Full opinion text
ORDER KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge, Sitting by Designation. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), the Court is charged with the authority and responsibility of reviewing and, within its discretion, awarding reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, [or] 1983....” Before the Court, for the second time, is the application of plaintiffs’ counsel Thomas I. Atkins (Atkins), 135 Eastern Parkway, Apt. # 11-B-l, Brooklyn,. New York 11238, for legal services performed between the dates of 7/6/94-8/4/95 at a rate of $340.00/ hour, accrued in half-hour (30-minute) increments, for a total of $126,401.04, plus out-of-pocket costs and a fee submission for the consultation services of a Dr. Robert L. Green at $75.00/hour, accrued in half-hour (30-minute) increments, for an additional $36,057.50, for an aggregate of $162,458.54; the application of James L. Hardiman (Hardiman) of Cleveland, Ohio for legal services performed between 3/2/92 through 12/28/92 at $175.00/hour, for a total of $20,256.25, 1/7/93 through 12/22/93 at $175/hour, for a total of $74,200.50, 1/6/94 through 12/30/94 at $200/hour, for a total of $119,300.00, and 1/3/95 through 8/31/95 at $225/hour, for a total of $50,006.25, accrued in half-hour (30-minute) increments, with out-of-pocket expenses of $386, for an aggregate of $263,-786.00; and the application of David W. Whitaker (Whitaker) of Beachwood, Ohio from 11/22/92 through 12/28/92 at a rate of $160/hour, for . the period between 1/7/93 and 12/22/93 at $160/hour, for the period between 1/14/94 and 12/27/94 at $160/hour, and for the period 1/8/95 and 9/1/95 at $160/hour, all accrued in half-hour (30-minute) increments, for a total of $102,307.99, plus out-of-pocket expenses of $427.00, for an aggregate of $102,734.99, aggregating a grand total for all applications submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel of $528,979.53. Subsequent to the initial fee submissions and after they had been proffered to the Court’s Legal Advisory Commission for review and comment (Appendix A), plaintiffs’ counsel on October 25, 1996 jointly filed a pleading styled a Motion for an Interim Award of Fees and Costs, with supporting briefs. The motion requested an interim payment of fees and costs to Thomas I. Atkins in the amount of $63,200.52, plus $18,-028.75 to Dr. Robert L. Green, his consultant, for a total of $81,229.27; to James L. Hardiman in the amount of $131,893.00; and to David W. Whitaker in the amount of $51,-153.95. (The above figures have been recalculated and corrected). The Court recognized its discretionary authority to award reasonable interim attorneys fees to a prevailing party in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from infringements of protected constitutional rights; however, because a preliminary examination of the initial fee applications and supporting logs disclosed practices and line entries of material concern to both the Legal Advisory Commission and the Court, and because the form and substance of each application reflected relevant ambiguities which solicited explanation and/or reconciliation, the Court, upon approving payment of interim fees in the following amounts: Thomas I. Atkins $ 42,133.68 Robert L. Green 12,019.17 James L. Hardiman 87,926.47 David W. Whitaker 33,388.86 returned the fee requisitions to the respective petitioners for resubmission after a reassessment of their individual fee requests pursuant to a twenty-page contemporaneously-issued interim order (Appendix B), wherein the Court attempted to correct the petitioners’ misconceptions of prevailing legal precedent which addressed the issues of legal fee awards, and wherein the Court identified, with particularity, the areas of ambiguity which prompted its concern. The Court accorded plaintiffs’ counsel forty-five days within which to reconsider their fee applications and produce evidence in a hearing before the Court, by affidavit, deposition, or otherwise to, inter alia, support their requested hourly rates and time commitments; to prove that their logged entries were meaningful, informational, and instructive; to support the relevance, scope, materiality, and/or necessity for the applicants’ endless intratelephonie conversations between plaintiffs’ multiple counsel; to evince the absence of duplicated effort; to prove that the hours billed were not excessive or otherwise unnecessary; and to prove that accruing expended time in half-hour (30-minute) increments was and is the accepted billing practice within the greater Cleveland, Ohio legal community. Applicants have elected to respond to the Court’s invitation by resubmitting their original applications with inconsequential amendments, together with the affidavits of two practicing attorneys attesting to prevailing hourly rates within the greater Cleveland legal community, and a Memorandum of Decision as to Attorneys Fees within the venue of the United States District Court of Massachusetts (Boston) authored by Judge Arthur W. Garrity, Jr. in Morgan v. Gittins, wherein he approved a $300/hour rate payable to Atkins in that desegregation case. Applicants have also submitted a brief in justification of their resubmitted fee applications. The Court’s December 29, 1995 interim order returning petitioners’ fee requests for reassessment is, in material parts, reviewed and incorporated herein in the format of a final disposition. The burden placed upon the Court by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is a heavy one, particularly within the context of the instant case. In exercising its discretion in this highly controversial area, the Court must be ever mindful of fundamental principles that ensure fair, impartial, and equitable treatment of all interested parties, including their legal counsel. It should be noted that the Court subscribes to and endorses the concept that the plaintiffs and all defendants, the State of Ohio Board of Education, the City of Cleveland School District, and its Board of Education should be free to retain the most qualified available legal talent of their own choice without interference from the Court. The Court also subscribes to and endorses the universally accepted definition of reasonable legal fees enunciated by the Supreme Court, and echoed by every circuit court which has considered the issue in a school desegregation case, as “fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel, but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1938 n. 4, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). More specifically, [t]o put these [12] guidelines into perspective and as a caveat to their application, courts must remember that they do not have a mandate under Section 706(k) [of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) ] to make the prevailing counsel rich. Concomitantly, the Section should not be implemented in a manner to make the private attorney general’s position so lucrative as to ridicule the public attorney general. The statute was not passed for the benefit of attorneys but to enable litigants to obtain competent counsel worthy of a contest with the caliber of counsel available to their opposition and to fairly place the economical [sic]' burden of Title VII litigation. Adequate compensation is necessary, however, to enable an attorney to serve his client effectively and to preserve the integrity and independence of the profession. The guidelines contained herein are merely an attempt to assist in this balancing process. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir.1974) (emphasis added); see also Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D.Cal.1974); aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.1977), rev’d on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C.1975). Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. at 1937, also dictates that “[t]he amount of the fee, of course, must be determined on the facts of each case.” This statement does not lighten the Court’s burden in the case at bar but rather poses a material obstacle in pursuing a resolution because, on March 3, 1995, when the Cleveland School District was placed under the supervision of the Ohio Board of Education and its Superintendent of Instruction by this Court (a copy of its Order is attached for convenience as Appendix C), it was and continues to be hopelessly bankrupt. It had exhausted its half billion dollar annual budget, was confronting a shortfall of $30,-000,000, and was in need of an immediate, loan in that amount, which it was unable to negotiate. It required the funds to meet daily operating expenses and payroll until June 30, 1995 (the end of its fiscal year) because it had, during the short years immediately preceding the March 3, 1995 court.order, escalated its indebtedness from $35 million to a staggering and irreversible $140 or more million as a direct result of politicized mismanagement. Although the fiscal condition of the District does not directly impact upon counsel’s right to an award of reasonable attorneys fees, and this Court excludes it from consideration in arriving at a reasonable fee allowance, it recognizes, however, that every dollar of an excessive fee award is a dollar diverted from the education of the District’s student enrollment and from the Court’s ability to efficiently and effectively implement its various remedial orders. Thus, in the instant case, the fiscal condition of the District is material only to emphasize the necessity for a more scrutinizing review of legal fee submissions. The Court has read with interest the briefs of plaintiffs’ counsel in support of then-fee applications which imply that certain sections of Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis, 611 F.2d 624, 641 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 2999, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980) are in conflict with, and override, at least in this circuit, the “12 Johnson factors” enunciated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974). Counsel misinterpret the pronouncements of Northcross and other existing legal precedent that address fee awards generally and, more particularly, in school desegregation cases. Contrary to counsel’s inferences, the twelve “Johnson factors” are guidelines recommended by the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 2-18, Disciplinary Rule 2-106. Id. at 719. They are not inflexible elements to be rigidly applied in deriving a reasonable fee award. They are exactly what they purport to be, namely, guidelines to be considered along with all other factors that have evolved in common law and the exercise of experience and sound judgment. The Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Northcross merely amplified the application of the Johnson guidelines without conflict with its findings and conclusions. However, assuming arguendo the existence of conflict between the dispositions, the Supreme Court adopted the “12 Johnson factors” in Hensley, in 1983, five years after the Sixth Circuit’s 1979 decision in Northcross. The pronouncements of Hensley and its progeny, accordingly, would supersede areas of conflict, if any had existed, and would accordingly remain the prevailing precedent in resolving the issue of § 1988 fee awards. The responsibility of the trial court in awarding fees in cases of this kind is a thankless one because it is necessarily called upon to question the time, expertise, and professional work effort of lawyers appearing before it, which is difficult and distasteful. In all probability, its decision will be unsatisfactory to all concerned. The trial judge’s burden to conserve and protect the School District’s revenues has, at least to some degree, been lightened by the findings, conclusions, and mandates of the Supreme Court expressed with clarity and precision by Justice Stevens in Hensley, and by pronouncements of the other circuits which have judged the issue. This Court accepts the direction of Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40, that counsel for prevailing parties be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client within the venue of the litigation, for all time reasonably expended on a matter. As nearly as possible, market standards within the community of the action should prevail, for that is the best way of ensuring that competent counsel will be available to all persons with bona fide civil rights claims. In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d at 718, the Fifth Circuit stated: The customary fee for similar work in the community should be considered. It is open knowledge that various types of legal work command differing scales of compensation. (Emphasis added). A review of prevailing hourly rates within the Cleveland legal community by the Legal Advisory Committee and the Court reflects that they comport with the broad spectrum of hourly rates charged by various Special Counsel in the instant proceeding: 1. Special Counsel for the defendant State of Ohio Board of Education and its Superintendent of Instruction in the instant case is paid a rate of $95.00 per hour by the State of Ohio Attorney General, accrued in tenths of an hour (six-minute) increments; 2. Special Counsel for the Cleveland Board of Education charged the following rates during the period under review: a). Squire, Sanders & Dempsey Cleveland, Ohio $187.00/hr. b) . Hogan & Hartson $165.00/hr. Washington, D.C. c) . Teamor, Thompson & Associates $145.00/hr. Cleveland, Ohio d). Daniel J. McMullen, $175.00/hr. Calfee Halter & Griswold Cleveland, Ohio (Court’s Special Counsel) The Court also concludes that the above-listed range of hourly rates are realistic and ■ adequate to attract and ensure the participation of competent, quality legal counsel necessary to pursue the limited remaining issues of this ease. Accordingly, without justification to the contrary, upon considering the prevailing hourly rates within the greater Cleveland legal community generally, coupled with actual legal fees charged by qualified Cleveland lawyers and prominent Cleveland legal firms to address the issues of the instant desegregation case, the Court determines the lode star prevailing fair and reasonable rate for legal services to address the issues and controversies common to this desegregation action in this community to be $175.00 per hour, but no greater than $200.00 per hour. Existing legal precedent recognizes that a prevailing applicant seeking fees bears the burden of proving entitlement to an award by documented records of the hours expended and the hourly rate applied, with the proviso that “[plaintiffs’ counsel, of course, is not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time expended.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. at 1941 n. 12. However, the applicant “who seeks payment must keep records in sufficient detail that a neutral judge can make a fair evaluation of time expended, the nature and need for service, and the reasonable fees to be allowed.” Id., 461 U.S. at 441, 103 S.Ct. at 1943 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also Johnson and Northcross. Applicants, relying upon extrapolated language from Hensley that directs “the district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award” erroneously infer that the mere filing of a fee application satisfies the petitioner’s burden of proof and the burden is thereupon shifted to the Court to prove by clear and concise explanation the reasons for its adjustments. The interpretation is misplaced and belies Chief Justice Burger’s comment in his concurring opinion in Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440-41, 103 S.Ct. at 1943 that: A district judge may not, in my view, authorize the payment of attorney’s fees unless the attorney involved has established by CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE the time and effort claimed and [has] shown that the time expended was necessary to achieve the results obtained. (Emphasis added.) Nine years earlier, the Fifth Circuit, in Johnson, 488 F.2d at 720, when addressing the initial burden placed upon an applicant for attorneys fees, directed that it must be kept in mind that the plaintiff has the burden of proving his entitlement to an award for attorney’s fees just as he would BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROVING A CLAIM FOR ANY OTHER MONEY JUDGMENT. (Emphasis added.) This language indicates the standard of proof to be a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Plaintiffs’ dilemma in this proceeding is that their applications presently before the Court not only fall short of both standards, they fall short of a far lesser burden of providing information of sufficient detail or explanation to permit a judge to make a fair and meaningful evaluation of time expended and the nature and need for the services committed, as will be hereinafter more fully discussed. Because the district judge has a firsthand understanding of the litigation before him, and has had the opportunity to observe and evaluate the ability and performance of counsel, and because of his desire to avoid appellate review, coupled with his own knowledge, experience, and expertise to gauge the time required to resolve comparable controversies, dictates that the determination of a reasonable attorney fee should be left to his sound discretion. Moreover, the exercise of that judgment should not be set aside unless the Court has clearly abused its discretion. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 432, 103 S.Ct. at 1934; Johnson, 488 F.2d at 716-17. An applicant’s failure to maintain records identifying distinct claims in sufficient detail from which a neutral judge can make a fair evaluation of time expended, the nature and need for the service, and the reasonable fee to be allowed may materially jeopardize the amount of the award because [t]his calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services. The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly. The district court also should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not “reasonably expended.” S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976). Cases may be overstaffed, and the skill and experience of lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission. “In the private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an important component in fee setting. It is no less important here. Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40 (citing Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc) (emphasis the Copeland court’s)). The Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir.1974) noted that: Although hours claimed or spent on a case should not be the sole basis for determining a fee, [citation], they are a necessary ingredient to be considered. The trial judge should weigh the hours claimed against his own knowledge, experience, and expertise of the time required to complete similar activities. If more than one attorney is involved, the possibility of duplication of effort along with the proper utilization of time should be scrutinized. The time of two or three lawyers in a courtroom or conference when one would do, may obviously be discounted. It is appropriate to distinguish between legal work, in the strict sense, and investigation, clerical work, compilation of facts and statistics and other work which can often be accomplished by non-lawyers but which a lawyer may do because he has no other help available. Such non-legal work may command a lesser rate. Its dollar value is not enhanced just because a lawyer does it. (Emphasis added). Mindful of this Circuit’s admonition embraced by its three-tiered “clearly erroneous” review standard for determining the reasonableness of billable hours submitted by a prevailing party announced in Wooldridge v. Marlene Industries Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1176 (6th Cir.1990), this Court proceeds with caution when balancing the hours expended against the degree of success obtained, and resolves the benefit of any doubt in applicant’s favor. Common sense dictates that a reasonable fee based on the number of hours actually worked is not synonymous with a reasonable fee based on the number of hours required to resolve a specific issue or controversy. Stated differently, a reasonable fee is one predicated, in part, on time required to resolve an issue, not the time actually expended. Unfortunately, there is no precise rule or formula for judging the time required versus actual time expended to achieve the degree of success, if any, ultimately attained by a prevailing party’s efforts. This is especially critical under the circumstances presented by the participation of plaintiffs’ multiple counsel, as in this proceeding, who are individually and collectively addressing a single primary issue by endless intra and inter telephone networking that does not permit or promote effective correlation and review of applicants’ individual and collective work product. The Court’s meaningful assessment of applicants’ work effort is further frustrated in this proceeding by the inadequate non-informative amended billing records that do not permit a reviewing court to identify distinct claims and the issues addressed, assess the necessity for multiple counsel, and distinguish between redundant, unnecessary, and duplicated work effort versus the proper utilization of time. Under similar circumstances where a court’s meaningful comparison between expended hours versus actual hours required to resolve a controversy is defeated by the applicants’ inability or refusal to submit meaningful billing records from which a reasonable assessment can be derived, the Court, within its discretion, may deduct a reasonable percentage of hours billed to offset the potential duplication of services expended and other indeterminable issues of concern. A review of the record in this case discloses that historically and, more particularly, within the last four years, the award and payment of legal fees to plaintiffs’ counsel and Cleveland School Board attorneys has been treated in a cavalier manner in disregard of the pronouncements of Hensley, Northcross, and Johnson. During this period, plaintiffs and Cleveland School Board counsel have engaged in a practice, condoned by the local school board and its general counsel, of reciprocal accommodation by waiving objections to opposing fee applications despite apparent questionable billing practices. The rejection of Hensley, Northcross, and Johnson criteria by the local school board during the last four years, which may have resulted in the award and payment of excessive legal fees to plaintiffs and the local board attorneys, have been abetted by withholding those applications and payments from taxpayer scrutiny by a “work product” privilege classification unilaterally imposed by the board’s general counsel. A review of the past and present applications submitted by plaintiffs’ lawyers and board counsel discloses no information that could be considered as material work product. Additionally, because the fees paid to multiple law firms representing the defendant School District as special counsel were and are payable from a common public fund (Desegregation Fund # 12) with those paid to plaintiffs’ counsel, and because any excessive award of fees to the School District’s counsel also diverts funds from the education of students in the District and impairs this Court’s implementation of its remedial orders, the guidelines of this Order apply with equal force to past, present, and future fee applications of special counsel for the District. The Court also directs that all future fee applications of the District’s special counsel, will be reviewed by the Office on School Monitoring and Community Relations for compliance with the dictates of this Order and the mandates of the Supreme Court in Hensley. Accordingly, the Court orders that since past, present, and future fees paid to plaintiffs’ and local board special counsel in this case flow from taxpayer funds, the amount of fee awards shall be a matter of public record, and all fee applications past, present, and future shall be presumed to be a public record, unless a party invoking the “work product” or “privileged communication” doctrines have justified the assertion. The threshold requirement to qualify for an award of legal fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is compliance with the “prevailing party” standards evolved by the Supreme Court in Hensley. It is true that plaintiffs, in the instant school desegregation action, were initially successful in their efforts which resulted in the late Judge Battisti’s August 31, 1976 remedial order as reaffirmed on February 6, 1978. Although this Court was not privy to his subsequent remedial orders, it assumes that plaintiffs were equally successful in “substantially advancing their clients’ interests” by obtaining “significant concession^] from the defendants” as a result of prosecuting the merits of each of those successive actions on their individual merits. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430-31, 103 S.Ct. at 1938. However, past successes, for which counsel have been paid, do not necessarily embrace all successive future issues that may arise during the implementation of a remedial order entered twenty or more years ago. It would appear from Hensley that, to qualify as a “prevailing party” seeking relief arising from successive interpretations and implementations of a seminal remedial .order, subsequent successive action undertaken by applicants must address a “substantial” claim which, through the efforts of the applicants, has advanced their clients’ interests by obtaining significant concessions from the defendant. In considering the impact of the “prevailing party” doctrine, the Court and counsel should be mindful of the Supreme Court’s findings in Hensley that: If ... a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount. This will be true even where the plaintiffs claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith. Congress has not authorized an award of fees whenever it was reasonable for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit or whenever conscientious counsel tried the case with devotion and skill. Again, the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained. Application of this principle is particularly important in complex civil rights litigation involving numerous challenges to institutional practices or conditions. This type of litigation is lengthy and demands many hours of lawyers’ services. Although the plaintiff often may succeed in identifying some unlawful practices or conditions, the range of possible success is vast. That the plaintiff is a “prevailing party” therefore may say little about whether the expenditure of counsel’s time was reasonable in relation to the success achieved. In this case, for example, the District Court’s award of fees based on 2,557 hours worked may have been reasonable in light of the substantial relief obtained. But had respondents prevailed on only one of their six general claims, for example, the claim that petitioners’ visitation, mail, and telephone policies were overly restrictive [citation], a fee award based on the claimed hours clearly would have been excessive. There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations. The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success. The court necessarily has discretion in making this equitable judgment. This discretion, however, must be exercised in light of the considerations we have identified. Id., 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 1941 (emphasis added). In Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Education, 773 F.2d 677 (6th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083, 106 S.Ct. 853, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986) an en banc panel of the Sixth Circuit applied Hensley in a context similar to this case. In Kelley, the lower court had awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs “for time spent [on] unsuccessful charges of contempt against the Board, yet unresolved matters as to faculty composition, and their efforts to keep Pearl High School open.” Id. at 685 n. 7. In reviewing the propriety of these awards, the en banc circuit in Kelley remanded the case to the lower court to “follow the mandate of Hensley to determine which claims plaintiffs have succeeded upon and those which they have not, and to calculate the attorneys’ compensable hours accordingly[.]” Id. at 686. After Hensley, the Kelley court directed, “a party’s request for attorney’s fees [should] be carefully scrutinized as to the extent of success on each claim, and further, that time spent on unsuccessful claims that are distinct from successful claims should be excluded in determining a reasonable fee.” Id. at 685. The applications before the Court disclose that the majority of the billed time during the period 7/6/94 through 7/12/95 accrued from negotiations that resulted in the Joint Stipulation dated May 16, 1995 which modified the then existing intractable mathematical school student assignment policy of 70% minority ± 15% by adopting a controlled parental choice school student enrollment procedure. The amendment was opposed by plaintiffs. Because the resolution of the issue resulted in a Joint Stipulation, the Court concludes that plaintiffs’ contribution to the result was equal to the efforts of the defendants. Consequently, plaintiffs qualify as a “prevailing party” to the degree of their contribution in formulating the May 16,1995 agreement. Within the context of the “Johnson factors” guidelines, few, if any, of the unique legal and sociological confrontations that impacted an award of legal fees in early school desegregation litigation remain today, having faded into history since the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), some forty-two years ago. During the time frame of the instant fee applications, the Court finds that no novel or difficult issues confronted the applicants beyond the ordinary legal questions that routinely surface in an ongoing school desegregation case. Applicants have not been precluded or hampered from accepting employment or retainers as a result of participating in this legal action; the payment of their fees is assured and awarded pursuant to the dictates of Hensley; and any stigma which may have attached in certain quarters during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s to litigating school desegregation cases has also fortunately passed with the evolution of time. Assessing the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the Johnson court recognized that: Cases of first impression generally require more time and effort on the attorney’s part. Although this greater expenditure of time in research and preparation is an investment by counsel in obtaining knowledge which can be used in similar later cases, he should not be penalized for undertaking a case which may “make new law.” Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718. With the exception of the most recent landmark disposition in Missouri v. Jenkins, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 132 L.Ed.2d 63 (1995), the evolution of school desegregation law from Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) to the present, reflects that most, if not all, of the legal issues of first impression which initially attached to school desegregation litigation have been decided by Supreme Court dispositions a number of years ago and by various circuits throughout the nation. Remaining cases in controversy are generally fact specific and indigenous to local community school districts requiring the attention, legal perception, and understanding of local counsel who are members of the community and who are sensitive to the voice of the community from personal observations and involvement. This is particularly true where, as in the instant case, the primary issue addressed by plaintiffs’ counsel between August, 1994 and August, 1995 (the period that accounts for the majority of hours recorded in the applications before the Court)' were expended in formulating plaintiffs’ response to defendants’ posturing for a declaration of incremental unitary status for the student assignment component of the Court’s various remedial orders. The issue of student assignments has been addressed and generally resolved by the Supreme Court and circuits courts in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 118 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); and their progeny. Any novelty or uncertainty that may have attached to it as an issue of first impression, and the risks inherent to its disposition, have long since dissipated. In sum, the legal services for which payment is requested in the present fee applications are routine services which do not warrant enhanced hourly rates. Proceeding to the applications of Atkins and Hardiman, the Court takes no exception to their legal qualifications and longevity in the history of school desegregation litigation including their participation in the case at bar. The Court takes no exception to their academic training or demonstrated legal abilities. Recognizing Atkins’ impressive legal credentials and his requested $340.00 hourly rate accrued in half-hour (30-minute) increments, the Court notes that the legal credentials of Mark O’Neill (O’Neill) of Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley are equally impressive. He is and has been for many years recognized as one of the most qualified trial lawyers within Cleveland and Ohio and enjoys the highest professional reputation. His longevity in the instant desegregation case, like the longevity of Atkins and Hardiman, dates to its inception in 1973. His demonstrated legal ability, and his knowledge and implementation of desegregation law, are well-documented. He is and has been during the years of this litigation the special counsel of the Ohio Attorney General representing the defendant State of Ohio Board of Education. His present hourly rate is $95.00/hour. Fredrick R. Nance of Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio, a highly-qualified trial counsel with academic training and legal ability comparable with those of Atkins, charged the Cleveland School Board Desegregation Fund # 12 $187.00/hour. Hogan & Hartson of Washington, D.C. charged the fund $165.00/hour. Teamor, Thompson & Associates, Cleveland, Ohio, charged the fund $145.00/hour. Daniel J. McMullen of Calfee, Halter & Griswold, Cleveland, Ohio (Court’s Special Counsel), with credentials and legal ability equal to those of Atkins, charged the fund $175.00/hour. Within the menu of present day prevailing-hourly rates in the greater Cleveland legal community generally, coupled with the actual legal fees charged by lawyers with legal credentials, ability, and experience equally impressive as those of Atldns, the Court, within its discretion, determines that the reasonable hourly rate for Atkins’ services in this proceeding to be $187.00/hour. The Court further observes that Hardiman has been a Cleveland resident sensitive to the voices of the local community and directly involved in the day-to-day administration of this case for the plaintiffs from its inception, and is also a highly reputable and respected lawyer in the greater Cleveland legal community. He is an individual of demonstrated legal ability. Considering and applying the mandates imposed upon this Court by existing legal precedent, together with the prevailing hourly legal rates within the greater Cleveland area as hereinbefore discussed, the' Court determines that the reasonable hourly rates for Hardiman’s legal services to be: 3/2/92 through 12/28/92 $175.00/hr. 1/7/93 through 12/23/93 $175.00/hr. 1/6/94 through 12/30/94 $187.00/hr. 1/3/92 through 8/31/95 $187.00/hr. Whitaker received a fee of $4,482.50, calculated on a $110.00/hour rate for services performed between 11/11/88 through 5/14/90. He presently seeks payment in the amount of $101,880.00 for expending 636.25 hours (as corrected from 636.75 hours) at $160.00/hour between 11/22/92 and 9/1/95. A review of his presently filed application again challenges the Court to determine the nature of his services and how they objectively contributed to an identifiable controversy before the Court. He appears to have committed most of his 621 hours as a monitoring liaison between Atkins, Hardiman, and class representatives without explanation of the purpose or need for his seemingly endless meetings. He has recorded attending various court hearings, meetings, and conferences with the court-appointed Special Master and with other legal counsel at which Hardiman was always also present. His presence at these meetings and court appearances is without explanation. To the Court’s knowledge, with one exception during court hearings in March of this year, he has not been called upon to, nor did he, contribute to the occasion. It is virtually impossible to determine from his application if he performed legal services, services as a consulting psychologist, or monitoring services. The extent and need for his services are questionable and should be monitored and reviewed. The Court concludes that the hourly rate for his services to be $110.00/ hour. Atkins’ explanation in justification for accruing time in half-hour or (30-minute) increments is not persuasive. The practice, as demonstrated in these fee submissions, solicits ambiguity that defeats effective over-' sight and monitoring of the applications for redundancy, duplication of effort, and necessity for the services performed, and severely complicates correlation of fee schedule line entries. Accruing services in half-hour (30-minute) increments also lends itself to pyramiding. For example: (a). A two, three, or five-minute telephone conversation between plaintiffs’ New York counsel, who conducts his legal practice primarily, if not exclusively, by telephone from his apartment in New York City, and who seeks an hourly rate of $340.00 calculated in half hour increments, and one of his two co-counsel in Cleveland, Ohio, who seeks an hourly rate of $225.00 calculated in half-hour (30-minute) increments, results in a charge to the School District of $282.50. If the same telephone communication includes a second Cleveland co-counsel, who seeks an hourly rate of $160.00, also calculated in half-hour (30-minute) increments, that two or three-minute telephone call is escalated to a charge of $362.50. The same three or four-minute telephone call calculated in six-minute increments or tenths of an hour, which is the general practice in the Cleveland legal community, would cost $72.50. As demonstrated, the incremental predicate upon which telephone charges are accrued rises to a high level of significance in the instant action because of the great volume of intra-telephonie communications between plaintiffs’ co-counsel and the inter-telephonic communications between plaintiffs’ counsel, individually and/or collectively, and other parties to this case, all of which are difficult to correlate and which emphasize the importance of maintaining contemporaneous records to support fee submissions. (b). The interaction between incremental charges, hourly rates, and duplication of effort amongst an inordinate number of multiple intra-firm and/or inter-firm counsel representing the same plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, exacerbates the precipitous mathematical progression which • attaches to deriving a reasonable fee award for addressing a controversy and amplifies the Court’s concerns. The interplay of these elements, if not properly scrutinized, lends itself to inter-counsel and intra-firm networking which, as previously indicated, could result in pyramiding fees. To illustrate, if, on the same day, one law firm assigns two lawyers to consider an issue, each with a hypothetical hourly rate of $187.00, and they confer, the hourly rate becomes $374.00. If they, in turn, discuss the controversy with a member of the second firm with a hypothetical hourly rate of $160.00, the hourly rate increases to $534.00. If a second member of the second firm with the same hypothetical hourly rate enters the dialogue, the hourly rate is $694.00. If a member of the third firm with a hypothetical hourly rate of $145.00 is consulted, the combined hourly rate is escalated to $839.00, as compared to a $187.00 hourly charge if a single lawyer would have resolved the issue. Depending' upon the hourly incremental billing practice, ie. tenths of an hour or $83.90 on the high side as compared to $18.70 on the low side or $209.75 as compared to $46.75 predicated on a quarterly incremental hourly charge. Accordingly, the burden rests upon the multiple applicants to disprove by proof of sufficient weight any semblance of the above consequence. As illustrated, the resultant equivocal ambiguity of the individual and collective fee applications frustrates the Court from arriving at a meaningful assessment of applicants’ individual contributions to the derivation and execution of the Joint Stipulation dated May 15, 1995 that addressed the high profile subject of student assignments, cross-town busing, and other interrelated sensitive local community-wide concerns. In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes, and therefore orders, that the acceptable general practice within the greater Cleveland legal community is to accrue expended time in a given controversy in one-tenths of an hour (6-minute) increments, which practice will be applied in calculating all legal fee applications, including future fees and those presently before it, submitted by prevailing parties in this desegregation case. In considering the three applications presently before it, and in all other instances, the Court recognizes a legitimate concern for the protection of the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege; however, the Court nonetheless believes that many, if not most, of the daily entries presented lack sufficient detail in their description of legal services to permit the Court to fairly evaluate the measure of time devoted to identifiable issues addressed and the work performed. The amended applications, like those submitted in the first instance, are replete with non-informative, meaningless entries listing telephone calls to, and/or meetings with, co-counsel and/or other individuals without reference to and/or meaningful explanation of the purpose for the call or meeting, its relevance or materiality, the issues discussed, or other pertinent necessary information from which the Court can formulate a considered evaluation as directed by Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941. These same comments apply equally to time schedules prepared by experts employed to assist counsel. Judging the instant fee applications against the dictates of Hensley and its progeny, this judge’s personal experience in assessing the value of attorneys’ fees during more than forty-seven years of active legal practice, his personal observations and experience from presiding over this proceeding and in his researching the issue of student assignments and other controversies confronting the parties in this litigation during the last eighteen months, together with assessing the observations and comments of the Court’s Legal Advisory Committee (Appendices E and E-l), which has reviewed the applicants’ initial and amended fee applications, and because the applicants have accrued and recorded committed hours of service in ambiguous half-hour (30-minute) increments, a practice that defeats an effective review of their submissions for redundancy, duplication of effort, and necessity for the services performed, and severely complicates correlation of the fee schedule line entries, concludes, for the second time, that applicants have not satisfied their burden of proof imposed by Hensley or Johnson, nor have they satisfied the lesser burden of providing applications with sufficient detail or explanation to permit this Court to make a fair meaningful evaluation whether the time expended was not excessive (as it appears to be); that the services were not redundant nor a duplication of effort which, in many instances they appear to be; and that the services performed were necessary. All of these shortfalls of proof were brought to the attention of the applicants in this Court’s decision of December 29, 1995. For the reasons stated herein, this Court accordingly reduces the time submissions of Atkins and Hardiman by a factor of twenty percent (20%) and the fee submissions of Whitaker by fifty percent (50%). In reviewing the incurred personal expenses submitted by the individual applicants, the Court concludes that: 1. the personal expenses and costs submitted by Atkins in the amount of $3,401.04 are approved; 2. the personal expenses and costs submitted by Green in the amount of $1,595.00 are disallowed for the reason that there is no supporting explanation nor documentation for the said incurred expenses; 3. the personal expenses and costs submitted by Hardiman in the amount of $386.00 are disallowed for the reason that there is no explanation nor supporting documentation for the said expenses; and 4. the personal expenses and costs submitted by Whitaker in the amount of $427.99 are disallowed for the reason that there is no explanation nor supporting documentation for the said expenses. For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that all three of the applicants have individually failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence entitlement to the payment they seek. Applicants have not only failed to support their claims in the amount they seek by a preponderance of the evidence, they have been unable to satisfy the less demanding burden of submitting applications that could permit a neutral judge to identify distinct claims, specify the issues addressed, assess participation of multiple counsel, and distinguish between redundant, unnecessary and duplicated work effort versus the proper utilization of time. Accordingly, the Court authorizes the following fees to: Claimant Hours Approved Hourly rate Approved Total Fees Allowed Interim Fees Awarded E^qpenses Allowed Total Balance Due Mr. Atkins 294.2 $187.00/hr $ 55,015.40 $42,133.68 $3,401.04 $ 16.282.76 Mr. Hardiman Pre 1/1/94 424.6 $175.00/hr $ 74,305.00 see total below $ 0.00 see total below Mr. Hardiman Post 1/1/94 654.6 $187.00/hr $122,410.20 see total below $ 0.00 see total below Mr. Hardiman Total 1079.2 rate varied $196,715.20 $87,926.47 see above $ 0.00 $108,788.73 Mr. Whitaker 318.125 $110.00/hr $ 34,993.75 1,388.86 $ 0.00 $ 1,604.89 Mr. Green 367.60 $ 75.00/hr $ 27,570.00 $12,019.17 $ 0.00 $ 15,550.83 Two of the submitted fee applications are inexcusably untimely, seeking fees for services performed by Hardiman and Whitaker during 1992, and which fail to reflect informative entries from which the Court can properly evaluate the work performed, can determine if the work performed was redundant, unnecessary and/or duplicated work effort or represented proper utilization of time, and/or whether time charged was essential to the litigation. In the future, to ensure a uniform procedure from which the Court will be capable of conducting the above evaluations, all fee applications will be submitted semi-annually. Submissions seeking fees for services performed between January 1 and June 30 of a calendar year' shall be filed with the Court by not later than July 31 of that year. Submissions seeking fees for services performed between July 1 and December 31 of a calendar year shall be filed with the Court by not later than January 31 of the following calendar year. Court approved fees for any given reporting period shall be reduced by five percent (5%) for each week or part thereof that the fee schedules are out of rule with the filing dates hereinbefore ordered. IT IS SO ORDERED. APPENDIX A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION [Filed August 29, 1995] ORDER KRUPANSEY, Circuit Judge, Sitting by Designation. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Court is charged with the authority and responsibility of reviewing and, within its discretion, awarding reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party in “any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of §§ 1981, 1981(a), 1982,1983....” The financial crisis confronting the Cleveland School System that has virtually eviscerated the Court’s ability to implement its desegregation Remedial Orders, coupled with the System’s burden to fund ongoing legal services necessary to resolve a myriad of controversies, including its position in Reed v. Rhodes, et al., requires the Court to have access to rehable information from a credible and independent source that will accurately disclose the scope of legal and other expenditures that may impact the financial recovery of the District, so that the Court may readily assess the overall effect of those legal expenses upon its implementation of various Remedial Orders and to determine the need, if any, for additional remedies. A cursory examination of past fee submissions and payments to special counsel having reflected a disparity, the Court finds that an advisory legal commission would be of invaluable service to the Court in responding to its responsibilities. Accordingly, Richard Alston, Director of the Office on School Monitoring and Community Relations (Attachment A), James W. Barnhouse (Attachment B), Dale F. Kainski (Attachment C), and William R. Norton (Attachment D) are appointed to serve as a Legal Advisory Commission to advise the Court in the exercise of its responsibility to review and determine if future legal fees and expenses charged to the defendants Cleveland School District and the State of Ohio Board of Education for services rendered in Reed v. Rhodes, by prevailing counsel, are fair, reasonable, and consistent with customary practices in the legal process in this community and in compliance with the dictates in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974), as adopted by the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The Commission shall, in addition to the foregoing, oversight all special counsel retainers, contracts, assignments, all commitments incident thereto according to the above-defined standards, and perform such other acts as the Court may, from time to time, request. Its observations and recommendations shall be made available to the Cleveland School District’s General Counsel and to the State of Ohio Board of Education Superintendent of Instruction, its duly designated deputy, and its legal counsel, upon request. The commission shall, as a public service, perform its assignment as a pro bono service at no charge to the Court or to the litigants. All reports and/or recommendations generated by the committee will be treated with confidence and be reported to the Office on School Monitoring and Community Relations. IT IS SO ORDERED. ATTACHMENT A Office on School Monitoring and Community Relations 511 Terminal Tower • Cleveland, Ohio 44113 • Phone (216) 522-7300 • FAX (216) 522-7305 41596 082995 VITA Richard Alston Richard Alston is the Director for the Office on School Monitoring and Community Relations. The Office was created by federal court order to monitor desegregation of the Cleveland Public Schools. He graduated in 1973 from Case Western Reserve University with a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemistry. From 1973 to 1974, he was the science instructor at the Street Academy, an alternative high school operated by the Urban League of Cleveland. From 1974 to 1976 he was employed as a Senior Chemist for the City of Cleveland. In 1978 he received his. degree from the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. During his studies at Cleveland-Marshall, he participated in the Street Law Program, which included teaching at Cleveland’s East Technical High School. In 1979 he began work with the Office on School Monitoring where he has participated in the development of many reports, lectured and conducted workshops for the community. In 1988 he became Deputy Director of the Office on School Monitoring. Since that time, along with continuing his other former activities he has assisted in bringing the various interests together in the Cleveland desegregation case. He and his wife Denise Cameron have two children. “Observe, assess and report on the progress of the desegregation of the Cleveland Public Schools and ... foster public awareness and understanding of the desegregation process.” Order of U.S. District Court May 4, 1978 41934 RICHARD ALSTON 3963 Tennyson Lane North Olmsted, OH 44070 EXPERIENCE AND EMPLOYMENT: Currently Director for the Office on School Monitoring and Community Relations. Appointed to this position on June 1, 1995. Prior positions: Acting Director October 1994 to May 1995; Deputy Director 1988 to 1994; Administrative Assistant and Special Assistant from 1979 to 1988. Instructor at the Cleveland House of Correction. Instruct residents of the House of Correction in basic criminal and correctional matters. April 1978 to 1979. Assistant social service worker at Cuyahoga County Jail. Assist inmates in research of legal matters. October 1977 to April 1978. Law library reference desk aid. Locate legal materials for students and lawyers. June 1976 to October 1977. High School law instructor. Worked within the National Street Law Program.instructing high school students in legal fundamentals. October 1976 to June 1977. Senior Chemist with the City of Cleveland Water Quality Control Program. March 1974 to March 1976. Science instructor at the Urban League Street Academy. Taught high school level courses in general science, biology, and chemistry. August 1973 to March 1974. EDUCATION: Cleveland Marshall College of Law, Cleveland, Ohio. Acquired Juris Doctor Degree in 1978. Admitted to the Bar in 1979. Case Institute of Technology (CWRU), Cleveland, Ohio. Acquired Bachelor of Science Degree in Chemistry in 1973. James Monroe High School, New York, N.Y. Graduated 1969. PERSONNEL: A special interest of mine is legal education at the community level. An objective of mine is to provide basic legal information as a community service. Much of my legal training has been geared toward this objective. Born April 23, 1951 in the Bronx, New York. Married to Denise Cameron. Two children, Aaron and Taylor, ages 8 and 6 respectively. ATTACHMENT B CURRICULUM VITAE James W. BARNHOUSE PERSONAL Born Canton, Ohio — September 14,1942 Admitted to Bar— Ohio, 1967 Arizona, 1991 EDUCATION Ohio State University — B.A. 1964, J.D. 1967 Phi Delta Phi PRACTICE Kitchen, Deery & Barnhouse — 1973- ) (Managing Partner 1992- ) COURTS Ohio 1967— United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio 1974— United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit 1983— United States Supreme Court 1983— Arizona 1991— United States District Court, District of Arizona 1994— ASSOCIATIONS Cleveland Bar Association Ohio State Bar Association Member— Legal Education Committee State Bar of Arizona American Bar Association Member— Section of Tort and Insurance Practice Products, General Liability and Consumer Law Committee Economics of Tort and Insurance Law Practice Committee Self-Insurers and Risk Managers Committee Member— Section of Litigation Products Liability Newsletter— Quarterly Contributing Editor Federal Bar Association Member — Energy, Environment and Natural Resources Committee Member — Federal Litigation Committee Defense Research Institute, Inc. Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys Member— Insurance Relations Committee Cleveland Association of Civil Trial Attorneys International Association of Defense Counsel Member — Products Liability Committee Federation of Insurance and Corporate Counsel Member — Economics of Trial Practice Committee Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee Products Liability Committee International Association for Insurance Law United States of America Chapter EXPERTISE Emphasis of practice in product liability/toxic tort defense, as well as construction litigation, insurance and automobile law, and professional liability. ATTACHMENT C DALE F. KAINSKI PARTNER BURKE KAINSKI & VAN BUREN A LEGAL PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION EDUCATION Notre Dame Law School Juris Doctor 1975 Bowling Green State University B.S. Business Administration Accounting 1972 COURT ADMISSIONS Ohio Supreme Court, 1975 U.S. District Court, N.D. Ohio, 1975 U.S. 6th Cir. Court of Appeals, 1977 United States Supreme Court, 1979 PRIOR EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE Arter & Hadden Associate Attorney 1986-1991 Chief Counsel City of Cleveland Department of Law 1983-1986 Assistant U.S. Attorney, N.D. Ohio U.S. Department of Justice 1978-1983 Law Clerks Deputy Clerk of Court Judge Robert B. Krupansky U.S. District Court, N.D. Ohio 1975-1978 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Trial and Appellate Practice in the State and Federal Courts and Administrative Agencies Commercial Transactions and Litigation Building Construction Transactions and Litigation Corporate and Business Transactions and Litigation Civil Rights Litigation Employment Discrimination Police Misconduct Zoning Discrimination Government Litigation Real Property Transactions and Litigation Intentional and Negligent Torts HONORS, ACTIVITIES AND OFFICES HELD Special Achievement Award, 1981 United States Attorney General Sustained Superior Performance Instructor, U.S. Attorney General’s Advocacy Institute, 1982 Member, Ohio State Bar Association College, 1992-94 Beta Gamma Sigma Business Honorary Society Delta Sigma Pi Professional Business Fraternity Notre Dame’s London Centre for Legal Studies Notre Dame Club of Cleveland Past President PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS AND OFFICES HELD Life Member, Judicial Conference United States Sixth Circuit Life Member, Judicial Conference Ohio Eighth Appellate District Federal Bar Association Past National 6th Circuit Vice President Past Chairman, Younger Lawyers Division Past Chairman, Long Range Planning Past Member, Executive Committee Past Member, National Council Past President, Cleveland Chapter Past Director, Cleveland Chapter American Bar Association Ohio State Bar Association Akron Bar Association Member, Federal Court Committee Member, Local Government Committee Cleveland Bar Association Member, Federal Court Committee Member, Business Litigation Committee Cuyahoga County Law Directors Association Delta Theta Phi Law Fraternity BURKE, KAINSKI & Van BUREN A LEGAL PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION I CASCADE PLAZA— 10TH FLOOR AKRON, OHIO 44308 1111 TELEPHONE (216) 762-9500 FACSIMILE (216) 762-6008 ATTACHMENT D WILLIAM R. NORTON 8815 Pheasant Lane Kirtland, OH 44094 (216) 258-3258 SUMMARY Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary of Reliance Electric Company, a $1.8 billion, NYSE manufacturing company with manufacturing facilities throughout the world. Managed eight lawyer department with a total budget of approximately $4 million annually. Continually reduced outside legal costs, des