Full opinion text
OPINION MURRAY M. SCHWARTZ, Senior District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff David G. Finch (“Finch”) has filed suit against his former employer, defendant Hercules, Incorporated (“Hercules”), alleging he was discriminated against based on his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Hercules terminated Finch at age 58 in February 1991,: and after exhausting his administrative remedies, Finch brought this action on May 5, 1992. Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1. After almost four years of indefatigable sparring over discovery, summary judgment, an aborted interlocutory appeal, and prodigious motions in limine, the parties at last were ready for trial. Commencing January 10, 1996, in a jury trial spanning nearly three weeks, Finch sought over $2 million in damages encompassing back pay, front pay, and stock losses. He also sought to double this figure by winning liquidated damages. The jury returned a verdict in Finch’s favor on the issue of liability but awarded Finch only $200,000 in back pay. D.I. 295. Before the Court are various post-trial motions: defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, D.I. 306, plaintiffs motion for a new trial on damages, D.I. 308, and plaintiffs motions for costs and attorneys’ fees, D.I. 333, 357. To date, this, litigation has provided the raison d’etre for no less than six opinions; the bulk of the parties’ briefs and appendices on record thus far command an entire section in the Clerk of the Court’s file room. Although the Court has persevered to convince counsel it would be in their respective clients’ best interests to bring this case to closure, ie., reach settlement, both parties have made it abundantly clear that an appeal is imminent regardless of the results of the decisions rendered today. If history is a reliable indicator, it is not unrealistic to expect this ease to languish further in the federal court system. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the Court will deny plaintiffs motion for a new trial on damages and will deny defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Because plaintiff has prevailed in this case, he will be granted attorneys’ fees and costs, albeit reduced from the amount he has sought. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND At trial, the following evidence was adduced, as viewed in the light most favorable to Finch. Finch began his employment at Hercules in 1962 as a Systems Analyst. Tr. F-81. Over time, Finch enjoyed a series of promotions and transfers that culminated in the senior executive level position of General Auditor in charge of Hercules’ Audit Department, a title he held for 11 years preceding his termination. Tr. F-83. As head of the Audit Department, Finch reported to work at Hercules’ corporate headquarters in Wilmington, Delaware. During the mid-1980s, Hercules, a major defense contractor, began downsizing, and selling off its business units as a response to post Cold-War government defense reduction. Tr. C-21, E-88. Athough Hercules divested itself of a number of businesses, it did not commensurately reduce the size of its central corporate staff in Wilmington, which comprised approximately 1600 personnel. Tr. A-113; Plaintiffs Exhibit (“PX”) 1. Consequently, the company’s overhead costs were proportionately greater than that of its peer corporations. Tr. A-114. In 1988, Hercules appointed James Beach, its Vice President of Productivity and Management and Operating Services, to address this imbalance between the corporate headquarters’ staff and the company’s various divisions. Tr. A-112, 133-34. Beach hired Coopers & Lybrand, an outside auditing firm, to prepare a report, known as the Indirect Productivity Improvement (“IPI”) study, and to recoihmend areas of possible elimination and consolidation. Tr. B-52-51. In late 1989, Beach hired consultant Thomas Litras with the goal of implementing the IPI recommendation of reducing Hercules’ corporate workforce. Tr. B-53. Hercules terminated-approximately 90 employees as part of an initial, albeit feeble, headquarters downsizing in January, 1990. Tr. A-136, Joint Trial Exhibit (“JX”) 19, p. 7. . - In September, 1990, Beach retained Litras again to design and execute a second, larger reduction in force (“RIF”). Tr. B-53, H-72. In that vein, Litras designated approximately 400 corporate positions that could be eliminated. Tr. B-103, H-78. A. Initiation of the RIF process On December 31, 1990, at a special meeting of the Board of Directors’ Executive Committee, the proposed reduction in force was approved. JX 21. By January 9, 1991, Litras initiated training of Hercules executives, including Finch, on how to force rank employees with the goal of culling employees for the RIF. Tr. B-28, JX 27, JX 28. Litras’ method of forced ranking required Hercules managers to rate their employees from best to worst with regard to a particular factor or factors. Hercules agreed to this forced ranking system because Litras had convinced management that Hercules’ current performance evaluation mechanism was practically worthless. Tr. B-56-57, H-58-59. Employees were to be ranked based on comparison with other employees in positions of similar skill or status levels. Tr. B-30. The ranking of managers together with their subordinates was generally to be avoided. Tr. B-31. The final step in the RIF procedure involved Hercules’ Compliance Committee. Tr. C-110. This committee functioned to monitor compliance with employment discrimination laws and assure uniformity in the RIF process. Tr. C-135, C-142. B. Finch’s Role as General Auditor. As Audit Department head, it was incumbent on Finch to force rank his employees and assist in implementing elimination of positions from that department consistent with Litras’ guidelines. Tr. F-92. After he attended the forced ranking indoctrination session, Finch’s completed ranking sheets were due to Human Resources the following week. Tr. B-27. As far as Finch knew, the position of General Auditor was not targeted for elimination; the retention of Finch’s position was consistent with Litras’ report and recommendation. Tr. H-84, JX 35, p. 27. However, it was not within Finch’s purview as department head to recommend elimination of his own job. Tr. H-74. Under Hercules’ management hierarchy, Finch reported directly to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors. Tr. C-62, F-80. In addition, Finch reported administratively to Arden Engebretsen, Tr. F-9, Hercules’ Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”). Tr. F-4, C-23-25. Finch and Engebretsen knew each other for over twenty years. Tr. F-44. Aside from their mutual employment at Hercules, they were both active members of the same church congregation and saw one another at church functions. Tr. F-59. In his capacity as lay clergy,' Finch had counseled Engebretsen’s sons when they were teenagers; Finch and Engebretsen had also served together on the regional governing board of the church. Tr. F-138-39. Also reporting to Engebretsen was George MacKenzie, Hercules’ corporate Controller. Tr. G-46. At trial, MacKenzie testified that he had complained of Finch’s participation in a car pool which prevented Finch’s availability for conferences after five or six o’clock. Tr. F-68, G-63. Finch, however, testified that although he was in a car pool, it was only during the early 1980s, and that if there were meetings late in the day, he would stay laté and have his wife pick him up. Tr. F-87. MacKenzie had also sharply criticized, in Engebretsen’s presence, both the Audit Group and Finch as lacking in leadership of that group. Tr. G-70. In addition, MaeKenzie also remarked to Engebretsen that Hercules, a Fortune 150 company, required a General Auditor who was a true professional, i.e., one eredentialed as a Certified Public Accountant (“CPA”). Id., Tr. G-58. Finch was not so eredentialed. Tr. F-134. According .to MacKenzie, Engebretsen tolerated little criticism of Finch’s performance as General Auditor. MacKenzie recalled that in response to MacKenzie’s critical comments about Finch, Engebretsen reacted by “ranting and raving.” Id. MacKenzie recounted a later incident during which Engebretsen responded in like manner. Tr. G-71. After these episodes, fearing reprisal by Engebretsen, MacKenzie refrained from disparaging Finch in Engebretsen’s presence. Tr. G-70. MacKenzie was not the only executive who perceived Engebretsen as protective of Finch. Thomas McCarthy, Hercules’ Vice President óf Human Resources from 1985 to 1992, viewed Engebretsen as a greedy, self-serving individual who valued loyalty in his subordinates over competéncy. Tr. H-94-95. McCarthy thought little of Finch’s capabilities and agreed with MacKenzie’s assessment that Finch was underperforming. Tr. H-92. Others complained to McCarthy about Finch’s lack of performance. Tr. H-97. Francis VanKirk of Coopers & Lybrand, the outside auditors, rated Finch’s department at a level of “C minus” and Finch himself as rating a “D.” Tr. J-88. The external auditors criticized Finch for lack of initiative, lack of cooperation, and lack of overall quality of performance. Tr. G-80, 1-43, J-34-36. VanKirk testified that, more often than not, his film had to redo or at least supplement the Audit Department’s work product for it to meet professional quality standards. Tr. 1—38. Joan Spero, a recent Chairperson of Hercules’ Audit Committee to which Finch directly reported, also did not have a high regard for Finch’s abilities as General Auditor. Tr. K-51. She testified that in her opinion, Finch was not at the “cutting edge of what was going on in the audit area.” Id. She felt that he lacked in leadership and technical expertise, and expressed concern that Finch was too deferential to CFO Engebretsen. She spoke of Finch as being “under [Engebretsen’s] thumb.” Tr. K-52. Hercules presented testimony from others who derided Finch. James Anthony, one of Finch’s subordinates, testified that Finch would sleep during the workday. Tr. J-9-10. Finch admitted that sometimes he would quite often read and then close his eyes to relax. Tr. F-145. Curiously, it was not until late in the administrative EEÓC proceeding that anyone at Hercules informed Finch the audit department and his leadership were deficient. Tr. F-86. Although there were these and other Hercules executives who were critical of Finch’s performance as General Auditor, there were those who exuded nothing but praise on his behalf. Arthur Neilsen, patriarch of the Neilsen television ratings enterprise and audit committee board member of several other major corporations, was both a chairperson and member of the Hercules Audit Committee for most of the time period from 1977 through 1990. Tr. E-75-76, 82. Neilsen regarded Finch as well qualified, very professional, always presented his work on time. He presented his reports in the form clearly, you could read and understand what he was talking about. And I thought he had very good judgment in selecting the points where we had to do the extra work. I think he followed up very effectively. And as far as I was concerned, he did an excellent job. Tr. E-82-83. Neilsen testified that he never heard anyone criticize Finch, from either inside or outside Hercules. Tr. E-83. After becoming aware of Finch’s termination, Neil-sen offered to circulate Finch’s resume and recommend Finch to any prospective employer. Tr. E-89. Finch presented other executives who corroborated Neilsen’s positive evaluation. William Hosker, Vice President and General Manager of Hercules Resins division, described Finch as changing the Audit Department from being adversarial to a department that was an ally of the business units. Tr. E-105. Hosker also recalled that Finch augmented the Audit Department’s tradition of merely auditing financial issues with the institution of operational audits. Tr. E-106. These operational audits involved auditors “working with the working people at the plants, the people who knew who the processes were, and together, they came up with a list of suggestions, recommendations, that would improve the efficiency of the operation.” Tr. E-106-07. The operational audit concept was further expanded into profit improvement and manufacturing efficiency programs that were eventually integrated into the operation of the business units themselves. Tr. E-107. Like Neilsen, Hosker viewed Finch as competent and beneficial to Hercules; he likewise had never heard any negative comments about Finch or his department. Tr. E-107-08. Finally, Finch presented testimony by Engebretsen, who had been influential in Finch’s promotion to General Auditor in 1980. Tr. F-8. Engebretsen was responsible for evaluating Finch and for any raises and bonus awards, Tr. F-21, F-50. Consistent with Neilsen’s testimony, Engebretsen recalled that the Audit Committee was “complimentary regarding the way in which Mr. Finch discharged his. duties.” Tr. F-13-14. Finch invariably qualified for bonuses, stock incentives, and above average raises. Tr. F-22. The record showed that Engebretsen documented written performance appraisals of Finch in 1980, JX 6; 1982, JX 7; and 1983, JX8. In 1982 and 1983, Engebretsen rated Finch’s performance as clearly exceeding job requirements. JX 7, JX 8. There were no documented evaluations of Finch by Engebretsen or anyone else since 1983. _ Tr. F-50. However, thére was evidence that Finch was considered as part of Hercules’ succession planning process in which potential replacements for key executive positions were identified. For example, in 1987, Fred Buckner, Hercules’ Chief Operating Officer, recommended Finch as someone with “growth potential” for a new European position. JX 12, Tr. F-27. In 1989, Finch was proposed as a candidate for a one or two level promotion. JX 14. In 1990, Alex Searl, Hercules’ Treasurer, proposed Finch for a possible promotion to Assistant Treasurer. JX 15. C. Engebretsen’s Departure From Hercules < In fall 1990, Hercules was engaged in the task of replacing its Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), who had announced his intent to retire at year’s end. Tr. B-94, C-19. Hercules’ Board of Directors hired Thomas Gos-sage in approximately November, 1990, as the new CEO; Gossage promised he would make it a priority to spearhead a further, more significant reduction in force. Tr. B-101. , CFO Engebretsen had applied for promotion to the CEO position but had" been passed over in favor of Gossage. Tr. B-95. Engebretsen was not a serious candidate for promotion because of his responsibility for a failed Titan missile development contract in which Hercules lost over $300 million. Tr. K-54, 56. According to Neilsen, after all the accounting of the $300 million loss had been completed, the Audit Committee concluded that the loss was not the fault of the Audit Department. Tr. E-85. Rather, the blame lay in the overall management of the financial sector, with problems occurring at many levels of management. Tr. K-72. Consequently, Hercules’ Board of Directors lost confidence in Engebretsen as CFO; indeed the departure of the outgoing CEO was influenced by the missile debacle. Tr. K-54-56, 60. One of Gossage’s first acts upon taking upon the mantle of CEO was to craft a severance package for Engebretsen. Tr. K-60. It was also Gossage’s understanding that because Engebretsen had been panned as the successor CEO, Engebretsen elected to end his affiliation with the company. Tr. C-24. Engebretsen retired in early January, 1991. Tr. F-4. Gossage and the Board of Directors shared mutual concern about future change and upgrade of management of the financial function; changing the audit function, however, was not raised. Tr. K-57, 59. On January 9, 1991, the same day that Litras initiated forced-ranking training of senior level executives, Gossage broke the news of the RIF in a memo to all Hercules employees. JX 25. In connection with his in-house announcement of the RIF, Gossage also granted a telephone interview with The News Journal, Wilmington’s local daily newspaper. Tr. B-105. The next day, January 9, 1991, The News Journal’s major front-page headline was entitled, “Hercules will cut 450 jobs.” PX-1. The news story detañed Hercules’ proposed RIF, outlining the corporation’s plan to “offer a ‘voluntary reduction in force’ program until January 28 to employees over the age of 50 who have been with the company for at least 10 years.” Id. If a sufficient number of employees did not voluntarily retire, they would be then subject to an involuntary RIF along with Hercules’ employees under age 50. Id. The article went on to quote Gossage as stating, “The young people in the company want us to bring Hercules back to where it ought to be again,” and “Older people wiU see friends impacted and wül feel bad about it. But we’U get this behind us.” Id. Gossage’s statements caused quite a stir at Hercules; George MaeKenzie, then Hercules’ Controller, characterized Gossage’s remarks as “unfortunate” and testified that others felt likewise. Tr. H-15-16. Hercules’ internal publication, Horizons, also featured an article about the RIF and Gossage’s statements to The News Journal. Tr. C-76. The general corporate atmosphere was full of tension; employees were full of apprehension about who in their midst would suffer job loss. Tr. F-124. Finch presented evidence of other remarks made by Gossage, albeit at a later date, in 1992. William Hosker testified that his manager, Doyle Miller, explained that Gossage was critical of the way Hosker’s division had failed to address the “tired-warriors” among its ranks. Tr. E-111-12. Hosker understood this phrase to denote someone aged in the mid-50s who was “blocking the movement of younger people into those positions which are necessary to get experience in order to contribute to the profitability of the corporation.” Id. D. Reduction,. Reconfiguration, and Finch With Engebretsen’s departure as CFO leaving a hole in Hercules’ financial corporate hierarchy, all of the CFO’s direct reports, including Finch, reported directly to CEO Gossage. Tr. B-145-46. Gossage requested input from the Treasurer and senior financial executives regarding the management structure of the financial organization until a new CFO could be found. Tr. C-86-87. Within one week of Gossage’s remarks to The News Journal, MacKenzie proposed that the General Auditor, Finch, should report administratively on an interim basis to the Controller, i.e., MacKenzie himself. Id., JX 29. Formerly, both Finch and MacKenzie reported to the CFO. JX 3. On January 14,1991, Gossage approved MaeKenzie’s proposal. Tr. C-87. Two days later, MacKenzie prepared an organizational chart that proposed eliminating the General Auditor position altogether. Tr. C-87, JX 30. MacKenzie’s chart, proposed as an “interim” internal audit chart, listed Finch’s direct reports as reporting to MacKenzie, with MacKenzie then reporting to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors. JX 30. MacKenzie discussed his proposal to eliminate the General Auditor position with Gos-sage, and they agreed that the idea should be put to the Chairperson of the Audit Committee, Spero. Tr. C-89. MacKenzie traveled to New York City and met with Spero, who was based there as Treasurer of the American Express Corporation. Tr. C-90, K-61. Spero readily agreed with MacKenzie’s recommendation. Id. Spero testified that at the next regular meeting of the Audit Committee, on January 29, .1991; the Audit Committee approved the restructuring of the Audit Department and the elimination of the position of General Auditor. Tr. K-97. Finch was not in attendance at the meeting. JX 32. The minutes of that meeting reflect only that “[t]he Chairman [Spero] led a discussion of the Internal Audit Department’s performance and staffing.” Id. Aside from Spero’s testimony, there was no evidence of the Audit Committee’s approval of elimination, interim or otherwise, of the General Auditor’s position. . Elimination of the General Auditor’s position was inconsistent with Litras’ recommendations for downsizing the corporation. Tr. B^8. In addition, reconfiguring the General Auditor responsibilities into the hands of the corporate Controller was contrary to the findings of the Treadway Commission, an entity formed to study fraudulent financial reporting among publicly held companies, such as Hercules. Tr. G-110. The Tread-way Commission has advised that a General Auditor, who is responsible for auditing the company’s financial statements, should not report administratively to one who is responsible for preparing the company’s financial statements. Tr. E-17. As Audit Committee member Neilsen explained: [T]he Controller’s Department has to prepare the figures that go in the annual report. That is the whole objective, get those figures right. The function of the Auditor is to come around and see if that has been done correctly. Is there anything wrong with the Controller’s work? If you have the Controller doing both things, it would be kind of like a baseball player calling balls and strikes on himself. It just wouldn’t be a good idea. Tr. E-92.. Because Finch now reported to MacKenzie, MacKenzie had the responsibility of force ranking Finch. Although the protocol recommended by Litras advocated against ranking heterogeneous groups of employees, MacKenzie force ranked several department heads, including Finch, along with lesser management personnel. JX 31, p. 7. For example, along with Finch, MacKenzie ranked J.J. Woods, Director of Operational Reporting Department, with Wood’s subordinate, J.P. Hunter, who was merely a manager in that department. Tr. G-l03-04. The forced ranking also included D.K. Brown, head of the Corporate Reporting Division, and one of his subordinate managers, S.A. Murray. Tr. G-l02-03. MacKenzie ranked Finch within a cohort of seven em: ployees; Finch was ranked sixth out of the seven. MacKenzie terminated Finch, age 58, and the seventh-placed individual, who was age 52. JX31. On February 4, 1991, MacKenzie informed Finch that Finch’s position was being eliminated and that he was no longer employed by Hercules. Tr. C-96, F-126. MacKenzie did not mention that the elimination of the position was only interim or temporary. Id. Although company policy required that a Final Personnel Report form be completed for all salaried exempt employees, there is no record of MacKenzie doing so. Tr. C-103-04, D-42. This report, if completed, would have included information on whether the terminated employee would be eligible for rehire. Id.; Tr. F-127-28. When MacKenzie appeared before the Policy Compliance Committee (“PCC”), he represented that the position , of General Auditor was to be eliminated. Tr. C-113. There was no evidence that he informed the PCC that thé elimination was “temporary” or “interim.” Tr. D-33, 62. The PCC Chairman, Robert Currie, understood the elimination would continue indefinitely; there was no discussion linking this elimination to the temporary non-existence of the CFO. Tr. D-78. E. Reinstatement of the General Auditor Position At its annual shareholders’ meeting in March, 1991, Hercules announced the hiring of Keith Elliott as its new Chief Financial Officer. Tr. E-7. One of Elliott’s priorities as the new CFO was the reorganization of the financial sector, in terms of both individual employees and structural hierarchy. Tr. 1-93. In June, 1991, Hercules shifted various key personnel within senior executive financial positions; for example, MacKenzie, formerly the Controller, became Treasurer. Tr. 1-94. At this same time, Elliott decided to reinstitute the General Auditor position, and reinstate that position’s reporting to the CFO. Id. From June, 1991 onward, the senior Audit Group employees reported administratively to the CFO pending the hiring of a new General Auditor. PX 31. In the meantime, Finch filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). In an answer to an EEOC request to Hercules for information, on August 21, 1991, MacKenzie represented in a notarized statement ’that Finch’s termination resulted from the elimination of the position of General Auditor. JX 37. MacKenzie did not relate that the elimination was merely interim. However, a representative from Hercules’ Human Resources Department stated to the EEOC that Hercules had recently hired a new CFO who was analyzing Hercules’financial structure. JX 36 at 4. Hercules did not inform the EEOC that the General Auditor position had been resurrected. Hercules also represented that Finch would be considered as a candidate for senior level positions that may become available as a result of the restructuring. Id. Finch was not contacted by Hercules for any such position. On October 7, 1991, Hercules interviewed Curtis Tomlin, a 38 year-old candidate for the General Auditor position." Tr. 1-112. MacKenzie was a member of the team that interviewed Tomlin. Tr. 1-111-12. After meeting with the Audit Committee and, inter alia, MacKenzie on December 4, 1991, Tomlin was officially introduced as Hercules’ new General Auditor. Id' Right after that, on December 17, 1991, MacKenzie submitted a second, more detailed statement to the EEOC in the form of a sworn affidavit. JX 38. Although MacKenzie described in this second statement that the elimination of Finch’s position was to be interim, he omitted mentioning that Hercules had not only reinstated the position but had also hired a 38 year-old replacement. In contrast to his previous statement, MacKenzie also added poor performance as a reason why Finch was terminated. Id. As examples of Finch’s alleged poor performance, MacKenzie’s affidavit catalogued Finch’s failure to “undertake risk assessments” and to “provide an operational plan to guide his staff’s activities for the fiscal year.” JX 38, ¶ 10. At trial, however, MacKenzie conceded these statements were not accurate, that Finch’s Audit Department did have an operational plan, and that Finch did undertake risk assessments. Tr. G-133-34. MacKenzie also stated in his affidavit that, in his' opinion, “the range of responsibilities of the General Auditor requires the training and expertise that is denoted by the CPA certification.” JX 38, ¶ 10. However, Hercules recently offered the General Auditor position -to Hans Holmberg, who is not credentialed with a CPA. Tr. E-20. Holmberg currently enjoys status as Vice President, Auditing Services, which oversees the range of Hercules audit functions worldwide. Id. F. Other Evidence of Hercules’ Consideration of Age in the RIF Prior , to the initiation of the actual RIF, Hercules conducted a demographic analysis of its corporate workforce to provide a snapshot of its workforce composition and data to be used for future personnel planning, recruiting, development, and training. Tr. H-52-53, JX 20. Age statistics of employees were present virtually in all documentation available to those implementing the RIF. Litras’ analysis used age as a constant identifier against which other factors such as length of service, education, race, sex, etc. were compared. JX 20. Although Hercules’ Director of Employee Relations, Robert Currie, testified that in the RIF process, Hercules was concerned not only about age discrimination, but race and gender discrimination as well, Tr. D-17, the forms used for the forced ranking of employees detailed both age and date of birth for the individual performing the ranking. The employee’s gender, national origin, and race, however, were not listed. Id. Hercules admitted that age was a criterion to be used in the RIF process, but only as a tie-breaker in the event that two employees tied on all other criteria. Tr. D-12. Theoretically, if there was a tie, then the younger employee would have been terminated; -however, that1 situation apparently never arose. Id. Additionally, on January 4, 1991, Hercules Human Resources Department generated lists of Hercules employees aged 50 and older by age, salary, and name. JX 22. Currie admitted that it was likely that the lists based on age were produced to aid in the RIF planning, specifically in the recruiting of voluntary retirees. Tr. H-137. Litras testified that statistically, if the RIF procedures had been correctly followed, there should have been a uniform, proportionate distribution of displacements among the various age groups. Tr. B-32. Finch produced evidence, however, that when the RIF was completed, the data showed otherwise. A larger, disproportionate amount of employees between the ages of 55-59 were terminated as contrasted to all other age groups; Finch, at age 58, fell into this category. JX 40. Finch presented expert testimony analyzing statistics resulting from the RIF. Dr. Thomas Daymont testified that employees over 55 were almost twice as likely to be terminated. Tr. D-117-18. Daymont expressed surprise that an employee’s age was listed on the forced ranking sheets because age purportedly was to play no part in the forced ranking process. Tr. D-108. He characterized age as receiving more attention in Hercules’ demographic RIF analysis than any other factor. Tr.-104. Contrasting Hercules’ RIF planning with those performed by other corporations, Daymont testified that “rarely if ever [had he] seen an analysis that had such a focus on a'ge as the one in’ the case of Hercules.” Tr. D-105. In his analysis of the data, Daymont focused on exempt, i.e., salaried employees such as Finch, Tr. D-109; the criteria for the forced ranking of exempt employees differed in some respecte from those used in ranking hourly or non-exempt employees. Tr. B-10. The exempt employee data showed that the difference in the statistics was “large enough to be ruled out due to chance,” and that “the probability level of getting this difference under the assumption of an age-neutral process was less than one percent.” Tr. D-122. Based on the data, Daymont concluded that age was a factor in the decision-making process in the forced ranking of exempt employees. Tr. D-109. Looking specifically at Hercules’ financial sector, Daymont found that employees over 55 were five times as likely to be terminated than employees under 55. Tr. D-121. When Daymont focused on the ranking decisions made by MacKenzie, Daymont found that “workers 55 and above were substantially more likely to be terminated than younger workers.” Tr. D-182. For MacKenzie terminations, nine out of eleven were over 40 years of age. Tr. H-19-20., In addition to terminating Finch, MacKenzie also terminated the following employees: J.A. Romano, age 51; J.L. Martin, age 31; W.J. Etherington, age 52; R.P. Macko, age 55; J.J. Krakowski, age 56; C.J. Smith, age 54; C.A. Matthews, age 44; R.V. Edwards, age 43; A.M. Sandy, age 22; and G.G. DeVito, age 55. Id.; JX 31. Daymont fount this disproportionate firing of older employees by MaeKenzie consistent with the overall pattern of age discrimination in the RIF process of exempt employees. Tr. D-182-83. Notwithstanding this consistency, Daymont also conceded that the trend among the MacKenzie terminations could not be regarded as a statistically significant pattern because the statistical population of MacKenzie terminations was simply too small to be significant. Nevertheless, the evidence showed that when looking at the entirety of MacKenzie terminations, nine out of eleven were over 40 years of age. Tr. H-19-21. Defendant’s expert, Dr. Bernard- Siskin, disagreed with Dr. Daymont’s conclusions. Sisken found only “weak evidence that age play[ed] a role” in RIF decisionmaking. Tr. 1-155. He agreed, however, that there was a statistically significant “quirk” or “fluke” in that data that showed the Hercules exempt employees at ages 55-56 as being at greater risk at being terminated for reasons possibly not related to mere chance. Tr. 1-146, 156, 186. He also pinpointed termination decisions arising from the Treasurer’s and Information Resource departments as possibly relating to this statistical anomaly. Tr. 1-186. III. DISCUSSION A. Defendant’s Judgment as a Matter of Law 1. Legal Standard The standard for granting a judgment as a matter of law is set forth in Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 50(a), which provides in relevant part ás follows: If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard with respect to an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that party with respect to that issue, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party on any claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim that cannot under the controlling law be maintained without a favorable finding on that issue. A motion for a judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) encompasses what was previously referred to as a “directed verdict” and a “judgment notwithstanding the verdict,” depending on whether the motion is brought before or after jury deliberations. The standard applied to a JMOL is a stringent one, contemplating “the court’s duty to assure enforcement of the controlling law and [to not intrude] on any responsibility for factual determinations conferred on the jury.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, Advisory Committee Notes, 1991 amendment. As the rule requires, Hercules sought a JMOL before submission of the case to the jury, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), and now renews its motion post-trial. Although entitled to do so under Rule 50(b), Hercules chose not to move for a new trial. The Court is charged with reviewing “the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.” Rotando v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir.1992). If the evidence and justifiable inferences most favorable to Finch afford any rational basis for the verdict, then judgment as a matter of law is inappropriate. Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Anastasio, 838 F.2d at 705) (internal citations omitted). The Court may not weigh the evidence, pass, on the credibility of witnesses, or replace its version of the facts for that of the jury. Blair v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 296, 300 (3d Cir.1982). The Court may, however, enter JMOL if upon review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, it can be said as a matter of law that there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability. Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir. 1996). At trial, Finch sought submission of his case to the jury under the “mixed-motive” legal theory enunciated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). The record, however, did not support a conclusion that both legitimate and illegitimate factors played a role in Hercules’ decision. Further, Finch had not presented evidence of discrimination sufficiently direct “to shift the burden of proof to the employer on the issue of whether the same decision would have been made in the absence of the discriminatory animus.” Miller v. CIGNA, 47 F.3d 586, 597 n. 9 (3d Cir.1995) (in bane). Consequently, the jury was instructed to consider the evidence under the now familiar “pretext” and burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Under these principles, Finch bore the burden of proving that age was a determinative factor in his employer’s challenged employment decision. Miller, 47 F.3d 586 at 596; Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 897 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052, 108 S.Ct. 26, 97 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987). For purposes of its motion for JMOL, Hercules wisely assumes arguendo that Finch met his initial burden of establishing the requisite prima facie case. D.L 343 at 16. However, once Hercules produced rebuttal evidence at trial of some legitimáte, nondiseriminatory reason for its termination of Finch, Finch needed to prove to the jury that “the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. To show pretext, Finch could not simply show ,the Hercules’ decision was merely wrong or mistaken, or that Hercules was not “wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 331 (3d Cir.1995). Rather, to show pretext, Finch needed to demonstrate such “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions” in Hercules’ “proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for [the asserted] nondiseriminatory reasons.” Id. Thus, assuming Hercules marshaled rebuttal evidence at trial, Finch still had the ultimate burden to show that age “played' a role in the decisionmaking process aiid that it had a determinative influence on the outcome of that process.” Miller, 47 F.3d at 597; see also Gomez v. Allegheny Health Services, Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1084 (3d Cir.1995) (“once the defense has produced rebuttal evidence, the question becomes whether the plaintiff has proved discrimination”). 2. Hercules’ Arguments and the Evidence a) Evidence of Pretext Hercules sets forth a number of arguments as to why it thinks no reasonable jury could conclude that Finch’s “age had anything with the decision to terminate his employment.” D.I. 343 at 16. First, Hercules contends that Finch did not present evidence-that Hercules’ stated reason for terminating Finch was unworthy of credence, and- that age was the real reason for his termination. Contrary to Hercules’ assertions, however, the trial record does contain sufficient evidence that a reasonable fact finder could find Hercules’ proffered reasons for terminating Finch were unworthy of credence. First, both sides adduced evidence supporting their diametrically opposing versions of Finch’s performance as General Auditor. Although he presented a lesser quantity of Hercules-affiliated witnesses that spoke favorably of his performance, Finch produced a star witness on his behalf, Arthur Neilsen, who can be described as an American corporate icon. According to Neilsen; Finch’s performance as General Auditor was unblemished. Other supporting testimony and documentary evidence showed that documentation of Finch’s performance at Hercules was unblemished as well. Finch demonstrated that his-performance rated his being suggested for promotion on several occasions. After viewing all of the evidence, the jury was free to weigh demeanor of the witnesses, as well as the impact, if any, of the witnesses’ current affiliation with the defendant on their credibility; the record contains sufficient evidence allowing a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the proffered reason of poor performance was pretextual. After rehearsing in its brief evidence presented at trial of Finch’s poor performance, Hercules additionally concluded that at best, Finch showed that various decisionmakers at Hercules disagreed about the quality of Finch’s performance. Hercules then argues that the evidence was “overwhelming” that Hercules honestly believed changes were necessary in the company’s financial sector, and, in furtherance of that goal, Finch was terminated based on his performance, not his age. Finch presented evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to call into question the credibility and honesty of the decision-maker responsible for Finch’s termination, MaeKenzie. Tellingly, no one at Hercules bothered to tell Finch during his eleven years as General Auditor that his performance was sub par until after he was terminated and filed an EEOC complaint and then only after the Hercules’ original advanced reason (elimination of the General Auditor position) could no longer be used as a satisfactory reason for the termination. First, the record shows that Litras, who masterminded the RIF, did not recommend the position of General Auditor be eliminated; that elimination was singularly ascribed to MaeKenzie. There was evidence sufficient to support an inference that MaeKenzie also deviated from Litras’ protocol regarding the grouping of like employees together when he ranked Finch along with other employees not at his management level. In addition, depending on his audience, MaeKenzie varied the presentation of his plan to eliminate Finch’s General Auditor position. When he presented his proposal to CEO Gossage and Audit Committee Chairperson Spero, MaeKenzie' outlined the plan as “interim.” JX 30; Tr. C-89. When he described the elimination of Finch’s position to the Policy Compliance Committee, however, he did not disclose that the elimination was temporary or interim; the PCC treated Finch’s termination ás a position elimination. Tr. D-62. When MaeKenzie broke the news to Finch that he was being terminated, he told Finch that he was being fired because his position was being eliminated. Tr. F-126. MaeKenzie also did not mention that the elimination of the position was temporary, or that any consideration of Finch’s performance factored into the termination decision. Id.; Tr. C-97. Moreover, MacKenzie’s discrediting Finch’s lack of CPA certification as additional justification for termination could be considered incredible in light of MacKenzie’s later participation in the hiring of a successor General Auditor that also had not earned a CPA. Last, but by no means least, in a sworn affidavit, MacKenzie represented to the EEOC that the position of General Auditor had been eliminated even though MacKenzie had previously authored internal Hercules documentation showing that ifcwas only an interim elimination. JX 37. This omission was all the more egregious considering MacKenzie’s active role in the hiring of the new General Auditor, Tomlin. Based on the exhibits admitted into evidence, MacKenzie never told the EEOC that Finch’s position had been resurrected; Hercules did not volunteer to the EEOC information the a new General Auditor had been hired until the EEOC specifically asked about Tomlin in May, 1992. JX 39. The Court again emphasizes that for purposes of the JMOL motion, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to Finch. The weight assigned to this evidence by the jury will not be second guessed; nor will the Court interpose its own belief as to what the evidence showed if it were different from that of the jury’s. Accordingly, the Court finds the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow the jury reasonably to find enough inconsistencies, implausibilities, and incoherences supporting an inference that evidence emanating from MacKenzie, the decisionmaker, was unworthy of credence. b) Evidence of Age Discrimination To survive Hercules’ motion for JMOL, Finch must have also coupled his presentation of pretext evidence with other evidence of discrimination so as to be sufficient to justify a reasonably drawn inference that he was terminated because of his age. Hercules characterizes Finch’s evidence of Hercules’ anti-age animus as a “mishmash of unrelated speculation.” D.I. 343 at 21. A review of the record, however, shows that Finch adequately wove the evidence into a web of facts from which a reasonable juror could draw inferences in his favor. At trial, Finch presented an overall picture of a corporation that had a history of considering age in its employment decisionmaking. For example, in succession planning documents pre-dating the 1991 RIF in Hercules’ financial sector, age was listed as a prominent component, usually delineated next to an employee’s name. JX 10, 15, 16. Age was also used by Litras as a constant identifier in his pre-RIF demographic analysis. JX 9. Finch presented expert testimony through Dr. Daymont painting this particular practice as suspect. !Age also appeared on a monthly personnel report disseminated to Hercules department heads. PX 5. Immediately prior to the RIF, Human Resources generated a list of employees, sorted by age, who were age 50 and over and who had more than 10 years of service with the company. JX 22. Although Hercules proffered a facially legitimate reason for the use of this report, the jury was free to draw its own inferences from these types of evidence considered separately and as a whole. Finally, both age and date of birth were highlighted on the force ranking sheets themselves. In short, a jury could reasonably conclude that age was frequently considered in employment decisionmaking at Hercules. Layered atop these circumstantial considerations were the comments of CEO Gos-sage. During his interview with The News Journal, he contrasted the effect of the RIF on younger and older workers. Gossage accepted responsibility for the newspaper’s quote, acknowledging that if it was not a precise quote, it captured the spirit of what he said. Tr. B-109. Gossage also explained that his remarks merely indicated that older Hercules employees who enjoyed a greater length of service would miss their friends who, being over age 50, would decide to take advantage of the voluntary retirement package that preceded the involuntary RIF. Tr. B-lll. He also added that the statement meant that the younger employees felt that Hercules should “get on with it and try to bring the company back to the level of performance it had.” Id. Finch testified that as an older employee, he was offended by Gossage’s remarks and that he concluded that Gossage was sending a message that the older people were no longer wanted. Tr. F-116. Finch also testified that Gossage was called upon to explain and confirm his remarks to The News Journal as chronicled by the in-house publication, Horizons, Tr. F-119-21; the jurors were free to infer from this that other older employees were similarly fearful to justify further probing of the remarks. MacKenzie also remarked that he and others thought Gossage’s statements were unfortunate, although the'jurors were left to draw their own inference as to why MacKenzie regarded Gossage.’s choice of words as unfortunate. From this evidence, a reasonable juror could draw an inference that Gossage believed that younger people, as opposed to older people, were the ones who cared more and were better equipped to revive Hercules’ corporate health. Accord, Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir.1990), (use by the CEO of the phrase “old dogs won’t hunt”, together with other evidence held to be sufficient to allow a trier of fact to find a bias against older employees), cert. denied 496 U.S. 906, 110 S.Ct. 2588, 110 L.Ed.2d 269 (1990). Finch also presented evidence that Gos-sage, as incoming CEO, sought to immerse himself in his new role and emerge as a strong leader. While being considered for this post, Gossage made it dear that one of his “platforms” would involve the streamlining and aggressive downsizing of Hercules corporate workforce. Because of the enormity of the RIF, Gossage’s statement to The News Journal would have been noteworthy in itself. The jury, however, could also have reasonably drawn an additional inference that in this first public proclamation as CEO, Gossage was also setting the tone of his management philosophy and style. Gossage agreed that “for the most part,” employees would tend to listen to what their CEO would say. Tr. B-105. Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that “[w]hen a major company executive speaks, ‘everybody listens’ in the corporate hierarchy, and when an executive’s comments prove to be disadvantageous to a company’s subsequent litigation posture, it can not compartmentalize this executive as if he had nothing more to do with company policy than the janitor or watchman.” Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 54 (3d Cir.1989). The record also shows that MacKenzie sought to curry favor with Gossage, to whom he directly reported during the RIF due to there being no CFO. MacKenzie has been aggressively promoted during Gos-sage’s tenure, over a relatively short amount of time. MacKenzie wasted no time in answering Gossage’s request for input as to how to restructure the financial sector; he was also charged with force ranking his managerial subordinates. MacKenzie’s terminations exhibit a marked tendency to disfavor older employees; nine out of eleven of his terminated employees were over age 40, the threshold age for triggering of the ADEA. Following the RIF, Gossage set and approved a $100,000 bonus bestowed on MacKenzie for his efforts; previously, MacKenzie’s bonuses were in the range of $40,-000. Tr. H-13-14. In addition, Gossage has promoted MacKenzie up Hercules’ corporate rungs to the position of CFO. Tr. C-56. Again, the jury was free to" consider this evidence, which was sufficient in indicating a possible nexus between Gossage’s statement, MacKenzie’s aspirations for promotion, and the resulting terminations at MaeKenzie’s hands. Based on this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that MacKenzie was influenced by his new boss’s remarks. In addition, Finch presented evidence that other executives may have been similarly influenced by Gossage’s remarks. According to Daymont, the likelihood of being a victim of Hercules’ RIF increased steadily with age from 10.9% for under age 40,15.2% for those in their 40s, and 20.4% for those age 50 and older. Tr. D-124. Daymont also presented evidence that among 55 to 59 year old exempt employees, such as Finch, over 25% were terminated. Daymont testified that in his expert opinion, the statistical data provided strong support that age discrimination permeated the RIF decisionmaking among exempt Hercules employees. Defendant’s expert, while ably reshuffling the RIF statistics to show a competing interpretation of the data favorable to Hercules, conceded that there was a quirk in the data involving a disproportionate termination of employees around the age of 55 or 56. He admitted that statistically, this could not be due to chance. Finally, the record also contained additional evidence of a second incident where Gos-sage may have again demonstrated an anti-age animus consistent with the remarks outlined above. According to another former Hercules employee,' Hosker, his immediate superior informed him- at a staff meeting that Gossage had expressed dissatisfaction with the handling of “tired warriors” in Hosker’s division. Hosker understood his supervisor to explain a “tired warrior” as one who was around age 50 and who was blocking the advancement of younger employees. Although Gossage denied ever using the phrase “tired warriors,” it was for the jury to weigh and resolve the conflicting testimony .and draw inferences therefrom. Although remote in time, the “tired warriors” statement could be viewed as evidence sufficient to support an inference of ongoing corporate anti-age bias. See Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1214 (citing Lockhart, 879 F.2d at 54; Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 733 (3d Cir. 1988)). Taken as a whole, in the light most favorable to Finch, the Court finds that there was sufficient evidence of anti-age bias permeating the Hercules corporate culture to allow the jury to find that the decisionmaker in this case, MacKenzie, discriminated against Finch when he terminated him in 1991. In sum, for purposes of the JMOL motion, the Court will not make an independent determination regarding which party, as a factual matter, has been blessed with a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, at this post-trial stage, Hercules needed to demonstrate that there was no rational basis underlying the jury’s verdict and that the record was devoid of sufficient evidence from which the jury could find liability. This Hercules has not done; the above analysis of the trial record demonstrates the presence of ample evidence sufficient to support the verdict of liability as reasonable. Defendant’s motion for JMOL will accordingly be denied. B. Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial on Damages Finch has also expressed dissatisfaction with the verdict by filing a motion for a new trial on damages! Finch urges that the Court erred in: (1) allowing defendant’s expert to present statistical evidence regarding voluntary retirement of persons in the workforce in general and at Hercules; (2) instructing the jury that it was plaintiff’s burden to prove the extent of his damages and the date on which he would have retired from Hercules; and (3) instructing the jury on mitigation of damages rather than ruling as a matter of law that plaintiff made a reasonable effort to mitigate. 1. Legal Standard—Grant of New Trial “The authority to grant a new trial resides in the exercise of sound discretion by the trial court, «and will only be disturbed if the court abused that discretion.” Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1017 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 190-91, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980)). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure vest a trial court with broad discretion in considering a motion for a new trial when the proffered ground is legal error. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). Although Rule 59 does not specify grounds upon which the Court may grant a new trial, significant errors of law prejudicial to the moving party involving evidence or jury instructions have been properly found as bases for a new trial. See Persinger v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 920 F.2d 1185, 1189 (4th Cir.1990) (prejudicial expert testimony justified grant of new trial); Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723, 730 (3d Cir.1990) (erroneous jury instruction serve as basis for new trial). In evaluating a motion for a new trial on the basis of trial error, the Court’s inquiry is twofold: (1) whether an error was in fact committed, and (2) whether that error was so prejudicial that denial of a new trial would be “inconsistent with substantial justice.” Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 709 F.Supp. 600, 601 (E.D.Pa.1989) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 61), aff'd, 922 F.2d 184 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217, 111 S.Ct. 2827, 115 L.Ed.2d 997 (1991). Finch seeks a new trial only on the issue of damages. “[I]f it clearly appears that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the other that a trial of it alone may be had without prejudice,” an issue may be isolated for a new trial. Spence v. Board of Educ. of Christina Sch. Dist., 806 F.2d 1198, 1201-02 (3d Cir.1986) (quoting Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500, 51 S.Ct. 513, 515, 75 L.Ed. 1188 (1931)). Because the nature or extent of the employer’s wrongdoing do not enter into the calculation of front and back pay, employment discrimination cases often lend themselves to bifurcation of liability and damages. See, e.g., Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir.1989) (affirming liability but vacating and remanding the issue of damages); Jordan v. Atchison, Topeka Santa Fe Ry. Co., 934 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1991) (grant of new trial on damages stemmed from erroneous jury instruction on loss of future earnings). However, given the manner in which the evidence was presented the Court views somewhat skeptically the notion of separability, of liability and damages in this case. The Court’s assessment corresponds to the positions of the parties prior to trial; both parties steadfastly opposed bifurcation. 2. Expert Testimony Finch contends the Court committed legal error by permitting one of Hercules’ expert witnesses to present statistical evidence regarding retirement age demographics. Hercules presented testimony by Dr. Jerome Staller, a forensic, economist with a Ph.D. in economics and statistics, who was qualified as an expert on economic damages. Tr. J-159. In his testimony, Staller maintained that to make an informed calculation of Finch’s damages in terms of lost wages, the pivotal question of when Finch would have retired needed to be addressed first. Although Staller was aware that Finch testified that--he had not intended to retire until age 65 or.70, Staller estimated that, based on retirement statistics, it was likely that -Finch would have retired somewhere between the ages of 60 .and 62. Tr. J-16L In coming to this conclusion, Staller looked at both internal data related to retirement patterns at Hercules as well as external data regarding age of voluntary retirement in this country in general. Id. According to Staller, one study showed that up to 77 percent of men retire from their regular career jobs nationwide before age 65. Tr. at J-164. Another study, conducted by a Dr. Parnés, showed that 70-73% of people retire before age 65. Id. Staller was quick to point out that Parnés was a colleague of one of plaintiffs expert trial witnesses on damages, Dr. Paul Andrisani. Tr. J-165. In addition, Nestle, another colleague of Parnés, conducted a survey of people at age 59 and asked the participants when they expected to retire.- Id. Approximately 73% replied that they would not retire until after age 65; however, 75% actually retired before turning 65. Id. From these data, Staller concluded that one’s actual date of retirement usually arrives much sooner than one anticipates. Staller also showcased internal Hercules data demonstrating that from 1989 to 1992, the average voluntary retirement age at Hercules was 60. Tr. J-166. In 1993, the average age was 58. Id. Seventy-five percent of Hercules workers retired by age 62. Id. After testifying about retirement trends, Staller described the economics of the decision to voluntarily retire at a given age, using Finch as an example. If Finch retired at age 62, for example, he would have received an annual retirement annuity of $54,000. Tr. J-168. In addition, Finch would have access to his 401K retirement plan money that was in excess of $185,000. Id. Without touching the principal 401K sum, assuming a rate of return of six and one-half percent, Finch would earn. $Í2,000 annually in interest. Finch would also be eligible for Social Security benefits worth annually approximately $12,000. Id. Finally, Staller calculated Finch as earning an annualized amount of $6,000 from the sale of stock that was not accessible to Finch until he retired. Id. Taken together, these sources of income would yield a total of $84,000 in annual income. Staller contrasted this figure with his projection of Finch’s annual salary at age 63 of $120,000, a figure $36,000 above the passive income figure given above. Id. However, had Finch, continued working, Staller calculated he would be in a 40 percent total tax bracket, and would net only $21,000 from the extra $36,000. Id. Stated differently, Staller testified that Finch could “take his retirement, get $84,000 in [cash] flow, or he stays and works and he gets 120 [thousand] but nets in effect an additional maybe $20,000.” Id. Staller posited that by the time many people reach age 62, they deem it not worth their while for the incremental increase in income to stay employed. Finch argues that Staller’s testimony on the subject of retirement age should have been excluded under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 allows for the introduction of expert testimony that “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” This rule establishes a “liberal policy of admitting expert testimony which will ‘probably aid’ the trier of fact.” Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir.1979) (quoting Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip. Co., 546 F.2d 530, 537 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984, 97 S.Ct. 1681, 52 L.Ed.2d 378 (1977)). Consequently, “doubts about whether an expert’s testimony will be useful should generally be resolved in. favor of admissibility.” In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723