Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER BAER, District Judge: Defendants have moved for immediate termination of the Consent Decrees and all supplemental orders entered in this action and the six related cases that are encompassed herein based on the recently enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA” or “the Act”), Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, §§ 801-810 (Apr. 26, 1996). Plaintiffs oppose the motion on the basis that the Act is superseded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is unconstitutional. Although the Court’s concerns with this new legislation are myriad, I am constrained under the law to uphold it. As the Supreme Court reminds us in the course of upholding the constitutionality of a Social Security eligibility provision: [I]t is not within our authority to determine whether the congressional judgment expressed in that Section is sound or equitable, or whether it comports well or ill with purposes of the Act.... The answer to such inquiries must come from Congress, not the courts. Our concern here, as often, is with power, not with wisdom. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960). Accordingly, the defendants’ motion is granted and the Consent Decrees are vacated. BACKGROUND The Consent Decrees in these related eases were entered in 1978-1979. As drafted and agreed to by the parties, and proposed to the Court for its approval, these decrees aimed to ensure that prison conditions became and remained safe and humane. The Decrees address issues that affect individual detainees directly as well as more structural, institutional problems that arise in prison management. Detainees, it should be noted, are those men and women awaiting plea or trial. They have not yet been convicted of anything. A few brief examples of the most important provisions of the Consent Decrees may be helpful. On the individual level, the Consent Decrees ensure that detainee mail and property are handled properly, and that procedures in concert with constitutional protections are followed during detainee cell and body searches. On an institutional level, the Consent Decrees seek to maintain the physical plant of the jails in a condition safe for human habitation. They mandate that attention be given to vermin and insect control, sanitation, maintenance and refuse removal. Other provisions govern food services to the detainees and ensure that the detainees are adequately fed while in custody, with food that is prepared and served in a sanitary environment. The PLRA, which was passed and signed as part of an appropriations bill, deals primarily with prisoners’ rights and prison conditions litigation. This decision represents one of the first tests with respect to the constitutionality of the Act. Section 802 of the PLRA amends 18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(a)(1), 3626(b)(2) and (3) and 3626(e) as follows: (a) Requirements for Relief.— (1) Prospective relief. — (A) Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief. * * * :}: 5b* * (b) Termination of Relief.— * * * * * * (2) Immediate termination of prospective relief. — In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. (3) Limitation. — Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation. * % * * * * (e) Procedure for Motions Affecting Prospective Relief.— (1) Generally. — The court shall promptly rule on any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions. (2) Automatic stay. — Any prospective relief subject to a pending motion shall be automatically stayed during the period— (A)(i) beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed, in the case of a motion made under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b); or (ii) beginning on the 180th day after such motion is filed, in the case of a motion made under any other law; and (B) ending on the date the court enters a final order ruling on the motion. Retrogression or even harmful aspects of new legislation play little or no role in the Court’s assessment of its constitutionality. As now Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 101 S.Ct. 453, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980): “The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.” Id. at 179 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. at 462 n. 12 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 942-43, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (footnote omitted in original)). With that thought in mind a brief historical analysis of the twin concepts of what might be called reform in correctional policy and prison conditions may provide a valuable setting for this decision. In Colonial times, there were no prisons and certainly no prisons as we know them today. Prisons did not begin to appear until well into the 18th Century. This is not to say the colonists had no philosophy about crime and how to handle perpetrators. In essence, criminals were punished, punished severely and that was that. There was no thought that men and women who had committed a crime could be rehabilitated and go on to live useful lives. Branding on the forehead was a frequent penalty for a first offense; death for a third. The fact that there were no prisons played a large role in the colonists’ approach to punishment. In the early 18th Century, we saw the beginnings of our prison system in what were characterized as county jails. Prisoners were placed in rooms or perhaps in a single room; there were no cells and there was no effort to distinguish between or separate men, women or children. For some time and certainly into the second decade of the 18th Century, while there was capital punishment for murder, many serious crimes, including arson, rape and burglary, exacted the forfeiture of property, restitution and relatively brief terms of imprisonment. From the very beginning, conditions in our prisons were marked by overcrowding, fire hazards and poor sanitation. Some of the same conditions which prompted the Consent Decrees in this ease and at which the PRLA has taken aim. Later in the 18th Century in what is known as the age of enlightenment in Europe, the concept of “correctional” reform began to emerge. At the same time, the hazards of prison life became known and changes began to take place. In his volume, The State of the Prisons, published in England in 1777, John Howard awakened public opinion with a detailed discussion of the inhuman conditions prevalent in most jails and prisons. The same kinds of problems emerged from Howard’s inspection as had plagued the prison business from the beginning. They included poor food or no food; poor ventilation which prompted an increased risk of fire; little or no medical attention and overcrowding. Following the American Revolution, our new nation embraced the reforms of the enlightenment including attention to correctional reform and to prison conditions. America wanted to begin life as a nation utilizing the most modern concepts in the correctional field and the most modern penitentiaries. Correctional reforms began to appear in new state codes and the theory of reform primarily in the guise of rehabilitation replaced earlier thinking where punishment itself was the only goal. The modem prison emerged during the early decades of the 19th Century and incarceration was viewed as simply one of several correctional goals. It was part of a philosophy that allowed as how “doing time” was not an end in itself. Unfortunately the advent of the modern prison and correctional reform in America faded to have the expected concomitant impact on improved prison conditions, as one author suggests: it simply moved corporal punishment indoors where, hidden from public view, it became even more savage ... For the most part, the general public did not know what went on behind prison walls. But it regarded the prison as a form of punishment and believed that the undesirables confined there deserved whatever they got. Towards the middle of the 19th Century, reform concepts such as parole and the indeterminate sentence emerged and became important correctional tools. The widening use of conditional release and parole resulted in reduced populations in prisons and at the same time was proven in some studies to deter recidivism. Naturally enough, since parole was conditioned on evidence of rehabilitation, prisoners were more amenable to educational and other programs which they were given to understand would accelerate such a finding by the parole board. Parole and conditional release grew up during this period and remained with us for a century until the 1980’s when in the federal system at least parole was abolished. Prison conditions varied during the 1800’s for the most part prisons during this period remained overcrowded, dirty and poorly ventilated. Even early in this century, Kate Barnard, an Oklahoma official, reported as follows on a visit to a Kansas prison: Prisoners who failed to dig their quota of three cars of coal per day were punished even further. She found one 17 year old, who had been able to mine only two carloads, chained to the wall of the prison. Other punishments included a form of water torture and “the crib,” where inmates were thrown with hands and feet tied and drawn together at the back. In addition to the value of the prisoners’ labor, the State of Kansas received 48 cents a day for keeping Oklahoma prisoners and paid about 10 cents a day for meals. Additional reforms particularly new alternatives to incarceration were initiated at or shortly after the dawn of the 20th Century. They included community service and ideas such as work release, which was first passed in Wisconsin with the Huber Law in 1913 and worked its way east and a similar law having been enacted in New York State some half century later, in 1967. Work release programs permit prisoners at least for minor crimes to work during the day and return to their cell in the evening so as to earn some money and to ease their readjustment back into the community. With the advent of organized crime and the accompanying violence of the 1920’s and 1930’s, a new “get tough” policy was spawned and for the most part continues to this day. It is unfair to generalize since at different times during the last half century some states have adapted reforms and improved prison conditions dramatically. Clearly prison conditions have markedly improved since the Kate Barnard revelations, those changes, especially those within the last 20 years, are in some measure attributable to consent decrees of the type before me on this motion to vacate. For the time being we have settled for a correctional policy that focuses on legislation creating many new crimes with long terms for both the new and the old. Such a “hard time” and longer term policy has, since the inception of our prison system, been accompanied by less attention to prisoners’ rights and prison conditions. If this policy had proven effective, it might at least be understandable. It has not. It is interesting to note that the primary result of this policy is the emergence of a growth industry in the prison construction business, state and federal expense budgets for our prisons that have never before reached their current numbers, all at taxpayers’ expense, and one million souls in those prisons. Dostoyevsky wrote in the middle of the 19th Century, “the degree of civilization in a society is revealed by entering its prisons.” In short the fact that this legislation, signed as part of a budget bill and in the midst of an election year, passes Constitutional muster is far from the whole story. Far more important is what will happen to prisoners’ rights and the conditions in our prisons as a consequence of this legislation. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY While I must examine only those few sections of the PLRA before me, the hearings that examined the bill as a whole are instructive. First it is worth noting that some believe that this legislation which has a far-reaching effect on prison conditions and prisoners’ rights deserved to have been the subject of significant debate. It was not. A single Senate hearing before the Judiciary Committee, one substantive House Report, and some floor debate is all we can find. This is so even though Senator Hatch told us that as of January 1994, 244 institutions in 34 jurisdictions were operating under court orders and 24 reported having court-ordered population caps. The thrust of the criticism which prompted the legislation was that the federal courts had overstepped their authority and were mollycoddling the prisoners in state and local jails. In short, the time had come to let the responsible entities, the municipal and state legislatures, take care of their own correctional facilities. After all, the cost of keeping up with the decrees are state and municipal obligations to be borne by state and municipal taxpayers, why shouldn’t they be dictated by state and municipal legislative bodies responsible to their constituents. Senator Abraham made that thought quite clear on the floor of the United States Senate: The legislation I am introducing today will return sanity and State control to our prison systems. It will do so by limiting judicial remedies in prison cases and by limiting frivolous prison litigation. On the cost front, Senator Abraham went on to say: People deserve to keep their tax dollars or have them spent on projects they approve. They deserve better than to have their money spent, on keeping prisoners in conditions some Federal judges feel are desirable, although not required by any provision of the Constitution or any law. Again, the alleged problem and one at which the legislation took aim was the theme throughout much of the testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing that prisons have gotten too comfortable and they have gotten too comfortable at the hands of federal judges. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson of Texas put it this way: Prisons exist for the protection of society — not for the comfort and convenience of criminals_ Interference by the federal courts has put the interests of criminals ahead of the interests of victims and law-abiding citizens. Conversely, Senator Simon joined Senator Kennedy in voicing concern about the proposed legislation and they aligned themselves with the remarks of Associate Attorney General John Schmidt who noted: “The constitutional provision enforced most frequently in prison cases is the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.... Prison crowding may also be a contributing element in a constitutional violation. For example, when the number of inmates at a prison becomes so large that sick inmates cannot be treated by a physician in a timely manner, or when crowded conditions lead to a breakdown in security and contribute to violence against inmates, the crowding can be addressed as a contributing cause of a constitutional violation.” Senator Hatch again in a statement on July 27, 1995 pretty much caught what is thought to be the temper of the times and to which Congress was responsive when he said: Properly understood, prisons serve three fundamental functions: the incapacitation of criminals, the punishment and deterrence of crime, and when possible, the rehabilitation of criminals. Incapacitation is the linchpin on which the others depend — punishment and rehabilitation cannot be accomplished if the criminal is not first incapacitated. If we know nothing else, we know that the criminal who is behind bars is not victimizing other innocent people in society at large. Punishment is also a vital function of the prison system. Ideally, it instills in the criminal an understanding that breaking society’s rules has consequences, and encourages the criminal to reform. The credible threat of serious punishment also should deter persons from committing crimes. Equally important, punishment provides closure and peace of mind to victims of crime, who too often are forgotten by the criminal justice system. The legislative history goes on to emphasize that “hard time” for convicted men and women is the only way to protect the public and that more hard time will protect the public more. Neal R. Peirce, a syndicated columnist and author, tells us something about how that trend has come to manifest itself: Leg-ironed work crews have recently been instituted in Alabama, Florida, Arizona and Wisconsin. Gov. William Weld (R., Mass.) apparently speaks for many when he argues prisons should be ‘a tour through the circles of hell,’ where inmates should learn only ‘the joys of busting rocks.’ Garner, Georgia’s new corrections chief, provides a foreboding picture of what that future might be. Wearing a black uniform and black boots like his own riot squad, he personally leads raids on prisons, a canine unit in tow. The prisoners are herded outside so officers can tear up their cells in search of contraband (often smashing prisoners’ Walkman radios in the process). THE DECLARATIONS In this matter, each side has submitted extensive declarations along with thousands of pages of exhibits. The exhibits essentially paint a historical survey of the Consent Decrees. The first of such Decrees was entered 18 years ago in 1978 and addressed conditions on Rikers Island and in several jails throughout the City now numbering 16 in all and accommodating today some 16,000 detainees. The conditions that brought about the Consent Decrees are not dissimilar from those that have plagued our nation from the time of our first prisons. They include environmental health and safety concerns and overcrowding. Interestingly, while the City suggests that each consent decree has added to what they conclude is the micro management mania of today, they neglect to evidence much awareness that each consent decree by definition required their imprimatur. Commissioner Michael F. Jacobson, Commissioner of the Department of Correction, by way of explanation, suggests that the City of New York was in some sense coerced into signing the Consent Decrees and what he characterizes as “court ordered” stipulations. There is testimony at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing from former Attorney General William Barr to the effect that during his tenure, jurisdictions under the aegis of consent decrees were invited to use his good offices to extricate themselves from such burdens. While Texas, Michigan and Philadelphia took him up on the offer, New York did not. John Boston, in his declaration on behalf of the plaintiffs goes on to dispute the City’s position that while there were many allegations of unconstitutional conditions, none were ever proven. He sets forth constitutional violations both with respect to protracted confinement in receiving rooms and overcrowding. See Benjamin v. Sielaff, 752 F.Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y.1990); Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F.Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.1983). Further, Mr. Boston points to the 1970’s, as the decade during which cases were brought that alleged overcrowding and other uneon-stitutional conditions in the prisons, one of which resulted in the City closing the Tombs (a Manhattan jail) rather than make the requisite improvements. The first consent decree followed the Benjamin v. Malcolm trial and was the result of an agreement reached while the matter was sub judice following months of negotiations. Tracing the history further, Mr. Boston’s declaration outlines how the City failed to comply with the decrees and that it was as a consequence of those repeated failures that in 1981, a motion was made by the plaintiff to hold the City in contempt. The City did not deny violations of the decree and rather than litigate the contempt motion, the City agreed to fund the creation of what came to be known as the Office of Compliance Consultants (OCC). With the advent of OCC, the plaintiffs declare that there continued to be “sluggish movement of the project,” Declaration of John Boston dated June 12,1996, at 5 (quoting OCC Third Progress Report 6 (Sept. 23, 1983), and contend that from the get go there was little commitment by the Department of Correction except perhaps at the very top and that any changes that were made were basically cosmetic in nature. The Boston declaration goes on to decry the “stagnate” situation and faltering progress by the City. Thereafter in 1990, the court found it necessary to set out specific steps to be taken by the City in order to achieve compliance with the Consent Decrees. See Benjamin v. Malcolm, 156 F.R.D. 561 (S.D.N.Y.1994) conditions evidencing non-compliance continued and resulted in sanctions, See Benjamin v. Sielaff, 752 F.Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y.1990). The City was ordered to close certain of its wooden structures on Rikers and in connection therewith, was apprised of considerable fire safety problems that required prompt attention. The plaintiffs contend that there is still non-compliance and OCC in February 1996 reports that non-compliance continues at least in the areas of fire safety, maintenance and sanitation. There continue to be problems in other areas as well all agree that improvements have been accomplished due primarily to the time and attention provided by the parties and the Federal court. Commissioner Jacobson in his declaration suggests that with respect to the bulk of the issues covered in the Consent Decrees and monitored by OCC, there have been few, if any, complaints. With respect to the areas of greatest continuing concern, such as fire safety the City has allegedly made operable every existing fire alarm system and has budgeted $82.8 million for further fire safety enhancements in the jails. Similarly for maintenance and sanitation, the Commissioner opines that with the new automated software system recently installed, maintenance will improve dramatically and with respect to sanitation, “[i]n general the jails are clean.” Jacobson Deel. at 9. One of this Court’s major concerns has been with respect to the wood frame modular units which not only leak but in fact may represent fire safety problems as well. The PRLA, according to the Commission, will trim the micro management problem, as well as the cost, and such legislation is long overdue. He contends that consent decrees such as the ones at issue here, “demean[] and demoralize!] City officials and employees. Worse yet by denying administration action, the Consent Decrees dissipate initiative and creativity.” Jacobson Decl. at ¶ 17. Stripped of hyperbole and taking history into account, the Declarations suggest federal court oversight of prison conditions was valuable. Now with respect to these constitutional guarantees, at least for the present, the challenge is for the City and the Board of Correction to be vigilant and attentive to those guarantees. DISCUSSION As discussed above, defendants motion seeks dissolution of the Consent Decrees currently governing certain conditions in the jails located on Rikers Island and elsewhere in New York City. Defendants rely on the recently effective PLRA which limits certain prospective relief in prison condition litigation and mandates a series of timetables for the duration of prospective remedies after which litigants may seek judicial review to determine if continuing enforcement is required. Plaintiffs oppose the City’s motion on the grounds that retroactive application of the PLRA to the Consent Decrees: (1) violates the Rules Enabling Act; (2) violates the separation-of-powers principles embodied in Article III of the Constitution; (3) denies them equal protection of the laws; and (4) denies them due process. The Court addresses these issues in the order listed based on two fundamental canons of interpretation. First, federal courts must consider and decide on a non-constitutional basis wherever possible. Only when a non-constitutional basis on which a decision may be made cannot be found should the Court reach any constitutional questions. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 2997, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985). Second, when deciding constitutional questions, the court must address the narrower grounds for decision first. See, e.g., Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., — U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 1452, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995) (citing Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (BrandEis, J., concurring)). The Court notes at the outset that it declines plaintiffs’ invitation to consider § 802 of the PLRA as a whole in determining this motion. Defendants based their motion solely on the immediate termination provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). Therefore that is the only section currently before the Court. The Court should not and will not reach out to determine the constitutionality of provisions not before it. Thus this decision is devoted in its entirety to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3), as amended by § 802 of the PLRA, and does not suggest that the balance of the PLRA is or is not constitutional. I. Rules Enabling Act The only non-constitutional grounds raised to challenge the immediate termination provision in § 3626(b)(2) is based on the Rules Enabling Act. This Act delegated authority to the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure in the district and circuit courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). The Act provides further that “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” Id. § 2072(b). Under this clause, statutes that are in direct conflict with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure are superseded. See Griffith Co. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 1194, 1197 n. 3 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854, 98 S.Ct. 171, 54 L.Ed.2d 125 (1987); see also Henderson v. United States, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 1638, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996) (holding the service provision in Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 “conflicts irreconcilably” with the service requirements in the Suits in Admiralty Act and therefore supersedes the statutory rule). Plaintiffs argue that § 3626(b)(2), which provides for “immediate termination of any prospective relief,” conflicts with Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b). This Rule gives courts the discretion to relieve a party from a final judgment “upon such terms as are just.” However, there is no direct conflict here because the two provisions can coexist. A court may still grant relief under Rule 60(b) on a discretionary basis if a party were to move pursuant to that Rule. In § 3626(b)(2), Congress has provided an alternative mechanism that parties may utilize to modify a final judgment. As there is no direct conflict, the PLRA is not superseded by Rule 60(b). Cf. United States v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 7-8 (W.D.Mich. July 3,1996) (holding that the PLRA’s automatic stay provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) is not superseded by either Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) or 62(b)). II. Separation of Powers Article III, § 1 of the Constitution provides that “The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Plaintiffs argue that retroactive application of the PLRA violates the separation of powers in that it mandates the reopening of final judgments, see Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995), prescribes a rule of decision without changing the underlying substantive law, see United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1872), and unconstitutionally restricts the remedial jurisdiction of the district courts. A. Final Judgments In Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995), the Supreme Court reiterated the concept that Congress could not require courts to reopen final judgments. At issue was § 27A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which modified the statute of limitations applicable to securities fraud claims brought under § 10(b) of that Act. Section 27A(b) required courts to reinstate actions that had been dismissed as time-barred under the old statute of limitations. The Supreme Court held this provision unconstitutional because it violated “the text, structure and traditions of Article III.” Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1452. The Court found that the “judicial Power” gleaned from Article III of the Constitution includes the power to issue conclusive judgments that finally determine a dispute. Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1453. Once the Article III court issues a final judgment, that judgment may not be altered by retroactive legislation. Id. While Plant concluded that Congress may not direct courts to reopen final judgments, the parties to this litigation dispute the definition of a final judgment for separation-of-powers purposes. Plaintiffs contend that finality depends solely on the right to appeal. Once the time for an appeal has lapsed, and the matter becomes res judicata binding the parties, the judgment is final and cannot be reopened by congressional, enactment. Furthermore, even though the Consent Decrees impose injunctive relief, plaintiffs argue Congress may not alter the prospective effects of these judgments because they are based on alleged violations of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and Congress has no power to modify the substantive constitutional law underlying the injunctions. In contrast, defendants argue that the finality inquiry is contextual and depends on the character of the judgment. The rule announced in Plaut, defendants contend, applies only to actions at law for damages. Injunctions, such as the Consent Decrees here, entail continuing, supervisory jurisdiction and therefore are not final judgments under Plaut. Finally, while Congress cannot change the scope of constitutional rights, defendants contend that it does have the power to limit the remedial jurisdiction of the district courts as it has done in the PLRA. A review of the relevant precedents convinces the Court that defendants are correct. As a constitutional question, the finality inquiry for separation-of-powers purposes involves a two-part jurisdictional analysis. The first part looks to whether the federal courts have jurisdiction over the merits of the complaint. Once the availability of further appeal, either to the courts of appeal or the Supreme Court, has been exhausted or waived, the judgment is no longer open to legislative alteration. See Plaut, — U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 1457; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 708, 712 n. 6, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987); Axel Johnson Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 6 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir.1993); Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 14 F.3d 486, 489 n. 4 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 1792, 131 L.Ed.2d 720 (1995); Georgia Ass’n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 805, 813 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090, 109 S.Ct. 2431, 104 L.Ed.2d 988 (1989). The second part considers the character of the relief awarded and whether the federal courts have retained jurisdiction over the remedial orders entered in the ease. Where the suit is an action at law for damages and the judgment has become final for res judicata purposes, the judgment is no longer subject to congressional enactments. See Plant, — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1456. Where the judgment imposes an executory decree, though, and the court retains supervisory jurisdiction, the judgment’s prospective effects are not final for separation-of-powers purposes. See DaYLo v. Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, 501 F.2d 811, 818 (D.C.Cir.1974) (holding that vulnerability to legislative alteration “would seem to depend on the character of the compliance called for”); Western Union Tel. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elect. Workers, Local Union No. 134, 133 F.2d 955, 957 .(7th Cir.1943) (“[Tjhough a decree may be final as it relates to an appeal and all matters included or embodies [sic] in such a step, yet, where the proceedings are of a continuing nature, it is not final.”). The seminal case in this analysis is Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 15 L.Ed. 435 (1856). In 1852, the Supreme Court issued an injunction mandating that a bridge across the Ohio River either be removed or raised because it obstructed the free navigation of the river. The Court also awarded the plaintiff costs. Thereafter Congress passed a statute that specifically stated the bridge at issue was lawful and designated it as a post road. After the bridge was destroyed in a storm, Pennsylvania sought to enjoin its reconstruction, but the Court dissolved the initial injunction based on the new statute. In so doing, the Court distinguished between an action for damages and an equitable decree: Now, we agree, if the remedy in this ease had been an action at law, and a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff for damages, the right to these would have passed beyond the reach of the power of congress. It would have depended, not upon the public right of the free navigation of the river, but upon the judgment of the court. The decree before us, so far as it respect the costs adjudged, stands upon the same principles, and is unaffected by the subsequent law. But that part of the decree, directing the abatement of the obstruction, is execu-tory, a continuing decree, which requires not only the removal of the bridge, but enjoins the defendants against any reconstruction or continuance. Id. at 431. The distinction drawn in the Wheeling ease has been consistently followed. The Court restated this proposition in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114, 52 S.Ct. 460, 462, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932): The distinction is between restraints that give protection to rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious to change, and those that involve the supervision of changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative. Similarly, in System Federation No. 91, Railway Employees’ Department, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 81 S.Ct. 368, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961), the Court held that a district court abused its discretion when it refused to modify a consent decree based on an amendment to the underlying law. The consent decree in Wright prohibited union shop agreements which were unlawful under the Railway Labor Act when the decree was entered. Subsequently, however, Congress amended the statute to permit such agreements and the Court held that this change warranted a modification of the consent decree. See also PlaUt, — U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 1459 (noting that legislation may affect “the prospective effect of injunctions entered by Article III courts” (citing Wheeling )); Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (holding consent decree may be modified based on significant changes in facts or law); Daylo, 501 F.2d at 817 (finding that the judgment in Wheeling was “vulnerable to retroactive legislation only to the extent that the remedy chosen — an injunctive decree rather than damages at law — directly affected public rights”); Class v. Norton, 507 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir.1974) (holding that Wheeling created a “doctrine of judicial deference to legislative revision of a statute upon which a prospective court order is based”); Johnston, 14 F.3d at 495 n. 10; Georgia Ass’n, 855 F.2d at 812. These principles are based on the “historic power of a court of equity to modify its decree in the light of changed circumstances.” 11 Charles A Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2863, at 336 (2d ed. 1995). As the Court wrote in Swift: We are not doubtful of the power of a court of equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions though it was entered by consent.... Power to modify the decree was reserved by its very terms, and so from the beginning went hand in hand with its restraints. If the reservation had been omitted, power there still would be by force of principles inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need. Swift, 286 U.S. at 114, 52 S.Ct. at 462, quoted in Wright, 364 U.S. at 647, 81 S.Ct. at 371. This authority is now codified in Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) which provides for relief from a final judgment where “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” See Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2863. A Rule 60(b)(5) motion, however, does not permit relitigation of the merits of the underlying dispute and is no substitute for an appeal. See Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 530-31 (2d Cir.1964); 7 James W. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 60.26[4] (2d ed. 1995). Therefore, Congress may legislate retroactively so as to modify the prospective effects of a judgment that is final for appeal purposes because this does not reopen the merits of the judgment. Cf. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S.Ct. at 464 (‘We are not at liberty to reverse under the guise of readjusting.”); Class, 507 F.2d at 1063. A judgment is “executory” and involves the “supervision of changing conduct or conditions” within the meaning of Wheeling, Swift and Rule 60(b)(5) where it compels a party to perform future acts or requires the court to supeiyise the relationship between the parties. Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1139 (D.C.Cir.1988). As the Second Circuit recently noted, “[i]n practical terms, these standards mean that judgments involving injunctions have ‘prospective application,’ while money judgments do not.” DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1275 (2d Cir.) (interpreting Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5)), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 512, 130 L.Ed.2d 419 (1994). While neither party argues that the Consent Decrees are nonfinal for appeal purposes in that the time to appeal has expired, the Consent Decrees are executory judgments with prospective effects. They impose injunctive relief over which this Court has retained supervisory jurisdiction. For example, the Court regularly issues orders fining the defendants for violating various provisions of the Consent Decrees and has entertained numerous motions regarding larger-scale enforcement and compliance issues. Recently, the Court modified the provisions regarding law library services for detainees in punitive segregation based on a significant change in factual circumstances, see Benjamin v. Jacobson, 923 F.Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y.1996), and the defendants have filed a motion to vacate selected portions of the Consent Decrees that is currently being briefed by the parties. Plaintiffs seek to distinguish Wheeling on the ground that it stands for the narrower proposition that an injunction is vulnerable to retroactive legislation only to the extent that the legislature may alter the law on which the judgment rests. Since the Consent Decrees here are based on allegations of constitutional violations, Congress lacks the authority to modify the substantive legal standards underlying the injunctions. Plaintiffs construct this argument on the distinction drawn in Wheeling and its progeny between public and private rights. All of the cases in which Congress altered the prospective effects of an injunction, plaintiffs contend, involved decrees that were based on statutes in areas where Congress has plenary power to regulate, not in areas of constitutional rights which Congress may not modify, such as prison conditions. For example, Wheeling involved the right of navigation along interstate waterways, while the consent decree at issue in System Federation v. Wright was based on a labor relations statute. See also Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 602-03, 43 S.Ct. 435, 436, 67 L.Ed. 819 (1923) (noting the public rights/private rights distinction in a suit to enjoin a consolidated school district that was retroactively legalized by a state statute after an injunction had been issued; the Supreme Court affirmed the dissolution of the original decree based on the new statute). In contrast, the Consent Decrees here are based on alleged violations of the constitutional rights of individual detainees within the plaintiff class. These rights, plaintiffs argue, are private, not public. Thus plaintiffs propose that in determining whether Congress may alter a final judgment, the Court must analyze the character of the relief imposed and the character of the right upon which the relief was based. Plaintiffs adopt the definition of public rights used by the Supreme Court in determining whether Congress violates the Seventh Amendment when it delegates adjudicatory authority to non-Article III forums, such as administrative agencies. Under this doctrine, public rights are those at issue in cases that ‘“arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments,’” Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51 n. 8, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 2795 n. 8, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50, 52 S.Ct. 285, 292, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932)), or that arise in private disputes based on rights that are closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme. Id. at 54, 52. S.Ct. at 293-94. The public rights doctrine, however, is inapplicable here. When the doctrine was first established in Murray’s Lessee v. Hobo-ken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1856), which incidentally was decided during the same term as Wheeling, the key element was the presence of the United States as a party. While the doctrine has been expanded in more recent cases, this original understanding is relevant to determining the meaning used by the Wheeling Court. Under the definition of public rights when Wheeling was decided, that case involved private, not public rights because the United States was not a party. This distinction is even clearer in Hodges which was both based on a state statute and did not involve the United States. Even today, the public rights doctrine is an expression of congressional authority and therefore must be limited to federal statutes. Plaintiffs’ argument that the source of the underlying right is an essential element of the separation-of-powers analysis must be rejected because the doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the structural allocation of power in the Constitution, rather than the individual claims in a particular action. The separation-of-powers principles embodied in Article III protect the jurisdiction of the courts from congressional abuse and overreaching. See Plant, — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1453-56 (providing historical review underlying finality doctrine). The doctrine is a structural safeguard, id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1463, that focusses on the relative power of the courts and Congress. Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1457. Article III invests the courts with the power “to say what the law is,” Marburg v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), and conclusively to decide cases free from legislative review of final judgments. Plant, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1453. Only the character of the relief awarded in a final judgment is relevant to the separation-of-powers inquiry because only that factor, and not the source of the underlying right, implicates the power and jurisdiction of the courts. As the Supreme Court noted in Plaut, “The issue here is not the validity or even the source of the legal rule that produced the Article III judgments, but rather the immunity from legislative abrogation of those judgments themselves.” — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1456. Perhaps a better explanation of the public/private rights distinction in Wheeling, repeated in later cases, is that the Court was merely distinguishing between different types of relief. A close examination of the Wheeling decision demonstrates that the Court focused exclusively on the remedy chosen, not the source of the underlying right. In the first Wheeling decision, the Court awarded costs and sustained an injunction. Both of these remedies were predicated on the fact that the bridge violated the public right of free navigation. As the Court held, “In both eases, the private right to damages, or to the removal, arises out of the unlawful interference with the enjoyment of the public right, which as we have seen, is under the regulation of congress.” Wheeling, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431. However, because the award of costs had become final, it was “unaffected by the subsequent law.” Id. In contrast, the executory decree was subject to legislative revision. Id. Had the decision rested on the fact that public rights as defined by the plaintiffs, i.e. rights created under the plenary authority of congressional enactment, been involved, both the damages and the injunction would have been held vulnerable. Thus the crucial distinction for separation-of-powers purposes is the character of the relief, not the character of the complaint. The D.C. Circuit appears to be the only court that has attempted to define the term “public rights,” and that court read the term broadly as referring to the relief granted. In Daylo, 501 F.2d at 818, the court examined, inter alia, Wheeling, Hodges, and Wright and noted that “the judicial decrees at issue called for actions which would have directly affected the rights of many persons not privy to the judgments, i.e., would have trenched upon ‘public rights.’ ” Indeed, after considering its earlier decision in McGrath v. Potash, 199 F.2d 166 (D.C.Cir.1952), in which the injunction only affected the parties, the court concluded that “[w]hat appears to unite these cases is that the injunctive decrees at issue were ‘legislative’ in function, attempting to control the legal status of a variety of future actions which the parties, or others, might or might not wish to take.” Daylo, 501 F.2d at 818. Thus the public/private rights distinction rests on the public nature of the decree, not the public nature of the suit. Finally, additional support for this analysis is found in the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 14 F.3d 486 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 1792, 131 L.Ed.2d 720 (1995). This was a pre-Plaut decision that found § 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act unconstitutional. In so doing, the court distinguished Wheeling and Hodges on the ground that “the rights involved were public rights — as opposed to the private rights asserted here — and a judgment declaring a public right may be annulled by subsequent legislation.” Id. at 492. The securities laws come within Congress’ plenary power under the Commerce Clause. Therefore, if a securities fraud action for damages involves private, rather than public, rights, the distinction must not be based on the source of the underlying law. Again what appears dispositive is the character of the relief. As the Consent Decrees embody executory relief over which the Court has retained supervisory jurisdiction, they are subject to alteration by retroactive legislation. Therefore, this Court finds that the section of the PLRA at issue here, 18 U.S.C. § 8626(b)(2), does not reopen final judgments in violation of the separation-of-powers principles outlined in Plaut See Plyler v. Moore, Civ.A. No. 8:82-876-2 (D.S.C. June 4, 1996) (bench ruling). B. Rules of Decision Plaintiffs also argue that the PLRA violates the rule of United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1872), because it prescribes a rule of decision without changing the underlying law. Klein involved a suit to recover the proceeds of cotton abandoned by a Confederate sympathizer during the Civil War to United States Treasury Agents. The rebel, Y.F. Wilson, later received a presidential pardon and swore an oath of loyalty to the Union. His administrator, Klein, sought recovery of the funds for his estate and the Court of Claims ruled in his favor based on a statute providing for such awards to former members of the Confederacy who were pardoned by the President and swore an oath of loyalty. However, while the case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, Congress passed a new statute mandating that presidential pardons could not be considered as evidence of loyalty, rather that such pardons were con-elusive evidence of disloyalty and that if judgment had already been rendered the Supreme Court must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court rejected the statute because, inter alia, it impermissibly imposed a rule of decision for pending cases. The Court distinguished its decision in Wheeling because in that case Congress had left the courts free “to apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances created by the act.” Id. at 147. Klein has been interpreted to hold that Congress may not prescribe a rule of decision for the courts to follow without any independent exercise of their judicial powers. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 391-92, 100 S.Ct. 2716, 2728-29, 65 L.Ed.2d 844 (1980). To affect the outcome of a pending case, Congress must amend the applicable law. See Axel Johnson Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 6 F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir.1993) (“The rule of Klein precludes Congress from usurping the adjudicative function assigned to the federal courts under Article III. However, Klein does not preclude Congress from changing the law applicable to pending cases.”); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir.1992) (upholding § 27A(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, which was not at issue in Plaut, against a Klein challenge because “the Act does not require courts to make any particular findings of fact or applications of law to fact”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 828, 114 S.Ct. 95, 126 L.Ed.2d 62 (1993); see also Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429, 438-39, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 1413-14, 118 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992) (upholding statute against separation-of-powers challenge based on conclusion that the new statute “compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law” without conclusively interpreting Klein). Plaintiffs argue that, as in Klein, Congress has denied this Court the power independently to decide the present motion. Rather, Congress has prescribed a rule of decision. The Court may only look at the record and determine if there was ever a finding of a constitutional violation. If there was not, then the Court must vacate the decrees, just as in Klein where the Supreme Court was directed to dismiss the suit if it was based on a presidential pardon. Furthermore, plaintiffs contend that Congress did not amend the applicable law because it lacked the authority to alter constitutional rights. However, while Congress did not amend the substantive law with respect to permissible prison conditions, it did change the law governing the district court’s remedial powers. Under the new law, courts must apply the same limitations on relief to consent judgments as to litigated judgments. This restriction is an obvious change. Prior to the PLRA, a court could enter a consent judgment as long as it is within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, comes generally within the scope of the pleadings and furthers the objectives of the law upon which the complaint is based. Local Number 93, Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3077, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986); see also id. at 525, 106 S.Ct. at 3077 (“Therefore, a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after trial.”). Furthermore, the power to enter the decree carries with it the power to enforce the decree with relief that is broader than that which could be granted after trial. See Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir.1989). In Rufo, for example, where the consent decree addressed the appropriate remedy after the district court had found a constitutional violation, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering the decree even though it provided more relief that “what a court would have ordered absent the settlement.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389,112 S.Ct. at 763. The Court also held that when the changed circumstances warrant a modification of a consent decree, the court should not “strive to rewrite a consent decree to the constitutional floor.” Id. at 391, 112 S.Ct. at 764. Rather, the court should only address the changed circumstances and modify the decree “only to the extent that equity requires.” Id. In contrast, the PLRA requires the court to vacate prison condition decrees or modify them to the constitutional floor. Accordingly, since the PLRA “compel[s] changes in law, not findings or results under old law,” Seattle Audubon, 503 U.S. at 438, 112 S.Ct. at 1413, it does not violate the separation-of-powers principles established in Klein. C. Restrictions on Remedial Jurisdiction Next plaintiffs argue that the PLRA divests courts of remedial jurisdiction to such a degree that the courts are no longer able effectively to vindicate constitutional rights. Article III, § 1 gives Congress the power to “ordain and establish” the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court has held that this clause gives Congress the authority to limit the jurisdiction of the district courts. However, plaintiffs cite several academic theorists and dicta in recent Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that Congress may not completely strip the lower courts of their enforcement powers. The Supreme Court discussed the power of Congress to control the remedial jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 58 S.Ct. 578, 82 L.Ed. 872 (1938). There the Court upheld the Norris-LaGuardia Act which denied federal courts jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes unless the court made particular findings of fact delineated in the statute. The Court held that “[t]here can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States.” Id. at 330, 58 S.Ct. at 582. The Norris-LaGuardia Act is analogous to the PLRA and thus Lauf applies here. Under the PLRA prospective relief is only permitted if the court finds that a violation of a federal right exists and that the prospective relief “is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). As in Lauf, Congress has conditioned the exercise of a court’s remedial jurisdiction on the existence of particular facts that must be demonstrated on the record. In Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 63 S.Ct. 1019, 87 L.Ed. 1339 (1943), the Court reiterated the principles expressed in Lauf. Lockerty involved a challenge to the Emergency Price Control Act which assigned jurisdiction over disputes arising under that Act to the Emergency Court of Appeals and denied jurisdiction to any other court, state or federal. According to the Lockerty Court, “[t]he Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power ‘of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.’ ” Id. at 187, 63 S.Ct. at 1022 (citations omitted). The Court need not enter the extensive academic debate surrounding the power of Congress to control the jurisdiction of the district courts, however, because it is clear that § 3626(b), the only section directly at issue here, preserves the Court’s ability to enforce constitutional rights. Under § 3626(b)(3), a court may not vacate prospective relief if it finds on the record that constitutional violations exist and that the relief is appropriately tailored to remedy the violation. While seemingly cramped by the new legal standards in § 3626(a)(1) and the time constraints imposed in § 3626(e), it is nonetheless fair to say that courts will continue to define the scope of prisoners’ constitutional rights, review the factual record, apply the judicially determined constitutional standards to the facts as they are found in the record and determine what relief is necessary to remedy the constitutional violations. Thus cases such as Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988), and Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974), are inapplicable. In those decisions, the Supreme Court interpreted statutes to permit judicial review of constitutional claims in order to avoid the serious constitutional questions that would be raised if the statutes precluded such review. While one might conclude from a reading of the legislative history that what Congress sought was to deny courts the power to enforce constitutional rights, another reader could conclude that Congress wanted to limit that relief to a minimum. As the House Report found: The dictates of the provision [in § 3626(a)(1)] are not a departure from current jurisprudence concerning injunc-tive relief. “In granting injunctive relief, the court’s remedy should be no broader than necessary to provide full relief to the aggrieved plaintiff.” McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1182 (3d Cir.1990) (citations omitted). This rule also applies to constitutional violations. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2757 [53 L.Ed.2d 745] (1977) (remedy must be related to the condition that offends the Constitution); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir.1986) (injunctive relief must be “no broader than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation”), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 [107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871] (1987). H.R.Rep. No. 21,104th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 n. 2 (1995); see also Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389, 112 S.Ct. at 762 (“Federal courts may not order States or local governments, over their objection, to undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing a constitutional violation that has been adjudicated.”); Lewis v. Casey, — U.S. —, —, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (U.S.1996) (“The remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury-in-fact that the plaintiff has established.”). The Fifth Circuit recently noted that the requirements in § 3626(a)(1) are in accord with that circuit’s prior law. See Williams v. E