Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER ELLIOTT, District Judge. A hearing which began on Tuesday, May 2, 1995,' and ended on Friday, May-12, 1995, was conducted by the'Gourt.in connection with the matter above identified. Following the suggestion made by the Court; counsel for the respective parties have filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court now files this opinion in' which the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, although not separately categorized, will be readily apparent. The Court will enter a separate order with respect to and deciding all motions of the Petitioners and of DuPont which are still pending. The Petitioners in this matter are nurserymen who previously were among the named Plaintiffs in separate actions against E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (hereafter DuPont) tried as consolidated cases in this court. A total, of 14 such actions were filed, and all of the cases were consolidated for the purposes of discovery prior to trial of the consolidated cases. At all times, however, the first four of those actions (the “Bush Ranch cases”) clearly were the “lead” cases. The Plaintiffs in those cases contended that DuPont’s product, Benlate 50DF, a fungicide, was defective and was contaminated with, among other things, highly toxic herbicides generically called sulfonylureas (“SUs”), manufactured, formulated and/or warehoused by DuPont at the same Belle, West Virginia, plant where benomyl, the active ingredient in Benlate 50DF, is manufactured. It was claimed that such SU-contaminated Benlate caused damages to the ornamental plants and the soils and waters of their nurseries, Therefore, the testing for the presence of SU contamination was the most critical evidence for both the Plaintiffs and the Defendant in the Bush Ranch, cases. This Petition to Show Cause was filed with the Court on March 22, 1995. The Petitioners, three of the four Plaintiffs in the original lead consolidated cases (hereafter “Büsh Ranch” cases), are alleging that DuPont, through its conduct, engaged in acts of misrepresentation and concealment as to critical evidence which constituted a fraud on the Court and a contempt of the. Court’s orders. On reviewing the petition, as well as the memorandum appendix in support and attached Exhibits 1-75, this Court on March 23, 1995, entered an order directing DuPont to show cause on April 24, 1995, why it should not be sanctioned for the conduct described in the petition. Among the motions filed by DuPont was a motion to recuse this District Court Judge before whom the wrongful conduct stated in the petition was alleged to have occurred. DuPont also filed motions to dismiss and to vacate the show cause order. Thereafter, considering these motions, the Court continued the hearing to May 1, 1995, and, at the request of DuPont’s counsel, the Court continued the hearing to May 2,1995. On April 26, 1995, the Court denied DuPont’s motion to recuse. On April 28, 1995, the Court denied DuPont’s motion to stay all proceedings pending review in the appellate court, that motion having been filed on April 27, 1995. DuPont then filed an emergency motion for stay in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on April 28, 1995, along with a petition for a writ of mandamus and a writ of prohibition. These motions were denied by the Court of Appeals on Monday, May 1, 1995. As already noted, the hearing on the show cause order began on Tuesday, May 2, 1995, and ended on Friday, May 12, 1995. The sole purpose of the hearing was to determine whether sanctions should be imposed on the Respondent DuPont. The show cause order was issued following consideration of a petition and voluminous exhibits, which alleged that DuPont had committed a fraud on this Court in connection with discovery matters, trial conduct, and a post-settlement application to the Court to vacate previous, sanctions orders. As set out in detail in this opinion, the Court finds and concludes that DuPont did commit the fraud, the discovery abuses, and the violations of this Court’s orders averred in the petition. DuPont has failed to show any. sufficient cause why it should not be sanctioned for the conduct detailed herein. The Court has heard the testimony and has reviewed the documentary evidence. The Court takes judicial notice of all of the pleadings, submissions, hearing transcripts, orders, and trial transcripts in the Bush Ranch cases. The Court has observed the demeanor of the witnesses and considered any inconsistencies in the evidence. The Court has determined that evidence from other cases involving allegations that DuPont’s Benlate 50DF caused damages, which evidence in most instances consists of trial or deposition transcripts, court orders, or in judicio statements by DuPont, properly should be considered where it concerns what happened in this court, or where it concerns actions or positions taken by or on' behalf of DuPont with respect to the Alta data and documents, or where it bears on the credibility of DuPont. The essentially identical conduct of DuPont in concealing and misrepresenting Alta tests and documents in other courts immediately after the Bush Ranch trial is, however, strong evidence of DuPont’s intent and motive, and establishes a pattern of concealment and false representations on this crucial issue. That pattern of concealment has continued through the show cause hearing here. It is without dispute that the core, almost the ultimate, issue in the Bush Ranch trials was whether or not the soils and or waters of the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ lands where their nursery businesses were conducted were contaminated by the use of DuPont’s Benlate product which itself was defective due to contamination by sulfonylureas (“SUs”) which were also manufactured by DuPont. DuPont was confronted with hundreds of claims and lawsuits throughout the United States alleging damage by Benlate, thus establishing a significant economic risk for DuPont if Benlate was found to be defective through contamination. While there was much circumstantial and indirect evidence of SU-contamination, throughout the bulk of the pretrial discovery- Plaintiffs had not been able to produce direct test results of their soils and waters. This was due principally to the fact that such testing could not generally be performed on scientific equipment available to Plaintiffs’ experts. The Plaintiffs agreed to allow agents of DuPont onto their properties where their nurseries were locate ed. for the purpose of taking soil samples. The Defendant agreed, however, that in return for being allowed access to the soils, waters, and plants of the Plaintiffs for purposes of taking samples, DuPont would furnish Plaintiffs with all materials generated in connection with any tests conducted on those soil, water, and plant samples. In an effort to bolster the defense contention that there were no SUs in Plaintiffs’ soils or waters, DuPont engaged Alta Laboratories, Inc. (hereinafter “Alta”) to perform sophisticated analytical chemistry tests, which few other laboratories, if any, in the country could perform. Although all materials generated in connection with such tests were to be furnished to Plaintiffs, both as a matter of discovery and pursuant to order of this Court, and as a matter of conditions made clear as a predicate to the entry of DuPont onto Plaintiffs’ lands to obtain samples for' these tests, the only documentary materials ever furnished were some tables or charts which the Defendant referred to and called “Summaries.” Some of those summaries were given to Plaintiffs on the eve of trial. The remainder of them were not furnished until after Plaintiffs had rested their ease and not until just before the Defendant was about to call its only witness through whom it would seek to elicit the information which was purportedly contained in the tables. It is the conduct of DuPont surrounding the preparation and use of these “summaries,” when taken together with the conduct generally of the agents and attorneys of DuPont, which gives rise to many of the allegations of fraud upon the Court currently before the Court. For a year preceding the Alta tests, the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs and DuPont had been engaged in a protracted series of discovery disputes, as the result of which this Court had repeatedly found DuPont to be in flagrant violation of discovery orders and duties. This Court had found Dupont’s conduct to be the most serious abuse in its years on the bench and the most serious abuse reflected in the legal precedents. A conditional sanction of, first, $500,000.00, then $1,000,000.00 had been set, without, it is now clear, altering DuPont’s conduct toward the Court, the civil justice system, or the opposing parties. During the lengthy discovery period in this case this Court was forced by the obstructive practices of DuPont to hold numerous hearings. Those hearings took place on the following dates: July 8, 1992; August 5, 1992; August 26, 1992; October 9, 1992; February 19, 1993; April 9, 1993; May 14, 1993; May 27, 1993; June 11, 1993; and June 29, 1993. As a result of the hearings held, the Court entered orders on the following dates: (1) Memorandum opinion and order on Plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery dated June 24,1992; (2) Order dated July 21,1992; (3) Order dated August 7, 1992; (4) Supplemental order dated September 25,1992; (5) Order granting Plaintiffs motion to adopt report of special master dated October 15,1992; (6) Order on pending motions dated October 23,1992; (7) Order dated November 16,1992; (8) Order dated December 10,1992; (9) Order imposing sanctions dated March 15,1993; (10) Supplemental order imposing sanctions dated April 14,1993; (11) Memorandum and order on hearings of May 14, 1993, and May 27, 1993, dated June 7,1993; and . (12)Order on continuation of Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions hearing held June 11, 1993, dated June 15,1993. This Court had never experienced the kind of deliberate refusal to comply with discovery orders that was evidently taking place during this period of time. It became apparent to the Court that DuPont was using its in-house legal staff, local Wilmington, Delaware, counsel, national coordinating counsel, and others to carry out a deliberate effort to restrict legitimate discovery in these and similar cases. The Court entered an order making such a finding on March 15,1993. Efforts by the Court to bring DuPont into compliance involved requiring an affidavit from, and subsequently the appearance of the Defendant’s Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Edgar S. Woolard, Jr. Mr. Woolard assured this Court that DuPont understood what its discovery obligations were and that it would produce all documents responsive to the Plaintiffs requests. In spite of these assurances, the Defendant continued to refuse to honor the Plaintiffs legitimate requests and its earlier assurances to the Court that it would produce all responsive documents. Because of the repeated refusals of DuPont to comply with the orders of the Court, and in order to make an appropriate impression on DuPont, the Court was constrained to enter a conditional order imposing a monetary sanction of $500,000.00. As the case approached trial, the Court entered an order on June 7, 1993, addressing both the May 14, 1993, hearing and the May 27, 1993, hearing, and found, among other things, that: By way of preface, the Court notes that DuPont’s prior non-compliance with the Court’s discovery orders is exemplified by the fact that Mr. George Frank, DuPont’s corporate counsel, submitted an affidavit on behalf of DuPont on January 4, 1993, wherein he certified to the Court that DuPont had fully complied with this Court’s orders in that full production of documents had been made pursuant to the Plaintiffs’ first requests for production even though he testified on cross-examination at the May 27 hearing that he never read through those requests. The Court finds such conduct to be typical of the Defendant’s attitude toward discovery throughout the history of this ease. The monetary sanction against DuPont was increased in that order from $500,000.00 to $1,000,000.00 and was again reserved for later ruling by the Court following a future assessment of DuPont’s discovery conduct. A fifth sanctions hearing was held on June 11, 1993, at which time the Court received evidence that DuPont had intentionally withheld documents related to the crucial issue in the case, crossrcontamination of Benlate with sulfonylureas. At that fifth sanction’s hearing, the Court received evidence that over one month prior to the hearing on May 6, 1993, DuPont scheduled the deposition of John Olsen, the contamination prevention coordinator at the Belle, West Virginia, DuPont plant. In connection with that deposition, the Court received evidence of the following: (a) On May 5,1993, the evening before his deposition, Mr. Olsen was in the Atlanta office of Alston & Bird with Elizabeth Gilley preparing for his deposition. He presented her with additional documents from the Belle, West Virginia, DuPont facility, which had not previously been produced to the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs, but which related to the cross-contamination of Benlate. (b) Rather than produce the documents and go forward with the deposition, DuPont’s counsel, on the eve of the Olsen deposition, falsely represented that Mr. Olsen was unavailable, and that the deposition would have to be canceled. (e) Mr. Olsen’s deposition was rescheduled for June 4, 1993, and it was not until the evening of June 3, 1993, that these same documents, already in the possession of DuPont counsel Gilley since May 5, 1993, were produced to the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs. (d) In the interim between May 5, 1993, and June 3,1993, representatives of DuPont, including Dr. David Johnson and Edgar S. Woolard represented to this Court that all responsive documents had been produced by May 14,1993, (e) DuPont recognized that documents concerning- cross-contamination of Benlate with sulfonylureas generated after the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ initial requests were responsive to and subject to production pursuant to Plaintiffs’ request for supplementation (filed on May 24, 1993) to supplement the earlier document production. As a result of the evidence presented at the June 11, 1993, hearing, the Court found as follows: Well, the Court finds that the Defendant, DuPont, continues to take every means possible to obstruct discovery to which the Plaintiffs are entitled. This is just a con- ■ tinuation of what has been going on for months. ... Now, having stated as I did just a moment ago that the Court finds that the Defendant continues to take every means possible to obstruct discovery to which Plaintiffs were entitled, immediately the idea comes to mind, of course, well, just increase the monetary sanctions from a million to two million, or five million, or what not. But it’s obvious that money does not make an impression on the Defendant. Now, with regard to what has been presented here today, the Court finds that it is without question now that the Plaintiffs have been clearly — have ■ clearly demonstrated that the Defendant has intentionally withheld documents relevant to the issue of cross-contamination of Benlate by Sulfonyl, however you pronounce that, ureas. ..'. (I)t prejudices the Plaintiffs in the presentation of their case for these documents to have been withheld until 30 days before the beginning of the trial, when under the Court’s order the documents should have been produced long ago. In other words, the Plaintiffs’ ease is clearly prejudiced by this action, inaction on the part of the Defendant. It is simply an abuse of the discovery process. And during the recent weeks, since this is the worst case of this nature that I have ever had anything to do with, I have been interested in other eases that have déalt with abuse of the discovery process, and I haven’t found a case that approaches this. In other words, I haven’t found a case where the deliberate actions on the part of a defendant to obstruct the discovery process approach what has happened here. There may be some, but I haven’t found any. (Emphasis added.) Subsequent to that June 11, 1998, hearing, DuPont produced over 225,000 documents responsive to the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ initial and supplemental requests, including many documents which were generated subsequent to Plaintiffs’ initial document requests. None of the Alta test materials concerning SU contamination was included in that production. ■ On June 26, 1993, Plaintiffs took the deposition of Nicholas Albergo, an expert witness named by DuPont. On that date, Mr. Alber-go testified, among other things, that Alta had conducted tests of the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ soils and waters for the presence of DuPont SUs. Based on the data, contained in the few charts available to him' from Alta at that time, Mr. Albergo testified that there was no evidence of SUs in any of the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ soils or waters which had been tested as reflected in the summaries. A final sanctions hearing was held on June 29, 1993, less than one week before the trial of the Bush Ranch cases was to begin. At that time the Court received evidence concerning DuPont’s continued non-compliance with its obligations and the Court’s orders during the course of discovery, explicitly related to cross-contamination issues. Present at the hearing as a corporate representative for DuPont was Dr. Joel Wom-mack, director of R & D and head of analytical chemistry for the Benlate Resolution Team since March, 1991. The Benlate Resolution Team was a group set up by DuPont to monitor, direct, and coordinate DuPont’s legal efforts with regard to all Benlate litigation. • The Court’s June 29 hearing was at a time when Alta’s tests had already been conducted. None of the data or documents had been produced, nor had the attendant Alta documents, which disclose the history of the testing and the activities of DuPont in connection with the ultimate preparation of the Alta report and summaries, been produced. Those documents established that DuPont knew from at least early in the week before Mr. Albergo gave a discovery deposition on June 26,1993, that there had been numerous initial positive findings of SU contamination, findings which the chemist conducting the tests has testified he recognized as “potentially bad news for DuPont” which he assumed might establish liability for damage at the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ nurseries. These documents were withheld by Defendant from the Plaintiffs. While DuPont remained silent about the Alta data and documents, the Court made the following findings: (a) “... but the Plaintiffs have been trying to get this information for a year. I’ve entered orders about producing tapes and producing results, and producing this, and producing another. And it’s just been an ongoing battle for the Plaintiffs and their efforts, legitimate efforts, to obtain discovery material, to get this information. Finally, they get some of it, here just a week before the case is supposed to go to trial, and haven’t got all of it yet.” (b) “... And by withholding this evidence until just a few days before the case goes to trial, of course, the effect is that once again the Plaintiffs have been prejudiced in the presentation of their case because they have been prevented because of the time constraints which are upon us, from conducting the discovery which would be necessary to further develop evidence concerning these deletions, and who did it, and why, and so on.” (c) “... the Court finds that the Defendant is not in compliance with the Court’s order, and is again ordered to produce to the Plaintiffs before the close of business on Friday of this week, all such information, and particularly the Shalaby information, which has been the focus of two or three of our hearings.” (Emphasis added.) The record reveals that DuPont has taken several positions as to why no sanctions should be imposed in response to the show cause order. Among those positions, DuPont states that it was under no obligation to produce to Plaintiffs in the Bush Ranch eases the Alta data and documents. DuPont states that the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ discovery, including the Plaintiffs’ supplemental discovery served not long before trial, did not require the production of the Alta data and documents, and that if the discovery did so require, DuPont had no duty to supplement its discovery responses through trial. DuPont also states that there was no .outstanding order of the Court requiring DuPont to produce all Benlate-related documents, which orders Petitioners allege would include the Alta data and documents. Further, DuPont, at times, has argued that the Alta data and documents were not subject to production because of a claim of work product protection. Concerning the chronology of discovery in the Bush Ranch cases, as it bears on the petition and the show cause hearing and as it bears on the reasons urged by DuPont why no sanctions should be entered, the Court summarizes its findings and/or finds as follows: (a) The conduct and strategy of DuPont in the discovery process was controlled either through its in-house counsel, national coordinating counsel, or Wilmington, Delaware, counsel and not solely by Alston Bird or other local counsel, and DuPont continues to knowingly approve, ratify and acquiesce in the past and present conduct of its counsel in this and subsequent' Benlate eases. DuPont, through its corporate officers and other officials, ratified, approved, and adopted this conduct and strategy and caused the same to be used by counsel representing DuPont in Benlate cases all across the country. (b) The Court found a continuing and deliberate effort by DuPont to impede, delay, and otherwise restrict legitimate discovery by Plaintiffs in the underlying cases and a repeated failure to comply with the Court’s orders concerning discovery. (e)Supplementation of discovery responses was both ordered by the Court and recognized by the parties; it is, moreover, encompassed within the civil rules. (d) This Court maintained a continuing order outstanding through the trial of the Bush Ranch cases which required DuPont to produce all Benlate-related documents to Plaintiffs. (e) Benlate-related documents included by definition all of the Alta data and documents. (f) The Alta data and documents were not produced to Plaintiffs, were not offered to Plaintiffs, were not provided to this Court, or were not otherwise made available to this Court or Plaintiffs in the underlying Bush Ranch cases. (g) DuPont made no claim of protection or privilege, either work product or attorney-client, to any of the Alta data and documents; and such a claim, if made, would not have been sustainable. (h) DuPont engaged in a deliberate effort to obstruct discovery during the Bush Ranch eases. (i) DuPont violated the rules of discovery, Court orders, and duty to participate in litigation in good, faith during the Bush Ranch cases, (j) Court orders entered during these eases clearly required DuPont to produce all documents relevant to, or likely to lead to information relevant to, the contentions and defenses in those cases, including contamination of Benlate by SUs, the very subject of the Alta tests, and the hingepin of the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ eases. . Whether or not Plaintiffs’ soils were actually and in fact contaminated with SUs was recognized by both parties as the critical issue in the case. The Defendant, in fact, argued strongly to the Court that DuPont should be allowed to introduce the Alta lab test “summaries” on that subject and that the Court’s failure to allow such evidence would be highly prejudicial to the Defendant on what DuPont characterized as “the critical issue in the case.” That “critical issue” is, however, not an issue which the Court need resolve here as a predicate to deciding whether or not Defendant’s conduct regarding the withholding of such evidence as claimed by the Petitioners here was conduct which should be sanctioned by the Court. Whether or not SUs were in fact present in the Plaintiffs’ soils was for the jury in the Bush Ranch cases to determine. Whether or not there was material evidence bearing upon the presence of SUs in the Plaintiffs’ soils which was improperly withheld by the Defendant is the question which this Court must determine. The Court must also determine at this time whether or not DuPont has even now told the truth about the circumstances surrounding the Alta data and documents. The evidence which actually went to the jury, with the exception of the Alta Labs evidence, as to the presence of SUs in the Plaintiffs’ soils was highly contested. DuPont presented the Alta Labs test summaries through its witness Albergo, and that unre-futed showing that the sole test results on that subject showed absolutely no SUs present in the Plaintiffs’ soils was the only direct evidence which the jury had as to the SU soil content resulting from analytical soil tests. All other evidence concerning the presence of SUs which the jury had before it, which evidence was circumstantial in nature, was contested by both sides, and the jury was left to weigh the relative merits of opposing witnesses testifying as to differing views of whether or not, for instance, whether the boxes of Benlate supplied to the Plaintiffs contained SUs or whether or not it was possible for cross-contamination to occur at the fabricating plant in West Virginia where both Benomyl and sulfonylureas were produced. Both sides had recognized Alta Labs to be highly regarded in the scientific community and most likely the only lab in the country capable of performing these very intricate, highly technical, and almost prohibitively expensive scientific tests. The introduction of the unrefuted critical opinion testimony by Mr. Albergo, stating without qualification that the Alta charts supplied to him by.DuPont showed that no SUs were present in Plaintiffs' soils, effectively destroyed the Plaintiffs’ circumstantial case on that decisive issue, just as testimony to the contrary would have been devastating to the Defendant’s case had it been shown that its own experts at Alta Labs had reached an opposite finding that there were SUs present. The evidence produced at this show cause hearing demonstrates clearly that DuPont’s Alta Lab scientists had in fact found in June of 199S substantial evidence as a result'of their testing that samples from each of the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ soils showed positive findings for SU contamination. Mr. Beth-em, one of the two scientists from Alta Labs, testified at his deposition in late 1994, which was admitted as evidence at the May 1995 healing, as follows: Q: Does your data support a representation that there are no sulfonylureas in the Columbus, Georgia Plaintiffs soils, without a reference to the detection limit? . A: No.... Q: And you could not state under oath or not under oath— A: Okay Q: —that sulfonylureas do not exist [sic] in the soil of the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs or the Columbus Plaintiffs at lower than fifty parts per trillion? A: No, I could not state that with certainty. Q: You have, in your data that reflect the presence of certain sulfonylureas in the extracts from certain samples at levels below that which you consider your detection limit, correct.... A: Yes, we do. Q: When Mr. Celia asked you a question, if you had any factual basis for the presence of SUs in the Columbus, Georgia soils, I believe you said you had no basis for determining — that you had no factual basis for determining, for stating that there were SUs in the Columbus case soils; is that correct? A: With the detection limit of fifty parts per trillion Q: And, in fact, you do have a basis to believe that there were SUs in the extracts from those soils, don’t you? A: Yes, I do. (Emphasis added.) Mr. Bethem also testified that, at the time he made his findings with Alta’s regard to SUs in the Plaintiffs’ soils, he considered those findings to be “bad news” for DuPont. The Alta Labs personnel then promptly reported their findings to DuPont’s lawyers, Alston and Bird, in mid June, 1993, and the Court concludes from the evidence that DuPont’s Dr. David Johnson necessarily knew about these findings. The evidence was not communicated to the Plaintiffs despite DuPont’s clear duty to do so and in fact was deliberately and consciously kept by the Defendant from becoming a part of the evidence in the ease through the employment by the Defendant of a scheme which the Court finds that DuPont perpetrated for the very purpose of hiding and concealing this critical and pivotal evidence. The Court finds that DuPont’s motive seems clear. Given the company’s great reliance on and belief in scientific testing, together with the potential economic exposure because of the large numbers of pending but unresolved cases, a finding by its own scientists that its Benlate was contaminated with its own SUs would be particularly grave. The evidence is undisputed, however, that following its reporting of its initial findings of SUs in mid June 1998, Alta Labs was ordered by the Defendant to go back, “after most of the work is done” and to “confirm (defirm)” the positive findings. The Alta documents containing this disclosure were not produced by DuPont. Testing procedures were changed. The minimum detection limit was raised. Tests were repeatedly redone and massaged. Soil samples that had been found to be positive were “homogenized” with other parts of the soil sample. Although the written data which comprised the Alta test procedures was highly complex and technical and incomprehensible to people without very specialized analytical chemical training, those documents were carefully concealed from the Plaintiffs and were, in fact, not made available to the only expert, Mr. Albergo, who the Defendant selected to testify with regai’d to the conclusions to be derived from that data. DuPont never offered, proffered or produced the Alta data and documents to the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs, despite a clear duty to do so arising from repeated orders of this Court, from the Civil .Rules, and from its own commitments and representations. Those documents, in fact, only came to light after a ruling by the Hawaii Supreme Court forced DuPont months later to produce them. The documents establish that DuPont knew, from at least early in the week before Mr. Albergo gave his discovery deposition on June 26, 1993, that there had been numerous initial positive findings of SU contamination, findings which the chemist conducting the tests has testified he recognized as “potentially bad news for DuPont,” and which he assumed might establish liability for damage at the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ nurseries. Rather than having the chemist who performed the tests testify as to the results of those tests, the Defendant chose instead to falsely present the results and conclusions of those tests through a witness untrained in analytical chemistry and incapable of interpreting the data showing the positive findings that Alta had made. Documents characterized by the Defendant as “Summaries” were supplied to Mr. Albergo, which documents purported to list in a table tests that Alta Labs had run on each of the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ soil. Only a portion of these summaries were supplied to Plaintiffs a few days before the trial began and the remainder were .withheld until after Plaintiffs had rested their cases and Defendant was well into its case. These “Summaries” were represented to be the results of the work of Bethem and Petersen of Alta Labs compiled in table form, and showing for each soil sample that no SUs were detected at the detection limit shown on the chart. When the Defendant attempted to introduce the documents at trial through their witness Albergo who they had called as a remediation.expert, Plaintiffs objected to the introduction of the charts on the basis that the witness had not performed the work on the soil testing and was not competent to authenticate and vouch for the document. The Court did not allow the introduction of the charts but did allow the witness to give his opinion as an expert based upon the hearsay conclusions evidenced in the tables. The Court.now finds that Mr. Albergo on. voir dire falsely represented to the Court his role in the oversight and supervision of the Alta tests which led to the preparation of those so-called summaries. During that voir dire and argument by counsel as to whether or not the Court should admit the tables or the information which the tables purported to show, the Court finds counsel for DuPont misrepresented to the Court and misled the Court and Plaintiffs counsel as to the true facts surrounding what the Alta Labs tests showed with regard to the presence of SUs in the soil samples tested by Alta. The Court further finds that the evidence which the Court permitted to go to the jury, based upon the false and misleading testimony of Albergo and upon the false and misleading representations and arguments of DuPont’s counsel, provided the false basis for the Defendant to argue throughout the remainder of the case, without contradiction, that the test evidence showed that no SUs were present in the soils of the Plaintiffs. The Court further finds that the evidence is now clear that, had the Plaintiffs been given the information which the Alta tests disclosed and had not been led to believe that those tests showed no presence of SUs, the trial of the case may have been materially altered. The presentation of Plaintiffs witnesses, the cross examination of Defendant’s witnesses, Plaintiffs rebuttal case, opening statements, and closing arguments, at the very least would have been entirely different. Specifically, the Court finds: That DuPont’s expert, Nicholas Albergo, testified falsely and misled the Court as to ,his role in the supervising, directing, and controlling of the Alta Lab scientists, and in his understanding of the basis for the summaries in connection with the testing of the Plaintiffs’ soils in the Bush Ranch tests. In order to bolster his own credibility, Mr. Albergo testified to the Bush Ranch jury that, “I visited the labs that I used, personally discussed the results with the analytical chemists, and personally looked at the raw data.” These statements were false. In reality, it is clear that Mr. Albergo and others have now testified that Mr. Albergo had little, if any, contact with the Alta analytical chemists, did not see or review any of their raw data, nor did he consult with them about the methodology or results. Mr. Albergo testified by deposition January 19, 1995, that he was not actually involved in these tests; that he had not hired Alta; that he had not discussed the results or methodology with the Alta chemists or DuPont’s counsel, that he had not reviewed any raw data; that he was never provided any data by DuPont, Alta, or DuPont lawyers; that he only saw summaries of the test results; and that, in fact, he had never even asked about the results or the underlying data. That DuPont’s counsel, Elizabeth Gilley, misrepresented to the Court during argument on the voir dire of the witness, Mr. Albergo, what the role of that witness was in procuring, supervising, directing, and controlling the Alta Labs scientists in the conduct of the testing of the Plaintiffs’ soils in the Bush Ranch tests. That Ms. Gilley, in conjunction with DuPont’s expert Nicholas Albergo, represented to this Court that Mr. Albergo worked closely with the analytical chemists at Alta running these tests and consulted with them concerning the methodology of the tests; the results of the tests, and data underlying the tests. Ms. Gilley then stated: No, Your Honor, but they were conducted under his direction. He selected the labs to perform the analysis, he directed them as to what analysis should be performed, he told them what to look for, told them what methods to use, and they did everything under his direction and control.... So, Your Honor, we would . submit that he would be entitled to testify to the results, to submit the data in support of those results because he is entitled to rely on that information as an expert in that field. All this information is documentary evidence that he testified about in his deposition. That DuPont’s counsel, Dow N. Kirkpatrick, Jr. misrepresented to the Court during argument on the voir dire of the witness, Mr. Albergo, what the role of that witness was in procuring, supervising, directing, and controlling the Alta Lab scientists in the conduct of the testing of the Plaintiffs’ soils in the Bush Ranch tests. That in arguing to allow Albergo to testify and to permit the introduction of the Alta summaries into evidence, Mr. Kirkpatrick said: This is the only expert in the entire case who has actually taken these samples and had them analyzed, and this is the issue because Plaintiffs have claimed that they have contamination on their property although they have no proof. And we have now got someone that has analyzed all of the samples, and will come in here and tell this Court and this jury that there are no SUs [sulfony-lureas] on the property, in the plants, or in the product. And we believe that that testimony is critical. (Emphasis added.) and The point simply is that we have the evidence that there are no SUs out there That is the issue in the case.... and Your Honor, we’re talking about the. crucial issue in the case.... That DuPont’s counsel, Dow N. Kirkpatrick, Jr. misrepresented to the Court during closing argument to the jury what the witness, Albergo, actually did and what the findings of the Alta Labs scientists actually were. That in argument to the jury in closing Mr. Kirkpatrick said: ... Nick Albergo went out and tested soil and other samples. He didn’t find any SUs in the soil or any of the samples out there. Those are our tests. Where are their tests? Do you recall when everybody went out, they dig up a shovel of dirt. We’d get half of it, they’d get half of it. We brought our test results in here. Where are their test results. Dr. Jones found plant disease. Mr. Albergo found no SUs. ... And our tests, the ones Mr. Albergo did, show there are not any SUs out there. What about Bush Ranch who plants his plants in the ground? He can’t claim sulfonylureas damage either. We tested for that. Mr. Albergo gave you the results in that test. ... All of this factual scientific information is in contrast to the Plaintiffs in these cases who are talking about some minute, very small sulfonylureas contamination in Benlate which they think has wiped out their plants. The evidence shows that sulfonylureas are not present in Plaintiffs’ Benlate soil. ... On the other hand, what did DuPont do? We asked Nick Albergo, a remediation specialist from Tampa to make a complete assessment. He visited each site, studied the property, took numerous samples, soil, water, air, other materials. He had them analyzed. You heard the results. There is no contamination. There are no SUs in the soil, water, or anywhere. (Emphasis added.) That DuPont presented testimony, evidence, and argument that there was no evidence of SUs in the Plaintiffs’ soils and waters, knowing the same to be false and misleading to the Court and jury. That in relying on a summary of the Alta data and documents, DuPont’s expert Albergo inherently relied on the data and documents generated by Alta Labs. That DuPont’s conduct with respect to this self-described “most critical” evidence was in violation of the Court’s orders, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a litigant’s duty of good faith and DuPont’s express agreements and representations, and, in and of itself, and in connection with the other conduct which occurred in the Bush Ranch cases deprived those Plaintiffs of a fair trial and constituted a willful, deliberate fraud on this Court. That DuPont precluded, through its willful misconduct, meaningful cross-examination of witnesses, meaningful scientific debate within the courtroom and meaningful argument to the jury on this self-described “most critical issue in the ease.” That DuPont improperly valued its own ■views of “science” to the exclusion of having the “science” tested in the crucible of the courtroom. That DuPont has now acknowledged that, as to the Alta data and documents, scientists can and do disagree concerning the ultimate conclusion and effect of Alta’s tests. In fact, DuPont acknowledged that the Alta data and documents were subject to scientific opinion that SUs were in the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ soils and water. That Todd David, one of Defendant’s lawyers, testified: Q. [Mr. Gill] Okay, and similarly there is a disagreement as to what the Bush Ranch initial findings mean or don’t mean, right? There could be a scientific dispute about that. A. [Mr. David] Well, I know that Mr. Bethem stands by his report from Alta as to the Bush Ranch samples. Q. Can you answer the question? A. I know that Dr. Jodie Johnson disagrees with Mr. Bethem’s conclusion. Q. Right. So, if you have the raw data, there could be a scientific disagreement about what all that means, right? A. Yes, and had Mr. Pope’s folks— Q. You explicitly said to Judge Roberts, speaking about Bush Ranch that there is a scientific disagreement about what all that means, right? A. Absolutely, sir. While the Bush Ranch jury was deliberating the parties reached agreement on a settlement. The parties approached the Court and DuPont presented to this Court a motion. to vacate the sanctions orders. DuPont represented there that, “Plaintiffs have agreed that, during the course of the case, DuPont did come in compliance with the Court’s orders and its discovery obligation.” While Plaintiffs could not and did not know that this representation was false, DuPont did. In reliance upon those representations, this Court vacated the discovery and sanctions orders. DuPont obtained that order through a deliberate and willful fraud on the Court, concealing and continuing its prior pattern of abuse. In so doing, DuPont has made this Court an instrument of its continuing fraud. Within a month after the conclusion of the Bush Ranch cases, DuPont went to trial in another Benlate case, this time in Florida (Lambert v. DuPont). See Lambert, et al. v. E.I. DuPont, et al., Civil Action No. CA-92-067, In the Circuit Court, In and For Hardee County, Florida. A third such trial occurred. approximately four months after the end of the Bush Ranch cases, again in Florida (Ritter-Whitworth v. DuPont). See Whitworth, et al. v. Harrell’s, Inc., et al., Civil Action GC-G-92-1293 and Ritter, et al. v. Growers Fertilizer Corp., et al., Civil Action No. GCG-1374, In the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit In and For Polk County, Florida. In each of those cases, an identical pattern emerged. Alta was called on to conduct tests for the presence of SUs through the same analytical method used in Bush Ranch, and, in each instance, obtained positive results. In Lambert, the Alta chemist has (after completion of the trial) testified that he found the positive SU results to be conclusive. In both instances, DuPont intentionally withheld from the plaintiffs those test data and, as in Bush Ranch, was able to argue to the Court and the jury that the evidence established that there were no SUs in the Plaintiffs’ soils or waters. See re Lambert, the following: May 3, 1995, Hearing Transcript, at pp. 465-467; May 9, 1995, Hearing Transcript, pp. 760-765; May 8, 1995, Hearing Transcript, at pp. 656-670, 694; May 9, 1995, Hearing Transcript, at pp. 761-784; May 11, 1995, Hearing Transcript, at pp. 1460-1461; Dr. Richard Browner, December 2, 1994, Kawamata. Farms, Trial Transcript (PX 10); Dr. J. Johnson, August 22, 1994, Hashimoto Trial Transcript at pp. 36-37 (PX 11). See also, PX 80 and 81. See, re Ritter-Whitworth, the following: May 8, 1995, Hearing Transcript at pp. 579-583, 606-620, 642-648. See also, PX 97 and 98. Following a bitter discovery dispute in another Benlate trial, Kawamata Farms v. DuPont, Civil Action No. 91-437 (Kona) and 920247K (Kona) In the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, State of Hawaii. The Hawaii Court ordered DuPont to produce data and documents from Alta, which included the Bush Ranch data and documents, draft reports, and telephone memoranda. For the first time, the test data containing those parts indicating positive findings were disclosed, along with notes from Alta showing Defendant’s directive to “confirm (defirm)” the positive results. DuPont strenuously resisted production both in the trial court and through mandamus in the Supreme Court of Hawaii, and asserted a claim of privilege as to the Alta data and documents, whieh claim is directly opposite to DuPont’s assertions to this Court in the show cause hearing. As set out, infra, this Court has concluded that DuPont has presented false positions here when contrasted "with its judicial admissions and assertions elsewhere. For example, DuPont has maintained here: (1) that it was not required by court order, rule or discovery request to produce the Alta data and documents; (2) that the Alta data and documents were shielded by a work product privilege despite DuPont’s representations to the Court that the Alta people were fact witnesses, and despite having never claimed a privilege or logged such documents in the required privilege logs; (3) that the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs never requested the Alta data and documents; (4) that DuPont “absolutely” did offer the data and documents to Plaintiffs’ counsel in the Bush Ranch proceedings, but that Plaintiffs’ counsel declined them; (5) that DuPont would have produced the Alta data and documents if the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs had made a Rule 1006 “objection” to the misleading “summaries;” (6) that some part of the Alta data and documents were “available” in the courtroom after the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs rested, but that riot all of those papers were present, and DuPont cannot say what parts were and what were not present, although it is now clear that a number of the most damaging parts were not present, assuming any of them were, since DuPont never advised the Court or opposing counsel of the claimed availability of a box of such papers in the courtroom. In Hawaii, however, DuPont argued that the Bush Ranch Alta data and documents were subject to a privilege whieh had never been waived, and that those papers had never been offered, proffered, tendered, or used in the Bush Ranch or any other Benlate trial. The Circuit Court in Hawaii, like this Court, found DuPont’s discovery abuses to be unprecedented, and imposed a sanction of $1,500,000.00. This Court is not engaged in determining whether a sanction should be imposed for DuPont’s conduct in other courts, but its clear pattern of concealment and misrepresentation concerning the same issues bears on DuPont’s intent, willfulness, and motive, and relates to the credibility to be given to its current professions of a corporate intent or desire to conform to the discovery rules and court orders. The Hawaiian production led plaintiffs in other Benlate cases to take the depositions of the Alta witnesses, Mr. Albergo and others, thereby disclosing much of the history of the events surrounding the Alta tests. This Court is not persuaded that DuPont has even now told the full truth of its conduct in that regard. In the proceedings before this Court on the show cause order, the Court finds that DuPont, when confronted with the allegations of the petition, which were supported by transcripts from other court proceedings, depositions, and court orders, has not fully and truthfully responded to those charges. Instead, it has engaged in evasion, equivocation, and falsehood; through its witnesses such as Mr. David and Mrs. Gilley, DuPont refused to give straightforward answers to questions about its conduct in regard to the Alta documents and its positions before other courts, refused to give words their plain and ordinary meanings, and refused to respond candidly or directly; it has sought to give a distorted reading to the plain meaning of words; it has created a whole series of after-the-fact excuses which are not supported by the facts and events; it has put forward legally and factually inconsistent éfforts at justifying its conduct; it has contradicted its own solemn representations to other courts, made to induce those courts to rule favorably to DuPont; it has resisted producing witnesses before this Court who have knowledge of -the facts, and those witnesses who did testify for DuPont were not credible; it has sought to avoid answering for its conduct by making irrelevant ad hominem attacks on Petitioners, Petitioners’ counsel, and the Court; it has filed affidavits based on incomplete or inaccurate recitals of the predicate facts; it has distorted the rules of evidence and the Civil Rules; it is clear that DuPont continues to evidence an attitude of contempt for the Court’s orders and processes, and to view itself as not subject to the rules and orders affecting all other litigants. DuPont’s actions and representations concerning the Alta data and documents, and its ultimate false representation concerning compliance with the order of this Court, constituted a fraud on the Court and a contempt of the Court’s orders. DuPont’s conduct of concealment and misrepresentation has continued through the show cause hearing. This conduct merits, indeed requires, vigorous action by the Court and the imposition of severe sanctions. The Court’s Authority DuPont has questioned the authority of this Court to issue the show cause order and conduct the hearing which ensued, contending also that the Court does not have the power to impose sanctions. This Court has the power, the authority, and the jurisdiction to investigate allegations of a fraud on the Court and a fraud on the judicial system, particularly where the alleged fraud was accomplished by concealing highly relevant and discoverable information and evidence, bearing on the most critical issue in the case, from the opposing parties and their counsel, from a testifying expert witness, and from the Court and the jury; where the production of such information and evidence was, pursuant to court orders, subject to both initial and supplemental discovery requests, was required by the Court’s orders, and had been promised by DuPont’s Chief Executive Officer, DuPont’s legal department, and DuPont’s trial counsel; where the alleged fraud ultimately involved the knowing and willful presentation to the Court and/or to the jury of false testimony and false argument; and where the alleged fraud involved the presentation to the Court of a motion containing materially untrue statements for the purpose of, and with the result of, obtaining an order from this Court vacating prior “findings of discovery misconduct, and relieving DuPont of an obligation to pay monetary sanctions. Such final action of-presenting a false representation to the Court to obtain relief had the effect of using the Court as an instrument to further the misconduct and fraud of DuPont. The Bush Ranch Plaintiffs and DuPont agreed in the pretrial order in those eases (see PX 1) that this Court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter there involved. The alleged fraud occurred in this Court, and this Court is the proper, if not the only, forum in which the matters raised in the present petition can, in the first instance, be determined. See Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364, 372, 74 U.S. 364, 372, 19 L.Ed. 214, 217 (1868) (it is anomalous for one court to take cognizance of an alleged contempt committed before and against another court; the court wherein the contempt occurred possesses ample powers to take care of its own dignity and punish the offender). See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (power to punish for contempts inherent in all courts). This Court has the power, the authority, and the jurisdiction to sanction DuPont, to hold DuPont in civil contempt, and otherwise to act to enforce the authority of this Court, if the allegations are shown by clear and convincing evidence to be true. This Court relies on its inherent powers, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and 18 U.S.C. § 401, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 26, 33, 34, and 37, and case authority, including Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., supra; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976); Link v. Wabash Railroad Company, 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966); Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 66 S.Ct. 1176, 90 L.Ed. 1447 (1946); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990), Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); Ex parte Wall, 17 Otto 265, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S.Ct. 569, 27 L.Ed. 552 (1883); Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall, 505, 86 U.S. 505, 22 L.Ed. 205 (1873); Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall 364, 74 U.S. 364, 19 L.Ed. 214 (1868); Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 181, 126 L.Ed.2d 140 (1993); BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, 12 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir.1994); Harre v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir.1985), opinion vacated in part on reconsideration, 866 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir.1989); Sizzler Fam. Steak Houses v. Western Sizzlin Steak, 793 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir.1986); Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., Inc., 775 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir.1985); Brandt v. Vulcan, Inc., 30 F.3d 752, 757 n. 7 (7th Cir.1994); Properties International Ltd. v. Turner, 706 F.2d 308 (11th Cir.1983); Southerland v. Irons, 628 F.2d 978 (6th Cir.1980); Town of Columbus v. Barringer, 85 F.2d 908 (4th Cir.1936); Porcelli v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 78 F.R.D. 499 (E.D.Wis.1978); and United States v. Pendergast, 35 F.Supp. 593 (W.D.Mo.1940). “The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice.” Ex parte Robinson, supra at 510. By statute, summary punishment for contempts may be inflicted: “1st, where there has been misbehavior of a person in the presence of the courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; 2nd, where there has been misbehavior of any officer of the courts in his official transactions; and, 3rd, where there has been disobedience or resistance by any officer, party, juror, witness, or other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the courts.” Id. at 511. “The power to punish, as contempt, misbehavior committed in the presence of the court is an inherent power. Congress has not limited the time within which it may be punished. Perhaps there is an inherent limitation in the inherent power, a limitation arising out of laches — the punishment must not be unreasonably delayed. Certainly it is not unreasonably delayed if a proceeding for punishment is begun as soon as the misbehavior is discovered, particularly if the mis-behavants, by concealment and fraud, have prevented the discovery.” United States v. Pendergast, 35 F.Supp. 593, 599 (W.D.Mo.1940). The Pendergast Court explained apparently limiting language in Ex parte Robinson, supra, which is not ■ quoted above. If any doubt at all could arise from the language of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Robinson, supra, it certainly was entirely dissipated in the later opinion in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 38 S.Ct. 560, 62 L.Ed. 1186 [ (1918) ]. It was made perfectly clear by the opinion in that ease that contempt was not restricted to interference with ‘order and decorum.’ When the opinion is read in connection with the opinion of the district court in the same case (220 F. 458) it is clear that it is the effect on the administration of justice which is the test of whether’ misbehavior is contempt. If the tendency of the misbehavior is to affect the administration of justice, it is contempt, whether it is in the presence of the court or at some point away from the presence of the court, whether it affects the order and decorum of the courtroom or does not affect them. Pendergast, 35 F.Supp. at 596. Civil contempt has a remedial purpose, not the least of which is to give force and vitality'to judicial decrees. “The private or public rights that the decree sought to protect are an important measure of the remedy.” McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct. 497, 499-500, 93 L.Ed. 599 (1949). See also, Universal Cooperatives, Inc. v. Tribal Co-Operative Marketing. Development Federation of India, Ltd., 45 F.3d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir.1995) (“Sanctions are on occasion necessary ‘not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.’ National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 747, 751 (1976)”). “There can be no question that courts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt.” Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 1535, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966). Here, DuPont violated not just one court order, but an entire series of court orders, and misrepresented its conduct to the Court. DuPont breached its discovery obligations, its ■ duty to proceed in good faith, and its representations to the Court and counsel. DuPont elicited and presented false testimony from a key witness. DuPont argued falsely to the Court and the jury. DuPont discredited the Bush Ranch Plaintiffs’ witnesses with the Alta tests. DuPont’s contemptuous fraud on this Court was brought to the attention of this Court as soon as practicable after the discovery of the conduct. DuPont’s conduct constitutes contempt of this Court. The Court of Appeals of this circuit recently considered and addressed a situation where, like here, the defendant “stubbornly withheld discoverable information.... ” Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 987 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir.1993). There, the district court specifically found four methods whereby the Defendants had resisted discovery: first, the defendants played word games, saying that certain words and phrases were not defined; second, the defendants unilaterally limited the meaning or scope of discovery requests; third, the defendants failed to produce documents ordered to be produced and in so failing showed disdain for the Court’s orders; and fourth, the defendants deliberately covered up damaging evidence. See id. at 1540-41. A review of the evidence here reveals all of the discovery avoidance methods shown in Malautea. Even more egregious misconduct occurred here than occurred in Malautea. In Malautea the district court chose to strike the defendants’ answers and enter a default judgment against them on the issue of liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed, despite the defendants’ contentions that the suppressed evidence referenced by the Court was not encompassed by the Court’s discovery orders, that the discovery orders were vague, and that any failure to comply was simply a misunderstanding. See id. at 1542. The Court of Appeals held that the Federal Rules (there Rule 37(b)(2)(C)) “give district judges broad discretion to fashion appropriate sanctions for violation of d