood by the opinions he rendered to the jury. Beshers stated that there was nothing about the questions he was asked or the documents which he reviewed which would cause him to alter his conclusions that the Turaflex frames met the yield strength requirement of Claim 5 of the suit patents. Tr. 1206:18-1207:3. The jury had the opportunity to consider Beshers’ credentials, to observe his demean- or, and to evaluate the testing procedures he followed and the results he obtained. During his testimony, Beshers stated his opinion that the purported flaws in his test procedures relied upon by defendants did not affect the accuracy of his results. The jury was entitled to rely upon Beshers’ opinion in this regard. Fed.R.Evid. 702. Accordingly, even if claim 5 were interpreted to require an alloy to possess the stated yield strength at —20°C, the evidence would be sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the accused frame components met the yield strength requirement of the patents in suit. V. Work-Hardening A- Construction of Claim 1 of the ’955 Patent Claim 1 of the ’955 patent describes “[a]n eyeglass frame having at least a portion thereof ... in the work-hardened pseudoe-lastic metallurgical state, said portion having been subjected to work-hardening.” 955:13:83-14:2. The parties dispute the meaning of this phrase. Defendants contend that this claim term should be interpreted to require work-hardening of a shape-memory alloy while it is at a temperature at which it is pseudoelastic, i.e., at a temperature between Ms and Md. This construction of the claim would require that an alloy be subjected to work-hardening while in a particular metallurgical state, but would not require that the finished component be in any particular state of work-hardening. Plaintiffs assert that the phrase “work-hardened pseudoelastic metallurgical state” describes a final state of an alloy and not a processing step. Plaintiffs argue, therefore, that the phrase should be construed to require that a finished product exhibit residual work-hardening and, within the appropriate temperature range, exhibit the characteristics of pseudoelasticity as well. Defendants did not move for judgment as a matter of law on this ground during the trial. Accordingly, they may not now raise this issue as a basis for such relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Moreover, defendants’ argument lacks substantive merit. The ordinary meaning of the phrase “work-hardened pseudoelastic metallurgical state” supports the interpretation advanced by plaintiffs. The term “work-hardened” modifies the term “state,” and thus clearly indicates a description of a finished product in a particular state, rather than a processing step which must be performed at a specific point during the fabrication of a frame component. This interpretation of the claim’s ordinary meaning is farther supported by the remaining terms of the claim. Claim 1 includes a process limitation — that the component have been “subjected to work-hardening” — which appears in the claim immediately following the term in dispute. This process limitation does not require that the work-hardening take place at any particular temperature or at any specific stage of fabrication. Moreover, had the phrase “work-hardened pseudoelastic metallurgical state” been intended to require that a component be subjected to work-hardening while in its pseu-doelastic state, there would be no reason for claim 1 also to require that the component be “subjected to work-hardening”, because a component in the work-hardened pseudoelastic metallurgical state would necessarily have been work-hardened. In other words, while it is redundant to require a frame component to be work-hardened at a particular temperature, and then in addition to require generally that the component be work-hardened, it is not redundant to require that a component be subjected to work-hardening during its fabrication and to require as well that the component still be in a work-hardened metallurgical state when completed. Thus, the inclusion of a work-hardening process limitation following the disputed phrase compels the conclusion that an alloy in the “work-hardened pseudoelastic metallurgical state” must exhibit residual work-hardening and pseudoelastic characteristics in its completed state, and not that the work-hardening must occur while the material is at a temperature in its pseudoelastic range. The interpretation advanced by plaintiffs is also supported by the specification of the ’955 patent. In describing the behavior of an alloy at temperatures between Ms and Md, the specification states that the alloy will behave as depicted in figure 2H of the patent, which is described by the inventors as representing work-hardened pseudoelasticity. 955:5:16-19. The specification states that “Figure 2H shows the stress-strain behavior of a martensite alloy at Ms < T < Md, ... which alloy has been work-hardened.” 955:3:51-54. Thus, the specification describes figure 2H as an example of the behavior of an alloy which is “work-hardened pseudoelastic” and states in addition that the alloy has been work-hardened. There is no indication in the specification, however, that the work-hardening must take place at any specific stage during processing. Thus, these passages in the ’955 patent specification indicate that the disputed phrase is intended to describe the characteristics of a finished product rather than a step in its fabrication. The expert testimony presented at trial also supports plaintiffs’ interpretation. As noted above, it is proper for a court to rely upon expert testimony to explain the meaning of technical or scientific terms, or of terms of art used in patent claims. Markman, 52 F.3d 980-981. Because the phrase “work-hardened pseudoelastic metallurgical state” is clearly a term of art used by those knowledgeable about material sciences, it is appropriate for this Court to consider the expert testimony of Dr. Beshers, a professor of metallurgy and material science. When asked at trial to describe the meaning of the phrase “work-hardened pseudoelastic metallurgical state,” Beshers testified that [t]he term ‘state’ at the end refers to the condition or state of the material ... It need not be attained in the same way all the time ... that state is work-hardened; that is, the structure has been changed by applying forces to it to produce the work hardened state and in the work hardened state it exhibits the pseudoelastic characteristics which we said goes with shape-memory alloys in a certain temperature range. Tr. 972. Beshers was then asked to interpret the phrase “having been subjected to work-hardening.” Beshers stated that, as he testified with respect to the phrase “work-hardened pseudoelastic metallurgical state,” that “there’s an implication in state, perhaps there may be more than one way to arrive at that final state, but [the phrase ‘having been subjected to work-hardening’] now says clearly some work hardening is to be included in the process that leads to the final state.” Tr. 972. Beshers testified specifically that it was not necessary to work-harden material that is already in the pseudoelastic state to achieve the properties depicted in figure 2H of the patent, which as discussed above is described in the patent specification as “work-hardened pseudoelastic.” Tr. 1095:22-1096:10. (Defendants’ material science expert, Walter Johnson, did not testify about the proper interpretation of the disputed phrase.) Defendants assert that the prosecution history supports their position, and point to several statements made by the inventors to the PTO indicating that desired properties can be achieved by work hardening an alloy while the alloy is in its pseudoelastic state. See PX 3, plaintiff CVI/Beta’s Request for Reexamination, at 6 (stating that a “component work-hardened, in the pseudoelastic state provides a desirable degree of comfort of wearing ...,”) and at 10 (distinguishing the patented invention from prior art by stating that “the work-hardening occurs at a different temperature relative to its transformation temperature, i.e., it occurs on marten-sitic material as opposed to the inventive material which is work-hardened in its pseu-doelastic state ”) (emphasis in original); DX 16, Second Preliminary Amendment to ’955 Patent, at 2 (stating that work-hardened pseudoelastic metallurgical state, also referred to as optimized elastic, “is due to the work hardening of a pseudoelastic material”). Other portions of the prosecution history, however, support the claim construction advanced by plaintiffs. In their Second Preliminary Amendment, for example, the inventors asserted that they were attempting to make it clear that claim 1 describes a frame in the work hardened pseudoelastic state which has been “subjected generally” to work-hardening. DX 16 at 2. The use of the word “generally” suggests that the work-hardening need not be performed while the alloy is in its pseudoelastie state. In any event, the claim language is clear and unambiguous and supported by the specification of the ’955 patent and the expert testimony at trial. Moreover, the patent examiner did not require the inventors to amend claim 1 to require specifically that work-hardening take place at a point during fabrication at which an alloy is in its pseudoe-lastic metallurgical state. Accordingly, the prosecution history references on which defendants rely do not compel the construction of the claim language they advance. For these reasons, the Court declines to construe the phrase “work-hardened pseu-doelastic metallurgical state” to require, as defendants urge, that the work-hardening processing step occur while the component is in its pseudoelastic state. Rather, the Court construes the claim language in dispute to require only that the finished component possess a metallurgical structure showing residual work-hardening and, within the appropriate temperature range, exhibit pseudoelastic behavior. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Defendants assert that the evidence at trial was insufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the accused frame components were in the “work-hardened pseudoelastic metallurgical state,” as claim 1 of the ’955 patent requires. Defendants’ argument is premised upon a construction of the claim which, for the reasons discussed above, the Court has rejected. Accordingly, defendants’ motion in this regard must be denied. Defendants further contend that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that the work-hardening requirement of Claim 1 of the T12 patent was infringed. The ’112 patent claims a frame having a portion that has been “subjected to at least 30% work-hardening.” 112:12:17-18. Having failed to move for judgment as a matter of law on this ground during the trial, defendants are barred from raising this issue now. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Moreover, defendants’ contention should be rejected on its merits. As discussed above, whether an accused product is covered by the claims of a patent is properly resolved by a jury. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822 (Fed.Cir.1992) (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 338 (15 How. 330), 14 L.Ed. 717 (1854)). To overturn a jury verdict, a party must demonstrate that the jury’s factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 821. This “raises the question of whether the jury’s resolution of a factual dispute was reasonable.” Id. Plaintiffs’ proof that the work-hardening requirement of Claim 1 of the ’112 patent was infringed was presented by Dr. Beshers, who described the results of his testing and examination of the accused frame components. Defendants assert that this evidence was insufficient for two reasons. First, defendants contend that Beshers’ results were based on several assumptions, rendering his results entirely speculative. Second, with respect to Turaflex frame Models 841, 868, 869, 870, 871 and 877, defendants argue that Beshers’ tests revealed that these frames were subjected to less than the 30% work-hardening required by claim 1. At trial, Dr. Beshers described the method by which he measured the allegedly infringing Turaflex frame components to determine whether they satisfied the work-hardening requirement of Claim 1 of the ’112 patent. Beshers stated that he calculated the percentage of work-hardening to which a particular component had been subjected from its geometry, and that any assumptions he made were conservative ones. Tr. 1023-25. Beshers’ test results were summarized in a chart which was admitted into evidence as PX 32A. As defendants point out, although the six frames with allegedly infringing temples were each found to have been work-hardened in excess of 30%, the three models with allegedly infringing brows were calculated to have been work-hardened from 23% to 28%. As stated above, however, Beshers testified that his results were based on the most conservative assumptions possible, and opined that the Turaflex model frames at issue each infringed the 30% work-hardening requirement of Claim 1 of the ’112 patent. See PX 439. Defendants’ expert, Walter Johnson, did not render an opinion regarding the 30% work-hardening requirement. Accordingly, a reasonable juror could have concluded, from Beshers’ testimony and the conservative assumptions on which it was based, that it was more likely than not that the Turaflex frames met the work-hardening requirement of the ’112 patent. Defendants’ motion in this regard must therefore be denied. YI. Jury Findings Under the Doctrine of Equivalents The jury found that two accused frame components infringed certain claims of the suit patents pursuant to the doctrine of equivalents. Defendants assert that the evidence of equivalency presented at trial was insufficient, that plaintiffs failed to establish the validity of the claimed equivalents over prior art, and that the jury should not have been permitted to consider infringement under the doctrine of equivalents without a preliminary finding by the Court that equitable consideration