Full opinion text
ORDER RE: 1.) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; 2.) DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS; 3.) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE; 4.) DEFENDANT MERVYN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT COLLINS, District Judge. Defendants’ motions came on regularly for hearing before this Court on March 18,1996. After reviewing the materials submitted by the parties, argument of counsel, and the case file, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 1.) Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is DENIED; 2.) Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs’ fourth and fifth causes of action are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice; 3.) Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court ORDERS the term “Slave Sweatshop” stricken from the First Amended Complaint; and 4.) Defendant Mervyn’s’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED without prejudice to a future motion. I. Background This action is one of several civil and criminal proceedings stemming from allegations that the Plaintiffs, who are immigrant garment workers from Thailand, were falsely imprisoned in a complex in El Monte, California, and employed in a system of involuntary servitude. The substance of Plaintiffs’ allegations will be addressed in further detail below. On September 5,1995, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants TAVEE UVAWAS, SUNEE MANASULANGKOON, SUPORN VERAYTWILAI, THANES PAN-THONG, PRAWIT PHAPHARASUJSERM, SANCHAI PONGPRAPIN, NUTTAPHAN KETWATTHA, MALINEE CHINWALA-NA, RAMPA SUTHAPRASIT, SUNTON RAWUNGCHAISUNG, and SEREE GRANJAPIREE, all individually, and doing business as SK FASHIONS, S & P FASHIONS, and D & R FASHIONS, for peonage and involuntary servitude, various labor violations, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”), violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), fraud, misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and false imprisonment. Plaintiffs have termed these Defendants the “operators,” because they were the individuals or entities who allegedly operated the El Monte facility where the Plaintiffs were held and employed. On October 25,1995, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), adding as Defendants MERVYN’S, TOMATO, INC. (“Tomato”), L.F. SPORTSWEAR, MS. TOPS OF CALIFORNIA, INC. (“Ms. Tops”), TOP-SON DOWNS OF CALIFORNIA, INC., F-40 CALIFORNIA, INC. (“F-40”), NEW BOYS, INC. (“New Boys”), BIGIN, INC. (“Bigin”), ITALIAN CLUB, and B.U.M. INTERNATIONAL, INC (“B.U.M.”). These Defendants added by the FAC were not directly involved in operating the El Monte facility. Plaintiffs distinguish this set of Defendants by terming them “manufacturer” Defendants. In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that these Defendants have: (1) failed to pay Plaintiffs a minimum wage or overtime, in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FSLA”) (29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 & 216(b)) and CaLLabor Code §§ 1194(a), 1194.2(a), 1197 & 2666(a); (2) employed Plaintiffs to manufacture garments by industrial homework, in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(d) & 215(a)(5), 29 C.F.R. § 530.2, and the California Industrial Homework Act (Cal.Labor Code §§ 2650 et seq.); (3) contracted with entities not registered with the state Labor Commissioner, in violation of CaLLabor Code §§ 2675 & 2677 and Cal.Reg.Code § 13634; (4) engaged in unfair business practices, in violation of Cal.Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.; (5) involuntarily deducted wages for transportation board, and outstanding debt, in violation of CaLLabor Code § 450 and FLSA § 3(m); (6) committed negligence per se; (6) committed negligent supervision; and (7) committed negligent hiring. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, declaratory relief, unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime premiums, restitution, liquidated damages, general damages, treble damages, interest, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. On December 6, 1995, Defendants Ms. Tops, Topson Downs, and F-40 (collectively “Ms. Tops”) filed motions to dismiss, for a more definite statement, and to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. Soon thereafter, on December 18, 1995, Defendant Mervyn’s joined in the Ms. Tops motions. On January 16, 1996, Defendant B.U.M. joined in the Ms. Tops motions, and Defendants Tomato, Bigin, and L.F. Sportswear filed their own motion to dismiss (“Tomato motion”). Defendant Mervyn’s filed its own motion to dismiss as well as a motion for summary judgment on the same date. Also on January 16,1996, Plaintiffs dismissed Defendants F^K), Topson Downs, and Ms. Tops from the action. On January 26, 1996, Defendants Tomato, Bigin, and L.F. Sportswear joined in the Ms. Tops and Mervyn’s motions to dismiss. Finally, on February 21, 1996, Mervyn’s joined in the Tomato, Bigin, and L.F. Sportswear motion to dismiss. On March 5, 1996, Plaintiffs filed one consolidated Opposition to all of Defendants’ motions to dismiss. In addition, Plaintiffs filed Oppositions to Defendants’ motions for a more definite statement and to strike. Finally, Plaintiffs filed a Request that Mer-vyn’s’ summary judgment motion be denied or continued pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). Defendants Mervyn’s and B.U.M. filed Reply briefs on March 11, 1996, in which Defendants Tomato, Bigin, and L.F. Sportswear joined. II. Plaintiffs’ Allegations As stated above, Plaintiffs are immigrants from Thailand who were employed as garment workers, allegedly in conditions amounting to involuntary servitude. FAC ¶ 5. According to the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs were forced to sew garments inside a facility at 2614 Santa Anita Avenue, El Monte, California (“El Monte facility”). FAC ¶ 10. Beginning in 1988 and continuing through August 2, 1995, the “operator” Defendants, doing business as SK Fashions, S & P Fashions, and D & R Fashions directly operated this facility and allegedly imprisoned and enslaved Plaintiffs, forcing them to work up to eighteen hours a day or more. FAC ¶ 11. In addition, the operators allegedly censored Plaintiffs’ mail, deprived them of contact with the outside world, subjected Plaintiffs to mental, physical, and economic coercion and cruelty, and restrained Plaintiffs through the use of threats of physical force against the Plaintiffs or their families. FAC ¶ 12. According to the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs were either not paid at all for their work or were paid below the minimum wage and were not compensated for overtime. FAC ¶ 16. Payments for transportation were allegedly deducted from Plaintiffs’ wages. FAC ¶ 16. In addition, food and other necessities were allegedly available to Plaintiffs only at grossly inflated prices. FAC ¶ 16. According to the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs were also forced to live, sleep, and eat at the El Monte facility, where they also worked. FAC ¶ 10. Plaintiffs allege that the El Monte facility was Plaintiffs’ “home” within the meaning of the California Industrial Homework Act (CaLLabor Code § 2650(c)). FAC ¶ 10. Allegedly, the individual operators and Defendants SK Fashions, S & P Fashions, and D & R Fashions at all times operated a joint integrated business operation out of the El Monte facility and at 1330 W. 11th Place, 1314 W. 12th Place, and 1319 W. 12th Place in Los Angeles (“Los Angeles facilities”). FAC ¶ 17. As such, the individuals, SK Fashions, S & P Fashions, and D & R Fashions allegedly constituted an “enterprise,” as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), and a single employer which employed Plaintiffs as industrial homeworkers. FAC ¶ 17. The specific allegations against the operator Defendants are not directly at issue in these motions. Defendants Tomato, L.F. Sportswear, Bi-gin, Ms. Tops, Topson Downs, F-40, New Boys, Mervyn’s and B.U.M. are all corporations engaged in the garment business. As stated above, Plaintiffs term these Defendants “manufacturers.” Plaintiffs allege that, together with the “operators,” these “manufacturer” Defendants acted as Plaintiffs’ joint employers “because each exercised meaningful control over the work plaintiffs performed.” FAC ¶ 19. Plaintiffs contend that the operators of the El Monte and Los Angeles facilities were an integral part of the “manufacturers’ ” business, and that the operators “acted, in effect, as supervisors and managers” for the “manufacturer” Defendants. FAC ¶ 19. In addition, Plaintiffs assert that the “manufacturer” Defendants have directly or indirectly employed Plaintiffs as industrial homeworkers within the meaning of Cal.Labor Code § 2650 et seq. and 29 C.F.R. § 530.2. FAC ¶20. According to the First Amended Complaint, Defendants Tomato, Bigin, L.F. Sportswear, and F-40 were not registered with the California Labor Commissioner, in violation of Cal.Labor Code § 2675 et seq. FAC ¶ 21. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that any registration issued to SK Fashions, S & P Fashions, D & R Fashions, or to any of the individual operators by the Labor Commissioner was procured by fraud and is null and void. FAC ¶ 22. Therefore, Plaintiffs allege that the “manufacturers’” garments were produced at unregistered garment factory locations. FAC ¶ 23. Plaintiffs further allege that the “manufacturers” contracted with the operators “to produce garments at prices too low to permit payment of employees’ minimum wages and overtime.” FAC ¶ 26. Plaintiffs assert that the “manufacturers” “utilize the business practice of contracting out garment manufacturing work in part to avoid compliance with labor laws and liability for violation of those laws.” FAC ¶26. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that the “[mjanufacturers engaged and continue to engage in a pattern and practice of contracting at unfairly low prices by utilizing garment contractors who are not registered and/or who are chronic violators of labor laws, thus condemning plaintiffs and other garment workers to long hours of work without minimum wages and overtime pay as required by law, to the detriment of themselves, their families and to the public at large.” FAC ¶27. Plaintiffs contend that the “manufacturers” have “concealed and continue to conceal pertinent facts regarding their activities,” and are unjustly enriched by the unlawful acts of the operators. Plaintiffs assert the following causes of action against the “manufacturer” Defendants. First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have failed to pay minimum wage and overtime, in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 & 216(b). FAC ¶¶ 37-39 (Second Claim For Relief). Second, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have failed to pay minimum wage and overtime, in violation of Cal.Labor Code §§ 1194(a), 1194.2(a), 1198, & 2665(a) and the Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order No. 1-89, § 3. FAC ¶ 40-44 (Third Claim For Relief). Third, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated 29 U.S.C. § 211(d) & 215(a)(5), 29 C.F.R. § 530.2, and CaLLabor Code ¶ 2650 et seq. by employing Plaintiffs as industrial homeworkers in the manufacture of garments. FAC ¶¶ 45-48 (Fourth Claim For Relief). Fourth, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have contracted with an unregistered garment manufacturer, in violation of Cal.Labor Code § 2675 & Cal.Reg.Code § 13634. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Bigin, F-40, New Boys, and Tomato have illegally not registered with the Labor Commissioner as garment manufacturers. FAC ¶¶ 49-53 (Fifth Claim For Relief). Fifth, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have engaged in unfair business practices, in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code §§ 17200 et seq. FAC ¶¶ 74-87 (Seventh Claim For Relief). Sixth, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), 29 C.F.R. § 531.30, and Cal-Labor Code § 450 by wrongfully deducting the costs of transportation, housing, and outstanding debt from Plaintiffs’ wages. FAC ¶¶ 88-93 (Eighth Claim for Relief). Seventh, Plaintiffs allege that because Defendants have violated all of the above statutes and regulations, their conduct constitutes negligence per se. FAC ¶¶ 111-14 (Thirteenth Claim for Relief). Eighth, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants negligently supervised the operators, because the Defendants should have known that the operators were employing workers in violation of federal and state law. FAC ¶¶ 115-120 (Fourteenth Claim for Relief). Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants negligently hired the operators to perform garment manufacturing work for them, because Defendants should have known that the operators would violate Plaintiffs’ rights. FAC ¶¶ 121-124 (Fifteenth Claim for Relief). III. Discussion Several interrelated motions are currently pending before the Court. The Court will address each group of motions in turn. A. Motion for More Definite Statement Defendants first seek a more definite statement from the Plaintiffs. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), “[i]f a pleading ... is so vague and ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement.]” However, a motion for a more definite statement must be considered in light of the liberal pleading standards of Rule 8(a) (a Complaint need only be a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]”). See Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F.Supp. 1072, 1077 (C.D.Cal.1994) (“Motions for a more definite statement are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted because of the minimal pleading requirements of the Federal Rules.”); see also Sehwarzer, et al., Federal Civil Procedure § 9:349 (“A motion for a more definite statement attacks unintelligibility in a pleading, not simply mere lack of detail.”). Thus, a motion for a more definite statement should not be granted unless the defendant literally cannot frame a responsive pleading. Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School District, 464 F.Supp. 1104, 1114 (N.D.Cal.1979). Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is indefinite in several respects. First, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs sloppily incorporated by reference all allegations throughout the Complaint, including those only against the “operators.” Second, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is indefinite because Defendants do not know which Plaintiffs were held at the El Monte facility and for how long. Finally, Defendants assert that much of the First Amended Complaint is simply vague. While Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is not always a model of clarity, it does state its claims. Defendants’ briefs amply demonstrate that they do understand the issues presented by the First Amended Complaint. Addressing Defendants’ specific arguments, the question of which Plaintiffs were held at the El Monte facility is an issue of detail, not intelligibility. In addition, Defendants did not appear confused by Plaintiffs’ incorporation by reference structure. Moreover, the Court has no doubt that Defendants will be able to frame a responsive pleading to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is denied. B. Motions to Dismiss Before the Court are essentially three separate motions to dismiss pursuant primarily to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). However, because each of the Defendants has joined in all three motions, and because the motions overlap in their arguments, the Court will not address each motion separately. Rather, the Court will address each motion’s arguments in the context of each relevant cause of action. 1. Standard for Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a) which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988). A court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.1986); see also Russell v. Landrieu, 621 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that the complaint must be read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). However, a court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences, unwarranted deductions of fact, or conclusory legal allegations east in the form of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031, 102 S.Ct. 567, 70 L.Ed.2d 474 (1981); Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 973 (8th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961, 89 S.Ct. 2096, 23 L.Ed.2d 748 (1969). Furthermore, unless a court converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment, a court cannot consider material outside of the complaint (e.g., facts presented in briefs, affidavits, or discovery materials). Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir.1991), overruled on other grounds by Central Bank of Denver, N.A v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., et al., 511 U.S. 164, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994). A court may, however, consider exhibits submitted with the complaint and matters that may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1989); Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir.1986), abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991). Lastly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “will not be granted merely because [a] plaintiff requests a remedy to which he or she is not entitled.” Sehwarzer, et al., Civil Procedure Before Trial § 9:230. “It need not appear that plaintiff can obtain the specific relief demanded as long as the court can ascertain from the face of the complaint that some relief can be granted.” Doe v. United States Dept. of Justice., 753 F.2d 1092, 1104 (D.C.Cir.1985); see also Doss v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 834 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir.1987) (demand for improper remedy not fatal if claim shows plaintiff entitled to different form of relief). 2. Analysis a. Statute of Limitations Defendants first assert that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs do not explicitly address this argument in their Opposition, but in their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs state that “[a]ny statute of limitations relating to the causes of action alleged in this complaint has been suspended for the period of plaintiffs’ false imprisonment. Plaintiffs were unable to seek appropriate remedies, including the filing of a lawsuit, until at least August 2, 1995.” FAC ¶ 30. The Court agrees. Two limitations schemes are relevant to this case: (1) For Plaintiffs’ federal cause of action for unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, the governing statute is 29 U.S.C. § 255; (2) For Plaintiffs’ other claims, California law governs. Both limitations schemes are silent on the question of whether the statute can be suspended or tolled on purely equitable grounds. Regardless, both federal and California law recognize equitable tolling in certain instances, “as in the ease of inability to bring suit or exercise one’s remedy.” Partlow v. Jewish Orphans’ Home of Southern California, Inc., 645 F.2d 757, 760 (9th Cir.1981), abrogated on other grounds, 493 U.S. 165, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989) (quoting Fulton v. NCR Corp., 472 F.Supp. 377, 383-84 (W.D.Va.1979)); see also Lewis v. Superior Court (Perret), 175 Cal.App.3d 366, 380, 220 Cal.Rptr. 594 (1985) (“[l]anguage of statutes of limitation must admit to implicit exceptions where compliance is impossible and manifest injustice would otherwise result.”). Clearly, Plaintiffs could not comply with the relevant statutes of limitations during the time in which they were allegedly held at the El Monte facility — indeed, during that time, they were physically restrained. Accordingly, the Court finds that any and all limitations periods were tolled until August 2, 1995, when Plaintiffs were released from the El Monte facility by officials of the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”). Because Plaintiffs filed their action on September 5, 1995, only one month later, Plaintiffs’ action is not barred by any statute of limitations. b. Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) For Failure to Pay Minimum Wage and Overtime In their second claim for relief, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have violated sections 6 and 7 of the FLSA (29 U.S.C. §§ 206 & 207) by failing to pay Plaintiffs the federal minimum wage, as well as overtime benefits. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claim fails in two respects. First, Defendants assert that the complaint filed on August 16, 1995 by the United States Secretary of Labor in Reich v. Uvawas, Case No. CV 95-5474 WDK (JRx) terminated Plaintiffs’ right to sue for unpaid compensation. In the alternative, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim fails because Defendants were not Plaintiffs’ “employers” within the meaning of the FLSA. The Court will address each argument in turn. i. Effect of Filing of Action By Secretary of Labor Against Individual “Operator” Defendants This question presents an issue of statutory construction not definitively resolved by the federal courts. Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), an employee has a private right to sue for minimum wage or overtime compensation withheld in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 or 207. However, this right terminates “upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary [of Labor] in an action ... in which a recovery is sought of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation ... owing to such employee by an employer ... unless such action is dismissed without prejudice on motion of the Secretary.” § 216(c). See also § 216(b) (right to sue terminates if Secretary of Labor brings suit for injunctive relief under § 217). On August 16, 1995, Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich filed an action to enjoin continuing FLSA violations and recover minimum wage and overtime compensation due to Plaintiffs. See Mervyn’s’ Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit A (“Reich Complaint”). Secretary Reich’s suit names eight of the individual operators as defendants: Tavee Uvawas, Sunee Manasulang-koon, Suporn Veraytwilai, Thanes Pan-thong, Prawit Phpharasujserm, Sanchai Pongprapin, Nuttaphan Ketwattha, and Rampa Suthaprasit. See Reich Complaint. The Secretary’s action is thus not against the Defendants at issue in the instant motions: Mervyn’s, Tomato, Bigin, L.F. Sportswear, and B.U.M. Regardless, Defendants assert that because Plaintiffs did not file suit until September 5, 1995, the Secretary’s prior filing terminated Plaintiffs’ right to sue. Plaintiffs assert that because Secretary Reich named only the “operator” defendants in his action, and not the “manufacturers” at issue here, Plaintiffs’ action can proceed. The enforcement provisions of the FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 216 and 217) serve several equally important Congressional purposes. First, the provisions are designed to “secur[e] to employees restitution of statutorily mandated wages.” Marshall v. Coach House Restaurant, Inc., 457 F.Supp. 946, 951 (S.D.N.Y.1978). Thus,' the FLSA ensures that individual employees will be compensated within the dictates of federal law. Second, the enforcement sections ensure that violators are “deprived of the use of unlawfully withheld compensation ..., thereby ‘protecting) complying employers from the unfair wage competition of the noncomplying employers.” Marshall, 457 F.Supp. at 952 (quoting Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527, 535 (3d Cir.1971) and Sen.Rep. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620,1659) Third, the enforcement provisions serve to deter future violations of the FLSA. There are three main vehicles for enforcing the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. First, under § 216(b), an employee may sue an employer for “unpaid minimum wages, or ... unpaid overtime compensation ... and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Second, the Secretary of Labor may sue under § 216(c) to recover an employee’s “unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated damages.” Finally, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to sue to obtain an injunction under § 217. Under the statutory scheme, actions by the Secretary of Labor take precedence over actions by employees. Indeed, in the 1961 amendments to the FLSA (which granted more power to the Secretary of Labor), Congress changed the “governmental policy toward enforcement ... from reliance primarily on private enforcement to reliance on enforcement by the Secretary.” Hodgson, 446 F.2d at 535. This policy shift was brought about primarily because of the ineffectiveness of solely private enforcement of the FLSA. Prior to the 1961 amendments, the “Secretary of Labor [had] no authority to require the payment of minimum wages and overtime compensation not paid in compliance with the law, except where an employee requests that an action be brought by the Secretary of Labor.” 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1658. This limitation on the power of the Secretary of Labor “impeded the Secretary in his efforts to enforce the act since many employees who [had] not been paid in compliance with the act [were] hesitant about requesting legal action against their employers.” Id. In response, Congress amended sections 216 and 217 to enhance the powers of the Secretary of Labor. At the same time, Congress lessened the power of individual employees to enforce the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA by making employees’ enforcement powers dependent upon the actions of the Secretary of Labor. Under § 216(b), an employee’s right to bring an action for unpaid minimum wage or overtime compensation “terminated upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor in an action under section 217 ... in which ... restraint is sought of any further delay in the payment of unpaid minimum wages, or the amount of unpaid overtime compensation[.]” Similarly, under § 216(c), an individual employee’s enforcement right “terminated upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary in an action ... in which a recovery is sought of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation[.]” See also E.E.O.C. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 897 F.2d 1499, 1505 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815, 111 S.Ct. 55, 112 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990) (“private lawsuits are secondary in the statutory scheme”); San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority v. McLaughlin, 876 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir.1989) (FLSA “allows suits involving the Secretary to take precedence over employee actions involving the same employer.”); Wirtz v. Robert E. Bob Adair, Inc., 224 F.Supp. 750, 755 (W.D.Ark.1963) (“the filing of the suit [by the Secretary of Labor] terminates the section 16(b) rights of employees”). These provisions were written into the FLSA in order to “relieve the courts and employers of the burden of litigating a multiplicity of suits based on the same violations of the act by an employer.” 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1659. They also serve to “substantially reduce the possibility of inconsistent adjudications^]” Donovan v. University of Texas at El Paso, 643 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir.1981); see also Pan American, 897 F.2d at 1506. As stated above, Defendants contend that the Secretary of Labor’s prior filed action precludes Plaintiffs’ second cause of action under § 216(b), even though the two actions are against different defendants. Defendants’ argument proceeds in several steps. As step one, Defendants assert that because Plaintiffs have pled that the “manufacturers” and the “operators” are joint employers, Plaintiffs’ work must be “considered as one employment[.]” Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1329 (9th Cir.1991) (Rymer, J., concurring) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a)). Because Plaintiffs’ work constituted one employment, both alleged joint employers “are responsible, both individually and jointly, for compliance with all of the applicable provisions of the” FLSA. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a); see also Salinas v. Rodriguez, 963 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir.1992). Because the “operators” are jointly and individually liable for the unpaid compensation, the Secretary of Labor can, in theory, recoup all of Plaintiffs’ losses by suing only the “operators.” In essence, because of 29 C.F.R. § 791.2, the Secretary of Labor may make the strategic choice of not suing one joint employer (e.g. the “manufacturers”), but still receive the full restitution of unpaid compensation from the other joint employer. Accordingly, Defendants assert that when presented with the opportunity to sue the “manufacturers,” the Secretary of Labor utilized his discretion and declined to do so, deciding instead to sue only the “operators.” Defendants argue that sections 216(b) and (c) prevent Plaintiffs from interfering with the Secretary’s strategic choice. Plaintiffs essentially contend that the FLSA’s enforcement provisions are employer-specific. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that under §§ 216(b) and (c), Secretary Reich’s decision to sue only the “operators” does not preclude this separate action against the “manufacturers.” The Court agrees. The plain language of §§ 216(b) and (c) does not dispose of this question. Indeed, the language itself is amenable to either interpretation. However, the legislative history and basic purposes of the FLSA mitigate in favor of allowing Plaintiffs’ action to proceed. As stated by the Ninth Circuit, “in construing the FLSA, we must be mindful of the directive that it is to be liberally construed to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with Congressional direction.” Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537, 1539 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 902, 127 L.Ed.2d 94 (1994) (citing Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assoc., 358 U.S. 207, 211, 79 S.Ct. 260, 263-64, 3 L.Ed.2d 243 (1959)). Because the FLSA is a remedial statute, it should be construed “in order to further Congress’ goal of providing broad federal employment protection.” Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1068, 111 S.Ct. 785, 112 L.Ed.2d 848 (1991). Preventing Plaintiffs from seeking unpaid minimum wage and overtime compensation from Defendants would only serve to frustrate Congress’ goal. As discussed above, the minimum wage and overtime enforcement provisions serve three basic purposes. First, the sections ensure that individual employees will be compensated for their work. Second, the enforcement provisions prevent employers from gaining an unfair advantage against competitors by wrongfully withholding due compensation. And third, the enforcement provisions deter future violations of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. If the “manufacturers” are in fact Plaintiffs’ “joint employers,” the Secretary of Labor’s action against the “operators” serves only one of these basic policy goals — compensation. The Secretary’s action will not prevent the “manufacturers” from obtaining an unfair advantage in the marketplace, and will not deter future misconduct by the “manufacturers.” Moreover, if Plaintiffs’ action under § 216(b) is terminated, these goals will remain unmet, thus frustrating the basic purposes behind the FLSA The ambiguous language of §§ 216(b) and (c) does not require such a result, which arguably contravenes the intent of Congress. Indeed, the sections do lend themselves to being read as employer-specific, as does the legislative history. See § 216(c) (an employee’s right to sue “shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary in an action ... in which a recovery is sought of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation ... owing to such employee by an employer [.]”) (emphasis added); 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1659 (stating that the provisions “relieve the courts and employers of the burden of litigating a multiplicity of suits based on the same violations of the act by an employer.”) (emphasis added). And, although no reported federal case has addressed this precise issue, the case law interpreting §§ 216(b) and 216(e) does not contradict this “employer-specific” interpretation. See, e.g. Pan American, 897 F.2d at 1505 (citing the language in 1961 U.S.C.CA.N. at 1659); San Antonio, 876 F.2d at 445 (stating that the FLSA “allows suits involving the Secretary to take precedence over employee actions involving the same employer.”) (emphasis added). Consistent with this Court’s duty to construe the FLSA broadly, and in light of the statute’s language, history, and goals, the Court will adopt Plaintiffs’ “employer-specific” interpretation of §§ 216(b) and (c). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Secretary of Labor’s complaint in Reich v. Uvawas does not bar Plaintiffs’ second cause of action. ii. Whether Defendants are “Employers” Within the Meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act Defendants also assert that even if Plaintiffs’ second cause of action can proceed under §§ 216(b) & (c), it fails because none of the “manufacturer” defendants are “employers” within the meaning of the FLSA. This issue turns on the meaning of the term “employment,” which is not adequately defined by the FLSA itself. Under the FLSA, the verb “employ” means “to suffer or permit to work.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). The FLSA’s definition of “employer” obliquely includes “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). An “employee” is “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). “The Supreme Court has instructed that courts are to interpret the term ‘employ’ in the FLSA expansively.” Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 386, 126 L.Ed.2d 335 (1993) (citing Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326-27, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 1350, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992)). The definition has “striking breadth” and “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles.” Nationwide, 503 U.S. at 326, 112 S.Ct. at 1350; see also Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 1475, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947) (“The definition of ‘employ’ is broad.”); Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir.1983) (the concept of employment “is to be given an expansive interpretation in order to effectuate the FLSA’s broad remedial purposes.”); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates, 603 F.2d 748, 753 (9th Cir.1979) (citing same principle). In light of this broad interpretation, the Supreme Court has commanded that the question of “whether there is an employment relationship under the FLSA is tested by ‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts.’ ” Hale, 993 F.2d at 1393 (quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, 366 U.S. 28, 33, 81 S.Ct. 933, 936-37, 6 L.Ed.2d 100 (1961)). A court must “consider the totality of the circumstances of the relationship[.]” Hale, 993 F.2d at 1394 (citing Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470); see also Real, 603 F.2d at 754 (quoting Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S.Ct. at 1477) (the determination “depends ‘upon the circumstances of the whole activity.’ ”). Accordingly, “[economic realities, not contractual labels, determine employment status for the remedial purposes of the FLSA.” Real 603 F.2d at 754. The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors to guide the analysis, such as “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.” Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470; see also Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir.1981) (also discussing whether the workers’ service is “an integral part of the alleged employer’s business.”). These factors “provide a useful framework for analysis,” but are neither exclusive nor conclusive. Id. “[TJhey are not etched in stone and will not be blindly applied.” Id.; see also Hale, 993 F.2d at 1394 (citing same language). A court must not “focus[] on selected and isolated control factors ... [and] lose[ ] sight of the circumstances of the whole activity.” Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 190 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 850, 104 S.Ct. 160, 78 L.Ed.2d 147 (1983). Indeed, courts have found employment relationships “even though the defendant-employer had no control over certain aspects of the relationship.” Castillo, 704 F.2d at 190. Furthermore, there may be more than one “employer.” The fact that the “operator” defendants employed the workers does not preclude Plaintiffs’ allegations that the “manufacturer” defendants also jointly employed the workers. See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (describing various “joint” employment situations); Castillo, 704 F.2d at 188; Campbell v. Miller, 836 F.Supp. 827, 831 (M.D.Fla.1993) (“An employer cannot shield himself from liability by placing a recruiter-contractor between himself and the laborers, [sic] by giving the recruiter contractor responsibility for direct oversight of the laborers.”). Ultimately, “[t]he touchstone of ‘economic reality5 in analyzing a possible employee/employer relationship for purposes of the FLSA is dependency” of the employee upon the alleged employer. Id. at 190; see also Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d at 1370 (citing Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130, 67 S.Ct. 1547, 1549-50, 91 L.Ed. 1947 (1947)) (the question is “whether, as a matter of economic reality, the individuals ‘are dependent upon the business to which they render service.’ ”). The “manufacturer” Defendants in this case are clearly removed from the actual garment manufacturing process that transpired in the El Monte facility. And, there is no “traditional” employment relationship between the Defendants and the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not plead that the “manufacturer” Defendants had the power to hire or fire the individual workers. Nor do Plaintiffs plead that Defendants directly supervised or controlled Plaintiffs’ work schedules or conditions. However, as dictated by the Supreme Court, this Court must construe the provisions of the FLSA expansively and look to the economic realities of the relationship between the parties. As pled by the Plaintiffs, the “manufacturer” Defendants have “contracted with [the operators] to produce garments at prices too low to permit payment of employees’ minimum wages and overtime. Manufacturers utilize the business practice of contracting out garment manufacturing work in part to avoid compliance with labor laws and liability for violation of those laws.” FAC ¶ 26. Plaintiffs further allege that the “manufacturer” Defendants “directly or indirectly employed plaintiffs ... as industrial homeworkers ... and exercised meaningful control over the work plaintiffs performed[.]” FAC ¶ 19-20. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the “operators” “acted, in effect, as supervisors and managers for” the “manufacturer” Defendants. FAC ¶ 19. Essentially, Plaintiffs assert that the El Monte facility “was an integral part of the process of garment manufacturing of each” “manufacturer” Defendant. FAC ¶ 19. Plaintiffs also allege that the “manufacturer” Defendants have a policy of contracting at “unfairly low prices by utilizing garment contractors who are ... chronic violators of labor laws, thus condemning plaintiffs ... to long hours of work without minimum wages and overtime pay[.]” FAC ¶27. Plaintiffs also allege that the workers are an “integral” part of the “manufacturer” Defendants’ business. FAC ¶ 19; Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d at 1370. This allegation is similar to the allegation recounted in the Fifth Circuit’s Castillo ruling. In that case, the “defendant did not pay [the intermediate contractor] enough for [him] to pay the workers minimum wage; it was therefore impossible for [the contractor] to comply with the FLSA” Castillo, 704 F.2d at 192. Thus, “[t]he economic reality of the situation was that the workers were dependent upon defendant— not [the intermediate contractor] — to pay them the minimum wage.” Id. Ultimately, Plaintiffs’ most important allegation is that Defendants “directly or indirectly employed plaintiffs ... and exercised meaningful control over the work plaintiffs performed!.]” FAC ¶ 19-20. In light of the liberal pleading standards of Federal Rule 8, and Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the “economic reality” of the garment business, this claim alone sufficiently alleges an “employment” relationship between the “manufacturer” Defendants and the garment workers. See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (a “joint employment” situation will exist “[w]here one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the employee.”). In conclusion, under the notice pleading of Rule 8 and the Rutherford “economic reality” standard, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an employment relationship between the Plaintiffs and the “manufacturer” Defendants within the meaning of the FLSA. Essentially, Plaintiffs have successfully pled that the “manufacturers” and the “operators” were the “joint” employers of the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second cause of action must be denied. c. Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action Under California Law for Failure to Pay Minimum Wage and Overtime Plaintiffs’ third claim for relief is identical to Plaintiffs’ second claim, except that it arises under California labor law. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ third cause of action fails because Defendants are not “employers” under California labor law. Defendants contend that because the broad federal definition of “employer” does not apply in California, the Court must apply the more restrictive common law conception of “employer.” Defendants assert that under this narrow reading of “employer,” Plaintiffs’ third cause of action cannot stand. As with federal labor law, California law mandates a minimum wage and overtime compensation. See Cal.Labor Code §§ 1197 (minimum wage) and 1198 (overtime). Under CaLLabor Code § 1194, “any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation ... is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Further, under CaLLabor Code § 1194.2, in any action to recover unpaid minimum wages (not overtime compensation), an employee “shall be entitled to recover liquidated damages in an amount equal to the wages unlawfully unpaid,” unless the employer demonstrates to the court that the omission was reasonable and in good faith. The terms “employer,” “employee,” and “employ” are not specifically defined in the Wages, Hours, and Working Conditions sections of the California Labor Code. See CaLLabor Code §§ 1171-1205. In addition, no reported California decisions have directly addressed the issue. However, as with the federal FLSA, the California law governing wages is remedial in nature and must be “liberally construed.” See California Grape & Tree Fruit League v. Industrial Welfare Commission, 268 Cal.App.2d 692, 698, 74 Cal.Rptr. 313 (1969); see also McIntosh v. Aubry (Pricor, Inc.), 14 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1589, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 680 (1993) (“Courts will liberally construe prevailing wage statutes”). The wage statutes “are not construed within narrow limits of the letter of the law, but rather are to be given liberal effect to promote the general object sought to be accomplished.” California Grape, 268 Cal.App.2d at 698, 74 Cal.Rptr. 313. Thus, in determining the applicability of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the California Labor Code, the Court must look to the fundamental remedial purposes behind the laws. Given this duty, the Court finds that the California courts would likely adopt the federal FLSA’s broad definition of “employment.” The California courts would likely focus on the “economic realities” of the relationship, rather than on mere contractual or technical distinctions. The Court reaches this conclusion for three main reasons. First, it is evident that the federal and state minimum wage and overtime provisions are analogous and complementary. Accordingly, federal authorities defining the concept of employment (see discussion above) are extremely persuasive to the Court in its determination of the California definition. Second, in its Order Regulating Wages, Hours, and Working Conditions in the Manufacturing Industry, the California Industrial Welfare Commission defines the terms “employ,” “employee,” and “employer” extremely broadly, and in terms almost identical to 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (“employ”), § 203(e) (“employee”), and § 203(d) (“employer”). See Industrial Welfare Commission Order 1-89, 8 California Regul.Code § 11010 (“IWC Wage Order”). The IWC Wage Order states that the verb “employ” “means to suffer, or permit to work.” Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (“ ‘employ’ includes to suffer or permit to work”). The IWC Wage Order states that an “employee” is “any person employed by an employer.” Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (“the term ‘employee’ means any individual employed by an employer”). Finally, the IWC Wage Order states that an “employer” is “any person ... who directly or indirectly, or through an agent or any other person, employs or exercises control over the wages, hours, or working conditions of any person.” Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (“‘Employer’ includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee”). Thus, the IWC has adopted the federal FLSA’s definitions of these terms. Third, the California Supreme Court has construed a related remedial statute to contain an extremely broad definition of “employer.” In S.G. Borello & Sons v. Department of Industrial Relations, 48 Cal.3d 341, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399 (1989), the California Supreme Court construed the Worker’s Compensation Act’s definition of “employment” to be “not inherently limited by common law principles.” Id. at 352, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399. Mindful of the “history and fundamental purposes” of the statute, the Court found that in determining whether “employment” existed, a court must consider “[t]he nature of the work, and the overall arrangement between the parties,” and not technical or contractual distinctions. Id. at 353, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399. The Court stated that “[e]ach service arrangement must be evaluated on its facts, and the dispositive circumstances may vary from case to case.” Id. at 354, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399. Moreover, in reaching this conclusion, the California Supreme Court cited with approval the various United States Supreme Court cases defining “employment” in the context of the FLSA. Id. at 352, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399. For these reasons, and in light of the general remedial purposes of the prevailing wage statutes, the Court thus interprets California law to construe the terms “employ”, “employee,” and “employer” broadly. Under these broad definitions, and for the same reasons discussed above (in the context of the FLSA cause of action), Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that Defendants are Plaintiffs’ “employers” within the meaning of the California prevailing wage statutes. Aecord-ingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ third cause of action must be denied. d. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action Under Federal and California Law for the Unlawful Manufacture of Garments by Industrial Homework In their fourth claim for relief, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have violated federal and California law by unlawfully employing Plaintiffs as industrial homeworkers. First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(d) and 215(a)(5) by employing Plaintiffs as industrial homeworkers without first obtaining the “special homework certificate” required by 29 C.F.R. § 530.2. Second, Plaintiffs contend that by employing Plaintiffs as garment industry homeworkers, Defendants have violated California Labor Code § 2651’s blanket ban on such employment. Defendants contend that both claims fail because there is no private right of action to enforce either regulatory scheme. The Court will address the federal and state theories in turn, i. Federal Law Governing Industrial Homeworkers Under 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5), it is unlawful to violate any regulation or order made pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 211(d). Section 211(d) empowers the Secretary of Labor “to make such regulations and orders regulating, restricting, or prohibiting industrial homework as are necessary or appropriate to prevent the circumvention or evasion of and to safeguard the minimum wage rate[.]” Pursuant to § 211(d), the Secretary of Labor promulgated 29 C.F.R. § 530.2, which provides that any person who employs industrial homeworkers (in specifically covered industries, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 530.1) must obtain a special homework certificate from the Department of Labor for each homeworker. Plaintiffs assert that because Defendants have not obtained such a certificate (contrary to the dictates of § 530.2), they have violated 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5) (which states that it is unlawful to violate regulations promulgated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 211(d)). Neither the FLSA nor the regulations implementing it expressly create a private right of action to enforce § 215(a)(5) or regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. Thus, the federal part of Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action turns on whether there exists an implied private right to sue for violations of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5). In determining whether a federal statute contains an implied right of action, a court must apply the four-factor test established by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). See Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995); Stupy v. United States Postal Service, 951 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1991). As identified by the Ninth Circuit in Stupy, the Cort factors are as follows: (i) the plaintiff must belong to the class for whose especial benefit the statute was created; (ii) the legislature must have shown an intent, either explicitly or implicitly, to create a private remedy; (iii) finding an implied cause of action must be consistent with the underlying purposes of the statute; and (iv) the cause of action must not be one that has traditionally been left to state law. Stupy, 951 F.2d at 1081; see also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 91, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1580, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981) (“Factors relevant to this inquiry are the language of the statute itself, its legislative history, the underlying purpose and structure of the statutory scheme, and the likelihood that Congress intended to supersede or to supplement existing state remedies.”). Of the four Cort factors, the most important by far is Congressional intent. See Northwest, 451 U.S. at 91, 101 S.Ct. at 1580 (“the ultimate question ... is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy”); Parks, 51 F.3d at 1484 (“These factors are not given equal weight; the critical inquiry is congressional intent.”); Stupy, 951 F.2d at 1081 (finding that legislative intent is “the dispositive issue”); see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 740, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1980, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (vehemently criticizing the Cort four-part test for diverting courts from the only proper inquiry: legislative intent). As stated by the Supreme Court, “[w]hile some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of implying private rights of action in order.to effectuate the purposes of a given statute ..., what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted[J” Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16, 100 S.Ct. 242, 245, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979). Thus, given the primacy of legislative intent, “[a]n evaluation of the other elements is not necessary if the court finds that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action.” Stupy, 951 F.2d at 1081 (citing California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1781-82, 68 L.Ed.2d 101 (1981)). Because this issue is ultimately a question of statutory construction, “it is appropriaté to begin with the language of the statute itself.” Northwest, 451 U.S. at 91, 101 S.Ct. at 1580. The FLSA does not expressly create a right to sue under 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5). Section 215(a)(5) merely states that it is unlawful to violate a regulation promulgated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 211(d). Because 29 C.F.R. § 530.2 was promulgated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 211(d), the violation of 29 C.F.R. § 530.2 is unlawful under 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5). However, this is not the issue. The question is whether a private litigant can sue to remedy violations of § 215(a)(5). On this point, § 215(a)(5) is silent. The enforcement and penalty sections of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216 and 217, recognize several rights of action. First, as discussed above, an employee may sue an employer for unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation. See § 216(b). Second, an employee terminated in retaliation for reporting violations of the FLSA may sue for legal or equitable relief. See §§ 215(a)(3) and 216(b). Third, the Secretary of Labor may sue for unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation, or seek an injunction. See §§ 216(c) and 217. Of course, the Secretary of Labor may also enforce his or her own regulations. Finally, a person may be prosecuted for violating the provisions of § 215. Section 215(a)(5) is not mentioned in this list; nor are regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. As stated by the Supreme Court, “where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it. “When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode.’” Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19-20, 100 S.Ct. at 247 (quoting Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289, 49 S.Ct. 129, 132, 73 L.Ed. 379 (1929)); see also Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 1251, 134 L.Ed.2d 121 (1996) (quoting same language). As a general rule, “[i]f the statute itself provides ‘a particular remedy or remedies,’ we should not add others.” Parks, 51 F.3d at 1484 (quoting Miscellaneous Service Workers Local # 427 v. Philco-Ford Corp., 661 F.2d 776, 781 (9th Cir.1981)). The legislative history behind the FLSA and § 215(a)(5) is silent on whether private litigants can sue to enforce regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. Additionally, the only federal cases after Cort to address the question of whether a private right of action exists under § 215(a)(5) have found that no such right exists. See O’Quinn v. Chambers County, Texas, 636 F.Supp. 1388, 1392 (S.D.Tex.1986), amended on other grounds, 650 F.Supp. 25 (S.D.Tex.1986); Marchak v. Observer Publications, Inc., 493 F.Supp. 278, 281 (D.R.I.1980). Thus, there is no evidence that Congress intended to create a right of action to enforce § 215(a)(5). Indeed, given the existence of other private rights of action under the FLSA (see § 216(b)), it appears that Congress did not intend to provide a private right to enforce § 215(a)(5). Because evidence of Congressional intent is the “dispositive” issue, the Court need not address the other Cort factors. Stupy, 951 F.2d at 1081 (“An evaluation of the other elements is not necessary if the court finds that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action.”). Finding no evidence of Congressional intent to create a private right of action to enforce § 215(a)(5), the Court will not imply one. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ federal cause of action to remedy violations of § 215(a)(5) must be dismissed, ii. California Law Governing Industrial Homeworkers Under California Labor Code § 2651, the manufacture of “wearing apparel” by industrial homework is “unlawful.” Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated this statute by employing the garment workers who lived at the El Monte facility. Defendants contend that no private cause of action exists to enforce § 2651. Neither § 2651 nor any other provision of the Industrial Homework Act (“IHA”) explicitly provide for a private right of action. Indeed, the language of the statute focuses only upon governmental agencies. California Labor Code § 2666 states that “[t]he Division of Labor Standards Enforcement shall enforce the provisions” of the IHA, together with the Department of Industrial Relations. Additionally, California Labor Code § 2667 states that “[t]he Attorney General may seek appropriate injunctive relief consistent with, and in furtherance of the purposes of’ the IHA. Therefore, because no explicit private right of action exists under the statute, Plaintiffs ask this Court to create one. No California case has directly interpreted the relevant provisions of the Industrial Homework Act or specifically addressed the issue of whether a private right of action exists to enforce its terms. As a general rule, when a statute does not explicitly provide a private right of action, the California courts will imply such a right only when there is evidence that the legislature intended to do so. Thus, the ultimate issue is generally one of divining legislative intent: whether the legislature actually intended to create such a private right of action to enforce a statute. See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins., 46 Cal.3d 287, 250 Cal.Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58 (1988) (inquiring into the language of the statute, the legislative history, and existence of a comprehensive regulatory scheme to determine whether the legislature intended a private right of action to exist to enforce Cal.Ins.Code § 790.03); Arriaga v. Loma Linda University, 10 Cal.App.4th 1556, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 619 (1992) (performing the same analysis with regard to Cal.Govt.Code § 11135). Plaintiffs dispute that Moradi-Shalal establishes the method of analyzing whether a private right of action exists under a California statute, and attempt to limit Moradi-Shalal to its specific facts: the interpretation of Cal.Ins.Code § 790.03. In addition, Plaintiffs dispute that the focus should be primarily on legislative intent. On the contrary, Plaintiffs contend that the proper focus should be on whether a private right of action will further the fundamental purposes of the legislation. Plaintiffs assert that “[violation of a statute embodying a public policy is generally actionable even though no specific remedy is provided in the statute; any injured member of the public for whose benefit the statute was enacted may bring an action.” United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court for the County of Kern, 47 Cal.App.3d 334, 343, 120 Cal.Rptr. 904 (1975) (quoting Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Assn., 275 Cal.App.2d 168, 174, 79 Cal.Rptr. 543 (1969)); see Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann, 124 Cal.App.3d 558, 569-71, 177 Cal.Rptr. 495 (1981) (looking to the purposes behind the statute to imply a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty under the Insurance Code); see also Credit Managers Ass’n v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 617, 624