Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER CASTILLO, District Judge. On October 31, 1994, while in a holding pattern for its approach to O’Hare International Airport, American Eagle Flight 4184 from Indianapolis, Indiana to Chicago, Illinois crashed near Roselawn, Indiana. Tragically, all 64 passengers and the 4 crew members aboard the flight were killed. Today, this Court finds that it has jurisdiction to preside over the numerous actions arising out of the crash of Flight 4184 that are presently pending on this Court’s docket. Of these 32 actions, 21 were originally filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (we shall refer collectively to these actions as the state court actions). Thereafter, Avions de Transport, Regional, G.I.E. (“ATR”), which is named in all the cases either as a defendant or a third-party defendant, removed the state court actions to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). The plaintiffs in the state court actions now move to remand the cases back to the Circuit Court of Cook County. For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs’ motion to remand is denied. BACKGROUND The plaintiffs in these related actions are representatives of the estates of the crash victims. The named defendants are the airline and related entities (the “AMR defendants”) as well as — in most cases — ATR and entities related to it. In a very small minority of eases, only the airline and related entities are named as defendants, with ATR brought in to the action as a third party defendant. ATR allegedly manufactured the ■ ATR72-210 aircraft involved in the crash. ATR removed these actions from state court contending that it is a “foreign state” as that term is defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq. (“the FSIA” or “the Act”). ATR’s removal petitions state in pertinent part: This Court would have, and does have, original subject matter jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. sections 1330 and 1331 in that ATR, at all relevant times, was, and is, a “foreign state” as defined in 28 U.S.C. section 1603 (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). ATR was, and is, a separate legal person, the majority of whose shares or other ownership interest were, and are, owned by the governments of the counties of France and Italy, it was not, and is not, a citizen of any of these United States, nor was it created under the laws of any third country. ATR’s Petition for Removal in Severin v. American Eagle, No. 95 C 252 ¶ 3; see also ATR’s Petition for Removal in Spencer v. AMR Corp., No. 95 C 629 ¶ 2. (These particular petitions are cited as representative exemplars of ATR’s removal petitions filed in all of the state court actions.) As evidence of its corporate structure and ownership, ATR has submitted the declaration of its Corporate Secretary, Francesco Paolo Giobbe. Giobbe states that ATR is an entity formed under French law, is not constituted under the laws of any other country, and is not incorporated in any state of the United States. Giobbe Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3. Giobbe further states that at least 65% of ATR’s shares are owned by the governments of France and Italy. Id. ¶ 3. Specifically, Giobbe attests that: Fifty percent (50%) of the shares of ATR are owned by the French government national aerospace concern, Soeiété Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (“SNIA”). SNIA, in turn, is majority (91.42%) owned by the French government. Of the French government’s 91.42% ownership interest, 62.16% is owned directly. Another 20% is owned by SOGEPA (a 100% owned holding entity of the French Government). Another 17.81% is owned through Crédit Lyonnais. Crédit Lyonnais is itself 52% owned by the French Government. The other fifty percent (50%) of the shares of ATR are owned by Aenia. Aenia is a division of Finmeccanica S.p.A. Finmecca-nica is the Italian government national aerospace concern, and is majority, minimum sixty-two (62%), owned by I.R.I. (a 100% owned holding entity of the Italian government). Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. ATR has also submitted the declarations of Roberto Camiz, Aenia’s Legal Counsel, and Philippe Simon, Deputy General Counsel for SNIA. Camiz states that Aenia is formed under Italian law, is not constituted under the laws of any other country, and is not incorporated in any state of the United States. Camiz Decl. ¶ 2. Camiz’ declaration repeats the ownership information concerning Aenia contained in Giobbe’s declaration and adds that Finmeccanica is “an Italian government national industrial concern acting in the aerospace field through Aenia,” is formed under Italian law, is not constituted under the laws of any other country and is not incorporated in any state of the United States. Id. ¶3. Similarly, Simon’s declaration states that SNIA, SOGEPA, and Crédit Lyonnais are “separate juridical entities] formed under French law.” Simon Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4. Simon’s declaration repeats the ownership information concerning SNIA contained in Giobbe’s declaration and confirms that SNIA “is the French government national aerospace concern.” Id. ¶2. Plaintiffs contest ATR’s invocation of the FSIA, arguing principally that ATR’s ownership structure does not entitle it to “foreign state” status under the Act. Specifically. plaintiffs contend that ATR’s connection to its foreign state ownership interests is achieved through both “pooling” and “tier-ing” of such interests and that the FSIA does not recognize such mechanisms for purposes of determining whether an entity may be considered a foreign state under the Act. Plaintiffs also raise several Seventh Amendment objections to ATR’s invocation of the Act. ANALYSIS Plaintiffs’ motion to remand requires this Court to wrestle with the vague and circuitous language of the FSIA. Federal courts that have had the opportunity to interpret the FSIA have remarked on its user-unfriendly nature with some frequency. See e.g., Vencedora Oceánica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne De Navigation (C.N.A.N.), 730 F.2d 195, 205 (5th Cir.1984) (“The FSIA presents a peculiarly twisted exercise in statutory construction.”); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 302 (2d Cir.1981) (referring to the FSIA as a “vaguely worded statute”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148, 102 S.Ct. 1012, 71 L.Ed.2d 301 (1982); Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F.Supp. 1094, 1106 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (referring to the FSIA as “remarkably obtuse”). Indeed, in Udaras, the court described the FSIA as “a six-year-old labyrinth that, owing to the numerous interpretive questions engendered by its bizarre structure and its many deliberately vague provisions, has during its brief lifetime been a financial boon for the private bar but a constant bane of the federal judiciary.” 549 F.Supp. at 1105. Although the foregoing remarks have been elicited by provisions of the FSIA other than those we confront in the instant case, we find them no less appropriate with respect to § 1603, to which we shall turn momentarily. First, a little background will help to put things in context. The FSIA provides that, subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the Act, “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1604. “The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ‘provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this country.’ ” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 1476, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993) (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. 488 U.S. 428, 433, 109 S.Ct. 683, 687-88, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989)). One of the most significant exceptions to immunity, and the one, no doubt that will ultimately come into play in this action is the “commercial activity” exception: A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case ... in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act eauses a direct effect in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). The threshold inquiry in applying the Act, of course, must be whether a “foreign state”, as defined by the Act, is a party to the action. That is the issue in dispute in this case. ATR contends it is a “foreign state”; the plaintiffs contend it is not. The Act defines a “foreign state” as follows: (a) A “foreign state”, ... includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b). (b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” means any entity— (1)which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country. 28 U.S.C. § 1603. The House Judiciary Report’s section-by-section analysis of the amended bill that was to become the FSIA provides: Section 1603. Definitions Section 1603 defines five terms that are used in the bill: (a) Foreign state. — Subsection (a) defines the term foreign state as used in all provisions of chapter 97 [the “Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States” chapter of the United States Code], except section 1608. In section 1608, the term “foreign state” refers only to the sovereign state itself. As the' definition indicates, the term “foreign state” as used in every other section of chapter 97 includes not only the foreign state but also political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the for-, eign state. H.R.Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6613. With this statutory background in place, we may now consider the plaintiffs’ contentions. Before considering the principal matters at issue, we pause to dispose of a miscellany of other arguments raised by the plaintiffs. Sufficiency of ATR’s Factual Showing as to Ownership As a threshold issue, several of the plaintiffs contend that ATR’s factual showing regarding its ownership structure is insufficient to support a claim of foreign-state ownership. However, the Court finds that Giobbe’s declaration (in conjunction with the supporting attachments) which explicitly states that “[f]ifty percent (50%) of the shares of ATR are owned by” SNIA and “[t]he other fifty percent (50%) of the shares of ATR are owned by Alenia” is sufficient. The abstract from the Registry of Commerce and Corporations of Toulouse France accompanying Giobbe’s declaration evidences that ATR is comprised of two members, SNIA and Alenia (a division of Finmeccanica S.p.A.), and that these two entities appoint representatives to the management and administration of ATR. The “Statutes” (by-laws) of ATR, also submitted in conjunction with the Giobbe declaration, add further corroboration. Additionally, we find the declarations of Messrs. Simon and Camiz, in conjunction with the supporting materials, sufficiently evidence the ownership interests of the French and Italian governments in SNIA and Alenia, respectively. Thus, what remains to be decided is whether the structure of ownership interests in ATR can support ATR’s claim to foreign state status. We discuss this issue at length below. The Purportedly “Collusive” Joinder of ATR to Create Federal Jurisdiction A number of the plaintiffs argue that the AMR defendants’ filing of the third-party complaints against ATR constituted a fraudulent and collusive act by and between the AMR defendants and ATR to create federal jurisdiction. Although the Court is sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ contentions that what is going on here is a transparent attempt to have these suits litigated in federal rather than state court, we find nothing improper in these efforts. Specifically, we find that there has been no manipulation of jurisdictional facts to create jurisdiction. See Nolan v. Boeing Co., . 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 962, 111 S.Ct. 1587, 113 L.Ed.2d 651 (1991). The AMR defendants have brought legitimate claims, for contribution and indemnity against ATR. And, the fact that ATR has answered the AMR complaints by, among other things, raising the affirmative defense that such claims are precluded by law and contract does not render the AMR complaints a sham. Plainly, the validity of ATR’s affirmative defenses remains to be litigated. No doubt the AMR defendants and ATR share a common interest in having this suit tried in a federal court rather than state court. But this fact alone does not collusion make for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1359; rather, to defeat federal jurisdiction, the collusion must involve some element of deceit or artifice. We need not concern ourselves with why these parties prefer to be in federal court so long as there is a legitimate basis for jurisdiction. See Chicago v. Mills, 204 U.S. 321, 330, 27 S.Ct. 286, 289, 51 L.Ed. 504 (1907) (noting that so long as a suit “is free from fraud or collusion a party’s motive in preferring a federal tribunal is immaterial”). Accordingly, because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any fraudulent manipulation of jurisdictional facts, the Court rejects their contention that federal jurisdiction has been improperly obtained through collusion. ' We now turn to consider the more substantial issues presented by the instant motions. “Pooling” of Ownership Interests The plaintiffs maintain that the plain language of the FSIA indicates that “foreign state” status is conferred under the Act only where a majority interest in the entity is owned by a foreign state, not a number of foreign states. Because ATR’s removal petition states that “ATR was, and is, a separate legal person, the majority of whose shares or other ownership interest were, and are, owned by the governments of the countries of France and Italy ... ”, plaintiffs contend that ATR cannot claim foreign state status and has pleaded itself outside of the reach of the FSIA. In support of its position, plaintiffs rely on Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 794 F.Supp. 650 (S.D.Tex.1992). In Linton, the court held that where an entity is owned by several other entities (the “owning entities”), an owning entity may not pool its ownership interests with those, of the other owning entities for purposes of calculating the total foreign state ownership of the owned entity, unless that owning entity is, itself, majority owned by a foreign state. Specifically, in Linton,the removing defendant (Airbus Industrie or “AI”) was owned by four corporations. Two of the owning corporations, which collectively owned 42.1% of AI, were controlled unquestionably by foreign states; a third owning corporation, which owned 20% of AI was unquestionably privately owned. The fourth owning corporation (Deutsch Airbus GmbH or “DA”) owned 37.9% of AI. The question addressed by the Linton court was articulated as follows: “[Assuming that pooling is allowed, the critical question is whether [DA’s] interest can be pooled with the 42.1% owned by foreign states. If so then FSIA applies; otherwise it does not.” 794 F.Supp. at 652. The Linton court’s answer to this question turned on whether DA could be considered a foreign state. If it was, the court assumed that its foreign state interests in AI could be pooled with the others; on the other hand, if DA was not a foreign state, the court would not allow the foreign state interests held through DA to be pooled with the others. DA was owned by two companies. One, unquestionably an agency of the German government, owned 20% of DA; the other, which owned 80% of DA, was a German corporation, only 36.56% of which was owned by foreign states (the remaining 63.44% was privately owned). The removing defendants in Linton reasoned that the overall foreign-state ownership of AI totalled slightly over 60% [42.1% + {(.2) (37.9%) = 7.58% } + {(.8) (.3656) (37.9%) = 11.08} = 60.76% ]; hence, they argued, AI should be regarded as having a majority of its shares owned by a foreign state. The Linton court rejected this approach. Instead, the court reasoned that DA itself was not a foreign state because a majority of its shares was not owned by a foreign state; only 49.25% [20% = {(.3656) (80%) = 29.25%}] of DA’s shares were owned by foreign states. 794 F.Supp. at 652. In reaching its holding that pooling would not be permitted under such circumstances, the court stated: [Ejven assuming that pooling is permitted, it is one thing to say that where an entity is owned by several other entities, FSIA applies to the first entity if more than 50% of its shares are owned by entities which are themselves foreign states. It is quite another thing to say that entities which are not foreign states or their instrumentalities may nevertheless pool their ownership interests in another entity such that FSIA applies to the latter. Id. Thus, the court held that because DA was not majority owned by a foreign state, any foreign state ownership interests in AI derived through DA could not be pooled with other foreign state ownership interests. 794 F.Supp. at 653-54. ' Plaintiffs read Linton as support for the broad proposition that pooling of (foreign state) ownership interests is impermissible for purposes of determining whether an entity claiming foreign state status is, in fact, majority owned by a foreign state. However, as should be clear from the foregoing account, this is not Linton's holding. Although on its face Linton is couched in terms of pooling, the case actually presents a tier-ing question — where the issue is “whether through ‘tiering’[,] a foreign state’s ownership interest can be attributed [to Airbus] when that foreign state did not own a majority interest in the company that held the ownership interest in Airbus.” Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 30 F.3d 592 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 639, 130 L.Ed.2d 545 (1994). With respect to the issue of whether pooling per se is permissible, the Linton opinion equivocates. First,the court stated that it was “far from clear that pooling is allowed under FSIA”, noting: Arguably, if Congress had wished to permit pooling, it could have easily defined a foreign state as an entity 50% or more of whose shares are owned by a foreign state or states. Because Congress did not so define foreign state, it is not for the courts to substitute this definition for the one provided. 794 F.Supp. at 652. However, shortly thereafter, the court continued: Obviously, FSIA applies to foreign states. Likewise under section 1603, an entity 50% or more of whose shares are owned by a foreign state is itself a foreign state. In the Court’s view, although reasonable minds could disagree, it does not do too much violence to either the plain language or the spirit of FSIA to hold that foreign states may pool, their interests in an entity for purposes of determining whether that entity is a foreign state under FSIA. FSIA would unquestionably apply if any owner were a party or if more than 50% of the entity in question were owned by any single foreign state. It is not, therefore, too much of a stretch to assume that Congress intended FSIA to apply to an entity owned by several foreign states, even if no single foreign states [sic] owns a majority: a majority of the entity’s stock or other ownership interest is still owned by foreign states to which Congress clearly intended FSIA to apply. Id. at 652-53. Thus, although Linton sends mixed messages regarding the permissibility of pooling per se, it plainly does not hold pooling to be impermissible under FSIA. To the extent that Linton intimates that pooling of ownership interests is impermissible, we note that — although the Fifth Circuit declined to review the FSIA issue — in dicta, the court cast doubt on the district court’s view: We ... observe that the district court questioned whether the interests of two or more foreign states could be combined, commenting that “pooling” appears to be foreclosed by the use of the state (“singular”) in the FSIA. Linton, 794 F.Supp. at 652. This reasoning probably should be examined in light of the rules of statutory ■ construction, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (providing that “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things” unless the context indicates otherwise), and in light of the cases in which the pooling issue has been considered. Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 30 F.3d 592, 598 n. 29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 639, 130 L.Ed.2d 545 (1994). And, in Mangattu v. M/V IBN HAYYAN, 35 F.3d 205, 207-08 (5th Cir.1994), the Fifth Circuit expressly held that foreign states could pool their ownership interests for purposes of meeting § 1603(b)(2)’s majority ownership requirement (“We hold that an entity 100% owned by foreign states, created by an agreement of all participating states, satisfies the requirements of § 1603(b)(2)”). Thus, the district court opinion in Linton is of very little persuasive force with respect to the pooling issue. Also, as the court observed in Linton, the majority of courts confronting the issue have, either explicitly or implicitly, recognized the propriety of pooling ownership interests for purposes of determining whether an entity may be considered an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA. See Linton, 794 F.Supp. at 651 (noting “every court that has considered the issue has approved this type of pooling”). Thus, for example, in LeDonne v. Gulf Air, Inc., 700 F.Supp. 1400 (E.D.Va.1988), the court found that Gulf Air, Inc. — a joint stock company created by a treaty among the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, the State of Bahrain, the State of Qatar, and the Sultanate of Oman, who collectively owned 100% of Gulf Air’s stock, id. at 1402 — was an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state notwithstanding the fact that no single foreign state owned a majority of its shares. The LeDonne court noted: In plaintiffs view, the FSIA does not apply unless majority ownership vests in a single foreign state. This is an unnecessary literalism that runs counter to the Act’s purpose and ignores the well-established international practice of states acting jointly through treaty-created entities for public or sovereign purposes. If the policies that animate the FSIA are to be given their full range, it must, therefore, apply to treaty-created instrumentalities jointly owned by foreign states. Id. at 1406. See also Mangattu v. M/V IBN HAYYAN, 35 F.3d 205, 207-08 (5th Cir.1994) (finding that foreign states could pool their ownership interests and that defendant, wholly owned by six foreign sovereigns, was therefore an instrumentality of a foreign state; “We hold that an entity 100% owned by foreign states, created by an agreement of all participating states, satisfies the requirements of § 1603(b)(2)”); Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F.Supp. 525, 530-31 (S.D.Tex.1994) (finding entity to be a foreign state under the FSIA where a majority of its shares were owned by two foreign states at one relevant time and by three foreign states at another); Aluminum Distribs., Inc. v. Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill Co., 1989 WL 64174 (N.D.Ill.1989) (following LeDonne and finding “that the ownership of a majority of shares by several foreign states satisfies the requirements of § 1603(b)(2)”); In re EAL (Delaware) Corp., 1994 WL 828320 *4 (D.Del.1994) (same); see also Rios v. Marshall, 530 F.Supp. 351, 371 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (assuming without discussion that an unincorporated association serving as the representative of 11 British West Indian governments was an instrumentality of those foreign states); but see Gardiner Stone Hunter Int’l v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, S.A., 896 F.Supp. 125, 131 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (reasoning that pooling is only permitted where the entity in question was created by treaty or was a multinational joint venture). We concur with the majority of courts that. have permitted the pooling of ownership interests for purposes of determining whether § 1603(b)(2)’s majority ownership requirement is met. In the first place, we find that 1 U.S.C. § 1 permits reading § 1603(b)(2) as referring to majority ownership by “foreign states” rather than simply “a foreign state.” Moreover, we find that the wooden reading urged by the plaintiffs would most assuredly frustrate the FSIA’s objective of providing “a comprehensive jurisdictional scheme in cases involving foreign states.” H.R.Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611. There is simply no sound policy justification for reading the FSIA to apply to an entity majority owned by one foreign state but not to apply to an entity majority owned by two or more foreign states. The sensitive concerns raised by a federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign are no less implicated in the latter context. Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs’ argument that pooling is impermissible. “Tiering” of Ownership Interests That does not end our inquiry, however, because this case does not simply involve pooling; in addition, a tiering of ownership interests is involved. As ATR’s evidence indicates, France and Italy’s respective fifty percent ownership interests in ATR are not direct ownership interests. Instead, these two governments “own” ATR through intermediary corporate entities. As set forth above, ATR’s undisputed evidence indicates that fifty percent of ATR is owned by the French government aerospace concern SNIA. SNIA, in turn, is 91.42% owned by the French government in the following manner: 62.16% is owned by the French government directly; 20% of SNIA is owned by Sogepa, a wholly owned holding entity of the French government; and, 17.81% of SNIA is owned by Crédit Lyonnais Industria, which, in turn, is wholly owned by Credit Lyonnais, which is at least 52% owned by the French government. The declaration of Philippe Simon, Deputy General Counsel for SNIA, and the supporting materials, indicate that'SNIA, Sogepa, Credit Lyonnais Industria, and Credit Lyonnais are all separate juridical entities formed under French law. A copy of a “K-BIS” Abstract from the Court of Commerce of Paris, France is attached to Simon’s declaration. That Abstract reflects that five of SNIA’s directors represent the French State through various ministries (i.e., defense, economy, transportation) and one represents Sogepa. The other fifty percent of ATR is owned by Alenia, a division of Finmeccanica S.p.A. The declaration of Alenia’s Legal Counsel, Roberto Camiz details Alenia’s ownership structure. Alenia is a division of Finmecca-nica S.p.A. Finmeccanica, described by Camiz as “an Italian government national industrial concern acting in the aerospace field through Alenia” is, in turn, majority (at least 62%) owned by Instituto Per La Ricos-truzione Industríale (“I.R.I.”), a wholly owned holding entity of the Italian government. Camiz states that “[a]ll of the capital stock of I.R.I. is represented by a single share owned by the Italian state through the Ministry of the Treasury.” Camiz Deel. ¶ 8. Camiz further states that Finmeccanica and I.R.I. are separate juridical entities formed under Italian law. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7. Accompanying Camiz’s declaration are copies of Finmec-canica and I.R.I.’s Certificates of Registration evidencing their separate juridical existence and Finmeccanica’s Certificáte also confirms that Alenia is a division of Finmec-canica. The issue raised by plaintiffs is whether France and Italy may “tier” their ownership interests through corporate intermediaries such as SNIA and Alenia. We conclude that they may. Until very recently, courts have uniformly considered majority state-owned corporations to be agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states for FSIA purposes even where the state ownership was only indirect. See, e.g., Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F.Supp. 1315, 1318 n. 5 (S.D.Tex.1995) (finding defendant Dead Sea Bromine Co. Ltd. to be a agency or instrumentality of Israel because Israel owned a majority of its shares and noting “[t]he fact that Israel’s ownership interest in Dead Sea is ‘indirect’ because Dead Sea is a wholly owned subsidiary of an entity in which Israel owns an indirect majority interest is immaterial”); Talbot v. Saipem A.G., 835 F.Supp. 352, 353 n.,2 (S.D.Tex.1993) (finding defendant Saipem S.p.A. to be a foreign state where it was owned indirectly (third-tier) by Italy’s Ministry of Treasury through a chain of intermediary corporations and noting “[t]hat Saipem’s ownership by the Italian government is indirect is immaterial”); Trump Taj Mahal Assocs. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta S.p.A, 761 F.Supp. 1143, 1150 (D.N.J.1991) (finding defendant Augusta S.p.A. to be a foreign state under § 1603(b)(2) despite the fact that its link to the Italian government was “triple-tiered”), aff'd without opinion, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826, 113 S.Ct. 84, 121 L.Ed.2d 47 (1992); Rutkowski v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 1988 WL 107342 (N.D.Ill.1988) (finding defendant Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (“ACL”) to be a foreign state under § 1603(b)(2) despite the fact that Quebec’s ownership of ACL was tiered through two other corporations); cf. Credit Lyonnais v. Getty Square Assocs., 876 F.Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (applying § 1603(b)(2) in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) and permitting the pooling of direct French ownership interests in defendant deriving through an intermediary corporation). Permitting ownership interests to be tiered for purposes of determining whether a defendant is entitled to foreign state status under § 1603 follows from § 1603’s definition of a foreign state. A foreign state “includes ... an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” in turn, is defined as any entity — (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). Thus, under § 1603(b)(2), if Corporation X is directly majority-owned by a foreign state it constitutes “an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” and therefore, under § 1603(a), it is a “foreign state.” If Corporation X, in turn, owns the majority of shares of Corporation Y, Corporation Y is, by definition, both owned by a foreign state [§ 1603(a) ] and is a foreign state [§ 1603(b)(2)], This Court’s reading of § 1603(b)(2) in conjunction with § 1603(a) leads to the conclusion that so long as the corporate intermediaries standing between a foreign state and a defendant seeking to invoke foreign state status are themselves majority-owned by a statutorily-defined “foreign state” (which, to be explicit, includes an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state), such tiering of ownership interests will not deprive the defendant of foreign state status. Recently, in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 187, 133 L.Ed.2d 124 (1995), the Ninth Circuit rejected such an analysis, concluding that an entity wholly owned by “an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” is not owned by a “foreign state or political subdivision thereof’ and hence does not meet the definition of § 1603(b)(2). Id. at 1462. The Gates court reasoned that the term “foreign state” could not be equated with the term “agency or instrumentality” for two reasons. First, the court observed that “the statute provides that a foreign state includes an agency or instrumentality, not that it is an agency or instrumentality or that it is defined as an agency or instrumentality.” Id. Respectfully, we find this observation to be of very little force. By its heading, § 1603 purports to provide “Definitions” of terms used in the FSIA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (captioned “Definitions”); see also H.R.Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6613 (“Subsection (a) defines the term foreign state as used in all provisions of [the Act]”) (emphasis added). Moreover, other sections of the Act plainly recognize that § 1603 sets forth determinative definitions of the term foreign state; for instance, the FSIA’s jurisdictional provision provides that “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any nonju-ry civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (emphasis added). The fact that § 1603 uses the expression “includes” does not alter the conclusion that the section sets out the scope of the intended meaning of the term foreign state as used throughout the Act. The plain meaning of this definitional provision, as informed by its legislative history, is that where the term foreign state occurs in the Act it is to be read as including agencies and instrumentalities of the foreign state. We decline to ignore this clear definitional provision. The Gates court also reasoned that the term foreign state, as used in § 1603(b)(2) could not be equated with “an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” because: If Congress had intended “agencies or in-strumentalities of a foreign state” to mean “a foreign state” for the purposes of section 1603, then it also would have intended “a political subdivision” to mean “a foreign state” because section 1603(a) defines a foreign state as including both “a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” The statutory language strongly indicates that Congress did not intend this interpretation, however, because the remainder of the section differentiates between “foreign states” and “political subdivisions thereof.” Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462. In this regard, the court observed that § 1603(b)(2) speaks of “an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof” and the court further observed that the House Report’s analysis of this section also distinguishes between foreign states and political.subdivisions thereof: The second criterion requires that the entity be either an organ of a foreign state (or of a foreign state’s political subdivision), or that a majority of the entity’s shares or other ownership interest be owned by a foreign state (or by a foreign state’s political subdivision). If such entities are entirely owned by a foreign state, they would of course be included within the definition. Where ownership is divided between a foreign state and private interests, the entity will be deemed to be an. agency or instrumentality of a foreign state only if a majority of the ownership interests (shares of stock or otherwise) is owned by a foreign state or by a foreign state’s political subdivision. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614) (emphasis added). Insofar as the Gates court is highlighting the fact that the references to “a foreign state’s political subdivision” in the statute and House Report are entirely supers fluous given that § 1603 defines a foreign state to include its political subdivisions, this Court agrees. We respectfully do not agree, however, that this superfluous reference to political subdivisions compels the conclusion that the term foreign state as used in § 1603(b)(2) was intended by Congress to refer only to the sovereign states themselves and not their agencies or instrumentalities. Such a conclusion flies in the face of both the plain language of § 1603(a) as well as the House Report’s analysis of § 1603(a), wherein the House Judiciary Committee observed: Subsection (a) defines the term foreign state as used in all provisions of chapter 97 [the “Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States” chapter of the. United States Code], except section 1608. In section 1608, the term ‘foreign state’ refers only to the sovereign state itself. H.R.Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6613. Here, in quite clear terms, the committee, specifies that subsection (a)’s definition applies “in all provisions” of the Act except § 1608 — there, and only there, “the term ‘foreign state’ refers only to the sovereign state itself.” The Gates court’s suggestion that the term foreign state as used in § 1603(b)(2) refers only to the sovereign state itself cannot be reconciled with this clear statement of legislative intent, nor the language of the statute itself. Moreover, in view of Congress’ clear statement that § 1603’s definition of foreign state applies “except as used in section 1608,” we find it inconceivable that Congress intended to nullify that definition in the section immediately following it through the roundabout method of including a reference to political subdivisions and inviting the reader to rely on the canon of statutory construction expressio unis est exclusio alterius (“Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another”). Moreover, the absence of any legislative history suggesting that Congress actually intended to override its definition of foreign state through this roundabout means buttresses our conclusion. Rather, we conclude that the term foreign state as used in § 1603(b)(2) includes the agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state. Although it is less than clear, we surmise that Congress included the superfluous reference to a “political subdivision” in § 1603(b)(2) for emphasis rather than to alter the definition of the term foreign state and that Congress omitted explicit (and equally superfluous) reference to agencies or instrumentalities in § 1603(b)(2) because it would render the definition of “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” circular— defining the term by way of referring to the term. Thus, while the Gates court was certainly correct that Congress “could easily have stated that [in order to be deemed an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state] an entity must be owned by a foreign state, a political subdivision or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state or political subdivision,” Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462, to do so would have introduced an unnecessary circularity into the statute. In view of the many other drafting shortcomings of the Act, the avoidance of this circularity is to be applauded. Although the Gates court’s analysis has an arguable foundation, we believe that its conclusion is inconsistent with the plain language of the Act as well as its legislative history. It would appear that the Gates decision was driven, in some part, by its concern that: [A] contrary reading of the statute could expand immunity far beyond what Congress intended. As it is written, the Act provides immunity to entities that are either organs of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof or have a majority of shares owned by the foreign state or political subdivision. To add to that list entities that are owned by an agency or instrumentality would expand the potential immunity considerably because it would provide potential immunity for every subsidiary in a corporate chain, no matter how far down the line, so long as the first corporation is an organ of the foreign state or political subdivision or has a majority of its shares owned by the foreign state or political subdivision. Id. We believe that this Court’s proper role is to give effect to what we perceive to be Congress’ plain language and intent, and to leave the legitimate concerns raised by the Gates court to the arena where they should be resolved — the legislative and executive branches of our government. Moreover, we note that the Gates court, like this Court, professes to be giving effect to “a literal reading of the statute,” id.; however, that court’s literal reading is achieved only by nullifying a key definitional provision of the Act and ignoring the House Judiciary Committee’s analysis of that definitional provision. Therefore we respectfully decline to follow it. Because we find that an entity that is majority owned by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state meets the definition of a foreign state under the PSIA, we further find that tiering of ownership interests is perfectly permissible for purposes of determining whether an entity is entitled to foreign state status under the Act. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contentions, we do not believe that permitting both pooling and tiering, as we do in the present case, so far removes the foreign state from the entity named as the defendant as to unduly expand the scope of the PSIA beyond that contemplated by Congress. In the first place, permitting pooling does nothing to “remove” or “distance” the foreign state from the entity. The ownership interests in the entity are no more remote whether the entity is owned by one foreign state or several. It is only tiering that permits the ownership interests of the foreign sovereign to become, in some sense, remote. However, as we have seen, this possibility derives from the language of the Act and we have neither the authority nor the inclination to rework the statute. In view of all of the foregoing considerations, we find that ATR is a foreign state as defined by the FSIA. Accordingly, we find that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over these related cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1330 and § 1441 and removal of the state court actions to federal court was therefore proper. Plaintiffs’ arguments that ATR was engaged in commercial activity and is therefore not entitled to immunity are misplaced in the instant remand motions. Whether ATR is entitled to immunity or is exempt from immunity under the commercial activity exception is a matter for another day. The threshold question, is simply whether ATR is entitled to foreign state status under the Act, permitting it to remove these actions from state court. The answer, again, is yes. We turn next to consider the difficult question of whether, in those eases where ATR is only named as a third-party defendant, removal of the entire action (as opposed to only the third-party action) is appropriate. Scope of Removal In view of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the state court actions naming ATR as a defendant were properly removed to federal court by ATR under the FSIA. The analysis is more complicated with respect to those actions in which ATR was not named as a defendant in the underlying state court action but rather was impleaded into the action by being named as a third-party defendant by the AMR defendants. The plaintiffs contend that only the third-party action — not the underlying action — may be removed to federal court and that removing the underlying action under the FSIA would infringe their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. We address the Seventh Amendment issues in the next section. In analyzing the proper scope of removal under the FSIA, we must begin by reviewing the Act’s jurisdictional and removal provisions. The FSIA’s jurisdictional provision states: The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.... 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). The Act’s removal provision states: Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. Upon removal the action shall be tried by the court without jury. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). Courts construing this language have reached conflicting conclusions with respect to the proper scope of removal under the FSIA. Compare In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 F.2d 1265 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that the underlying claims against the nonforeign state defendant as well as the third-party claims against the foreign defendant may be removed), Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.1990) (same), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 962, 111 S.Ct. 1587, 113 L.Ed.2d 651 (1991), Lopez del Valle v. Go-bierno de la Capital, 855 F.Supp. 34, 36-37 (D.Puerto Rico 1994) (same), Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) conferred jurisdiction over the entire civil action not just the claims against the foreign state in a suit in which a foreign state was named as a defendant along with nonforeign-state code-fendants) and Arango v. Guzman, 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir.1980) (same) with Schlumberger Indus., Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 36 F.3d 1274 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) does not confer pendent party jurisdiction over nonforeign-state code-fendants) and Alifieris v. American Airlines, Inc., 523 F.Supp. 1189 (E.D.N.Y.1981) (holding that only the third-party complaint against the foreign state may be removed and remanding claims outside the third-party complaint to state court). As the Seventh Circuit recently observed, “[t]he majority view is that the statute authorizing the removal of suits against a foreign state, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), authorizes the removal of the entire ease, even if there are nonforeign defendants.” Alonzi v. Budget Constr. Co., 55 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir.1995). This has been held to be the case in actions involving foreign-state as well as nonforeign-state defendants, see e.g., Teledyne; Arango, supra, and in cases involving foreign states brought into the case solely as third-party defendants, see, e.g., Surinam Airways; Nolan, supra. The Seventh Circuit has yet to resolve the issue for this circuit. Alonzi, 55 F.3d at 333-34. By and large, the arguments for and against extending removal to the entire action and not just the claims against the foreign state have been amply set out in the foregoing opinions. We now turn to an examination of the reasoning in those opinions. Because the reasoning is essentially the same in all cases on either side of the split, we will confine our discussion to representative cases. In Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 962, 111 S.Ct. 1587, 113 L.Ed.2d 651 (1991), the Fifth Circuit addressed the scope of removal under § 1441(d) in a context quite similar to that presented here. In Nolan, sixteen personal injury suits were filed in state court by the representatives of the estates of the decedents and injured passengers who were killed or injured in the crash of a Boeing 737-400 aircraft. The plaintiffs named as defendants the designer and manufacturer of the aircraft (Boeing); the designer and manufacturer of portions of the aircraft’s engines (General Electric Company); and another defendant that had participated in the marketing of the aircraft’s engines. Boeing subsequently obtained leave of the state court to file third-party demands for contribution and indemnification against Societe Nationale d’Etude et de Construction de Moteurs d’Aviation, S.A. (SNECMA), a French Government-owned concern that manufactured the aircraft’s engines. Thereafter, SNEC-MA removed the sixteen suits to federal district court under § 1441(d). The plaintiffs sought remand to the state court contending that, at most, SNECMA was entitled to remove the third-party claims only, not the entire action. The district court denied the motion to remand and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit analyzed the issue as one of “pendent party” jurisdiction — that is, assuming that removal of the third-party claims were proper, did .the federal district court properly possess pendent party jurisdiction over the underlying action. The court’s analysis was framed by the Supreme Court’s then recent opinion in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989), in which the Court held that there is no pendent party jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) and cast doubt on the availability of pendent party jurisdiction- generally. Congress responded to the Finley decision by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which “co-difie[d] pendent jurisdiction under the name ‘supplemental jurisdiction,’ expressly including pendent party jurisdiction.” Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1181 (7th Cir.1993). By extending federal jurisdiction “to all claims sufficiently related to the claim on which its original jurisdiction is based to be part of the same case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution,” id., section 1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdiction “to the constitutional limit.” Id. at 1182. Because Finley’s reservations concerning pendent party jurisdiction have now been largely met by § 1367(a), much of Nolan’s discussion is superfluous at this point, nevertheless, Nolan’s analysis is instructive. The Nolan court began its analysis by noting that there was no constitutional obstacle to exercising pendent party jurisdiction over the underlying actions because the parties to those actions possessed “minimal diversity,” which is. all that is constitutionally required. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531, 87 S.Ct. 1199, 1204, 18 L.Ed.2d 270 (1967) (finding that “Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens”). In the instant case, as in Nolan, the parties to the underlying state court actions possess minimal diversity. Having determined that there was no constitutional impediment to adjudicating the underlying action, the Nolan court next considered whether there was adequate statutory authority — for, as the court observed, Article III specifies the “outer limits of federal subject matter jurisdiction [and] [w]ithin those limits ... the federal courts are authorized to hear only those cases that Congress by statute authorizes them to hear.” Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1064. Accordingly, the court noted that “the question becomes one of statutory construction — ie., whether section 1441(d) authorized removal not only of Boeing’s third-party claims against the foreign sovereign SNECMA, but also of plaintiffs’ main claims.” Id. In concluding that § 1441(d) does authorize removal of the underlying action, the court relied on several considerations. First, the ' language of § 1441(d) provides that “Any civil action brought in a state court against a foreign state ... may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United States_” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (emphasis added). The Nolan court contrasted this language with that of the FTCA (which was at issue in Finley and found not to confer pendent party jurisdiction) and observed that “the FSIA [unlike the FTCA] grants jurisdiction to the federal courts over ‘actions]’ and not just over ‘claims.’ ” Nolan at 1064. Thus, the court concluded that the language of § 1441(d) “is broad enough to extend federal court subject matter jurisdiction over the entire action in which the foreign state is a party, rather than simply over the ‘claims’ in that action which are specifically asserted against the foreign state.” Id.; accord Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 F.2d at 1259 (finding that “the use of ‘any civil action’ in § 1441(d) was clearly meant to grant removal jurisdiction over more than just the ‘claims’ asserted against a foreign state”); see also Teledyne Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that the phrase “any civil action” is broad enough to embrace the entire action and “tends to affirmatively exclude the sort of unspoken qualification [viz., “and no one else”] read into the statute in Finley ”). Next, the court reasoned that the purpose and structure of the FSIA militate in favor of the conclusion that § 1441(d) should effect removal of the entire action to federal court. As courts and commentators have observed, a central purpose of the FSIA was “to establish uniform procedures for litigation against foreign States, their agencies and instrumen-talities in the United States.” Mark B. Feld-man, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder’s View, Int’l & Comp.L.Q. 302, 305 (1986); see also 14 CHARLES A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3662 (1985) (observing that Congress intended § 1330’s broad grant of jurisdiction to promote uniformity of decision in actions involving foreign governments); Rebecca J. Simmons, Note, Nationalized and Denationalized Commercial Enterprises Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 90 Colum.L.Rev. 2278, 2294 (1990) (noting that a “critical ... purpose of the FSIA was to impose order and uniformity” on United States law relating to immunities of foreign nations); Kimberly K. Hill, Note, Foreign GovemmenUOumed Corporations, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and the Right to a Jury Trial, 1982 Duke L.J. 1071, 1074 (1982) (noting that a principal objective of the FSIA is to ensure that the doctrine of restrictive immunity will be applied uniformly in United States courts); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 879 (4th Cir.1981) (“Both the statutory language and the legislative history [of the FSIA] evince the congressional decision to achieve uniformity of decisional law in the area of suits against foreign sovereigns.”), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982, 102 S.Ct. 1490, 71 L.Ed.2d 691 (1982). This purpose could be thwarted, the Nolan court reasoned, if a foreign government could remove only the third-party action that named it as a defendant and not the underlying action: the interest of a sovereign third-party defendant in removing the entire case may be more compelling [than that of a foreign sovereign named as a co-defendant (in which context courts have almost unanimously held that the entire action may be removed) ], because its liability is logically dependant on the liability of a defendant in the main action. To protect itself fully, a third-party defendant like SNECMA could be called on to assert defenses on behalf of Boeing.... The outcome of the main suit very much affects SNECMA’s rights. Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1065 (citations omitted). See also Surinam Airways, 974 F.2d at 1259 (noting “[i]f a foreign state lacks the ability to remove an entire case to federal court, then the goals of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act will be frustrated when that foreign sate is brought into an action as third-party defendant and is denied, for all practical purposes, to fully litigate its liability in federal court”). Finally, the Nolan court relied on the Act’s legislative history to buttress its conclusion. In particular, the court quoted the House Judiciary Committee Report on the Act which states in pertinent part: In view of the potential sensitivity of actions against foreign states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law in this area, it is important to give foreign states clear authority to remove to a Federal forum actions brought against them in the State courts. New subsection (d) of section 1441 permits the removal of any such action at the discretion of the foreign state, even if there are multiple defendants and some of these defendants desire not to remove the action or are citizens of the State in which the action has been brought. H.R.Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6631. The court also highlighted the Committee’s observation that the FSIA prescribes “the jurisdiction of U.S. district courts in eases involving foreign states.... ” H.R.Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6610. With respect to the former passage, the court reasoned that the Committee’s focus “on ‘actions’ rather than ‘claims,’ ... reinforces the view that the FSIA grants federal jurisdiction over entire cases where a foreign state is a party.” Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1065; accord Surinam Airways, 974 F.2d at 1259. And, this Court would add that the Committee’s explicit remarks concerning removal “even if there are multiple defendants and some of these defendants desire not to remove the action” make quite plain the Congressional intent that all claims, not just those against the foreign state, would be removed. With respect to the second excerpt from the Committee Report, the court observed that the wording — the use of the phrase “eases involving foreign states” in particular — “is indistinguishable .from language that the Supreme Court in Finley suggested was broad enough to create pendant party jurisdiction.” Id. at 1065-66; accord Surinam Airways, 974 F.2d at 1259; see also Teledyne, 892 F.2d at 1409 (“This formulation is virtually indistinguishable from examples given by. the Supreme Court of language broad enough to create pendent party jurisdiction.”). In contrast to the holdings in Nolan, Teledyne, and Surinam Airways, the Fourth Circuit recently held that the FSIA’s original jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), does not confer pendent party jurisdiction over nonforeign state codefendants in an action in which one of the named defendants is a foreign state. Schlumberger Indus., Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 36 F.3d 1274 (4th Cir.1994). Because Schlumberger* s holding was principally predicated on the FSIA’s original jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), and not its removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), Schlumberger is not directly at odds with the former cases. However, the Fourth Circuit also addressed § 1441(d) and concluded that § 1441(d) also failed to confer jurisdiction over the nonforeign-state code-fendants and the court’s reasoning there plainly conflicts with that of Nolan, Teledyne, and Surinam Airways. So, we review Schlumberger here to see what light it sheds, if any, on the issue of the scope of removal jurisdiction under § 1441(d). In Schlumberger, the plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment suit in South Carolina state court against a number of insurance companies that had issued it comprehensive general liability policies to determine the insurers’ rights and responsibilities in conneetion with certain environmental clean-up costs incurred by the plaintiff. The suit could not be filed in federal court because there was not complete diversity between the parties. However, one of the named defendants, The Insurance Company of Ireland (“ICI”) removed the case under § 1441(d). The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed ICI and moved to remand the ease in view of the absence of federal question or diversity jurisdiction. The remand motion was denied and the suit continued, ultimately resulting in summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurers. The plaintiff appealed. After initially voting to certify the liability issue to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the Fourth Circuit raised the issue of whether there was a defect in the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Assuming that federal jurisdiction over ICI was proper under either 28 U.S.C. § 1380(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), the court observed: The problem arises with respect to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over