Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND....................................1424 II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT...............................1425 III. FINDINGS OF FACT.....................................................1427 A. Undisputed Facts.....................................................1427 B. Disputed Facts .......................................................1429 TV. LEGAL ANALYSIS ......................................................1430 A. The Federal “Due Process” Claim.......................................1430 1. The due process “privacy” claim.....................................1430 2. The “sick leave” due process claim...................................1432 B. Disposition Of State-Law Claims........................................1433 1. Absence of a federal claim..........................................1433 2. Invasion of privacy.................................................1434 a. Forms of the tort asserted here..................................1435 b. Disposition of Hanson’s invasion of privacy claims..................1436 3. Conversion of “property” interest in privacy...........................1438 a. The “conversion” cause of action under Iowa law...................1438 b. “Conversion” of “intangible” interests ............................1439 4. Intentional infliction of emotional distress.............................1439 a. Elements of the tort............................................1440 b. Outrageousness................................................1440 c. Emotional distress.............................................1442 5. Discharge in violation of public policy ................................1443 a. Retaliation based on sick leave...................................1445 b. Retaliation based on an assertion of confidentiality.................1445 6. Malicious prosecution and abuse of process............................1446 a. Malicious prosecution...........................................1446 b. Abuse of process...............................................1447 c. The improper prosecution claims here............................1448 V. CONCLUSION...........................................................1449 BENNETT, District Judge. When a plaintiff brings as many claims as might arise from allegedly wrongful conduct of a defendant as plaintiff believes have a colorable basis in law and fact, the court finds that defendants often respond by asking the court, in motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, to separate the wheat from the chaff. Here, just prior to trial, the court must decide which of seven claims, some of which have two variants, should proceed to trial. The plaintiff alleges wrongful conduct against her by a hospital where she was both an employee and a patient. She alleges that this wrongful conduct ultimately led to her termination as an employee of the hospital. The claims alleged include federal constitutional claims of violation of due process, and state law claims of invasion of privacy, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, discharge in violation of public policy, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The hospital asserts that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all seven claims. I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Plaintiff Dianne Hanson filed her complaint in this matter in the Iowa District Court for Hancock County on April 11, 1995, alleging seven causes of action against her former employer, defendant Hancock County Memorial Hospital, its board of trustees, and members of the board or employees of the hospital. All defendants are referred to collectively herein as “the Hospital.” The Hospital removed the action to federal court on May 8,1995, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (c). Removal was on the basis that one of Hanson’s causes of action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, thus presenting a federal question upon which to invoke the jurisdiction of this court. All of the other claims, pendent state-law claims, were also removed. Hanson’s motion to remand some or all of the claims to state court was denied, as was her motion for default judgment. The Hospital answered the original complaint on May 26, 1995, denying the seven claims stated therein. The original seven causes of action allege wrongful conduct on the part of the Hospital against Hanson in her status as both a patient and an employee. Hanson alleges that the Hospital’s wrongful conduct ultimately led to Hanson’s termination as an employee of the Hospital on October 20, 1994. On January 12, 1996, a magistrate judge of this district granted Hanson’s motion to amend the complaint to add an eighth cause of action, captioned as an “Amendment To Petition” and designated as another “Count I.” The “Amendment To Petition” was filed on January 16, 1996. However, the court granted the Hospital’s motion to dismiss this eighth cause of action on April 15, 1996. Thus, only the original seven causes of action are before the court. Precisely what those seven causes of action are is not altogether clear from the briefing of the parties. However, the court takes recourse, at least in the first instance, to the complaint itself for identification of Hanson’s claims. Count I alleges breach of Hanson’s right to privacy while a patient at the Hospital. Hanson alleges that breach of her right of privacy resulted in the Hospital, as her employer, terminating her from her position in the Hospital’s dietary and food service department. Count II alleges that the defendants “refused to maintain said confidentiality [of Hanson’s hospital patient records] and converted hospital patient information for their own use.” Complaint, ¶ 5. The complaint alleges that the value of the converted “property” right to privacy is $272,-380.00, and therefore seeks this sum as actual damages. Complaint, ¶¶ 5-7, and prayer. Count III is a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, in which Hanson asserts that the Hospital acted outrageously in two ways. First, she alleges that the Hospital acted outrageously in making public information concerning her stay in the Hospital after she requested absolute confidentiality. Second, she alleges it was outrageous for the Hospital to use the confidential information for the purpose of firing her rather than for her medical treatment. Count TV is a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The complaint alleges that Hanson’s termination was motivated by the Hospital’s belief that Hanson would make a claim for sick leave benefits. In the alternative, Hanson alleges that the Hospital fired her in retaliation for her efforts to maintain her right to confidentiality of her hospitalization. Count V asserts a claim of malicious prosecution, founded on allegations that the Hospital wrongfully prosecuted an action to deny Hanson unemployment benefits, but that the proceedings in question, administrative proceedings before the Iowa Department of Job Service, ended favorably to her. Count VI, which is founded on similar allegations, alleges that the Hospital abused legal process in the Job Service proceedings to compel Hanson to disclose confidential information concerning her stay at the Hospital. Count VII states the federal claim upon which the removal jurisdiction of this court is predicated. It asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Hanson’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, because Hanson alleges that she was deprived of her property right to sick leave benefits without a pre-deprivation hearing. Hanson seeks actual and punitive damages on each of these claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Hanson’s claims on June 3, 1996. Owing to various extensions, and the piecemeal filing of portions of her response, Hanson’s resistance to the motion for summary judgment was not completed until August 8, 1996. The court must therefore rule upon the motion promptly, in light of the imminent trial of this matter, which is scheduled to begin September 3, 1996. The court’s consideration of the motion begins with a recitation of the standards for summary judgment, continues with a discussion of the undisputed and disputed facts as demonstrated by the record in this case, and turns finally to the legal analysis of each of Hanson’s claims. II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes “that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine issues of fact away from juries.” Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1990). On the other hand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have authorized for nearly 60 years “motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, “summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555); Hartnagel v. Norman, 958 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir.1992). The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: Rule 56. Summary Judgment (b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move for summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof. (e) Motions and Proceedings. Thereon____ The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) & (c) (emphasis added); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett; 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shenandoah South, Inc., 81 F.3d 789, 791 (8th Cir.1996); Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1325 (8th Cir.1995); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir.1994); Roth v. U.S.S. Great Lakes Fleet, Inc., 25 F.3d 707, 708 (8th Cir.1994); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.1993); Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir.1990); Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here Hanson, and give Hanson the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); Rifkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 78 F.3d 1277, 1280 (8th Cir.1996); Marts v. Xerox, Inc., 77 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir.1996); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir.1994); Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1994); Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 545 (8th Cir.1993); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1991); Coday v. City of Springfield, 939 F.2d 666, 667 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.Ed.2d 416 (1992). Procedurally, the moving parties, here the Hospital defendants, bear “the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for their motion and identifying those portions of the record which show lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553); see also Reed v. Woodruff County, Ark., 7 F.3d 808, 810 (8th Cir.1993). The Hospital defendants are not required by Rule 56 to support their motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim. Id. “When a moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. Hanson is required under Rule 56(e) to go beyond the pleadings, and by affidavits, or by the “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir.1995); Beyerbach, 49 F.3d at 1325. Although “direct proof is not required to create a jury question, ... to avoid summary judgment, ‘the facts and circumstances relied upon must attain the dignity of substantial evidence and must not be such as merely to create a suspicion.’ ” Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir.1985) (quoting Impro Prods., Inc. v. Herrick, 715 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026, 104 S.Ct. 1282, 79 L.Ed.2d 686 (1984)), cert. denied sub nom. Metge v. Bankers Trust Co., 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S.Ct. 798, 88 L.Ed.2d 774 (1986). The necessary proof that the nonmoving party must produce is not precisely measurable, but the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1994). In Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, and Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56, the Supreme Court established that a summary judgment motion should be interpreted by the trial court to accomplish its purpose of disposing of factually unsupported claims, and the trial judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Johnson v. Enron Corp., 906 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir.1990). The trial court, therefore, must “assess the adequacy of the nonmovants’ response and whether that showing, on admissible evidence, would be sufficient to carry the burden of proof at trial.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 396 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552). If Hanson fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim with respect to which she has the burden of proof, then the Hospital defendants are “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Woodsmith, 904 F.2d at 1247. However, if the court can conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmovant, then summary judgment should not be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2509-10; Burk, 948 F.2d at 492; Woodsmith, 904 F.2d at 1247. With these standards in mind, the court turns to consideration of the undisputed and disputed facts in the case as presented by the record on summary judgment. III. FINDINGS OF FACT A Undisputed Facts Dianne Hanson began working for the Hospital on July 30, 1982, as a cook in the dietary department. Hanson’s employment with the Hospital continued until October 20, 1994, when she was discharged by the Hospital. The parties do not dispute that Hanson was an at-will employee of the Hospital. The parties also agree that the Hospital is a municipal subdivision- operating under state law and that it receives funding from Hancock County. Hanson’s direct supervisor in the Hospital dietary department was defendant Lyola Tulp, the dietary manager. The Hospital administrator was defendant Lawrence Crail. The other named individual defendants, Clayton Greiman, Dean Cataldo, Dorothy Larson, Lois Schroeder, Patricia DeWaard, Steve Palmer, and A1 Denny, were members of the Hospital’s Board of Trustees. It is undisputed that, in the year prior to her. discharge, Hanson began receiving below-standard performance evaluations and that, on October 1,1993, Tulp placed Hanson on what Tulp described as “probation” for three months. This first probation period ended January 1, 1994. Among the criticisms leading to Hanson being placed on probation was Hanson’s failure to inform Tulp before scheduling days off and arranging for other employees to cover for her. Tulp made another unfavorable performance evaluation of Hanson at the end of this probation period. Although the disciplinary procedures outlined in the Hospital’s employee handbook indicate that an employee could be discharged following a period on probation if performance did not improve, Tulp instead placed Hanson on “probation” for an additional six months. The performance evaluation indicated that if improvements were not made, Tulp would consider other “alternatives.” This performance evaluation and Tulp’s decision to extend Hanson’s probation were discussed with Hanson on February 14; 1994. The second probation period ended August 14, 1994. Hanson’s performance evaluation at the end of this second probation period still did not indicate improvement. However, Tulp and Administrator Crail determined that, rather than discharge Hanson at that time or place her on probation for a third time, if Hanson again violated Hospital rules or policy, she would be discharged. The Hospital’s employee handbook, entitled Personnel Policies, provides for notification of an employee’s supervisor of any absences as follows: “If you are unable to report for work for any reason, notify your supervisor as soon as you know that you will be unable to report for work so that timely arrangements for a replacement can be made.” Defendants’ Exhibit I, Personnel Policies, p. 2.8. Hanson had been criticized in performance evaluations for failing to get her supervisor’s approval for shift changes and instead arranging them herself. However, it is undisputed that employees in the dietary department sometimes traded shifts, and that Tulp’s permission for such trades was not always obtained in advance. According to her regular work schedule, Hanson had days off on October 20 and 21, 1994. She therefore scheduled a stay at the Hospital for a cancer biopsy those two days. Prior to entering the Hospital, Hanson executed a form request that all information concerning her stay at the Hospital be kept confidential. Hanson also arranged for other employees to cover her shifts on October 22 and 23, 1994, should she be unable to. return to work. Hanson did not, however, alter the written work schedule. The two employees who had agreed to cover Hanson’s shifts altered the written work schedule to reflect their, understanding that they were to work for Hanson. The focus of this lawsuit is the actions of Lyola Tulp leading to Hanson’s termination. At about 6:00 a.m. on October 20, 1994, Tulp reviewed the day’s list of patients, which is ordinarily supplied to the dietary manager- to determine dietary needs. She recognized Dianne Hanson’s name on that list. Tulp sought to verify the identity of the Dianne Hanson on the patient list by contacting the nursing division, and was informed that the person in question was indeed the Dianne Hanson employed in the Hospital dietary department, but that she wanted no visitors. Tulp then checked the dietary department work schedule, and discovered that it had been altered so that other employees were covering Hanson’s shifts for October 22 and 23, 1994. Tulp considered this change of Hanson’s work schedule without prior authorization from Tulp to be a violation of Hospital policy. Tulp also considered that Hanson had been warned not to make unauthorized changes in her work schedule in the performance evaluations leading to Hanson’s placement on probation. Tulp consulted Hospital Administrator Lawrence Crail, who concurred that the failure to obtain authorization for a schedule change was a violation of Hospital policy. Crail and Tulp therefore concluded that Hanson should be discharged for chronic, substandard work performance with the “last straw” being a further incident of revising her work schedule without authorization from her supervisor. In a letter dated October 21, 1994, Tulp informed Hanson that her employment was terminated effective October 20, 1994. The body of that letter státes the following: I have been informed that you recently had surgery at HCMH and are recuperating at home. I learned of this, not from you, which should have been the case, but from noting your name on the patient dietary records yesterday morning, and inquiring if it was you. I certainly hope your surgery went well, and I want to wish you a speedy recovery. Dianne, you have been on probation for over nine months for unacceptable behavior patterns, and have repeatedly not responded appropriately to my written and spoken requests for modification of your behavior. You have been very disruptive to the smooth operations of the Dietary Department, and it has been reported to me on several occasions that you have told others—not me—that you hated to come to work. When a person does not like her job, the quality of the work tends to suffer. This most recent incident, not telling me you were having surgery so I could modify the work schedule, but instead finding your own replacements, is just the last of a long, long history of unacceptable behavior. It appears as though your attitude is not going to change, though I have counselled you on frequent occasions. Therefore, with Mr. Crail’s agreement, I am herewith terminating your employment at HCMH, effective Thursday, October 20, 1994. I wish you every success in securing employment in a situation more to your liking. Defendant’s Exhibit H. Hanson complained about her dismissal first in a telephone call to Crail on October 26, 1994, but he advised Hanson that he supported Tulp’s decision to terminate her, and that the Hospital “stood firm” on the termination of her employment. Hanson sought and obtained a “name-clearing” hearing on March 9, 1995, with the Hospital Board of Trustees, at which she again complained about her dismissal and the alleged violation of the privacy of her hospital patient records. However, the Trustees affirmed the dismissal and provided no remedy for any alleged violation of privacy. Following her termination, Hanson filed a claim for unemployment compensation with the Iowa Department of Job Service. The Hospital opposed that claim, asserting that Hanson had been discharged for misconduct. On November 16, 1994, a Job Service representative determined that Hanson was entitled to unemployment benefits. The Hospital filed a timely appeal, but on January 24, 1995, a Job Service Administrative Law Judge affirmed the representative’s determination that Hanson was entitled to benefits. The Hospital sought further review before the Employment Appeal Board on February 7, 1995. Hanson filed her brief on appeal to the Employment Appeal Board, but the Hospital did not. Instead, the Hospital requested that its appeal be dismissed on March 8, 1995. B. Disputed Facts The record reflects that the following facts are in dispute. The question to be addressed below, in the court’s legal analysis, is whether these disputes of fact are material under the governing law, such that they preclude summary judgment on any of Hanson’s claims. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Beyerbach, 49 F.3d at 1326; Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 394. First, Hanson disputes the reason for her below-average performance evaluations by defendant Lyola Tulp. Hanson contends that Tulp was her supervisor for approximately six years. However, it was only beginning in 1989, and continuing through 1992, when Hanson began taking courses that would qualify her for Tulp’s dietary manager position, that Tulp began to give Hanson unfavorable performance evaluations and began blaming Hanson for things Hanson contends she did not do. Hanson therefore contends that Tulp fabricated the allegedly poor performance reflected in Hanson’s performance evaluations. Hanson also contends that she was not put on “probation” as the result of poor performance evaluations in late 1993 and early 1994, because she continued to accrue sick leave and other benefits that she asserts are not available to probationary employees according to Hospital policy as stated on page 1.1 of the Hospital’s Personnel Policies. Hanson contends that Tulp and other Hospital defendants have repeatedly stated that she altered the work schedule for October 22 and 23, 1994, but that it is undisputed that the written work schedule was altered by the employees who had agreed to cover for her, Blanche Chizek and Becky Kofron. Hanson contends that Kofron and Chizek misunderstood the arrangement about working for her, because she had asked them to cover for her only if needed. Apparently, Hanson asserts, Kofi-on and Chizek incorrectly thought they were supposed to cover the shifts no matter what. Furthermore, Hanson contends that she was able, and intended, to return to work on October 22, 1994, to work her scheduled shift. Therefore, Hanson asserts that she had no obligation to notify Tulp that she anticipated an absence from work on October 22, 1994. Hanson also contends that the Hospital was on notice that a cancer biopsy ordinarily requires only two days of time off, so that the Hospital should have known Hanson would return to work as originally scheduled. However, the record does not reflect that Tulp knew the specific nature of Hanson’s treatment at the Hospital apart from the fact that it was some kind of “surgery.” The Hospital contends that whether or not someone else actually physically altered the work schedule, it is undisputed that Hanson arranged substitutes without Tulp’s knowledge or permission, which is the essence of the violation of Hospital policy on the basis of which the Hospital terminated Hanson. Finally, Hanson contends that there is at least a genuine issue of material fact that the Hospital was aware of the stressful nature of Hanson’s reason for entering the Hospital. Furthermore, the Hospital’s own performance evaluations of Hanson indicate that she does not handle stress on the job well. Thus, Hanson contends that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Hospital knew its decision to terminate Hanson under the circumstances would inflict serious emotional distress upon a person already in a stressful situation. TV. LEGAL ANALYSIS (including some further ñndings of fact) Although it is the last of the seven claims in the complaint, the court’s analysis begins with Hanson’s federal elaim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This course is appropriate, because this federal claim is the basis for this court’s jurisdiction. Hanson has asserted that if the court finds summary judgment is appropriate on this federal claim, it should remand the remaining state-law claims to state court. Thus, the disposition of the federal claim may determine whether the court can or should also decide the motion for summary judgment as to any of the state-law claims. A The Federal “Due Process” Claim Before considering the merits of the motion for summary judgment on the due process claim, the court must first determine precisely what due process claim is at issue. As the court observed in its recitation of the procedural background for this case, the due process elaim pleaded in the complaint is that Hanson was deprived of her property right to sick leave benefits without a pre-deprivation hearing. This is the nature of the claim as the Hospital understands it, as reflected in the Hospital’s brief in support of its motion for summary judgment. However, in her resistance brief, Hanson appears to assert two due process claims. Hanson asserts a property interest not only in her accumulated sick leave, but in her right to privacy. She contends that Crail and Tulp deprived Hanson of her “property” right to privacy without providing any due process, and that the Hospital Trustees also failed to protect this property interest. The court perceives this “due process” elaim based on deprivation of Hanson’s asserted privacy rights to be an alternative theory for her other privacy rights claims stated in her complaint. 1. The due process “privacy” claim In the circumstances of this case, the court will not entertain the due process “privacy” elaim, which was never stated in any version of the complaint, but only in plaintiffs brief. Treating the articulation of the new due process claim in plaintiffs brief as a belated request for leave to amend, it is apparent that such a belated amendment should be denied. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that, except in circumstances not present here, “a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). The Supreme Court has stated that the granting of leave to amend is within the discretion of the district court. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330, 91 S.Ct. 795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971). Federal courts have generally and consistently recognized that the rules governing the amendments of pleadings are to be construed liberally. Standard Title Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 349 F.2d 613, 622 (8th Cir.1965). The leave sought should be “freely given” in the absence of any justifiable reason for denial of the motion, such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the defendant or futility of the amendment. Fo man v. Davis, 871 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). In Humphreys v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 990 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir.1993), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s refusal to allow a pre-trial motion for leave to amend where the amendment was offered as a change of theory of the case after summary judgment had been granted against the plaintiff and no valid reason was shown for failure to present the new theory at an earlier time. Humphreys, 990 F.2d at 1081. Similarly, in Sorenson v. First Wisconsin Natl Bank of Milwaukee, 931 F.2d 19 (8th Cir.1991), the court refused to allow what it called an “ad hoc assertion” of a new theory of a case after summary judgment in an attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact where none had existed before. Sorenson, 931 F.2d at 21. The decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals most nearly on point procedurally, however, is that relied upon in Sorenson, the court’s decision in Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 838 F.2d 286 (8th Cir.1999). In Wilson, the plaintiff filed an affidavit in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, in which he expanded on his earlier testimony concerning his discharge and created an issue of material fact as to whether the statute of limitations had equitably tolled in his age discrimination suit. Wilson, 838 F.2d at 288. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this change in the plaintiffs theory was improper, because a party could delay summary judgment by making revisions, and therefore no case would ever be proper for summary judgment. Id. at 289. In accord with the decisions already discussed is that of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Missouri Housing Dev. Comm’n v. Brice, 919 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir.1990), which cited with approval the following: [I]f the amendment substantially changes the theory on which the ease had been proceeding and is proposed late enough so that the opponent would be required to engage in significant new preparation, the court may deem it prejudicial. Brice, 919 F.2d at 1316 (quoting 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1488, at 659-62 (2d ed. 1990)). The Hospital has never acquiesced in the assertion of a non-pleaded claim, as its own brief reflects its understanding that only the “sick leave” due process claim was at issue. Furthermore, the assertion of this alternative “privacy” claim on the eve of trial works a prejudice upon the Hospital, because it would require significant new preparation. Brice, 919 F.2d at 1316. It would be improper to allow Hanson to forestall summary judgment by asserting a new theory so close to trial. Wilson, 838 F.2d at 289. Hanson has asserted no reason for not bringing such a theory of her privacy claim earlier, Humphreys, 990 F.2d at 1081, and indeed has availed herself of other opportunities to attempt to amend the complaint without raising such a theory. Such delays and failure to assert the new theory in prior proffered amendments, coupled with the prejudice entertaining the new theory at this late date would work upon defendant, are sufficient grounds for this court to deny an implicit or explicit request for leave to assert a new claim. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. at 230. Thus, Hanson’s due process claim will be considered here only as pleaded, i.e., as a claim for denial of due process in the deprivation of an alleged property right to accumulated sick leave. In the alternative, assuming that the court should entertain the belated “privacy” due process claim, the court finds that the Hospital is entitled to summary judgment on the claim. Hanson has failed to demonstrate that her right to privacy is a “property” interest entitled to due process protection. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty5 or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”); Jennings v. Lombardi, 70 F.3d 994, 995 (8th Cir.1995) (Fourteenth Amendment prohibits government from depriving any person of property without due process of law, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-09, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). The court therefore turns to consideration of the due process claim actually pleaded. 2. The “sick leave” due process claim The only due process claim, and hence the only federal claim, in this litigation is Hanson’s claim that she was deprived of her property right to sick leave benefits without a pre-deprivation hearing. The court notes that due process claims are generally subjected to a two-part analysis: (1) is the asserted interest protected by the due process clause; and (2) if so, what process is due. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1153-54, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982); Sanders v. Woodruff, 908 F.2d 310, 312 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Herron v. Woodruff, 498 U.S. 987, 111 S.Ct. 525, 112 L.Ed.2d 536 (1990); Tyler v. Black, 811 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir.1987), adopted in relevant part, 865 F.2d 181 (8th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1027, 109 S.Ct. 1760, 104 L.Ed.2d 196 (1989); see also Youakim v. McDonald, 71 F.3d 1274, 1288 (7th Cir.) (two-step analysis of due process claim, citing Logan), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2571, 135 L.Ed.2d 1087 (1996). In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the Supreme Court wrote, “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty5 or ‘property5 interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332, 96 S.Ct. at 901; Jennings, 70 F.3d at 995 (8th Cir.1995); Demming v. Housing and Redev. Auth., 66 F.3d 950, 953 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Mathews). The possession of a protected life, liberty, or property interest is thus a “condition precedent” to the government’s obligation to provide due process of law, and where no such interest exists, there is no due process violation. Movers Warehouse, Inc. v. City of Little Canada, 71 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir.1995); Zenco Dev. Corp. v. City of Overland, 843 F.2d 1117, 1118 (8th Cir.1988) (“A discussion of whether a party has a right to procedural due process must start with the question of whether the party has a property interest in the thing taken away.”). Protected interests “are created and their dimensions are defined” not by the Constitution but by an independent source, such as state or federal law. Movers Warehouse, 71 F.3d at 718 (citing Craft v. Wipf, 836 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir.1987)); Zenco Dev. Corp., 843 F.2d at 1118. When the assertedly protected interest is a grant of a benefit or privilege from the government, a person “must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He [or she] must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id. (again citing Craft, which in turn quotes Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709); Zenco Dev. Corp., 843 F.2d at 1118 (also quoting Roth). The court will pass, at least for now, on the question of whether Hanson’s sick leave benefits are such a property right, to consider instead the second step of the due process analysis. The next step in the due process analysis is to ask what process is due in the present instance, Sanders, 908 F.2d at 312, or, to put it another way, what process is due in light of “the practicalities and peculiarities of the ease”? Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (due process is a “flexible concept”; its protections vary according to the demands of a particular set of circumstances); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Griffin-El v. Delo, 34 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir.1994) (the extent of due process required depends upon particular interests affected, citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332-35, 96 S.Ct. at 901-03); Birdsell v. Board of Fire and Police Comm’rs, 854 F.2d 204, 207-09 (7th Cir.1988). In general, due process requires that a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker be provided at a meaningful time, and in a meaningful manner. Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 260 (8th Cir.1994) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332, 96 S.Ct. at 901). However, although a state must generally provide due process before depriving a citizen of property, when pre-deprivation process is impractical or impossible, the availability of some meaningful post-deprivation remedy satisfies due process. Parrott v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1914-15, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Furthermore, a due process claim lacks merit where there exists an adequate state court remedy. Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Parrott, and finding adequate state court remedy pre cluding § 1983 due process claim under a state statute providing for enforcement of visitation orders). This doctrine applies to deprivations of property or liberty. Zakrzewski, 87 F.3d at 1014; Williams-El v. Johnson, 872 F.2d 224, 224 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 199, 107 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989); Birkenholz v. Sluyter, 857 F.2d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir.1988). However, the availability of state law post-depriva tion remedies is relevant “only where the challenged acts of state officials can be eharacterized as random and unauthorized.” Coleman, 40 F.3d at 262 (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541, 101 S.Ct. at 1916; Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3207-08, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); emphasis in the original). The discharge of an at-will employee resulting in the loss of accumulated sick leave is not such that the state can predict when the loss of sick leave will occur and the discharge of such an employee is not the result of an established state procedure. It is instead the result of a random and unauthorized, and assertedly intentional, act by state employees, Tulp and Crail. Coleman, 40 F.3d at 262. Therefore, this is a situation in which state post-deprivation remedies must be deemed to bar Hanson’s due process claim, if such remedies are adequate. Zakrzewski, 87 F.3d at 1014. Adequate state-law remedies for Hanson’s claim do indeed exist. Hanson may pursue a claim for accumulated sick leave pursuant to the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Act, Iowa Code Ch. 91A. Thus, her due process claim fails. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Hanson’s only federal claim. B. Disposition OfState-JMW Claims 1. Absence of a federal claim Hanson contends that if summary judgment is appropriate on her only federal claim, the court must remand the state-law claims to state court for adjudication, rather than proceed to disposition of those claims either on summary judgment or at trial. The rule Hanson asserts, however, is not the law. The rule is instead that a federal district court has discretion to dismiss without prejudice state law claims remaining before the court after the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction....”; emphasis added); Labickas v. Arkansas State Univ., 78 F.3d 333, 334 (8th Cir.1996) (it is within the district court’s discretion to dismiss state-law claims once summary judgment or dismissal has been granted on all federal claims, but dismissal should be without prejudice); McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir.1994) (28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides the district court with discretion to reject jurisdiction over supplemental claims, but only if they fall within one of the instances stated). Some time ago, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals identified factors the district court should consider in deciding whether, upon dismissal or summary judgment on a federal claim, it should, in its discretion, dismiss the remaining state-law claims. Koke v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 1340, 1346 (8th Cir.1980). Those factors include “the difficulty of the state claim, the amount of judicial time and energy already invested in it, the amount of additional time and energy necessary for its resolution, and the availability of a state forum.” Koke, 620 F.2d at 1346. The court finds this specification of considerations no less applicable to discretionary supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 than it was prior to enactment of that statute in 1990. Compare Willman v. Heartland Hosp. East, 34 F.3d 605, 613-14 (8th Cir.1994) (citing same factors stated in Koke, but affirming remand of the case, because exercise of pendent jurisdiction is discretionary when the case falls within § 1367(c)(3), and the matter may be remanded even after the parties have completed a lengthy and complex discovery process and the court has disposed of a motion for summary judgment just weeks before trial, citing Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 549 (8th Cir.1991)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1361, 131 L.Ed.2d 218 (1995); with Mizuna, Ltd. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank, 90 F.3d 650, 657 (2d Cir.1996) (also applying factors similar to those stated in Koke, but finding that when the federal claim was dismissed, the district court had discretion under § 1367(c)(3) to remand the case to state court, and had properly retained the case in consideration that “three judicial officers had already expended substantial resources on the case over a year’s time, and an order had issued that contemplated an imminent resolution; in addition, returning the case to state court would facilitate Mizuna’s fairly bald effort to avoid an unfavorable outcome that the court had already foreshadowed, and would be grossly unfair to Royal.”). Applying the Koke factors, therefore, the court concludes that the state claims are not particularly unusual or complicated, and this court has invested significant time and energy, as have the parties, in bringing this matter to the summary judgment stage and trial readiness. Koke, 620 F.2d at 1346. These factors weigh in favor of keeping any remaining state-law claims in federal court. Although the court will necessarily have to invest further energy in consideration of the motion for summary judgment on the remaining state-law claims, and yet more if the matter proceeds to trial, which might weigh in favor of remand to state court, it is readily apparent that the imminent trial date in federal court, and hence imminent resolution of a controversy almost two years old, is unlikely to be matched in a state forum. Thus, on balance, the court will, in its discretion, maintain jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, both to render a ruling on the Hospital’s summary judgment motion and, if necessary, through trial. The court therefore turns to consideration of the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment on each of Hanson’s state-law claims in turn. 2. Invasion of privacy The first of Hanson’s state-law claims is a claim for invasion of privacy. The Iowa Supreme Court first recognized the tort of invasion of privacy in Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817, 821-22, 76 N.W.2d 762, 764-65 (1956). Stessman v. Am. Black Hawk Broadcasting Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 686 (Iowa 1987); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904, 100 S.Ct. 1081, 63 L.Ed.2d 320 (1980); Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Iowa 1977). In Bremmer, the tort was defined as invasion of “the right of an individual to be let alone, to live a life of seclusion, to be free from unwarranted publicity.” Bremmer, 247 Iowa at 821, 76 N.W.2d at 764. Since the recognition of the tort in Bremmer, the Iowa Supreme Court has adopted and applied the principles of invasion of privacy articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977). Stessman, 416 N.W.2d at 686; Lamberto v. Bourn, 326 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Iowa 1982); Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Comm’n of Muscatine, 304 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Iowa), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086, 102 S.Ct. 645, 70 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Howard, 283 N.W.2d at 291; Winegard, 260 N.W.2d at 822 (first applying those principles). The Restatement principles the Iowa Supreme Court has adopted are found in § 652A and subsequent sections defining each form of the tort. Section 652A states as follows: (1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other. (2) The right of privacy is invaded by (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or (b) appropriation of the other’s name, or likeness, as stated in § 652C; or (e) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in § 652D; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 652E. Winegard, 260 N.W.2d at 822 (also stating that these four forms of invasion of privacy were cited in Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 508, 112 N.W.2d 862, 863-64 (Iowa 1962)). The court in Winegard clarified the requirements of each of these forms of the tort. Id. a. Forms of the tort asserted here The first form of the tort in question here, intrusion upon seclusion, was defined in Winegard as follows: Category (a) requires an intentional intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of another which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. § 652B. Id. The court noted further that both categories (e) and (d) of the tort require publicity or publication of some sort, and that the latter category overlaps the law of defamation. Id. at 823; see also Anderson, 304 N.W.2d at 248 (Category (d) “false light” theory of the tort, stating that although untruthfulness is required, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he or she was defamed); Howard, 283 N.W.2d at 298 (Category (c) publicity theory of invasion of privacy). Category (a) of the tort, however, does not require publication. Lamberto, 326 N.W.2d at 309; Winegard, 260 N.W.2d at 822; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, comment a. To recover under the intrusion upon seclusion theory of the tort, a plaintiff must show, first, that the defendant intentionally intruded upon the seclusion that the plaintiff “has thrown about [his or her] person or affairs.” Restatement § 652B comment e; accord Winegard, 260 N.W.2d at 822. Second, the intrusion must be one that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Winegard, 260 N.W.2d at 822; accord Restatement § 652B. The defendant is not liable, however, if the plaintiff is already in public view. Restatement § 652B comment c. Stessman, 416 N.W.2d at 687. The Iowa courts have made no other-articulation of the elements of the intrusion on seclusion theory of the tort, and, more importantly here, have not specified the degree of injury necessary to recover on the tort. Hanson also contends that she has asserted the third form of the tort as described in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A(2)(e), unreasonable publicity, as further described in § 652D. This form of the tort was discussed in Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904, 100 S.Ct. 1081, 63 L.Ed.2d 320 (1980), again relying on the Restatement formulation for its articulation of the elements of the tort: This theory of invasion of privacy is defined in Restatement section 652D: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. Howard, 283 N.W.2d at 291; Winegard, 260 N.W.2d at 823. Hanson asserts that it is undisputed that Lyola Tulp gave “publicity” to the matters on which Hanson had requested absolute confidentiality, because Tulp “made known” to employees of the Hospital that Hanson was staying in the Hospital, and, as a consequence of that “publicity,” the employees sent Hanson flowers. b. Disposition of Hanson’s invasion of privacy claims The court finds that, despite genuine issues of material fact on the first element of Hanson’s first claim of invasion of privacy, “intrusion on seclusion” as described in § 652B of the Restatement, her failure to generate a genuine issue of material fact as to the second element of this claim is fatal. As to the first element of the claim, that the defendant intentionally intruded upon the seclusion that the plaintiff “ha[d] thrown about [his or her] person or affairs,” Stessman, 416 N.W.2d at 687; Winegard, 260 N.W.2d at 822; Restatement § 652B comment c, a reasonable inference from the record is that Tulp intentionally sought information from the nursing division concerning the identity of the Dianne Hanson who appeared on her patient list. Hanson’s assertion that she made a specific request for confidentiality during her hospital stay at least demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact that she had raised about her a curtain of seelusion concerning her identity as a patient of the Hospital that she did not want violated. However, Hanson’s claim founders as to the second element, that the intrusion must be one that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Stessman, 416 N.W.2d at 687; Winegard, 260 N.W.2d at 822; Restatement § 652B. It is possible that Tulp could not have obtained verification of Hanson’s identity had she not been a Hospital employee. However, it is the fact that Tulp was a supervisory employee of the Hospital, coupled with the limited nature of her inquiry, that take her inquiry and the disclosure to her out of the “highly offensive” category. Although both a statute, Iowá Code § 22.7, and a Hospital policy affirm the confidentiality of patient records, both reasonably relate only to disclosures to outsiders. Although it might be highly offensive for the Hospital to disclose the identity of a patient to a member of the general public who happened to be the patient’s employer, it is not reasonable to suppose that requests for information, even information confidential as to outsiders, by persons on the staff of the Hospital, or disclosures to such persons, would be equally offensive. Employees of the Hospital reasonably come within the curtain of seclusion, not without it. The limited offensiveness here is also a result of the limited nature of the inquiry, which was only for verification of identity, not some intimate detail of ailment, condition, or treatment. It is possible that, had Tulp accessed confidential files not normally open to her, or had she made inquiries into the nature of Hanson’s ailment, medical treatment, medical histoiy, pharmacy or medication records, radiological or biopsy reports, or prognosis, or had she contacted treating physicians, or, indeed, had she- asserted a right to visit Hanson because she was a member of the Hospital staff despite being advised that Hanson wanted no visitors, a reasonable person could find a highly offensive intrusion upon seclusion, even if such inquiries were made by a member of the Hospital staff. However, the request for information concerning the identity of a patient by a Hospital department supervisor, Tulp, and the disclosure of that information to the department supervisor do not raise the inference that a reasonable person would find either the request or disclosure to be “highly offensive.” The Hospital is therefore entitled to summary judgment on this “privacy” claim. As to Hanson’s “privacy” claim based on §§ 652A(2)(c) and 652D of the Restatement, the claim alleging “unreasonable publicity,” the court finds that Hanson has failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact that any “publicity” occurred that is sufficient to bring Tulp’s conduct within § 652D. Hanson has mistaken “publicity” for “publication,” which is precisely the distinction made in the comments to this formulation of the tort in § 652D of the Restatement. Thus, comment a provides as follows: The form of invasion of the right of privacy covered in this Section depends upon publicity given to the private life of the individual. “Publicity,” as it is used in this Section, differs from “publication,” as that term is used in § 577 in connection with liability for defamation. “Publication, ” in that sense, is a word of art, which includes any communication by the defendant to a third person. “Publicity,” on the other hand, means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. The difference is not one of the means of communication, which may be oral, unit-ten or by other means. It is one of a communication that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public. Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in this Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private life to a single person eneren to a small group of persons. On the other hand, any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small circulation, or in a handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or any broadcast over the radio, or statement made in an address to a large audience, is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning of the term as it is used in this Section. The distinction, in other words, is one between private and public communication. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, comment a (emphasis added). Hanson has not alleged “publicity” at all in her complaint, nor for that matter in her brief, but only communication to a small group. Nor has she pointed to any part of the record demonstrating that the Hospital employees who learned of her stay, or the Hospital employees altogether, are so numerous that Tulp’s communication to them, assuming it occurred, would constitute “publicity.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, comment a. This failure to designate support for the claim in the record is fatal. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; McLaughlin, 50 F.3d at 511; Beyerbach, 49 F.3d at 1325. Any claim under § 652D of the Restatement therefore fails as a matter of law. Because no genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on either of the theories of an invasion of privacy Hanson has asserted, the Hospital is entitled to summary judgment on Hanson’s “invasion of privacy” claim in Count I. 3. Conversion of “property” interest in privacy In Count II of her complaint, Hanson alleges that the defendants converted hospital patient information for their own use, and she seeks damages in the amount of $272,380.00 as the value of the converted “property” right to privacy. Although the Hospital has not distinguished its challenge to the first of Hanson’s “privacy” claims from its challenge to the “conversion” claim alleging conversion of the privacy right, it appears that the Hospital’s ground for summary judgment on the “conversion” claim is that the information upon which Tulp and Crail relied in firing Hanson was already available to them as employees of the Hospital. However, the court found above that there was at least a genuine issue of material fact that Tulp could not have obtained the confirmation of Hanson’s identity as the patient in the Hospital but for her position as an employee of the Hospital, yet Tulp had no need for such information to see to the dietary needs of the patient named Dianne Hanson. Nonetheless, this issue of fact does not preclude summary judgment on this claim, because the court finds no legal basis for such a claim. a. The “conversion” cause of action under Iowa law In her resistance to the motion for summary judgment, Hanson has clarified that her “conversion” claim is a claim pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A Under Iowa law, which is based on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A, “[cjonversion is the act of wrongful control or dominion over another’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with that person’s possessory right to the property.” Ezzone v. Riccardi, 525 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Iowa 1994) (citing Kendall/Hunt Pub. Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 247 (Iowa 1988), and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1), at 431 (1965)), cert. denied sub nom. Ezzone v. Hansen, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1958, 131 L.Ed.2d 850 (1995); McCray v. Carstensen, 492 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Iowa Ct.App.1992) (also citing Kendall/Hunt); Larson v. Great West Cos. Co., 482 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa Ct.App.1992) (also citing Kendall/Hunt, but not § 222A of the Restatement). Thus, no conversion may be found where the exercise of control was not wrongful. Larson, 482 N.W.2d at 173 (citing Williams v. Redinger, 179 Iowa 615, 616, 161 N.W. 701, 702 (1917)). Furthermore, liability for conversion may only be imposed when the intentional and wrongful interference with the property is so serious that the actor may justly be required to pay full value. Kendall/Hunt, 424 N.W.2d at 247; McCray, 492 N.W.2d at 445; Larson, 482 N.W.2d at 174. Citing § 222A of the Restatement, Iowa courts list the following factors as appropriate to consider whether the interference is sufficiently serious to find a conversion: (a) the extent and duration of the actor’s exercise of dominion or control; (b) the actor’s intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the other’s right of control; (c) the actor’s good faith; (d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference w