Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS BENNETT, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND.1498 A. Procedural Background.1498 B. Factual Background.1500 II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS.1502 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS .1503 A. Defendants’ January 26,1995, Motion To Dismiss .1503 B. The Defendants’ Other Motions To Dismiss.1504 1. Is the RICO claim time-barred?.1504 2. Sufficiency of RICO allegations.1506 a. Purpose and scope of RICO.1506 b. Elements Of Plaintiffs § 1962(c) RICO Claim.1507 i. RICO enterprise.1508 ii. Conduct of the enterprise.;.1510 iii. Pattern of racketeering activity.•.1512 iv. Causation.1517 v. Summary.1519 c. RICO conspiracy.1520 C. Lack Of A Federal Question.1521 IV. CONCLUSION.1523 This lawsuit alleges appalling and shocking conduct; but even so, the motions to dismiss raise probing and nettlesome questions as to whether such conduct states a federal claim upon which to invoke the limited jurisdiction of this court. The plaintiff in this lawsuit has asserted claims pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state law alleging that defendants extorted favorable terms from him in settlement of a dissolution of marriage by threatening a criminal prosecution for sexual abuse of a'minor child. The defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that the plaintiff’s claims each fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. More specifically, the defendants attack the plaintiffs RICO claim, the only one upon which federal jurisdiction is based, as time-barred, pleading no proper RICO enterprise or conduct of that enterprise by the RICO defendants, and failing to allege a pattern of racketeering activity or continuing criminal activity. I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND A, Procedural Background Plaintiff Bryan Reynolds filed this lawsuit on December 27,1994, against various defendants alleging injuries as the result of their conduct during an acrimonious divorce. Bryan Reynolds named as defendants Lisa Reynolds, his ex-wife, and Charles Condon, his former father-in-law. In addition, he named as defendants his ex-wife’s attorney, Barbara Orzeehowski, Ms. Orzechowski’s law firm, Klass, Hanks, Stoos, Stoik & Villone (herein “Law Firm”), and some of the partners therein, Marvin J. Klass, James C. Hanks, William K. Stoos, Anthony J. Stoik, and James R. Villone. The original complaint was amended on January 17, 1995, prior to any answer or motion by the defendants. This first amended complaint in this matter was in eleven counts. However, the only count involving a federal claim, and thus the count upon which federal jurisdiction was then asserted, was a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of Bryan Reynolds’s civil rights. That count alleged that the defendants, individually and as a group, acting under color of state law, had conspired with the Woodbury County Attorney’s Office to subject Bryan Reynolds to the threat of a wrongful prosecution in order to gain advantage in the divorce proceedings involving Bryan and Lisa Reynolds. On January 26, 1995, defendants Orzechow-ski, the Law Firm, and Messrs. Klass, Hanks, Stoos, Stoik, and Villone (collectively, “the Law Firm Defendants”), moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant Condon joined in that motion to dismiss on February 1, 1995, as did defendant Lisa Reynolds on February 2, 1995. Plaintiff Bryan Reynolds resisted the motion to dismiss on February 24, 1995. . However, on February 24, 1995, Bryan Reynolds also sought leave to file a second amended and substituted complaint. Leave to amend was granted on March 22, 1995. The March 22, 1995, second amended complaint withdrew all reference to a claim of violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Instead, Count I of this complaint asserted violation of provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, as the only federal claim upon which jurisdiction of this court was founded. The gravamen of the RICO claim is that the Law Firm is a RICO “enterprise;” and that defendants Con-don Lisa Reynolds, and Orzeehowski conducted that enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) or conspired to do so in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Bryan Reynolds alleges that these defendants “maliciously and repeatedly made various threats to Plaintiff constituting several acts of extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1),” March- 22, 1995, Amended And Substituted Complaint (Complaint), ¶ 106, and “repeatedly caused letters and other matters and things to be delivered by the United States Postal Service in repeated violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341,” which prohibits mail fraud. Complaint, ¶ 107. All of the conduct specifically pleaded as RICO predicate acts is alleged to have occurred between October 21, 1990, and November 22, 1991. On April 8, 1995, the Law Firm Defendants moved to dismiss the March 22, 1995, second amended and substituted complaint. They assert that the second amended and substituted complaint still fails to state a federal claim upon which relief can be granted, because the RICO count does not allege “continuing criminal activity,” these defendants did not “direct the enterprise,” the claim is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and no conduct of these defendants as alleged in the RICO claim was the cause of any injury to Bryan Reynolds. They also moved to dismiss any of the state law claims made against any of the Law Firm Defendants on the ground that they also failed to state a claim and that there was no viable federal question upon which to base jurisdiction in this court over any state-law claims. Lisa Reynolds joined in this motion to dismiss on April 14, 1995. Defendant Condon also joined in the motion to dismiss on May 3, 1995, but at the same time moved to dismiss all other counts against him. Lisa Reynolds then joined in defendant Condon’s motion to dismiss, as well, as that of the Law Firm Defendants, on May 3, 1995. Bryan Reynolds resisted the new motion to dismiss by the Law Firm Defendants, in which Lisa Reynolds joined, on April 21, 1995. He resisted the motion to dismiss by defendant Condon on May 19, 1995. Bryan Reynolds argues that he has sufficiently alleged a “pattern” of racketeering activity, that Lisa Reynolds and Condon are proper RICO defendants, that the Law Firm is a proper RICO enterprise, that the defendants have not attacked the adequacy of his RICO conspiracy claim, and that his RICO claim is not time-barred. As to defendant Condon’s and defendant Lisa Reynolds’s additional grounds for dismissal of the claims against them, Bryan Reynolds argues that this court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to hear such claims. The court heard oral arguments on the motions to dismiss on November 1, 1995. Plaintiff Bryan Reynolds was represented at the oral arguments by counsel J. Russell Hixson of Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler & Hagan, P.C., in Des Moines, Iowa. Mr. Hix-son appeared by telephone. All other counsel appeared in person. Defendant Charles Condon was represented by counsel Nicholas V. Critelli, Jr. of the Law Offices Of Nick Critelli, P.C., in Des Moines, Iowa; defendant Lisa Reynolds was represented by counsel Edward J. Keane of Gildemeister, Willia & Keane, in Sioux City, Iowa; and the Law Firm Defendants were represented by counsel Maurice B. Nieland of Rawlings, Nie-land, Probasco & Killinger, in Sioux City, Iowa. The oral arguments were both spirited and informative for the court and of great assistance in resolving close, troublesome, and complex issues of federal law. B. Factual Background The factual background for disposition of this motion, of course, is based entirely on the facts as alleged in Bryan Reynolds’s March 22, 1995, complaint. According to the complaint, Bryan and Lisa Reynolds were married on April 12, 1988, and at that time entered into an antenuptial agreement for division of their property in the event the marriage ended. Lisa Reynolds had two children, J.R. and Joshua, from a previous marriage, whom Bryan adopted. The couple also had a child together, whom they named William (“Billy”) Reynolds. On June 19, 1990, Lisa Reynolds filed for dissolution of the marriage in Woodbury County Court. Lisa Reynolds was represented in those proceedings by defendant Orzechowski of the defendant Law Firm. It is probably sufficient to pass over a number of Bryan Reynolds’s factual allegations concerning the dissolution proceedings and events surrounding it simply by stating that matters became acrimonious. More to the point, Bryan Reynolds alleges that on October 26, 1990, Lisa Reynolds made a report to the Child Protection Center in Sioux City that Bryan Reynolds had sexually abused their son J.R. after purportedly telling Bryan that “I’ve got a way I’m going to get you and the house too.” Bryan Reynolds alleges that defendants Orzeehowski, Condon, and Lisa Reynolds then launched a campaign to use the potential for criminal prosecution or the promise that Lisa would drop the charges to obtain terms for Lisa in the settlement of the divorce that were better than those available to her under the couple’s antenuptial agreement. Bryan Reynolds also asserts that, eventually, these defendants extorted termination of Bryan’s parental rights in the two children he had adopted. Allegedly as a result of these threats, Bryan Reynolds entered into a series of stipulations tó settle the divorce proceedings on terms favorable to Lisa. Specifically, Bryan Reynolds alleges that he entered into a stipulation on January 16, 1991, which staved off his imminent arrest on child sexual abuse charges. A decree of dissolution of marriage was only entered on March 1,1991, after Bryan had also agreed, on February 21, 1991, to the court’s termination of his parental rights to J.R. and Joshua. Although Bryan Reynolds believed that his agreements with Lisa over the dissolution proceedings had forestalled any such occurrence, on November 22, 1991, the Woodbury County Attorney’s Office filed charges against Bryan for sexual abuse of J.R. Reynolds that had allegedly taken place on September 22, 1990. Bryan Reynolds was arrested on November 22, 1991, and was eventually tried on April 14, 1992. A jury convicted Bryan Reynolds, and, on May 18,1992, Bryan was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. On January 25,1994, the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed Bryan Reynolds’s conviction and remanded for a new trial after Bryan Reynolds had already served more than two years of his prison term. The appellate court ruled that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of alleged extortion and coercion by Charles Condon and Lisa Reynolds. On August 16, 1994, the retrial was dismissed by the Woodbury County Attorney’s Office on the ground that the complaining witness, Lisa Reynolds, had refused to testify. Turning specifically to the predicate acts alleged in support of the RICO claim, the complaint makes the following factual allegations. In October of 1990, Lisa Reynolds threatened to get more than the antenuptial agreement would have given her, and subsequently made the allegations of sexual abuse of J.R. to that end. Defendant Orzeehowski became involved in this scheme in late November or early December of 1990 when she told Bryan Reynolds’s divorce attorney in a telephone conversation that Lisa would drop the abuse charges if Bryan agreed to terminate his parental rights to J.R. and Joshua. Defendant Condon then told Bryan Reynolds, again in a telephone conversation, that Lisa would drop the abuse charges if Bryan gave Lisa the marital home on favorable terms. At a meeting at the Law Firm on December 22,1990, attended by Bryan Reynolds, his attorney Steve Jensen, and defendants Condon, Reynolds, and Orzeehowski, defendant Condon allegedly indicated to Bryan Reynolds that they would pursue the abuse charges unless Bryan was “willing to give us something in the divorce.” The complaint alleges that in early January of 1991, defendant Orzeehowski, “as attorney for Defendant Reynolds and as a partner in Defendant Law Firm, used the resources of her Law Firm to communicate with other Defendants and to draft a new stipulation and provided the same to Defendant Condon for delivery to Plaintiff’ on January 12, 1991. Defendant Condon is alleged to have told Bryan Reynolds in a telephone conversation on January 15, 1991, that defendant Orze-chowski was drafting yet another stipulation, which would give Lisa Reynolds a still more favorable settlement of the divorce. Condon allegedly told Bryan Reynolds that he would not be arrested for child sexual abuse the next day if he agreed to the stipulation, but that otherwise he would be. Condon also allegedly told Bryan Reynolds at that time to pay the Law Firm $2,500. On January 16, 1991, Bryan Reynolds picked up the new stipulation from the Law Firm, where “Defendant Orzeehowski personally handed Plaintiff the new stipulation which had been drafted by her in her capacity as Defendant Reynold’s lawyer using the resources of the Law Firm and she told Plaintiff that he was to call Defendant Condon before he left the offices.” In that call, Condon purportedly told Bryan Reynolds that he (Condon) would now send Lisa to tell the county attorney not to press the charges against Bryan Reynolds. Allegedly “still in fear” of a wrongful prosecution, Bryan Reynolds agreed, sometime in February of 1991,. to terminate his parental rights in J.R. and Joshua and to give Lisa the marital home in exchange for $20,000. The complaint alleges that “[o]n February 21, 1991, the court, based on the petition submitted by Defendant Reynolds and drafted by her lawyer Orzechowski with the resources of the Law Firm, terminated Plaintiffs parental rights to J.R. and Joshua.” Furthermore, “[o]n March 1, 1991, the court, based on the petition submitted by Defendant Reynolds and [ ] drafted by [her] lawyer Orzechowski with the resources of the Law Firm, entered a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage” pursuant to the December 22, 1990, stipulation signed by the parties, but not, it appears from the pleadings, pursuant to any of the later stipulations Bryan Reynolds alleges were extorted from him. On November 22,1991, the sexual abuse charges were filed and Bryan was arrested, allegedly at Lisa’s renewed instigation, because Lisa was unhappy that she had not had her way about visitation with the couple’s son Billy on Halloween. The allegations of mail fraud, which the complaint asserts are also predicate acts under the RICO statute, are, in their entirety, as follows: Upon information and belief, for the purposes of executing and attempting to execute a scheme to defraud Plaintiff out of his property, the defendants repeatedly caused letters and other matters and things to be delivered by the United States ■ Postal Service in repeated violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud). These mailings include but are not limited to documents mailed between the defendants and from the defendants to the court for filing and to Plaintiff which furthered the defendants’ fraudulent scheme. Complaint, ¶ 107. Although the complaint identifies a number of telephone calls as the means of committing predicate acts, nowhere does the complaint specifically allege “wire fraud” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Nor does it specifically allege that any of these predicate acts were instances of “witness tampering,” in the form of manipulating Lisa Reynolds’s communications with the county attorney concerning the abuse charges. However, at oral arguments, Bryan Reynolds’s counsel asserted that the complaint adequately pleads numerous instances of both witness tampering and wire fraud in support of the RICO claim. Having surveyed the factual allegations upon which the March 22, 1995, second amended complaint in this matter is based, the court turns next to the question of the standards applicable to determining whether that complaint states claims upon which relief can be granted. II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS A motion to dismiss may be made, inter alia, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) requires the court to review only the pleadings to determine whether the pleadings state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.CivB. 12(b). Such motions “can serve a useful purpose in disposing of legal issues with the minimum of time and expense to the interested parties.” Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 973 (8th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961, 89 S.Ct. 2096, 23 L.Ed.2d 748 (1969). The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of the plaintiffs claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemical Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir.1989). In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume that all facts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint are true, and must liberally construe those allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The court is mindful that in treating the factual allegations of a complaint as true pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court “do[es] not, however, blindly accept the legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts.” Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987), and 5 C. Wright & A. Miner, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 595-97 (1969)); see also LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1103 (6th Cir.1995) (the court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences,” quoting Morgan, 829 F.2d at 12). Plaintiffs allegations here as to mail fraud consist of little more than conclu-sory statements of wrong-doing. Such con-elusory aUegations need not and wül not be taken as true; rather, the court wül consider whether the facts alleged in the complaint, accepted as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Westcott, 901 F.2d at 1488. “A complaint should not be dismissed for fañure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 101-02. Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual aüegations. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Thus, it is only in the “unusual case” where the complaint on its face reveals some insuperable bar to relief that a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted. Fusco v. Xerox Corp., 676 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir.1982). With these standards in mind, the court wül consider the various defendants’ motions to dismiss for fafiure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. III. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. Defendants’ January 26, 1995, Motion To Dismiss The Law Firm Defendants moved to dismiss the first amended complaint, filed January 17,1995, on January 26,1995, largely on the ground that Bryan Reynolds’s civü rights claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was inadequate, and since this sole federal claim was inadequate, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Although Bryan Reynolds resisted that motion to dismiss on February 24, 1995, that same day he also offered his second amended complaint, which was eventually filed on March 22, 1995, and which entirely withdrew the assertedly deficient § 1983 claim as weU as two other challenged state-law claims. The court concludes that consideration of the objections to the remaining state-law claims of the first amended complaint raised in the January 26, 1995, motion to dismiss, even where those claims are simüar to those in the. second amended complaint, would be a pointless exercise. Therefore, the Law Firm Defendants’ January 26,1995, motion to dismiss, joined in by defendant Condon on February 1, 1995, and defendant Lisa Reynolds on February 2, 1995, is denied as moot. B. The Defendants’ Other Motions To Dismiss The court will consider next the Law Firm Defendants’ April 3, 1995, motion, joined in by both Lisa Reynolds and defendant Con-don, .challenging the adequacy of the pleading of the RICO claim in the March 22, 1995, second amended complaint. The defendants’ first allegation of an “insuperable bar” to this claim, apparent on the face of the complaint, Fusco, 676 F.2d at 334, is that it is time-barred. The defendants then take issue with the adequacy of the pleading of the RICO claim on a number of grounds. The court will consider each of these grounds for dismissal seriatim. 1. Is the RICO claim time-barred? In Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150 (8th Cir.1991), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the statute of limitations applicable to a civil RICO claim. The court noted that in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 156-57, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2766-67, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987), the Supreme Court had held that the applicable statute of limitations for such a claim was the four-year statute of limitations found in the Clayton Act, but that the Court expressly left open the question of the time at- which a RICO action accrues. Granite Falls Bank, 924 F.2d at 151. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals therefore held that “the nature of the conduct proscribed by RICO compels the application of discovery principles in fashioning an accrual rule” for civil RICO actions. Id. at 153. Recognizing that “the heart of any RICO complaint is the allegation of a pattern of racketeering,” citing Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 154, 107 S.Ct. at 2766, the court agreed that “an appropriate accrual rule must include an emphasis on the pattern element,” but should also look to the injury requirement of a RICO cause of action. Id. at 154. The court specifically adopted the rule formulated by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which is that “with respect to each independent injury to the plaintiff, a civil RICO cause of action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both the existence and source of his injury and that the injury is part of a pattern.” Id. (quoting Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Florida, Inc., 906 F.2d 1546, 1554-55 (11th Cir.1990). Thus, the court concluded that the allegations of the complaint, taken as trae in an action that had been dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), demonstrated that “this action was filed within four years from the time of the Bank’s post-injury discovery of the alleged pattern of racketeering activity,” and the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint as time-barred was improper. Id. at 155. In this case, the Lav/ Firm Defendants asserted in their brief that the last predicate act alleged against defendant Orzechowski occurred on or before February 21, 1991, which is more than four years prior to the offering or filing of the second amended complaint in which the RICO claim is first asserted. Bryan Reynolds argues that he was not injured until some time after December 27, 1990, four years before the filing of his original complaint, and that he could not reasonably have discovered that his injury was part of a pattern before that date. Although Bryan Reynolds asserted in his brief, albeit almost in passing, that his RICO claim should “relate back” to the filing of his first amended complaint, the defendants made no argument in their briefs as to why that should not be so. At oral arguments, the Law Firm Defendants argued that, even assuming relation back to be proper, that the stipulation actually accepted by the court was worked out at the meeting on December 22, 1990, and that this only actually injurious act, if chargeable against these defendants in support of a RICO claim, is more than four years before even the original complaint was filed. These defendants also asserted that the March 22, 1995, complaint was an entirely new complaint, not merely a continuation and refine-merit of the former complaint, such that it should not relate back at all. At oral arguments, Bryan Reynolds’s counsel also asserted that Bryan has suffered continuing injuries after February of 1991, some of which have continued to the present and may extend indefinitely into the future. These injuries, Bryan argues, are lost income as the result of his prison record and wrongful prosecution, and continuing emotional distress from his wrongful prosecution and incarceration, the loss of his parental rights in J.R. and Joshua, and the loss of his home. The court agrees, however, with counsel for Lisa Reynolds that under this theory of continuing injuries as forever extending the accrual of Bryan Reynolds’s RICO claim, the statute of limitations would never begin to run. It is also apparent that as to the injuries actually pleaded in the second amended complaint, the “accrual date” under Granite Falls Bank, 924 F.2d at 154, was most likely on or about February 21, 1991, although the “accrual date” could reasonably be found to be as late as the last predicate act alleged, which was in November of 1991. Because either of these dates would fall within the four-year statute of limitations if the filing of the original complaint is the key date, and the November 1991 date would fall within the statue of limitations if the key date is March 22, 1995, when the second amended complaint was filed, the court need not pass on assertions of an accrual date any later than November of 1991. The court does not agree with the Law Firm Defendants that the last date of injury, and hence last reasonable date of accrual of Bryan Reynolds’s RICO claim, that can reasonably be inferred from the pleadings, Westcott, 901 F.2d at 1488, was December 22, 1990. Defendants have not demonstrated in what way December 22, 1990, was the soonest that the plaintiff could or should reasonably have discovered both the existence and source of his injury and that the injury was part of a pattern. Granite Falls Bank, 924 F.2d at 154. For example, from the facts alleged, it could reasonably be inferred that there was no actual injury until the court confirmed the December 22,1990, stipulation in the decree of dissolution of marriage on March 1, 1991. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(e), as amended in 1991, provides for relation back of amendments to the date of the original pleading when (1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action, or (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or (3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted [when certain other conditions are met]. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). ' The Eighth Circuit-Court of Appeals does not appear to have passed on the interpretation of the amended version of the rule. However, in construing the provision for relation back in former Rule 15(c) now found, in identical language, in Rule 15(c)(2), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the controlling case on the Rule 15(c) issue, Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30-31, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 2385, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986), as holding that the “ ‘linchpin [of Rule 15(c) ] is notice, and notice within the limitations period.’ ” Schrader v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 952 F.2d 1008, 1011-12 (8th Cir.1991). The court concluded that the amended complaint including a new claim could not relate back to the original complaint where the defendant had no proper notice of the claim. Id. at 1012-13. More recently, cases interpreting the amended version of Rule 15(c) have applied similar standards to the question of whether an amendment should relate back to the filing of the original complaint, thus thwarting a defendant’s statute of limitations argument. See, e.g., Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dept., 66 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir.1995) (amendments under new version of Rule 15(c), as with former version, relate back only when defendant has proper notice of claim); McClellon v. Lone Star Gas Co., 66 F.3d 98, 102 (5th Cir.1995) (amendment relates back if it corrects deficiencies in the original pleading or expands factual allegations already made, because there is no lack of notice of the claim); Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir.1995) (amendment does not relate back where it brings in new parties who did not timely assert claims, and defendant therefore had no timely notice of those plaintiffs’ claims). In Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168 (1st Cir.1995), the First Circuit Court of Appeals confronted a question nearer to the one before this court, which was whether an amendment stating a new claim, not merely making new or refined allegations' or identifying defendants previously sued only as “John Does,” should relate back to the filing of the original complaint. The First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that “[i]f the new claim arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact [as was pleaded in the original complaint], it will ordinarily relate back to the date of the institution of the suit.” Rodriguez, 57 F.3d at 1175 n. 7. Thus, in that case, the fact that the statute of limitations for the new claim may have run by the time the amended complaint in which it first appeared was filed did not present an insurmountable obstacle to assertion of that new claim. Id. In the present case, the court concludes that Bryan Reynolds’s assertion of the RICO claim should relate back to the date of the filing of his original complaint. The RICO claim asserted in the amended pleading “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2). Simple comparison of the original complaint with the second amended complaint filed March 22, 1995, demonstrates that the factual allegations upon which both complaints are based are nearly identical. Where, as here, the new RICO claim “arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact [as was pleaded in the original complaint],- it will ordinarily relate back to the date of the institution of the suit.” Rodriguez, 57 F.3d at 1175 n. 7. Because Bryan Reynolds’s RICO claim does relate back to the filing of his original complaint, the predicate acts on or about February 21, 1991, which defendants assert were the last to start the running of the statute of limitations, were within four years of the filing of the original lawsuit on December 27, 1994. Therefore, Bryan Reynolds has alleged and may be able to prove a set of facts demonstrating that his claim falls within the applicable four-year statute of limitations. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 102. The statute of limitations presents no “insuperable bar” to assertion of the RICO claim in this lawsuit, Fusco, 676 F.2d at 334, and defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the RICO claim on this ground. 2. Sufficiency of RICO allegations In order to determine the adequacy of the RICO claim asserted in this lawsuit, the court deems it appropriate first to examine the purpose and scope of RICO. The court will then consider the requirements for adequately pleading a RICO violation. a, Purpose and scope of RICO This court recently considered the scope and purpose of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, in De Wit v. Firstar Corp., 879 F.Supp. 947, 960-62 (N.D.Iowa 1995). In De Wit, the court noted that RICO claims have as one necessary element proof of either “a pattern of racketeering activity,” involving crimes defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), or “collection of an unlawful debt.” De Wit, 879 F.Supp. at 960 (citing H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 232, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2897, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3277, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)). Thus, crimes not specified in § 1961 cannot support a RICO claim. Manion v. Freund, 967 F.2d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir.1992) (breach of fiduciary duty is not one of the specified state crimes listed in the definition of “racketeering activity,” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), and thus could not support a civil RICO claim). However, because they are crimes listed in § 1961, the crimes of extortion and mail fraud, conduct specifically alleged in the RICO claim here, can be RICO “predicate acts,” as can the wire fraud and witness tampering the plaintiff here asserted in oral arguments had also been alleged, if not so identified. The Supreme Court identified the purpose of RICO as follows: The occasion for Congress’ action was the perceived need to combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime. In Title IX, Congress picked out as key to RICO’s application broad concepts that might fairly indicate an organized crime connection, but that it fully realized do not either individually or together provide anything approaching a perfect fit with “organized crime.” See, e.g., [116 Cong.Rec.] at 18940 (Sen. McClellan) (“it is impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well”). H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 248, 109 S.Ct. at 2905; Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Financial Co., 886 F.2d 986, 990 (8th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2533, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981)). Thus, RICO also imposes civil liability on other types of organizations that have no alleged ties to organized crime. Atlas Pile Driving Co., 886 F.2d at 990. The parties here contest whether RICO was intended to include within its reach a law firm conducting normal legal business. As this court observed in De Wit, the reach of RICO beyond the activities of organized crime has caused courts some distress as well. De Wit, 879 F.Supp. at 961. However, the Supreme Court regarded the extensive reach of RICO as an indication of the breadth Congress intended the statute to have, not as a defect in its drafting. Id. The court will consider below whether this law firm nonetheless escapes RICO’s extensive reach. RICO contains a civil enforcement scheme permitting private individuals harmed by criminal RICO activity to recover damages in a civil action. Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 384 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2459, 124 L.Ed.2d 674 (1993). The relevant provision of the Act is as follows: Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in ■ any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); Bowman, 985 F.2d at 384; Diamonds Plus, Inc. v. Kolber, 960 F.2d 765, 768 (8th Cir.1992) (“RICO provides a civil cause of action to those who are injured by activities violative of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).”). Under § 1964, then, any individual who has experienced injury to his or her. business or property “by reason of’ a RICO violation has standing to bring a private civil action. Bowman, 985 F.2d at 384. The litigant’s injury, however, must result from a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496-97, 105 S.Ct. at 3285; Bowman, 985 F.2d at 385. The court turns next to the elements of a viable RICO claim. b. Elements Of Plaintiff’s § 1962(c) RICO Claim The plaintiff here alleges that defendants have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which is the provision of RICO that makes it •“unlawful for any person ... associated with an enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. ...” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); Bowman, 985 F.2d at 384 n. 1; Diamonds Plus, Inc., 960 F.2d at 768; Atlas Pile Driving Co., 886 F.2d at 990. Thus, to establish a RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity that must include at least two racketeering acts.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496, 105 S.Ct. at 3285; United States v. Nabors, 45 F.3d 238, 239 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Sedi-ma for the elements of the violation in a criminal RICO prosecution); Nolte v. Pearson, 994 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (8th Cir.1993); Bowman, 985 F.2d at 385 (quoting Sedima); Terry A. Lambert Plumbing, Inc. v. Western Sec. Bank, 934 F.2d 976, 979 n. 4 (8th Cir.1991); Granite Falls Bank, 924 F.2d at 153; Atlas Pile Driving Co., 886 F.2d at 990; and compare United States v. Bennett, 44 F.3d 1364, 1373 (8th Cir.1995) (another criminal RICO prosecution in which the court stated that “[t]o prove a substantive RICO violation, the government must establish: 1) the existence of an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce; 2) the defendant’s association with the enterprise; 3) that the defendant participated in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs; and 4) that the defendant’s participation was through a pattern of racketeering activity,” citing United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1260 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817, 105 S.Ct. 86, 83 L.Ed.2d 33 (1984), and United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom. Meinster v. United States, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982)). The court in Sedima concluded that the statute requires no more than this. Where the plaintiff alleges each element of the violation, the compensable injury nec- ■ essarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation is the commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise.... Any recoverable damages occurring by reason of a violation of § 1962(c) will flow from the commission of the predicate acts. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496-97, 105 S.Ct. at 3285-86 (footnotes omitted); Bowman, 985 F.2d at 385 (quoting Sedima). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals describes this as a “proximate cause” requirement that the injury asserted be proximately caused by the predicate acts alleged. Bowman, 985 F.2d at 387 (citing Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 1318, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992), and Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Serv., 978 F.2d 344, 351 (7th Cir.1992)). The court therefore turns to examination of Bryan Reynolds’s allegations of each of these elements of a § 1962(c) violation by the RICO defendants in this case. i. RICO enterprise. There appears to be some confusion among the parties as to what is alleged to be the RICO enterprise in this litigation. Defendant Condon, in particular, asserts that Bryan Reynolds has inadequately alleged an association-in-fact enterprise of the Law Firm and two of its clients, Condon and Lisa Reynolds, and that courts have uniformly rejected RICO enterprises alleged in this way. Defendant Condon asserts that viable RICO enterprises are more often “law firms gone bad,” in which the law firm itself is the primary vehicle for an insurance fraud or other scheme. However, Bryan Reynolds counters that he has alleged no such association-in-fact, but has repeatedly alleged and argued that the Law Firm itself is the “RICO enterprise.” A review of the complaint indicates that Bryan Reynolds’s characterization of his complaint is correct. Complaint, § 104 (“The Law Firm is an ‘enterprise’ engaged in activities which affect interstate commerce within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).”). The question actually relevant to the motions to dismiss here, therefore, is whether the Law Firm itself, not the Law Firm plus any other defendants, can be a proper RICO enterprise. The decisions of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals consistently define a RICO enterprise as exhibiting three basic characteristics: (1) a common or shared purpose; (2) some continuity of structure and personnel; and (3) an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in a pattern of racketeering. Nabors, 45 F.3d at 240 (quoting Atlas Pile Driving Co., 886 F.2d at 995); Diamonds Plus, Inc., 960 F.2d at 770-71 (also quoting Atlas Pile Driving Co.); Atlas Pile Driving Co., 886 F.2d at 995. The first characteristic, common or shared purpose, has apparently troubled the courts little, while the second, continuity of structure and personnel, has been of less certain meaning. De Wit, 879 F.Supp. at 966. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “continuity” does not require that members remain consistent. Nabors, 45 F.3d at 240. “Indeed, this circuit’s definition of an enterprise specifically includes the phrase ‘some continuity ... of personnel’ (emphasis supplied), Atlas Pile Driving Co., 886 F.2d at 995, not ‘complete continuity.’ ” Id. The third characteristic, distinct structure, has required the most clarification. De Wit, 879 F.Supp. at 967. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has defined the meaning of this characteristic as follows: Th[e] distinct structure might be demonstrated by proof that a group engaged in a diverse pattern of crimes or that it has an organizational pattern or system of authority beyond what was necessary to perpetrate the predicate crimes. The command system of a Mafia family is an example of this type of structure as is the hierarchy, planning, and division of profits within a prostitution ring. Diamonds Plus, Inc., 960 F.2d at 770 (quoting United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Phillips v. United States, 459 U.S. 1040, 103 S.Ct. 456, 74 L.Ed.2d 608 (1982)). Thus, the “focus of the inquiry” on this characteristic is “whether the enterprise encompasses more than what is necessary to commit the predicate RICO offense.” Id. Because a law firm obviously has the three characteristics listed in Nabors, it appears that Bryan Reynolds has alleged a proper “RICO enterprise.” A law firm must have, at a minimum, the common or shared purpose of practicing law, it involves at least some continuity of personnel, and it has a distinct structure apart from or greater than anything necessary to commit RICO predicate acts. Nabors, 45 F.3d at 240. Indeed, although defendant Condon may be correct in his assertion that courts are reluctant to recognize a “RICO enterprise” defined as a law firm plus a client or clients, decisions of other district courts are in almost complete agreement with the proposition that a law firm itself may be a RICO enterprise. See Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Freeman, 684 F.Supp. 1086, 1088 (S.D.Fla.1988) (law firm met only requirements for enterprise under United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2528, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981), that it have ongoing organization, formal or informal, and that various associates function as a continuing unit; the continuity of existence of the law firm, however, did not establish the “pattern of racketeering activity” requirement); Bingham v. Zolt, 683 F.Supp. 965, 970-71 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (law firm could be “enterprise” for RICO purposes, but for it also to be a “RICO defendant,” it had to form an enterprise with other firms or people); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rosenfield, 683 F.Supp. 106, 109 (E.D.Pa.1988) (law firm was RICO enterprise, because it was a professional corporation organized for the practice of law, and further had the requisite nexus with interstate commerce); Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot & Mannino, P.C., 670 F.Supp. 597, 598 (W.D.Pa.1987) (law firm identified as RICO enterprise challenged RICO claim on basis of plaintiffs standing, not failure to meet “enterprise” requirement); McMurtry v. Brasfield, 654 F.Supp. 1222, 1224 (E.D.Va.1987) (law firm can bq “RICO enterprise,” but it.cannot also be a “RICO defendant”); Park South Assocs. v. Fischbein, 626 F.Supp. 1108, 1112 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (law firm could be RICO enterprise because it was legal entity meeting organizational requirements). Yet, in Broyles v. Wilson, 812 F.Supp. 651 (M.D.La.1993), the district court concluded that a law firm could not be a RICO enterprise, because the plaintiff had not “allege[d] that [the law firm] existed for the purpose of effectuating [the RICO defendant’s] scheme to defraud [the plaintiff],” but instead had the common purpose of conducting the regular business of a law firm, ie., the practice of law. Broyles, 812 F.Supp. at 657. Thus, the question is, does the common or shared purpose of the supposed enterprise have to be to perpetrate the RICO predicate acts or to injure the plaintiff before the enterprise is a “RICO enterprise”? Although the district court in Broyles apparently concluded that it did, the court did not develop an argument in support of that conclusion. Although an .association-in-fact enterprise may well be associated only for the common purpose of committing, the illegal predicate acts or for the purposes of pursuing a larger illegal scheme, that is not so of a legal entity identified as a “RICO enterprise.” Indeed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that “[a]n enterprise is particularly likely to be found where ... the enterprise alleged is a legal entity rather than an ‘associational enterprise.’ Legal entities are garden-variety ‘enterprises’ which generally pose no problem of separateness from the predicate acts.” Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 n. 9 (8th Cir.1982) (citing cases). Furthermore, in Turkette, the Supreme Court distinguished between the “enterprise” requirement on the ground that it was met by organizational characteristics, while a “pattern of racketeering activity” required a series of criminal acts. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583, 101 S.Ct. at 2529. The court concludes here that there is no requirement that the common or shared purpose of the “RICO enterprise” in fact be the criminal or injurious scheme of which the plaintiff complains, or even that the common or shared purpose be illegal activity aimed at this or other victims; ■ the enterprise need only have a common or shared purpose, which may be legal or otherwise, and may be related to the predicate acts or not, as the case may be, as well as the other organizational characteristics of an enterprise, conti-. nuity of structure and structure distinct from that inherent in a pattern of racketeering activity, Nabors, 45 F.3d at 240, in order to meet the “enterprise” element of a RICO claim. The RICO enterprise, at least when identified as a legal entity, need not, however, have as its shared or common purpose the illegal scheme perpetrated against the victim, although, in some circumstances, that may be the case. The requirements the court finds necessary are met by the Law Firm here. Bryan Reynolds’s RICO claim cannot be dismissed for failure to plead a proper RICO enterprise. ii. Conduct of the enterprise. However, even though the Law Firm is a proper RICO enterprise, the court finds an insuperable bar to the RICO claim in this case in the inadequacy of any pleading of conduct of the enterprise by the RICO defendants. Where the record is “devoid of evidence that defendants participated, either directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise,” the court need'not reach any other element of the § 1962(c) RICO claim before dismissing it. Nolte, 994 F.2d at 1317. The “conduct” element is the distinguishing element of a § 1962(c) claim, because [i]n their comments on the floor, members of Congress consistently referred to subsection (c) as prohibiting the operation of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity and to subsections (a) and (b) as prohibiting the acquisition of an enterprise. Representative Cellar, who was Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee that voted RICO out in 1970, described § 1962(c) as proscribing the “conduct of the affairs of a business by a person acting in a managerial capacity, through racketeering activity.” 116 Cong. Rec. 35196 (1970) (emphasis added). Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 182, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 1171-72, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993) (emphasis in the original). The Court recognized that these remarks did not mean that § 1962(c) was limited to the operation or management of an enterprise, but that liability under § 1962(c) required that “one has participated in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.” Id. at 183, 113 S.Ct. at 1172 (approving the test applied by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals below in Arthur Young v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir.1991); Nolte, 994 F.2d at 1317 (also embracing this test). Whether the plaintiff has adequately pleaded this element of a EICO violation is the issue this court finds dispositive in this case. Defendants argue that Condon and Lisa Reynolds had no capacity to control the managerial decisions of the Law Firm, and did not attempt to do so. Bryan Reynolds seizes on the defendants’ apparent lack of argument as to defendant Orzechowski’s ability to manage the law firm as a concession that a partner in the Law Firm necessarily managed it, and Condon and Reynolds “indirectly” conducted the business of the Law Firm through Orzechowski. In Reeves, having established the test for “conduct” as considering defendant’s participation in the operation or management of the enterprise, the Supreme Court then considered whether this test improperly limited the reach of § 1962(c) to extend liability to “outsiders” to the enterprise. Id. at 185, 113 S.Ct. at 1173; see also De Wit, 879 F.Supp. at 964. The Court found four grounds for rejecting this concern: First, it ignores the fact that § 1962 has four subsections. Infiltration of legitimate organizations by “outsiders” is clearly addressed in subsections (a) and (b), and the “operation or management” test that applies under subsection (c) in no way limits the application of subsections (a) and (b) to “outsiders.” Second, § 1962(c) is limited to persons “employed by or associated with” an enterprise, suggesting a more limited reach than subsections (a) and (b), which do not contain such a restriction. Third, § 1962(e) cannot be interpreted to reach complete “outsiders” because liability depends on showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the “enterprise’s affairs,” not' just their own affairs. Of course, “outsiders” may be liable under § 1962(c) if they are “associated with” an enterprise and participate in the conduct of its affairs — that is, participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.... In sum, we hold that “to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs,” § 1962(c), one must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself. Reves, 507 U.S. at 185, 113 S.Ct. at 1173 (emphasis in the original). The court concludes that Lisa Reynolds and Condon are “outsiders” who do not properly fall within the proscription of § 1962(c). In the words of the Supreme Court, they conducted “just their own affairs,” not the “enterprise’s affairs.” Id. The court cannot conceive of a construction of the “conduct” requirement that would turn a client’s demands upon a lawyer into “conduct” of the law firm, any more than the Supreme Court could conceive that a firm’s provision of services to a “RICO enterprise” was “conduct” of the enterprise. Id. 507 U.S. at 177, 113 S.Ct. at 1169. As to defendant Orzechowski, the court does not believe that the mere fact that she was a partner in the Law Firm necessarily means that she “conducted” the enterprise for the purposes of a RICO claim. In other words, her status as a partner does not mean that she “conducted] the affairs of [the Law Firm] by ... acting in a managerial capacity, through racketeering activity.” Id. at 507 U.S. at 182, 113 S.Ct. at 1171-72 (quoting 116 Cong.Rec. 35196 (1970); first emphasis added by the Supreme Court and second emphasis added by this court here). There are no allegations whatsoever in the complaint that Orzechowski acted in a managerial capacity in the Law Firm. Id. What is alleged is that Orzechowski conducted the affairs of Condon and Lisa Reynolds. That, after all, is what an attorney does for a client. Even assuming, arguendo, that a partner in a law firm necessarily acts in such a managerial capacity, a proposition that may not always be factually supportable, and further assuming that no allegation of such management is necessary, there are no allegations that OrzechowsM conducted or managed the affairs of the Law Firm through racketeering activity, id. 507 U.S. at 182, 113 S.Ct. at 1172 (liability under § 1962(c) extends to “one [who] has participated in the operation or management of the enterprise itself’ through a pattern of racketeering activity), although there are certainly allegations that she conducted the affairs of Condon and Lisa Reynolds through activities falling within the definition of racketeering activity in § 1961. What is alleged is merely that Orzechowski used the facilities of the law firm to draft documents that were useful or necessary to the extortionate scheme Bryan Reynolds alleges. The court concludes that, as a matter of law, such allegations are insufficient to meet the “conduct” element of a RICO claim. Simply by alleging that an attorney acted on behalf of a client, whether the means used were fair or foul, and that in doing so, the attorney used the facilities of the firm, does not allege that the attorney has conducted the affairs of the law firm in which she is a partner, or that the clients indirectly conducted the affairs of the law firm through the attorney, through racketeering activity. Id. The pleading of the RICO claim is therefore deficient as a matter of law and must be dismissed. Nolte, 994 F.2d at 1317 (where the record is “devoid of evidence that defendants participated, either directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise,” the court need not reach any other element of the § 1962(c) RICO claim before dismissing it). in. Pattern of racketeering activity. Notwithstanding the court’s conclusion that the pleading of the RICO claim is deficient as a matter of law as to the “conduct” element, the court will reach the remaining elements of a RICO claim and other issues raised by the parties, which include the need to plead adequately a pattern of racketeering activity. Liability under RICO is premised upon conduct involving a “pattern” of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962; Manion, 967 F.2d at 1185. Indeed, at oral arguments, the parties lavished the greatest attention on the adequacy of the pleading of this element. Perhaps justifiably so, at least in other contexts in which “conduct” has been adequately alleged, because allegation of a “pattern of racketeering” has been described as “the heart of any RICO complaint.” Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 154, 107 S.Ct. at 2766; Granite Falls Bank, 924 F.2d at 154 (quoting Malley-Duff). This pattern requirement is the primary source of RICO’s unique character. Granite Falls Bank, 924 F.2d at 153. The Act defines a “pattern” as requiring at least two acts of racketeering or predicate acts. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5); Manion, 967 F.2d at 1185; Diamonds Plus, Inc., 960 F.2d at 769. Courts have noted that a RICO “pattern” has two characteristics, “relatedness” and “continuity.” Manion, 967 F.2d at 1185-86; Terry A. Lambert Plumbing, 934 F.2d at 979 (relatedness and continuity of acts is required by the legislative history, citing H. J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239, 109 S.Ct. at 2900). Predicate acts are “related” if they “have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 3285 n. 14 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)). Continuity requires proof of “related predicates extending over a substantial period of time” or “involving a specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely into the future.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242, 109 S.Ct. at 2902 (proof that predicate acts are “part of an ongoing entity’s regular way of doing business” may suffice to meet “continuity” requirement). As defendants often reminded the court in oral arguments, the “at least two acts of racketeering activity” requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) “is only a minimum requirement,” and two might not be enough. Diamonds Plus, Inc., 960 F.2d at 769 (citing H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238, 109 S.Ct. at 2900). The requirements that the acts be related and amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity are also essential. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that “[u]ltimately, the existence of a pattern is a question of fact.” Id. (citing Terry A. Lambert Plumbing, 934 F.2d at 980). The continuity requirement involves primarily the court’s examination of the length of time during which the conduct occurred. Terry A. Lambert Plumbing, 934 F.2d at 980; Atlas Pile Driving Co., 886 F.2d at 994. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has declined to determine what period of time is needed to establish continuity. Terry A. Lambert Plumbing, 934 F.2d at 980. Instead, the court has held that a period of “over three years” was sufficient, Atlas Pile Driving Co., 886 F.2d at 994, but a single transaction, with only one victim, taking place over a short period of time does not constitute a “pattern of racketeering” sufficient to sustain a RICO claim. Terry A. Lambert Plumbing, 934 F.2d at 981. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that a period, of seven months may be sufficient, if the plaintiff can demonstrate the predicate acts constitute more than “sporadic crime.” Nabors, 45 F.3d at 241. It is the “relatedness” factor that is fatal to some of the allegations of predicate acts alleged to form part of the “pattern of racketeering activity” here, specifically, the allegations of mail fraud. What the court finds to be fatal to these allegations is the absence of factual allegations identifying with sufficient specificity any predicate acts of mail fraud such that the court can determine' in what way they may or may not be related. The bald allegations of mail fraud do not identify the acts, actors, or victims sufficiently for the court to determine whether or not they “have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 3285 n. 14; Manion, 967 F.2d at 1185-86. Asserting that “defendants repeatedly caused letters and other matters and things to be delivered by the United States Postal,” Complaint, ¶ 107, at unspecified times within a period of several months to persons identified only generally as other defendants, the court, and the plaintiff, id., is inadequate as a matter of law to demonstrate or to allege either a RICO “pattern” of mail fraud or the underlying racketeering acts of mail fraud themselves. Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1327 (7th Cir.1994) (mail or wire fraud must be pleaded wi