Full opinion text
OPINION LONGOBARDI, Chief Judge. I. NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS InterDigital Technology Corporation («ITC”) is the owner of a group of patents which relate to the field of digital wireless telephony. This, group of patents includes the six patents-in-suit, all of which originate from one initial patent application filed on March 20,1985. ITC alleges that Motorola directly infringes, contributes to the infringement of, and/or induces the infringement of the patents-in-suit, both literally and/or under the doctrine of equivalents through its manufacture, sale, or use of its digital cellular telephone products. ITC further alleges that such infringement was and is willful. Through its declaratory judgment action Motorola denies ITC’s infringement allegations and further alleges that the patents-in suit are invalid. ITC seeks monetary and injunc-tive relief and both sides seek attorneys’ fees. The patents-in-suit contain more than 250 claims. After numerous hearings, the number of claims to be tried was reduced to 24. In addition, ITC abandoned any claim that Motorola infringed the ’024 or ’391 patents, and the Court entered a judgment of nonin-fringement in favor of Motorola with respect to these two patents. [Docket Item (“D.I.”) 318]. This case was originally scheduled to be tried to a jury for fourteen days beginning February 6, 1995. At the initial pretrial conference on January 26,1995, however, the Court determined that the parties were not prepared to go to trial. As has been amply documented, this lack of preparedness was caused in principal part by the inability of counsel to communicate with each other with even a semblance of the professionalism expected of members of the bar. The Court held two more pre-trial hearings in an attempt to keep the trial date, but when insufficient progress was made the trial was rescheduled for fourteen days beginning March 2, 1995. The Court and counsel then embarked upon a month long pretrial process punctuated by nine additional pretrial hearings. The Court took these unprecedented steps to bring this matter to trial because of representations by counsel regarding the importance of the case and their ability to try the case in the allotted time if only the Court could reschedule the trial with minimal delay. Trial finally began on March 2,1995. Due to ITC’s unwillingness or inability to try their ease within the time originally agreed upon, the Court extended the trial from fourteen days to seventeen days. As an additional accommodation to ITC, the Court relaxed its original ruling that the trial time would be split evenly between the parties. On the eighteenth day, the Court gave its charge and the jury began its deliberations. After four days of deliberations the jury rendered its unanimous verdict that ITC had not proven that Motorola had infringed any of the 24 claims and that each of those claims was invalid. ITC subsequently filed its motion to alter or amend the judgment, for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”), or, in the alternative, for a new trial. [D.I. 303]. Motorola subsequently filed a motion for an award of attorneys’ fees. [D.I. 302]. This is the Court’s decision on those motions. II. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND The digital wireless telephony system claimed in the patents-in-suit is comprised of two components, a base station and a subscriber unit. The representative claims fall into three categories: base station claims, subscriber unit claims, and system claims. The Court will describe the operation of this system in very general terms only, because any level of specificity leads straight into disputed issues. The base station is connected to a public telephone system, which the parties refer to as the “Public Switch Telephone Network” (“PSTN”). The base station receives an. information signal (i.e., a telephone call) from the PSTN and performs a number of functions on the signal (conversions, compression, etc.) which are required by the patent. The signal is then transmitted to the subscriber units. ■ One problem encountered by wireless telephony systems is that the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has allocated a limited number of radio frequencies for telephone transmission use. As wireless telephones become more popular, this “frequency spectrum” becomes more fully utilized and limits the further growth of the industry. Because it is unlikely that the FCC can or will substantially expand the frequencies available to wireless telephone systems, the industry has sought to develop a number of techniques for making more efficient use of the available frequency spectrum. One such technique which is utilized in the patented system and the accused products is Time Division Multiple Access (“TDMA”). TDMA makes more efficient use of the frequency spectrum by time-slotting multiple signals on each frequency channel. The patents describe a number of functions which are necessary to allow the subscriber units and the base station to communicate with each other in this time-slotted manner. For example, the base station must be able to combine multiple information signals into a single signal to be transmitted, and a given subscriber unit must be able to pick out which portion of the incoming signal is intended for it and which portion is intended for another subscriber unit. Finally, the patent claims describe subscriber units which receive the information signal from the base station, and perform several functions so that the signal may be delivered to the human ear. The subscriber unit also must take an analog voice signal and process it and transmit it back to the base station utilizing the TDMA technique. To a large extent the functions performed by the subscriber units, and the disputes revolving around them, mirror the functions performed by the base station. Some aspects of the subscriber stations, however, are unique to the subscriber station. One such example is that the subscriber stations receive and transmit at different times, which the parties refer to as “half-duplex” operation. The parties dispute exactly what is required in many of these steps as they are described in the patent claims and further dispute whether or not these functions are performed by Motorola’s accused products. Four groups of Motorola products are at issue in this suit. United States Digital Cellular (“USDC”) products are perhaps the most familiar to the average consumer, because they are the cellular telephones which are so common in America today. ITC’s infringement ease with respect to USDC products involved presentation of evidence relating to their use in cellular systems with base stations manufactured by Ericsson, a third party. Motorola’s Personal Digital Cellular products (“PDC”), which consist of both subscriber units and base stations, are made for use in Japan. Motorola’s Groupe Speciale Mobile products (“GSM”), which consists of both subscriber units and base stations, are made for use in Europe. Finally, Motorola’s Mobile Integrated Radio System (“MIRS”) products, which consist of both subscriber units and base stations, is essentially a radio dispatch system with telephone system interface capability, and is used in fleet operations such as ambulance or taxi companies. III. ITC’S RULE 59(e) MOTION TO AMEND THE VERDICT Rule 59(e) allows parties to file a motion “that questions the correctness of the judgment,” New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indent. Co., 938 F.2d 1162, 1176 (3d Cir.1991). ITC contends that Motorola presented two alternative theories at trial: (1) ITC’s patents were not infringed and valid, or (2) ITC’s patents were infringed but invalid. ITC further contends that Motorola presented two distinct alternative claim interpretations in support of these two theories: a “narrow” interpretation which supported Motorola’s noninfringed/valid theory, and a “broad” interpretation which' supported Motorola’s infringed/invalid theory. ITC now contends that the jury’s verdict of non-infringement and invalidity could only have been reached by the jury if they impermissi-bly used Motorola’s “narrow” interpretation in considering infringement and used Motorola^ “broad” interpretation in considering validity. ITC requests that the Court overturn the jury’s invalidity verdict. Motorola denies that it pursued two alternative theories at trial, and contends that the record supports a finding that the jury used a single claim .interpretation for both noninfringement and invalidity. There can be no doubt that a jury must use the same claim interpretation for determining issues of noninfringement and invalidity. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed.Cir.1988). The Court specifically instructed the jury regarding this requirement: 4.2 Claims Construed the Same way for Validity as for Infringement: The first step in determining if Motorola has proved any of the asserted claims of ITC’s patents are invalid is to interpret each claim of each patent. You must interpret the claims the same for determining validity as you did for infringement. That is, if you interpreted a claim broadly or narrowly in making your decision as to whether Motorola infringed, then you must interpret that claim equally broadly or narrowly for the purpose of deciding whether the claim is valid; that is, whether the prior art shows that the claim is not new or would have been obvi- . ous. I have previously instructed you on how to interpret claims. Those instructions apply here as well. ITC provides ample citation to portions of the trial transcript which demonstrate that an important theme in Motorola’s case was that ITC’s patents were invalid if they were read as broadly as would be necessary for them to cover Motorola’s products. The Court finds no support in the record, however, to overturn the entire jury verdict on the grounds that this was Motorola’s only contention. By emphasizing one position Motorola did not waive its right to obtain a verdict of noninfringement and invalidity so long as that allegedly inconsistent verdict may be fairly reconciled with the evidence in the record. Indeed, ITC raised the spectre of a “double-standard” in their cross-examination, and Motorola’s experts made clear in their testimony that they were aware of this danger. [See discussion of Dr. Goodman’s testimony regarding compression means infra]. The Court’s instructions to the jury made them aware of this danger as well, and the verdict does not mandate a finding that the jury ignored their duty to follow the law. The Court rejects ITC’s argument paraphrasing or characterizing Motorola’s argument to the jury. The Federal Circuit looks to the law of the forum, in this case the Third Circuit, in analyzing the issue of inconsistent jury findings. Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Marketing Corp., 972 F.2d 1300 (Fed.Cir.1992). This Court has “very limited discretion” in determining whether or not a jury’s verdict is inconsistent. Loughman v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 105 (3d Cir.1993). “In reviewing the propriety of a jury verdict, [the Court’s] obligation is to uphold the jury’s award if there exists a reasonable basis to do so.” Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1230 (3d Cir.1989). “A verdict must be molded consistently with the jury’s answers to special interrogatories when there is any view of the ease which reconciles the various answers.” Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153, 1159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 542, 107 L.Ed.2d 539 (1989). While the Court’s mandate to search the record for any evidence which the jury “could have” believed in reaching its verdict may seem to weigh unfairly in favor of the verdict-winner, it is a crucial aspect of the constitutional right to a trial by jury which was demanded by ITC in this litigation. The Court has reviewed the nature and sufficiency of the evidence infra in evaluating ITC’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and while the Court’s analysis is presented in more detail in that portion of the opinion, the Court finds that the jury’s noninfringement and invalidity verdicts are not necessarily inconsistent and therefore may not be overturned by the Court on that ground. ITC’s motion to alter or amend the judgment is denied. . IV. RULE 50(b) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW A. Legal Standard In resolving a motion for a JMOL in a case that has been tried to a jury, the Court: must determine whether there exists evidence of record upon which a jury might properly have returned a verdict in [the non-movant’s] favor when the correct legal standard is applied. If there is not, [the movant] was entitled to have the question removed from the jury and decided as a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996) (emphasis in original) (quoting Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 1560 (Fed.Cir.1985)). “Notwithstanding the jury’s verdict, on review of a motion for JMOL the court retains the power and duty to say what the correct law is, and then to examine the factual issues submitted to the jury and determine whether findings thereon are supported by substantial evidence and support the verdict under the law.” Id. (citations omitted). The Federal Circuit has defined “substantial” evidence: “Substantial” evidence ... is such relevant evidence, taken from the record as a whole, “as might be accepted by a reasonable mind as adequate to support the finding under review.” In reviewing the evidence “a court must (1) consider all the evidence, (2) in a light most favorable to the non-mover; (3) drawing reasonable inferences favorable to the non-mover; (4) without determining credibility of witnesses, and (5) without substituting its choice for that of the jury between conflicting elements in the evidence.” Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. Partnership, 860 F.2d 415, 417 (Fed.Cir.1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1067, 109 S.Ct. 2068, 104 L.Ed.2d 633 (1989) (citations omitted). ITC contends that the Federal Circuit’s Markman decision, which issued only days after the jury returned its verdict, requires the Court to construe all claims as a matter of law. ITC further contends that once this is done, the record supports granting ITC’s motion for JMOL of infringement and validity on all claims. In response, Motorola contends that the claims in dispute in this case utilize section 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, means or step plus function language, and that Mark-man does not require that construction of such claims is a matter of law. Motorola also contends as a threshold matter that ITC is barred from bringing a motion for a JMOL because ITC failed to raise any specific grounds in support of its JMOL during trial. See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1173 (3d Cir.1993) (a Rule 50(b) motion must be preceded by a Rule 50(a) motion that is “sufficiently specific to afford the party against whom the motion is directed with an opportunity to cure possible defects in proof which otherwise might make its case legally insufficient.”) (emphasis in original); Bonjomo v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 814 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908, 106 S.Ct. 3284, 91 L.Ed.2d 572 (1986) (the requirement that the specific grounds for a JNOV must be asserted in the motion for a directed verdict, before the issue is submitted to the jury, “affords the non-moving party an opportunity to reopen its case and present additional evidence.”). ITC’s motion for JMOL consisted of the following: Mr. Hoffman: Your Honor, for the record, we do move for judgment as a matter of law in connection with the declaratory judgment claims filed by Motorola. The Court: I’ll take it under advisement. [Tr. 4214, see also 4442], In response, ITC contends that Rule 50 is essentially a notice provision, and that the sufficiency of a motion for a JMOL must be judged within the context of a given trial. The Court is unpersuaded by ITC’s attempt to shift its responsibility to the Court and the opposing party. [D.I. 331 at 11]. Responsibility for making a sufficiently specific JMOL motion remains with the movant at all times. Nevertheless, counsel also has a responsibility to follow the orders and rulings of the Court. The Court made clear that it did not require or desire additional argument at the time the motion was made, and it would be unfair to penalize ITC for acceding to the Court’s wishes. The Court -will rule on ITC’s JMOL motion. B. Discussion — Infringement Title 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) provides in part: [WJhoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1984 & Supp.1995). According to the Federal Circuit, the “issue of infringement raises at least two questions: (1) what is patented, and (2) has what is patented been made, used or sold by another.” Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed.Cir.1983); see also Rawlplug Co. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 11 F.3d 1036, 1041 (Fed.Cir.1993); ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1988); American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 722 F.Supp. 86, 92 (D.Del.1989). Thus, the resolution of the issue of infringement is a two-step process. First, a court must determine the scope of the claims of the patent. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 779 F.Supp. 1429, 1442 (D.Del.1991), aff'd, 980 F.2d 742 (Fed.Cir.1992). Then, once the scope of the claims is ascertained, the court must determine whether the defendant’s allegedly infringing activity falls within the scope of the claims. Id. At trial, the Court followed its customary practice of allowing claim construction issues to be resolved by the jury on the grounds that claim construction often involves underlying factual disputes which are the province of the jury. This practice was agreed to by both parties, who informed the Court early on in this litigation that they did not wish to file summary judgment motions prior to trial. Accordingly, the Court did not construe the claims for the jury and the jury was instructed on claim construction issues. The parties did not object to this procedure and at no time requested that the Court construe the claims as a matter of law. Six days after the jury rendered its verdict, the Federal Circuit sitting en bane issued its landmark decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). The Federal Circuit held that “interpretation and construction of patent claims, which define the scope of the patentee’s rights under the patent, is a matter of law exclusively for the court,” Id. at 970-71, and further held that “in a case tried to a jury, the court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of language used in the patent claim.” Id. at 979. ITC contends that if the Markman decision had issued before this case went to trial, the Court “would have had to instruct the jury as to the meaning of the claims, including all disputed terms.” [D.I. 310 at 11]. The Court disagrees. While the preferable and more efficient course following Markman may be to construe the claims for the jury, “it is permissible under Markman to construe the claims [for the first time] on a post-verdict motion for JMOL.” Fonar Corp. v. General Elec. Corp., 902 F.Supp. 330, 337 n. 3 (E.D.N.Y.1995). Moreover, by invoking its right to a jury trial while simultaneously failing to request that the Court construe the claims for the jury, [1/26/95 Conference, Transcript (“Tr.”) 205-66], ITC waived its right to have the claims construed by the Court. Regardless of the landmark status of the Markman decision, however, the Court must first determine whether the Markman decision is even applicable to the claims at issue in the case sub judice. The limitations of the 24 claims tried to the jury in this case are stated as a “means” or “steps” for performing a specified “function” but the claims language does not delineate the type of means which actually performs that function. This type of limitation is commonly known as a means (or step)-plus-function limitation, and its use is specifically authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. The Federal Circuit has provided the following explanation of means-plus function elements: By its express terms, § 112 ¶ 6 permits an element in a claim to be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function. However, the scope of such a claim is not limitless, but is confined to ' structures expressly disclosed in the specification and corresponding equivalents. Thus, the statutory provision prevents an overly broad claim construction by requiring reference to the specification, and at the same time precludes an overly narrow construction that would restrict coverage solely to those means expressly disclosed in the specification. Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569 (Fed.Cir.1991) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In Markman, the Federal Circuit left for another day the “issue of whether a determination of equivalents under § 112, para. 6 is a question of law or fact.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 977. ITC makes two pro-posáis in addressing how this Court should resolve this open issue in the case sub judice. First, ITC contends that construction of means-plus-funetion language, like any claim language, is a question of law for the Court. The Court believes this is an accurate statement of law, especially given the Federal Circuit’s emphasis in Markman upon the role of the Patent and Trademark Office in removing ambiguity from patent claims. Id. At 986 (“If the patent’s claims are sufficiently unambiguous for the PTO, there should exist no factual ambiguity when those same claims are later construed by a court of law in an infringement action.”) The Court’s conclusion is only strengthened by the Supreme Court’s recent unanimous affirmance of the Markman decision. — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 1384. Thus, the function performed by the means-plus-funetion element is a claim construction issue which should be resolved as matter of law, because it requires the Court to look only at the patent itself, which has been cleansed of ambiguity by the PTO. Likewise to the extent a dispute exists regarding the meaning of one of the specific means disclosed in the specification, that too is a matter of law which should be resolved by the Court. For instance, if a patent contains a means-plus-function limitation claiming a “means for fastening” and the specification discloses a “button” as a possible fastening means, under Markman a court must resolve any disputes regarding both the 1) function of the fastening means, and 2) the meaning of the word “button,” as a matter of law. Determination of function and understanding the nature of the specific means disclosed is only the first part of a means plus function analysis. The second step, as ITC recognizes, involves a determination of whether the accused device “(1) perform[s] the identical function recited in the means limitation and (2) perform[s] that function using the structure disclosed in the specification or an equivalent structure.” Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1993). ITC contends that the “sweep” of the Markman decision warrants viewing these questions as also involving questions of law. [D.I. 332 at 1 n. 2]. The Court finds these questions were for the jury to decide. This conclusion is supported by prior Federal Circuit ease law which is not inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s Markman decision and thus survives Markman, and by the reasoning underpinning the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court Markman decisions. Federal Circuit case law prior to Mark-man clearly indicates that a determination of structural equivalence under § 112 ¶ 6 involves questions of fact. Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1991) (“the scope of literally infringing ‘equivalents’ under § 112 ¶ 6 is a factual determination.”); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed.Cir.1990) (per curiam) (“structural equivalency under section 112 ¶ 6 is a question of fact”). Because the Federal Circuit did not rule on the factual or legal nature of a § 112 ¶ 6 equivalents determination, the Opticon and Bond decisions are not inconsistent with Markman and remain good law which this Court is bound to follow. Moreover, the Court’s conclusion that any potential conflict between thése decisions and Markman is illusory is bolstered by the fact that three of the members of the Federal Circuit Markman majority were also members of unanimous panels in either Opticon or Bond. In addition, the proficiency of patent examiners in eliminating ambiguity is simply inapplicable to the question of whether an accused product which was probably never even seen by the PTO performs the identical function as the means element through use of substantially equivalent means. For example, a hypothetical patent may clearly and unambiguously describe the function of a “means for fastening” and clearly define what a “button” is, but this does not eliminate the factual nature of subsequent inquiries regarding whether a “zipper” in an accused device performs an identical function and whether this “zipper” is structurally equivalent to a “button.” Moreover, understanding means-plus-function analysis to contain factual inquiries is not inconsistent with the Markman conception of patent claim construction as analogous to statutory interpretation: Statutory interpretation is a matter of law strictly for the court. There can be only one correct interpretation of a statute that applies to all persons. Statutes are written instruments that all persons are presumed to be aware of and are bound to follow. Statutes, like patents, are enforceable against the public, unlike private agreements between contracting parties. When interpreting statutes, a court looks to the language of the statute and construes it according to the traditional tools of statutory construction, including certain well known canons of construction. A court may also find it necessary to review the legislative history of the statute, which is itself a matter of public record, just as the specification and prosecution history of a patent are public records. While a court may seek from the public record to ascertain the collective intent of Congress when it interprets a statute, the subjective intent of any particular person involved in the legislative process is not determinative. Thus the members of Congress, or staff persons who draft legislation, are not deposed or called on to testify in actions involving statutory interpretation. Similarly, the subjective meaning that a paten-tee may ascribe to claim language is also not determinative. Thus, it is from the public record that a court should seek in a patent infringement case to find the meaning of claim language. Markman 52 F.3d at 987. The statutory construction analogy, like the PTO proficiency argument, focuses on the Court’s duty to resolve disputes regarding terms used in the patent as a matter of law. This analogy should not extend, however, to inquiries regarding issues that are not part of the four corners of the patent, specification, or prosecution history, such as a § 112 ¶ 6 structural equivalents determination. This distinction in essence draws “a line between issues of document interpretation and product identification”, a line which “the Court has drawn repeatedly in explaining the respective roles of the jury and judge in patent cases.” Markman, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1394. Finally, common sense dictates that a determination of structural equivalents must be left to the jury, because if it were not, there would be nothing left for the jury to decide. Claim 1 of the ’705 patent, for example, is expressed entirely in means-plus-function elements. If the Court were to decide the function performed by each of the means-plus-function elements, define the specific means found in the specification, and determine whether the accused products contained features which were structurally equivalent to each of the means-plus-function elements, the jury would be reduced to no more than a rubber stamp. Indeed, the jury’s role, or lack of role, with respect to means-plus-funotion claims would differ from its role with respect to all other claims, where they would still decide the question of whether the accused products contain the properly construed limitations of a non-means-plus-function claim. The Court is aware of nothing in § 112 ¶ 6 which would support creating such a dichotomy. The Court concludes, therefore, that analysis of a means-plus-funetion limitation is not entirely a legal inquiry, as ITC contends, nor is it entirely a factual inquiry, as Motorola contends. Construction of terms found in the claims or the specification is a legal inquiry, but evaluation of the function and structural equivalence of an allegedly infringing product is a factual inquiry. With this understanding of § 112 ¶ 6 analysis in mind, the Court turns to its review of the jury’s non-infringement verdict. All nine of the independent claims in this case contain a “compression means” or “compressing” step limitation. The compression limitation involves two issues of claim construction. First, the Court must determine, as a matter of law, the function of the compression means. To determine the “true meaning” of a disputed claim, a Court must examine: 1) the claim at issue; 2) the specification, and 3) the prosecution history. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979; ZMI Corp., 844 F.2d at 1579; Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867 (Fed.Cir.1985); American Standard, 722 F.Supp. at 92. Neither ITC nor Motorola makes any citation to the prosecution history in their post-trial briefing and for this reason the Court presumes that the relevant sources for claim construction in the case sub judice are the claims and the specification. The Court finds that the function of the compression means is to reduce the voice information rate in order to reduce the amount of information transmitted over the airwaves. [’863 patent specification, Col 8:8-11; Col 3:34-36]. The Court does not accept ITC’s contention that the function should be expanded to include “compression to less than 16 Kbps.” The specific number is the result reached by the disclosed means and not the function. While the number may play a role in an evaluation of the structural equivalence of various compression means, the weight attributed to this factor is for the jury to decide. This function of the compression means, however, was not a matter in dispute at trial. Motorola did not dispute this definition of compression means, [see, e.g., Tr. 1992, 3723], but rather, disputed whether the compression means utilized in the accused products were structurally equivalent to the specific compression means disclosed in the specification. Before turning to the factual question of structural equivalents, however, the Court must first address a second issue of claim construction raised by ITC. ITC contends that Motorola’s expert testimony at trial was predicated on an opinion that the claims contained a limitation requiring that compression means result in the selective deletion of certain information from the digital information signal. The selective deletion limitation is only specifically set forth in claims 162 and 213 of the ’375 patent (and their dependent claims). ITC contends that under the doctrine of claim differentiation it is improper to read this limitation into claims 1 and 10 of the ’863 patent, cláim 1 of the ’089 patent, claim 1 of the ’705 patent, and claims 91,133, 219 of the ’375 patent (and their dependent claims), which do not specifically contain this selective deletion language. The doctrine of claim differentiation is a canon of claim construction which holds that when a patent contains both broad and narrow claims, the additional limitation of the narrow claim should not be read into the broad claim. Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987 (Fed.Cir.1988); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed.Cir.1983). “The doctrine embodies the common sense notion that ordinarily language of one claim should not be so interpreted as to make another claim, such as a claim dependent on the first claim, identical in scope.” 4 Donald S. Chisum, Patents § 18.03[6] at 18-70 (1994). The specification discloses two specific compression means, Residual Excited Linear Prediction (“RELP”) and Subband Coding (“SBC”). [’863 patent specification at 8:11-14]. ITC does not dispute that these disclosed compression means employ selective deletion techniques. [Tr. 2043]. ITC also does not dispute that RELP and SBC are the only compression means disclosed in the specification. The scope of a § 112 ¶ 6 element must be determined by reference to the specific disclosures made in the specifications. The interpretation of the claimed compression structure as including selective deletion of voice information comes to the claims via § 112 ¶ 6, not from other claims, and thus the prohibition against reading limitations from one claim into another is not violated. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1538 (Fed.Cir.1991). For this reason, assuming arguendo that Motorola’s expert testimony was predicated on the existence of the selective deletion limitation in all claims, the Court concludes that this predicate was correct as a matter of law. By so holding, the Court is not holding that the claimed compression means do not, as a matter of law, cover products containing compression means that do not employ selective deletion. The selective deletion issue is one factor to be considered and weighed by the jury in evaluating structural equivalence under § 112 ¶ 6. Motorola’s USDC, MIRS, and JDC products utilize a Vector Sum Excited Linear Predictive coder (“VSELP”), and Motorola’s GSM products utilize a Residual Post Excited Linear Protective coder (“RPE/LTP”), to perform the compression function. Goodman and Cox, Motorola’s experts, testified that VSELP and RPE/LTP were not equivalent to RELP or SBC. [Tr. 3723-3737; 2921-24], This testimony constitutes substantial evidence upon which the jury was entitled to rely in finding that there was no structural equivalence between the compression means in the patents-in-suit and the compression means in the accused products. Substantial evidence exists to support a finding that neither the claimed compression means nor a structural equivalent is found in the accused products. Each of the 24 claims in suit contains a compression means limitation or depends from a claim with such a limitation. Therefore, on this ground alone, the Court finds that substantial evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict of nonin-fringement on each and every of the 24 claims in suit. The Court thus finds it unnecessary to reach Motorola’s additional arguments in support of the noninfringement verdict. Even if the Court had been required to construe the claims under § 112 ¶ 6 and determine structural equivalence as a matter of law the Court’s decision would have mirrored the verdict of the jury. C. Invalidity A patent is presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282. The party asserting invalidity has the burden of proof. Id. This burden is satisfied only by proving facts establishing invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 872 (Fed.Cir.1985); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 779 F.Supp. 1429, 1488 (D.Del.1991), aff'd 980 F.2d 742 (Fed.Cir.1992). The “ ‘clear and convincing’ standard of proof of facts is an intermediate standard which lies somewhere between ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’” Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed.Cir.1988). 1. Anticipation Title 35 U.S.C. § 102 provides in relevant part: a person shall be entitled to a patent unless— (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, ... Invalidity by reason of anticipation “requires that all of the elements and limitations of the claim are found within a single prior art reference.” Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1991); see Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827, 108 S.Ct. 95, 98 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 673 F.Supp. 1278, 1287 (D.Del.1987), aff'd 865 F.2d 1247 (Fed.Cir.1989). “That which would literally infringe if later in time anticipates if earlier than the date of the invention.” Lewmar Marine Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744 (Fed.Cir.1987) (emphasis omitted), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1007, 108 S.Ct. 702, 98 L.Ed.2d 653 (1988). For an invention to be anticipated, there must not be any differences “between the claimed invention and the reference disclosure, as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention.” Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1576. If more than one reference is needed to establish invalidity, then anticipation under § 102 cannot be found. Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1267 (Fed.Cir.1991). “Furthermore, with an element expressed in terms of a means plus function, ‘absent structure [in a prior art reference] which is capable of performing the functional limitation of the ‘means,’ [the prior art reference] does not meet the claim.’ ” RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc., 730 F.2d 1440, 1444 (Fed.Cir.1984) (quoting In re Mott, 557 F.2d 266, 269 (CCPA 1977)). The element disclosed in the prior art must be identical to or the structural equivalent of the element disclosed in the patent. Stoller v. Ford Motor Co., 711 F.Supp. 1451, 1456 (N.D.Ill.1989), rev’d on other grounds 925 F.2d 1480 (Fed.Cir.1991). “The disclosure need not be express, but may anticipate by inherency where it would be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art.” Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 516, 133 L.Ed.2d 424 (1995) (quoting Continental Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed.Cir.1991)). Anticipation is a question of fact. Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1576. Claims cannot be construed differently for invalidity issues than they were for infringement issues. Beachcombers v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc. 31 F.3d 1154, 1163 (Fed.Cir.1994). a. 1981 Kinoshita Japanese Reference and 1983 NEC RSS Reference The jury found that both the 1981 Kinoshi-ta Japanese reference and the 1983 NEC RSS reference anticipated claims 1 through 6 and 10 of the ’863 patent, claim 1 of the ’705 patent and claims 91, 133, 162 and 178 of the ’375 patent. Because ITC’s challenges to these two references are virtually identical, the Court will address them together. The Court is mindful, however, that each reference must stand alone in order to support a finding of anticipation and discusses them together only for ease of presentation. Before reaching the issues common to these two references, however, the Court must first address ITC’s contention that Motorola’s expert, Dr. Goodman, did not actually rely upon the 1983 NEC RSS publication, but relied instead on a later 1985 NEC publication. This dispute is material because the jury listed the 1983 NEC RSS publication as anticipating certain claims, but because Motorola did not list the 1985 article on the verdict form the jury made no findings with respect to the 1985 NEC article. In support of its contention ITC relies upon Dr. Goodman’s testimony that the 1985 NEC RSS document “talked to me a little more as a technical person.” [Tr. 3711-12]. Dr. Goodman also testified, however, that he could reach the same conclusions from both the 1983 and 1985 articles, [Tr. 3712], and specifically testified on cross examination that his testimony was based upon the 1983 article. [Tr. 3752, 3840]. The Court rejects ITC’s characterization of his testimony. ITC contends that Motorola did not present sufficient evidence to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the following claimed elements are disclosed in either of these two references: (1) the compression means claimed in each of these claims; (2) the subscriber unit claimed in claims 3-6 of the ’863 patent, claim 1 of the ’705 patent, and claims 162 and 178 of the ’375 patent; (3) the synchronization means claimed in claim 1 of the ’705 patent; and, (4) the half-duplex limitation present in claim 178 of the ’375 patent. (i) Compression Means The patents-in-suit disclose two types of compression means, RELP and SubBand Coding. [Tr. 2921], The Kinoshita Japanese article discloses two different speech compression means, Adaptive Predictive Coding (“APC”) and Adaptive Differential Modulation (“ADM”). [Tr. 3105; MTX 52A]. The 1983 NEC RSS publication discloses Adaptive Differential Pulse Code Modulation (“ADPCM”) as a means for accomplishing speech compression. [Tr. 3759]. 1981 Kinoshita Japanese Reference On cross examination, Dr. Goodman testified that the APC compression means disclosed by the Kinoshita Japanese article was equivalent to the compression means disclosed in the patents-in-suit, [Tr. 3870-72], and the jury was entitled to credit this expert testimony. ITC contends that Dr. Goodman’s testimony regarding the structural equivalence of the Kinoshita compression means and the claimed compression means is inconsistent with his testimony that the VSELP compression means used in the accused products is not structurally equivalent to the claimed compression means. Dr. Goodman provided the following testimony in response to cross-examination on this alleged “double standard”: Q. On the invalidity side, you said Kino-shita disclosed APC vocoding, and that is the equivalent of the RELP. But then, when we got to the infringement side, you said, Oh no. But we can’t say that VSELP and RELP are equivalent. Isn’t that correct sir? [objection by counsel omitted]. Do you disagree with that, sir? That is what you told this jury? A. It’s my opinion that Kinoshita — yes. I don’t disagree. It’s my opinion that Kino-shita’s teaching is sufficient to cover RELP, and that RELP doesn’t cover VSELP. Q. It’s kind of a double standard at work here, isn’t it? A. This is — this is my opinion about what is similar and what is quite different. The — in fact, I’m sorry to be a professor again, but adaptive predictive coding is itself a broad term and no less an authority than Dr. Atal, who has all these patents, uses the term adaptive predictive coding in a very well known paper. And I was astonished myself, but he actually used it. When he described what he meant by it, it turns out to be the same as RELP. It’s in one of the trial documents. So perhaps Kinoshita was referring to adaptive predictive coding in the same way that Atal was. But certainly he said that there are elements of linear predictive, adaptive prediction. In any definition of adaptive predictive coding, there is — there is some sort of linear prediction taking place. Q. And— A. And it’s not a big step to go to RELP from there. [Tr. 3871-73 (emphasis added) ]. The jury was faced with a choice between the testimony of Motorola’s experts and ITC’s position. On the factual issue of structural equivalency of the claimed compression means, both for validity and infringement, the jury was entitled to credit the above testimony. 1983 NEC RSS Reference Dr. Goodman testified: the type of compression that’s done in [the 1983 NEC RSS article] is 32 kilobits ADPCM. It’s not identical to the RELP compression. [Tr. 3759]. Because Dr. Goodman testified that ADPCM was not identical to RELP, the 1983 NEC RSS article may only anticipate if ADPCM is structurally equivalent to RELP. Much of the remainder of Dr. Goodman’s direct examination testimony on compression means dealt with an obviousness analysis involving other prior art, the Atal and Un references. [Tr. 3759-61, 3784, 3798, 3811]. The sum of Dr. Goodman’s direct testimony, therefore, is not sufficient to establish structural equivalency of APDCM to RELP because the subject was simply never broached. Motorola contends that testimony regarding structural equivalency was elicited, however, by ITC during its cross examination of Dr. Goodman: Q. This Australian system[’s compression means] was at 32 kilobits, wasn’t it, sir? A. Yes. Q. In fact, it was a wave form coder. It wasn’t a RELP, a VSELP, or any other kind of ELP, was it? A. It was a wave form coder. It wasn’t an ELP. Q. Which is a completely different type of voice encoding, is it not, sir? It’s not even a distant cousin to express your terms? A. I’m going to have to be a professor again and say that this RELP is regarded as a hybrid coder. My colleagues told me don’t dump this on the jury. If you’re asking about it, it really includes wave form coding techniques, so the residual is, in fact, coded with a wave form coding technique that’s very similar, if not identical — it’s similar to the ADPCM. So there is a piece of a wave form coder there. And that’s why I was giving it the name hybrid, because people couldn’t figure out what it was. If you want to make these categories, I’ll have to be a professor about it and tell you what I would tell my students. [Tr. 3830-31 (cross-examination) ]. Motorola contends that this testimony establishes that RELP is “very similar if not identical” to ADPCM and thus supports the finding of structural equivalency necessary for an overall finding of anticipation. [D.T. 324 at 23]. ITC contends that this is a distortion of this testimony, and argues that the “very similar” testimony is directed only to one facet of RELP compression means, the residual, and was not an opinion regarding structural equivalency. [D.I. 332 at 9 n. 9]. The Court finds that this testimony is insufficient to establish the structural equivalency of ADPCM. First, Dr. Goodman did not testily that the two compression means are structurally equivalent, and while the phrase “structural equivalency” need not be uttered as some sort of “magic words”, the clear and convincing evidence standard.requires at the very least that Dr. Goodman present the jury with some sort of comparison and conclusion regarding ADPCM and RELP. Dr. Goodman made no such comparison on direct examination, and Motorola stretches too far in contending that he provided it to the jury through the above-cited testimony, which merely discusses one aspect of the compression means without offering a conclusion as to the whole. Because insufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict that the claimed compression means (or its structural equivalent) is disclosed in the 1983 NEC RSS reference, the Court will overturn the jury’s verdict that the 1983 NEC reference anticipates claims 1 through 6 and 10 of the ’863 patent, claim 1 of the ’705 patent, and claims 91,133,162 and 178 of the ’375 patent. (ii) Subscriber Unit Claims 3-6 of the ’863 patent, claim 1 of the ’705 patent, and claims 162 and 178 of the ’375 patent all contain limitations directed to subscriber units. ITC contends that neither the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese reference nor the 1983 NEC RSS reference can anticipate these claims because they do not disclose a subscriber unit. 1981 Kinoshita Japanese Reference Dr. Cox testified that the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese reference did not contain a “subscriber unit block diagram”, but further testified: “However, it is inconceivable that you would ever build a mobile radio base station that did not have a subscriber unit associated with it.” [Tr. 3077]. While there are no block diagrams of subscriber units in the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese reference, there are numerous reference to subscriber units, which are referred to by Kinoshita as “mobile units.” [See, e.g., MTX 52A at 5 (“[T]he base station is the control station ..., while the mobile units are slave stations”) ]. On redirect, Dr. Cox testified that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that although the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese reference did not contain a block diagram of a subscriber unit, the system nevertheless would inherently include a subscriber unit which was “compatible with the parameters of the base station” and performed the same functions. [Tr. 3317-19]. The Federal Circuit has provided the following explanation of the principle of inherency: To serve as an anticipation when the reference is silent about the asserted inherent characteristic, such gap in the reference may be filled with recourse to extrinsic evidence. Such evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.... Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient. If, however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the performance of the questioned function, it seems to be well settled that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient. This modest flexibility in the rule that “anticipation” requires that every element of the claims appear in a single reference accommodates situations where the common knowledge of technologists is not recorded in the reference; that is, where technological facts are known to those in the field of invention, albeit not know to judges. It is not, however, a substitute for determination of patentability in terms of § 103. Continental Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268-69 (Fed.Cir.1991) (citations omitted). An important aspect of any inherency analysis is whether the missing element must necessarily be understood to be part of the reference. Mere possibilities or even probabilities are not enough to support a finding of anticipation. Id.; see also Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047-48 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 516, 133 L.Ed.2d 424 (1995); Electro Med. Sys. S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, 34 F.3d 1048, 1052-53 (Fed.Cir.1994). The essence of Dr. Cox’s testimony is that the subscriber unit claim limitations are necessarily disclosed by the 1981 Kino-shita Japanese reference to the extent these limitations are merely mirror images of identical base station limitations. He also testified that the Kinoshita article included references to mobile units and that it would be inconceivable to build a base station without mobile units associated with it. ITC makes no effort in its briefs to rebut or discredit this “mirror image” testimony with respect to claims 3-6 of the ’863 patent, claim 1 of the ’705 patent, or claim 162 of the ’375 patent, and the Court thus finds that ITC has failed to show that their subscriber unit argument requires abrogation of the jury’s anticipation findings for those claims. Claim 178 of the ’375 patent, however, contains a subscriber unit limitation requiring that the subscriber unit operate in half-duplex mode. Because Motorola concedes that the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese reference does not disclose half-duplex operation, either expressly or inherently, [D.I. 324 at 23 n. 8], the Court concludes that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict that claim 178 of the ’375 patent anticipated by the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese article. 1983 NEC RSS article The 1988 NEC RSS reference also does not contain “circuit” or “block” diagrams of subscriber units, but does refer to the existence of subscriber units. [See, e.g., MTX 98 at 11]. Dr. Goodman testified: A. There is no circuit diagram [in the 1988 NEC RSS reference], no. The subscriber unit, as we’ve described — as has been described by various people here and, in fact, mentioned in the patent, is kind of a mirror image of some of the equipment in the base station, so that understanding how the base station works is a very good indication to someone with skill in the art of how to build a subscriber unit. Q. So now you’re saying the entire subscriber unit is implicit in Exhibit No. 98? A. Yes. [Tr. 3841]. The Court concludes for the same reasons as stated with respect to the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese reference that ITC has failed to demonstrate that their subscriber unit argument requires abrogation of the jury’s anticipation findings with respect to claims 3-6 of the ’863 patent, claim 1 of the ’705 patent, or claim 162 of the ’375 patent. As with the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese reference Motorola concedes that the 1983 NEC RSS reference does not disclose the half-duplex limitation found in Claim 178 of the ’375 patent and thus cannot anticipate this claim. [D.I. 324 at 23 n. 8]. For this reason the Court will vacate the jury’s verdict that claim 178 of the ’375 patent is anticipated by the 1983 NEC RSS reference. (iii) Synchronization Means Claim 1 of the ’705 patent contains the following “synchronization means” limitation: means to determine synchronization, between the base station and the subscriber stations utilizing a code for exchanging the current state of the connection there between, the link quality, and the power and timing adjustments. ITC contends that neither the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese reference nor the 1983 NEC RSS reference disclose the four specific functions performed by the claimed synchronization means: state of connection, link quality, power adjustment, and timing adjustment. 1981 Kinoshita Japanese Reference Dr. Cox testified on direct examination that the claimed synchronization means was disclosed in the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese reference: “The ’81 Kinoshita reference does discuss the need for synchronization. That is one of the issues that Kinoshita was concerned with and discusses in that paper. So that is in there, yes.” [Tr. 3140], ITC contends that Dr. Cox’s testimony cannot have been relied upon by the jury because the testimony does not specifically refer to the four, functions described in the synchronization means limitation. ITC made no attempt, however, to raise this contention before the jury, either on Dr. Cox’s cross-examination, during ITC’s rebuttal case, or during closing argument. The Court finds that the jury was entitled to credit Dr. Cox’s unrebutted expert conclusion that the claimed synchronization means was disclosed by the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese reference. 1983 NEC RSS Reference On direct examination, Dr. Goodman testified that the 1983 NEC RSS reference “contains a means for determining synchronization and uses a code to — to control the synchronization”, [Tr. 3811], but did not offer specific testimony regarding the four claimed functions. On cross examination, in response to a specific question regarding these functions, Dr. Goodman testified that they were not disclosed by the 1983 NEC RSS reference. [Tr. 3839]. Motorola argues that Dr. Goodman’s testimony on direct examination supports a finding that the synchronization means was inherently present in the 1983 NEC RSS reference. The Court disagrees. Nothing in Dr. Goodman’s direct examination testimony or in the reference itself indicates that any means for synchronization present in the prior art reference necessarily includes the four claimed functions. Moreover, Dr. Goodman specifically testified on cross-examination that it did not. The Court finds that the record provides insufficient evidence to support a finding that the 1983 NEC RSS reference discloses the claimed synchronization means and for this reason the Court will overturn the jury’s finding that the 1983 NEC RSS article anticipates claim 1 of the 705 patent. b. 1981 Kinoshita IEEE Article The jury found that the 1981 Kinoshita IEEE article anticipated claims 162,178, 213 and 219 of the ’375 patent. (i)Claim 162 In the special verdict form, which contains Motorola’s anticipation contentions, Motorola did not contend that the 1981 IEEE article anticipated claim 162. [D.I. 295 at 19-20]. Instead, Motorola contended that “the disclosure of the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese article, which implicitly would use a subscriber unit like that show in the 1981 IEEE Kinoshita article” anticipated claims 162 and 178. [D.I. 295 at 19], The IEEE article contains a subscriber unit block diagram which is essentially a mirror image of a corresponding base station block diagram. The IEEE article was presented to the jury to clarify what Motorola contended was inherent in the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese reference. It was not presented to the jury as an anticipating reference with respect to claims 162 and 178. Nevertheless, in filling out the special verdict form, the jury found that both the 1981 Kinoshita IEEE article and the 1981 Kino-shita Japanese article anticipated claim 162. In seeking to defend this portion of the jury’s verdict Motorola now contends that, notwithstanding the contentions it placed in the jury verdict form, its expert Dr. Cox did indeed provide testimony from which a jury could conclude that the 1981 IEEE article anticipated claim 162. [D.I. 324 (citing Tr. 3073-77) ]. The portion of Dr. Cox’s testimony relied upon by Motorola, however, stands only for the proposition that the IEEE article is another paper describing Kinoshita’s system. Dr. Cox did not testify that it provided the same disclosure as the 1981 Kino-shita Japanese article with respect to claim 162. For this reason, the Court finds that Motorola did not in fact contend before the jury that the 1981 IEEE article anticipated claim 162 and that insufficient evidence exists to support this specific finding by the jury. (ii)Claim 178 As previously discussed, Claim 178 depends from claim 162 and contains an additional limitation requiring the subscriber unit to operate in half-duplex mode. The jury’s finding that claim 178 is anticipated by the 1981 Kinoshita IEEE article suffers from the same difficulties as discussed above with respect to claim 162. In addition, even if the Court were to assume arguendo that Motorola did present evidence at trial that the 1981 Kinoshita IEEE article and the 1981 Kino-shita Japanese article contained identical disclosures, Motorola concedes that the 1981 Kinoshita Japanese article does not disclose half-duplex operation. [D.I. 324 at 23]. The testimony elicited at trial as well as the Court’s review of the 1981 Kinoshita IEEE article leads the Court to conclude that the IEEE article does not disclose half-duplex operation. For this reason the Court must conclude that sufficient evidence does not exist to support the jury’s verdict that the 1981 Kinoshita IEEE article anticipated claim 178 of the ’375 patent. (iii)Claims 213 and 219 The jury found that claims 213 and 219 of the ’375 patent were anticipated by the 1981 Kinoshita IEEE article. This finding was supported by Dr. Cox’s testimony that each of the steps found in these claims were disclosed in the reference. [Tr. 3168-69]. ITC contends that this testimony was insufficient because elsewhere Dr. Cox testified that the Kinoshita references did not disclose the compression means claimed by the patents-in-suit (including claims 213 and 219). Dr. Goodman did testify, however, that the Kinoshita compression means was structurally equivalent to the claimed compression means, [see discussion of compression means supra], and the jury was entitled to rely upon the combined testimony of Dr. Goodman and Dr. Cox in finding that the IEEE article anticipated claims 213 and 219. e. The Adams Patent The jury found that claims 213 and 219 of the ’375 pa