Full opinion text
ORDER KARLTON, Chief Judge Emeritus. Plaintiffs, state prisoners who suffer from serious mental disorders, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the mental health care provided at most institutions within the California Department of Corrections is so inadequate that their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution are violated. Plaintiffs also raised a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and prospective injunctive relief. The named defendants are Pete Wilson, Governor of the State of California, Joseph Sandoval, Secretary of the Youth and Corrections Agency of the State of California, James Gomez, Director of the California Department of Corrections, Nadim Khoury M.D., Assistant Deputy Director for Health Care Services for the California Department of Corrections, and John S. Zil, M.D., Chief of Psychiatric Services for the California Department of Corrections. All named defendants are sued in their official capacity. The matter was referred to Chief Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(e)(17). On October' 22, 1991, Judge Moulds recommended certification as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(1)(A), 23(b)(1)(B), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On November 14, 1991, those findings and recommendations were adopted by this court, and a class was certified consisting of “all inmates with serious mental disorders who are now or who will in the future be confined within the California Department of Corrections (except the San Quentin State Prison, the Northern Reception Center at Vacaville and the California Medical Facility-Main at Vacaville).” (Order filed November 14,1991, at 4-5.) On June 6, 1994, the magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. On July 25, 1994, defendants filed objections to the findings and recommendations (“Objections”). On September 13, 1994, plaintiffs filed a response to defendants’ objections (“Plaintiffs’ Response”). Plaintiffs’ response was accompanied by declarations of Michael Bien (Bien Declaration) and Donald Specter (Specter Declaration) with appended exhibits. On November 7, 1994, defendants filed a closing brief (“Defendants’ Closing Brief’), raising various evidentiary issues. On March 25, 1995, this court remanded the matter to the magistrate judge because he had resolved the matter on constitutional grounds without first addressing the statutory claim. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, et al., 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 1323, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988). Plaintiffs then moved to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim and the matter was returned to this court. Defendants were given an opportunity to comment on the terms and conditions of dismissal and plaintiffs were granted an opportunity to respond. Thereafter the Rehabilitation Act claim was dismissed and this court again turned to consideration of the merits. Having concluded that the briefing on this matter exhausts the issues and thus resolution without oral argument is appropriate, see L.R. 230(h), the court now disposes of the matter. The court turns first to the eviden-tiary issues raised by defendants. The court then considers their objections to the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations. I. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES Defendants move to strike all of the exhibits appended to the Specter Declaration pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 802 on the grounds, that they are hearsay. Defendants also seek to strike exhibits B, H, I, J, and K pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404(a) arguing that these exhibits constitute inadmissible character evidence. Finally, defendants contend that all of the exhibits are more prejudicial than probative and that they should therefore be stricken pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 403. Exhibits A, C, D, E, G, H, I, J, and K to the Specter declaration are documents filed in this court or the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Gates v. Deukmejian, CIV S-87-1636 LKK JFM P 1988 WL 92568 (E.D.Cal.). While the court can take judicial notice of court records, see Escobar-Ramos v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 927 F.2d 482, 485 n. 3 (9th Cir.1991), three factors have led to the eon-elusion that the documents will be disregarded in resolving plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. First, the Gates litigation involves conditions of confinement at California Medical Facility, an institution not included in the class in the instant action. Second, the Gates case is governed by the consent decree entered into by the parties to that action in December 1989. Resolution of issues in that action is thus determined with reference to the standards set forth in that decree while resolution of the instant action turns on standards applicable to claims made under the Eighth Amendment. Finally, to the extent that the evidence from Gates is offered to support appointment of a special master it is unnecessary; for the reasons discussed in this order, the record in this action, standing alone, supports such appointment. Exhibit B is a letter from defendant James Gomez to Allen Breed, the court-appointed mediator in Gates. The letter contains statements about the instant action; it is an admission by a party to this action and thus is not hearsay. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). Nor is exclusion of the letter pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 403 or 404(a) warranted. Defendants’ motion to strike will be denied as to Exhibit B to the Specter declaration. Exhibit F is an excerpt of a transcript of proceedings from the 1993 trial in Madrid v. Gomez, No. C-90-3094 TEH (N.D.Cal.). The court can take judicial notice of this transcript. Escobar-Ramos, 927 F.2d at 485 n. 3. Plaintiffs contend that this transcript is admissible pursuant to Fed. R.Evid. 106 to augment a portion of the transcript from Madrid appended to defendants’ objections. Defendants’ exhibit is cumulative of evidence already in the record in this action. {See Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings (RT) at 28:44-48.) The court has not, therefore, considered the transcript tendered by plaintiffs in connection with the de novo review of this record. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to strike will be granted as to Exhibit F. Exhibit L is a letter from defendants’ counsel to plaintiffs’ counsel concerning possible stipulations to modify the time limits set forth in the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations. Plaintiffs have offered this letter to support their argument that defendants’ objection to those time limits is premature. The letter is of such limited relevance to the issues before the court that it will not be considered. In their reply brief, defendants also move to strike the deposition excerpts of employees of the California Department of Corrections and of defendants’ experts, Drs. Koson and Dvoskin. The magistrate judge permitted plaintiffs to submit deposition excerpts of CDC employees, including consultants, as admissions of party opponents. (RT at 16:189.) The excerpts were admitted subject to other applicable evidentiary objections. (Id.) The magistrate judge allowed defendants to file objections to the tendered deposition excerpts. (Id.) He also permitted defendants the option of augmenting the deposition excerpts or calling each deponent as a live witness at trial. (Id.) Defendants now renew their objection, overruled by the magistrate judge, that plaintiffs have not made a showing required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 32 sufficient to support admission of the excerpts and that admission of the excerpts is not authorized by any of the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 32. Defendants proceed from the assumption that the admissibility of depositions is governed in the first instance by Fed. R.Civ.P. 32. As has been observed, however, “the Federal Rules of Evidence ... provide the general rules regarding the use at trial of depositions_ Rule 32 defines some circumstances in which a deposition is admissible, leaving most issues of admissibility to the Federal Rules of Evidence.” 8A Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2141, at 157, § 2142, at 158 (1994); see United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (Fed.R.Civ.P. 32 and Fed. R.Evid. 804 “are independent bases for the admission of a deposition.”). As a general matter, admissibility of deposition testimony is resolved under the hearsay rule. Angelo v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 962 (10th Cir. 1993). The deposition excerpts at issue here were offered as admissions of party-opponents pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(C) and (D). Those subsections provide that “[a] statement is not hearsay if ... offered against a party and [it] is ... (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(C), (D). If in fact the excerpts fall within these subsections, they are not hearsay and Fed.R.Civ.P. 32 has no application to their admissibility. Statements made by employees of the California Department of Corrections concerning matters within the scope of their employment are admissible under Fed. R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1262 & n. 10 (9th Cir.1982). Defendants’ request to strike will be denied as to all deposition excerpts of individual employees of the CDC who were so employed at the time of their deposition. At the time of argument before the magistrate judge on this issue, defendants claimed that one deponent, Dr. Alt-mansberger, had ended his employment with the Department of Corrections the day before his deposition, that two other deponents, Dr. Maloof and Mr. Rollin Rose, were working for “Paroles” rather than “directly under the defendants in this ease,” that Scarlett Carp was a consultant, not an employee of the Department, and that defendants’ experts were employed by the Attorney General’s Office and not by defendants. (RT at 16:159,161.) Plaintiffs argued that Dr. Altmansberger’s deposition was originally noticed for a date during his employment, that it had been continued by stipulation of the parties, and that they were not informed that he would be quitting his job. (RT at 16:167.) Plaintiffs further argued that Dr. Maloof and Mr. Rose were still employees of the California Department of Corrections at the time of their deposition, even though they reported to another division within the Department. (Id.) Plaintiffs argued that Scarlett Carp and the two experts were employed by defendants as consultants and that statements about that consultancy were admissions. (Id. at 16:168— 69.) One of the predicates for admission of an employee’s statement under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) is that the employee must have been employed by the party at the time the statement being offered was made. M. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6723, at 509 (Interim Edition) (1992). Dr. Altmansberger was not employed by the Department of Corrections at the time of his deposition. Accordingly, the court has not considered that deposition excerpt. Dr. Maloof and Mr. Rose were still employed by the Department at the time of their depositions. Those deposition excerpts will remain in the record. The admissibility of the deposition excerpts of Scarlett Carp, Dr. Koson, and Dr. Dvoskin present a different issue. To the extent the material is introduced for the truth, its admissibility turns on whether these individuals were “agents” of the defendants. See Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1440 (9th Cir.1990) (out-of-court statements by insurance agent inadmissible against insurance company where plaintiff had failed to demonstrate whether agent was “agent” or “independent contractor”). To the extent the material bears on the state of mind and knowledge of the defendants, however, it is not subject to hearsay objections at all. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). Moreover, the court notes that defendants offered the declarations of both Dr. Kosin and Dr. Dvoskin; to the extent the deposition testimony is offered in rebuttal of that testimony it is properly received. Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(1). To avoid a prolonged examination of the facts bearing on agency, the court will restrict its use of this material to the latter functions. Having disposed of these preliminary evi-dentiary matters, the court turns to the substantive issues at bar. II. Summary of Findings and Recommendations Undergirding the magistrate judge’s recommendations were a series of legal conclusions. First he concluded that the Eighth Amendment requires the state to provide inmates with access to adequate mental health care. (Findings and Recommendations at 14.) Second, he concluded that there are six components required for a mental health care system to meet minimum constitutional requirements. (Id.) Third, he determined that an Eighth Amendment claim based on inadequate medical care in prison is comprised of both an objective and a subjective component. (Id. at 15.) The objective component focuses on the degree of seriousness of the deprivation of medical care, while the subjective component focuses on whether defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to serious medical needs. (Id.) The magistrate judge was also required to propose factual findings. Although there are a great many specific findings, there are eight essential ones. First, Judge Moulds found that defendants do not have an adequate mechanism for screening inmates for mental illness, either at the time of reception or during incarceration. He further found that the CDC has lacked adequate screening since at least 1987. (Id. at 31.) Second, he found that the CDC is seriously and chronically understaffed in the area of mental health care. Indeed he found that there was no dispute in this regard. (Id. at 36.) Third, he found that defendants have no effective method for insuring the competence of their mental health staff and, therefore, for insuring that inmates have access to competent care. (Id. at 42.) Fourth, he found that “[t]here are significant delays in, and sometimes complete denial of, access to necessary medical attention, multiple problems with use and management of medication, and inappropriate use of involuntary medications.” (Id.) Fifth, he found that “the mental health status of class members is adversely impacted by inappropriate use of punitive measures without regard to the impact of such measures on their medical condition.” (Id.) Sixth, the magistrate judge found that the medical records system maintained by defendants is “extremely deficient.” (Id. at 61.) Seventh, the magistrate judge found that defendants have designed an adequate suicide prevention program and have taken many of the steps necessary to implement that program. (Id. at 75.) He also found, however, that the program has not yet been fully implemented at least in part because of the severe understaffing in mental health care. (Id.) Finally, the magistrate judge found substantial evidence of defendants’ deliberate indifference to the deficiencies in their system. (Id. at 75-76.) Having concluded that the system for delivery of mental health care to members of the class maintained by the defendants violates the Eighth Amendment, the magistrate judge recommended a series of steps designed to redress the perceived constitutional violations. The majority of these recommendations would require defendants to develop and implement a series of forms, protocols, and plans in consultation with court-appointed experts. (Id. at 78-82.) Judge Moulds also recommended appointment of a special master for a period of three years to (1) consult with the court concerning the appointment of experts; (2) monitor compliance with court-ordered injunctive relief; (3) report to the court in twelve months on the adequacy of suicide prevention; and (4) perform such additional tasks as the court may deem necessary. (Id. at 78.) III. Standard of Review of the Findings and Recommendations The district court reviews de novo those portions of the proposed findings of fact to which objections have been made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Business Machines, 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920, 102 S.Ct. 1277, 71 L.Ed.2d 461 (1982). The court may, however, assume the correctness of that portion of the proposed findings of fact to which no objection has been made, and decide the matter on the applicable law. See United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir.1979)). The magistrate judge’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Britt v. Simi Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir.1983)). The court is not bound to adopt the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations; on the contrary, the court must exercise “sound judicial discretion” in making its own determination on the record. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2412-13, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Remsing, 874 F.2d at 617. IV. Substantive Standards The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution imposes on the states an obligation to provide for the basic human needs of prison inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). While “[t]he Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’ ... neither does it permit inhumane ones.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, -, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2480, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993). The obligation to provide for the basic human needs of prisoners includes a requirement to provide access to adequate mental health care. Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir.1994); Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253. If the state fails to meet this obligation, “it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment.” Helling, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2480. Where the allegations are that there has been a failure to provide adequate medical care, plaintiffs, to prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment, must demonstrate that defendants acted with “ ‘deliberate indifference’ ” to their “ ‘serious medical needs.’ ” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2323, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)); Doty, 37 F.3d at 546. An Eighth Amendment violation is comprised of both an objective component and a subjective component. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298, 111 S.Ct. at 2324. The objective component turns on whether the deprivation of a particular medical need is “sufficiently serious.” Id.; see also McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.1992). “The ‘routine discomfort’ that results from incarceration and which is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society’ does not constitute a ‘serious medical need.’” Doty, 37 F.3d at 546 (quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059). Rather, a medical need is said to be “serious” for Eighth Amendment purposes, “if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’ ” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (citation omitted). The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citations omitted). The objective component of deliberate indifference is treated as a mixed question of law and fact in this circuit. Doty, 37 F.3d at 546. The etiology, symptoms, and diagnosis of medical conditions present questions of fact; whether a medical condition is a “serious medical need” for purposes of the Eighth Amendment is a legal conclusion to be drawn from established facts. Id. In the context of this lawsuit, the objective component turns on whether the mental health care delivery system operated by defendants is so deficient that it deprives seriously mentally ill inmates of access to adequate mental health care. To analyze that question, the courts have focused on the presence or absence of six basic, essentially common sense, components of a minimally adequate prison mental health care delivery system. Balla v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 595 F.Supp. 1558, 1577 (D.Idaho 1984) (citing Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D.Tex.1980)). As explained in detail below, the magistrate judge correctly identified those components and made appropriate findings concerning them. (Findings and Recommendations at 14.) Under present doctrine, even when inmates with serious mental illnesses are deprived of access to adequate mental health care, an Eighth Amendment violation is not shown unless defendants have acted with “deliberate indifference” to their need for such care. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303, 111 S.Ct. at 2327. “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. As the Supreme Court recently explained, however, where the evidence before the district court proves the objective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, “the defendants could not plausibly persist in claiming lack of awareness, any more than prison officials who state during litigation that they will not take reasonable measures to abate an intolerable risk of which they are aware could claim to be subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eight Amendment....” Id. at-n. 9,114 S.Ct. at 1984 n. 9. y. Defendants’ Objections A. Preliminary Observations: The law provides for commitment to prison as punishment for the commission of serious crimes. Hence prisons are “places of involuntary confinement of persons who have demonstrated a proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, behavior.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3200, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Administration of such institutions is no easy task. Moreover, in California that task has been complicated by the fact that prisons have also become the repository of an enormous number of the state’s mentally ill. Thus in the matter at bar one of defendants’ experts estimated that on any given day there are probably between 13,000 and 18,000 inmates in California’s prisons in need of treatment because they suffer from serious mental disorders. {See Declaration of Joel A. Dvoskin (Dvoskin Declaration) at 6; Attachment to Letter from Karl S. Mayer, filed May 25, 1994.) As I noted above, under the Eighth Amendment such prisoners are entitled to adequate medical care. It is of course fundamental that neither the dimension of the task, nor its difficulty, excuses compliance with a constitutional mandate. After a trial the magistrate judge found that the delivery of necessary- care to the mentally ill inmates who comprise the plaintiff class was so deficient that it constituted a substantial violation of the federal Constitution. Defendants have interposed numerous objections to the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations. Their objections to Judge Moulds’ findings and recommendations can be grouped into two categories. First, defendants contend that there are five “fundamental deficiencies” which pervade the findings and recommendations, herein characterized as “fundamental” objections. Second, defendants raise specific objections to the legal standard used by the magistrate judge to analyze defendants’ state of mind and to several factual determinations that he made in the Findings and Recommendations. These are referred to as “specific” objections. B. Fundamental Objections 1. Definition of Serious Mental Disorder Defendants object that the magistrate judge did not include a definition of “serious mental disorder” in the findings and recommendations. They suggest the absence of such a definition has two results, one evidentiary, the other substantive. As to the evidentiary issue they argue that without a more specific definition of “serious mental disorder,” the connection between what a defendant knew and the defendant’s response to that knowledge is “clouded.” Defendants also contend that the absence of a specific definition of “serious mental disorder” precludes this court or anyone charged with implementing relief from determining who is a member of the class, and thus its extent or the requisites for relief. (Objections at 76.) The record in this action demonstrates that this objection is simply disingenuous. The class certified in this case, far from representing some amorphous enigma to defendants, describes a group of inmates who have been studied by the CDC for over eight years. Two of the major studies offered as evidence in this action, the Stirling Report and the Scarlett Carp Report, were based on data concerning the prevalence of inmates suffering from “serious mental disorders.” {See e.g., Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 at ii-3, ii-7; Defendants’ Exhibit D1338 at i.) These reports both concern themselves with the prevalence of, and the provision of mental health care services to, inmates who suffer from such disorders. Moreover, witnesses at trial had no trouble addressing the term. Thus, John O’Shaugh-nessy, Chief of Mental Health for the California Department of Corrections, testified that there is a clinical definition for the “seriously mentally disordered.” (RT at 19:21.) In addition, one of defendants’ experts, Dr. Ko-son, offered an opinion concerning the definition of serious mental disorder. (Declaration of Dennis F. Koson, M.D. (Koson Declaration) at 3.) Defendants’ other expert, Dr. Joel Dvoskin, discussed treatment for inmates suffering from “serious mental disorders” without any apparent need for further definition (Dvoskin Declaration, passim), and testified that “the level of need in the California Department of Corrections for treatment of serious mental disorder on any given day would be approximately 11 to 15 percent of the population.” (Dvoskin Declaration at 6.) Defendants’ contention also fails because it ignores the relevant law. As noted above, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence addresses medical needs in both the physical and mental contexts, see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 and Doty, 37 F.3d at 546, and thus provides a legal gloss to the term. It is, of course, true that the legal conclusion that a medical condition constitutes a serious medical need is intertwined with a factual determination inherently dependent on clinical findings. That hardly renders the concept uncertain, although it does suggest the means of resolution of questions in a specific context. The court concludes that the phrase “serious mental disorder” has a readily available definition in a medical context, in a legal context, and, as a result of at least two major studies conducted by or for the CDC, in a penological context. Accordingly, the court finds that defendants’ objection that the term “serious mental disorder” lacks sufficient meaning to enable them to ascertain what the problem is, or to do what the Constitution requires of them, is without merit. 2. Specification of Applicable Constitutional Minima Defendants’ second “fundamental” objection is that the magistrate judge failed to specify the minimum for each, or any, of the elements of a constitutionally adequate mental health care delivery system. Defendants do not object to the elements of a constitutionally adequate delivery system as described by the magistrate judge, see n. 10 supra. Instead, defendants object to the magistrate judge’s failure to quantify the specific level of services that the CDC must provide in order to satisfy the requirements of the federal Constitution. Defendants’ argument, to the extent it reflects a serious legal position, as contrasted with mere obstructionism, does not convince. The Constitution requires defendants to provide inmates in their custody with access to adequate mental health care. Doty, 37 F.3d at 546; Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253. The basic components of a constitutionally adequate system have been described by the courts. See e.g., Balia, 595 F.Supp. at 1577 (quoting Ruiz, 503 F.Supp. at 1339). The Constitution does not, however, prescribe the precise mechanisms for satisfying its mandate to provide access to adequate mental health care. Moreover, in cases challenging conditions of prison confinement, courts must strike a careful balance between identification of constitutional deficiencies and deference to the exercise of the wide discretion enjoyed by prison administrators in the discharge of their duties. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1086-87 (9th Cir.1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987). The need to strike that balance, common sense, and the clinical nature of the problem, all suggest that standards to insure compliance with the Eighth Amendment can only be developed contextually. The magistrate judge relied on the six elements described in Balia, 595 F.Supp. at 1577, as the basic framework for a constitutionally adequate mental health care system. (Findings and Recommendations at 14, 29.) He found deficiencies of a constitutional magnitude in most of the necessary areas. He did not, however, specify the exact mechanisms for screening inmates, or the number of staff that must be hired, or the specific level of competence that must be possessed by staff, or the precise methods of medication management to be used, or the manner of maintaining medical records. Indeed, it would have been error to do so. See Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1258-54. Rather, properly allowing for deference to the peno-logical expertise of defendants, while recognizing the essentially medical nature of the problem, the magistrate judge essentially proposed leaving the matter to the creation of protocols, standards, procedures and forms to be developed by defendants in consultation with court appointed medical experts. For the reasons explained above that resolution appears wholly appropriate. Defendants’ second objection is without merit. 3. Individual Consideration of Deliberate Indifference Defendants contend that the magistrate judge failed to consider whether there was evidence that each defendant had acted with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of class members. The contention that the magistrate judge failed to consider the liability of each defendant individually is not supported by the record. While Judge Moulds did not make individual findings as to each defendant, he found that the defendants have acted with deliberate indifference. Defendants’ contentions that the record does not support a finding of deliberate indifference as to each, or any defendant, is discussed infra. 4. Reliance on Expert Opinion Defendants’ fourth “fundamental” objection pertains to expert testimony. It takes essentially two forms. One addresses the weight accorded the evidence, and the other focuses on the legal use made by the magistrate judge of that evidence. The evidentiary objections raise issues concerning the propriety of reliance on expert testimony in general, the reliability of the testimony in this case because of the sources of information used by the expert witnesses, and the propriety of the expert testimony addressing the prevalence of illness. The court turns to these issues seria-tim. Defendants contend that the expert declarations “are entitled to little weight in determining whether a particular condition constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” (Objections at 82.) They appear to premise this argument on the lack of personal examination of inmates, {id. at 84), and suggest the declarations are unreliable insofar as they are based on medical files “pre-selected” by plaintiffs’ counsel. On this basis defendants contend the declarations are not evidence of inmate suffering or of the prevalence of mental illness in the CDC. (Objections at 79.) Defendants’ contentions concerning the use of expert opinion will not He. The law contemplates expert testimony in the form of opinion when “specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact ...,” See Fed.R.Evid. 702; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, -, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2795, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (assistance to trier is “a condition [going] primarily to relevance”); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1526 (9th Cir.1993) (en bane) (expert opinion is competent evidence of harm likely to accrue to inmates as a result of particular conditions of confinement). Defendants’ deprecation of the sources reHed on to formulate the opinion testimony offered in this case fares no better. Fed.R.Evid. 703 provides experts with “wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on first hand knowledge or observation.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; see also Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1460 (9th Cir.1988), vacated, 490 U.S. 1087, 109 S.Ct. 2425, 104 L.Ed.2d 982 (1989), original decision reinstated, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir.1989) cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1838, 108 L.Ed.2d 966 (1990). For the same reason their attack upon the files selected is without merit. Daubert, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 (latitude permitted experts in reH-anee on nonadmissible sources is premised on the “assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a rehable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipHne.”) The clinical testimony of plaintiffs’ experts is precisely the type of testimony contemplated by the Federal Rules of Evidence: testimony offered by three psychiatrists and one clinical psychologist concerning the condition of mentally ill inmates based on statements by inmates, review of medical records, personal observation, and interviews with custodial and chnical staff. See Fed.R.Evid. 703 (advisory committee’s notes). This evidence, together with the testimony of inmate witnesses called at trial, plainly demonstrates the suffering of mentally ill inmates incarcerated in the California Department of Corrections. Defendants also attack the sufficiency of the testimony concerning the prevalence of severe mental illness within the inmate population. Expert testimony concerning this issue was offered by way of oral testimony, expert declaration (including the declaration of defendants’ expert, Dr. Dvoskin), and documentary evidence. Defendants’ only specific objection concerning reHanee on expert testimony for prevalence data centers on the use of Dr. Grassian’s declaration. (Objections at 80.) Dr. Grassian averred that “[ejstimates of the number of mentaHy ill inmates at PeHcan Bay vary” and that he did not know the precise number of mentally ill inmates at that institution. (Id.; Declaration of Stuart Grassian, filed February 25, 1993, at 45 RT at 5-193.) Defendants do not dispute that there were mentally ill inmates housed at Pelican Bay. The objection to the use of Dr. Grassian’s declaration is without merit. The objection to the magistrate judge’s use of the expert testimony appears to be of two types: first defendants contend that he used that testimony first to establish constitutional minima and second, as proof of deliberate indifference. The court examines each of these contentions in turn. Defendants argue that Judge Moulds improperly relied on expert testimony to establish constitutional minima. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 n. 13, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2400 n. 13, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (expert opinions as to desirable prison conditions while potentially helpful and relevant, are insufficient to establish constitutional minima). The argument is inapposite. The constitutional standards that apply to this case are well established, see § IV supra. The task before this court is to determine from the evidence whether defendants have violated these constitutional requirements. In his findings and recommendations the magistrate judge articulated the appropriate standards; there is nothing to support the contention that he used expert testimony to establish constitutional norms. Defendants also argue that “the Findings and Recommendations are replete with examples of use by the magistrate judge of opinions of experts to conclude that ‘defendants’ must be ‘deliberately indifferent’ because ‘they’ have not similarly embraced the opinions without question.” (Objections at 8.) The attack is without justification. The magistrate judge did not conclude that defendants are deliberately indifferent simply because they have failed to embrace expert opinion, nor because they failed to adopt the recommendations of any of the major studies undertaken to assess the state of the delivery of mental health services within the CDC. The court discusses in detail below the issue of deliberate indifference and the relationship between the evidence adduced at trial and the applicable standard for determining deliberate indifference. See § V(D). It suffices here to note that Judge Moulds concluded that defendants have known for years of the gross deficiencies in the provision of mental health care to inmates incarcerated in the CDC, and that they have failed to take reasonable steps to avert the obvious risk of harm to mentally ill inmates that flows from the failure to remedy those deficiencies. The evidence fully supports those conclusions. 5. Standards for Compliance With Recommendations Defendants’ last “fundamental” objection is to the purported absence of any standards in the findings and recommendations to guide defendants and court-appointed experts in the formulation of the remedial plans recommended by the magistrate judge. This objection is again without merit. Having concluded that the delivery of health care to those suffering serious mental illness is constitutionally deficient, Judge Moulds recommended development of remedial plans to address that constitutional failure. Requiring development of remedial plans is the method most often employed by district courts faced with systemic constitutional deficiencies because it is an efficacious way to both “cure[ ] ... constitutional defi-eiencies and minimize[ ] intrusion into prison management.” Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146, 1280 (N.D.Cal.1995). That process seems to this court to represent both a sensible and legally appropriate way of proceeding if the findings are otherwise upheld. C. Specific Objections Defendants have raised numerous objections to specific factual findings by the magistrate judge. The court has reviewed de novo all of the findings to which objections have been raised and now disposes of those objections. 1. Screening The magistrate judge found that “[i]n order to provide necessary mental health care to prisoners with serious mental disorders, there must be a system in place to identify those individuals, both at the time they are admitted to the Department of Corrections and during their incarceration.” (Findings and Recommendations at 31.) He further found that “the CDC lacks an adequate mechanism for screening for mental illness, either at the time of reception or during incarceration, and has lacked adequate screening since at least 1987.” (Id.) Judge Moulds concluded that “only those inmates who self-report or present with medical records demonstrating a prior psychiatric history, those who exhibit bizarre behavior, or those who ask to be seen by a psychiatrist will be identified as needing psychiatric care.” (Id. at 35.) Defendants object to the factual finding that the CDC does not have adequate procedures for screening for mental illness. (Objections at 33.) Defendants also object to the legal conclusion that the Constitution requires defendants to do more to screen for mental illness than they presently do. (Objections at 87.) Those objections must be rejected. The evidence cited by defendants depicts precisely the type of screening described by the magistrate judge. It is screening based on self-reporting, use of records of prior hospitalization and/or past or current use of psychotropic medications, exhibition of bizarre behavior, and requests for care. (See e.g., RT at 18:38; RT at 19:8-9; RT at 19:10-11; RT at 19:13; RT at 19:14-15.) Certainly each of those means of identifying ill inmates is appropriate. The question, however, is whether the Eighth Amendment requires more. Under the Eighth Amendment the defendants are required to maintain a system in which inmates are able to make their need for mental health care known to staff competent to provide such care before inmates suffer unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253. The evidence demonstrates that some inmates with serious mental disorders are, by virtue of their condition, incapable of making then-needs for mental health care known to staff. (Declaration of Craig Haney, Ph.D., filed February 25, 1993 (Haney Declaration), at 18; RT at 1:115-16; RT at 3:8; RT at 10:101.) See also Madrid, 889 F.Supp. at 1217; Casey v. Lewis, 834 F.Supp. 1477, 1550 (D.Ariz.1993). Delivery of adequate mental health care to such inmates requires their identification. For that reason it has been held that correctional systems are required by the Constitution to put in place a “systematic program for screening and evaluating inmates in order to identify those who require mental health treatment.” Balia, 595 F.Supp. at 1577. Defendants do not have a systematic program for screening and evaluating inmates for mental illness. (Defendants’ Exhibit D1338 at 34 (“Screening and follow-up evaluations are not formalized and staffing for these functions is inconsistent among reception centers,....”); Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 440 at 4 (“There is a lack of comprehensive, standardized screening for mental illness and suieidality” in the CDC)). The mechanisms on which they rely are either used haphazardly, or depend for efficacy on incomplete or non-existent medical records, self-reporting, or the observations of custodial staff inadequately trained in the signs and symptoms of mental illness. The evidence before the court plainly shows that thousands of inmates suffering from mental illness are either undetected, untreated, or both. (See e.g., Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at ii-9, ii — 10; RT at 19:141 (testimony of John O’Shaughnessy); RT at 39:74-75 (testimony of James Gomez).) The federal Constitution does not tolerate such a lack of medical care. 2. Staffing a. Sufficiency of Staff In order to provide inmates with access to constitutionally adequate mental health care, defendants must employ mental health staff in “sufficient numbers to identify and treat in an individualized manner those treatable inmates suffering from serious mental disorders.” Balla, 595 F.Supp. at 1577; see also Madrid, 889 F.Supp. at 1257 (citing cases). The magistrate judge found that the California Department of Corrections is seriously and chronically understaffed in the area of mental health care. (Findings and Recommendations at 36.) A workload study undertaken by defendants almost a decade ago found that the need for psychiatric services far exceeded the available staffing resources, (Id. at 37), and the Stirling Report and the Scarlett Carp Report confirmed this finding. (Id.) Defendants’ objections to these findings consist of arguments that (1) they do have staff who provide inmates with mental health care services; (2) the magistrate judge failed to specify what level of staffing is required by the Constitution,; and (3) the Scarlett Carp consultants “designed their plan to be well above constitutional minima.” (Objections at 94.) Defendants’ first objection is inapposite. The fact that defendants have some staff providing mental health services is not evidence that they have sufficient staff; Defendants’ third objection is based on the declarations of defendants’ experts, Dr. Dvoskin and Dr. Koson. (See Dvoskin Declaration at 6, Koson Declaration at 18). As the court now explains, that criticism is unjustified. Moreover, as the court also explains, the Scarlett Carp report hardly stands alone. The Scarlett Carp study did find the system was substantially understaffed. (Defendants’ Exhibit D1338 at 34.) The Scarlett Carp delivery system and staffing recommendations were based on a goal of providing care based on a community model described as providing mentally ill persons with “reasonable access to necessary care,” (Defendants’ Exhibit D1338 at 41), considering, however, “a reasonable assessment of what is feasible ... to meet constitutional obligations and the mental health needs of the inmate population, given budget constraints and public policy.” (Id.) Elsewhere in the report, “reasonable access” is defined as “timely, responsible, and adequate care provided by qualified (and appropriately licensed) staff.” (Defendants’ Exhibit D1338 at xi.) These standards are not materially different from the constitutional requirement of ready access to competent medical staff. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253 (“The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials provide a system of ready access to adequate medical care.”). The goals of the Scarlett Carp study and the design criteria incorporated to achieve those goals closely track the mandates of the federal Constitution. For that reason the assessment of staffing needs contained in the Scarlett Carp final report is significant evidence that the level of mental health care staffing is constitutionally inadequate. That evidence, however, does not stand alone. Several major studies have been done regarding mental health care in the California Department of Corrections over the last decade. Each has concluded that the system is seriously understaffed. (See e.g., Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 456 at vi (1986 Workload Study concluded that “workload is clearly excessive with existing resources”); Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 at ii — 19, 20 (Stirling Report finding that 20% of budgeted positions were unfilled, resulting in, inter alia, fewer patients being treated and/or patients received reduced care); Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2 at iii (Stirling Report finding of need to “[s]et adequate staffing standards for all mental health professionals and ... [djetermine why recruitment and retention of professional mental health staff is a problem.”)). Plaintiffs’ experts testified to significant understaffing within the system. (See e.g., Declaration of Dr. Edward Kaufman (Kaufman Declaration), filed February 5, 1994, at 16 (“Every CDC institution I evaluated had a shortage of psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatric social workers, psychiatric nurses, and occupational and recreational thera-pists_ Given the large numbers of seriously disturbed inmates in these institutions, many more mental health staff should be present. Staff were stretched dangerously thin in all institutions.”); Declaration of Dr. Russell C. Petrella (Petrella declaration), filed February 5, 1993, at 39-40 (“The most obvious and pervasive sign of the lack of adequate mental health care resources in the CDC system are [sic] the unacceptably long delays in access to every level of care. Inmates suffer long waits at every stage of the process.... These delays, which I saw at every institution I looked at, are a critical sign of understaffing.”)). The overwhelming weight of the evidence before this court demonstrates that the California Department of Corrections is significantly and chronically understaffed in the area of mental health care services. The Department does not have sufficient staff to treat large numbers of mentally ill inmates in its custody. This conclusion demonstrates that plaintiffs have satisfied the objective component of a showing of a violation of the federal Constitution. b. Competence of Staff Defendants object to the finding that they have no effective method for ensuring either the competence of their staff or that inmates have access to competent care. They also object to the magistrate judge’s finding that this violates the plaintiff class members’ Eighth Amendment right of access to adequate mental health care. Finally, they object to the suggestion that a remedial order require the development of a quality assurance system. Once again analysis commences with the observation that state prisoners have a constitutional right of access to adequate mental health care. Both as a matter of law and common sense, in order to meet that requirement of the federal Constitution, defendants must provide inmates with access to a competent medical staff. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253 (“The medical staff must be competent to examine prisoners and diagnose illnesses ... [and] must be able to treat medical problems or refer prisoners to others who can.”); see also Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253); Cabrales, 864 F.2d at 1461 (9th Cir.1988) (“Access to medical staff is meaningless unless the staff is competent and can render competent care.”). Defendants’ expert, Dr. Dvoskin, testified that in his opinion “a large system such as the California Department of Corrections could probably not provide adequate mental health care without some sort of management information system and some form of quality assurance.” (Dvoskin Declaration at 9.) Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Petrella, concurred in that assessment. (Petrella Declaration at 21.) In sum, defendants are not providing adequate mental health care to inmates, and they do not have any form of quality assurance that reaches all institutions covered by this class action. Defendants’ expert has testified that defendants cannot provide adequate mental health care without some form of quality assurance. Requiring development of a quality assurance program is an appropriate remedy for constitutional deficiencies in the delivery of prison health care. See Grubbs v. Bradley, 821 F.Supp. 496, 500 (M.D.Tenn.1993). Defendants’ objections to this portion of the findings and recommendations is without merit. 3. Care of Mentally III Inmates a. Delays in Access to Care The magistrate judge found that “[t]here are significant and unacceptable delays” in inmate access to mental health care at each level of the mental health care delivery system as it exists in the CDC. (Findings and Recommendations at 43-44.) Defendants object to these findings insofar as they are based on the opinion testimony of experts and contradicted by “percipient witness caregivers.” (Objections at 17, 52.) Defendants also argue that there was no finding by the magistrate judge that the delays caused harm to any individual inmate. (Objections at 99.) Finally, defendants argue that there was no finding by the magistrate judge as to whether the delays are a result of deliberate indifference by any defendant. (Objections at 101.) The constitutional requirement that defendants provide inmates with “a system of ready access to adequate medical care,” means simply either ready access to physicians at each prison or “reasonably speedy access” to outside physicians or facilities. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253. In addition, there must be an “adequate system for responding to emergencies.” Id. At the outset, the court notes that the previous findings with respect to the inadequacies in screening and staffing, standing alone, render inescapable the conclusion that mentally ill inmates’ access to care within the CDC is unconstitutionally delayed. Additionally, the evidence before the court plainly demonstrates substantial delays in access to mental health care for inmates housed in the California Department of Corrections. The Scarlett Carp Final Report highlighted delays in access to necessary care as a deficiency in the present mental health care system. (Defendants’ Exhibit D1338 at 34.) It identified a “major problem” with access to acute inpatient hospitalization, and a “backlog of cases awaiting transfer to Enhanced Outpatient Program due to the limited number of beds available in designated institutions.” (Id. at 34-35.) Beyond the 1993 report there was extensive testimony concerning delays in access to necessary care at every level. (See e.g., RT at 3:13-18 (In February 1992, the waiting list to see a psychiatrist after initial screening was over 400 inmates at the reception center at Wasco State Prison; delays lasted up to three months and had “escalated to the point where inmates were cutting their wrists just to receive medication”); RT at 22:3-6 (In 1991 and again in 1992, there were backlogs of 300-400 inmates awaiting transfer to enhanced outpatient psychiatric programs at California Men’s Colony or California Medical Facility); Defendants’ Exhibit D880 (CDC memo to David Tristan stating that “[t]he problem of the backlog of male inmates awaiting transfer to CMF and CMC for mental health services is approaching the crisis level for the Department”); Kaufman Declaration at 9 (delays of up to several months in transfers to Atascadero State Hospital for inpatient hospitalization).) Defendants’ objections to the magistrate judge’s findings in this regard are without merit. Because the evidence demonstrates that there are delays everywhere within the system and that those delays result in exacerbation of illness and patient suffering, a violation of the objective facet of the test for violation of the Eighth Amendment has been demonstrated. b. Medication The magistrate judge found constitutional violations arising from the failure of the system to properly address questions arising as to the proper medication of class members. They may generally be classified as issues relating to medication management, and issues relating to involuntary medication. I address the questions in turn. 1. Medication Management The magistrate judge found that defendants’ current practices with respect to medication management violate the Constitution. (Findings and Recommendations at 50.) Specifically, the magistrate judge found that “defendants’ supervision of the use of medication is completely inadequate; prescriptions are not timely refilled, there is no adequate system to prevent hoarding of medication, there is no adequate system to ensure continuity of medication, inmates on psychotropic medication are not adequately monitored, and it appears that some very useful medications are not available because there is not enough staff to do necessary post-medication monitoring.” (Findings and Recommendations at 50.) In light of these findings Judge Moulds advanced a series of recommendations designed to remedy these deficiencies. (Id. at 79.) He also recommended that the preliminary injunction governing heat plans for management of inmates on psychotropic medication be made permanent for a period of two years. (Id. at 50-51.) Defendants object to the factual findings and accompanying recommendations concerning medication management. . Defendants also object to the recommendation that the preliminary injunction be made permanent. Defendants’ objections to the factual' findings concerning medication management are based on (1) evidence that they have a computer tracking system in place at each institution to identify inmates on medication; (2) some evidence in the record that at some institutions prescriptions are timely refilled and medication ingestion is monitored to one degree or another at some institutions, that various factors “may affect the way an inmate receives his psychotropic medication,”; and (3) that there is a “special procedure” by which a CDC physician can obtain permission to prescribe medication not in the CDC formulary. (Objections at 57-61.) The computer tracking system is only available at individual institutions; it is not networked to any other institution. (See e.g., RT at 21:86.) Thus, it provides no solution to the significant problems that occur when inmates on psychotropic medication are transferred from one institution to another. In addition, the fact that at some places within the CDC some inmates are getting timely medication and/or appropriate monitoring does not address the systemic failure resulting in gross deficiencies at institutions throughout the CDC. Finally, the evidence of record demonstrates that some medications that are very effective in the treatment of serious mental disorders are not available. (See e.g., Defendants’ Exhibit D1196.) In order to satisfy the Constitution, medical staff must have available to them the modalities to provide inmates with necessary care. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). The magistrate judge’s factual findings concerning the constitutional deficiencies in medication management are fully supported by the record and will be adopted by the court. Defendants object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the preliminary injunction concerning heat plans for inmates on psychotropic medication be made permanent on the grounds that the findings made by the magistrate judge are insufficient to support imposition of a permanent injunction. The magistrate judge found that “[t]he principal obstacle ... was motivating defendants to develop the heat management plans that are the subject of that injunction; now that the plans are developed and in use, defendants have little reason to abandon them and good reasons to keep them in place.” (Findings and Recommendations at 51.) The court agrees with defendants that the finding made by the magistrate judge does not support issuance of a permanent injunction. The court finds, however, that the record in this action does support such an injunction. The standards for issuing a permanent injunction are substantially similar to those applied to requests for preliminary injunctive relief; however, in order to obtain a permanent injunction plaintiffs must actually succeed on the merits of their claims. Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1318 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 541, 546 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1401-02, 1404 n. 12, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987)). Plaintiffs originally sought a preliminary injunction in this action on August 1, 1991, following the heat and medication related deaths of three inmates on psychotropic medication. (Findings and Recommendations at 2.) That request for preliminary injunctive relief was denied on the basis of a memorandum submitted by defendants at the time of the hearing on the request for preliminary injunction and evidence of some steps being taken by defendants to address the problem. (Id. at 4.) Since the preliminary injunction was denied in the fall and trial was then set for early summer, the matter was not revisited until April 2, 1992, when plaintiffs renewed their motion for preliminary injunction. (Id. at 4.) In the interim, defendants had done almost nothing to have a permanent plan ready for the summer. (Id. (citing Declaration of Katherine Sher, filed April 2, 1992, at paragraph 17).) The matter was resolved on the eve of hearing by stipulated injunction, after settlement negotiations with the magistrate judge. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiffs have succeeded on the merits of the claims ra