Full opinion text
OPINION CARMAN, Judge: The following actions were consolidated by order of the Court of International Trade (Court or CIT) dated February 4, 1994: British Steel plc v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00550-CVD and Geneva Steel, et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00572-CVD consolidated as British Steel plc v. United States, Consol. Court No. 93-09-00550-CVD; Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas Gerais, S.A. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00558-CVD, Gulf States Steel, Inc. of Alabama, et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00574-CVD, and Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas Gerais, S.A. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00578-CVD consolidated as Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas Gerais, S.A. v. United States, Consol. Court No. 93-09-00558-CVD; Inland Steel Industries, Inc., et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00567-CVD, Usinor Sacilor, et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00588-CVD, Usinor Sacilor, et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00589-CVD, Usinor Sacilor, et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00590-CVD, and Usinor Sacilor, et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00591-CVD consolidated as Inland Steel Industries, Inc., et al. v. United States, Consol. Court No. 93-09-00567-CVD; LTV Steel Co., Inc., et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00568-CVD, Thyssen Stahl AG, et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00585-CVD, AG der Dillinger Hüttenwerke v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00596-CVD, and Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp and Krupp Hoesch Stahl AG v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00603-CVD consolidated as LTV Steel Co., Inc., et al. v. United States, Consol. Court No. 93-09-00568-CVD; Laclede Steel Co., et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00569-CVD, Pohang Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00579-CVD, Dongbu Steel Co. Ltd., et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00580-CVD, Dongbu Steel Co. Ltd., et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00581-CVD, and Pohang Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00582-CVD consolidated as Laclede Steel Co., et al. v. United States, Consol. Court No. 93-09-00569-CVD; Lukens Steel Co., et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00570-CVD, Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00618-CVD, and Industrias Monterrey S.A de C.V. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00632-CVD consolidated as Lukens Steel Co., et al. v. United States, Consol. Court No. 93-09-00570-CVD; and Geneva Steel, et al. v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00566-CVD and Fabrique de Fer de Charleroi v. United States, Court No. 93-09-00599-CVD, consolidated as Geneva Steel, et al. v. United States, Consol. Court No. 93-09-00566-CVD. After several scheduling conferences and upon review and consideration of the minutes of the December 15, 1993, scheduling conference and upon agreement of all parties and pursuant to U.S. CIT R. 42(a), the Court entered the scheduling order governing the joint proceeding in the above-captioned cases. As a convenience to the parties, the Court used British Steel PLC v. United States, Consol. Court No. 93-09-00550-CVD to identify this joint proceeding and to establish the guidelines set forth in the February 18, 1994, scheduling order. In accordance with that order, the parties were jointly ordered to brief five general issues which were divided into two groups. General Issues— Group One pertains to: (a) the Department of Commerce’s (Department or Commerce) use of a fifteen-year allocation period to determine the benefit from several nonreeurring countervailable grants; (b) Commerce’s use of a grant methodology to countervail equity infusions into an unequityworthy company whose shares are not publicly traded; and (e) Commerce’s treatment of privatization and restructuring regarding previously received subsidies, including the Department’s use of a repayment methodology. General Issues — Group Two pertains to: (a) Commerce’s determination of the appropriate sales denominator to be used in subsidy calculations when a respondent’s total sales include not only sales of domestically produced merchandise, but also sales of merchandise produced in one or more foreign countries; and (b) Commerce’s treatment of disproportionality for the purpose of evaluating the specificity of a potentially countervailable program. The Scheduling Order directed all questions of law and issues of fact regarding the five general issues to be briefed solely in the context of the briefs on these issues. All parties were prohibited from re-briefing or re-arguing any of these questions or issues in the context of the briefs on the country-specific issues. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1988). Standard of Review The appropriate standard for the Court’s review of a remand determination by Commerce is whether the agency’s determination is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B) (1988) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i) (1994)). “Substantial evidence is something more than a ‘mere scintilla,’ and must be enough reasonably to support a conclusion.” Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 10 CIT 399, 405, 636 F.Supp. 961, 966 (1986), aff'd, 5 Fed.Cir. (T) 77, 810 F.2d 1137 (1987) (citations omitted). Section One: Allocation On the general issue of the allocation methodology, Usinor Sacilor, Sollac, GTS, and British Steel pic (collectively “plaintiffs”) filed a joint motion for partial judgment on the agency record pursuant to U.S. CIT R. 56.2 and for an order declaring that aspect of the General Issues Appendix appended to Certain Steel Products from Austria, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,225, 37,225-31 (Dep’t Comm.1993) (final determ.) (General Issues Appendix) pertaining to the allocation methodology employed by Commerce as set forth in the General Issues Appendix and applied in the final countervailing duty determinations in Certain Steel Products from France, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,304 (Dep’t Comm.1993) (final determ.) (French Final Determination) and Certain Steel Products from the United Kingdom, 58 Fed.Reg. 37,393 (Dep’t Comm. 1993) (final determ.) (British Final Determination ) to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record and not otherwise in accordance with law. Commerce opposed plaintiffs’ motion, as did AK Steel Corporation, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Geneva Steel, Gulf States Steel Incorporated of Alabama, Inland Steel Industries, Incorporated, Laclede Steel Company, LTV Steel Company, Incorporated, Lukens Steel Company, National Steel Corporation, Sharon Steel Corporation, U.S. Steel Group a unit of USX Corporation, and WCI Steel, Incorporated (collectively “Domestic Producers”). On February 9, 1995, this Court issued an opinion addressing all five general issues. See British Steel plc v. United States, 879 F.Supp. 1254 (CIT 1995) (British Steel). On the general issue of the allocation methodology, this Court held: (1) Commerce failed to allocate the benefits of the subsidies received by the firms under investigation in a manner reflecting the actual “commercial and competitive benefit” of the subsidies to the companies and thus the determinations conflicted with Congress’ clearly expressed intent; (2) Commerce’s use of a 15-year allocation period based solely on the U.S. Internal Revenue Service’s Class Life Asset Depreciation Range System (IRS tax tables) was unsupported by substantial evidence on the record and was not otherwise in accordance with law; and (3) the allocation methodology as set forth in the General Issues Appendix was unlawful. See id. at 1298. Accordingly, the Court remanded the French Final Determination and the British Final Determination to Commerce. The Court directed Commerce to reexamine the allocation methodology as employed in both final determinations for a case by case examination of the relevant commercial and competitive factors of the firms under investigation occasioned by receipt of the subsidies at issue. After having examined such factors, Commerce was to determine if those factors, when examined with or without a proxy such as the IRS tax tables, led to a method of allocating the benefits of nonrecurring subsidies that reasonably reflected the commercial and competitive advantages enjoyed by the firms receiving such subsides. This part of the opinion addresses Commerce’s Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand on General Issue of Allocation (dated June 30, 1995) (Allocation Remand). Background A. The Allocation Methodology As explained in British Steel, in allocating the economic benefits of nonrecurring subsidies, Commerce apportions the value of the subsidies over a number of years beginning with the year of receipt. The countervailing duty (CVD) statute is silent, however, as to the methodology to be employed in allocating subsidy benefits. Since 1982, Commerce’s practice has been to allocate benefits from nonrecurring subsidies, such as grants and equity, over the average useful life (AUL) of renewable physical assets as set out in the IRS tax tables. Because the IRS tax tables set the AUL of renewable assets in the steel industry at 15 years, Commerce established an allocation period of 15 years for the subsidy benefits in the French Final Determination and the British Final Determination. B. The Allocation Remand 1. The Average Useful Life Methodology Commerce determined the AUL methodology to be the most reasonable allocation methodology complying with the Court’s instructions in British Steel. To explain its use of AUL to determine the appropriate time period over which to allocate subsidy benefits, Commerce notes two basic accounting principles: (1) the principle that the “actual duration of the commercial or competitive benefit associated with a grant or equity infusion is almost always indeterminate’’; and (2) the recognition “that the exact nature of the expenditure of the grant or equity funds ... is not relevant to the question of commercial and competitive benefit.” Allocation Remand at 6. Notwithstanding the difficulties raised by these principles, Commerce continues, the agency is charged with basing its choice of a reasonable time period on the “commercial and competitive factors for the firms under investigation.” Id. at 7. Of these factors, Commerce isolates production as the essential factor: “[T]he competitive position of any company ultimately depends upon its productive activity; without production, there are no other commercial and competitive factors that are relevant for a manufacturing enterprise.” Id. This finding is in accord with the CVD statute, Commerce states, because the “statute focuses on benefits to production of the subject merchandise.” Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1988) (providing that a duty equal to the net amount of a bounty or grant shall be paid on “any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export” of the subject merchandise)). “A company’s renewable physical assets,” Commerce explains, “are reasonably related to the productive activity of a firm in that the renewable physical assets are absolutely essential to production; and renewable physical assets have a determinable average useful life. The AUL has competitive significance because the renewal of physical assets is essential to production.” Id. Commerce recognizes that other factors relate to a company’s production other than physical assets, such as employees, land, buildings, and raw materials, but notes that with the exception of land and buildings, only physical assets (capital equipment and machines) have an identity which cannot be separated from the firm because capital assets are owned and controlled by the firm; they are the substance within the corporate form. As such, they comprise the core element of a company’s productive activities and thus bear a measurable relationship to the duration of subsidy benefits. Id. at 39. “Unlike land or equity which have an indeterminate life,” Commerce continues, “physical assets have a useful life which can serve as a reasonable measure of the duration of benefits provided to a firm from nonrecurring subsidies.” Id. Commerce considered alternative methodologies proposed by the parties, but in the end found that “AUL is the most reasonable method of deriving the allocation period for nonrecurring subsidies; it reasonably reflects the commercial and competitive advantages enjoyed by the firms under investigation.” Id. at 20. “[T]he AUL of the renewable physical assets employed by a company provides a reasonable approximation of the duration of the commercial and competitive benefits to that company for all non-recurring subsidies,” Commerce reasons, as subsidy “benefits extend as long as the average useful life of the company’s assets.” Id. at 7. 2. Company-Specific AUL Calculations After determining AUL was the most reasonable methodology for deriving an allocation period, Commerce applied the methodology to the companies under investigation to derive a company-specific AUL for each respondent. To make the company-specific AUL calculations, Commerce requested that Usinor Sacilor, Sollac, and GTS (collectively “Usinor Sacilor”), respondents in the French Final Determination, and British Steel pic (BS pic), a respondent in the British Final Determination, provide the AUL of their assets as well as “any national standards concerning the average useful life of assets in France and in the United Kingdom.” Id. at 17. Both Usinor Sacilor and BS pic provided AUL calculations based on the depreciation and fixed assets values as reported in their respective financial statements. Commerce describes its calculation of company-specific AUL as follows. First, Commerce observes that although it preferred actual company-specific AUL as calculated from company asset ledgers, both BS pic and Usinor Sacilor informed Commerce that actual AUL information was unavailable. The companies instead submitted AUL calculations based on their financial statements, the data from which, Commerce determined, “provide a reasonable basis for approximating [AUL] for purposes of this redetermination.” Id. at 46. Second, Commerce explains, [w]hen calculating annual depreciation, an asset’s gross book value is multiplied by a rate derived using the asset’s expected useful life. We reviewed the companies’ financial statements and determined that, by reversing this calculation and dividing the gross book value of assets by depreciation expense, a reasonable estimate of average useful life is obtained. Id. (footnote omitted). The foundation for this calculation, Commerce continues, is twofold. First, “the rate at which the assets are depreciated for these two companies is based on the average useful lives- of assets.” Id. Second, the cumulation of the assets and of related depreciation expense over several periods “serves to mitigate any distorting influence caused by additional depreciation or writebacks of earlier charges.” Id. As the third step in the company-specific AUL calculations, Commerce “added depreciation charges for several years, and divided by the sum of average gross book value of depreciable fixed assets for the related periods.” Id. at 46-47. a. French Final Determination Usinor Sacilor provided Commerce with AUL calculations based on the company’s financial statements during the period 1978 through 1991. To compute Usinor Sacilor’s AUL calculation, Commerce summed depreciation charges for several years and divided by the sum of average gross book value of depreciable fixed assets for the related periods. Where detail of fixed assets was provided, land, construction-in-progress, and pre-payments to suppliers of property were not included in the calculation of gross book value. Commerce concluded “Usinor Sacilor’s AUL calculation using gross book value of plant and equipment results in an average AUL of 14 years.” Id. at 19. Accordingly, Commerce allocated the benefits from nonrecurring subsidies provided to Usinor Sacilor over 14 years. b. British Final Determination In response to Commerce’s request for the AUL of company assets, BS pic stated the estimated service life of each of its assets was recorded on individual asset registers, and that it maintained over 50,000 separate asset accounts. The company reported it has never calculated a weighted average service life for these assets. Therefore, BS pic did not calculate an AUL from its asset register, Commerce found, but instead submitted an AUL calculation based on depreciation and asset values as reported in its financial statements. BS pic’s AUL calculations used a nine-year period — from 1978 through 1986— and were derived by dividing net book values of land, buildings, plant and machinery at the beginning of the year by depreciation for that year. Commerce, however, rejected BS pie’s use of net book value and recalculated the company’s AUL using gross book value, arriving at an average AUL of 18 years. Accordingly, Commerce allocated the benefits from nonrecurring subsidies provided to the company over 18 years. Contentions of the Parties A. Foreign Producers Plaintiffs contend Commerce’s AUL allocation methodology fails to reasonably reflect the commercial and competitive benefit of nonrecurring subsidies and therefore should be abandoned in favor of an alternative methodology — the long-term debt methodology. (Comments of Usinor Sacilor on Commerce’s Remand Redetermination on the General Issue of Allocation (Usinor Sacilor’s Comments) at 5, 18.) Usinor Sacilor argues Commerce’s explanation that “ ‘[a] company’s renewable physical assets are reasonably related to the productive activity of a firm in that the renewable physical assets are absolutely essential to production,’ ” (id. at 8 (quoting Allocation Remand at 7)), “offers up nothing more than a warmed-over, slightly lengthier version of the ‘life cycle’ theory, which the Court has already rejected [in British Steel ],” (id.). Although physical assets are unquestionably related to a company’s production activities, Usinor Sacilor contends, there is absolutely no basis for concluding that the useful lives of these particular assets are therefore a reasonable measure of the duration of the commercial and competitive benefit to a company resulting from an infusion of subsidy funds, in light of the court’s recognition ... that subsidies benefit the firm as a whole, not just physical assets. (Id. at 8-9 (footnote omitted).) Usinor Sacilor also argues the fact that “there is no way to precisely measure the duration of a subsidy benefit” does not give Commerce free rein “to adopt an arbitrary but administratively convenient practice in the exercise of its discretionary authority.” (Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).) Commerce has conceded the arbitrariness of the AUL methodology, Usinor Sacilor charges, and cannot rely on agency experience as a basis for the methodology when in fact the rationale was “lifted directly from the Domestic Producers.” (Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).) Usinor Sacilor insists Commerce has failed again to “substantiate a conceptual or factual link between an industry’s ‘life cycle’ or ‘production’ and AUL that would justify concluding that the latter is reasonably related to the commercial and competitive benefit to the firm.” (Id. at 18.) The premise behind the long-term debt methodology proposed by Usinor Sacilor is that “it is the receipt of money on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations, not the purchase of equipment or anything else” that constitutes the subsidy benefit. (Id. at 14.) Commerce has long recognized the financial nature of subsidy benefits, Usinor Sacilor contends, and the Court itself “has elucidated the financial nature of subsidy benefits.” (Id. at 15.) In light of the above, Usinor Sacilor urges the Court to direct Commerce to abandon the AUL allocation methodology and adopt the long-term debt methodology. BS pie adds the argument that Commerce’s analysis of the relationship between assets and the duration of subsidy benefits is based on a logical fallacy. BS pic argues “simply because subsidies and physical assets are both related to production, it does not follow that subsidies are logically related to physical assets or the useful lives of those assets.” (BS pic’s Comments at 8 (footnote omitted).) BS pic also rejects Commerce’s premise that capital equipment and machines “have an identity which cannot be separated from the firm____ [T]hey comprise the core elements of a company’s productive activities ____” (.Allocation Remand at 39, quoted in BS pic’s Comments at 9.) Commerce has cited no authority for such a proposition, BS pic contends, and has failed to explain why the useful lives of equipment and machines is of greater relevance than any other factors of production — including employees, patents, licenses, and leased land and buildings — all of which have definitive and measurable lives. (BS pic’s Comments at 10.) BS pic also alleges Commerce’s company-specific AUL calculations produce amortization periods that vary widely. This underscores that AUL calculations have “little if anything to do with the actual average useful life of a steel producer’s assets,” BS pie argues. (Id. at 16.) Such a methodology is essentially arbitrary, BS pic charges, and is “not a sound basis upon which to administer U.S. CVD laws.” (Id.) BS pie supports the alternative allocation methodologies proposed by Usinor Sacilor, and argues “[wjhile these alternatives are not a perfect measure of the likely duration of subsidy benefits, they are decidedly less arbitrary and more relevant than the methodology chosen by the Department.” (Id. at 17.) B. Department of Commerce Commerce disputes Usinor Sacilor’s claim that in British Steel, the Court rejected the general concept of AUL and determined AUL had no logical relationship to the commercial and competitive benefits enjoyed by a subsidy recipient. (Def.’s Resp. to Comments on the Remand Determination on the General Issue of Allocation at 4.) Instead, Commerce argues, the Court merely requested an explanation “of how the allocation methodology reflects the commercial and competitive benefit to the recipient of nonrecurring subsidies.” (Id. at 5.) Commerce refutes BS pic’s claim that the AUL methodology is tainted by a logical fallacy. Commerce argues it did not conclude that “all subsidy benefits relate to the lives of physical assets,” but only that “the lives of physical assets are reasonably related to the benefits from nonrecurring subsidies.” (Id. at 7 n. 4.) Plaintiffs are also wrong, Commerce contends, when they argue Commerce skewed its analysis toward equipment and machines and away from other productive resources. Commerce argues it did recognize there are factors other than physical assets that relate to a company’s productive activity, but that the agency properly drew a critical distinction between physical assets, which have a useful life, and other corporate elements such as land or equity, which have an indeterminate life. It is “[t]his distinction between core elements and non-core elements of a firm’s productive activities,” Commerce continues, which is the essential element of the AUL methodology. (Id. at 9.) Commerce responds to BS pic’s complaint that the agency’s method of calculating company-specific AUL leads to variable results by pointing out that “the use of this method was dictated, in large part, by the information provided by the parties during the remand proceeding. Commerce requested actual AUL information and the parties were unable to provide it.” (Id. at 17.) Furthermore, Commerce points out that company-specific calculations, by their nature, will produce variable results as different companies have different replacement schedules for fixed assets. With respect to plaintiffs’ proposed long-term debt methodology as an alternative to the AUL methodology, Commerce contends such an approach “is based upon arbitrary assumptions and leads to anomalous results.” (Id. at 10.) Focusing on the hypothetical cost of alternative financing as a basis for determining the allocation period is misguided, Commerce argues, because the focus of CVD law is the benefit to production. Additionally, Commerce posits that a debt-based methodology would be subject to some of the same drawbacks that plaintiffs allege infect the AUL methodology — variable results depending on the years and the individual companies examined. C. Domestic Producers Plaintiffs’ criticisms of the AUL methodology are unfounded, Domestic Producers argue, as “AUL represents a meaningful approximation of the period over which subsidies benefit the recipient, regardless of use.” (Reply Comments of Def.-Intervenors AK Steel Corp., et al., Regarding Allocation (Domestic Producers’ Rebuttal Comments) at 9.) Domestic Producers concede that subsidies may be used for purposes other than the purchase of physical assets, but stress there is “no economic or accounting theory that will allow the determination of the period over which subsidies used for these purposes provide benefits.” (Id., “Summary of Argument” at 1.) Domestic Producers dispute BS pic’s claim that Commerce’s methodology is logically flawed. Commerce’s conclusion that the AUL of physical assets is reasonably related to production, Domestic Producers continue, “does not mean that all subsidies must relate to physical assets or that benefits definitively last as long as assets; it means only that the AUL of physical assets is a meaningful measure of the benefits from subsidies.” (Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).) Domestic Producers upbraid plaintiffs for failing to discuss precedent, where, according to Domestic Producers, the Court upheld an allocation methodology that was the same as that employed by Commerce in the Allocation Remand. See Ipsco, Inc. v. United States, 13 CIT 335, 710 F.Supp. 1581 (1989) (Ipsco III), rev’d in part on other grounds, 8 Fed.Cir. (T) 80, 899 F.2d 1192 (1990). Accordingly, Domestic Producers contend the Court should reach the same conclusion it did in Ipsco III and hold Commerce’s “use of a company-specific AUL is a reasonable method for determining the allocation period for subsidies.” (Id. at 17.) The long-term debt methodology proposed by plaintiffs is not a reasonable method of determining the allocation period, Domestic Producers argue, because the duration of existing long-term debt bears no relationship to the duration of subsidy benefits. Domestic Producers insist Commerce has already provided a detailed explanation in the Allocation Remand why such a methodology is lacking, which explanation plaintiffs have failed to rebut. Accordingly, although such a showing is not necessary under the law, Domestic Producers assert Commerce’s AUL methodology is superior to that recommended by plaintiffs. Discussion This Court did not, contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, reject the AUL methodology in British Steel. In that decision, the Court held Commerce failed to allocate the benefits from nonrecurring subsidies in a manner reflecting the actual “commercial and competitive benefit” of the subsidies, and held Commerce’s use of a 15-year allocation period based solely on the IRS tax tables was not based on substantial evidence and was not otherwise in accordance with law. See British Steel, 879 F.Supp. at 1298. Accordingly, the Court found the allocation methodology as set forth in the General Issues Appendix was unlawful as applied, but rendered no finding on the AUL methodology itself. Because the CVD statute does not provide for a method of allocating the benefits bestowed by nonrecurring subsidies, the method chosen by Commerce need only be “based on a permissible construction of the statute,” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and must not “contravene or ignore the intent of the legislature or the guiding purpose of the statute.” Ceramica Regiomontana, 10 CIT at 405, 636 F.Supp. at 966 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-83) (further citation omitted). As expressed in the legislative history to the Trade Act of 1979, Commerce is charged with deriving “[rjeasonable methods of allocating the value of such [nonrecurring] subsidies over the production or exportation of the products benefiting from the subsidy.” S.Rep. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 471. Additionally, “a reasonable period based on the commercial and competitive benefit to the recipient as a result of the subsidy must be used.” Id. at 85-86, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 471-72. The Court finds Commerce has set forth a reasonable explication of how allocating the benefits of nonrecurring subsidies using the AUL of certain physical assets reflects the commercial and competitive benefit of the subsidies to the companies. The Court recognizes there appears to be no economic or accounting theory that would permit an actual determination of the precise period over which subsidies benefit a company. This should not be surprising given the impractieality of tracing subsidies to individual assets and the futility of monitoring those assets to determine how long they benefit from such subsidies. Faced with this difficulty, but mindful of the Court’s instructions to allocate subsidy benefits in a manner re-fleeting their commercial and competitive benefit to the company, Commerce chose the AUL methodology using company-specific AUL calculations as a reasonable surrogate for determining the actual duration of benefits flowing from subsidies. The Court does not quarrel with Commerce’s reasoning that the CVD statute focuses in part on production in identifying those subsidies that are countervailable. The statute defines “subsidy,” in part, as a bounty or grant “paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of any class or kind of merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(ii) (1988) (emphasis added); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1988) (providing that a duty equal to the net amount of a bounty or grant shall be paid on “any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export” of the subject merchandise). As plaintiffs correctly point out, there are other company resources that play a role in the production of merchandise beyond the renewable physical assets that Commerce examined in its AUL methodology. Commerce’s focus on renewable physical assets does not necessarily mean, however, that Commerce considers renewable physical assets to be the only company resources that aid production. Commerce, in its discretion, chose to examine the determinable life of renewable physical assets and provided a reasoned explanation for doing so. If Commerce were compelled to consider only those corporate resources that actually benefited from subsidies, the agency would face an impractical and impossible task. In short, the AUL methodology using company-specific calculations is a reasonable method of allocating the commercial and competitive benefit of subsidy benefits. The Court is not persuaded by any of plaintiffs’ arguments attacking the reasonableness of the AUL methodology. For example, plaintiffs’ contend the AUL methodology appears to have been advanced first by Domestic Producers. This claim, even if true, is irrelevant. The Court will not require that Commerce’s methodologies be drawn solely from the font of agency wisdom. It is proper for Commerce to base its methodologies on numerous sources including statutory directives, internal agency analysis, and party comments. BS pie’s complaint that the AUL methodology yields variable results that undermine the reliability of the methodology is not convincing. It is reasonable to expect that once Commerce examines the commercial and competitive benefit of nonrecurring subsidies on a firm by firm basis there will be differences in results in light of the unique economic circumstances of each firm. The variations in company-specific AUL calculations are not indicative of a weakness in the methodology, but rather reveal the differences in financial data and depreciation methods of each company. To its credit, Commerce devoted considerable resources weighing alternative allocation methodologies proposed by plaintiffs. See Allocation Remand at 8-16; 22-29. The Court need not review the alternative methodologies nor Commerce’s reasons for rejecting them in favor of the AUL methodology. See Wheatland Tube Corp. v. United States, 17 CIT 1230, 1245, 841 F.Supp. 1222, 1234 (1993) (“Commerce has broad discretion to choose a methodology to satisfy the statutory mandate.”) It is sufficient to say Commerce has provided a persuasive rejection of alternative allocation methodologies. The Court also notes Commerce’s AUL methodology is strikingly similar to a methodology upheld by the CIT in Ipsco III and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). In Ipsco III, the allocation methodology reviewed was based on “data taken from Ipsco’s 1984 Annual Report” that allowed Commerce to calculate the average depreciation period by subtracting from the total value of Ipseo’s replaceable physical assets the value of construction in progress and then dividing this result by the net depreciation charged during the year. Ipsco III, 13 CIT at 335-36, 710 F.Supp. at 1582 (citation omitted). This is similar to Commerce’s methodology in the Allocation Remand where the agency divided the gross book value of assets by depreciation expense to obtain a reasonable estimate of a company-specific AUL. See supra at 433 (explaining how Commerce calculated company-specific AUL in the Allocation Remand). The CIT in Ipsco III upheld Commerce’s “allocation of the subsidy to a period representing the average depreciable life of all of Ipsco’s replaceable physical assets” even though the Court recognized “this may not be a totally logical approach to grant valuation.” Ipsco III, 13 CIT at 337, 710 F.Supp. at 1584. On appeal, the CAFC affirmed, finding Commerce’s allocation methodology unobjectionable. Ipsco, Inc. v. United States, 8 Fed.Cir. (T) 80, 88, 899 F.2d 1192, 1198 (1990). In conclusion, the Court finds Commerce’s Allocation Remand Allocation Remand setting forth a method of determining the allocation period over which to allocate the benefits of nonrecurring subsidies using the company-specific average useful life of renewable physical assets is sustained as based on substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law. Section Two: Sales Denominator On the general issue of the sales denominator, plaintiffs filed a joint motion for partial judgment on the agency record pursuant to U.S. CIT R. 56.2 and for an order declaring that aspect of the General Issues Appendix pertaining to the appropriate sales denominator employed by Commerce as set forth in the General Issues Appendix, 58 Fed.Reg. at 37,231-36, and applied in the French Final Determination and the British Final Determination to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record and not otherwise in accordance with law. AK Steel Corporation, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Geneva Steel, Gulf States Steel Incorporated of Alabama, Inland Steel Industries, Incorporated, Laclede Steel Company, LTV Steel Company, Incorporated, Lukens Steel Company, National Steel Corporation, Sharon Steel Corporation, U.S. Steel Group a unit of USX Corporation, and WCI Steel, Incorporated (collectively “Domestic Producers”) opposed plaintiffs’ motion. In British Steel, regarding the general issue of the sales denominator, this Court held: (1) Commerce did not permit plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issue of Commerce’s adoption of the presumption that subsidies are tied to domestic production for companies with multinational production in Commerce’s determination of the appropriate sales denominator; and (2) Commerce did not provide plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to submit evidence to rebut the presumption erected by Commerce in its determination of the appropriate sales denominator. British Steel, 879 F.Supp. at 1319. Accordingly, the Court issued a remand on the general issue of the sales denominator. This part of the opinion addresses Commerce’s Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand on General Issue of Sales Denominator (dated June 23, 1995) (Sales Denominator Remand). Background A. The Tying Presumption As the Court explained in British Steel, Commerce divides the net countervailable benefit allocable to the period of investigation (POI) by the company’s sales of benefitting merchandise during the POI. If the subsidy at issue is deemed tied to domestic production, Commerce allocates the benefit of the subsidy fully to the sales of domestically produced merchandise and uses domestic sales as the denominator. If the subsidy is deemed untied, however, Commerce allocates the benefit of the subsidy to total worldwide sales and uses worldwide sales as the denominator. British Steel, 879 F.Supp. at 1310 (citing General Issues Appendix, 58 Fed.Reg. at 37,231). To determine whether a particular subsidy at issue is tied to domestic production, Commerce begins with the approach it first employed in Certain Hot Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products from France, 58 Fed.Reg. 6221 (Dep’t Comm.1993) (final determ.) (France Bismuth). Under this approach, the “focus is on resolving the factual question of whether the subsidies at issue are tied to the recipient firm’s production of merchandise domestically in the country under investigation or, alternatively, untied.” Id. at 1311 (quotations and citation omitted). In the French Final Determination and the British Final Determination, Commerce modified the sales denominator analysis it employed in France Bismuth by erecting a rebuttable presumption to decide the factual question of tying. As explained by Commerce, [U]nder the Department’s refined “tied” analysis, the Department will begin by presuming that a subsidy provided by the government of the country under investigation is tied to domestic production. However, this presumption is not irrebuttable. A party may rebut this presumption by presenting evidence tending to show that the subsidy was not tied to domestic production. General Issues Appendix, 58 Fed.Reg. at 37,231, quoted in British Steel, 879 F.Supp. at 1311. To rebut the presumption that subsidies are tied to domestic production, Commerce declared, [Relevant evidence may include the nature of the program at issue, whether the subsidy was bestowed specifically to provide other than a domestic benefit, communications between the government and the respondent relating to the subsidy provided pursuant to the program at issue, the govemment’s ownership interest, if any, in the respondent, and any other evidence addressing the likely beneficiaries of the subsidy____ [T]he above list of evidentiary criteria is not exhaustive, nor can any one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance in all cases. Id., quoted in British Steel, 879 F.Supp. at 1311. B. The Court’s Remand Instructions to Commerce In remanding the French Final Determination, insofar as that determination pertained to Commerce’s application of the sales denominator methodology, this Court ordered Commerce to give interested parties notice and the opportunity to comment on the agency’s adoption of the tying presumption. If, after consideration of such comments Commerce determined the tying presumption was an appropriate means to calculate the sales denominator, the Court ordered Commerce to give interested parties notice and the opportunity to submit evidence on the record for the purpose of rebutting the tying presumption after which Commerce was directed to examine the submitted evidence to determine whether it was sufficient to rebut the tying presumption. If Commerce found the evidence submitted sufficient to rebut the tying presumption, the Court directed Commerce to make all necessary and appropriate findings and calculations. See British Steel, 879 F.Supp. at 1330. In remanding the British Final Determination, insofar as that determination pertained to Commerce’s application of the sales denominator methodology, this Court ordered that if Commerce should find in its remand determination on the general issue of privatization that any party was liable for countervailing duties, Commerce was directed to give interested parties against whom countervailing duties had been assessed notice and the opportunity to comment on the agency’s adoption of the tying presumption. If, after consideration of such comments Commerce determined the tying presumption was an appropriate means to calculate the sales denominator, the Court ordered Commerce to give interested parties notice and the opportunity to submit evidence on the record for the purpose of rebutting the tying presumption after which Commerce was directed to examine the submitted evidence to determine whether it was sufficient to rebut the tying presumption. If Commerce found the evidence submitted sufficient to rebut the tying presumption, the Court directed Commerce to make all necessary and appropriate findings and calculations. If Commerce were to find in its remand determination of the British Final Determination on the general issue of privatization that no parties were liable for countervailing duties, the agency need not revisit the general issue of the sales denominator as it related to the British Final Determination. C. Sales Denominator Remand 1. Basis for the Tying Presumption Commerce explains the tying presumption satisfies the two standards governing an agency’s use of a presumption; first, the presumption is consistent with the intent of the CVD statute; and second, there is some rational connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed. Sales Denominator Remand at 8,13-14. The tying presumption comports with the first standard, consistency with the CVD statute, Commerce asserts, because [i]t reasonably strives to measure subsidies benefitting the merchandise under investigation accurately, as it “allocates fully to the products actually being investigated any subsidies directly tied to them,” Appendix 2 of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed.Reg. 39316, 39320 (Sept. 7, 1982), and avoids “having to dilute benefits ... that we know are tied to products under investigation,” Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; Industrial Nitrocellulose from France, 52 Fed.Reg. 833, 835 (Jan. 9,1987). Id. at 8 (citation omitted). As to the second standard — a rational connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed — Commerce first references British Steel where the agency argued the Department can reasonably conclude that a government normally would provide a subsidy to a firm with multinational production for domestic purposes. [Commerce] added that the obvious corollary to this view of government subsidization is that the government normally will not provide subsidies to firms that refuse to use them in the way that the government wants, and firms receiving subsidies normally will not use them in a way that would contravene the government’s purposes, as they otherwise would risk losing future subsidies. Id. at 9. Commerce buttresses this observation by stating that a careful review of the various materials cited by the respondents does “not detract from the soundness of the Department’s conclusion that governments normally will provide subsidies to firms with multinational production with the intent and desire that the firms use those subsidies domestically.” Id. at 10. After discussing certain economic texts cited by respondents, including one source suggesting multinational firms will pursue direct foreign investment as part of their profit-maximizing behavior, Commerce concludes: Overall, while the evidence submitted by the respondents illustrates certain instances where a government might allow a company it owns to expand overseas, the evidence does not warrant a different conclusion from that reached by the Department based on its experience in this area. Accordingly, the Department continues to conclude that there is a rational connection between the facts proved, i.e., that the government of the country under investigation has provided a subsidy to a firm with multinational production, and the facts presumed, i.e., that the subsidy is tied to the firm’s domestic production. Id. at 13-14. Commerce also notes that a reviewing court may look to the usefulness of a presumption when assessing its validity and adds that it is not unusual for Commerce to use presumptions, several of which have been upheld by the courts. For all of the foregoing reasons, Commerce adopts its tying presumption again in the remand proceeding. 2. Rebuttal Evidence Under the Tying Presumption Commerce describes the various types of rebuttal evidence that may be probative in rebutting the tying presumption. See id. at 3^4 (quoting General Issues Appendix, 58 Fed.Reg. at 37,231). The types of evidence are: (1) the nature of the program at issue; (2) whether the subsidy was bestowed specifically to provide other than a domestic benefit; (3) communications between the government and respondent relating to the subsidy provided pursuant to the program at issue; (4) the government’s ownership interest in the respondent; and (5) any other evidence addressing the likely beneficiaries of the subsidy. Id. at 3 (quoting General Issues Appendix, 58 Fed.Reg. at 37,231). Before considering the rebuttal evidence submitted by the parties in the French Final Determination and the British Final Determination, Commerce sets forth several general principles to guide its analysis of the evidence. First, the tying presumption is rebutted once a party ... presents evidence “tending to show” that the subsidies at issue are not tied to domestic production. For this purpose, the party must present enough evidence so that a reasonable fact-finder could be convinced of the non-existence of the presumed fact---There must be presented, in other words, sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the subsidies at issue are tied to the recipient firm’s domestic production. Id. at 15-16. Second, Commerce examines each subsidy at issue separately to determine if a party has rebutted the tying presumption. Accordingly, Commerce declares that if it were to find that a grant was untied in one year, this “would not mean that grants to that company in other years, even under the same subsidy program, were necessarily untied.” Id. at 16. The third principle Commerce enunciates is that in the event the presumption is rebutted, Commerce evaluates “all of the record evidence, without the aid of any presumption, [to] decide whether or not the subsidies at issue are, in fact, tied or untied.” Id. Finally, Commerce does “not consider any evidence of subsequent events intended to demonstrate the actual effects or uses of the subsidies at issue.” Id. at 17 (emphasis omitted). 3. Application of the Tying Presumption to the Record Evidence a. French Final Determination Commerce explains Usinor Sacilor, the French respondent, advanced evidence and argument to rebut the tying presumption for subsidies provided pursuant to two of the ten programs determined to provide countervail-able benefits in the French Final Determination: (1) the conversion of debt instruments — “préts á caractéristiques spéciales” (PACS) or “loans "with special characteristics” and “Fonds dTntervention Siderurgique” (FIS) or “Steel Intervention Fund” bonds — into equity in 1981, 1986, and 1988; and (2) grants given in the form of shareholders’ advances from 1982 through 1986. Id. at 17. Commerce made the following findings regarding the conversion of debt instruments. In 1978, with the French steel industry approaching insolvency, the government of France (GOF) asked the French steel companies and their creditors to restructure the French steel industry. The ensuing restructuring plan required substantial government subsidies, consolidation of the steel companies’ debt, reduction of debt service charges, and the conversion of long-term debt into PACS. Despite these efforts, the steel industry continued to suffer from severe losses. In response, the GOF announced the 1982 Plan Acier. This plan sought to re-establish a sound financial structure for the French steel industry by reducing its financial expenses to a level comparable to that of its principal competitors, and sought to modernize production facilities in France through an investment plan calling for the infusion of FF 17.5 billion over the five-year period, 1982-1986. However, because of unrealistic estimates of demand and production, the 1982 Plan Acier was changed and a revised plan was adopted in March 1984. The revised plan resulted in massive subsidies and a major restructuring of the French steel industry in 1986. Commerce determined “it is clear that each of these steel plans focused on improving the financial structure of the French steel industry and modernizing and expanding its facilities in France,” however, “[tjhere was not the slightest intimation in these plans that the monies given to Usinor Sacilor ... were intended for foreign operations.” Id. at 19. To explain this finding, Commerce first summarizes the arguments put forth by Usinor Sacilor. Usinor Sacilor argues that the French government initiated the debt conversions in 1981, 1986 and 1988 in order to benefit Usinor Sacilor’s world-wide operations. As Usinor Sacilor explains, the French government gave these subsidies to Usinor Sacilor, which is the parent company of numerous domestic and foreign subsidiaries and which, for accounting purposes, keeps consolidated books incorporating its subsidiaries’ financial data. According to Usinor Sacilor, the subsidies had significant effects on the overall capital structure of Usinor Sacilor, as they allowed Usinor Sacilor to cover massive consolidated losses, to provide operating capital for consolidated operations and to finance investment. Usinor Sacilor also points out that, for the years relevant to the 1981, 1986 and 1988 debt conversions, Usinor Sacilor’s consolidated losses totalled FF 72.9 billion. Usinor Sacilor asserts that these losses included losses from not only its domestic subsidiaries, but also its foreign subsidiaries. Id. at 20-21. In Commerce’s view, however, the debt conversion subsidies “provided benefits, in the first instance, directly to Usinor Sacilor, not to any of its subsidiaries---[W]e do not view the accounting transactions undertaken by Usinor Sacilor to eliminate its consolidated losses — as providing the proper focus.” Id. at 21. Instead, Commerce reasons, “we have focused on the massive debt to equity conversion, specifically, what Usinor Sacilor likely would do with this benefit.” Id. When seen in this light, Commerce continues, Usinor Sacilor has not presented evidence tending to show how or why foreign subsidiaries likely would benefit from the debt conversions in 1981, 1986 or 1988. The record evidence suggests that the subsidizing French government’s focus was entirely domestic, and Usinor Sacilor has pointed to no evidence suggesting what Usinor Sacilor likely would do with these subsidies. Id. at 21-22. As to the shareholders’ advances — provided to allow Usinor Sacilor to meet its short-term capital needs during the period 1982-1986 — Commerce found there were no official agreements between the GOF and Usinor Sacilor regarding the advances. Instead, Commerce elaborates, Usinor Sacilor presented the company’s short-term capital needs to the GOF and the GOF gave Usinor Sacilor monies in the form of shareholders’ advances. In light of the characteristics of the shareholders’ advances program and in the absence of any evidence further describing the nature of Usinor Sacilor’s short-term capital needs, Commerce concludes, “Usinor Sacilor has not presented evidence tending to establish how any foreign subsidiary likely would have benefitted from these shareholders’ advances. Consequently, we conclude that Usinor Sacilor has not rebutted the tying presumption here.” Id. at 24. Because Usinor Sacilor did not rebut the tying presumption for any of the subsidies at issue, Commerce determined the ad valorem subsidy rate in the French investigation would remain the same as that calculated in the French Final Determination as amended, and as summarized in the Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand on General Issue of Privatization (dated July 17,1995). b. British Final Determination Commerce states respondent BS pie advanced evidence and argument intended to rebut the tying presumption for subsidies provided by Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) in the form of equity infusions made under section 18(1) of the Iron and Steel Acts of 1975 and 1982 (Acts) in fiscal years 1977/78 through 1985/86. Evidence BS pic presented to Commerce included: (1) relevant excerpts from the Acts; (2) corporate plans and budget forecasts submitted by British Steel Corporation (BSC) to HMG; (3) a 1978/79 annual report showing that a non-United Kingdom (UK) subsidiary suffered losses; and (4) affidavits from a BSC officer and supporting documents regarding the 1984 closure of a Canadian operation (Firelake) in which BSC held a substantial interest. After reviewing the evidence, Commerce found BS pie had rebutted the tying presumption only for section 18(1) equity infusions bestowed during fiscal year 1984/85. Commerce summarized BS pic’s evidence and argument concerning the provisions in the Acts as follows: First, the Acts state “ ‘the Secretary of State may, with approval of the Treasury, pay to the Corporation such sums as he thinks fit.’ ” Id. at 25 (quoting Acts, section 18(1)). Second, the Acts grant BS pic “the authority to operate “within or outside the United Kingdom.’ ” Id. (quoting Acts, section 2). According to BS pic, these provisions establish BS pic faced no restrictions on its use of section 18(1) funds and therefore its ability to use the funds to benefit its foreign operations. Thus, BS pic reasoned, “the lack of restrictions on its use of the funds at issue implies that the government had knowledge that, and acquiesced in the fact that, these funds may benefit foreign operations.” Id. Commerce was not persuaded by this argument, however, and declares “this evidence, without more, is insufficient to rebut the typing presumption.” Id. at 26. Essentially, this evidence establishes little more than the two facts which originally had to be established for the presumption to be applied, ie., (1) that the government provided a subsidy to a firm, and (2) that the firm at that time was engaged in multinational production.... [T]he other fact arguably established by BS pic, ie., that HMG placed no express restrictions on the firm’s use of the subsidy funds, adds little. Here, BS pic has not even established, for example, that HMG affirmatively communicated to BSC that it could use the subsidy funds for whatever purpose it desired, without limit, or, as in [Certain Steel Products from Austria, 58 Fed.Reg. 37,217 (Dep’t Comm.1993) (final determ.) (Austrian Final Determination) ], that BSC could use the subsidy funds “at home or abroad.” Instead, BS pic essentially points to the absence of express restrictions on the firm’s use of the subsidy funds in its attempt to rebut the tying presumption____ Indeed, the presumption would be of little utility if the mere absence of express evidence of the government’s desires was sufficient to rebut it. Id. Commerce then examines the budget forecasts for the years 1982/83 and 1983/84, which BS pic submitted on the record to show its capital requirements included “fixed assets abroad.” Id. at 28. Commerce observes, however, the budget forecasts did not list a separate amount for fixed assets abroad, only an amount for the general category of “other” capital requirements, which included not only fixed assets abroad but also items apparently involving domestic matters. For this reason, “it is impossible to determine whether BSC ... had capital requirements for fixed assets abroad, or whether the ‘other’ capital requirements included only one or more of the other listed items.” Id. Accordingly, Commerce concludes “this evidence is not sufficient to rebut the tying presumption. It provides no specific information regarding the existence of BSC capital requirements associated with fixed assets abroad.” Id. Commerce next discusses the 1978/79 British Steel Corporation (International) Ltd. annual report that BS pic provided to show that one of its German subsidiaries suffered losses. Commerce found such evidence wanting: “Beyond showing the existence of these losses, however, BS pic’s evidence does not contain anything which would lead us to believe that any subsidy funds received by BSC in fiscal year 1978/79 were likely to be used to offset losses of the German subsidiary.” Id. at 29. Accordingly, Commerce determined this evidence did not rebut the tying presumption. Finally, Commerce considers two affidavits from a BSC official addressing the circumstances surrounding the 1984 closure of Fire-lake, a Canadian iron ore mining operation in which BSC held a 41.7% interest. In 1984, BSC and other shareholders decided to close Firelake for economic reasons. The BSC official present at meetings with HMG recounted discussions of BSC’s substantial financial obligations in connection with the Firelake closure, including projected costs of £135 million: [Government representatives advised BSC that HMG would approve the provision of £135 million to BSC for the specific purpose of effecting the expenditures in Canada to terminate Firelake’s operations. However, government representatives further advised that, as a legal matter, HMG could not authorize the funding of the £135 million pursuant to a funding program separate and apart from that established pursuant to section 18(1). Instead, HMG representatives proposed that the funds so advanced would be made pursuant to section 18(1). Id. (citation omitted). Commerce also notes there is additional record evidence corroborating the BSC official’s affidavit testimony regarding the HMG’s approval of funding for the Firelake closure, and concludes, we find that BS pic has rebutted the presumption that subsidies provided under section 18(1) for fiscal year 1984/85 were tied to domestic production, given that the evidence would tend to show that the funding benefitted BSC’s foreign operations, i.e., Firelake. Absent any contradictory evidence, other than the 1973 and 1978 White Papers,[] which are relatively more general in nature and removed in time, we also find this evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 1984/85 subsidy funds were untied. Id. at 31. Accordingly, Commerce declares the ad valorem, subsidy rate in the British Final Determination would be recalculated in the final remand determination on the general issue of privatization. In the Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand on General Issue of Privatization (dated July 17, 1995), Commerce calculated a final subsidy rate of 21.30% ad valorem (carbon steel plate) for BS pic. Contentions of the Parties A. Foreign Producers 1. The Tying Presumption Plaintiffs contend Commerce’s presumption-based tying methodology is inherently flawed and contrary to law for several reasons. (Pis.’ Resp. to the Redetermination Pursuant to Ct. Remand on the General Issue of Denominator (Usinor Sacilor’s Comments) at 3.) First, Usinor Sacilor argues the presumption-based methodology ignores the established principle that equity infusions are incapable of being tied because they have an in