Full opinion text
ORDER GERTNER, District Judge. Defendants have requested that this court dismiss the entirety of plaintiffs case against them. Their request comes before me in three motions for summary judgment: Motion of Defendant Kenneth D. Stuart, filed September 30, 1994; Motion of Defendants David A. Spina, Thomas W. Johnson, Ira B. Gerger-man and Susan G. Rice, filed September 29, 1994; and, Motion of Defendant State Street Bank and Trust Company, filed September 29, 1994. For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Amended Memorandum and Decision, dated November 29, 1995, I conclude that defendants’ motions for summary judgment shall be ALLOWED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. As to each claim, I rule as follows: 1. With respect to plaintiffs claims of sexual harassment against all defendants, under M.G.L. e. 151B (Count I); M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C (Count II), M.G.L. c. 93, § 102 (Count IV) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Count III), defendants’ motions for summary judgment are ALLOWED. Accordingly, Count I is DISMISSED IN PART, Count II is DISMISSED, Count III is DISMISSED IN PART, and Count IV is DISMISSED. 2. With respect to plaintiffs retaliation claims, under M.G.L. e. 151B (Count I) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Count III), I DENY summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 3. As to Count V, charging negligent infliction of emotional distress as against defendants State Street Bank, Spina, Stuart, Johnson and Rice, defendants’ motions for summary judgment are ALLOWED, and Count V is accordingly DISMISSED. 4. As to Count VI (interference with contractual and/or advantageous relations), I DENY summary judgment as to claims against defendants Spina, Stuart, Johnson and Gregerman. However, defendant Rice’s motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED, and Count VI against defendant Rice is accordingly DISMISSED. 5. With respect to Count VII for negligent supervision and retention against defendants State Street Bank, Spina and Johnson, defendants’ motions for summary judgment are ALLOWED, and Count VII is accordingly DISMISSED. 6. Count VIII for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress against defendant Stuart, I DENY summary judgment. 7. As Count IX for wrongful termination against State Street Bank, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED, and Count IX is accordingly DISMISSED. 8. As to Count X for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against State Street Bank, I ALLOW defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, Count X is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND DECISION GERTNER, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION The plaintiff, Barbara Ruffino, worked as a corporate manager at State Street Bank and Trust. She alleges that, over a period of years, she was subjected to a sexually harassing and hostile work environment. She also charges that when she told supervisors about the discriminatory conditions, she confronted an indifference which turned to retaliation against her as she pressed her complaints. This case raises some of the close questions of discrimination law: questions of fairness with respect to the filing requirements for plaintiffs who have sought redress within their workplace; questions of the relationship between statutes prohibiting employment discrimination and common law causes of action; and questions of the different language and forms of harassment and retaliation in different work settings. In her complaint, Ruffino alleges that her employer, defendant State Street Bank and Trust Company (“State Street” or the “Bank”), and certain Bank employees, defendants David Spina, Kenneth D. Stuart, Thomas W. Johnson, Ira B. Gregerman, and Susan G. Rice, violated the Massachusetts Anti-Discrimination Law, M.G.L. c. 151B (Count I) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count III) by creating a sexually harassing and hostile work environment and then by retaliating against her. Ruffino also alleges a host of state law violations: violation of Massachusetts General Law Chapter 214, § 1C (Count II); violation of Chapter 93, § 102 (Count IV); negligent infliction of emotional distress against defendants State Street Bank, Spina, Stuart, Johnson and Rice (Count V); interference with contractual and/or advantageous relations against defendants Spina, Stuart, Johnson, Gregerman, and Rice (Count VI); negligent supervision and retention against defendants State Street Bank, Spina and Johnson (Count VII); intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress against defendant Stuart (Count VIII); wrongful termination against defendant State Street Bank (Count IX); and, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against defendant State Street Bank (Count X). On June 24,1992, plaintiff filed an administrative charge with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC). On January 19, 1993, she filed suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court. Defendants removed to federal court. Defendants move for summary judgment. They challenge the adequacy of Ruffino’s sexual harassment claims principally on statute of limitations grounds, arguing that the claims are time-barred. They also reject the contention that Ruffino was sexually harassed at State Street, or that her allegations were improperly handled. As to the retaliation claims, defendants flatly deny that State Street Bank or its agents retaliated against Ruffino. Finally, they contend that the panoply of state law claims brought by plaintiff are either statutorily barred or meritless. For reasons set forth below, defendants’ motions for summary judgment shall be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, with respect to Ruffino’s state and federal claims of sexual harassment, I GRANT summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that her claims are barred by the relevant limitations period; I further GRANT summary judgment to the defendants on plaintiffs state claims brought under M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C and M.G.L. c. 93, § 102. As to plaintiffs retaliation claims, however, I DENY summary judgment for the defendants, on the ground that plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer the existence of unlawful retaliation. As to plaintiffs common law claims, I find as follows: Count V for negligent infliction of emotional distress is barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act and shall be dismissed; Count VI for interference with contractual relations shall not be dismissed as to defendants Spina, Stuart, Johnson, and Greger-man, and shall be dismissed as to defendant Rice; Count VII for negligent supervision is barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act and shall be dismissed; Count VIII for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress as to defendant Stuart shall not be dismissed; Count IX for wrongful termination shall be dismissed; Count X for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing shall be dismissed, as the cause of action is not cognizable on these facts. II. PROCEDURAL STANDARD Discrimination cases are often bound up in the sort of factual inquiries best left to a jury. Through circumstantial evidence, parties seek to prove motive and intent, issues least suited for a determination on a motion for summary judgment. E.g., LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 840 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994); Goldman v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993); Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809, 575 N.E.2d 1107 (1991). Summary judgment is appropriate only when all the relevant pleadings and supporting documents, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, present no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir.1995); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 259 (1st Cir.1994); Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 711-716, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991); Smith College v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 221, 227, 380 N.E.2d 121 (1978). Where the moving party makes an initial showing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party may not merely rely on bald allegations to avoid summary judgment. Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1030 (1st Cir.1995); Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 719, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (1985). The non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Barbour, 63 F.3d at 36. III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In or about February of 1984, Barbara Ruffino was hired as a training officer by defendant State Street Bank and Trust Company. Less than two years after her initial hire, Ruffino became the Division Personnel Officer (“DPO”) for Corporate Staff. Ruffino reported to David Spina, Executive Vice President of State Street Bank, who had oversight responsibility for the Corporate Staff and also for a separate Operations Division. In addition to her other duties, Ruffino was responsible for conducting special projects as requested by Spina. From August of 1989 onward, Ruffino also reported to Thomas Johnson, Senior Vice President who took on duties as Chief Administrative Aide to Spina. Ruffino also occasionally reported to Kenneth Stuart, Senior Vice President for the Bank’s Human Resources Division. In December of 1987, an incident took place which, according to Ruffino, affected her experience of her workplace and her sense that, because she was a woman, less authority and respect was afforded her by those to whom she reported. Richard Cabot, a Vice President for Benefits Administration in the Human Resources Division, recommended that the job title of an employee within his division be upgraded. Without consulting and seeking the approval of DPO Ruffino, as the procedure required, Cabot discussed the promotion directly with Stuart. Then, bypassing Ruffino, Stuart recommended the action to Spina. When Ruffino discovered that Stuart had intentionally circumvented her, she researched the proper chain of command and reported the incident to Spina. According to Ruffino, when Stuart learned of her report, he had two reactions: the first was to question her authority, and the second was to let her know that he would not quickly forget this incident. According to Ruffino, after this event, Stuart began to assert his power in a different way: He sexually harassed her. Much of his harassment occurred in private, during Ruffino’s meetings alone with Stuart and in conversations out of the earshot of others. Stuart’s comments were often laced with inappropriate and offensive sexual innuendo. For instance, upon finding out that Ruffino’s husband had been ordained as a priest, Stuart repeatedly made unwelcome and lewd comments about Ruffino’s sexual life, including asking her whether her husband now “did it with his collar on.” See Ruffino Dep., Vol. I, 159-172. Stuart made such remarks during his private meetings with Ruffino, when he ran into her in the hallways of the Bank, and sometimes in the presence of others. Not all his statements, however, were directed at Ruffino personally. He also made inappropriate remarks to Ruffino about other women. Fot instance, during the Summer of 1989, an employee returning, from maternity leave had asked Ruffino if she could have use of a spare room among the personnel offices; she needed a private place in which to use her breast pump, so that she could continue breast-feeding her newborn. Ruffino approached Stuart with the employee’s request. He agreed that she could use the room. Then he added: “She doesn’t need the pump; I’ll take care of her.” Id. Ruffino was offended and stated so. Within days of that 1989 incident, Ruffino met with Susan G. Rice, Manager of Employee Relations.' Rice was the State Street employee designated to handle reports of harassment and discrimination. Ruffino spoke of this and other incidents; she asked for help. Ruffino was particularly concerned about figuring out how to respond, given Stuart’s position as Head of Personnel. Rice seemed sympathetic. She acknowledged that she too had heard Stuart make inappropriate and derogatory comments; she recognized that they might well constitute sexual harassment. However she said that, because she reported to Stuart, she did not want to “get in the middle of it,” or words to that effect. See Ruffino Dep., Yol. I, 88. No investigation ensued. After her meeting with Rice, Ruffino sought out Marge Dupere, a manager in the Employment Department. Dupere reported to Patrick Cunniff, the Manager of Employment. During her meeting with Dupere, Ruffino told her of the same incidents as well as of her meeting with Rice. According to Ruffino, Dupere told her to tolerate it; she said that there was nothing that could be done. Plaintiff alleges that the discrimination continued. At least some of the conduct took place in meetings she was required to attend, namely, regular staff meetings held by Spina during the period from August of 1989 through March of 1991. On one occasion, before the group began its morning meeting, some of the attendees discussed the possible candidacy of a particular woman for governor. Stuart remarked that when she got PMS (Premenstrual Syndrome), she would not be able to handle the job. On another occasion, in the Summer of Í990, Stuart stopped by Ruffino’s office to discuss the hiring of a director for community affairs. Ruffino asked about women candidates. In talking about the only -female external candidate, Stuart stated that he had reservations about her candidacy, because she had been married three times, stating something to the effect of: “Any woman that couldn’t keep three men happy certainly wasn’t somebody they were going to look for.” See Ruffino Dep., Vol. Ill, 61-62. Ruf-fino was disturbed and reported the comment to another Bank employee, Robert Malley. . She asked Malley to address Stuart’s behavior. When, early in 1991, Ruffino followed up with Malley, she discovered that nothing had been done. This was not the only comment Stuart made indicating that he keyed his assessment of women’s job performance to his perception of their success in their private lives. For instance, sometime between 1988 and 1990, when Ruffino served as DPO, Ruffino attended a meeting with Stuart and another Bank manager. The three were discussing whether a particular State Street employee, a woman, would cooperate on a project. Stuart commented that the employee “didn’t have a man now and you know what that does to her personality,” or words to that effect. See Ruffino Dep, Vol. Ill, 21-23. In or about October of 1990, Ruffino sat through a staff meeting during which Stuart made what she counted to be five or six disparaging remarks about women. Having complained once to Rice to no effect, in or about November of 1990, Ruffino turned to Johnson, because of his role as her supervisor and a Department Head and also because he was Stuart’s good friend. She explained to Johnson that Stuart’s ongoing remarks were offensive to her and others, particularly because of his central role, as Division Head of Human Resources, in enforcing anti-discrimination policies. According to Ruffino, Johnson said that he himself had heard inappropriate comments and wondered about them. He promised to take the issue up with Stuart. No immediate action was taken. In or about January of 1991, Ruffino was discussing a professional matter with Johnson in which she mentioned that she thought it was important that Johnson had a doctorate in the relevant field. As Ruffino recounts the incident, at that point, Stuart appeared and said that “this was just like” Johnson. Stuart explained, “Every time he gets around girls, he wants to play doctor. And we always have trouble with him on our golf trips.” See Ruffino Dep., Vol. Ill, 36. Finally, it appears, Johnson did talk with Stuart — during a golf game. As Stuart recalled, the criticism was not seriously delivered. Indeed, Stuart noted that Johnson’s tone and words were so casual that he thought Johnson was joking. See Johnson Dep., Vol. II, 142-144, Exh. 43. Notwithstanding, at deposition, Ruffino could not recall Stuart making any inappropriate corn-mente after Johnson spoke to Stuart or, in any ease, after March of 1991. In early 1991, while Stuart’s conduct was ongoing, discussions about reorganizing her department surfaced. There was talk of the elimination of Ruffino’s position. Johnson suggested to Ruffino that she transfer to the Systems Productivity and Analysis Department in Johnson’s Information Systems Division (“ISD”) and become the Productivity Analyst within that department. Johnson characterized the new .position as a lateral move with excellent promotion opportunities. Ruffino’s title at that time was that of Assistant Vice President. Based upon his explanation, Ruffino enthusiastically accepted the position. However, Ruffino was not made aware of certain facte about the new job. For instance, after her transfer, Ruffino was asked to work in a cubicle instead of a separate office. She was also informed, some time after the transfer, that she would be reporting to Ira Gregerman, Vice President and Manager of the Systems Productivity and Analysis Department, instead.of reporting directly to Johnson. Ruffino also alleges that after a few months in her new position, she was removed from Johnson’s division management team. Ruffino took this action to be part of a gradual demotion, effectively reducing her status and authority. Notwithstanding her concerns, Ruffino met with Gregerman to set forth performance and professional development goals for the remainder of the 1991 calendar year, including monitoring the ongoing training and development program for ISD managers, known as the ISD Management Development Program (“MDP”). As part of their discussions, Ruffino prepared a proposed training program. According to Ruffino, Gregerman never responded to it. In her new position, Ruffino continued to have occasional professional dealings with Stuart, during which, she alleges, he continued to harass her, until October of 1991. However, at deposition, Ruffino recalled only two incidents during which she had contact with Stuart after her transfer in March of 1991. The first occurred sometime during the summer and'involved internal mailing addresses for a special project. She alleged no harassing conduct during that meeting. The second did not take place until the meetings set up to address her grievances, in October of 1991. Indeed, on October 10, 1991, Ruffino approached Johnson to discuss the harassment “she had previously experienced.” See Complaint, ¶ 30. Ruffino explained to Johnson that the Congressional hearings held with respect to the allegations of sexual harassment by Professor Anita Hill against then Judge Clarence Thomas had motivated her to step forward again. During their conversation, Johnson said that he was aware of, and had heard, Stuart’s frequent derogatory remarks and jokes about women. From Ruf-'fino’s observations, Johnson seemed to agree with her assessment of Stuart and with her impression that he harbored negative attitudes towards women. Johnson asked Ruffino if Stuart’s conduct had interfered with her work. She reported that it had. As an example, she noted that her ability to raise questions, in the course of her role as DPO, had been stifled by his actions. In addition to raising concerns about Stuart, Ruffino told Johnson that she believed that • discrimination and sexual harassment pervaded the Bank’s culture. She also made suggestions as to possible remedial measures the Bank could pursue, ineluding confronting Stuart in a formal setting and instructing him to cease his harassment. A few days after their discussion, Johnson requested that Ruffino prepare a memorandum. He asked her to do so minutes before a meeting scheduled with Stuart and to limit her comments to a couple of incidents directly involving Stuart. She did. In a memorandum entitled “Notes for Tom Johnson Discussion with Ken Stuart on My Behalf,” Ruffino stated, among other things, that she was complaining about Stuart’s “derogatory comments about women and his sexual innuendos.” She then listed two examples. The first related to the above-described incident in December of 1987 when Stuart circumvented her in the promotion process. In her brief narrative regarding that incident, Ruffi-no noted Stuart’s discomfort with her role and independent authority. . She did not allege that Stuart made any sexually-charged and offensive comments during their exchanges. The second example centered on the above-described request Ruffino had made on behalf of an employee who had just returned from maternity leave. In her notes for Johnson, Ruffino specifically referred to Stuart’s offer to “take care” of the employee so that she would not need to use a breast pump. Late in October of 1991, Johnson and Spi-na asked Ruffino to meet with Stuart and Rice separately. She expressed concern but was told that it was “this or nothing.” If she met with both of these managers, Johnson and Spina promised that they would initiate a broader investigation, not only into the incidents about which Ruffino complained, but also into the existing procedures for handling complaints and possible programs for identifying sexual harassment and sex . discrimination at the Bank. . Based on their assurances, Ruffino agreed to meet with Stuart and Rice. Initially, Ruffino conditioned her agreement to participate in the meetings on the presence of a neutral third party to mediate. Ruffino and Johnson came up with two names; Spina rejected both. Spina said he wanted to keep the discussions “inside” State Street. Johnson suggested that he could act as Ruffino’s advocate. Reluctantly, Ruffino accepted this scenario. At that time, Ruffino did not know that Stuart,-Johnson and Spina together had discussed and structured the meetings. See Johnson Dep., Vol. II, Exh. 43, at Bates No. 0241. Nor did she know that it was Johnson’s design to limit the scope of Ruffino’s grievance and to dissuade Ruffino from pursuing her complaint of systemic hostile environment discrimination. Indeed, when Ruffi-no agreed to a grievance process only involving meetings with Rice and Stuart, Johnson apparently reported this result to Stuart, commenting that he had been able to get Ruffino “off that kick.” Id Furthermore, Ruffino did not know that prior to any investigation, all three men agreed that the problem was Ruffino herself. For instance, during a phone conference in which Stuart, Spi-na and Johnson participated, Stuart said that he thought the trouble was Ruffino; Spina concurred, calling Ruffino “zany, crazy, off her rocker,” or words to that effect. Id Surely, Ruffino was unaware when she agreed to the format and prepared for the meetings, that the night prior to the arranged meeting with Stuart, Spina called the Stuart at home to “commiserate;” that Spina reiterated his belief that the issue was Ruffi-no; and that he had called Ruffino a “whacko woman” or words to that effect. Id As Stuart himself noted, he, too, wanted to make sure that Ruffino was perceived as “unbalanced,” among other things.. Id As might be expected given this backdrop, the meetings — however cordial — failed as remedial measures. No future corrective plans were discussed, nor was there any follow-up investigation. None of the actions requested by Ruffino (and promised by State Street’s agents) was initiated. Instead, Ruffino alleges, various Bank employees accelerated their attempts to demean her work and scuttle her attempts at continued success at State Street. As support for this contention, Ruffino points to contrasts in the view of her work before the retaliation began and afterwards. For instance, in his monthly activity reports to Johnson during 1991, Gregerman had regularly described the Management Development Program activities, in which Ruffino was involved, in generally positive terms; his activity reports did not suggest the sorts of problems which were later attributed to Ruf-fino. In contrast, in or about December 1991 or January of 1992, according to Ruffino, Johnson met with Gregerman to inform the latter of specific concerns he wished noted in Ruffino’s annual review. By February of 1992, Gregerman’s view of Ruffino’s work seemed to have changed. Ruffino’s 1991 annual review contained more critical information than had been in any prior review of her performance. Specifically, Ruffino discovered that Gregerman gave her an “N” rating, indicating “Does Not Meet Standards” on two performance standards, the first “N” rating(s) she ever received. After the review, she was also granted a percentage raise at the bottom of her rating scale, 3.7%. This increase was in marked contrast to her raises in years past, and in contrast to the increases received by others within the same general rating category that year. After reading her evaluation, Ruffino prepared a detailed response, disputing the negative comments. Only after this reaction, in or about March or April of 1992, did State Street initiate an investigation into Ruffino’s claims. According to Ruffino, the investigation in the Spring of 1992 was perfunctory, at best. First, Spina placed Rice in charge, although it was Rice who had initially failed to take action on Ruffino’s complaints. Second, Ruf-fino argues, the findings of the investigation were determined before any interviews took place. As evidence, Ruffino points to Rice’s own notes, made before she interviewed any employees. The notes indicate her conclusions: no finding of sexual harassment, and troubles with Ruffino. During that same time period, Bank supervisors began discrediting Ruffino’s work, questioning her professional conduct and attendance on the job, and addressing her sarcastically and unprofessionally. Ruffino alleges that their conduct was inconsistent with the respect accorded other managers who had not complained about discrimination. Ruffino took a disability leave on May 6, 1992. Upon the advice of her physician, she informed the Bank that she could not return to work as long as the conditions which led to her leaving existed. See Doyle Dep., 86. Dr. Doyle had concluded that conditions at the Bank had caused Ruffino stress based on a baseline analysis of her mental state and other factors. Apparently, the Bank did not move to change conditions. A May 29, 1992 memo from Cynthia Graham to Rice noted: “Just follow-up with Ira [Gregerman], who had followed-up with Tom [Johnson], Tom doesn’t care if he ever hears from her [Ruffino] again (a widely held statement, I’m sure) ...” See Johnson Dep., Yol. Ill, 89, Exh. 61. These events occurred in a work environment, Ruffino alleges, which was generally discriminatory and demeaning toward women. She outlines other incidents, alleging that the conduct of several State Street supervisors contributed to a work environment in which women’s professional contributions were demeaned and in which sexually offensive language was to be expected and endured. Effective October 1,1992, Ruffino resigned from her position at State Street Bank. IY. DISCUSSION A. Sexual Harassment Claims 1. Title VII and Chapter 151B Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, with respect to the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The legislation, both generally and particularly in the area of employment, is ambitious and broad in purpose. See, e.g., H.R. No. 914, CM Rights Act of 1964, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, pp. 2355, 2393 (“The purpose of this title is to eliminate ... discrimination in employment”); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 69-70, 104 S.Ct. 1621, 1631, 80 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984) (“By 1972, Congress was aware that employment discrimination was a ‘complex and pervasive’ problem that could be extirpated only with thoroughgoing remedies ...”); Harris v. Forklift Sys., — U.S. —, —, 114 S.Ct. 367, 371, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (reaffirming Title VIPs “broad rule of workplace equality”). It is well settled that in order to eradicate discrimination in the workplace, harassment based on gender must be prohibited. E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991) (setting out EEOC Guidelines for sexual harassment); Harris v. Forklift Sys., — U.S. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 370 (confirming that Title VII makes hostile environment sexual harassment actionable); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (adopting EEOC Guidelines and affirming that sexual harassment shall be considered a form of workplace sex discrimination); see also Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 899 (1st Cir.1988). A claim for sexual harassment will lie where the offensive conduct is based on the employee’s sex, is unwelcome and is sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere with the employee’s job performance or to create an abusive work environment. Harris v. Forklift, — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 370. Where a specific quid pro quo is not alleged, a plaintiff may make out a claim for “hostile environment” sexual harassment, if the complained of conduct is sufficiently pervasive or severe to “alter the terms and conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working conditions.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405; Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 782 (1st Cir.1990). The state law is certainly no less ambitious, no less clear regarding sexual harassment and no less committed to broad remedial measures. See College-Town Div. of Interco v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 160, 508 N.E.2d 587 (1987). The inquiry required by College-Town centers on whether a defendant’s conduct “created a barrier, based solely on gender, to [a plaintiffs] full and un-trammelled participation in the workplace. General Laws c. 151B, § 4, was intended to removed these discriminatory barriers.” College-Town, 400 Mass. at 162, 508 N.E.2d 587. Plaintiff has argued that defendants’ conduct amounted to hostile environment discrimination: personally directed, unwelcome and sexually offensive comments, derogatory remarks about women generally, the casual devaluing of women’s professional performance, an inappropriate and unwelcome focus on plaintiffs sexual life and the private lives of other women at the Bank. However, given the timing of the allegations, the first question — and ultimately the dispositive one — is whether the claims of sexual harassment are barred by the statute of limitations for discrimination actions brought under state or federal law. a. Statute of Limitations: Legal Standards Defendants make several points regarding plaintiffs allegations of harassment. They argue that the comments did not meet either the federal or state standards for hostile environment; they contend that she sat on her rights by not complaining earlier; and they state that no matter what the merits of plaintiffs case, Ruffino’s sexual harassment claims, under both Title VII and Chapter 151B, are time-barred. Ruffino responds that her sexual harassment claims were timely filed and that, even if they were not, the court should exercise its equitable powers to save her claims. I agree with defendants. Ruffino has failed to provide specific facts within the appropriate limitations period sufficient to avoid summary judgment on her state and federal claims of sexual harassment. Further, I find that this is not a case in which the filing period should be equitably modified. Therefore, I grant summary judgment as to the sexual harassment claims which comprise part of Counts I and III of plaintiffs complaint. Title VII and Chapter 151B require that plaintiffs file charges of discrimination within a fairly narrow limitations period. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), M.G.L. c. 151B, § 5. As the First Circuit has explained, the basic purpose behind a short filing period is to provide “the government an opportunity to conciliate while ,the complaint is fresh and [to give] ... early notice to the employer of possible litigation.” Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 753 (1st Cir.1988) (discussing statute of limitations in ADEA cases). However, it has long been recognized that these strictures must be interpreted broadly to give effect to the state and federal laws’ broad remedial purposes. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392-98, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1131-35, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (filing requirements under Title VII are not jurisdictional and are to be “interpreted broadly to effectuate the broad remedial intent of Congress to eliminate discrimination.”). Particularly, under continuing violations theory, where a plaintiff alleges an ongoing course of discrimination, a charge may encompass unlawful conduct outside of the limitations period, as long as at least one incident of unlawful conduct occurred within the requisite period. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60-61, 106 S.Ct. at 2402-03; Kassaye v. Bryant College, 999 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir.1993); Lynn Teachers Union, Local 1037, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 406 Mass. 515, 519-520, 549 N.E.2d 97 (1990); 804 Code Mass.Regs. § 1.03(2). Under federal law, the central inquiry is whether a present, independent violation exists within the limitations period. E.g., Muniz-Cabrero v. Ruiz, 23 F.3d 607, 610 (1st Cir.1994). As this Circuit has stated, the “mere effects or consequences of past discrimination, as opposed to independently actionable violations ... are insufficient to serve as the trigger of the limitations period.” Kassaye, 999 F.2d at 606. To be sure, the distinction between a violation with a present life and one with merely a present impact is often obscure. The difficulty in distinguishing after effects from continuing discrimination is especially acute when hostile environment sexual harassment is alleged, because this cause of action need not rely on acts which, standing alone, would support a claim of discrimination. Indeed, hostile environment discrimination typically is not confined to one act, directed at one individual, one time; rather, it is a composite of workplace action and inaction. As one court has commented, “[w]hen there are multiple incidents and victims, it is the cumulative effect of the offensive behavior that creates the working environment.” King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed.Cir.1994). Accordingly, when a plaintiffs hostile environment claim is challenged on a statute of limitations ground, specific incidents within the statutory period cannot be examined in isolation. Instead, sueh evidence must be considered in light of other factual allegations extending outside of the filing period. These discriminatory acts, taken together, must be examined to determine whether their cumulative effect created a hostile work environment for the plaintiff, during the relevant limitations period. b. Statute of Limitations Application Has Ruffino alleged specific conduct, during the limitations period, sufficient to support her claim for hostile environment sexual harassment? Flatly, she has not. Ruffino concedes that when she complained of Stuart’s harassment in October of 1991 (an act within the limitations period), she referred to defendant Stuart’s misconduct while she served as DPO, that is, until about March of 1991. And although Ruffino alleges generally that Stuart continued to harass her until October of 1991, when specifically asked at deposition, she could cite to no offensive, humiliating or demeaning conduct on his part following her departure from her job as DPO. Furthermore, plaintiff could not specify others’ conduct during this time—apart from the failure of her supervisors to address her earlier claims of sexual harassment—which was offensive, or demeaning to women such that it might have contributed to the hostile environment she alleges was created outside of the limitations period. Plaintiff seems aware of this essential gap and tries to finesse it in her pleadings. It will not work. Mere allegations of “ongoing” harassment until October of 1991 are insuffi-dent. Under a hostile environment theory, while misconduct alleged within the filing period need not provide an independent cause of action, there must be more than the legacy of suspicion and on-going ill feeling on the part of the plaintiff from past acts for her to jump the hurdle set up by the limitations period. Plaintiff suggests an alternative theory to support her continuing violation theory of hostile environment discrimination. She contends that defendants’ failure to investigate contributed to the hostile environment in she was compelled to work. Theoretically, a failure to investigate claims of sexual harassment may be evidence of a hostile environment and may continue the substantive violation of a plaintiffs rights to work free of sexual harassment. See, e.g., Maturo v. National Graphics, Inc., 722 F.Supp. 916 (D.Conn.1989); cf. Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir.1986) (where the employer had reason to know that an employee was being harassed because of his race and the employer did nothing to prevent the harassment, that employer may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, if it is determined that the harassment was not merely an “isolated slur” but rather a “campaign of harassment.”). In Maturo, plaintiff brought suit against employer and her immediate supervisor under Title VII for damages allegedly arising from her constructive discharge from her job. The Maturo court found that the defendant’s failure to respond to plaintiffs repeated complaints led to an escalation of the harassment and ultimately to intolerable work conditions. The court held that where an employer failed to take reasonable, corrective measures to eliminate a supervisor’s sexual harassment, that employer was liable not only under a theory of vicarious liability for the misconduct of the supervisor but also in its own right for failing to take steps to correct the situation. Id. at 922. This case is not Maturo. Ruffino does not — and apparently cannot — allege that the blind eye turned by her employer permitted any continuing or escalating harassment, within the limitations period. However ineptly done, her supervisor’s discussion with Stuart, along with her own efforts, apparently put an end to his offensive conduct. Additionally, Ruffino has not alleged with any specificity that others’ misconduct, which contributed to a hostile, offensive and abusive work environment, continued into the limitations period. Ruffino also claims that the retaliation she experienced contributed to the sexually harassing and hostile environment. To be sure, where a plaintiff claims hostile environment discrimination and retaliation the two causes of action are often factually and legally intertwined. However, retaliation is a distinct cause of action, motivated, at least in part, by a distinct intent to punish or to rid a workplace of someone who complains of unlawful practices. Unless specific facts suggest otherwise, the simple factual and legal intersection between an underlying claim of discrimination and retaliation is insufficient to revive an otherwise stale claim. On the facts presented here, continuing violations theory cannot rescue Ruffino’s sexual harassment claims. c. Equitable Estoppel and Tolling: Standards The limitations periods of Title VII and Chapter 151B are not jurisdictional but rather are subject to equitable tolling, waiver and estoppel. See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 392-398, 102 S.Ct. at 1131-35; Christo v. Edward G. Boyle Ins. Agency, 402 Mass. 815, 525 N.E.2d 643 (1988). Courts have recognized two distinct, though related, doctrines which may be used to modify the length of the relevant filing period: equitable estoppel and equitable tolling. Both doctrines have their roots in a single notion: Where a defendant has engaged in inequitable conduct, effectively preventing a plaintiff from filing a charge of discrimination, that defendant should not be permitted to “escape liability” because of his or her own misdeeds. See, e.g., Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 752 (1st Cir.1988). Under the theory of equitable estop-pel, where a plaintiff reasonably relies on an employer’s misleading representations and evidence of the employer’s improper purpose is demonstrated, plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief and a modification of the limitations period. Id. Under the doctriné of equitable tolling, where a plaintiff is not on notice that he or she should assert his or her legal rights and where commencing an action would not unduly prejudice the defendant, a court may modify the filing period. However, not all circumstances in which a plaintiffs inaction is the result of a defendant’s (even harsh) actions will call for tolling. For instance, in Kale, the court rejected a plaintiffs request for modification of the limitations period where that plaintiff had spent a year “reeling from the blow” of being fired after twenty years on the job and thus did not file a technically timely administrative charge. In' arriving at its conclusion, the Kale court outlined some factors which weigh in favor of tolling the statutory period: (1) reasonable absence of the plaintiffs actual or' constructive notice of discrimination; (2) the plaintiffs diligence in pursuing her or his rights; and (3) absence of prejudice to the defendant(s). The court specifically noted that the list is not exhaustive, for “it is in the nature of equity to entertain case-specific factors that may counsel in favor of tolling.” Id. at 753 n. 9. See also Conroy v. Boston Edison Co., 758 F.Supp. 54, 60 (D.Mass.1991). The standards are articulated slightly differently under state law. State courts have held that where a defendant “encourages or cajoles the potential plaintiff into inaction, that conduct may be a basis of extending the limitations period as [a] matter of equity.” Cherella v. Phoenix Technologies, Ltd., 32 Mass.App.Ct. 919, 920, 586 N.E.2d 29 (1992), citing with approval, Christo, 402 Mass. at 817-819, 525 N.E.2d 643. d. Equitable Modification: Application Turning to the case at bar, Ruffino asks this court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling and to modify the limitations period to permit litigation of her sexual harassment claims. Ruffino argues that her employer’s promises' of investigation and remediation prevented her both from knowing that her grievances were not being dealt with in a serious manner and from asserting her rights; that she diligently asserted her rights when she became aware that there was no investigation, and that tolling will not result in further prejudice to the defendants. While her argument is not wholly without merit, on the facts in this case, it falls short. Unlike an employee who did not have notice of discriminatory action, Ruffino knew full well that defendants’ conduct might give rise to a valid complaint of gender discrimination and hostile environment sexual harassment. Her repeated complaints are evidence of such awareness. Her request for equitable modification, then, turns on the question of whether, as Ruffino argues, State Street’s promises of investigation somehow misled her such that she reasonably put off filing charges. On the facts alleged by Ruffino, this argument cannot be sustained. Ruffino alleges repeated and patterned harassment. She alleges repeated, unheeded, complaints and stonewalling by supervisors at the Bank. Assuming her allegations true, she has undercut her own case. Clearly she was not only on notice of her legal rights and of the allegedly discriminatory conduct; she was also on notice, as early as her first meeting with Rice, and undoubtedly by the time she met with Johnson, that the Bank’s response was, at best, perfunctory. On these facts, it was thus unreasonable for her to rely on their alleged representations. While it is certainly understandable that an employee would hope against hope for internal redress of her grievances, at some point her decision to rely on a recalcitrant workplace grievance process bars litigation of her claims in court. Ruffino has passed that point. Although the court may exercise its authority in equity to modify a filing period, it should not do so in a case such as this, where the plaintiff was well aware of her risks, and where permitting the claims to proceed would result in the defendants’ being called upon to defend against allegations of actions long past. 2. M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C Plaintiff also claims that defendants’ conduct violated M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C, which grants all persons the right to be free from sexual harassment, as that term is defined in M.G.L. c. 151B. The statute provides that “[t]he superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce this right ... and to award damages.” M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C. Defendants contend that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s reasoning in Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 631 N.E.2d 555 (1994) forecloses the possibility that a plaintiff may seek redress independently under M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C. In Charland, the SJC confronted the question of whether M.G.L. c. 93, § 102 (the Equal Rights Act), provided a cause of action for employment discrimination independent of M.G.L. c. 151B. The court examined the comprehensive remedial scheme for workplace discrimination set forth in Chapter 151B. The court reasoned that a law enacted after M.G.L. c. 151B, such as M.G.L. c. 93, § 102, could not possibly have been intended to establish a “parallel and competing alternative to dealing with the problem of employment discrimination.” Id. at 584, 631 N.E.2d 555. Accordingly, the SJC held that where M.G.L. c. 151B is applicable, it “provides the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination not based on preexisting tort law or constitutional protections.” Id. at 586, 631 N.E.2d 555. In Clarke v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 57 F.3d 21 (1st Cir.1995), the First Circuit considered whether Charland required that actions brought under M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C similarly be barred. Although M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C was also enacted after M.G.L. c. 151B, the First Circuit found that Charland was not directly controlling because of the unique history of M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C, and that M.G.L. 151B does not exclude the possibility of a workplace sexual harassment claim brought under M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C. However, on its own analysis of the legislative history, as it exists, the court determined that the Massachusetts Legislature intended that Chapter 214, § 1C be available to discrimination plaintiffs only when Chapter 151B’s administrative prerequisites had been followed, but the claim had not been adjudicated. The court reasoned: “Section 1C serves an essential function — by vesting in the superior court (as distinguished from the SJC, for example) exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain such administratively exhausted — but unadjudicated — sexual harassment claims.” Clarke, 57 F.3d at 24-26; see also Johnson v. Plastic Packaging, Inc., 892 F.Supp. 25, 31 (D.Mass.1995). I must add, however, that the reasoning in Clarke goes directly against the weight of state law decisions on this matter. E.g., Burman v. Bock Oldsmobile, Inc. et. al., Civ. No. 92-2690, 3 Mass.L.RptR. 441 (Norfolk Super.Ct., May 15, 1995); Sobotka v. Westfield Savings Bank, Civil No. 93-332, 2 Mass. L.RptR. 193 (Hampden Super.Ct., April 21, 1994); Henry v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., Civil No. 92-4192 (Suffolk Super.Ct. May 5, 1993). In Sobotka v. Westfield Savings Bank, Civil No. 93-333 (Hampden Sup.Ct., January 3, 1995), decided well after the district court decision in Clarke v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc., C.A. No. 94-11101-EFH (D.Mass. August 17, 1994), a state superior court examined the intersection between M.G.L. c. 151B and M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C. The court concluded that: “The express language of [c. 214, § 1C] ... grants to sexual harassment victims direct access to the Superior Court apart from the procedures of c. 151B.” Id., Slip Op., at 6; accord Heins, Massachusetts Civil Rights Laws, Mass.L.Rev. (Spring 1991), at 34. This reading of the law is consistent with the plain meaning of the statute, its legislative history, as well as its particular placement in the General Laws. As to the legislative history, the statute was enacted during the same legislative year and as part of the same package in which the Legislature specifically defined sexual harassment under the state’s Anti-Discrimination Law, M.G.L. c. 151B. See St.1986, §§ 2 & 6; M.G.L. e. 151B, § 1(18); M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C. The Legislature was undoubtedly aware that it was giving strength and direction to sexual harassment law under Chapter 151B; it was also well aware that Chapter 151B generally grants plaintiffs the right to have their claims heard in superior court, after filing with the MCAD, and that Chapter 151B also permits the superior court to grant equitable relief. Notwithstanding, the Legislature created another remedy, sounding in equity and within the superior court’s original jurisdiction. While that statute borrowed the definition of harassment from Chapter 151B, it declined to borrow the procedural prerequisites. It strains credulity to believe that the Legislature self-consciously set out to create redundant law. The distinct nature of Section 214 is underscored by its placement in the chapter of the General Laws providing for jurisdiction in equity. Generally, M.G.L. c. 214, § 1 confers equitable jurisdiction on the supreme judicial court and superior court. M.G.L. c. 214, § 1 enumerates two specific equitable causes of action, a right to privacy, M.G.L. e. 214, § IB, and after 1986, a right to be free of sexual harassment, M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C. Others are enumerated in other sections of Chapter 214. It is not for the courts to second-guess the legislative determination that these named wrongs deserve specific, statutory, equitable remedies. Notwithstanding, the First Circuit’s holding in Clarke necessarily dictates the result in this court. The claims under M.G.L. c. 214 § 1C are dismissed. 3. M.G.L. c. 93, § 102 Plaintiff also claims redress under the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, M.G.L. c. 93, § 102. Defendants contend that this claim is barred because Chapter 151B provides the exclusive remedy for claims of discrimination in the making of employment contracts. See Charland v. Muzi Motors, 417 Mass. 580, 631 N.E.2d 555 (1994); Agin v. Federal White Cement, Inc., 417 Mass. 669, 632 N.E.2d 1197 (1994). As noted above, in Charland, the SJC considered this issue and held that where M.G.L. 151B is applicable, M.G.L. e. 93, § 102 claims are barred. Id. at 584, 631 N.E.2d 555. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count IV is granted. B. Retaliation Claims Both state and federal law prohibit retaliation against employees who oppose employment practices which they believe to be unlawfully discriminatory. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4); see also Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816, 827 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). 1. Title VII a. Standards Under Title VII, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme governs a court’s assessment of whether an employer may be found liable for adverse actions taken against an employee allegedly in retaliation for that employee’s engaging in protected activity. The three-staged analysis ultimately requires a plaintiff to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a rational factfinder could conclude that the adverse action was taken for retaliatory reasons. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also Texas Dep’t. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 n. 8, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); St. Mary v. Hicks, — U.S. —, —, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Hazel v. U.S. Postmaster General, 7 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993); Petitti v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 909 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir.1990). First, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of retaliation, demonstrating that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity, known to the employer; (2) he or she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment actions. Hazel, 7 F.3d at 4; Ramos v. Roche Products, Inc., 936 F.2d 43, 48 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, Rossy v. Roche Products, Inc., 502 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 379, 116 L.Ed.2d 330 (1991); Petitti, 909 F.2d at 33. It is well established that where an employee complains of alleged sexual harassment and sex discrimination under Title VII and he or she reasonably believes his or her allegations to have some foundation, that employee has satisfied the first element of the prima facie case. Holland v. Jefferson National Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir.1989) (where complainant reasonably believes that employer’s conduct is discriminatory, a report of sexual harassment is a protected activity under Title VII); Morgan v. Mass. General Hosp., 712 F.Supp. 242 (D.Mass.1989), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 901 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.1990) (since Title VII protects against sexual harassment, an employee is protected against retaliation for opposing such activities); accord Hazel, 7 F.3d at 3-4. As to the second element of the prima facie case, an adverse employment action does not need to amount to a discharge, although, “[n]ot all actions taken by an employer ... constitute ‘adverse employment decisions.’ ” Hurley-Bardige v. Brown, 900 F.Supp. 567, 572 (D.Mass.1995). Generally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she was denied a term, condition or privilege of employment. Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1179 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218, 111 S.Ct. 2828, 115 L.Ed.2d 997 (1991); see also Petitti 909 F.2d at 33 (where an employment action “disadvantages” persons engaging in protected activity, this element is made out). The third element requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a causal connection between the alleged adverse action and her or his protected activity. At this stage, an inference of retaliation may arise where “[a] showing of [adverse action] ... soon after the employee engages in protected activity specifically protected by section 704(a) of Title VII ... is indirect proof of a causal connection between the [adverse action] ... and the activity because it is strongly suggestive of retaliation.” Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 110 (1st Cir.1988); see also Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 828 (where there is a “long period of delay” between the protected activity and adverse action, an inference of retaliation may be negated); accord Petitti, 909 F.2d at 33 (the third element of the prima facie case is made out where there is a showing that “retaliatory motive play[ed] a part in the adverse employment actions.”). Once established, that prima facie ease gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of retaliation. In order to rebut that presumption, the employer must come forward with evidence of non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse action. The employer’s burden is not onerous; the employer must come forward with competent evidence which, if taken as true, would permit a rational fact-finder to conclude that there was a “non-discriminatory reason” for the challenged employment action. Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1091 (1st Cir.1995) (citing Hicks, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2748). Finally, where the defendant has met its burden of production, the plaintiff must proffer “sufficient admissible evidence,' if believed, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element in a prima facie ease and that the employer’s justification for the challenged employment action was merely a pretext for impermissible ... discrimination.” Id. In a retaliation case, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the articulated reason, in significant measure, was a pretext for retaliation. Byrd, 61 F.3d at 1032; Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 827. This ultimate determination of the employer’s motive presents a “pure question of fact.” Hazel, 7 F.3d at 4. b. The Case at Bar In the case at bar, Ruffino has met her initial burden under federal law. As to the first element of her prima facie case, Ruffino’s complaints of sexual harassment and sex discrimination are precisely the kind intended for protection from retaliation under Title VII. Except as to Gregerman, it is undisputed that the defendants knew of her complaints. With respect to Gregerman, he was aware — at minimum— of the fact of her complaints, if not of all their details. As to the second element, Ruffino alleges at least two phases of retaliatory conduct: first, she alleges that she suffered a demotion and a loss of status when she transferred from her post as DPO over to ISD; second, she contends that, after formally complaining of sexual harassment in October of 1991, she became the target of unfair ridicule, monitoring and criticism, and that she received an unwarranted and unfair performance review in February of 1992, as well as a retaliatory pay adjustment. While plaintiff also argues that these retaliatory conditions were so onerous that she was compelled to resign, she need not reach for a constructive discharge theory to make out her prima facie case. I find that she has met her burden of producing specific evidence which, if credited at trial, would tend to show that she was denied a term or condition of employment. Upon her first complaint to Johnson, she was moved from her job and slowly stripped of her authority. After issuing another, more formal, complaint, she became the target of ridicule by top management. Circumstances surrounding her review and pay increase are, at minimum, disputed. If Ruffino’s version of events is credited, the inference may be drawn that others in State Street’s management team had decided that since she was “off her rocker,” they would simply push her out. As to the third requirement, the causal connection, where direct evidence is missing, temporal proximity may provide the necessary nexus. Here, the adverse actions taken against Ruffino, if her allegations are credited, escalated sharply during and immediately following Ruffino’s decision to press her complaints. I find this temporal connection sufficient to raise an inference of retaliatory motive. In response to the plaintiff’s prima facie ease, defendants must come forward with legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse actions taken. In this case, defendants try to simplify the picture and focus primarily on the fact of her contested evaluation. Their argument boils down to the following: that since Ruffino never personally made any allegations of sexual harassment against Gregerman, the manager who signed her performance evaluation, or against Johnson, neither of these men had reason to retaliate against Ruffino; and that Ruffino’s performance evaluation was wholly warranted, even generous. Regarding her pay raise, they assert that she fell within the lower range of her the ratings scale, and thus received a low-range merit raise. Defendants have produced credible evidence of