Full opinion text
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BY THE COURT: This case arises from the 1992 Florida congressional redistricting process in which a three-judge federal court established a number of districts with racial or ethnic minorities constituting a majority of the voting age population. Plaintiffs are white and hispanic voters who raise an equal protection challenge to Florida’s Third Congressional District under the authority of Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). Plaintiffs claim that District Three is unconstitutional because it segregates voters on the basis of race, and is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. On November 20, 1995, we granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on two issues: first, the three-judge court ("the DeGrandy court") which established the district's boundaries lacked the constitutional authority to adopt a permanent redistricting plan; and second, District Three was drawn for predominately race-based reasons, thereby triggering strict scrutiny. Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F.Supp. 1529, 1552-53, (N.D.Fla.1995). See generally Miller v. Johnson, 514 U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2481, 2490, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (strict scrutiny triggered when a redistricting or reapportionment plan is drawn for predominately race-based reasons), on remand, 922 F.Supp. 1556, No. 194-008, (S.D.Ga.1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3625, 3642 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1996) (Nos. 95-1425, 95-1460); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642-47, 113 S.Ct. at 2825-27 (same). This cause has now proceeded through discovery on the remaining issue of whether District Three survives strict scrutiny review. A three-day bench trial was concluded in this matter on February 22, 1996. All parties and party-intervenors were represented at the trial. The Court now sets out its findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based upon all admissible evidence presented at trial, or otherwise contained in the record. DISCUSSION: As discussed below, the remaining plaintiffs in this action have shown that they have suffered an actual injury in fact. Therefore, plaintiffs have standing to maintain their equal protection challenge to District Three. See Miller, 514 U.S. at —, —, 115 S.Ct. at 2481, 2485; United States v. Hays, 514 U.S. —-—, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 2436-37, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1343(a)(3). Since plaintiffs have already met their burden of showing that race was the predominant motivating factor in the drawing of District Three, strict scrutiny applies. Miller, 514 U.S. at —, —, 115 S.Ct. at 2481, 2490; Shaw, 509 U.S. at —-—, 113 S.Ct. at 2825-27. "To satisfy strict scrutiny, the state must demonstrate that its districting legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest." Miller, 514 U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 2490. As we earlier noted in a separate order, the trial burdens in this case are as follows: "Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors bear the burden of producing evidence demonstrating there is a strong basis in evidence that the DeGrandy court's predominant use of race-conscious districting satisfies strict scrutiny." On the other hand, plaintiffs bear the burden of "rebutting the evidence put forward by Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors on the strict scrutiny issue, and persuading the Court that Defendants have not made a sufficient showing to satisfy strict scrutiny review." Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F.Supp. 1574, 1580 (N.D.Fla. 1996) (citations omitted). We altered the order of presentation at trial for purposes of convenience and clarity, with the defendants and the defendant-intervenors proceeding first, in order to properly reflect the parties' respective trial burdens. I. Compelling Governmental Interest: The first trial issue is whether the DeGrandy court had a compelling governmental interest in drawing District Three for predominately race-based reasons. A compelling interest has been described by the Supreme Court as one "of the highest order." Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 2233, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). Defendants contend two compelling interests motivated the DeGrandy court in its redistricting plan: first, that the DeGrandy court was motivated by a desire to comply with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; and second, that the DeGrandy court desired to adopt a remedial measure designed to eradicate effects of past discrimination in Florida. On the other hand, plaintiffs assert that there were no compelling interests that justified the creation of District Three. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that there was no voting practice or procedure in northeast Florida that interacted ivith present effects of past discrimination in a manner that denied or abridged the right of African-Americans to vote. They further maintain that District Three was not draAvn in order to avoid a dilution of African-American voting strength in northeast Florida, since the African-American community in northeast Florida was too small and too geographically separated to satisfy the Gingles threshold criteria. Each of the compelling interests advanced by Defendants' and Defendant-intervenors will be separately addressed. A. Compliance with the Voting Rights Act: Although a number of lower courts have concluded that compliance with the Voting Rights Act is a compelling governmental interest, the Supreme Court has stopped short of adopting such a blanket rule. For example, in Shaw, the Court noted: The States certainly have a very strong interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as interpreted and as applied. But in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits, and what it requires____ We note, however, that only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial block voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. And those three Justices specifically concluded that race-based districting, as a response to racially polarized voting, is constitutionally permissible only ivhen the State “employ[s] sound districting principles,” and only when the affected racial group’s “residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority. ” 509 U.S. at 654-57, 113 S.Ct. at 2830-32 (quoting United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167-68, 97 S.Ct. 996, 1011, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) (opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens and Rehnquist, JJ.)) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Miller, the Court held that "compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws cannot justify race-based districting where the challenged district was not reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of those laws." 514 U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 2491 (finding that Georgia's Eleventh Congressional District was not required by the VRA "under a correct reading of the statute"). See also Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. —, —, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 2667, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Given our decision in Shaw, there is good reason for state and federal officials with responsibilities related to redistricting, as well as reviewing courts, to recognize that explicit race-based districting embarks us on a most dangerous course. It is necessary to bear in mind that redistricting must comply with the overriding demands of the Equal Protection Clause."). For purposes of analysis in this case, however, we will assume that compliance with the Voting Rights Act is a compelling governmental interest if, and to the extent, there is a "strong basis in evidence" that remedial action is required to avoid violating federal law. See Miller, 514 U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 2491 (collecting cases). In order to have a "strong basis in evidence" to engage in race-based redistricting, a governmental actor must have "information sufficient to support a prima facie showing that its failure to do so would violate the Act." Hunt, 861 F.Supp. at 437-40 (citations omitted). Accord King, 1996 WL 130439, at *26-27; Quilter v. Voinovich, 912 F.Supp. 1006, 1020 (N.D.Ohio 1995), appeal dismissed, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 42, 133 L.Ed.2d 9 (1995). Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500, 109 S.Ct. 706, 725, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("strong basis in evidence" requires evidence "approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation") (plurality opinion); Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394, 1401 (11th Cir.1991) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1073, 112 S.Ct. 969, 117 L.Ed.2d 134 (1992). Of course, compliance must also be measured under a correct and constitutional reading of the Voting Rights Act. Without question, the DeGrandy court was motivated by a desire to comply with the Voting Rights Act. Yet, it is also apparent that the DeGrandy court was operating under the mistaken assumption that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required the adoption of a congressional redistricting plan with as many majority-minority districts as could be reasonably accomplished. See DeGrandy, supra, 794 F.Supp. at 1085 ("Like the Special Master, we conclude that `the law supports the drawing of a minority district where, in light of minority concentrations and community of interests, such a district can reasonably be drawn.'") (quoting Report of the Special Master at 14); id. ("Where, in a statewide redistricting case such as the present one, this court can reasonably draw a majority-minority district, we cannot choose to create an influence district or districts."); id. at 1091 (Vinson, J., specially concurring) ("It is not our goal ... under section 2 of the [Voting Rights] Act to draw as many minority districts as possible. But we should draw as many as can be reasonably done.") (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has since held, however, that a correct reading of Section 2 does not require maximization. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. —, —, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 2659, 129 L.Ed.2d 775, 794 (1994) (rejecting "the rule of thumb apparently adopted by the District Court, that anything short of the maximum number of majority-minority districts consistent with the Gingles conditions would violate § 2"). Furthermore, as discussed below, the De-Grandy court lacked a compelling interest in drawing District Three to comply with the Voting Rights Act for two additional reasons. First, any Section 2 claim the DeGrandy plaintiffs had under the Act was already moot when the DeGrandy court established District Three. Second, even if the DeGrandy plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim was not moot and had remained viable after the existing scheme was struck down, the record demonstrates the absence of a “strong basis in evidence” that a Section 2 violation occurred. 1. Mootness of the DeGrandy Plaintiffs’ Section 2 Claim: Plaintiffs’ counsel stated in closing arguments that “[t]his really, though, has turned into somewhat of a back-door vote dilution case. There’s never been an allegation that the plan that was in effect from 1982 to 1992 diluted minority voting strength ...” Tr. at 672. However, the DeGrandy plaintiffs had alleged in an eight-count complaint numerous violations of federal law, including constitutionally impermissible malapportionment and unlawful vote dilution. See DeGrandy 2nd Am. Compl. (92-40015, Doc. 44). Nevertheless, this Section 2 claim was already moot before the DeGrandy court began consideration of a remedial plan. On April 30, 1992, the DeGrandy court had entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs on that claim, finding that, in light of the 1990 census results, Florida’s existing congressional districting plan was malapportioned in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the “one-person, one-vote principle” (92-40015, Doc. 304). In Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993) (decided after the DeGrandy Court entered the order now challenged in this case), a unanimous Supreme Court found that a vote dilution claim was moot under analogous circumstances. There, the plaintiffs had alleged in their suit that, in light of the 1990 census results, Minnesota's congressional and legislative districts created in 1983 were malapportioned, and that the districts diluted the vote of minority groups in Minneapolis. A three-judge court found that the state court's legislative reapportionment plan violated the Voting Rights Act because it did not contain a super-majority minority senate district, when its own court-ordered remedial plan had contained such a district. Emison v. Growe, 782 F.Supp. 427 (D.Minn.1992). The Supreme Court reversed. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388. The Supreme Court first noted that the plaintiffs' vote dilution claim became moot once the state court had declared the 1983 plans to be unconstitutionally malapportioned: [I]t is not precisely clear which legislative districting plan produced the vote dilution ... For almost a decade prior to the 1992 election season, the only legislative districting plan that had been in use in Minnesota was the 1983 plan, which all parties agreed was unconstitutional in light of the 1990 census. More importantly, the state court had declared the 1983 plan to be unconstitutional in its final order of January 30. Once that order issued, the Emison plaintiffs’ claims that the 1988 plan violated the Voting Rights Act became moot, unless those claims also related to the superseding plan. Id. at 39, 113 S.Ct. at 1083-84 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court then held that even if that were not the case, the district court’s failure to consider (much less find) any evidence of racially polarized voting precluded the district court from adopting a remedial plan that included a super-majority minority district. Id. at 40-42, 113 S.Ct. at 1084-85. Therefore, under Growe, once the DeGrandy court had entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their malapportionment claim, the plaintiffs’ Section 2 challenge to the 1982 congressional districting plan was no longer cognizable. Furthermore, the De-Grandy plaintiffs’ Section 2 vote-dilution challenge could not have related to the superseding plan adopted by the DeGrandy court—Plan 308—because as Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors have ably pointed out, Plan 308 itself was adopted as a remedy, not as a violative vote-dilution vehicle. 2. Insufficient Evidentiary Record: Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs’ vote-dilution claim was moot, the DeGrandy court nevertheless found that Florida’s existing congressional districts, drawn in 1982, violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973). This Court is now placed in the unusual position of retracing the steps of the DeGrandy Court to determine whether the creation of District Three was required under a correct reading of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The DeGrandy plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that “[t]he current districts [in the existing 1982 redistricting plan] for each and every state legislative and congressional district violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, because the plans, taken as a whole, dilute the voting strength of minority voters statewide.” DeGrandy 2nd Am. Compl. at ¶ 100. In addition, the DeGrandy plaintiffs asserted that “[p]ursuant to the 1990 decennial census, and in accordance with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the Voting Rights Act, minority voting strength must not be diluted and districts must be created to ensure racial and language minority-majority and minority - influence districts.” DeGrandy 2nd Amd. Compl. at ¶ 103 (emphasis added). In reviewing the DeGrandy plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim, the DeGrandy court found that “the absence of an existing plan prevents the court from engaging in the factually intensive analysis of a traditional section 2 challenge ...” 794 F.Supp. at 1083. The DeGrandy court obviously considered the Section 2 claim in the context of the malapportionment in Florida’s congressional districts in the aftermath of the 1990 decennial census. However, beyond malapportionment (which affected voters of all races and ethnicities), the DeGrandy court merely stated that “[t]he absence of a meaningful opportunity for minorities to participate in the political process and elect a candidate of their choice constitutes a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.” DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1080. The DeGrandy court supported its conclusion with several very general findings: past effects of discrimination against minorities; disparities in socio-economic conditions; the existence of varying degrees of racially polarized voting in Florida; the lack of minority success in both the United States Congress and the Florida Legislature; and the fact that certain Florida counties had to be precleared by the Justice Department pursuant to the Voting Rights Act. See 794 F.Supp. at 1078-80. As discussed below, these general findings are simply insufficient to support a vote dilution claim under a proper interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, which requires a “comprehensive, not limited, canvassing of relevant facts.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 2657. The essence of a claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires “that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. at 2764. Thus, a plaintiff must prove three threshold criteria when challenging a redistrieting scheme: (1) the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) the minority group is politically cohesive; and (3) the minority’s preferred candidate is usually defeated by white majority bloc voting. Id. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. In addition, various non-statutory criteria are set out in the Senate Report accompanying Section 2, including the history of official discrimination, the socio-economic conditions that hinder the ability to participate effectively in the political process, and the electoral success of members of the minority group. See S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 206-07 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07. These criteria will each be addressed in turn. a. Geographic Compactness: Upon review of the DeGrandy record and all of the relevant evidence presented at the trial in this case, it is evident that the African-American population in Northeast Florida is not sufficiently large and geographically compact so as to constitute a majority in a fairly drawn congressional district. Using 1990 census data, District Three contains 562,518.5 persons, with 55.0% being African Americans. African-Americans in Northeast Florida are divided into four major population concentrations. The largest populations of African-Americans are at the extremes of Congressional District Three— namely, 133,068 in Duval County (Jacksonville), and 73,669 in Orange County (Orlando), some 100 miles to the south. Other concentrations of African-Americans in District Three include: 23,248 in Volusia County (Daytona Beach), at the coast of the Atlantic Ocean; 21,722 in Alachua County (Gaines-ville), in the western arm of District Three; 14,474 in Marion County; and 13,780 in Seminole County. These African-American population concentrations are not physically adjacent to each other, and are linked together only by narrow land bridges of white rural and small town populations. Weber Rep., Pls.’ Ex. 3 at ¶ 8, Weber Test., Tr. at 416. In drawing the district, the African-American population concentrations in major urban areas were segregated from the adjoining white populations, thereby excluding from District Three most white voters within these urban areas. See Lichtman Test., Tr. at 630. In order to achieve its goal of creating a minority-majority district in northeast Florida, the DeGrandy court was forced to link these widely dispersed population concentrations together. In so doing, however, the DeGrandy court created a district that splits every one of the fourteen counties that constitute the district. Weber Test., Tr. at 424. District Three also divides nearly every town in its path, even splitting individual precincts. Lichtman Test., Tr. at 339, 388, 628-33; Maggiotto Test., Tr. at 612. As Judge Vinson noted in DeGrandy, “District 3, in north Florida, has the appearance of something lifted from a Rorschach test. It wanders, web-like, from south of Orlando throughout northeast Florida.” 794 F.Supp. at 1090-91. Judge Vinson also noted: These odd-shaped districts will present administration difficulties. The census tracts utilized in drawing the districts overlap established voting precincts and will not easily jibe with other state and local district boundaries. They are disconnected from the traditional way we view the formation of such districts. They follow few recognized political boundaries. They will undoubtedly present campaigning problems for the candidates within those districts. Perhaps most importantly, I do not believe that these districts will make sense among the public. They appear to be something created by Gov. Elbridge Gerry. Without some objective geographical compactness standard to evaluate districts, the potential for future abuse in crafting district boundaries is virtually unlimited---- I would much prefer 23 districts which comply with some reasonable standard of compactness. Id. at 1092 (citations omitted). Moreover, by any number of quantitative measures of compactness commonly used in political science, Congressional District Three ranks among the least compact districts in the country. According to the Congressional Research Service, a branch of the Library of Congress, District Three has a perimeter score of 0.011, which ranks 434th out of 435 congressional districts. District Three’s dispersion score—0.111, ranks 429th out of 435 districts. Finally, District Three has a population score of 0.260, ranking 428th out of 435 districts. C.R.S. report, appendix A. Further, when these three measures of compactness are averaged together, District Three has the highest mean ranking, and is the least compact, of any congressional district in the country. Weber Test., Tr. at 423. Consequently, we conclude that the African-American population is not sufficiently large and geographical compact to meet the first Gingles precondition for establishing vote dilution in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. b. Political Cohesiveness: The evidence in both DeGrandy and this case leave no doubt that African-Americans in Florida, and particularly in District Three, are politically cohesive. This Gingles factor has definitely been established. c. Racially Polarized Voting: The DeGrandy court concluded that racially polarized voting exists in Florida, and in the areas comprising District Three, but the Court’s opinion cites little evidence in support. Although this does not mean that such polarized voting does not in fact exist, it does indicate that the DeGrandy court failed to engage in a “comprehensive, not limited, canvassing of relevant facts” [Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 2657], to reach such a conclusion. Such an examination requires a close analysis of racially polarized voting in the political unit or subdivision being challenged. Absent the requisite “ ‘majority bloc voting’ showing[ ] ... needed to establish that the challenged districting thwarts a distinctive minority vote by submerging it in a larger white voting population, ... there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy.” Growe, 507 U.S. at 40-41, 113 S.Ct. at 1084. The DeGrandy court's only statement concerning this was that "[t]he results of Florida's legislative elections over the past ten years establish the presence of racially polarized voting," citing Florida's Supreme Court Chief Justice Shaw's dissenting opinion in In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment Session 1992, 597 So.2d 276, 287-93 (Fla.1992). DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1079. However, the Eleventh Circuit recently emphasized that a district court's fact-findings in a vote-dilution case must be based upon evidence presented in that case, and not something from another case [Johnson v. DeSoto County Bd. of Comm'rs, 72 F.3d 1556, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1996)], particularly an opinion expressed in dissent. Even if Chief Justice Shaw's observations could have been applied in DeGrandy , Justice Shaw concluded that racially polarized voting existed on the basis of electoral results showing that only five African-Americans were elected to the state legislature between 1982 and 1990, with no tangible evidence that dilutive white-bloc voting or similar causal relationship with a voting practice or structure led to these results. See 597 So.2d at 290-91. The DeGrandy court did not identify any other evidence of racially polarized voting, including the "district-specific" analysis demanded by Gingles. See SCLC, 56 F.3d at 1305 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). This limited analysis may have been due to the Court’s understanding that “[t]he parties agree that racially polarized voting exists throughout Florida to varying degrees.” De-Grandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1079. Counsel for the NAACP made this very point in closing argument. Nevertheless, the absence of evidentiary findings by the DeGrandy court on the issue of racially polarized voting means that we must primarily rely on the evidence presented at trial before us. Dr. Allan Lichtman, a veteran of Voting Rights Act litigation, provided Defendants’ expert testimony on the issue of whether racially polarized voting existed in northeast Florida in 1992, and continues to exist today. In conducting his analysis, Dr. Lichtman relied upon three primary forms of methodology: ecological regression, extreme case analysis, and an examination of the actual outcome of elections. Dr. Lichtman further relied upon the R2 (or squared-correlation coefficient) and statistical significance to assess the reliability of his regression analysis. On the basis of 60 elections between 1984 and 1994, Dr. Lichtman concluded that significant racial polarization exists in Florida at every political level-— county-wide and State legislative elections, congressional elections, and State-wide elections. Lichtman Rep., Defs.’ Ex. 1; Lichtman Test., Tr. at 325-27, 332-36. However, we reject Dr. Lichtman’s results because of several critical methodological errors in his analysis. First and foremost, Dr. Lichtman only examined black versus white elections, excluding all black versus black and white versus white elections, even though there was an extensive amount of testimony that the African-American community had a clear candidate of choice in such elections. Lichtman Test., Tr. at 321, 323-24, 362-67. Furthermore, in part as a result of his first error, Dr. Liehtman disregarded a number of congressional elections that are highly relevant to a determination of whether racially polarized voting precludes African-Americans from electing their candidate of choice in congressional elections. In fact, Dr. Liehtman considered only four congressional elections—three involving Congresswoman Brown’s elections in races against only white opponents. Lichtman Rep., Defs.’ Ex. 1; Lichtman Test., Tr. at 321, 359-62. Finally, Dr. Liehtman failed to consider that differences in white and African-American political party affiliation could explain why racially polarized voting was apparent in a superficial analysis of election results. While it appears that racially polarized voting exists, at least to some extent, in District Three, this polarization may be a collateral effect of the fact that voters in northeast Florida are ideologically polarized along political party lines. Dr. Lichtman conceded that African-Americans in northeast Florida are overwhelmingly Democrats. Lichtman Test., Tr. at 360. This party-line polarization becomes manifest when African-Americans run against whites, or against other African-Americans. Indeed, the average white crossover rate of 23 percent that Dr. Lichtman found as a result of his very limited analysis [see Lichtman Rep., Defs.' Ex. 1 at Table 2; Lichtman Test., Tr. at 325], might very well be the white Democratic vote that any Democratic candidate, white or African-American, would be expected to receive. This ideological polarization along party lines was articulated by Senator Holzendorf [an African-American], who indicated that she was unaware of a single instance in which a Republican had been the candidate of choice among African-Americans in Duval County because "[t]hey haven't given the right message, yet." Holzendorf Test., Tr. at 82. Finally, and most importantly, the evidence demonstrates that African-Americans have consistently elected the candidate of their choice in congressional elections in northeast Florida under the 1982 districting plan: Congressmen Bill Fuqua and Bill Grant (while he remained a Democrat), from District Two; Congressman Charles Bennett, from District Three; and Congressman Bill Chappell, from District Four. Holzendorf Test., Tr. at 78-81; Hill Test., Tr. at 502. An important truth is that a candidate of choice does not have to be a candidate of the same race. Therefore, even if racially polarized voting existed in northeast Florida specifically, or more generally throughout Florida, the ability of African-American voters to elect the candidate of their choice in congressional elections would vitiate any claim of Section 2 vote dilution. d. Past History of Discrimination: At the trial of this matter, several witnesses testified as to Florida’s history of discrimination. Dr. Paulson (Defendants’ expert in political parties and elections, civil rights, and southern politics) discussed at length the past use of such mechanisms as multiple ballot box laws, tissue ballots or “little jokers,” the secret ballot, the “white primary,” the poll tax, run-off elections, at-large elections, multiple-member elections, and gerrymandering as examples of discriminatory practices employed by the State of Florida to prevent African-Americans from having a political voice. Paulson Test., Tr. at 9-34; Defs.’ Ex 6B. Other witnesses, including Mr. Samuel Muldrew, Mr. Lloyd N. Pearson, Mr. Glynell Presley, and Mr. Willie H. Williams, testified about their own personal difficulties in registering to vote and exercising their rights to vote in the past. In addition, Mr. Leon Russell, President of the Florida State Branches of the NAACP, testified about the past use of harassment and intimidation to prevent African-Americans from participation in the electoral process. This Court previously took judicial notice of the fact that "Florida's past history of racial discrimination is well documented" (Doc. 91 at 53). Mortham, 915 F.Supp. at 1552 (citations omitted). Past discrimination itself is relevant in determining whether a violation of the Voting Rights Act has occurred. E.g., McMillan v. Escambia County, Fla., 748 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1567 & n. 36 (11th Cir.), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976, 105 S.Ct. 375, 83 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984). Yet, the effects of past discrimination alone are insufficient to establish a Section 2 violation. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements ("LULAC II"), 999 F.2d 831, 866-68 (5th Cir.1993) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 878, 127 L.Ed.2d 74 (1994). In this case, we find no evidence of any existing voting practice in Florida that discriminates against African-Americans or other racial or ethnic minority groups. Holzendorf Test., Tr. at 95; Witt Test., Tr. at 157; Presley Test., Tr. at 181; Guthrie Test., Tr. at 250; Lichtman Test., Tr. at 358; Engstrom Test., Tr. at 484. See also Tommie Bell Dep., Pls.' Ex. 6; Beverly Hill Dep., Pls.' Ex. 9; Deanie Lowe Dep., Pls.' Ex. 10. Dr. Paulson stated as much in his testimony. Absent proof of any existing discriminatory voting practice, the presence of remote — albeit pervasive — instances of discrimination does little to bolster Defendants' case. e. Socio-Economic Disparities: Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors also presented a great deal of expert testimony concerning socio-economic disparities between whites and African-Americans in District Three. Dr. Paulson and Dr. Richard Engstrom (Defendants’ expert in elections systems and minority politics) reported the disparities between whites and African-Americans in unemployment rates, high school and college graduation rates, income,the number of persons in housing units without vehicles, and the percentage of households below the poverty level. Engstrom Rep., Defs.’ Ex. 3; Paulson Rep., Defs.’ Ex 6B; Defs.’ Ex. 10, Tab 2. We find that these socioeconomic disparities are not unique to District Three, to Florida, or to the South, but rather more generally reflect the socioeconomic differences between whites and African-Americans in similar districts throughout the country. See David Bositis, The Congressional Black Caucus in the 103rd Congress (1994). Nevertheless, we will take judicial notice of the fact that there are significant socio-economic disparities in Florida between white and African-American citizens, much of which may be a result of past discrimination. We do recognize that this is not evidence of a Voting Rights Act violation unless it is coupled with proof that participation in the political process is in fact depressed among minority citizens. See LULAC II, 999 F.2d at 866. The reason for showing decreased voter participation is because “[t]he Voting Rights Act and Fifteenth Amendment apply only to racial discrimination, not discrimination based on socio-economic status.” Howard v. Kelly, No. 93-900, 1994 WL 118211, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1994). Voter registration rates for whites and African-Americans are now essentially the same in District Three. Overall, African-Americans in District Three make up 50.6 percent of the voting age population (“VAP”) and have a voter registration rate of 50.6 percent, compared to non-Hispanic whites in District Three, who make up 47.6 percent of the VAP and have a voter registration rate of 48.8 percent. See Attachment G to DeGrandy Independent Expert Report (92-40015, Doc. 388). In Duval County, where 52 percent of District Three’s registered voters reside [Paulson Test., Tr. at 38], African-Americans of VAP actually have a higher voter registration rate than whites—64.6 percent compared to 62.0 percent. Engstrom Rep., Defs.’ Ex. 3 at App. A; Engstrom Test., Tr. at 482. State-wide, African-Americans have an overall voter registration rate of 50.95 percent, compared to the overall state registration rate of 53.72 percent of the VAP—a difference of 2.77 percent. See id. This minor difference between African-American voter registration rates and statewide voter registration rates leads the Court to conclude that participation in the political process is not depressed among African-American voters at a statistically significant level. Furthermore, the testimony of Mr. Lloyd Pearson, an African-American who over the course of thirteen years single-handedly registered over 40,000 people (most of whom are African-Americans) [Pearson Test., Tr. at 521], belies Defendants’ argument that socioeconomic disparities hamper voter registration in the African-American community. On the other hand, voter turnout among African-American voters has undoubtedly been lower than turnout among white voters in Florida. We must note, however, that much of the turnout data, especially the data supplied by Dr. Engstrom, is highly questionable . Similarly, the turnout data provided by Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Michael Maggiotto, which shows that turnout in District Three among African-Americans was significantly higher than among whites [see Maggiotto Rep. Pls.’ Ex. 15 at 6], is methodologically unsound because Dr. Maggiotto failed to adjust for split-precincts that included voters residing outside the District. Lichtman Test., Tr. at 338-40, 623-36. More reliable figures were provided by Dr. David Bositis, Defendants’ expert in congressional politics and race and representations, although these figures obviously were unavailable to the De-Grandy court at the time Distinct Three was drawn. Dr. Bositis showed that in District Three, turnout among African-American VAP was 45.7 percent in 1992 and 41.2 percent in 1994, compared to white VAP turnout of 52.7 percent in 1992, and 57.6 percent in 1994. Statewide, turnout among African-American VAP was 46.3 percent in 1992 and 29.7 percent in 1994, compared to white VAP turnout of 59.7 percent in 1992 and 45.0 percent in 1994. Bositis Rep., Defs.’ Ex. 4 at Table 1; Bositis Test., Tr. at 204. Some of this lower turnout is accounted for by the slightly lower (2.77%) voter registration rates among African-American voters. Other reasons, such as voter apathy, may also play a role in lower turnout. Regardless of the reasons for lower voter turnout, the following discussion reflects that African-Americans have been able, and continue to be able, to elect the candidates of their choice in elections in spite of lower turnout. Consequently, the Court finds that notwithstanding their lower socio-economic status, African-Americans in Florida now enjoy equal access to and participation in the political process. f. Lack of Electoral Success: The DeGrandy court also pointed to the lack of electoral success by African-American candidates in Florida. The court correctly acknowledged that the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act adopted a result-oriented test, concluding that “[plaintiffs demonstrate a violation of the Act only when equal access to the political process has been denied.” DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1082. There is no dispute about African-Americans’ lack of electoral success in years past. However, the absence of past electoral success in elections is not dispositive; rather, it is merely evidence of vote dilution that has denied plaintiffs equal access to the political process. Compare with Johnson v. DeGrandy, where the Supreme Court held: Lack of electoral success is evidence of vote dilution, but courts must also examine other evidence in the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of the opportunities minority voters enjoy to participate in the political processes. To be sure, some § 2 plaintiffs may have easy cases, but although lack of equal electoral opportunity may be readily imagined and unsurprising when demonstrated under circumstances that include the three essential Gingles factors, that conclusion must still be addressed explicitly, and without isolating any other arguably relevant facts from the act of judgment 512 U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2657 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). See also McWherter, 877 F.Supp. at 1108 (“We agree with the conclusion reached by other federal courts that findings of racial polarization and historical inequality do not necessarily result in a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This is true even when a reappoftionment plan does not provide for substantial proportionality.”). As discussed above, the DeGrandy court’s failure to engage in a fact-intensive inquiry and findings on racially-polarized voting patterns in Florida prevents us from now concluding that application of the Gingles totality of the circumstances test supported a finding of Section 2 liability. Moreover, the evidence presented at trial shows that African-Americans do in fact enjoy considerable electoral success in District Three and Florida—even within majority white districts—because of significant crossover by white voters. For example, State Senator Betty Holzendorf, an-African-American, testified that she received 78.1 percent of the vote against a white candidate, even though the VAP of her district is 44.7 percent African-American and 53 percent white. Holzendorf Test., Tr. at 74-75. And Senator Holzendorfs election is not an anomalous or isolated event. State Representative Alzo Reddick won in a district that has a 46.2 percent African-American VAP. Lichtman Test., Tr. at 390. State Senator Arnette Girardeau was elected in a northeastern Florida district that had little more than a forty percent African-American VAP. State Representative Cynthia Chestnut won in a district that is only 28 percent African-American. Holzendorf Test., Tr. at 76-77; Lichtman Test., Tr. at 389-90. Nate Glover won an overwhelming majority of the vote in the first at-large primary when he was elected Sheriff of Duval County, in which African-Americans comprise fewer than 24 percent of the registered voters. Bell Dep., Pls.’ Ex. 6 at 35-36. The testimony is replete with other current examples of electoral success by African-American candidates, at all political levels. See Clifton Test., Tr. at 106; Witt Test., Tr. at 151-52; Presley Test., Tr. at 175, 178-81; Williams Test., Tr. at 510-13. See also Bell Dep., Pls.’ Ex. 6; Hill Dep., Pls.’ Ex. 9; Lowe Dep., Pls.’ Ex. 10. The following exchange underscores the support that African-American candidates receive from white voters: SEN. HOLZENDORF: .... And so the person that is going to represent the entire county has to be able to bring a concern for all of the people in the county and not just one particular area. MR. SULLIVAN: So, in other words, for a black to have success in a district that is made up of both blacks and whites, the black candidate has to reach out to the white community? SEN. HOLZENDORF: That’s correct. MR. SULLIVAN: And, if they don’t reach out, they don’t get the white vote? SEN. HOLZENDORF: That’s correct. MR. SULLIVAN: And a black candidate, like yourself, has to reach out to the white community in order to obtain white votes? SEN. HOLZENDORF: That’s correct. Holzendorf Test., Tr. at 83. In fact, if District Three Representative Corrine Brown had not received such white crossover vote, she would not have been elected. Congresswoman Brown ran against two formidable candidates in 1992 and 1994, Don Weidner and Marc Little. Although African-American turnout in District Three was only 45.7 percent in 1992 and 41.2 percent in 1994 [Bositis Rep., Defs.’ Ex. 4 at Table 1; Bositis Test., Tr. at 204], Congresswoman Brown still garnered 59 percent of the vote in 1992 and 58 percent of the vote in 1994—near “landslide” levels of victory. Bositis Test., Tr. at 216-18; Brown Test., Tr. at 299. Therefore, despite past discrimination, we find that African-Americans now enjoy a great deal of electoral success at every political level, even in districts where they comprise only a small portion of the voting age population. g. Preclearance Of Florida Counties: The DeGrandy court also pointed out that “[a]s a result of Florida’s past discrimination practices, the United States Justice Department must preclear five Florida counties pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act ...” 794 F.Supp. at 1079. These counties are Collier, Hardee, Hendry, Hillsborough, and Monroe Counties. 40 Fed.Reg. 43746 (1975); 41 Fed.Reg. 34329 (1976). See 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. However, none of these counties are included in District Three. Further, to the extent that the DeGrandy court was addressing a statewide claim under Section 2, there is no evidence that any violations of the Voting Rights Act were then (or are today) present in these preclearance counties. In fact, as discussed below in section II infra, the remedial plan adopted by DeGrandy actually had a retrogressive effect on the ability of African-American voters in some of these five counties to be able to elect the candidates of their choice. 3. Summary: In sum, to state a “strong basis in evidence” that a Section 2 violation has occurred, there must be some indication that past discrimination has actually hampered the ability of minorities to participate in the political process [LULAC II, 999 F.2d at 866], through interaction with a “certain electoral law, practice, or structure.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. at 2764. There is insufficient evidence to support such a finding in this case. The three primary categories of evidence relied upon by DeGrandy included effects of past discrimination, socioeconomic disparities between whites and African-Americans, and African-Americans’ lack of electoral success. However, as discussed above, the failure of the DeGrandy court to show under the totality of the circumstances how this evidence interacted with the electoral structure being challenged (e.g., the existing redistricting plan) to hamper the ability of African-Americans to participate in the political process, precludes a finding of unlawful vote dilution. As a result, the De-Grandy court lacked the requisite “strong basis in evidence” that a Voting Rights Act violation existed, or that race-based redistricting was required under the Act. Consequently, Plaintiffs have carried their burden of persuading the Court that the DeGrandy court lacked a compelling interest in drawing District Three in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. B. Remedying Present Effects Of Past Discrimination: There is a significant state interest in eradicating the present effects of past racial discrimination. E.g., Miller, 514 U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 2490; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 654, 113 S.Ct. at 2831; United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167, 107 S.Ct. 1053, 1064, 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (plurality opinion). Accord Ensley Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1564-65 (11th Cir. 1994), reh'g en banc denied, 60 F.3d 717. Shaw recognized the possibility that such an interest could be "entirely distinct from the Voting Rights Act." However, there must still be a "`strong basis in evidence for [concluding] that remedial action [is] necessary'" to cure the specific instances of past discrimination. Id. at 654-57, 113 S.Ct. at 2831-32 (citations omitted). See also the citations and analysis contained in Section I(A) of this opinion. "Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1848, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986) (plurality opinion). Accord Croson, 488 U.S. at 500, 109 S.Ct. at 725 (plurality opinion). Rather, the discrimination must be identified with some specificity in the electoral law, practice, or structure to which the relief is to apply. Id. at 504, 109 S.Ct. at 727; Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir.1994). As noted above, Florida has a long and unfortunate history of racial discrimination. For too many years, racially motivated voting practices such as the poll tax and the Democratic “white primary” were allowed to make a mockery of the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thankfully, such practices have long been abolished and are only a part of Florida’s sad legacy of discrimination. Nevertheless, Defendants maintain that the lingering effects of Florida’s long history of discrimination continue to this day, and that the DeGrandy Court had a compelling interest in remedying those lingering effects. Yet, Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors have presented no evidence of any current voting practice or procedure which denies or impairs the right to vote of African-Americans. Absent such evidence, the DeGrandy court lacked the requisite “strong basis in evidence” that present effects of past discrimination required adoption of a race-based redistricting plan. In fact, Defendants’ counsel recognized in closing arguments' that the DeGrandy court failed to engage in the requisite fact-intensive analysis of whether any violation of federal law mandated the creation of District Three: MR. BURR: .... I believe that DeGrandy either was or could have been a remedy case. When I say “remedy case,” obviously, I’m not referring to a remedy of a simple one person/one vote malapportionment Problem. I believe the record in DeGrandy was such that it would have supported a finding, if the DeGrandy court had chosen to make one, that District Three was created as a race-conscious remedy to eradicate the lingering effects of a pervasive pattern of discrimination against black voters and would be black voters in Northeast Florida. Similarly, the DeGrandy court could have, if it had chosen to do so, rule that the lingering effects of vote dilution in Northeast Florida require, mandated the creation either of District Three or a district very much like District Three in order to avoid a head-on collision to the Voting-Rights Act. * * * * * * ... I want to hit on one last point, and this is the one I wanted to come back to about, well, if, in fact, the DeGrandy court could have found a Section 2 violation in 1992 and did not, what’s the reason for that? How did that really happen? And I run the risk of bordering on presumptuousness here in talking to two members of this court who, of course, were members of the panel in DeGrandy, but that is sort of the nature of this case. But it seems to me that the DeGrandy court did not have to make—or did not make findings of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or Section 2 simply because it didn’t have to. It wasn’t required to. By the time the congressional phase of the DeGrandy case ended, all of the parties that were before the court—the House and the Senate and the Democrat[ ]s and the Republicans and the NAACP, and all of the others—basically, everybody was of the same mind, and that was that there should be created in Northeast Florida a congressional district that would give blacks a reasonable opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. So, it simply was not incumbent upon the court to go ahead and make a difficult and perhaps divisive finding about an issue that all of the parties had agreed to. Tr. at 679, 686-87 (emphasis added). The Court appreciates counsel’s acknowledgment of what the DeGrandy court did not do. However, this acknowledgment demonstrates a fatal misapprehension of the nature of a federal court’s remedial powers—and effectively ends this case. In recent years, the federal courts have wrestled with the problem of utilizing affirmative action as a remedy for past racial discrimination. It has been said that "a state has a compelling interest in taking race-based affirmative action where it has a firm basis for concluding that such action is necessary to eradicate the effects of past or present racial discrimination within its own jurisdiction, even when it has no federal statutory mandate to do so." Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F.Supp. at 443-44 (collecting citations). However, such expansive authority does not exist for federal courts that have assumed the redistricting role. "[F]ederal courts may not order the creation of majority-minority districts unless necessary to remedy a violation of federal law." Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 156, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 1156, 122 L.Ed.2d 500 (1993) (citing Growe, 507 U.S. at 40-41, 113 S.Ct. at 1084). As Justice O'Connor noted in Missouri v. Jenkins, the reason for this limitation is that Courts ... are different. The necessary restrictions on our jurisdiction and authority contained in Article III of the Constitution limit the judiciary’s institutional capacity to prescribe palliatives for societal ills. The unfortunate fact of racial imbalance and bias in our society, however pervasive or invidious, does not admit of judicial intervention absent a constitutional violation.... Unlike Congress, which enjoys “ ‘discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ ” federal courts have no comparable license and must always observe their limited judicial role. — U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 2061, 132 L.Ed.2d 63 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). The same reasoning applies when a federal court considers what remedy to impose. Once a constitutional or statutory violation is shown, a federal court must limit its remedy solely to redressing the violation. See generally Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279-88, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2756-61, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) ("Milliken II") ("the remedy does not `exceed' the violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the `condition that offends the Constitution [or statute].'") (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 3124, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974) ("Milliken I")); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2369, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is not some all-purpose weapon for well-intentioned judges to wield as they please in the battle against discrimination."). Even assuming the DeGrandy court had a sufficient basis for concluding that present effects of past discrimination resulted in a constitutional or statutory violation (apart from the Voting Rights Act)—which the record does not support—-there is little evidence that the DeGrandy court was in fact motivated by an intent to remedy past discrimination. Instead, the DeGrandy opinion is permeated with language indicating that the DeGrandy court’s focused intent in drawing District Three was to create a second African-American majority-minority district. See 794 F.Supp. at 1085-87, 1091. In Miller, when the Court confronted a similar absence of evidence that the state actor was pursuing an interest in remedying present effects of past discrimination, the Court instead concentrated on the state actor’s actual motivation: “creating a third majority-black district to satisfy the Justice Department’s preclearance demands.” 514 U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 2490. We will therefore tailor our remaining analysis to what we find to have been the DeGrandy court’s actual motivation: creation of at least two African-American majority-minority districts, and one African-American influence district, as the DeGrandy court presumed was required under the Voting Rights Act. Consequently, we must, and do, conclude that plaintiffs have carried their burden of persuading the Court that the DeGrandy court lacked a compelling interest in drawing District Three in order to remedy present effects of past discrimination. II. Narrowly Tailored: Based upon the 1990 decennial census results which entitled Florida to four additional congressional seats and the ensuing malapportionment in Florida’s congressional districts, the DeGrandy court found violations of Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution [which requires Congressional Redistricting every 10 years], the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the one-person-one-vote principle, and the Voting Rights Act. 794 F.Supp. at 1090. Therefore, the DeGrandy court had the power to fashion a remedial plan narrowly tailored to correct the malapportionment. See, e.g., Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 279-88, 97 S.Ct. at 2756-61. However, the DeGrandy court went beyond correcting malapportionment. Instead, it perceived that the Voting Rights Act required race-based redistricting through the creation of as many African-American majority-minority and minority influence districts as was reasonable and practicable—including District Three. Since we have already concluded that the DeGrandy court lacked a compelling interest in drawing District Three, it is not really necessary to address whether District Three was narrowly tailored to further any compelling interest. Nevertheless, we will engage in such an inquiry to insure that our analysis is complete, recognizing that there may be further judicial review of this matter. Assuming it had been established that a compelling interest requires race-based redistricting "under a correct reading of the [Voting Rights Act] statute," Miller, 514 U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 2491, any remedial plan must still be narrowly tailored. See id. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 2490. Cf. Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 74 F.3d 230, 234 (11th Cir.1996) (there must be "a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish that the plan is narrowly tailored to remedy that discrimination"); Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist., 71 F.3d 1382, 1391 (8th Cir.1995) (en banc) (same). The remedial plan must, therefore, be limited to correcting the violation in the most narrowly tailored manner — e.g., by narrowly fashioning the remedy for only those practices or political units that actually violate federal law. To determine whether a remedy is in fact narrowly tailored, the Supreme Court has examined race-based remedial plans under a five factor test: (1) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (2) whether the remedial plan imposes a rigid racial "quota" or just a flexible racial "goal"; (3) the planned duration of the remedial plan; (4) the relationship between the remedial plan's goal for minority representation in the pool of individuals ultimately selected to receive the benefit in question and the percentage of minorities in the relevant pool of eligible candidates; and (5) the impact of the remedial plan on the rights of innocent third parties. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F.Supp. at 445 (collecting cases). See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 510-11, 109 S.Ct. at 730-31; Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171, 107 S.Ct. at 1066 (plurality opinion); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-84, 106 S.Ct. at 1849-52; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 510-15, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2791-93, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980). As the Shaw court pointed out, the second, third, and fourth factors will virtually always be satisfied in the redistricting context. See 861 F.Supp. at 446-48. Consequently, we will turn our attention towards an examination of how District Three fares under the first and fifth factors. A. Less Race-Based Plans Were Available: 1. Legal Standards: It has been noted that “[t]he first factor requires the court to decide whether the state could have accomplished its compelling purpose just as well by some alternative means that was either completely race-neutral or made less extensive use of racial classifications.” Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F.Supp. at 445. ' However, since [a] state ... engaging in race-based redistricting to comply with the Voting Rights Act obviously has no completely race-neutral alternative means of accomplishing that end,.... the primary inquiry ... will therefore be whether the state could have complied with the Act by enacting a redistricting plan which, though race-based made less extensive use of racial classifications than the one it chose. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F.Supp. at 445-46 (emphasis in original) (collecting citations). The inquiry, therefore, focuses on two questions: “whether the plan creates more majority-minority districts than is reasonably necessary to comply with the Act, and whether the majority-minority districts it creates contain substantially larger concentrations of minority voters than is reasonably necessary to give minority voters a realistic opportunity to elect representatives of their choice in those districts.” Id. at 446 (citing Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F.Supp. 1188, 1206-08 (W.D.La. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 514 U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 2431. Recently, the Supreme Court has defined the proper contours of the Voting Rights Act in order to further clarify what the Act permits and what it requires with regard to drawing majority-minority districts. The reason for this line of jurisprudence is because the Act had been used by federal courts, the state