Full opinion text
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ELFVIN, District Judge. This is an action seeking equitable and non-monetary redress for a wrongful misappropriation of “trade secrets” allegedly belonging to plaintiff Zimmern and pertaining to the design and manufacture of single-screw compressors. Zimmern had licensed his accumulated knowledge of single-screw compressors to companies in various parts of the world. Plaintiff Monovis, Inc. (“Monovis”) is Zimmem’s exclusive licensee in the United States and it, in turn, has entered into sublicense agreements with companies in this country. Defendant Aquino was an employee of such a sublicensee company and, through his employment, was exposed to and worked with Zimmern’s claimed trade secrets and, allegedly, is subject to a continuing duty not to disclose them. Aquino and another — Ewan Choroszylow — formed defendant Aurora Technology Corporation (“ATC”) in 1987 and have endeavored to engage in the business of designing, manu-factoring and selling single-screw compressors and their parts. The Complaint for trade secret misappropriation and for breach of the duty of nondisclosure was answered by the defendants who asserted counterclaims sounding in unfair competition and antitrust and have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such motion was based in part on Aquino’s sworn affidavit that he had designed a single-screw compressor prior to the time that his then employer, the Worthington Group, a division of McGraw-Edison Company (“Wor-thington” or “McGraw-Edison”), had received any of Zimmern’s alleged proprietary trade secrets. After the serving and filing of said motion Dresser-Rand Company (“Dresser-Rand”), a successor in title and in interest to Worthington, moved to intervene, arguing that any invention or innovation devised by Aquino during his employment by Worthington and Dresser-Rand is the property of Dresser-Rand by virtue of assignments he had executed. Over the defendants’ opposition, Dresser-Rand was granted leave to intervene. This Court, after the case had been reassigned, issued an Order consolidating the hearing of a motion by the plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction with the trial on the merits of the prayer for a permanent injunction. The trial was lengthy and oft-interrupted and was followed by proposed findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law and supporting briefs and oral argument. The United States Navy (“the Navy”) became interested in obtaining single-screw compressor capabilities for its underwater craft and began discussing the possibility of Worthington’s providing such technology and product. According to John Brown, formerly a Vice-President of Engineering at Wor-thington, that company had begun discussing such machinery with the Navy in late 1980 or early 1981. Brown (9/11/91) 11. He testified that the Navy then was in the process of evaluating and comparing five or six different types of “positive displacement compressors” to determine which was best-suited for its future needs and that the decision was made at Worthington to have someone learn about “this technology” to facilitate further discussions with the Navy. Id. at 11-12. Brown stated that, “somewhere in that general time frame” (1980-1981), there were indications that the Navy would issue a request for proposals from companies interested in developing a single-screw compressor technology. He selected Aquino, then a Worthington employee, for such task and responsibility. Ibid. Aquino performed some preliminary work and evaluations of such machines. Among such endeavors, he undertook and accomplished a technical evaluation of Zim-mern’s single-screw compressor.” Aquino recommended that Worthington rely on Zim-mern’s single-screw expertise. Worthington was awarded a single-screw compressor contract by the Navy in November of 1983 and Aquino was named the manager for the project, known as “the Star Project.” Worthington eventually entered into a sublicense agreement with Monovis. Worthington and its employees (including Aquino) who were to be exposed to Zim-mern’s information agreed to hold it in confidence. Zimmern’s advice and knowledge were received by Worthington in due course and as work on the Star Project proceeded. Numerous meetings were held from 1983 through 1986 at which Zimmern and/or his representatives discussed all aspects of single-screw technology with Worthington’s employees; Aquino was often present at such meetings. Worthington’s Buffalo plant closed in 1987 and work on the Star Project was transferred to a facility of the new owner Dresser-Rand in Painted Post, N.Y. Choroszylow, a Worthington employee and Aquino’s associate-to-be in ATC, resigned from employment with Dresser-Rand August 24, 1987 (effective as of September 4th). Plaintiffs Exh. 302. Ten days earlier and while Aquino was still associated with Dresser-Rand, Aquino and Choroszylow however had travelled to Cooper Industries’s Gardner-Denver Industrial Machinery Division in Quincy, Ill. (“Cooper”) to discuss the possibility of their providing single-screw technology to Cooper. Following his resignation from Dresser-Rand, Choroszylow began setting up ATC which was formally incorporated that October. He commenced actively marketing the new company’s claimed expertise in single-screw compressor technology and capability. Such marketing efforts were directed toward Cooper and numerous other companies. Aquino was offered a job at Dresser-Rand in Painted Post when the Buffalo plant closed, but he rejected the offer. Aquino (3/27/91) 565-567. Instead, Aquino entered into a “Consultant Agreement” with Dresser-Rand in early June of 1987 for the purpose of inculcating its engineers with his own accumulated knowledge of the Star Project. See Plaintiffs’ Exhs. 28, 29. Aquino was considered “the expert” on single-screw compressors in the company. Aquino (3/25/91) 156-157. The Consultant Agreement contains an assignment-of-inventions clause, pursuant to which Aquino agreed to assign to Dresser-Rand any inventions he conceived which related to his duties thereunder. Aquino worked as a consultant for Dresser-Rand through October 1987. Aquino (3/29/91) 879. Within a month of the announcement of the Worthington plant’s closing, Brown had secured a position as Director of Engineering at Cooper. He testified that his background in single-screw compressors at Wor-thington was surely a factor in Cooper’s decision to hire him, inasmuch as Cooper had an interest in developing such a machine. Brown (9/11/91) 92-93. Around the time Brown left Worthington he advised fellow employees Ralph Coleman and George Saf-ford that Cooper was hiring and that, if they were interested, they should apply. Once at Cooper, Brown had the ability to hire people into his department, which fluctuated in number from fifty to eighty employees. Id. at 79. Coleman and Safford applied for positions with Cooper and offers of employment were extended to and accepted by them in short order. See Plaintiffs’ Exhs. 46, 47 (letters dated April 24, 1987 from Brown extending offers on Cooper’s behalf to Coleman and Safford, respectively); Plaintiffs’ Exhs. 48,49 (letters from Coleman and Safford, dated May 6 and May 1,1987, respectively, accepting the offers). Aquino commenced working at ATC November 2, 1987, following his work at Dresser-Rand under the Consultant Agreement. On November 4, 1987 Choroszylow wrote Coleman at Cooper, providing him with detailed cost estimates of the manufacturing tool ATC proposed to use to fabricate the rotor of a single-screw compressor. Aquino claims he had conceived of such manufacturing device and method on November 2 or 3, 1987. Aquino’s background comprises his having received his education in mechanical engineering at the Polytechnic Institute of the University of Naples in Italy and having started work for Worthington shortly after completing his studies in 1963. On July 6, 1965 Aquino signed an “Agreement for Assignment of Inventions” pursuant to which he agreed to assign to Worthington all his rights in and to any inventions conceived by him during the course of his employment. See Plaintiffs’ Exh. 8. The agreement also contained a clause addressing and limiting the post-termination use by him of any and all confidential information obtained by him during the course of his employment. Aquino successively held positions as an analytical engineer in the company’s Applied Mechanics Department, as a design engineer in its Development Department and as a Senior Analytical Engineer in its Research Department. Plaintiffs’ Exh. 89B. A key point of contention in this case is the quantitative and qualitative significance of the work done by Aquino on the Star Project prior to the issuance to Worthington of the Monovis sublieense and its receipt of Zim-mern’s “Know-How book.” It is the defendants’ position that Aquino had designed a single-screw compressor during the Summer and early Fall of 1983 and before receiving any information or other assistance from Zimmern, other than reverse-engineering a single-screw compressor which Worthington had for such purpose purchased from Mitsui-Seiki Company (“Mitsui”), a Zimmern licensee, early in 1983. Aquino claims to have accomplished this feat “[ujsing publicly available information, knowledge gleamed [sic] from examining the Mitsui single screw compressor, and consultations with Navy personnel.” Defendants’ Memorandum, p. 38. The evidence concerning Aquino’s efforts prior to Worthington’s — and his — receipt of the Zim-mem Know-How must be examined in detail. By June of 1981 Aquino had prepared a “preliminary examination.” Therein he recommended that “Zimmern compressors should be pursued for HP [high pressure] and LP [low pressure] Navy compressors * * Plaintiffs’ Exh. 9, at 1. Such preliminary evaluation was based upon information obtained in a meeting or meetings with individuals at the Navy’s “David Taylor Research Center”, upon a 1977 Navy report on various types of compressors including Zimmem’s single-screw compressor and upon the masters degree thesis of Navy engineer Thomas Bern which he had presented at Purdue University in 1979. Id. at 2, 4. The “preliminary technical evaluation” is aptly characterized. Despite its brevity, the document discusses not only the CP configuration eventually chosen for the Star Project, but also touches on the CC, PC and PP alignments. As a proposal for reducing leakage Aquino suggests, inter alia, reducing the running clearances and notes that “[t]his is the simplest method, but it requires manufacturing the parts with very close tolerances which, in turn, would increase the number of rejects.” Id. at 6. The conclusion that re-dueing the clearances between the moving parts of a compressor decreases leakage and thereby increases efficiency is an elementary and obvious one. See Zimmem (3/15/91) 192-193 (“every designer in the world would try to do that”). The preliminary evaluation depicts Worthington at the earliest stages of its single-screw compressor program. Aquino testified that, before writing his preliminary evaluation, he “visited” with Navy personnel and conversationally received some data which “was not 100% correct but qualitatively was correct”; he claims that such information enlightened him as to the “trends” of the Navy’s work. Aquino (4/5/91) 898. Aquino also testified that he reviewed Bern’s thesis. Aquino (4/15/91) 822. He pointed out at trial the conclusion in Bern’s thesis that the single-screw compression process can be modelled as an “isentropic” process. Aquino further testified that, before preparing his preliminary evaluation, he reviewed that portion of Bern’s thesis which describes the “supercharging effect” that occurs at a single-screw compressor’s intake — Aquino (4/15/91) 833 — and that he understood that Zimmern claimed that his own knowledge of these items was a trade secret. Id. at 830, 833-834. Following this favorable assessment of Zimmern’s compressor, Worthington’s management decided to pursue a Zimmem subli-cense. Loree Paulson, in 1983 the Manager of Marine and Government Operations, explained the decision: “We knew Zimmem had worked on this machine for many years. We knew that he had probably seen success and failure. We knew that he probably had the basis to help us in our designs. We knew that he had a manufacturing technology. “Mr. Smidansky [Paulson’s boss] asked the manufacturing people to look at this and see if they could develop a machine tool. The report that came back was that it would cost well over a million dollars with no chance of success. They didn’t know exactly how to machine this and if they could maintain the accuracy and the fits, and the interchange that was required. So, we felt that for the product technology and the manufacturing technology, Mr. Zimmem had years of experience and something concrete to show that would guarantee success, especially for the navy contract, where we would have to make contractual commitments to certain costs and certain timetables. “And Mr. Zimmern’s license would eliminate a lot of uncertainty and guarantee us success.” Paulson (8/23/91) 18-19. Paulson further testified that, at the time the decision to take a Zimmem sublicense was made, Worthington had no engineers with experience in designing or manufacturing single-screw compressors and reiterated that to attempt either task from scratch would be a lengthy and expensive process with no guarantee of success. Id. at 19-22. Derek Woollatt, in 1983 Worthington’s Manager of Research and Development, concurred with Paulson’s view, testifying that to develop single-screw technology would take “certainly several years, maybe four to five years” and cost “a few million dollars” and that developing a method to manufacture the screw might have been an additional project. Woollatt (8/29/91) 26. On March 17,1982 Worthington employees travelled to the Navy’s David Taylor Research Center for a “Pre-Proposal Conference” on single-screw compressors. See Defendants’ Exh. 115 (Worthington Trip Report). They were informed that the Navy wanted a “Zimmern approach” to the single-screw compressor and that bidders were encouraged to take a Zimmern license, but that such was not mandatory, provided that a bidder not possessing a Zimmern license could prove single-screw capability. Id. p. 4. By May 14, 1982 Worthington had prepared and submitted to the Naval Sea Systems Command a “PROPOSAL FOR A SINGLE-SCREW AIR COMPRESSOR DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.” Defendants’ Exh. 326. The proposal is replete with references to Zimmern and his technology. It begins: ‘Worthington has defined a program for the design and development of single-screw air compressors (SSAC) to meet the U.S. Navy’s low- and high-pressure air requirements. We will use the basic technology developed by Mr. B. Zimmern and the DTNSRDC to design and develop a low pressure (9.5 atm) SSAC unit and will build and test two prototypes before delivering a unit to the US Navy.” Defendants’ Exh. 326, p. 1-1. The proposal then discusses Worthington’s plan to procure a Zimmern license: “Having duly noted the potential advantages that the Zimmern single-screw compressor offer [sic] for shipboard use, Wor-thington has for more than a year been negotiating a non-exclusive license agreement with Mr. Zimmern. * * * The agreement is essential to Worthington’s participation in the future of the single-screw compressor technology, and with it we are confident that we can undertake and complete the program described herein to the US Navy’s full satisfaction. The license agreement itself, and a satellite agreement devised especially for this program, will provide all the technical assistance from Mr. Zimmern and his staff that can reasonably be expected of a licensor. For the low-pressure (LP) prototype, Mr. Zimmern will manufacture the mainrotor and the (planar) gaterotors and he will supply the design drawings and manufacturing techniques for these components * * Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The technical section of Worthington’s proposal to the Navy was prepared by Aquino. Aquino (4/16/91) 933-935. It clearly reveals Worthington’s intention to rely on Zimmern for technical information pertaining to the design and manufacture of the single-screw compressor. For example, it states that “[t]he basic technical data required to design and build a single-screw air end will be available to Worthington through its pending license agreement with Monovis, which is owned and controlled by Mr. Bernard Zim-mern.” Defendants’ Exh. 326, p. 2-6; see also id. p. 2-5. The parties disagree as to how much work was done on the Star Project between the submission of Worthington’s proposal to the Navy in May of 1982 and the award of the Navy contract in November of 1983. Brown testified that Worthington’s marketing people received early indications from the Navy that Worthington’s bid was the most “responsive,” leading them to believe Worthing-ton would be awarded the contract. Brown (9/11/91) 20. Brown stated that he met with Worthington management in mid-1983 and that they decided to get a team in place and “get a jump on the project.” Ibid. The plaintiffs acknowledge Worthington’s substantial interest in the Navy contract and the considerable time that went into preparing its proposal. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, p. 59. They argue, however, that there was little incentive for Worthington to proceed with the project in the time between preparation of its bid and the contract award because it would not be paid for such work should the award not materialize. Ibid.; Paulson (8/28/91) 257-258; Brown (8/12/91) 227-228. Starting in May or June of 1983, Aquino developed a computer program to assist him in the design and analysis of the single-screw compressor. Aquino (4/16/91) 1004. Zim-mern testified that Aquino’s program performs the types of calculations Zimmern was doing by hand in 1962, before he built his first compressors. Zimmern (3/12/91) 234. Furthermore, Zimmern testified in detail why he considers that computer models for studying leakage paths in single-screw compressors, such as described in Bein’s thesis, are less helpful than some designers believe. For example, Zimmern testified that to assess leakage accurately at any point in the compressor an engineer must know what is leaking — gas, liquid or a mixture of the two. Bein’s computer model, Zimmern said, does not take this into account. Zimmern (3/12/91) 253-254. Also, there is a difference between the clearances in a machine when it is sitting idle and the “running clearances” due to the various forces that come into being when the machine is in motion. Bein’s computer model does not take such differences into account. Zimmem’s approach to evaluating leakage is to “test, test, test.” Zimmern (3/12/91) 256-257. Zimmern conceded that computer programs are helpful and even indispensable in confronting some design problems, but contended that they do not solve all of a designer’s problems. Id. at 257; see also Paulson (8/23/91) 67 (responding in the negative when asked whether it was possible for Aquino to have designed the Star compressor from his computer program). The purchased Mitsui unit was disassembled and some measurements taken therefrom by Aquino and recorded on six pages of hand-drawn sketches. See Defendants’ Exh. 49. The measurements pertain to the bearing housing for the gaterotor shaft, the screw rotor, the gaterotor support and gaterotor, the drive-end view of the main housing and a cross section of the housing. Ibid.; Aquino (4/14/91) 993-1001. Aquino testified that during 1983 the Mitsui compressor was run for 1,000 hours but was subjected to monitored testing for only thirty-five hours. Aquino (3/28/91) 730-731; see also Defendants’ Exh. 57. Aquino’s measurements of the Mitsui machine did not provide Wor-thington with sufficient information to fabricate a single-screw compressor. Omitted from Aquino’s list were the location, size and shape of the discharge port, the existence of a gaterotor contact line, the gaterotor pin, the floating pin angle, the contact line on the screw groove, the width of the screw groove, the angle of cooperation, the changing angles on the sides of the screw groove, critical tolerances, the perpendicularity of the gaterotor and screw axes, the concentricity requirements of the gaterotor on its shaft and of the screw on its shaft, the existence of a plenum chamber, the types of materials and their finishes and the labyrinth seal on the screw. Paulson (8/28/91) 246-252. In sum, the measurements provide some dimensions but fall far short of a sufficiently detailed description of a single-screw compressor. Id. at 251-252. For instance, Aquino’s measurements did not include critical clearances between certain moving parts which clearance, according to Paulson, are “virtually impossible” to measure because certain regions of an assembled compressor cannot be accessed with a measuring device. Id. at 243-245. Furthermore, even if such clearances were discernible, it is impossible to determine the dimensional tolerances on any part by looking at a single machine, because a tolerance is a range of acceptable dimensions. Id. at 245. See also Wehber (8/30/91) 49. Finally, it should be noted that the Mitsui unit examined at Worthington was of a smaller size than the Star compressor, so that even the dimensions of the Mitsui parts that were accurately measurable might well not be readily transferable to the Star. Aquino also claims to have divined the existence of the contact line on the gaterotor by studying the Mitsui compressor. He testified that, when a gaterotor in the Mitsui unit broke in the Spring of 1983, he took it out of the machine and looked at it on a comparator and observed a contact line, “even though the contacted area was a little worn out.” Aquino (4/16/91) 1014-1015. Aquino also says he saw contact lines on gaterotors when he visited the Navy laboratory. Id. at 980. Finally, Aquino stated that he had observed a contact line on a drawing of a gaterotor tooth in a patent issued to Zimmern January 13, 1976. Aquino’s explanation of gaterotor shapes in the technical proposal to the Navy implies that he did not then know of the existence of contact fines — despite his claim at trial that he did- — or was for some unexplained reason not divulging his knowledge re such. His diagram of the “Present Gaterotor Design” depicts a gaterotor “ ‘Rounded’ From Wear Due To Vibration And Stopping (Observed On Test Compressor).” Defendants’ Exh. 326, p. 2-40. It also shows with dashed fines a “Corner In New Condition” without a contact line. Ibid. Whether or not Aquino knew of contact fines, his “Proposed Gaterotor Design” featured gaterotors with “curved side faces” — id. pp. 2-40 & 2-41. The approach suggested in Zimmern’s patent is not the trade secret approach Zimmern here claims has been misappropriated. There was much evidence and testimony concerning technical drawings of the Star compressor prepared by Aquino prior to his receipt of Zimmern’s Know-How. While it is clear that some such drafting was done in that time frame, it is equally clear that Aquino did not have a single-screw compressor designed with precision “on paper.” To appreciate this fact, an understanding of the steps in the drafting process is required. Preliminary or layout or conceptual drawings are the first step; generally speaking, they are used to orient the various parts of a machine in relation to one another and to begin to plot the machine’s overall architecture. Such drawings lack critical information such as tolerances and clearances which are supplied later in detailed design drawings. The latter are intended to convey enough information to permit the manufacture of parts and the assembly thereof into a working machine. See, e.g., Armbruster (9/13/91) 113-114. Zimmem’s Know-How book had been received at Worthington, about mid-December of 1983 and Aquino by then may have prepared some preliminary or layout drawings, but he clearly had not advanced to detailed design drawings. See Defendants’ Proposed Finding of Fact 137 (Aquino’s layout drawings “essentially complete” when Zimmern Know-How received; next step was to go to “detailed design and working drawings to make components”); id. 138 (layout design work “pretty well finished” before anything received from Zimmern). Furthermore, even the layout drawings prepared by Aquino described a machine with a 196 millimeter (“mm”) screw and 196 mm gaterotor and later a 178 mm screw with a 184 mm gaterotor. It is the defendants’ position that Aquino’s layout drawings could have easily been converted to detailed design drawings from which a single-screw compressor could have been manufactured and that such could have been accomplished without Zimmem’s help. See Defendants Proposed Finding of Fact 134. In support of this assertion, the defendants point to the deposition testimony of Coleman (Coleman did not testify personally at trial) that “clearances could be established by reverse engineering of a single-screw compressor.” Defendants’ Proposed Finding of Fact 135. Coleman also testified that, once Aquino had prepared the layout drawings, any further information required to convert them to detailed design drawings would “pop out” automatically. Coleman Tr. 57-58. Evidently, what Coleman was referring to was that tolerances are sometimes selected as a matter of “common sense engineering,” or by consulting tables in an engineering handbook or by reference to “industry standards.” For example, draftsman Raymond Armbruster testified that tolerances can be determined based on experience with previous jobs or studying similar drawings. Armbruster (9/13/91) 112-114. He further testified that clearances of two to three thousandths of an inch are common in the compressor industry. Id. at 127. The defendants thus note triumphantly that Zim-mern cannot claim a monopoly on the use of certain clearances. Such attempt to demystify the clearances and tolerances of the Star compressor in this manner fails, however, because no one at Worthington had had any prior experience working with single-screw compressors. Knowledge of the . clearances and tolerances used in other types of compressors does not readily translate to such for single-screw compressors, in part because a novel machine tool must be employed to fabricate the main rotor. In such compressors, Zimmern is the industry standard, for the simple fact that no one without his help has ever built one that worked. By way of example, Zimmern testified that the tolerance on the groove width “ * * * is something that I believe only us and our licensees know about because to be able to establish those tolerances, you have to be able to machine and as the machining is not that easy and there’s a lot of constraints that you will see, you try to do your best and, in fact, the knowledge of the tolerance you can achieve come [sic] from experiment from results, not from just your will. So, the practical tolerance you can put on a drawing comes from experience and not from wish, so they are not common engineering practice. You cannot find them in any book nor in any course.” Zimmern (3/12/91) 345. In sum, the evidence indicates that Aquino began studying single-screw compressors before Zimmern’s help was received, but fails to support the defendants’ contention that Aquino had successfully and completely designed, or had brought his technical knowledge to the point where he could design, a working single-screw compressor prior to the receipt of Zimmern’s Know-How. His preliminary evaluation, with its recommendation that a Zimmern license be pursued, the descriptions of the decision to seek Zimmern’s aid, and the proposal to the Navy all indicate a perception at Worthington that Zimmem’s assistance was critical to success. If Aquino had had as firm a handle on the situation as he claims, there would have been no need for Worthington to pay for a Zimmern license. Aquino may have completed on his own some preliminary design layouts and taken some general measurements from the Mitsui compressor, but he had produced neither de-tañed design drawings nor a machine tool, and he certainly had not buñt a working prototype. In short, Aquino had not provided Worthington with a single-screw compressor in 1983. The Star compressor was designed and developed into a working machine over the ensuing years, with Zimmern’s help. Zimmern had received his formal education in France, studying physics, mathematics, mechanics and business. He began to work on the development of a single-screw compressor around 1962. At that time he was employed by Cegos, a French management consulting firm, so he was limited to working on his single-screw compressor on Saturdays, Sundays, during vacation time and sometimes at night. In 1971 Zimmern reached the point of having to choose between continuing at Cegos or working full time on single-screw compressors; he chose the latter. Zimmern (3/11/91) 85. Zimmern set up his own company, Omphale, in Paris. He thereafter devoted aH of his time to the development of single-screw technology and has thus been working on single-screw compressors for roughly the last thirty years. Zimmern (3/11/91) 86. Zimmern does not claim to be the “inventor” of the single-screw compressor. He credits past scientists such as DaVinci and Archimedes with the initial concepts underlying the screw. What he does claim responsibility for is solving the hundreds of practical problems encountered in actuaHy budding a working single-screw compressor, as opposed to merely appreciating the possibflity in general or theoretical terms. Zimmern’s account of the years he has spent developing the single-screw compressor supports his view of his contribution. Beginning in 1961 and working with his father, Zimmern took approximately one year to design on paper a single-screw compressor that he thought should be successful. He approached various companies with his plans, “and the reply was always, oh, it’s interesting, it’s remarkable but something shouldn’t work.” Zimmern (3/11/91) 121. Zimmern concluded that he would have to make a working model. With a grant from the French government, he and his father buñt a single-screw compressor. It took them a year and a half to make the machine run for a sufficient period of time (a few hours) to aüow for a demonstration to Peugeot, a French automobfle manufacturer. Peugeot was sufficiently impressed with the machine that it obtained a license to use the technology. Zimmern and Peugeot then worked to improve the machine he had built. Zimmern (3/11/91) 119-122. The first machine Peugeot designed under its license with Zimmern was unsuccessful; it ran for less than thirty seconds before it seized. Peugeot and Zimmern worked through many variations of the machine over a period of three years before Peugeot achieved a marketable result. Zimmern (3/11/91) 122. In 1969, Zimmern issued a license to Chicago Pneumatic, a United States company. He continued to develop, improve and refine single-screw technology. Based on the improvements he was making, Zimmern was able to negotiate a license agreement in 1972 with Mitsui. According to Zimmern, Mitsui is presently a major manufacturer in the Japanese market. Zimmern (3/11/91) 122-124. Zimmern’s strategy is to work with his licensees to help them achieve their particular goals, while at the same time enriching his own knowledge. Zimmern claims to have spent a minimum of $500,000 per year, and presently about $1 mülion per year, on research and development and to have employed nine or ten individuals in that regard. Zimmern (3/11/91) 124-125. Such expenditures of money reflect Zimmern’s commitment to the testing of his ideas. He testified that “[n]inety-nine percent of the ideas don’t work and we have three rules in the company for young engineers, rule number one, you test, rule number two, you test, rule number three, you test.” Zimmem (3/11/91) 116-117. Testing is time-consuming but, according to Zimmern, absolutely necessary because most new developments fail. Zimmem (3/11/91) 126. In stark contrast to the defendants’ view, in Zimmem’s eyes the success or failure of a single-screw development is determined in the laboratory, not at the drawing board. Zimmern’s efforts to advance single-screw compressor technology, both independently and in cooperation with his licensees, is an ongoing process; the single-screw technology is continually evolving. Zimmem testified that between 1970 and 1991 he achieved a ten to fifteen percent increase in efficiency in the type of single-screw compressor at issue in this case and that such is a “tremendous” amount in the compressor industry. Zimmern (3/11/91) 126-127. As for the present state of his business, Zimmern testified that compames with sales in the billions of dollars, companies with large engineering departments and compressor engineers of their own, enter into license agreements to obtain his single-screw expertise. Such companies include Mitsui and “Daikin” in Japan and Snyder General, York International and Dresser-Rand in the United States. Zimmem is compensated by down payments and royalties. His annual royalty income is claimed to exceed one million dollars. He asserted that approximately 100,000 single-screw compressors manufactured under Zimmern’s licenses are presently operating worldwide and that no company has manufactured and sold single-screw compressors commercially without first obtaining a Zimmern license. Significantly, no evidence was presented disputing his statement that no one has ever built a commereially-successful single-screw compressor without his help. Zimmern (3/11/91) 136-137. Zimmem has taken protective measures aimed at insuring that the information he claims as trade secrets will indeed remain undisclosed. His license agreements require the licensees to keep their machine tools in closed rooms with access limited to authorized personnel. Zimmem’s Connecticut facility is kept secure and all visitors there are escorted. Viewers of Zimmem’s machine tool at that facility — whether they be licensees or potential licensees — must acknowledge in writing that what they see is confidential. Confidential information imparted to licensees at meetings must be acknowledged by the receiving party either at the end of the meeting or within sixty days. Zimmem’s Know-How book, which is an extensive compilation of his collected knowledge of the technology of single-screw compressors, is kept confidential. See Plaintiffs’ Exh. 205 (“THE SINGLE-SCREW COMPRESSOR/CALCULATION AND DESIGN/CONFIDENTIEL [sic]/Deeember 1983”). In addition, as set forth in detail hereinafter, Zimmem’s license agreements define the term “Know-How” and delineate the licensees’ obligations to protect such; also, employees of a licensee who are to be exposed to Zimmern’s Know-How sign confidentiality agreements recognizing the existence of their employer’s confidentiality obligations under the license agreement and acknowledging that such obligations extend to them as employees. Zimmern (3/11/91) 140-143. The sublicense agreement between Wor-thington and Monovis was finally executed August 30, 1983. See Plaintiffs’ Exh. 296. In sum, the license agreement stated that Monovis would provide Worthington with Zimmem’s single-screw compressor Know-How, to be kept confidential by Worthing-ton, in exchange for a down payment and royalties to Monovis. ARTICLE 6 of the sublieense agreement describes Worthing-ton’s obligations relative to the protection of the Know-How. One such obligation was that the managerial personnel of any of Wor-thington’s departments involved in single-screw compressor work certify that they had read key provisions of the agreement, including the provision setting forth Worthington’s duty to protect the Know-How, and that they undertake to inform their subordinates of such provisions. Plaintiffs’ Exh. 296, Subarticle 6.G(ii). Aquino, who had been assigned as a project engineer for the air-end of the Star compressor — Paulson (8/23/91) 73 — , signed such a certification (referred to hereinafter as a “Confidentiality Agreement”) September 15, 1983. Plaintiffs’ Exh. 238. Aquino’s Confidentiality Agreement is in the form of a two-page letter from Paulson to Aquino, who signed and dated it at the bottom of the last page. Relevant portions of the Confidentiality Agreement are reproduced and discussed hereinafter. Coleman signed a Confidentiality Agreement identical to Aquino’s December 6, 1983. Plaintiffs’ Exh. 19. Beginning in early December 1983, Zim-mem began providing his Know-How concerning CP single-screw compressors to Worthington and its employees, Aquino included. According to the defendants, Zim-mem’s Know-How book was received at Worthington on or about December 13, 1983. Defendants’ Proposed Finding of Fact 137. The Know-How book is an extensive technical discourse on the design and manufacture of single-screw compressors. Aquino claims that he already had completely designed a single-screw compressor. Thus, Brown testified that, when he briefly reviewed Zimmern’s Know-How book on the CP compressor, “[i]t was a big disappointment” because he “judged much of the material to be general engineering principles.” Brown (9/11/91) 27. Aquino testified that, when Woollatt informed him that the Know-How book had arrived, he told Woollatt he did not have much use for it because he had done what he was “supposed to do.” Aquino further testified that he had not even reviewed the book as of January 30, 1984. Aquino (4/17/91) 1285. The defendants’ position is impossible to square with the proof of events both prior— discussed hereinabove — and subsequent to the receipt of Zimmern’s assistance. Aquino and others at Worthington were steeped in Zimmern’s Know-How after 1983. Such indoctrination was not an exercise in futility; it enabled the company to duplicate successfully and in a short time what Zimmern had taken many years to develop. As early as December 7, 1983 Aquino and another Worthington employee visited Monovis’s “alter ego” corporation Single Screw Compressors, Inc. (“SSCI”) in Connecticut. Aquino brought with him a “list of topics we would like to discuss.” Defendants’ Exh. 51. Ten items were listed; item two was captioned “air end” and listed the following subtopics: “• SIZING CONSIDERATIONS “•DESIGN INVOLVEMENT, SCHEDULING & REVIEWS “• DESIGN INTERFACING WITH WATER LUBRICATED BEARINGS “•MATERIAL PREFERENCES “• MANUFACTURING INVOLVEMENTS ON: “•MAIN ROTOR “•GATEROTORS & SUPPORTS “•HOUSING” According to Aquino, when they arrived at SSCI, the only person there was Sweetser, Monovis’s President, who could not answer their questions because he was a “marketing man,” not a “technical man.” Aquino (4/17/91) 1248. The fact that Aquino still had questions, however, is more probative than whether he received immediate answers. On January 16, 1984 Aquino, accompanied by Coleman and Paulson, again travelled to SSCI. Paulson testified that they brought Worthington’s most recent and up-to-date preliminary layout drawings to the January 16th meeting — Paulson (8/23/91) 88-89— and that these drawings “may have had a few rough dimensions on them, but they did not have any tolerances or clearances” because “we didn’t know what some of the clearances and tolerances would be. They were rough layouts, they were conceptual drawings, more of the concept of how we would lay out the machine. We weren’t down to that detail yet.” Id. at 90; see Plaintiffs’ Exhs. 181, 213. Technical information was given to the Wor-thington visitors at the meeting. For example, Sweetser testified that, when he had first viewed the drawing identified at trial as Plaintiffs’ Exh. 213, he immediately noticed that Worthington was using an outmoded method for connecting the screw to the shaft. The method Worthington proposed was common to the Mitsui units, but had been abandoned by Zimmern in 1980 or 1981. Sweet-ser informed the Worthington visitors of Zimmern’s new method for attaching the screw to the shaft. Sweetser (4/24/91) 2463-2465. In addition, they were shown Zim-mern’s manufacturing equipment and received an explanation of Zimmern’s machine tool, although such was not then in actual operation. See Paulson (8/23/91) 76-77; Coleman 333, 434-435; Sweetser (4/25/91) 2543-2548. Aquino testified that he was not at the meeting. Aquino (3/27/91) 644. Sweetser and Paulson both stated that he was there, and the documentary evidence supports the conclusion that he was. See Plaintiffs’ Exh. 20 (Coleman’s notes with initials “G.A.” in list of names); see also Plaintiffs’ Exh. 147 (Worthington trip report listing Aquino as an attendee); Plaintiffs’ Exh. 149A (letter from Sweetser to Paulson verifying that a general explanation of the machine tool was given to Aquino and others). Such evidence weighs strongly in favor of a conclusion that Aquino attended the meeting. On January 25 and January 30, 1984 Wor-thington employees again met with the plaintiffs’ representatives at SSCI. Aquino prepared a “list of topics which some basic data in Norwalk is required about in order to define the details of the water flooded SSC air end.” Defendants’ Exh. 58, p. 4. The list included many items related to the assembly of the compressor and the dimensions, clearances and tolerances of its parts. Zimmern was present and dispensed technical advice at both meetings. For example, Zimmern explained his method of so locating the bearing housing with reference to the screw as to insure that the screw is absolutely concentric within its casing. See Plaintiffs’ Exh. 266A (letter confirming release of such information). Zimmern also examined a Worthing-ton single-screw compressor drawing marked at trial as Defendants’ Exh. 279 — Zimmern (3/12/91) 227 — and recommended that, instead of using a 184 mm gaterotor as in the drawing, a [Redacted] mm gaterotor and screw be used. In addition to noting that the gaterotor was oversized, Zimmern made four other pencilled notations on the drawing, including a suggestion to use plenum chambers. Id. at 161; see Plaintiffs’ Exh. 210; Defendants’ Exh. 279. Aquino admits seeing Zimmern’s CP machine tool during the January 30th meeting. Aquino (3/27/91) 646-647. It is noteworthy that Coleman wrote the instructions “read, understand k-how” at the top of his notes of such meeting. See Defendants’ Exh. 58. From March 14 through March 16, 1984, Coleman and Aquino were at Omphale in Paris for further meetings with Zimmern. The documents generated in connection with those meetings reflect Zimmern’s continued and substantive technical assistance to Wor-thington. See Plaintiffs’ Exh. 22 (Coleman’s meeting agenda); Plaintiffs’ Exh. 183a (Coleman’s meeting notes); Plaintiffs’ Exh. 258b (description of confidential information disclosed — signed on two sides by Aquino); Defendants’ Exh. 35 (Worthington trip report); Defendants’ Exh. 73 (March 29, 1984 letter from Zimmern to Coleman describing confidential information disclosed at March meetings). On the whole, the evidence of Zim-mern’s technical assistance with the Star Project and of Aquino’s exposure to Zim-mern’s Know-How is substantial. As set forth earlier, Aquino and Choroszy-low had travelled to Cooper in Quincy, Ill. for a meeting while Aquino still was working as a consultant to Dresser-Rand and before Choroszylow had submitted his letter of resignation. They met with the former Wor-thington employees Brown, Coleman and Safford. Aquino testified that he had had no idea prior to the August 14th meeting that single-screw compressors would even be discussed; he said that he had been under the impression that Cooper wanted him to do “just plain engineering work,” although he admits that he then had had no idea why a company like Cooper would need his services. Aquino (3/28/91) 792-793. In any event, any confusion as to the purpose of the meeting had been immediately resolved; the sole topic of conversation was single-screw compressor technology. Aquino (3/28/91) 793. Choroszylow testified that Aquino’s and his continued relationships with Dresser-Rand had been a major topic of discussion and concern at the meeting. Choroszylow (8/12/91) 8. Coleman’s notes of the meeting reflect such concern with the entry “E.C. aware his existing situation is negative to progress.” Plaintiffs’ Exh. 58. Despite the concerns over Aquino’s and Choroszylow’s past and ongoing obligations, the meeting went forward with some discussion of the possibility of Aquino and Choroszylow supplying Cooper with a screw manufacturing technique. Coleman’s notes of the meeting contain the entry “Can prep, timetable in next 2 wks on idea of screw fabrication with existing tool.” Plaintiffs’ Exh. 53. Cho-roszylow testified that he “may have said that” — Choroszylow (9/12/91) 14 — and that he left the meeting “very hopeful that we could have a relationship to start, but we weren’t going away feeling it was in the bag, so to speak.” Id. 15-16. As already noted, Aquino’s work as a consultant to Dresser-Rand lasted through October 1987. His first day of work at ATC was Monday, November 2, 1987. Aquino (3/29/91) 878. Aquino testified that on that same day or the next day he conceived of the idea for the machine tool he would sell Cooper. Aquino (3/29/91) 911-912. The idea allegedly occurred to him as he was examining a catalog of worm gears. Ibid. Aquino testified that the idea started as an embryo and that he might have worked a few more days to see if it was feasible and could be implemented, but that “once you have an idea, it doesn’t take too much to firm it down.” Ibid. On November 4, 1987 Cho-roszylow sent Coleman a detailed eost-esti-mate for a screw-manufacturing process and a single-screw compressor design. Plaintiffs’ Exh. 55. Although Choroszylow testified that selling single-screw technology was “absolutely not” anywhere on the list of expected activities of the new business, statements of ATC’s income for the years 1987, 1988 and 1989 reflect that 100%, 85-90% and roughly 70%, respectively, of the company’s income in those years was derived from single-screw compressor activities. Choroszylow (9/12/91) 19. Just as the evidence belies the defendants’ claim that Aquino designed a single-screw compressor at Worthington prior to the receipt of any of Zimmern’s Know-How, their claim that their machining process had suddenly occurred to Aquino just after he had severed his ties with Dresser-Rand is contradicted by evidence of events prior to November 1987. First, there is the reference to an “existing tool” in Coleman’s notes of the August 14th meeting. Plaintiffs’ Exh. 53. Second, Choroszylow and Aquino entered into an agreement with Peter Dooley August 27th pursuant to which they were to communicate to Dooley certain technology they had developed and intended to use in a consulting business, for the purpose of determining whether Dooley could implement such technology. See Plaintiffs’ Exh. 51. Under the agreement, Dooley acknowledged that any information revealed to him by Choroszylow and Aquino was to be kept confidential. Ibid. Aquino at trial recalled asking Dooley to keep “our machining process” confidential. Aquino (3/25/91) 179. Choroszylow attempted to explain the agreement with Dooley as pertaining to ATC’s plans to work with “regenerative thermal engines,” but conceded that “one of the elements” intended to be covered by the agreement was a machine tool for fabricating single-screw compressors. Choroszylow (9/12/91) 36. On September 5th Choroszylow wrote to Coleman at Cooper, stating: “As per our last conversation, it was my intent to forward our development proposal following my separation from Dresser-Rand. Since this occurred on September 4th you will shortly receive this document. The proposal will identify milestones for establishing our manufacturing approach and will spell out contract deliverables as understood at this point. Preparatory work will begin on this project in anticipation of both of our needs.” Plaintiffs’ Exh. 34. On September 14th Choroszylow again wrote Coleman that “Giovanni and I have mapped out an approach that we believe offers a quick response to the commercial ‘window’ you foresee with an advanced, heretofore untried, mainrotor machining technique.” Plaintiffs’ Exh. 54. Choroszylow went on to provide a general outline and cost estimates for providing Cooper with a single-screw manufacturing process and a single-screw design. Ibid. Choroszylow spoke with Coleman by telephone September 28th. Coleman’s notes indicate that the defendants’ process was “not as Z and not recognized by myself,” the “Z” obviously denoting Zim-mem. On September 30th Coleman wrote Choroszylow, following up on the latter’s September 14th letter and their September 28th telephone conversation. On the subject of manufacturing, Coleman synopsized that “fy]ou are very confident that your process will work by adapting an existing machine tool and that the resultant rotors will perform equal to or better than the existing state-of-the-art” and that “you have fairly well-established contacts with a manufacturer willing and capable of making the necessary tooling and modifications under ATC direction.” Plaintiffs’ Exh. 56. Coleman also sought assurances that “your process will be satisfactory, meaning equal to or improved over the Zimmern approach.” Ibid. Choroszylow wrote to Coleman September 30th providing a machine tool cost projection of “$80k for a production quality machine tool.” Plaintiffs’ Exh. 59. Choroszylow reported that “[t]he machine tool envisioned will be based on a common production tool, modified to perform specialized rotor machining.” Ibid. A meeting took place between ATC and Cooper representatives October 27th. Aquino testified that he was not present; Choroszylow testified that Aquino was there. See Aquino (3/29/91) 900; Cho-roszylow (9/16/91) 157. It is readily apparent from Coleman’s notes of the meeting that the manufacturing process ATC proposed to sell Cooper was discussed. See Plaintiffs’ Exh. 61. The first entry in the notes under the heading “Manufacturing — Rotor & Gates” is “Uniqueness (vs. Zimmern) if any.” The day after this meeting, Brown authored a memorandum indicating that Coleman and he had reviewed ATC’s proposed machine tool. See Plaintiffs’ Exh. 62. Brown indicated that “[t]he approach seems feasible and is sufficiently different than has previously been tried by others that we believe a proprietary position can be achieved by Cooper Industries.” Ibid. It would, of course, be impossible for Brown to make such an assessment if Aquino, as the defendants claim, had not yet even had his initial “worm gear catalog” inspiration for the machine tool. Dresser-Rand employees recalled Aquino’s discussing his ideas for manufacturing while he was working at Dresser-Rand. Wehber testified that Aquino described Zimmem’s manufacturing method, the five-axis milling method, and an idea to “get around” Zim-mem’s method by adapting a conventional lathe. Wehber (8/30/91) 13-14, 39-44. Paul-son testified that in 1985 Aquino had told him about an idea for manufacturing screws “that would have fingers that would shift back and forth. He used his hands, in like a star shape. So, that would shift back and forth and it could be done using an old lathe.” Paulson (8/23/91) 102. See also Dupler (8/29/91) 9 (recalling between ten and fifteen conversations with Aquino regarding Aquino’s idea for manufacturing a screw). The evidence discussed hereinabove weighs heavily against the defendants’ claim that Aquino conceived a manufacturing process via a flash of genius immediately upon severing his ties to Dresser-Rand and arriving at ATC. Aquino had the idea for a machine tool, and Choroszylow had been actively going about selling it to Cooper, before Aquino left Dresser-Rand. This Court concludes from the evidence that the defendants’ “flash of genius” account is a ruse designed to avoid Aquino’s obligations to plaintiffs. This Court now tons its attention to the legal standards governing “trade secret” misappropriation. Because subject matter jurisdiction in this case rests on diversity of citizenship, the substantive law of the State of New York must be applied. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). In trade secret eases, New York courts apply the widely-accepted standards of section 757 of the Restatement of Torts (1939) (“The Restatement”). See, e.g., Integrated Cash Mgmt. Serv. v. Digital Transactions, 920 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir.1990); Rodgard Corp. v. Miner Enterprises, Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1353, 1359-1360, 1989 WL 41727 (W.D.N.Y.1989). A party claiming trade secret misappropriation must first show that he in fact possessed a trade secret and, second, that such secret was improperly taken from him. The Restatement, § 757; see Integrated Cash Mgmt. Serv. v. Digital Transactions, 920 F.2d at 173. Whether the plaintiffs possess protectable trade secrets must be addressed first; if they did, whether any such were misappropriated will be discussed, although, as will be seen, such inquiries overlap somewhat. The Restatement’s definition of a trade secret provides, in pertinent part: “A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.” The Restatement, § 757, comment b. (Emphasis added.) In determining whether one possesses a trade secret, New York courts have relied on the six factors set forth in The Restatement: “(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; [and] (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.” Ibid.; (quoted in Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Pico, Inc., 89 A.D.2d 803, 803-804, 453 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (4th Dept.1982)). Secrecy has been identified as the most important consideration among the above factors — Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 783 F.2d 285, 298 (2d Cir.1986) — although, as this Court has itself opined, the fact that a particular trade secret may have been available “in the public domain” does not provide an absolutely safe harbor for one who instead obtains it improperly or from an improper source. See Rodgard Corp. v. Miner Enterprises, Inc., supra. The Restatement confirms the view that “a substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the information.” That the secrecy need not be not absolute reflects the theory underlying liability for trade secret misappropriation — to wit, that individuals exposed to trade secrets in confidence ought to be prevented from improperly using or disclosing them. This Court must first decide whether the plaintiffs have proven the existence of trade secrets deserving of protection. Zimmern claims as such a great body of information pertaining to both the design and manufacture of single-screw compressors. At the most general level, the information the plaintiffs seek to protect falls within the categories of information which may qualify for trade-secret status described in The Restatement: they pertain to a “compilation of information,” “a pattern for a machine” and “a process of manufacturing.” With respect to the six factors The Restatement indicates should be considered in determining if trade secrets are present, the first and sixth are hotly contested and will be discussed at length hereinafter. The second factor is the extent to which the claimed trade secret is known by employees and others involved in the plaintiff’s business. Not much evidence was received on this point, although the information was obviously known to Zimmern and also to Sweetser and to at least a couple of others. In any event, this Court does not understand the defendants to claim that any trade secret information came into their hands or entered the public domain .due to the “loose lips” of any Zimmern employee. This factor must, in this instance, be equated to what was known by those to whom the plaintiffs had granted lieenses and by those individuals employed by such licensees. As for the third factor listed in The Restatement, this Court finds that Zimmern has taken substantial steps to maintain the secrecy of his single-screw compressor Know-How. See supra, p. 1217. However, his and his company’s vast proliferation of the Know-How, albeit under the protective umbrellas of confidentiality-imposing licenses, weighs against their proprietorship. Regarding the fourth factor, the evidence demonstrated the value of the claimed trade secrets to Zimmern (who derived substantial fees from license agreements), to Worthing-ton (which felt that a license from Zimmern was the key to developing, within a tolerable temporal and monetary frame, a working single-screw compressor), to the Navy (which encouraged bidders to take a Zimmern license or else otherwise prove their capabilities), to Cooper (which tried to buy a single-screw compressor from Aquino after he had been exposed to Zimmern’s Know-How) and to other Zimmern licensees. Regarding the fifth factor, the evidence further showed that more than twenty years of Zimmern’s personal efforts, along with large sums of money, had gone into developing the single-screw technology. See supra, pp. 1216-1217. This Court now examines the evidence as to the first and sixth factors listed in The Restatement — viz., the extent to which the claimed trade secrets are known by parties other than the plaintiffs and the ease or difficulty with which such information could have been acquired or duplicated by others. The defendants assert that the claimed trade secrets are “widely known” outside of Zim-mern’s business. The defendants repeatedly emphasize that there can be no trade secret protection for information in the public domain. They then set out to prove that each of Zimmem’s individual claimed trade secrets was publicly known. Their argument encounters two obstacles: first, their proof of what is in the public domain is grossly less conclusive than they claim and, second, they have failed to rebut adequately the plaintiffs’ position that their most important and overriding trade secret is the combination of a great many elements of Know-How into a working compressor and a commercially-viable manufacturing process. Anent what was in the public domain, the defendants’ first assertion is that “essentially all” of the items the plaintiffs claim as trade secrets were publicly disclosed by the Navy in research dating back to the mid-1970’s. Such is simply not the case. It is true that the Navy was very interested in obtaining single-screw compressors and that its engineers at the David Taylor Research Center made some attempts to develop such “in-house.” For example, Navy engineer Wayne Boblitt testified at his deposition that the Navy experimented with a gear-hobbing technique for manufacturing a main rotor. Boblitt Tr. 110. The defendants variously assert that the Navy’s technique is “substantially similar” and “identical” to Zimmern’s process. See Defendants’ Memorandum, pp. 12-13, 15. The defendants further assert that Navy personnel “