Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDERS REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS TO COMPEL AND FOR CONTEMPT SANCTIONS FEIKENS, District Judge. This protracted prisoner class action commenced in 1977. To provide a context for my decisions today, I will sketch a brief history of the ease. For those persons interested in a more detailed presentation, the history provided in Glover v. Johnson, 721 F.Supp. 808 (E.D.Mich.1989), and Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703 (6th Cir.1991), should suffice. In a 1979 opinion, I found that the educational and vocational opportunities available to female prisoners in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (“Department of Corrections” or “Department”) were substantially inferior to those provided male prisoners. Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp. 1075 (E.D.Mich.1979) (“Glover I”). On April 6,1981, after comprehensive negotiations, I entered a Final Order setting forth the remedies to be provided by the Department. Glover v. Johnson, 510 F.Supp. 1019 (E.D.Mich.1981) (“Glover II”). Neither of these orders was appealed and therefore they serve as the law of the case. Glover, 934 F.2d at 706. From 1981 to 1986, the Department proved unwilling to implement some of the programs ordered in Glover I and Glover II, even after findings of contempt and threats of further contempt. In 1991,1 tried another approach; I ordered Defendants to develop a remedial plan to address the constitutional problems in its women prisons. Defendants appealed this order but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with me that the Department had not used its best efforts to comply with Glover I and Glover II. Glover, 934 F.2d at 714. In fact, the court of appeals stated that “[t]he history of this case shows a consistent and persistent pattern of obfuscation, hyper-technical objections, delay, and litigation by exhaustion on the part of the defendants to avoid compliance with the letter and the spirit of the district court’s orders.” Id. at 715. From 1991 to 1995, Defendants did not comply with their own remedial plan in significant ways. Intent on ending this time-consuming and costly litigation, I tried a third approach to resolve this dispute. In a July 25, 1995 order, I established a “compliance committee” to address the problems preventing compliance with the remedial plan. The Compliance Committee included representatives from the parties and the court but no lawyers; it was my hope that a nonadversarial approach to the conflict might render more satisfying results. However, the Compliance Committee format met with substantial resistance. Defendants appealed every one of my orders seeking to establish or sustain it. Department of Corrections Director Kenneth McGinnis declined to meet with me to discuss how the Compliance Committee might be structured or utilized to meet the common goal of finality in these proceedings. Without hope that this nonad-versarial approach could succeed, I dissolved the Compliance Committee in a January 5, 1996 order. In July 1995, Plaintiffs had filed three motions alleging problems that I had hoped would be resolved by the Compliance Committee. In these motions Plaintiffs sought relief for alleged violations of the remedial plan and other associated orders regarding prisoner access to the courts, denial of programming based on prisoner custody level, and denial of program opportunities at Camp Branch. When the Compliance Committee effort failed, I scheduled hearings on these motions. On January 19, 1996, Plaintiffs filed a fourth motion alleging violations of court orders as to apprenticeship programming at the Crane Women’s Facility. On February 15, 1996, February 16, 1996, March 11, 1996, and March 15, 1996, eviden-tiary hearings were held on Plaintiffs’ motions. On May 7, 1996, and May 9,1996, the parties argued their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on the four motions. This opinion and its orders address the issues raised in these four motions. I. Contempt Proceedings Because Plaintiffs seek contempt sanctions, it is important to state the law of contempt proceedings. The basis of all such proceedings is “the basic proposition that all orders and judgments of courts must be complied with promptly.” NLRB v. Cincinnati Bronze, Inc., 829 F.2d 585, 590 (6th Cir.1987). In a civil contempt proceeding, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did not comply with a court’s prior order. Glover v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 264, 266 (6th Cir.1996), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3828 (May 80, 1996). The test for compliance is not whether a defendant made a good faith effort at compliance but whether the defendant took all reasonable steps to obey the court’s order. Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d at 708. Once a prima facie showing of a violation of the court’s order has been made, the charged party has the burden of proving inability to comply. Huber v. Marine Midland Bank, 51 F.3d 5, 10 (2d Cir.1995). “The alleged con-temnor’s burden is to establish his inability clearly, plainly and unmistakably.” Id. The burden of production regarding inability “may be difficult to meet, particularly in cases ... where the defendants have a long history of delay and the plaintiffs’ needs are urgent.” Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067, 107 S.Ct. 955, 93 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1987). (Citations omitted). II. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Law Library Access and Implementation of Inmate Assistance Agreements at Scott Correctional Facility The Constitution guarantees effective and meaningful access to the courts for prisoners. Lewis v. Casey, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2180-81, 135 L.Ed.2d 606; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1494-95, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Having concluded that Defendants have violated this constitutional right on several occasions, I have issued assorted remedial orders requiring Defendants to provide Plaintiffs adequate access. See, e.g., Glover, 510 F.Supp. at 1023; Glover, 721 F.Supp. 808, 814-15 (E.D.Mich.1989). Recently, my orders regarding access have been embodied in the remedial plan. It provides, in conjunction with Department of Corrections Policy Directive (“PD”) BCF-61.01, that all general population prisoners shall be entitled to use the main law library at each correctional facility for a least six hours each week. RP 2-3; PD-BCF-61.01 at 4. It also requires Defendants to provide paralegal training “until such time as a sufficient pool of trained legal assistants is developed.” RP 2-4. Finally, the Defendants are required to establish a method to determine when a sufficient pool of inmate paralegals exists to meet the needs of the prisoner population. RP 2-6. From December 1991, when the remedial plan was implemented, until January 1995, when Defendants established its new segregation policy, general population prisoners of every custody classification were provided use of the main law library at Scott Correctional Facility (“SCF”). There has been no ambiguity in the Court’s order that all plaintiff class members were entitled to access to a Bounds law library. That this has been the understanding of Defendants is evidenced by the fact that in the remedial plan Defendants acknowledged that they had already remedied their procedures to allow level I prisoners, housed outside the main complex at SCF, regular access to the main law library. Finally, Prisoners were also able to establish a legal assistance agreement with a trained prisoner paralegal, irrespective of custody level. Plaintiffs contend that in contravention of this Court’s orders, Defendants have denied prisoners assigned to custody levels I, IV, and V at SCF adequate access to the courts. Defendants counter that the limits they have placed upon prisoner access to the main law library and legal assistance are justified by legitimate security concerns. Moreover, Defendants contend that the access still available to level I, IV and V prisoners satisfies the requirements of the orders of this Court and the Constitution. Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this motion. I conclude that Defendants’ contentions are largely without merit and that prisoner access to the courts at SCF violates the clear orders of this Court and is also constitutionally inadequate. A. Findings of Fact Based upon the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearings, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), I make the following findings of fact in regard to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Law Library Access and Implementation of Inmate Assistance Agreements: 1. Defendants ’ Segregation Policy (1) In January 1995, as a consequence to an escape from the Ryan Correctional Facility, Defendants implemented Policy Directive 05.01.140, which requires the segregation of prisoners by custody level. Tr. 1/23/96 at 29. (2) PD 05.01.140 provided for exceptions to the requirement of segregation for academic or vocational training, the Warden’s Forum, the Prisoner Benefit Fund, and Store Committee. Defs. Ex. 5. (3) Defendants’ segregation policy was modified by the Department of Corrections to permit prisoners of different security levels to attend sex offender and assaultive offender psychotherapy groups and outpatient mental health team group therapy. Defs. Ex. 5 (DOM 1995-54). (4) The warden of SCF sought and received variances from PD 05.01.140 for Women’s Legal Services and prison industries. Tr. 1/23/96 at 35-36. (5) The warden for SCF never sought a variance to allow level I or level V prisoners to use the law library with other custody levels. Tr. 1/23/96 at 36. (6) Defendants’ segregation policy does not require the exclusion of any custody level from use of libraries. Defs. Ex. 5 (PD 05.01.140 and DOM 1995-54). (7) In January, 1996, SCF was provided a blanket exemption from PD 05.01.140 which applies whenever the warden determines that mixing of custody levels is necessary to the provision of services and functions. Tr. 1/23/96 at 36-37; Pis. Ex. 1; Defs. Ex. 5 (DOM 1996-51). 2. Library Access (8) The main law library at SCF is the only law library at SCF which meets the minimum requirements of Bounds as required in the remedial plan. Tr. 1/23/96 at 77, 80; Defs. Ex. 4. (9) When the remedial plan was implemented in 1991, all prisoners were provided access to the main law library at SCF. RP 2-3. (10) The mini-law libraries utilized by Defendants include only the minimum collection required for segregation unit law libraries. Tr. 1/23/96 at 80; Tr. 2/15/96 at 149. 3. Level I Prisoner Access (11) Level I prisoners, who are housed in the Franklin Unit outside the main complex at SCF, are no longer permitted physical access to the main law library at SCF. Tr. 1/23/96 at 28. (12) In lieu of access to the main law library, Defendants have installed a mini-law library in the Franklin (level I prisoners) and Essex (level V prisoners) Units. Tr. 1/23/96 at 88,145. (13) Level I prisoners are allegedly denied access to the law library because they could introduce contraband into SCF or serve as unwitting mules. Tr. 1/23/96 at 27; Tr. 2/15/96 at 63. (14) Level I prisoners are not problematic prisoners and are trusted prisoners. Tr. 1/23/96 at 26. (15) The warden at SCF could not recall a single instance where a level I prisoner had introduced contraband while in the main law library. Tr. 1/23/96 at 28, 32. (16) The warden at SCF could not recall a single instance where there was a security problem due to the mixing of level I prisoners with other custody levels in any context (college classes, vocational programming, prison store, Prisoner Benefit Fund, Women’s Legal Services, or prison industries). Tr. 1/23/96 at 38. (17) Defendants continue to exclude level I prisoners after receiving a blanket variance from the segregation policy. Tr. 1/23/96 at 38. 4.Level V Prisoner Access (18) Level V prisoners are general population (not segregation) prisoners. Tr. 1/23/96 at 82; Tr. 2/15/96 at 149. (19) Level V prisoners, who are housed in the Essex Unit, are no longer permitted physical access to the main law library at SCF. Tr. 1/23/96 at 85. (20) Level V prisoners who requested access to the main law library were denied. Tr. 1/23/96 at 104r-05. (21) Defendants’ policy regarding prisoner access to law libraries requires all general population prisoners to have access to the main law library at correctional facilities. Defs. Ex. 4 (PD 05.03.115); Tr. 2/15/96 at 78. (22) Level Y general population male prisoners are not denied access to a full library or limited to a segregation unit law library. Tr. 2/15/96 at 150. (23) In lieu of access to the main law library, Defendants have installed a mini-law library in the Essex Unit. Tr. 1/23/96 at 105. (24) The mini-law library in Essex is located in a nine-by-nine-foot cell. Tr. 1/23/96 at 90. (25) Level V prisoners can only use the Essex mini-law library for one hour intervals and there can only be two prisoners in this library at any one time. Tr. 1/23/96 at 90. (26) The mini-law library in Essex does not contain Department policy directives and prisoners are charged for copies obtained from the main law library. Tr. 1/23/96 at 95, 104. (27) The level V paralegal is denied physical access to the main law library. Tr. 1/23/96 at 60. 5. Legal Assistance (28) Level I and V prisoners can request legal assistance from the SCF law librarian via institutional mail. Tr. 1/23/96 at 53-58. (29) Level I and V prisoners can borrow up to five books or other legal resources from the main law library at SCF via institutional mail. Such loans are limited to 24 hours. Tr. 1/23/96 at 62-63. (30) Requests for books from the main law library must be specific. Tr. 1/23/96 at 85, 86. (31) It takes as little as a day or two and as much as a week or more for a book to be delivered to a prisoner from the main law library. Tr. 1/23/96 at 103,145. (32) Level I and V prisoners can receive legal assistance from an inmate paralegal if a legal assistance agreement is approved by the prison administration. (33) Prior to the implementation of PD 05.01.140, prisoners who were party to a legal assistance agreement could meet in the law library to work on their legal matters. Tr. 1/23/96 at 127. (34) In February 1995, Defendants terminated all existing legal assistance agreements between prisoners of differing custody levels. Tr. 1/23/96 at 125. (35) From February 1995 until October 1995, Defendants did not permit any cross-custody legal assistance agreements. Tr. 1/23/96 at 125-26; Tr. 2/15/96 at 143. (36) After October 1995, Defendants permitted cross-custody legal assistance agreements to be conducted via institutional mail. Tr. 1/28/96 at 128. (37) Legal assistance agreements conducted via institutional mail take approximately one week from the time a prisoner solicits advice to the time she receives a response. Tr. 1/23/96 at 130. (38) There is no established procedure for inmates'in a eross-eustody legal assistance agreement to send legal materials to one another. Tr. 1/23/96 at 129. (39) Level I and level V paralegals do not have access to the main law library. Tr. 1/23/96 at 89,147. (40) Illiteracy presents serious barriers to legal assistance conducted via institutional mail. Tr. 1/23/96 at 136. (41) Defendants have not developed a mechanism to determine if there is an adequate pool of paralegals. Tr. 2/15/96 at 154. 6. Level IV Prisoner Access (42) Level IV prisoners are scheduled to have physical access to the main law library at SCF from 7:45 a.m. to 10:45 a.m., Monday through Sunday. Pis. Ex. 6; Tr. 2/15/96 at 108. (43) Level IV prisoner work details, GED classes, vocational programming, and yard time occur Monday through Friday between 7:45 a.m. and 10:45 a.m. Tr. 1/23/96 at 114; Tr. 2/15/96 at 130,135. (44) College programming, which occurs between 7:45 a.m. and 10:45 a.m. on Saturdays, also conflicts. Tr. 1/23/96 at 117. (45) Religious services occur between 7:45 a.m. and 10:45 a.m. on Sundays. Tr. 1/23/96 at 117. (46) Level IV prisoners who have requested use of the main law library at a time other than regularly scheduled hours have been denied. Tr. 1/23/96 at 121. (47) A level IV prisoner who needed to use the main law library more than her allotted six hours per week was accommodated. Tr. 1/23/96 at 240; Tr. 2/15/96 at 109,131. (48) Level IV prisoners are not permitted to borrow resources from the main law library. Tr. 1/23/96 at 122. (49) Plaintiffs must choose between rights to access to the main law library and remedial programming and work details. Tr. 1/23/96 at 114-15. (50) A prisoner who has a job detail, or participates in GED programming, or participates in court ordered programming, and attends church will only be able to access the law library for three hours a week. Tr. 1/23/96 at 116-18. 7. Miscellaneous Finding (51) As a consequence of Defendants’ restrictions on access, prisoners have had pleadings, grievances, appeals, and rehearings dismissed for untimeliness. 1/23/96 at 96-97, 99,103,117,128. B. Conclusions of Law I find by clear and convincing evidence that Defendants have denied, in violation of the orders of this Court and the Constitution, level I, IV, and V prisoners at SCF meaningful and effective access to the courts. First and foremost for the purpose of this motion, Defendants do not deny that their denial of level I and level V prisoners access to a Bounds law library is contrary to the remedial plan. Defendants essentially admit to contempt and try to justify their actions by arguing that they had a legitimate penological interest for their actions and that they have provided adequate alternative means of access. However, the remedial plan was established to address constitutional violations by the Department in the women’s prison system. Defendants cannot decide unilaterally that a provision of the remedial plan has been met or that it is no longer needed. Any such determination is the role of this Court. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-20, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 1408-11, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Crunch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). If Defendants desire changes in the remedial plan, the proper course would be for them to move to modify it. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992); see also Glover, 934 F.2d at 708-09. Defendants are certainly entitled to present evidence of their evolving needs, of alternative methods by which adequate access to the courts might be provided, and of changes in the law. Id. Yet Defendants made no such motion and submitted no such evidence. Hence, Defendants’ actions regarding prisoner access can only be characterized as contemptuous. I also find Defendants’ justifications for their actions to lack merit. Defendants’ claim that they have provided adequate alternative means of access for level I, IV and V prisoners is specious. In Bounds, the Supreme Court resolutely held that prisoners have a fundamental right of meaningful access to the courts. This holding was very recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Lewis. Lewis, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2179-80. In evaluating the constitutional adequacy of prisoners’ access to the courts, the Supreme Court has instructed trial courts to evaluate prisoner access “as a whole,” stressing that “meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823, 832, 97 S.Ct. at 1495, 1500; see also Lewis, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2180-81. Defendants’ contention that they are only required to provide either a law library or legal assistance is self-serving and a gross oversimplification. Prison officials are not required to provide both a law library and legal assistance if access to either a library or trained personnel is effective and meaningful. This has been the longstanding rule in the Sixth Circuit. In Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973, 113 S.Ct. 1415, 122 L.Ed.2d 786 (1993), the question presented was whether the State of Michigan had to hire attorneys to assist prisoners in the preparation of their law suits. In holding that the touchstone of access is not access to lawyers but access to courts, the court carefully reviewed Bounds and other relevant precedent. It noted that the Supreme Court specifically stated in Bounds that “a legal access program need not include any particular element” and that prison authorities must simply provide access to courts that is “adequate, effective, and meaningful.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822, 832, 97 S.Ct. at 1495, 1500. The court declared that “Bounds teaches that “[t]he requirement of meaningful access can be satisfied in various ways,” and “state legislatures and prison administrators must be given Vide discretion’ to select appropriate solutions.” Knop, 977 F.2d at 1004 (quoting Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 14, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2772-73, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (concurring opinion of Kennedy, J.)). In Glover v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 264 (6th Cir.1996), a case cited by Defendants in support of their either/or argument, the court of appeals again utilized the effective and meaningful standard. It stated that “[w]ith regard to female prisoners in this facility who are not illiterate, not unable to understand English, this furnishing of a sufficient library with an adequate staff satisfies Bounds v. Smith standards.” Glover, 75 F.3d at 268. For illiterate prisoners, library access is obviously not effective and meaningful access to the courts. Access to the courts at SCF is not effective or meaningful for level I, IV, or V prisoners. Level I and V prisoners have access to the courts via a mini-law library housed in each of their units, librarian assistance, and legal assistance agreement with other inmates. The mini-law libraries do not meet the minimum requirements of a Bounds library as required by the remedial plan. Defendants argue that the mini-law libraries are a concept contemplated by the remedial plan. This is true only with respect to prisoners in segregation. However, both level I and level V prisoners are general population prisoners by Defendants’ own admission. The mini-law libraries are simply inadequate for conducting all but the most basic legal work (if they are properly maintained) and do not provide prisoners with adequate access without significant additional assistance. Defendants’ limits on legal assistance agreements render them wholly ineffective. If a level I or V prisoner needs to meet with a paralegal, which is necessary for most prisoners and all illiterate prisoners, she must enter into a legal assistance agreement with a paralegal of the same custody level. This means that neither the inmate nor her paralegal has access to the main law library. If a level I or V prisoner wants her paralegal to have access to the main law library, she must presently utilize a level II paralegal. Such a cross-custody legal assistance agreement can only be conducted via institutional mails. This requirement renders the legal assistance useless to an illiterate inmate. Notwithstanding these problems, the paging system established by Defendants was shown to be ineffective. First, an inmate must know with specificity what resource she wants in order to request it from the main law library. Second, inmates can borrow no more than five books at any one time and can keep them for only 24 hours. Third, while one inmate reported that she generally received requested books in one to two days, another testified that it generally took a week. Fourth, it was shown that it takes at least a week for a prisoner to ask her paralegal a question and receive its answer. Finally, copies of materials from the main library are only provided once a week. Limits such as these, which are inherent to a paging system, restrict access to the point where it is virtually devoid of value. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated: Simply providing a prisoner with books in his cell, if he requests them, gives the prisoner no meaningful chance to explore the legal remedies he might have. Legal research often requires browsing through various materials in search of inspiration; tentative theories may have to be abandoned in the course of research in the face of unfamiliar adverse precedent. New theories may occur as a result of a chance discover of an obscure or forgotten case. Certainly a prisoner, unversed in the law and the methods of legal research, will need more time or more assistance than the trained lawyer in exploring his case. It is unrealistic to expect a prisoner to know in advance exactly what materials he needs to consult. Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 2825, 61 L.Ed.2d 276 (1979). In regard to level V prisoners, there are other problems with the mini-law library. The collection in the Essex mini-law library does not even contain basic materials such as MDOC policy directives. Furthermore, use of this facility is limited to two inmates at any one time for no more than one hour periods. This limitation fails to even meet Defendants’ own policies. Defendants own policy directive on institutional law libraries states that “[o]rdinarily, meaningful legal research cannot be performed in time periods of less than two hours.” P.D. 05.03.115 at paragraph R. Level IV prisoners are also denied effective and meaningful access to the courts. By scheduling virtually all prisoner activities for the same time, level IV prisoners must choose between use of the law library and the other prison activities. In fact, if a level IV inmate has a job detail or GED classes or participates in other court ordered programming and attends church on Sunday, she can only access the law library for three hours each week. This situation is also contrary to P.D. 05.03.115 which states that “[e]aeh general population prisoner shall be entitled to at least six hours per week of law library use, in segments of not less than two hours each, unless a shorter time segment is requested by the prisoner and approved by the librarian or other civilian staff person in charge of the library.” P.D. 05.03.115 at paragraph R. Defendants have also denied the requests of level IV prisoners for alternative times to access to the law library. Defendants also argue that they have a legitimate security concern which justifies the limits they have imposed on access. Prisons may certainly regulate library use to preserve prison security. However, prison authorities cannot so limit access to adequate law libraries and legal assistance that they are rendered meaningless. The importance of the right to meaningful access cannot be overstated. Casey v. Lewis, 43 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir.1994), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). “It is the right upon which all other rights depend.” Id. Defendants cite Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), in support of their limits on access. In Turner, the Supreme Court held that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” I again note that the standard which Defendants must meet in defense of contempt is not Turner but impossibility. A party found to violate a court order must show that compliance would be factually impossible and the party “could not possibly comply with the Court’s order, despite maMng all reasonable efforts.” Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1301 (11th Cir.1991). Defendants do not even attempt to argue that they can meet this requirement. In addition, Defendants’ segregation policy and the manner in which it has been applied are not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. In Turner, the Supreme Court discussed several inquiries it deemed relevant in deciding whether a regulation is reasonable: 1.Is there a “valid, rational connection” between the regulation and the govemment interest said to be served by the regulation? 2. Are there alternative means of exercising the allegedly impinged constitutional right that remain available to inmates? 3. How does accommodating the asserted constitutional right impact on guards and other inmates and the allocation of prison resources generally? 4. Are there ready alternatives to the prison regulation? Id. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62. It is significant that the Court has stressed that Turner’s “reasonableness standard is not toothless.” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1882, 104 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989); see also Muhammad v. Pitcher, 35 F.3d 1081, 1084 (6th Cir.1994). Prison security is unquestionably a legitimate penological interest. However, Defendants’ refusal to allow level I and V prisoners access to the main law library does not bear a rational connection to prison security. First, Defendants readily acknowledge that level I prisoners are not a security threat. While Defendants contend that level I prisoners could introduce contraband into the prison, the SCF warden could not recall a single incidence of this sort, in the library or elsewhere. Second, and more importantly, the exceptions to Defendants’ segregation policy have swallowed the rule. From the outset, the segregation policy had exemptions for all educational and vocational programming, the Warden’s Forum, Prisoner Benefit Fund, and the Store Committee. Later came exceptions for sex offender and assaultive offender groups and outpatient mental health team group therapy. Defendants also sought and obtained additional variances with regards to Women’s Legal Services and the prison industries. SCF subsequently received a blanket variance of P.D. 05.01.140. Hence, while prisoners of different custody levels now regularly mix at SCF for many purposes, including educational classes, vocational training, Warden’s Forum, the Prisoner Benefit Fund, the Store Committee, sex offender groups, assaultive offender groups, mental health groups, kitchens, prison industries, work details, Women’s Legal Services, and paralegal training classes, Defendants still contend that they must adhere to the policy in regard to library access for security reasons. Defendants’ continued refusal to allow level I and V prisoners access to the main law library is an exaggerated response to its security concerns. Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this motion, citing the recently decided Lewis case and arguing Plaintiffs have not shown widespread actual injury. In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that prisoners alleging a violation of their right to access must have standing, i.e., be able to show actual injury, in order to pursue their claim. Lewis, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2179-80. Apparently, Defendants believe that Plaintiffs must make such a showing to pursue their present motion. Defendants have once again failed to grasp that these proceedings are for contempt. The validity of the original orders finding violations of Plaintiffs’ rights of equal protection and access are not at issue and may not be collaterally attacked in these proceedings. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1); see also Cherokee Express, Inc. v. Cherokee Express, Inc., 924 F.2d 608, 607-08 (6th Cir.1991). Moreover, Plaintiffs clearly have standing to challenge Defendants’ violations of this Court’s remedial orders. Civil contempt proceedings are a supplemental part of the original action from which they stem. D. Patrick, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.3d 455, 459 (7th Cir.1993); see also Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1017 at 71 (1987). The remedial orders, which were proposed by Defendants as the manner by which they wanted to provide equal protection and access, were entered as relief for the entire Plaintiff class. Therefore, any member of the class has standing to challenge a violation of these orders in a contempt proceeding. Even if this case was not in the procedural posture that it is, i.e., a motion for contempt for violation of prior court orders and violation of Defendants’ own proposals for remedial relief, the concerns of the Court expressed in Lewis are not present in the facts of this case. The contempt alleged by the Plaintiffs addresses the Defendants’ actions with regard to SCF alone. Plaintiffs seek remedial relief based on proofs of contempt as to that facility alone, and do not seek to extend relief system-wide as was the case in Lewis. III. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Law Library Access and Implementation of Inmate Assistance Agreements at Crane Women’s Facility Plaintiffs also contend that access to the courts for prisoners at Crane Women’s Facility (“CWF”) is inadequate. These allegations are largely without merit. Only level II prisoners are incarcerated at CWF. Consequently, no prisoners are denied physical access to the law library because of the Department’s segregation policy. Similarly, the limits on legal assistance agreements do not impact prisoners at CWF as they do at SCF. The one meritorious aspect of Plaintiffs’ motion as it relates to CWF concerns what Defendants consider “pending litigation”. The meaning of this term determines admission to the law library and whether inmates can make photocopies. Some inmates are unclear or confused as to the meaning of the term “pending litigation” and the photocopying policy and contend that these policies are subjectively and arbitrarily applied. Tr. 1/23/96 at 151-53. Therefore, Defendants need to establish and provide to the court written policies regarding its definition of pending litigation and photocopying. IV. Plaintiffs Motion for an Order of Contempt Regarding Defendants’ Denial of Programming Opportunities at Scott Correctional Facility In the Glover I and Glover II opinions, I concluded that Defendants were unconstitutionally denying programming to women incarcerated by the Department of Corrections. I consequently ordered Defendants to provide vocational, apprenticeship, and prison industry opportunities for women prisoners. At SCF, Defendants are presently required by court orders to provide six vocational programs. Order of May 18, 1992. In regards to apprenticeships, Defendants are required to provide five programs. Glover, 510 F.Supp. at 1021-22; Glover, 721 F.Supp. at 822; RP 4-2. Finally, Defendants are required to provide two prison industries, license tabs and cushions. Glover, 510 F.Supp. at 1022. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are in contempt of my orders in two respects. First, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have unilaterally discontinued court ordered vocational programming. Second, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are denying programming to prisoners at SCF on the basis of custody level. A. Findings of Fact Based upon the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearings, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), I make the following findings of fact in regard to Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Order of Contempt Regarding Defendants’ Denial of Programming Opportunities at Scott Correctional Facility: 1. Deviation from Court Ordered Vocational Programming (52)In December 1995, Defendants discontinued the auto mechanics vocational program. Tr. 2/15/96 at 169. (53) There continues to be some prisoner interest in the auto mechanics vocational program. Tr. 2/16/96 at 23, 29. (54) In December 1995, Defendants discontinued the building trades vocational program. Tr. 1/23/96 at 174; 2/15/96 at 171. (55) Those prisoners who were detailed to the building trades vocational program when it was canceled were not given an option to complete the program. Tr. 1/23/96 at 178. (56) It is Defendants’ intent to replace the building trades vocational program with a pre-vocational program. Tr. 2/15/96 at 171. (57) In December 1995, the instructor for the institutional maintenance vocational program resigned. Tr. 2/15/96 at 171. (58) Due to their interest in changing its vocational programming, Defendants have not posted their need for an instructor for the institutional maintenance vocational program. Tr. 2/15/96 at 171. (59) In May 1995, Defendants separated participants in the auto mechanics vocational program by custody level; level IV’s attend the program in the morning and level II’s attend in the afternoon. Tr. 2/15/96 at 45-46. (60) Prisoner participation in the auto mechanics vocational program has been limited due to the Department’s inability to transport participants to the Western Wayne Correctional Facility (‘WWCF”). Tr. 2/15/96 at 48. (61) In 1995, Defendants established a panel to conduct a review of the vocational programming at SCF. Defs.Ex. 2F; Tr. 2/15/96 at 90. (62) The review panel concluded in June 1995 that many women at SCF were not ready for vocational programming and that they needed to conduct some pre-vocational training prior to enrollment in vocational programs. Defs.Ex. 2F; Tr. 2/15/96 at 94. (63) The review panel recommended that the Department close the two Western Wayne vocational programs as well as Scott’s custodial maintenance program and replace them with other options. Defs.Ex. 2F. (64) The review panel also recommended that the three vocational programs it recommended canceling should be replaced with (1) a pre-vocational program in building trades; and (2) a dental technician program. Defs. Ex. 2F. (65) Defendants have established a ten-seat computer lab at SCF dedicated to the improvement of skills. Tr. 2/15/96 at 97. (66) The computer lab at SCF is not a vocational program but a pre-vocational program. Tr. 2/15/96 at 97-98. (67) In 1995 Defendants established a dental vocational program that continues to be operational. Tr. 1/23/96 at 250; Tr. 2/15/96 at 172. 2. Denial of Programming Based on Custody Levels a. Level I (68) Level I prisoners cannot participate in programming within SCF unless they waive their level I status, become level II, and live within SCF. Tr. 1/23/96 at 175; Tr. 2/15/96 at 192. (69) Prior to the fall 1995, Level I prisoners were not allowed to participate in apprenticeship programs because of their custody level. Tr. 2/15/96 at 155. (70) On January 11, 1996, there were two level I prisoners involved in vocational programming at SCF. Defs.Ex. 2C. (71) On January 11, 1996, there were zero level I prisoners involved in apprenticeship programming at SCF. Defs.Ex. 2C. b. Level IV (72) Level IV prisoners were denied prison industry programming. Tr. 1/23/96 at 199. (73) Level TV prisoners were denied the auto mechanics vocational program. Tr. 1/23/96 at 201. (74) On January 11, 1996, there were 19 level IV prisoners involved in vocational programming at SCF. Defs.Ex. 2C. (75) On January 11, 1996, there were zero level IV prisoners involved in apprenticeship programming at SCF. Defs.Ex. 2C. e. Level V (76) Prior to the fall of 1995, level V prisoners were not allowed to participate in apprenticeship programs because of their custody level. Tr. 2/15/96 at 157. (77) Level V prisoners were denied vocational programming. Tr. 1/23/96 at 181; Tr. 2/15/96 at 162. (78) Level V prisoners were denied prison industry programming. Tr. 1/23/96 at 182. (79) On January 11, 1996, there were two level V prisoners involved in vocational programming at SCF. Defs.Ex. 2C. (80) On January 11, 1996, there were zero level V prisoners involved in apprenticeship programming at SCF. Defs.Ex. 2C. d. Miscellaneous Findings (81) In January 1996, Defendants posted recruitment signs for prisoner industries which specified that only level II prisoners could apply. 1/23/96 at 192. (82) Defendants’ prerequisites for prisoner participation in vocational programming do not presently discriminate based upon custody level. Defs.Ex. 2A. (83) Defendants’ prerequisites for prisoner participation in prison industry programming do not presently discriminate based upon custody level. Defs.Ex. 2D and 2M. (84) Level II prisoners can only attend the programming at Western Wayne in the mornings and level IV prisoners can attend only in the afternoon. Tr. 2/15/96 at 45,166-67. (85) If level I or level V prisoners were to qualify for programming at Western Wayne, Defendants do not know when they would attend. Tr. 2/15/96 at 166-67. B. Conclusions of Law 1. Deviation from Court Ordered Vocational Programming I find by clear and convincing evidence that Defendants are in contempt of my orders requiring six vocational programs at SCF. There are only four vocational programs at SCF which are operational. Defendants admit that they have discontinued the auto mechanics, building trades, and the institutional maintenance vocational programs. Defendants contend that they are only required to provide three vocational programs coupled with other additional programs. Defendants’ argument is based on my characterization of the orders regarding vocational programming at SCF in my March 14, 1995 opinion. I stated: Defendants have developed the dental lab program at Scott and a career vocational plan has been developed. Additionally, there are court-ordered programs at Crane and Scott in office occupations, graphic arts and food service; there are three other non-court ordered programs at Scott: institutional maintenance, auto mechanics, and building trades. Glover, 879 F.Supp. 752, 759 (E.D.Mich.1995). Defendants have seized upon my statement that “there are three other non-court ordered programs at Scott: institutional maintenance, auto mechanics, and budding trades.” Defendants argue that this language means that they are only required to provide three vocational programs. In order to appreciate the disingenuousness of Defendants’ argument, my March 14, 1995 opinion must be placed into context. Defendants were first ordered to expand their vocational programming in 1979. Glover, 478 F.Supp. at 1087. In that year, I held that the five vocational programs offered to women prisoners were of insufficient quantity and quality and ordered the Department to expand its vocational offerings to women inmates. It is significant that in ordering Defendants to increase their vocational programs I left it to Defendants to determine the subject matter of the additional vocational programs. In the ensuing years, Defendants refused to comply with my orders regarding vocational programming. In 1989, I held Defendants in contempt regarding vocational programming. Glover, 721 F.Supp. at 836-39. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed my finding because it concluded that my 1979 order was no longer effective. Glover, 934 F.2d at 712. In order to address this shortcoming, I required Defendants to create a remedial plan by which they pledged to be bound. RP 1-2. As part of the remedial plan, Defendants submitted a vocational program plan entitled “A Plan for Vocational Programs and Work Pass” (“PVPWP”). In that document, Defendants committed to offer vocational training programs in the specific subjects of institutional maintenance, graphic arts, and food services. PVPWP at 2. In addition, Defendants committed to the development of additional vocational programs pending a survey of the prisoner population. PVPWP at 4 and 5. I note that these requirements are consistent with my continued belief that it is Defendants who can best determine what sort of programming will be effective. In 1992, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enjoin the closing of the Huron Valley Women’s Facility. Plaintiffs feared, among other things, that vocational programming would be interrupted or terminated if I permitted this move. In my Order of May 18, 1992 I stated: I decline to enjoin the transfer of women inmates to Scott on the basis that such programs would be interrupted, provided, however, that the programs outlined in the letter I received from Director McGinnis dated May 7,1992, and as discussed on the record at the May 14th, 1992 hearing are implemented forthwith. The vocational programs outlined in that letter which are to be offered at Scott include business occupations, food service technology, graphic arts, auto mechanics to be provided at Western Wayne Correctional facility, building trades to be provided at the Western Wayne Correctional Facility, and institutional maintenance. Those programs must be operating by June 1st or June 8th as discussed at the hearing. Significantly, in this order I specified the subject matter of three vocational programs in addition to the three I had specified in my earlier orders. However, I only specified what the Director of the Department of Corrections had suggested as the preference of the Department. With this order, Defendants had finally committed, however nominally, to increase vocational programming from the five programs offered in 1979. It is against this backdrop that my March 14,1995 opinion must be read. In that opinion, I concluded that Defendants’ vocational programming still did not substantially comply with the PVPWP. Glover, 879 F.Supp. at 759-60. In stating that there were three, “non-court ordered” vocational programs at SCF, I was referring to the fact that the subject matter of the last three programs was not decided by the court. When Defendants were ordered to add business occupations, auto mechanics, and building trades vocational programming in 1992, they had selected the subject matter of these programs themselves. In making the statement at issue, I was noting that Defendants could not blame their continued failure to provide adequate vocational programming on an overly intrusive court. Admittedly, my statement could be ambiguous to a person unfamiliar with the history of court ordered vocational programming at SCF. However, by no means does it serve as a basis for Defendants’ decision to discontinue vocational programming. First, this statement is pure dicta and cannot possibly serve to modify an existing court order. A district court speaks only through its orders. Glover, 934 F.2d at 712. Second, Defendants’ interpretation requires one to ignore the immediate and greater context of the statement. In regard to the immediate context, my March 14, 1995 opinion concluded that Defendants, in providing the six vocational programs, were still not substantially complying with my orders regarding vocational programs. If Defendants were not complying while providing six programs in 1995, how could they conclude that they would be in compliance by providing four in 1996? In regard to the greater context, it has been the clear and unequivocal requirement of this court and its orders that Defendants expand the quantity (and quality) of its vocational programming. To reduce the number of vocational programs can only be understood as contrary to my orders. At best, my statement in the 1995 opinion can be said to establish some ambiguity as to court ordered vocational programming at SCF. However, Defendants have never sought a clarification or modification. Defendants’ failure to request such clarification or modification precludes them from raising any alleged ambiguity as a defense to contempt. Glover, 934 F.2d at 708-09. Defendants’ contention that the business occupations, auto mechanics, and building trades vocational programs were only “pilot programs” subject to unilateral cancellation is not accurate. In terminating these programs, Defendants have clearly violated my orders and are thereby in contempt. 2. Denial of Programming Based on the Basis of Custody Level I also find by clear and convincing evidence that Defendants have denied court ordered programming to level I, IV and V prisoners based upon their custody level. Defendants have so admitted. This was a clear violation of this court’s orders requiring Defendants to provide vocational training, apprenticeships, and prison industries for all eligible women prisoners in Michigan. Glover, 478 F.Supp. at 1101-02; Glover, 510 F.Supp. at 1021-22. Defendants’ argument that their segregation policy required them to deny such programming is without merit. First, separation of custody levels does not mandate denial of programming. Second, Defendants’ segregation policy has always included an exemption for vocational programming and later included an exemption for prison industries. Still later, Defendants received a blanket exemption from the segregation policy. In concluding that Defendants have denied programming on the basis of custody level, I also note that Defendants claim and have provided some evidence that they are no longer doing so. Defendants have committed to permit level I, IV, and V prisoners who meet program eligibility requirements to participate in court ordered programming. By so doing, Defendants have purged this contempt. However, Defendants have admitted that they do not know how they would accommodate qualified level I and level V prisoners in programming offered at Wayne County Correctional Facility. Therefore, Defendants must present to the court a plan in which they specify how they will do so. V. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Compliance with this Court’s Orders Regarding Camp Branch As a part of its prison program, the Department of Corrections also utilizes camp facilities. Camps usually provide alternative, off-grounds programming to low custody prisoners likely to be released in the short term. The off-grounds programming includes public works and work pass programs. The prescription of off-grounds programming as a cost-efficient means of providing rehabilitative opportunities to female prisoners has been an integral part of this case since its inception. My 1979 order and my 1981 orders required Defendants to provide work pass and public works programming at all prisons and camps housing members of the plaintiff class. PVPWP at 6. In 1989,1 found the Defendants in contempt for “a continuing pattern of willful and intentional violations of ... [my work pass] orders.” Glover, 721 F.Supp. at 829, 842. In the remedial plan, Defendants committed to continue these programs. PVPWP at 6-7. Defendants are not required to provide college, vocational, or apprenticeship programming at the camps. However, the public works and work pass programs provided at the camp facilities are not intended to displace the educational, vocational, and apprenticeship programming available to qualified prisoners. It has been the long-standing commitment of Defendants that qualified prisoners who are placed in the camps may transfer to a facility providing court ordered educational, vocational, and apprenticeship programming not available in the camp. In addition, Defendants have committed not to transfer a prisoner pursuing educational, vocational, or apprenticeship programming to a facility where this programming would be interrupted. In June, 1994, I issued an interim order providing that “there shall be no transfer of any Plaintiff pursuing Glover program opportunities unless the transfer is to a placement where the plaintiff is able to continue without interruption her pursuit of the program.” Interim Order Regarding Camp Branch of June 9,1994. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are denying women in the camp system access to educational, vocational, and apprenticeship programming and that insufficient numbers of women are participating in work pass and public works. They argue that the “point and intent and spirit” of this court’s orders establish that Defendants can not put people in the camp program who were pursuing court ordered programming or circumvent these orders by transferring prisoners directly from intake into the camp system without permitting qualified women to transfer to a facility with desired programming. Plaintiffs also contend that Camp Branch is overcrowded and that Defendants do not provide a life skills program at this facility. A. Findings of Fact Based upon the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearings, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), I find the following facts in regard to Plaintiffs’ motion regarding programming at Camp Branch: (86) As of 1/11/96, there were 310 prisoners at Camp Branch. Def. Ex. 6E. (87) Prisoners within three years of their earliest release date (“ERD”) or within four years of their earliest release date having served two years are eligible for camp placement. Defs. Ex. 6A. (88) If a prisoner is eligible for camp placement when she enters the correctional system, she will not be classified to any vocational or ■ apprenticeship programming. Tr. 1/23/96 at 194. (89) As of December 19, 1995, the earliest release date for the population at Camp Branch was as follows: (a) Approximately 200 inmates, or 62% of the population, had an ERD of 12 months or less; (b) Approximately 85 inmates, or 27% of the population, had an ERD between 12 months and 24 months; (c) Approximately 31 inmates, or 10% of the population, had an ERD between 24 months and 36 months; (d) Approximately 2 inmates, or less than 1% of the population, had an ERD more than 36 months. Def. Ex. 6D; Tr. 2/15/96 at 237-250. (90) Approximately 20% of the prisoners at Camp Branch remain there beyond their ERD. Tr. 2/15/96 at 243. (91) Defendants do not transfer prisoners from other facilities to Camp Branch if they are participating in vocational programming, apprenticeships, or Michigan Prison Industries. 2/15/96 at 232,250. (92) Defendants will transfer eligible prisoners from Camp Branch to other facilities for college programming. Tr. 2/15/96 at 232. (93) Two prisoners have requested a transfer from Camp Branch for vocational, apprenticeship, or prison industry programming. Tr. 2/15/96 at 252. (94) It is Defendants’ policy not to transfer eligible prisoners at Camp Branch who request vocational, apprenticeship, or prison industry programming to a facility which provides these programs. Tr. 2/15/96 at 237. (95) 115 inmates, or 36% of the population, have an ERD of more than twelve months and are not permitted apprenticeship, vocational, or prison industry programming. Tr. 2/15/96 at 250,252. (96) Prisoners who are eligible to be transferred directly into the camp system are allowed to apply for educational programming prior to their transfer to the camp system. Tr. 1/23/96 at 194. (97) Prisoners who are eligible to be transferred directly into the camp system are not permitted to participate in vocational, apprenticeship, or prison industry programming, even if they have an ERD beyond twelve months. (98) Defendants do not screen prisoners for eligibility to vocational or apprenticeship programming. Tr. 2/15/96 at 229, 231; Tr. 2/16/96 at 10. (99) Defendants presently provide a work pass and public works programs at Camp Branch. Tr. 2/15/96 at 233. (100) Defendants’ work pass program was not established until after Plaintiffs’ motion regarding Camp Branch was filed. Defs. Supp.Resp. to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Compliance at 4. (101) There are presently 6 prisoners at Camp Branch involved in work pass. Defs. Ex. 6E. There is no waiting list at Camp Branch for work pass programming. Tr. 2/15/96 at 233. (102) There are currently 136 women in the plaintiff class involved in public works. Defs.Ex. 6 and 6E. There is no waiting list at Camp Branch for public works. Tr. 2/15/96 at 233. (103) Some prisoners at Camp Branch are ineligible for public works and work pass. Tr. 2/15/96 at 236. (104) A prisoner could spend three years at Camp Branch and never be eligible for vocational, apprenticeship, public works, or work pass programming. Tr. 2/15/96 at 236. (105) Defendants provide a life skills program at Camp Branch. Tr. 2/15/96 at 234. B. Conclusions of Law There is clear and convincing evidence that Defendants are and have been in contempt of several my orders concerning camp facilities. First, by their own admission, Defendants were not providing a work pass program at Camp Branch prior to Plaintiffs’ motion to compel compliance. It was only after the filing of this motion that Defendants implemented their work pass program at Camp Branch. The recentness of this program is evidenced by the fact that there are only six women participating in it, less than 2% of the population at Camp Branch. For purposes of comparison, I note that when the remedial plan was approved in 1991, 29% of the prisoners in camp facilities participated in work pass. PVPWP at 6. Defendants have fulfilled my order not to transfer prisoners from other facilities to Camp Branch if they are participating in court ordered programming. However, Defendants are in contempt of my order requiring Defendants to permit prisoners in camps to transfer from the camps to facilities providing vocational, apprenticeship, and prison industry programming. A significant number of women, roughly 38 percent of the population at Camp Branch, are not receiving court ordered programming even though their earliest release dates are more than a year away. Defendants are also denying eligible women the opportunity to participate in court ordered programming by transferring new inmates directly to the camps without providing them the opportunity to enroll in court ordered programs. Defendants do not even screen new inmates who are camp eligible for court ordered programming. Finally, Plaintiffs have failed to establish clear and convincing evidence that Defendants are in contempt regarding overcrowding or the omission of a life skills program at Camp Branch. Camp Branch is not overcrowded and it provides a life skills program. VI. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt for Failure to Comply with Orders Regarding Apprenticeship Programs at Crane Correctional Facility Defendants are required to provide five meaningful apprenticeships at Crane Women’s Facility (“CWS”). RP4-2. In so doing, Defendants were required to identify staffing needs, the type of related instruction that would be needed and delivered, and the space and materials necessary. Id. Defendants were then to establish a monitoring plan to ensure that meaningful apprenticeships were implemented and maintained. RP 4-5. The remedial plan also explicitly requires Defendants to recruit prisoners for the apprenticeships. Id. The mere posting of apprenticeship openings was held to be insufficient in my Opinion and Order of June 16, 1993. Defendants were specifically required to assist in motivating inmates to apply for apprenticeships. Opinion and Order of June 16,1993. For each apprenticeship, Defendants are required to provide on-the-job (“OTJ”) training and 144 hours of related (i.e., academic) instruction. RP 4-2. In 1993, after concluding that Defendants were providing inadequate related instruction via correspondence courses, I ordered Defendants to provide related instruction through one of three methods: (1) classroom instruction; (2) community college; or (3) lectures. Opinion and Order of June 16,1993 at 7. In their motion, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have failed to provide meaningful apprenticeships at CWF as ordered by this Court. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that one of the apprenticeships has never been implemented, that the training in other apprenticeships is inadequate, that Defendants are not recruiting participants for the apprenticeships, and that Defendants do not adequately monitor the apprenticeship programs. A. Findings of Fact Based upon the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearings, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), I find the following facts in regard to Plaintiffs’ motion regarding apprenticeship programming at CWF: 1. Electrician Maintenance Apprenticeship (106) The electrician maintenance apprenticeship has never been filled. Defs.App.Ex. 3. (107) There have been six postings for the electrician maintenance apprenticeship: December 9, 1992-December 23, 1992; February 24, 1993-March 10, 1993; May 11, 1993-May 25, 1993; July 6, 1993-July 20, 1993; October 11, 1993-Oetober 25, 1993; and March 14, 1994-March 28, 1994. Defs.App. Ex. 2. (108) There is