Full opinion text
ORDER McDADE, District Judge. Before the Court is Petitioner Anthony Hall’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 By a Person in State Custody Under a Sentence of Capital Punishment [Doc. # 6]. BACKGROUND Procedural History On April 17,1984, following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of McLean County, Illinois, Anthony Hall was found guilty of murder. After the court determined that he had waived his right to a jury sentencing, the court sentenced him to death. Hall filed a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court which affirmed his conviction and sentence on October 17,1986, People v. Hall, 114 Ill.2d 376, 102 Ill.Dec. 322, 499 N.E.2d 1335 (1986) (“Hall I”), and denied his petition for rehearing on December 1,1986. The United States Supreme Court denied Hall’s petition for writ of certiorari on March 30, 1987, Hall v. Illinois, 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1618, 94 L.Ed.2d 802 (1987), and his petition for rehearing on May 18, 1987. Hall v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 1060, 107 S.Ct. 2205, 95 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987). Hall subsequently filed a state post-conviction petition in the Circuit Court of McLean County on September 28,1987. On March 6, 1991, the trial court denied the petition. On September 23, 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. People v. Hall, 157 Ill.2d 324, 193 Ill.Dec. 98, 626 N.E.2d 131 (1993) (“Hall II”). The petition for rehearing was denied on January 31, 1994. On November 14, 1994, the United States Supreme Court denied Hall’s petition for writ of certiorari. Hall v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 507, 130 L.Ed.2d 415 (1994). On March 7, 1995, the Illinois Supreme Court stayed Hall’s execution pending the filing of his petition for habeas corpus in federal court. Hall filed a § 2254 Petition in this Court on March 23, 1995. By leave of this Court, an Amended § 2254 Petition was filed on July 11, 1995, which asserts the following claims: I. MR. HALL WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS WHEN THE TRIAL COURT PRONOUNCED A DEATH SENTENCE, ERRONEOUSLY HOLDING THAT ILLINOIS LAW PREVENTED IT FROM BEING MERCIFUL AND FROM FOLLOWING ITS INDIVIDUAL CHOICE TO IMPOSE A SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT II.TRIAL COUNSEL WERE CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE AT THE CAPITAL SENTENCING HEARING WHERE THEY FAILED TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT ANY OF TEN SIGNIFICANT AND AVAILABLE MITIGATION WITNESSES AND WHERE THEY FAILED TO HIRE A MITIGATION EXPERT AND FAILED TO ASSIST IN THE PREPARATION OF THE PRESENTENCE REPORT III. MR. HALL’S RIGHTS UNDER THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS WERE VIOLATED WHERE HE DID NOT KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO A SENTENCING JURY BECAUSE NEITHER THE COURT NOR COUNSEL INFORMED HIM THAT A JURY’S DECISION TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY MUST BE UNANIMOUS OR ELSE NO DEATH PENALTY MAY BE IMPOSED IV. THE TRIAL JUDGE’S REFUSAL TO RECUSE HIMSELF AFTER HE HAD BEEN PHYSICALLY ASSAULTED BY THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL AND SENTENCING HEARING BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL ADJUDICATOR AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND BY THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT V.THE TRIAL JUDGE’S REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW AFTER THEY HAD A SERIES OF DISPUTES WITH MR. HALL CULMINATING IN MR. HALL’S PHYSICAL ATTACK ON COUNSEL AND AFTER COUNSEL’S ASSERTION THAT THE ATTORNEY/CLIENT RELATIONSHIP WAS “IRRETRIEVABLY LOST” VIOLATED MR. HALL’S RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS VI. MR. HALL WAS DENIED A FULL AND FAIR HEARING TO ESTABLISH HIS CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS WHERE THE POST-CONVICTION COURT REFUSED TO ALLOW HIGHLY RELEVANT EVIDENCE AND WHERE IT REFUSED TO RE-CUSE ITSELF IN THE FACE OF THE APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY A. The Refusal To Allow An Expert In the Defense of Capital Cases To Testify and Give His Opinion That Trial Counsel Rendered Prejudicially Ineffective Assistance of Counsel B. The Refusal To Appoint A Mitigation Expert To Establish Prejudice In Sentencing Counsel’s Ineffective Performance C. The Trial Judge’s Failure To Re-cuse Himself From The Post-Conviction Proceedings VII. THE ILLINOIS DEATH PENALTY STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE AND AS APPLIED A. The Illinois Death Penalty Statute is unconstitutional on its face because it fails to guard against discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious exercise of prosecutorial discretion in determining which defendants shall be subjected to a death penalty hearing. B. The Illinois Death Penalty Statute is unconstitutional because it is applied in an arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory manner. C. The Illinois Death Penalty Statute unconstitutionally vests a judicial function in the prosecution. D. The Illinois Death Penalty Statute is unconstitutional on its face because it fails to limit the nonstatuto-ry aggravating factors which may be considered by the sentencing authority. E. The Illinois Death Penalty Statute is unconstitutional on its face because it fails to require written findings with regard to nonstatutory aggravating factors that would allow meaningful review and ensure that improper factors were not considered at sentencing. F. The Illinois Death Penalty Statute is unconstitutional because it shifts to the defendant the burden of proving that a sentence other than death is appropriate or at least it is unclear who bears the burden of proof. G. The Illinois Death Penalty Statute unconstitutionally fails to require a determination that death is the appropriate penalty. H. The Illinois Death Penalty Statute unconstitutionally fails to provide adequate notice that the State will seek the death penalty. I. The determination by a majority of the Illinois Supreme Court that the Death Penalty Statute is unconstitutional renders the statute and Mr. Hall’s execution unconstitutional. J. The cumulative effect of its defects renders the Illinois Death Penalty Statute unconstitutional. Factual Background On February 8, 1983, the body of Frieda King was found in a small closet next to a large walk-in freezer in the Pontiac Correctional Center. An autopsy revealed that King had died from severe blood loss resulting from stab wounds in the upper portion of her back and chest. At the time of the murder, Petitioner Hall had been working as a clerk in the inmate kitchen. After an investigation, Hall was charged with the murder on February 14,1983. Mr. Hall’s case was assigned to Judge William T. Caisley. The case remained on Judge Caisley’s call throughout trial and post-conviction proceedings. On March 8, 1983, the court appointed Livingston County Public Defender David Ahlemeyer as Hall’s counsel. Soon after, Hall sent a letter to Judge Caisley complaining that he was unable to establish a rapport with Ahlemeyer, apparently out of fear that the public defender’s ties to the community and political concerns would weaken his ability to represent Hall. In a second letter to Judge Caisley dated June 20, 1983, Hall continued to express dissatisfaction with Ahlemeyer and asked to be represented by private counsel. Hall wrote that a “conflict of interest [between himself and Ahlemeyer is] an understatement” of the situation. On July 11, 1983, Ahlemeyer filed a motion for a fitness hearing on the ground that “defendant refuses to cooperate with counsel and refuses to visit with him at the Pontiac Correctional Center.” On August 17, 1983, the court held a hearing to consider Hall’s motion to discharge Ahlemeyer and Ahlem-eyer’s motion to withdraw as Hall’s counsel. Ahlemeyer informed the court that Hall had refused to meet with him at the Pontiac Correctional Center on June 29, 1983. Ah-lemeyer further alleged that the correspondence with Hall thereafter indicated that Hall would not cooperate with him. Ahlem-eyer therefore requested leave to withdraw on the ground that it was impossible to prepare an adequate defense without the cooperation of Hall. He did assure the court, however, that he had no animosity toward Hall and that there was no conflict of interest which would affect his representation. In requesting the appointment of other counsel, Hall informed the court that he was dissatisfied because Ahlemeyer had never provided him with discovery material despite his requests and because Ahlemeyer was often not available to take Hall’s phone calls or to keep Hall fully informed as to the status of the case. Hall also claimed that he had lost confidence in Ahlemeyer’s ability to vigorously contest guilt because Ahlemeyer had advised him to take a bench trial to avoid the death penalty. Finally, Hall requested counsel more experienced in capital litigation since Ahlemeyer had never been involved in a capital case before. After hearing the State’s argument in opposition to the appointment of other counsel, the court stated: I do find that the evidence produced here before this court today, the representation of the public defender and the representation of the defendant, show that there has been inadequate preparation of this case for trial at the present time; that is in part due to the fact that the public defender had other matters which he was attending to earlier in this year and was unable to confer with Mr. Hall and that he may have been absent from his office on several occasions when Mr. Hall attempted to call him and to that extent the failure to be ready for trial may be attributable to the public defender. I do also find that Mr. Hall has refused to consult with his counsel since June and that the public defender has on [at least one occasion] been out to the penitentiary ... and Mr. Hall has refused to consult with him relevant to his defense ... and so I do find that a portion of the failure to be ready for trial on the defense’s part rests with the defendant in failing to accept a visit from the Public Defender on one and possibly two occasions, and it is obvious to the court from what has transpired here in open court today that there does appear to be a lack of a good working relationship between the defendant and his counsel. The court ruled that, while it “is apparent that [Hall and counsel] are not getting along well together ... that there is some bickering going on here, [this does not] constitute cause for the appointment of counsel other than the Public Defender.” The court also found that counsel’s lack of experience in capital litigation did not call for the appointment of other counsel. The court reasoned that an indigent defendant is entitled only to representation by the Public Defender and not by counsel of his choice. Ahlemeyer then asked that the court disregard any pro se motions the defendant filed. The court thereafter granted Ahlemeyer’s motion for a fitness hearing. The fitness hearing was held on October 4, 1983. Ahlemeyer offered into evidence the report of Dr. Robert Chapman who concluded that Hall was psychologically fit to stand trial. Ahlemeyer requested to testify, and he was examined by the court. He testified that Hall continually refused to meet with Ahlemeyer or to assist Ahlemeyer on the case. As a result, Ahlemeyer was of the opinion that it was impossible to prepare an adequate defense. However, Hall testified that his refusal to cooperate with Ahlemeyer was a “deliberate and rational act” based upon Ahlemeyer’s collusion with the State. He then told the court: “I am not going to cooperate with him and if he comes within an arm’s length of me I will spare you the particulars. If that is what I have to do to get him off this case, I will rise to that occasion. I can only get an assault charge.” Hall further stated that he would not cooperate with any local counsel, explaining that he had written to “private practice attorneys in the Bloomington area and they are so unethical they won’t answer my letters.” The court ruled that Hall was fit for trial and continued the matter until November 1,1983. On November 1, 1983, Ahlemeyer requested that Hall be shackled while he was in the courtroom. The court, after reading a letter addressed to the court in which Hall substantially repeated the threat made earlier, ordered Hall shackled. The court then indicated that it would entertain Hall’s renewed motion for other counsel. Hall indicated he did not want to deal with Ahlemeyer or any other local counsel. He also informed the court that a private attorney, Shelly Bannister, had corresponded with him and agreed to represent him if the court would order her appointment. A letter from Bannister to the court, which was made part of the record, indicated that she had extensive background in criminal cases arising from the penitentiary, that she had discussed the case with Hall and was able to cooperate with him, and that she was willing to accept appointment as Hall’s counsel. Ahlemeyer also renewed his motion to withdraw as counsel. Ahlemeyer argued that the physical threat Hall made in open court was a changed circumstance which required Ahlemeyer’s withdrawal. He said that the threat gave “rise to a conflict between the defendant and myself that would make it very difficult for me to represent him.” Ahlemeyer said that even if the defendant were rendered “absolutely immobile,” the threat still “would create a conflict in my own mind.” Ahlemeyer also stated: “I personally feel that his threats both in the courtroom and by letter to me were simply a part of his ... tactics of putting the court in the position not knowing what to do as far as restraining the Public Defender.” Ahlemeyer said he regretted the need for the shackling. The following then occurred: Mr. Ahlemeyer: I personally think, your Honor, his being shackled while I prepare the case with him would not — why should I get away from you, are you threatening me again? Defendant: No, I am not threatening you. Mr. Ahlemeyer: What did you say, say it louder so the court reporter can get it on the record. Defendant: That was off the record. Mr. Ahlemeyer: He said “get away from me.” Defendant: Yes, Get away from me. I am afraid of you. Keep him away from me. The Court: Please have a seat. Defendant: I am afraid of that man, keep him away from me. The Court: Mr. Hall, have a seat. Defendant: You understand? The Court: I understand. Defendant: Keep him away from me, I am afraid of him. The Court: Just please take a seat. Mr. Ahlemeyer: I would simply state your Honor, I don’t think the shackling would inhibit any preparation for trial ... I would agree with Mr. Hall that being shackled in the courtroom is not the best procedure and may be something that would have to be overcome, but unfortunately I don’t think that he has left us with any choice in the matter. The court denied the motions to replace Ahlemeyer as counsel and to appoint Shelly Bannister as Hall’s counsel. The court then announced that it would meet in chambers off the record separately first with Hall and then with Ahlemeyer. After these conferences, the court indicated that it had discussed the possibility of appointing the Public Defender of McLean County to assist Ahlemeyer in the defense. While Hall initially refused this offer, on December 5,1983, he acquiesced to the court’s appointment of Steven Skelton, the Public Defender of McLean County. The selection of the jury for Hall’s trial commenced on February 21, 1984. Just pri- or to jury selection, the court ordered that Hall be and remain unshackled for the trial. The proceedings continued through the selection of the jury. At that point, Hall made a motion to the court saying there were certain witnesses he wanted to testify but that his counsel refused to call them. Defense counsel stated that these witnesses would harm the defense, and if they were called, Hall would have to' represent himself. Hall thereby made a motion to conduct the trial pro se. The court urged Hall to consider the matter overnight and stayed the proceedings until the next day. The following day, after Hall’s continued insistence that he be allowed to proceed pro se, the court adjourned the proceedings to the conference room so that it could talk privately with defense counsel and Hall. During this conversation, the court advised Hall that it would be “foolhardy” to conduct the trial pro se. Hall in response asked the court if he could proceed pro se but have counsel sit with him, advise him, and pose objections for him. Ahlemeyer objected “strenuously” to this arrangement, calling it half-way representation and a violation of “every ethical code.” The court asked Hall who the witnesses were that he wished to call, but before Hall could answer, Ahlemeyer objected because he believed it possible that a jury trial might still be waived and that Judge Caisley could then be the trier of fact. Judge Caisley then suggested that he (Judge Caisley) leave the room and that Hall’s objections be placed on the record in his absence. There followed an interruption in the record, after which the court stated: Let the record show that the defendant has now been removed and that the prosecution is now present in chambers and that we are outside the presence of the jury and the persons assembled in the courtroom, and let the record further show that defense counsel, Steven Skelton has just been struck on the head with a chair and that the court has also been struck by defendant on the head with his fist and at this point, bearing in mind the previous threats that were made by the defendant at the pretrial stage against defense counsel, the court is going to order from this stage on the defendant shall be shackled at all times whether in the presence of the jury or not because it is essential for the security of the court and the officers of the court. This decision has been made only with most reluctance, but I think that with this overt act and the fact that one defense counsel and the court itself has been attacked by this defendant indicates the necessity of this step which is most reluctantly taken. Ahlemeyer and Skelton subsequently testified that, not only had Hall struck Skelton over the head with a chair, but he had also thrown a chair at Ahlemeyer before punching Judge Caisley. Skelton’s injuries included “a pretty good lump and a welt, a concussion.” His jacket was ripped down the back. Skel-ton had headaches continuously for two weeks thereafter, causing him to consult his physician. Ahlemeyer slightly injured his leg as he tripped over the court reporter’s machine on the way out the door. Ahlemeyer and Skelton testified that Judge Caisley was the “most severely hurt” of the three. Medical personnel at the courthouse told him to lie down, and he did so for about a half hour. He had abrasions and contusions on his head. Judge Caisley disagreed with defense counsel’s assessment as follows: “I was struck in the head, and I did suffer a contusion, swollen slightly in the head, and I was not significantly injured.” After the attack, Hall was removed from the conference room by several correctional officers and was ordered to be shackled by the court. After this was done, Hall was brought back into the court outside the presence of the jury. The court then asked Hall if he still wished to proceed without counsel. When Hall did not respond, the court assumed that his silence constituted a withdrawal of his motion. Defense counsel then made another motion to withdraw from the case, stating that they could not “ethically or morally” proceed on Hall’s behalf and that any attorney-client relationship which had previously existed was now “irretrievably lost.” They also pointed out that the occasion may arise when they might be called to testify against Hall in a separate proceeding arising from the battery. However, the court denied the motion saying that “under the circumstances, just minutes before the trial is to begin I don’t think at this point I can in all fairness allow defense counsel to withdraw.” Defense counsel also asked the court to reconsider its decision that Hall’s silence constituted a withdrawal of his motion to proceed pro se. Counsel pointed out that the last thing Hall had said was that he still wanted to represent himself and that the matter had never been adequately resolved. The court responded that Hall had never unequivocally stated that he did not want counsel and thus he had never knowingly waived his right to counsel. Defense counsel next made a motion for a mistrial, arguing that the occurrence in the conference room had tainted the jury. The court denied the motion for a mistrial saying that a defendant could not, by his own misconduct, bring about a mistrial. Moreover, the court found that the conflict between Hall and his counsel afforded no grounds for mistrial, nor did the possibility that the jury might have heard the scuffle in chambers. Defense counsel further asked the court to recuse itself, arguing that it would be impossible for the court to be fair after being struck on the head by Hall. The court denied the motion for recusal, saying that the interests of “proceeding to justice ... requires a certain element of courage to go forward” and that it would not allow the fact that Hall had struck the court to prejudice or influence it. The court allowed Hall back into the courtroom, but required that he sit away from his counsel, with several guards seated behind him, and with his hands and feet cuffed. Hall made another motion to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. The court questioned Hall and found that there was no knowing and intelligent waiver. Hall told the court, “I still don’t understand a word you said,” and accused Skelton of hitting him. The motion was denied. During the prosecution’s opening statement to the jury, Hall interrupted to inform the court that he wanted to waive his right to a jury trial. After the prosecution concluded its opening statement and defense counsel reserved an opening statement, the jury was excused and counsel repeated Hall’s request to waive a trial by jury. The court admonished Hall as to the charges against him, and that the court would determine his guilt or innocence and the range of possible sentences if judgment were entered against him. Hall said that he understood, and the court accepted his jury waiver for the guilt phase of the trial. At that point, there arose a question as to whether Hall was also waiving his right to a jury sentencing. Hall told the court, “I don’t want a jury, period, in any phase of this trial.” He explained: [Ajssuming that we get to the penalty phase, and according to the conduct that happened today by you being hit in the mouth and the attorney being jumped on and the attorney be fighting with me, I feel that you would transfer, and correct if I am wrong, transfer the penalty disposition to another Court to decide, that way it would clear yourself of undue prejudice or bias due to the fact that you were hit in the mouth today and this is what I see may come down the line, assuming that I am found guilty. That is why I want to have that right exercised today to waive jury on the guilt and innocence phase and penalty, if possible, if we get to that stage. However, Defense counsel, the State, and the court all agreed that the issue had not yet arisen and therefore the court postponed any decision as to whether Hall was also waiving jury sentencing. The court informed the members of the jury that Hall had decided to waive trial by jury. The court therefore excused the jury but admonished the jurors to avoid speaking to anyone or listening to radio or television broadcasts concerning the case because there was “the possibility that you may be required to determine the matter of punishment.” After the jury was excused, Hall was tried by the court which found Hall guilty of murder on March 2,1984. After the guilty verdict, the State reminded the court that it was seeking capital punishment and therefore asked that Hall make a choice whether to call back the original jury, pick another jury, or proceed with a court sentencing. Defense counsel requested a date for sentencing and said it would make a decision prior to that. The court, however, said it needed a decision that afternoon because it had “14 jurors who have been qualified.” The court was referring to the jurors who had been dismissed following the State’s opening argument. The court recessed the proceedings until afternoon and again asked Hall to decide whether he wanted a court or jury sentencing. After a brief forty second recess in which Hall discussed the matter with his counsel, Hall told the court he would waive jury sentencing. The court admonished Hall that if he waived jury sentencing, the court would be the sole determiner of the sentence. However, the court did not explain to Hall that under Illinois law, a jury’s decision to impose the death penalty must be unanimous. The court accepted HaU’s waiver, and the jury was discharged. Later that same day, Hall spoke to Charles Schiedel, Deputy Defender of the Supreme Court Unit of the State Appellate Defender’s Office, who asked Hall if he had been advised of the unanimity requirement for imposing a jury verdict. When he learned that Hall had not, Schiedel explained the requirement to Hall and advised him to tell his attorneys and the court of the unintelligent nature of his jury waiver. On April 17, 1984, the day the sentencing hearing was to begin, Hall made a motion to withdraw his jury sentencing waiver on the basis that he had not been informed, either by the court or by counsel, that a jury’s decision to impose the death penalty must be unanimous. The court denied Hall’s motion to withdraw his jury waiver, saying that Hall had knowingly waived his right to a jury sentencing and that a qualified jury had already been discharged. The State proceeded with aggravation witnesses, first calling the warden of Pontiac prison, who testified that the deceased was killed while working in the prison. The State next introduced the testimony of Ron Umbdenstoek, a correctional captain at Me-nard Correctional Center. He testified that Hall was involved in an altercation while an inmate at Menard. Hall had allegedly held an inmate while two other inmates stabbed him; however, the victim was only slightly injured. Umbdenstoek also testified that Hall and his accomplices had tried to throw a man off the prison galley. Hall had ten months of statutory “good time” revoked because of this incident. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that the report written on the incident only charged Hall with being involved in a fist fight. The State introduced convictions for armed robbery, armed violence, and rape. The State also introduced the testimony of two of Hall’s past victims. One testified that she had been robbed and raped by Hall, and the other testified that Hall had robbed and attempted to rape her. The State offered no evidence concerning the assault on defense counsel and the trial judge. The defense introduced the testimony of Lloyd Shaddle, a dentist and Jehovah’s Witnesses minister who had conducted religious services for Hall while he was incarcerated. He testified that Hall regularly attended bible study classes and often expressed concern for his family. Hall took the stand next. He testified that his mother had been 13 years old when he was born. He testified that he had first been incarcerated at the age of 16 and had been out of prison for only two years of his entire adult life. He also testified that he was married, a high school graduate, and a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. The final witness was Dr. Syed Ali, a psychiatrist at Pontiac Correctional Center. He conducted an examination of Hall from which he determined that Hall was of above-average intelligence and was anxious and depressed about the forthcoming sentence. The court also considered a presentence report prepared by Probation Officer Ramona Beasley. The report consisted of a recitation of Hall’s prior convictions and his institutional disciplinary record. The report indicated that the probation officer had sent a letter to Hall’s wife, Clereatha Hall, but that she had not responded. The report also stated that the probation officer had attempted to interview Hall in prison on two occasions, but he had refused to speak to her. In his final argument before sentencing, Ahlemeyer argued to the court that the death penalty is wrong in every ease. He further contended that “[t]he mitigating factors in this ease involve Hall’s childhood development, lack of normal guidance and advantages that many of us have, his present abilities, his religious beliefs.” Ahlemeyer then concluded by asking the court “to spare Hall's life today for all of our benefits, to demonstrate that we are not on the level of the perpetrators of vicious crimes; that we are capable of rising above that and dealing with people in a human way and in a Christian way ... when a tragedy like this happens, all of us bear some of the guilt.” In sentencing Hall to death, Judge Caisley set forth the various statutoiy factors that he had considered in making his decision. During this discussion, he added: I haven’t, seen that spark of interest in rehabilitation, that desire on the part of the defendant to change. Doctor Shaddle was in here this morning and spoke about teaching Bible class in which the defendant was enrolled and this might have set off an indication within the defendant that he was going to become rehabilitated. However, this offense occurred after [HalTs attendance in Bible class] and so I am not persuaded that there is likely to be rehabilitation in this case. The court concluded: The choice in this case really boils down to two choices and both of them certainly have a cry to be heard and considered by this court. It is a choice between justice and a choice between mercy. If the choice were mine to make individually I would make a choice on the side of being merciful in sentencing this Defendant to a term of life imprisonment. However — and I do feel just because Anthony Hall did not show mercy toward Frieda King and did not show mercy toward any of the other unfortunate victims, two of whom were here today, is not a good reason to deny him mercy. But I have also taken an oath to administer the laws of the State of Illinois in a manner that I best can, and it seems to me that it is my duty under the laws of the State of Illinois in following my oath of office as judge to sentence the Defendant, Anthony Hall, to death. And so it is with a good deal of personal reluctance on my part, although not with any doubt that he is guilty of this offense or that there are any mitigating factors under the statute that would prevent it or that there are any aggravating factors that would prevent it. I think all of the aggravating factors are stacked against the Defendant. I think there has been a complete absence of mitigating factors. I am persuaded there is not reasonable doubt here, and so it is my unhappy duty under the laws of the State of Illinois to sentence Anthony Hall to death ... After Hall’s direct appeal was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, he filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging that he had been denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing and that he had not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the sentencing jury. Judge Caisley initially appointed the Public Defender of Logan County as Hall’s post-conviction counsel, but when Hall requested that Professor Marc R. Kadish of Chicago be appointed, the judge granted the request. Kadish moved for Judge Caisley’s recusal based upon the assault, but the motion was denied. The defense also filed a motion for the appointment of a mitigation expert to help establish sentencing counsel’s ineffectiveness. The court denied the motion. The court did, however, grant an evidentia-ry hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel issue. The defense filed a motion in limine to be allowed to call Michael Metniek as a legal expert to testify as to the prevailing standard for counsel competency in capital cases and to render his opinion that sentencing counsel in this case failed to meet that standard. The court found that Metniek was qualified as an expert, but refused to allow him to testify on the ground that his testimony would not be helpful because he would be second-guessing trial tactics of original counsel. At the evidentiary hearing, the defense presented testimony and affidavits of ten mitigation witnesses who were never contacted by defense counsel or asked to testify at the sentencing hearing. These witnesses were: Father Richard Means, a chaplain at Pontiac Correctional Center; Leta Powell, whom Hall had saved from drowning; Thomas R. O’Connor, who had worked with Hall at Pontiac; Paula Robinson, whom Hall had assisted by chasing away an attacker; Patricia Rolfe Hunt, whose child Hall had saved from choking; Fate Mickel, Hall’s old basketball coach; Julian Smith, a janitor at Hall’s elementary school; and Hall’s mother, sister, and wife. Hall testified on his own behalf about his attempts to have Ahlemeyer removed as his counsel and to have Shelly Bannister, with whom he had developed a good relationship, appointed. He stated that he had lost 360 days good time credit for his altercation with counsel and the trial judge. Hall also testified that after he was found guilty on March 2,1984, neither of his attorneys ever came to visit him or to discuss the importance of preparing for the sentencing hearing before that hearing occurred on April 17, 1984. Neither of them informed him that a probation officer would visit him to prepare a presentenee investigation report. When the probation officer attempted to see him at the prison, he refused the visit because he did not know the purpose of the visit. He therefore had no input into the content of the presentence investigation. Hall stated that prior to trial, he gave his attorneys a list of witnesses he wanted called which included the individuals whose affidavits the defense produced at this post-conviction hearing. The State called Ahlemeyer and Skelton as its witnesses at the post-conviction hearing. Ahlemeyer testified that after the altercation with Hall, there “wasn’t much” of an attorney-client relationship “at all from that point on.” Ahlemeyer stated that, “frankly, I don’t remember exactly talking to” Hall after the guilty verdict but prior to sentencing. However, he said that he must have gotten Dr. Shaddle’s name from Hall at some point. Prior to trial, Ahlemeyer had tried to get Hall’s mother and wife to attend the trial, but he was unsuccessful. He also had given one of them the sentencing date and told them “if they wished to appear that they were certainly welcome.” Ahlemeyer said he knew Father Means by sight, but he had no recollection of talking to him, and he did not know if Means had ever called his office, but there would have been no reason to refuse to call him as a witness. Ahlemeyer testified that he was aware of what a mitigation expert is and that he was aware of their use at the time of the sentencing hearing although “they weren’t so popular then.” Ahlemeyer said he did not seek the service of a mitigation expert because, “I guess it is just because it wasn’t being done ... it was the type of thing that was just getting started, and I guess that’s the reason.” On cross-examination, Ahlemeyer said that he had only moved to withdraw from 5 or 6 cases in 15 years of practice and that he only did so when “I am unable to assure them that I will act in their best interests.” Ah-lemeyer said he never discussed with Skelton who was the lead counsel on the case, and he did not recall their dividing responsibilities. After the attack by Hall, Ahlemeyer made a report of the incident to the County Sheriffs Department. He was unaware whether the Department of Corrections ever took disciplinary action against Hall as a result of the incident. Ahlemeyer said his strategy in preparing for sentencing was “to focus in on an argument based on just generally on the theory opposing the death penalty in all cases.” This approach was taken because Ahlemeyer believed that the evidence in aggravation was overwhelming and that it was not “going to do a lot of good to Hall to try to prove that when he was thirteen years old he-was a good boy.” Ahlemeyer thought it was better to attack the death penalty because he knew Judge Caisley to be a very religious and sympathetic man. It was Ahlemeyer’s judgment before sentencing “that mitigation was pretty scarce.” Ahlemeyer did not remember ever attempting to contact Hall when he became aware that Hall was refusing to see the probation officer. Skelton testified that his agreement on the division of labor with Ahlemeyer was that Ahlemeyer would handle the sentencing phase of the case by himself. Skelton said he never spoke to Hall after the guilty verdict until the day of sentencing and failed to inform Hall about the function of the probation officer. There had been some discussion with Hall about who he wanted to call at sentencing, but Ahlemeyer made the final decision. Skelton had no recollection of Father Means or Leta Mills or Hall’s mother and wife ever trying to contact him to testify, but there was no reason Skelton was aware of as to why they would not have been called to testify if they had indicated a desire to do so. On cross-examination, Skelton said that he was brought into the case because Ahlemeyer and Hall were not getting along, “to put it mildly.” After entering the case, Skelton provided Hall with the discovery materials, something Ahlemeyer had not done. After he was hit by Hall, Skelton was questioned by the Sheriffs Department and photos were taken of his and the Judge’s injuries. Skel-ton was not aware that Hall lost good time credits as a result of the incident. Skelton moved to withdraw at that time because he believed the attorney-client relationship was irretrievably lost. Skelton said that it was “certainly” difficult for him to fulfill his obligations to his client. Skelton had a vague recollection of meeting with Father Means after sentencing and Means’ inquiry as to why he had not been called to testify. He did not think he ever spoke to Hall about the nature of the presentence report. Skelton also testified that he would have called Hall’s mother and his wife at sentencing if they had “been made available.” At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court made the following finding: What the evidence does establish is that the defense, for one reason or another, may have failed to call witnesses who would have testified as to Anthony Hall’s good character, as to good deeds that he had done previously, and ... that there are witnesses out there who were available and who might have been called by defense counsel to testify at the sentencing hearing as to other mitigating evidence ... The court ordered the parties to submit additional briefs on the question of “whether or not that incompetence of counsel is sufficient to grant [ ] relief.” After briefs were submitted, the court entered a written order on March 6, 1991, denying the post-conviction petition. The written findings included that the failure to call Hall’s wife and his mother was excusable because “[t]heir indifference during the trial [as shown by their failure to be present] could certainly have been read to be a sign of hostility toward the defendant or of fear of him.” The court found the failure to call Father Means not to be prejudicial because a clergyman of Hall’s Jehovah’s Witnesses faith, Lloyd Shaddle, had been called to testify at sentencing. The court concluded: Without exception, the affiants would have testified about Hall’s character, and per-sonality_ Certainly the court was interested in learning as much about Mr. Hall’s character as possible. However, some of the affiants’ testimony would have merely supported the court’s own observations concerning Anthony Hall’s character commencing with an initial conference with him on February 23, 1983, and continuing through the conclusion of the sentence hearing a little more than a year later. The court was exposed to Hall’s friendliness and sociability. At times he could be very respectful and pleasant to be near. He seemed genuinely interested in court personnel and frequently conversed easily with them at recesses. Thus, the court found that even if the witnesses had been called at sentencing, there would not be a reasonable probability that the sentence would have been different. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. ANALYSIS I Right to an Individualized Sentencing Decision Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the trial judge was prevented, through his own erroneous understanding of the law, from imposing an individualized sentence upon him. In imposing Hall’s death sentence, Judge Cais-ley stated: The choice in this case really boils down to two choices and both of them certainly have a cry to be heard and considered by this court. It is a choice between justice and a choice between mercy. If the choice were mine to make individually I would make a choice on the side of being merciful in sentencing this Defendant to a term of life imprisonment.... But I have also taken an oath to administer the laws of the State of Illinois in a manner that I best can, and it seems to me that it is my duty under the laws of the State of Illinois in following my oath of office as judge to sentence the Defendant, Anthony Hall, to death.... I think all of the aggravating factors are stacked against the Defendant. I think there has been a complete absence of mitigating factors. I am persuaded there is not reasonable doubt here, and so it is my unhappy duty under the laws of the State of Illinois to sentence Anthony Hall to death. Petitioner asserts that this language demonstrates the trial judge’s erroneous belief that mercy could not be used as a mitigating factor in imposing Hall’s sentence when in fact Illinois law does allow for such a factor to be considered. See Hall I, 102 Ill.Dec. at 338, 499 N.E.2d at 1351 citing People v. Holman, 103 Ill.2d 133, 170, 82 Ill.Dec. 585, 469 N.E.2d 119 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220, 105 S.Ct. 1204, 84 L.Ed.2d 347 (1985) (“[M]ercy is a relevant factor for consideration at a capital sentencing hearing, but it is to be considered within the context of all factors in aggravation and mitigation.”). However, the Court finds that Judge Caisley properly applied the law at Hall’s sentencing. The purpose of individualized sentencing in the death penalty context is to ensure that the “sentencer has treated the defendant as a ‘uniquely individual human being’ and has made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence. Thus, the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime.” Penny v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2947, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (internal citation omitted). This underlying purpose is not served when a sentencing judge or juror invariably decides to impose the death penalty upon everyone who becomes eligible for it. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2229, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992) (internal citation omitted): Surely if in a particular Illinois case the judge, who imposes sentence should the defendant waive his right to jury sentencing under the statute, was to announce that, to him or her, mitigating evidence is beside the point and that he or she intends to impose the death penalty without regard to the nature and extent of mitigating evidence if the defendant is found guilty of a capital offense, that judge is refusing in advance to follow the statutory direction to consider that evidence and should disqualify himself or herself. Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial. Likewise, the purpose behind individualized sentencing is equally not served when the sentencing authority invariably decides not to impose the death penalty out of a purely personal sense of mercy, regardless of the presence of aggravating factors. For instance, a juror may be excluded “for cause” where he has made unmistakably clear that he “would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before [him].” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 n. 21, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (emphasis in original). Because the death penalty is designed to be imposed according to the individual circumstances of the offense and characteristics of the offender, see Penny, 492 U.S. at 319, 109 S.Ct. at 2947; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2931, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), it would be against the current dictates of Supreme Court precedent for a trial judge to disregard the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors at issue in a particular case. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43, 107 S.Ct. 837, 840, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (holding that the decision to impose the death penalty should not be based on “extraneous emotional factors” such as “mere sympathy” that are unrelated to the particular aggravating and mitigating factors at issue in the case). While this discussion may appear to digress from the issue at hand, it actually resolves it by explaining the language used by Hall’s sentencing judge. Prior to the instant case, Judge Caisley had never sentenced anyone to death. Moreover, Judge Caisley had a reputation as being a very religious and sympathetic man. In fact, this is why Ahlemeyer’s strategy at the sentencing hearing was to attack the death penalty in all cases rather than focusing on the aggravating and mitigating factors particular to Hall. In his decision, Judge Caisley initially stated, “If the choice were mine to make individually, I would make a choice on the side of being merciful in sentencing this defendant to a term of life imprisonment.” In other words, if no statutory scheme existed to guide his decision, his personal sense of mercy would compel him to not impose the death penalty in any case. However, realizing that such a ruling based upon mercy alone would offend the notion of individualized sentencing as well as Illinois law, Judge Caisley rightly chose instead to focus on the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors particular to Hall’s case. Under this analysis, the court found that “all of the aggravating factors are stacked against the defendant,” thus making him eligible for the death penalty under the statute. 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(b). The court was then required to find at least one mitigating factor “sufficient to preclude ” the imposition of the death penalty. 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(h) (emphasis added). It is at this point that Petitioner believes that Judge Caisley made a mistake of law and erroneously found that mercy could not be such a mitigating factor. However, a trial judge is presumed to know the law and to apply it in making his decisions. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 689, 653, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3057, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). Nowhere in the record does Judge Caisley demonstrate an ignorance of the law. Rather, his failure to assert mercy as a mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the death penalty was a calculated decision on his part. The statute requires the sentencing authority to weigh the various aggravating and mitigating factors in order to decide whether any mitigating factor is “sufficient to preclude” the imposition of the death penalty. Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 998 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110, 111 S.Ct. 1024, 112 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1991). In other words, the fact that the trial court feels some mercy for a defendant does not mean that mercy automatically constitutes a mitigating factor “sufficient to preclude” the death penalty; this determination must be made within the context of the aggravating factors also. Thus, when Judge Caisley said, “I think there has been a complete absence of mitigating factors,” he meant that there had been a complete absence of significant mitigating factors that would outweigh the aggravating factors stacked against Hall and be sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. This was a reasonable disposition of the case. By making this finding, Judge Caisley properly placed the relative mercy required by the statutory language and the United States Constitution above his personal sense of mercy unrelated to the particular circumstances of Hall’s case. In this way, Judge Caisley’s decision to impose the death penalty was more “individualized” in the constitutional sense than Petitioner’s version would have him be. Because the language used by Judge Cais-ley at sentencing can be reasonably interpreted in accordance with the Illinois Death Penalty Statute, Petitioner has failed to rebut the presumption that the trial judge correctly applied the law to the facts of the case. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 653, 110 S.Ct. at 3057. Accepting the factual findings of the Illinois Supreme Court as true, Purkett, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1771; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Court finds that Judge Caisley properly applied the laws of Illinois when he sentenced Hall to death. Thus, Petitioner’s claim is denied. II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Petitioner contends that his trial counsel, Ahlemeyer and Skelton, were constitutionally ineffective at the capital sentencing hearing because of their failure to: (1) present any of ten available mitigation witnesses; (2) hire a mitigation expert; and (3) assist in the preparation of the presentence report. To make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, Petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for his attorney’s unprofessional representation, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Failure to satisfy either of these prongs is fatal to such a claim. United States v. Slaughter, 900 F.2d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir.1990). If a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be disposed of using the prejudice prong alone, that course should be followed. Smith v. Lane, 794 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir.1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071. The Court believes that Strickland itself is dispositive of Hall’s first ground of ineffectiveness. In Strickland, the petitioner argued that his counsel had been constitutionally ineffective at the capital sentencing phase because his counsel had failed to present character witnesses on his behalf. 466 Ü.S. at 699, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. The Supreme Court in Strickland held that the petitioner had not met the “prejudice” prong of its test for attorney ineffectiveness: [A]t most this evidence shows that numerous people who knew respondent thought he was generally a good person and that a psychiatrist and psychologist believed he was under considerable emotional stress that did not rise to the level of extreme disturbance. Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, hence, the sentence imposed. Id. at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071. Likewise, in the instant case, Petitioner alleges that his counsel’s failure to present ten mitigation witnesses at his capital sentencing hearing deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. However, just as in Strickland, each of these witnesses is merely vouching for Hall’s good character. Three witnesses (Powell, Hunt, and Robinson) would have provided examples of Hall’s heroism in saving them or their children from incidents of drowning, choking, assault, and flat tires. Father Means would have testified that he “saw no evidence of violence in Mr. Hall and that Mr. Hall was honest, sensitive, sociable, respectful, a good worker and pleasant to be around.” O’Connor would have testified that Hall was “loyal, cooperative, reliable, nice, caring, concerned, patient, and trustworthy.” Mickel would have stated that Hall was a “pleasant, hardworking student.” Smith would have called Hall a “friendly, pleasant, fine young man.” Hall’s sister and wife would have made similar remarks about Hall’s character. Hall’s mother would have testified that she was only 13 years old when Hall was born and that he never knew his father. However, these general allegations of Hall’s good character and childhood deprivations hardly rebut the laundry list of aggravating evidence stacked against him. To begin with, Hall is a convicted murderer. He carried a knife to the cold storage area of the prison with the intent to murder Frieda King in cold blood. The number of wounds inflicted upon her body was evidence that she suffered a brutal death. Hall committed this murder despite his regular attendance at bible study classes in prison. He used his assignment in the inmate kitchen to commit the murder. He killed King while she was working in the course of her duties at the prison. In addition, Hall had a considerable criminal history. He had allegedly held an inmate while two other inmates stabbed the victim. He had attempted to throw a man off the prison galley (although the prison report noted it as a fist fight). He had prior convictions for armed violence, armed robbery, and rape. One of his victims testified that he had robbed and raped her; another testified that he had robbed and attempted to rape her. He had been in prison since the age of sixteen (with the exception of two years). The court reasonably found that he had no good chance for rehabilitation. Like the Supreme Court in Strickland, id., this Court finds that the overwhelming nature of the aggravating evidence negates any reasonable probability that but for the exclusion of the ten mitigating witnesses, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 699,104 S.Ct. at 2070. Another factor that influences the Court’s decision in this regard is the fact that Judge Caisley did hear these ten mitigation witnesses at Hall’s post-conviction hearing and found: Without exception, the affiants would have testified about Hall’s character, and per-sonality_ Certainly the court was interested in learning as much about Mr. Hall’s character as possible. However, some of the affiants’ testimony would have merely supported the court’s own observations concerning Anthony Hall’s character commencing with an initial conference with him on February 23, 1983, and continuing through the conclusion of the sentence hearing a little more than a year later. The court was exposed to Hall’s friendli1 ness and sociability. At times he could be very respectful and pleasant to be near. He seemed genuinely interested in court personnel and frequently conversed easily with them at recesses. On this basis, the trial court denied Hall’s claim for post-conviction relief. In light of the record, the Court believes that Judge Caisley’s decision was sound. Who better to know whether the outcome would have been different than the same judge who had originally sentenced Hall to death? See also Stewart v. Gramley, 74 F.3d 132, at 135 (7th Cir.1996) (“[SJince it is obviously not the theory of capital punishment that murderers are compelled to murder by their past and therefore should not be punished, it cannot be right that anything brought out at a death-penalty hearing is certain or even likely to help the defendant to save his life.”). The same can be said for Hall’s second ground for asserting ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase — the failure to call a mitigation expert. At the conclusion of the evidence at the post-conviction hearing regarding the need for a mitigation expert, Judge Caisley found that the testimony of such a expert would not have reasonably resulted in a different outcome. This was a reasonable finding in light of the aggravating evidence against Petitioner and the fact that mitigation experts were rarely used at the time of Hall’s trial. Thus, that ground also does not meet the prejudice prong of Strickland. As for the third ground, counsel’s failure to participate in the preparation of the presentence report, it has been procedurally defaulted by Petitioner’s failure to raise that issue in the post-conviction petition or on appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court from his sentence of death. See Jones v. Washington, 15 F.3d 671, 675 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2753, 129 L.Ed.2d 870 (1994) (holding that procedural default occurs where Petitioner does not raise the issue to the state’s highest court on post-conviction review); Reese v. Peters, 926 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that procedural default occurs where Petitioner fails to raise the issue on direct appeal or fails to raise the substantial denial of a constitutional right in the original or amended post-conviction petition). Nor has Petitioner established “cause and prejudice” for the default, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2565, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), or shown that he is “actually innocent” of the death penalty. Schlup v. Delo, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 851, 862 (1995). Thus, the Court need not even consider that claim in this collateral proceeding. However, the Court notes that the overwhelming aggravating evidence against Hall would negate any reasonable probability of the result being different by'counsel’s involvement with the presentence report. Thus, the prejudice requirement of Strickland would not be met. Petitioner cites a number of cases where counsel failed to present mitigating evidence at a death penalty sentencing hearing and the court found that the prejudice requirement of Strickland had been met. However, all of these eases are distinguishable. In the instant case, counsel did not fail to present mitigating evidence of diminished mental capacity or psychiatric problems, cf. Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 857-59 (7th Cir.1991); Wilson v. Butler, 813 F.2d 664, 671-73 (5th Cir.1987), on reh’g, 825 F.2d 879, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079, 108 S.Ct. 1059, 98 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1988); Hendricks v. Calderon, 1995 WL 517211, at * 10 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1995), or of the absence of prior felony convictions. Cf. Lewis v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1446, 1457 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829, 109 S.Ct. 83, 102 L.Ed.2d 59 (1988); Woodard v. Sargent, 806 F.2d 153, 157-58 (8th Cir.1986). Nor was Petitioner’s counsel suffering from personal problems which prevented him from putting on an effective defense. Cf. Dillon v. Duckworth, 751 F.2d 895, 897, 901 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108, 105 S.Ct. 2344, 85 L.Ed.2d 859 (1985) (counsel had recently divorced, his brother was paralyzed in an accident, and his father had undergone eme gency heart surgery, all of which prompted him to attest to his own professional incompetence). In the instant case, Hall’s counsel called three mitigating witnesses to the stand, attempted to contact Hall’s wife and mother, and made an eloquent closing argument which appealed to the trial court’s sense of mercy. Cf. Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 367-68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 206, 107 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989) (defense counsel called no character witnesses at the sentencing hearing and his closing argument was “grossly substandard”); United States ex rel. Emerson v. Gramley, 883 F.Supp. 225, 243 (N.D.Ill.1995) (counsel declined to introduce any mitiga