Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER ROBERT E. JONES, District Judge: Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Defendants, alleging violations of the Freedom of Access to Clinics Act of 1994 (“FACE”), 18 U.S.C.A § 248 (1996), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988), Oregon RICO (“ORICO”), Oregon Revised Statutes (“ORS”) 166.720 (1995), and Oregon state tort law. This action is before this Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint (# 103, # 104, # 112), and Motion for Judgment on the pleadings (# 114). FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Plaintiffs allege that the Individual Defendants formed the American Coalition of Life Activists (“ACLA”) with the intention to use “harassment, intimidation and threats of violence in order to causé violent acts and to drive plaintiffs out of business.” Compl. ¶38. ACLA causes violent acts primarily through publication of “wanted” or “unwanted” posters which mimic law enforcement posters seeking the arrest of criminals. Id. ¶39. Specifically, in January 1995, ACLA and the Individual Defendants released a “wanted” poster (the “Deadly Dozen List”) which listed names, home addresses, and some telephone numbers of thirteen physicians, including three Plaintiffs Hem, Elizabeth Newhall, and James Newhall, who perform abortions. Id. ¶ 40-41, Ex. A. The Deadly Dozen List states that the individuals listed are “Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity” and offers a “$5,000 Reward for information leading to arrest, conviction and revocation of license to practice medicine.” Id., Ex. A. Plaintiffs claim that the Deadly Dozen List “suggests an objective that requires the capture and punishment of the individuals named in the poster.” Id. ¶41. Moreover, Plaintiffs state that the Deadly Dozen List is reasonably perceived by Plaintiffs to be a threat of force against Plaintiffs, as demonstrated by the following: (1) Defendants made threatening statements in connection with release of the Deadly Dozen List; (2) in response to release of the Deadly Dozen List, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States Department of Justice offered the doctors on the Deadly Dozen List protection 24 hours a day; and (3) attacks on physicians occurred after release of similar type posters. Id. ¶ 43. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ allegations show a sustained temporal pattern in which a physician is shot to death shortly after his picture appears on a “wanted” poster (Exs. C, D, and E; as alleged Id. ¶¶53, 55; 56, 58; and 60, 68). Exhibits A and B, like Exhibit E, the distribution of which preceded the shooting of Dr. Britton, his wife, and volunteer escort, contain the specific language “crimes against humanity.” All five posters contain descriptions which specifically identify each physician. After the Deadly Dozen List was distributed, Defendant McMillian publicly encouraged violence against abortionists on March 27, 1995: “More violence is inevitable, and it is righteous. * * * It wouldn’t bother me if every abortionist in the country today fell dead from a bullet.” Id. ¶ 45 (quoting Defendant McMillian). In addition, Defendant Bray sells bumper stickers that read, “‘Execute Murderers-Abortionists.’” Id. (quoting Defendant Bray’s Bumper Stickers). Both Defendants Crane and Ramey also sported these bumper stickers. Furthermore, an illustration in the July 1995 issue of the Life Advocate depictéd a pot of thick liquid on which is drawn a map of four cities where abortionists have been killed. The illustration also depicted several cans, each bearing the name of an abortionist, from which the contents were being poured into the pot. Next to the illustration is a biblical quote referring to the shedding of blood. Id. ¶46. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]his picture obviously is intended to be an endorsement of the prior murders and shootings of abortion providers and to cause further violence against members of the plaintiff classes.” Id. Finally, in August 1995, during a convention in St. Louis, Missouri, “defendants, acting in furtherance of their conspiracy, unleashed a new wave of threatening posters into interstate commerce * * * that target for violence physicians who provide abortions * * Id. ¶ 47-48. One of the posters targets Plaintiff Crist by including his name, home and work addresses, and his photograph. Id. ¶48, Ex. B. In addition, during the convention, Defendants released several posters which targeted abortion clinics. Id. ¶ 49. To provide context to Defendants’ activities, Plaintiffs also allege several violent incidents involving abortionists and clinics: (1) in March 1993, Dr. David Gunn was murdered after his name, physical description, address, and description of his car, appeared on an “unwanted” poster, Id. ¶¶ 53-55, Ex. C; (2) in August 1993, Dr. George Patterson was murdered after release of a “wanted” poster containing a description of himself and his car, Id. ¶¶ 56-58, Ex. D; (3) in May 1993, after Defendant Treshman stated that “we have been assured that [Dr. Crist] will be monitored and appropriate action will be taken,” a shot gun was fired several times into the children’s play-room at Plaintiff Crist’s home, Id. ¶¶ 59-60; (4) in August 1993, a member of ALM shot Dr. George Tiller after the Life Advocate published several articles about him, and Defendants Bray and Stover praised the shooting, Id. ¶¶ 61-62; (5) in July 1994, Dr. James Barrett was murdered after publication of an “unwanted” poster featuring his name, photograph, home address, work and home telephone numbers, and date of birth, Id. ¶¶ 66-68, Ex. E; (6) in November 1994, after Defendant McMillan stated publicly, “Why would a person [assassinate] publicly, when maybe he could have done it clandestinely, with a high-powered rifle * * Dr. Garson Romalis was shot in the leg by a sniper with an assault rifle, Id. ¶¶ 73-74; (7) in December 1994, after the Life Advocate noted that Dr. Britton’s murder caused other abortionists to resign, a gunman killed two clinic workers at the Planned Parenthood and Preterm Abortion Clinics in Brookline, Massachusetts, as well as fired shots into the Hillcrest Clinic in Norfolk, Virginia, Id. ¶¶ 77-78. Plaintiffs contend that “Defendants’ unrelenting threats, including and in connection with the repeated distribution of ‘unwanted’style posters, as noted above, has [sic] aggravated the past violence and has [sic] instilled fear in all plaintiffs that more violence is yet to come if defendants are not stopped.” Id. ¶¶ 80. CAUSES OF ACTION Based on the above allegations, Plaintiffs assert the following seven causes of action: (1) Defendants have conspired to violate FACE, 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(a)(1), by intending to injure, threaten and intimidate Plaintiffs through the dissemination of “unwanted”-style posters which target abortion providers like Plaintiffs who are aggrieved persons within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(c)(1)(a); (2) Defendants violated FACE, § 248(a)(1), by threatening, injuring, and intimidating Plaintiffs because they are providing “reproductive health services”; (3) Defendants, except ACLA, violated RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), by participating and agreeing to participate in the operation or management of ACLA’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity that involves at least two predicate acts which include publication of the Deadly Dozen List and similar oral or written publications containing threats of force against Plaintiffs; (4) Defendants, except ACLA violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) by conspiring to violate RICO as a result of agreeing to the commission of two or more of the predicate acts; (5) Defendants violated ORICO, ORS 166.720(3), for the same reasons evinced under Plaintiffs’ federal RICO claims; (6) Defendants violated ORS 166.720(4) by conspiring to violate ORICO; (7) Finally, Defendants’ intentional conduct transgresses the bounds of socially tolerable conduct and caused Plaintiffs to suffer emotional distress which is actionable under Oregon tort law. Plaintiffs request a declaration that Defendants’ conduct violates FACE, RICO, ORI-CO, and state law, and is not protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Furthermore,' Plaintiffs seek an injunction preventing Defendants from continuing to violate FACE, ORICO, and any other laws by publishing the Deadly Dozen List and similar posters. In sum, Plaintiffs demand compensatory damages of at least $200 million, punitive damages of at least $300 million, and treble damages of at least $300 million. In response to Plaintiffs’ allegations, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and under Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings. I examine these motions below. STANDARD On a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Farmers Ins. Ex. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir.1990). However, “[w]here [as here] a district court acts on a defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) without holding an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.” Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir.1995). That is, plaintiff need only demonstrate facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim can be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995); Mountain High Knitting, Inc. v. Reno, 51 F.3d 216, 218 (9th Cir.1995). All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. National Wildlife Federation v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir.1995); Everest and Jennings v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir.1994). Similarly, a Rule 12(c) motion for “judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when, even if all allegations in the complaint are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a- matter of law.” Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 670 (9th Cir.1993) (citing Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir.1990)). DISCUSSION Although many of the Defendants filed separate Motions to Dismiss and briefs in support of those motions, most of the arguments address identical issues or adopted analyses in other Defendants’ memoranda. Therefore, unless otherwise designated, I consolidate and address the Defendants’ contentions together. Defendants maintain that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants and they also attack each of Plaintiffs’ seven causes of action. I address each ground for dismissal in turn. I. Personal Jurisdiction A. Individual Defendants’ Arguments Defendants contend that this Court may not assert general jurisdiction over them for several reasons: (1) they were not physically served with the Complaint in Oregon; (2) they are not domiciled in Oregon; (3) they do not engage in substantial activities in Oregon; and (4) they did not expressly consent to this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them. In addition, this Court cannot assert long-arm jurisdiction over Defendants because Plaintiffs’ allegations do not sufficiently show that Defendants distributed threatening posters which were used or consumed in Oregon through the ordinary course of trade. Finally, Defendants argue that long-arm jurisdiction would also violate their due process rights because: (1) Defendants have not purposefully availed themselves of the privileges in Oregon; (2) Defendants’ activities have not arisen out of forum-related activities; and (3) extension' of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. B. Plaintiffs’ Arguments In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that the Court may properly exercise jurisdiction because, through their activities with ACLA, Defendants are responsible for publication and distribution of the Dirty Dozen List which intentionally targets two Oregon physicians, Drs. James and Elizabeth Newhall, who are Plaintiffs in this action. Because Defendants directed their anti-abortion efforts directly against Oregon residents, they had purposeful contact with Oregon which resulted in the injury that is the subject of this lawsuit. C. Analysis Although seven Defendants join in Defendants Mears’ and Dodds’ argument in support of dismissal for lack of personal jurisdietion, only Defendants Mears, Dodds, Treshman, and Miller raised the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in their first responsive pleading. Defendants Foreman, Wysong, and Dreste failed to dispute personal jurisdiction in their Answer. “A general appearance or responsive pleading by a defendant that fails to dispute personal jurisdiction will waive any defect in service or personal jurisdiction.” Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.1986) (citing Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870, 108 S.Ct. 198, 98 L.Ed.2d 149 (1987). Therefore, Defendants Foreman, Wysong and Dreste waived their right to dispute personal jurisdiction, and I address this argument only with respect to Defendants Mears, Dodds, Miller, and Treshman. Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is tested by a two-part analysis: the exercise of jurisdiction must (1) satisfy the requirements of the applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, or if none exists, the long-arm statute of the state in which the district court sits; and (2) comport with principles of federal due process. Terracom v. Valley Nat. Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 559 (9th Cir.1995). Oregon’s long-arm statute, ORCP 4, confers jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Machinery Co., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.1990) (citing ORCP 4L; Oregon ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 294 Or. 381, 384, 657 P.2d 211 (1982)). Therefore, because Oregon’s long-arm statute is coextensive with the outer limits of federal due process, I need only analyze the second prong of the personal jurisdiction test. Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir.1994). “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant in any State with which the defendant has ‘certain minimum contacts * * * such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ [citation omitted].” Galder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 1486, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (quoting International Shoe Co.v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90. L.Ed. 95 (1945)). For a defendant to be subject to general personal jurisdiction, he must have such “continuous and systematic contacts with the forum that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Reebok Intern. Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 276, 133 L.Ed.2d 197 (1995). However, where, as here, the defendant’s contacts with the forum are not continuous and systematic, the forum may exercise only specific personal jurisdiction, which is determined by the following three-part test: “(1) The nonresident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.” Id. (quoting Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir.1993)). 1. Purposeful Availment “This purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or third person.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (merely contracting with a resident of a forum state is insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction over a nonresident). Different standards for purposeful availment apply to tort cases, as compared to contract cases. Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995) (extended specific jurisdiction to nonresident defendants who caused plaintiff to be unlawfully arrested in the forum state). Unlike a contract case (e.g. Burger King), in a tort case, “jurisdiction may attach if an out-of-forum defendant merely engages in conduct aimed at, and having effect in, the situs state.” Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473 (citing Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d. 617, 621 (9th Cir.1991)). “[T]he three elements of purposeful availment. in tort cases are: (1) intentional action; (2) aimed at the forum state; and (3) causing harm that the defendant should have anticipated would be suffered in the forum state.” Ziegler, 64 F.3d .at 474 (citing Core-Vent at 1486). The lack of physical contact with the forum does not necessarily defeat jurisdiction. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788, 104 S.Ct. at 1486 (personal jurisdiction proper where nonresident’s wrongdoing is intentionally directed at a resident); Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474. In the present action, Plaintiffs assert a claim under state tort law, as well as claims under FACE, RICO, ORICO, which all involve tortious-type conduct. Therefore, in determining whether Defendants purposefully availed themselves of this forum, I apply the analysis for tort eases, set forth in Ziegler. According to Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, Defendant ACLA, “acting through and in active concert with each of the other defendants, publicly announced and released into interstate commerce” the Deadly Dozen List which targeted two Oregon Plaintiffs by listing their names and addresses. Compl. ¶ 40, Ex. A. “Defendants intended for the Deadly Dozen List to instill fear in the doctors specifically named therein * * * [and] have distributed and continue to distribute the Deadly Dozen List throughout the United States, with the intent to spread their message of violence against plaintiffs and to intimidate plaintiffs and cause them serious physical and emotional harm.” Compl. ¶¶ 41, 43. As Plaintiffs document in their Complaint, lists or posters similar to those distributed by Defendants have resulted in death or injury to other doctors who perform abortions. These factual allegations show that Defendants targeted two Oregon doctors with the intention to instill fear in the doctors and cause them serious physical and emotional harm. Therefore, the purposeful availment requirements of Ziegler are easily met: Defendants’ wrongful conduct was aimed directly at two Oregon doctors who Defendants knew were in Oregon and who Defendants clearly anticipated and hoped would suffer the intended harm. Consequently, I find that all Defendants purposefully availed themselves of Oregon law. 2. Arising Out Of The claims arise out of a defendant’s forum-related activities if plaintiff would not have a cause of action “but for” defendant’s contacts with'the forum. Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474. The “but for” test should not be narrowly applied; rather, the requirement is merely designed to confirm that there is some nexus between the cause of action and defendant’s contact with the forum. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir.1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991). As in Ziegler, there is no dispute in this case that “but for” the contacts between Defendants and Oregon, the Oregon Plaintiffs would not have suffered the injury which is the subject of this lawsuit against Defendants. Ziegler 64 F.3d at 474. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries arise out of Defendants’ contact with Oregon. 3. Reasonableness of Exercising Jurisdiction In determining whether exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, the court must weigh all of the following seven factors: (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful injection [sic] into the forum; (2) the defendant’s burdens from litigating in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 475 (citing Terracom v. Valley Nat. Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir.1995)). No single factor is dispositive. Terracom at 561 (citing Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1488). I address each factor in turn. a. Purposeful Interjection “[T]he extent of interjection is to be considered: ‘Even if there is sufficient interjection into the state to satisfy the [purposeful availment prong], the degree of interjection is a factor to be weighed in assessing the overall reasonableness of jurisdiction under the [reasonableness prong].” Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1488 (quoting Insurance Company of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir.1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Like Ziegler, where Florida defendants caused a California plaintiff to be arrested in California, in this case, Defendants significantly interjected into Oregon by publishing and nationally distributing threats directed at two Oregon Plaintiffs. The harmful effects in Oregon caused by Defendants’ actions were not merely incidental; rather, Defendants intentionally directed their actions towards Oregon so that the Oregon Plaintiffs would be physically and emotionally injured. See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 475 (“[defendants] intentionally directed their actions towards California, for the purpose of having [plaintiff] arrested there and extradited. Their purposeful injection [sic] into California was significant.”). Consequently, Defendants’ significant interjection into Oregon, for the purpose of injuring the Oregon Plaintiffs, weighs in favor of exercising jurisdiction here. b. Burden on Defense The second factor concerns Defendants’ burden in litigating this ease in Oregon. Unlike other cases involving nonresident defendants, the four Defendants in this case who challenge personal jurisdiction in Oregon are each from a different State: New Hampshire, Kansas, Wisconsin, and Maryland. As a collective group, no one State is less burdensome than another for the Defendants. However, for each individual Defendant, their resident State is obviously less burdensome than Oregon because none of the Defendants have significant physical contacts with Oregon. Accordingly, the burden on each Defendant in litigating in Oregon tips slightly in Defendants’ favor. c. Conflict with Nonresident State’s Sovereignty Although Defendants’ States may have an interest in protecting their residents’ rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, their States have little interest in resolving claims which involve unprotected tortious conduct of their residents, as alleged by Plaintiffs. Therefore, interference with the sovereignty of the nonresident States is minimal and this third factor favors jurisdiction. d. Forum State’s Interest Like other States, Oregon maintains a strong interest in providing an effective means of redress for its residents who are tortiously injured. See Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1489 (noting that California . maintains a strong interest in providing redress to its residents who are tortiously injured). Therefore, this fourth factor also supports exercising personal jurisdiction. e. Efficiency Similarly, the fifth factor also weighs in favor of exercising jurisdiction in Oregon because Oregon contains more parties to this lawsuit than any other State. In evaluating this factor, the Ninth Circuit instructs that the court should look “ ‘primarily at where the witnesses and the evidence are likely to be located.’” Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 475-76 (quoting Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1489). Because the parties will be witnesses in this action, Oregon contains a larger number of witnesses than any other single State. Although the four Defendants who oppose jurisdiction do not reside in Oregon, the following co-defendants are physically present in Oregon: ACLA, ALM, Burnett, Ramey, and Stover. Furthermore, five of the Plaintiffs are also located in Oregon: Planned Parenthood, Portland Feminist, Elizabeth Newhall, James Newhall, and Karen Sweigert. Therefore, Oregon is the most efficient foruni for resolution of this matter. f. Importance of Forum to Plaintiffs Obviously, Plaintiffs would prefer to litigate in Oregon, but “mere preference on the part of the plaintiff for its home forum does not affect the balancing * * Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1490. Plaintiffs have not suggested that they cannot obtain identical relief in other States. However, the overwhelming majority of parties are physically present in Oregon; thus, it would be foolish to require Plaintiffs to seek redress in some other State where personal jurisdiction as to other Defendants may be lacking. This factor neither adds nor detracts from the reasons for exercising jurisdiction in Oregon. g. Unavailability of Alternative Forum As with the sixth factor above, Plaintiffs do not argue that no other forum exists. “ ‘Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the unavailability of an alternative forum.’ ” Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 476 (quoting Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1490). Clearly, Plaintiffs could sue in another State. However, Plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy this factor has little effect on the determination to exercise jurisdiction in this ease. h. Balancing Factors In sum, factors 1 (purposeful interjection), 3 (non-forum States’ sovereignty), 4 (Oregon’s interest), and 5 (efficiency), favor the Plaintiffs. At best, factors 2 (burden on Defendants), 6 (importance of forum to Plaintiffs), and 7 (alternative forum), tip in favor of Defendants. However, Defendants’ purposeful interjection, Oregon’s interest in providing redress to its residents, and efficiency, decisively tip the balance in Plaintiffs’ favor towards exercising jurisdiction. “Once purposeful availment has been established, the forum’s exercise of jurisdiction is presumptively reasonable. To rebut that presumption, a defendant must present a compelling ease that the exercise of jurisdiction would, in fact, be unreasonable.” Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 476 (quoting Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)). Because the balance of factors strongly favors Plaintiffs, Defendants cannot overcome the presumption that exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable. Consequently, this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over the non-resident Defendants who timely challenged jurisdiction: Mears, Dodds, Treshman, and Miller. Likewise, this Court has personal jurisdiction over all other Defendants because they either reside or are principally located in Oregon, or they waived their right to object to personal jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1). II. Prohibition Of Speech Protected By The First Amendment A. Defendants’ Arguments Addressing the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs impermissibly seek to prohibit speech protected by the First Amendment. Defendants’ anti-abortion protests are speech and may not be proscribed merely because they are offensive and intimidating to Plaintiffs. Furthermore, Defendants’ oral statements and posters do not fall within the “fighting words” exception to protected speech because that expression does not incite imminent lawless action which is likely to occur. In fact, Plaintiffs failed to alleged that their anti-abortion expressions either incite imminent violence or are likely to produce the violence. Therefore, based upon the undisputed allegations in the Complaint, Defendants’ expressions are not “fighting words” and must be protected. B. Plaintiffs’ Arguments Contrary to Defendants’ characterization of Plaintiffs’ theory, Plaintiffs do not contend that Defendants’ expression must incite imminent violence to be forbidden. Instead, they argue that Defendants’ actions constitute “true threats” which are prohibited by FACE and not protected by the First Amendment. Although Defendants’ expression does not expressly threaten Plaintiffs, they assert that the expression becomes a “true threat” when placed in context. Therefore, by alleging the context surrounding Defendants’ expression and its effect upon Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support the conclusion that Defendants’ expression constitutes “true threats” which are not protected speech under the First Amendment. C. Analysis Plaintiffs seek to prohibit Defendants’ conduct under FACE, 18 U.S.C. § 248, which regulates three types of activities: (1) the use of “force,” (2) “threatfs] of force,” and (3) “physical obstruction.” 18 U.S.C. § 248(a). Only the second proscribed activity, “threats of force,” constitutes expressive conduct eligible for protection under the First Amendment. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484-85, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 2198-99, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993) (“[a] physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment”). Furthermore, FACE only forbids “threats of force” that “intimidate” which is defined as to “place a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm” Id. § 248(e)(3). “True threats” are not protected by the First Amendment. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (upholding statute that criminalized threats of violence against the president but concluding that the statement, “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.,” was political hyperbole and not a “true threat” given its context); see also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (“threats of violence are outside the First Amendment”); Melugin v. Hames, 38 F.3d 1478, 1484-86 (9th Cir.1994) (upholding constitutionality of statute, as interpreted by the Alaska Court of Appeals, which criminalized threats of death or physical injury). However, statutes which punish “a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind.” Watts, 394 U.S. at 707, 89 S.Ct. at 1401. Therefore, “[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.” Id. Consequently, to the extent Plaintiffs seek to prohibit “true threats” under FACE, the First Amendment is not violated. The issue then is determining whether Defendants’ expressive conduct constitutes a “true threat.” The Ninth Circuit recently restated the objective test used to resolve the issue of whether a threat is a true threat: “whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement Would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.” United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir.1990). Furthermore, “[a]lleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context, including the surrounding events and the reaction of the listeners.” Id. (citing United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082, 110 S.Ct. 1140, 107 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1990) and United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 1987)); accord United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.) (“So long as the threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific * * * as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution, the statute may properly be applied.”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022, 97 S.Ct. 639, 50 L.Ed.2d 623 (1976). Lovell v. Poway Unified School District, 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir.1996). Under this test, the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant had the ability or actually intended to physically harm the plaintiff. Melugin, 38 F.3d at 1485. “Moreover, the issue whether the [plaintiff] has shown a ‘true threat’ is a question of fact for the jury, not a question of law for the court.” Id. (citing United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186, 1192 (7th Cir. 1990)). In Lovell, a student told a school counselor, “If you don’t give me this schedule change, I’m going to shoot you!” Lovell, 90 F.3d at 369. The counselor informed the school about the student’s statement; in response, the school suspended the student. Id. The student’s parents filed suit on behalf of the student, claiming, in part, that the suspension violated the student’s First Amendment rights by punishing her speech. Id. at 370. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the suspension did not violate the student’s First Amendment rights because threats of violence are not protected speech and “[a] reasonable person in these circumstances would have foreseen that [the counselor] would interpret that statement as a serious expression of intent to harm.” Id. at 372. Thus, a true threat exists if the target of the speaker reasonably believes that the speaker has the ability to act him or herself or .to influence others to act at a level less than incitement—it is the perception of a reasonable person that is dispositive, not the actual intent of the speaker. Unlike in Lovell, the alleged threats in this case are not so easily identified in the Complaint. Nevertheless, federal notice pleading standards are not strict and motions to dismiss are not granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claims which would entitle [them] to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants have distributed and continue to distribute the Deadly Dozen List throughout the United States, with the intent to spread their message of violence against plaintiffs and to intimidate plaintiffs and cause them serious physical and emotional harm.” Compl.. ¶ 43, Ex. A. Furthermore, “[b]y creating and circulating [a poster targeting Plaintiff Crist], the defendants intend to place Dr. Crist * * * in reasonable fear of bodily harm should he continue to perform abortions * * Id. ¶ 48, Ex. B. Viewing the Deadly Dozen List and the Crist poster in the factual context of previous “unwanted”-style posters which listed names of other doctors who were subsequently assaulted or murdered, I cannot conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable person in these circumstances would not foresee that the Plaintiffs would interpret the Deadly Dozen List and Crist poster as serious expressions of intent to harm. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372-73 (“Alleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context, including the surrounding events and the reaction of the listeners. * * * Given the level of violence in public schools today, it is no wonder that [the counselor] felt threatened. * * * [Nevertheless,] the final result turns upon whether a reasonable person in these circumstances should have foreseen that his or her words would have this effect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim because Defendants’ speech may be unprotected “true threats.” However, the Court agrees with the observation by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), as amicus curiae, that Plaintiffs do not clearly separate the expression that constitutes a “true threat” from the context of the expression. In addition, Plaintiffs do not clearly identify the individual Defendants who are responsible for the threats. “Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence. For liability to be imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims.” N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3429, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982). Therefore, Plaintiffs are given leave to amend their Complaint in order to clearly distinguish between the allegedly actionable and the contextual expressions, as well as specifically name the individual Defendants who intended to further the alleged threats of violence. III. Constitutionality Of PACE A. Defendants’ Arguments Defendants argue that FACE violates the Commerce Clause because it regulates activity which is not sufficiently connected to interstate commerce. . Second, the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize Congress to regulate solely private conduct through FACE. Third, Defendants contend that FACE is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment for several reasons: (1) the statute impermissibly bans speech based on its anti-abortion viewpoint; (2) FACE imposes a content-based restriction by regulating speech based upon whether it intimidates the listener; and (3) FACE is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it fails to define key terms and regulates speech that does not fall within the categories of “fighting words” or “imminent threats of lawless action.” B. Plaintiffs’ Arguments Plaintiffs respond by arguing first that Congress rationally concluded that the conduct regulated by FACE (e.g., violence, threats of violence, and physical obstructions aimed at persons who provide abortions) affects interstate commerce. Furthermore, Congress crafted FACE so that it was reasonably tailored to regulate such conduct. Therefore, Congress properly regulates such conduct under the Commerce Clause. Second, Plaintiffs reject' Defendants’ suggestion that FACE must regulate state action, in order to be valid under the Fourteenth Amendment. The relevant inquiry is whether Congress possessed authority under the Constitution for enacting FACE, not whether Congress seeks to regulate state action. Third, Plaintiffs maintain that FACE passes constitutional muster under the First Amendment because it is viewpoint and content neutral. In addition, FACE is not constitutionally overbroad because it regulates only unprotected expression. Moreover, the statute is also not unconstitutionally vague because it clearly defines the prohibited activity. C. Analysis In relevant part, FACE enables persons who provide or seek reproductive services to recover civil remedies against anyone who: [B]y force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services * * *. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248. Defendants’ constitutional attacks of this statute are addressed individually below. 1. Commerce Clause The Constitution delegates to Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. “Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce [citation omitted], i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, — U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 1624; 1629-30, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 which criminalized possession of firearms in school zones because the statute failed to regulate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce) (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n. 27, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 2024 n. 27, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968)). “Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.” Lopez, — U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 1630. “ ‘Even activity that is purely intra-state in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.’ ” Model v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclam. Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 277, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2360, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (holding that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, which mandates compliance with environmental standards, did not contravene the Commerce Clause) (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 546, 95 S.Ct. 1792, 1795, 44 L.Ed.2d 363 (1975)). In determining whether a particular exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause, “[t]he court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding.” Model, 452 U.S. at 276, 101 S.Ct. at 2360. “This established, the only remaining question for the judicial inquiry is whether ‘the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.’ ” Model, 452 U.S. at 276, 101 S.Ct. at 2360 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262, 85 S.Ct. 348, 360, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964)) (concluding that Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because restaurants that discriminated served fewer customers, and therefore suppressed interstate commerce). In the present action, Congress made the following findings when it enacted FACE: (1) An interstate campaign of violent, threatening, obstructive and destructive conduct aimed at providers of reproductive health services across the nation has injured providers of such services and their patients, and the extent and interstate nature of this conduct place it beyond the ability of any single state or local jurisdiction to control; (2) Such conduct, which has included blockades and invasions of medical facilities, arson and other destruction of property, assaults, death threats, attempted murder and murder, infringes upon the exercise of rights secured by federal and state law, both statutory and constitutional; (3) Such conduct also burdens interstate commerce by forcing patients to travel from states where their access to reproductive health services is obstructed to other states, and by interfering with the interstate commercial activities of health care providers, including the purchase and lease of facilities and equipment, sale of goods and services, employment of personnel and generation of income, and purchase of medicine, medical supplies, surgical instruments and other supplies from other states * * *. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 488, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 724; see also H.R.Rep. No. 306, at 6-10 (1993) reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 703-707 (explaining the need for federal remedies to protect patients and providers of reproductive health services); see also S.Rep. No. 117, at 31-32 (1993). Based upon its extensive findings, Congress rationally concluded that violence, threats of force, and physical obstructions directed at persons seeking or providing reproductive health services substantially affect interstate commerce. Furthermore, all circuits which have addressed the issue agree that Congress rationally concluded that the activity regulated by FACE substantially affects interstate commerce. See United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (7th Cir.1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26,1996) (No. 96-141); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 920-21 (8th Cir.1996), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6,1996) (No. 96-5615); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680-83 (7th Cir.1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3669 (Mar. 20, 1996) (No. 95-1523); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1519-21 (11th Cir.1995); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 55, 133 L.Ed.2d 19 (1995). I agree with the Fourth Circuit in Reno, which concluded that “Congress also chose regulatory means reasonably adapted to permissible ends [because] [t]he Act’s criminal and civil penalties are designed to deter violent, obstructive and destructive conduct.” 47 F.3d at 647 (listing the Act’s permissible ends). Therefore, in accord with all circuit courts that have examined whether Congress permissibly invoked its commerce power to enact FACE, I conclude that FACE is a .constitutional, exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. 2. First Amendment The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in part, that “Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech * * “The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-311 [60 S.Ct. 900, 905-06, 84 L.Ed. 1213] (1940), or even expressive conduct, see, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 [109 S.Ct. 2533, 2540-41, 105 L.Ed.2d 342] (1989), because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.” R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2542, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Furthermore, “[w]hen the government targets not subject matter but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 [112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547-48, 120 L.Ed.2d 305] (1992). Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.” Rosenberger, et al., v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, et al., — U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2516, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995). “The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” Id. (citing Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)). Regulations which “suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content” are valid under the First Amendment only if they survive strict scrutiny, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, —, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2459, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994), which requires Congress to “show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118, 112 S.Ct. 501, 509, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991). However, where the regulation is content-neutral, it need only satisfy “an intermediate level of scrutiny,” Turner, 512 U.S. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 2459, which upholds the regulation if “it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968); see also Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (applying intermediate level of scrutiny to time, place, and manner restrictions on speech). Therefore, I must first determine whether FACE is content and viewpoint neutral, and then apply the proper level of scrutiny under the First Amendment. a. Content- and Viewpoint-Based Several circuits have addressed the issue of whether FACE is content- and viewpoint-based, and I concur in their well-reasoned conclusions. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 923 (8th Cir.1996); American Life League, 47 F.3d 642, 651 (4th Cir.1995); Cheffer, 55 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir.1995) (expressly adopting rationale set forth in American Life League). However, I offer a brief analysis in addition to the Eighth, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits’ discussions. As discussed earlier in Part II.C. of this Opinion, FACE regulates the use of force, threats of force, and physical obstruction, which are activities that are not protected under the First Amendment. The fact that application of FACE is based upon whether the victim of a threat of violence is placed in “reasonable apprehension of bodily harm,” does not cause the statute to become content-based, like the ordinance in Forsyth County, Co. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992), because threats of violence are not protected under the First Amendment. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 922. Furthermore, FACE is not viewpoint-based merely because its application is limited to force, threats of force, or physical obstruction against a person because that person obtains or provides reproductive health services. Congress may “single[ ] out” specific types of conduct “because this conduct is thought to inflict greater* individual or societal harm,” Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-88, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (upholding statute that enhances sentences for crimes motivated by racial bias), so long as no distinction is made based upon the expressive content or viewpoint of the conduct, see R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377, 391-94, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547-49 (striking down ordinance that regulated certain types of “fighting words” which insulted or provoked violence “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender” because the ordinance distinguished application based on the content and viewpoint of the “fighting words”). Unlike the ordinance in R.AV., FACE is not viewpoint-based because it prohibits all conduct regardless of the violator’s viewpoint so long as that conduct is directed towards a person merely because that person obtains or provides reproductive health services. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390, 112 S.Ct. at 2546-47 (“Where the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.”); see also Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 923; American Life League, 47 F.3d at 650-51. The mere fact that a class of persons with a particular viewpoint are more likely to violate the statute does, not render the law a viewpoint-based regulation of speech. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, —, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2524, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (“That petitioners all share the same viewpoint regarding abortion does not in itself demonstrate that some invidious content- or viewpoint-based purpose motivated the issuance of the order” which established a 36-foot buffer zone from which demonstrators were prohibited); see, e.g., O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673 (upholding a statutory prohibition on burning draft cards despite the fact that most violators would likely oppose the Vietnam War). Consequently, like the Eighth, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, I conclude that FACE is a content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral regulation. Therefore, I apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to determine whether the statute’s incidental burdens on protected speech violate the First Amendment. b. Intermediate Scrutiny Under O’Brien A statute survives intermediate scrutiny if (1) .it is content-neutral, (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, and (3) the restriction is narrowly tailored to further that interest. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679. “To satisfy this standard, a regulation need not be the least speech-restrictive means of advancing the . Government’s interests.” Turner, 512 U.S. 622, —, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2469. “Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the * * * regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Id. (quoting Ward v. Bock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2758, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). FACE . furthers the government’s “strong interest in protecting a woman’s freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling services in connection with her pregnancy,” Madsen, 512 U.S. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 2526 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)), as well as the government’s interest in “protecting patients and staff from violence and harm and protecting reproductivé health facilities from physical destruction or damage.” American Life League, 47 F.3d at 651. These interests are substantial .and support any incidental burdens on protected speech caused by FACE, so long as the burdens are no greater than necessary to further the government’s interests. FACE regulates only force, threats of force, and physical obstruction; thus, it “ ‘leaves open ample alternative means for communication,’ ” and is narrowly tailored to further the government’s interests. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 923 (quoting American Life League, 47 F.3d at 652) (“In a non-violent, non-obstructive manner, protestors may still stand and express their antiabortion message. They may still proclaim their views and make their pleas by voice, signs, handbills, symbolic gestures and other expressive means”). In sum, I conclude, as did the Eighth, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, that FACE serves substantial government interests in preventing violence and preserving access to reproductive health services, and is narrowly tailored to further those interests, without targeting the content of the expression. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 924; American Life League, 47 F.3d at 652; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521-22. c. Vagueness and Overbreadth In addition, I reject Defendants’ argument that FACE is unconstitutionally vague because terms like “obstruction,” “interference,” and “threat of force” are unclear, and “intimidate” is based upon the subjective reaction of third parties. “A statute is void for vagueness when it does not sufficiently identify the conduct that is prohibited.” United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir.1996). Therefore, the statute must “be sufficiently clear so as not to cause persons ‘of common intelligence * * * necessarily [to] guess at its meaning and [to] differ as to its application^]’ ” Id. (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). In the present action, all the challenged terms, except for “threat of force,” are defined by the statute. For instance, FACE defines “intimidate” as to “place a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or to another,” “interfere with” as to “restrict a person’s freedom of movement,” and “physical obstruction” as “rendering impassable ingress to or egress from a facility that provides reproductive health services * * 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(2), (3), and (4). These specific and clear definitions, by themselves, are sufficient to defeat Defendants’ vagueness challenge. Nonetheless, further support for this conclusion is found in United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.1987), where the Ninth Circuit held that the terms “threat of force,” “intimidate,” and “interfere with,” as used in the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1982) (prohibits anyone who “by force or threat of force * * * intimidates or interferes with * * * any person because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin * * *”) are not unconstitutionally vague. 813 F.2d at 1530. In so holding, the court emphasized that “legislation which proscribes the use of force or the threat of force should not be found to be void for vagueness.” Id. I see no-reason for a different result in this case; FACE is not unconstitutionally vague. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 924; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521-22, American Life League, 47 F.3d at 653. Likewise, I also reject Defendants’ contention that FACE is unconstitutionally overbroad because it regulates speech that does not fall within two of the categories of exclusion from First Amendment protection: “fighting words” or “imminent threats of lawless action.” As discussed earlier in Part II.C. of this Opinion, Plaintiffs do not claim that Defendants’ actions constitute “fighting words” or an “incitement to imminent violence,” but rather allege that Defendants are directing threats of violence at Plaintiffs. Therefore, the analyses under the “fighting words” and “incitement to imminent violence” doctrines do not apply here. Moreover, because true threats of violence are similarly not protected, I must reject Defendants’ argument that FACE is overbroad. Accordingly, I reject Defendants’ vagueness and overbreadth arguments and hold that FACE does not violate the First Amendment. Furthermore, I also conclude that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that Defendants’ “unwanted”style posters constitute “threats of violence” under FACE and overcome Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). However, although Plaintiffs succeed at this point in the litigation, there are several troubling issues with regard to their FACE claim that Plaintiffs may need to address in order to survive a motion for summary judgment: (1) whether all Plaintiffs have standing to assert a claim under FACE, (2) which specific conduct by Defendants constitutes “true threats,” and (3) whether sufficient evidence warrants submitting to the jury the issue of whether Defendants’ alleged conduct constitutes “true threats.” At this early stage of the case, accepting all of Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, I cannot say as matter of law that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim under FACE, but I harbor significant doubts as to whether Plaintiffs will possess sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact for trial. IV. RICO To state a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), a plaintiff must show that the conduct of an enterprise, through a pattern of racketeering activity, injured plaintiffs business or property. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). A “pattern” of racketeering activity does not exist unless there is evidence of at least two predicate acts. Brady v. Dairy Fresh Products Co., 974 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.1992). “Racketeering activity” is any act indictable under several provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir.1989) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)) (listing the offenses). Defendants attack Plaintiffs’ RICO and ORICO claims on several grounds. I address each of Defendants’ contentions in turn. A. Pleading Standard for RICO Claims 1. Arguments First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the heightened pleading standard mandated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) for RICO claims by not pleading with particularity RICO “predicate acts” (i.e., violations of federal and state criminal law) allegedly committed by Defendants. In opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs contend that they pleaded Defendants’ “predicate acts” with sufficient particularity by alleging that Defendants’ threats of violence in furtherance of a plan to commit extortion and/or coercion violated the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and Oregon’s coercion statute, ORS 163.275. 2. Analysis Allegations of fraud must be stated with particularity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Likewise, RICO claims based upon predicate acts involving fraud must be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b). See Lancaster Comm. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 9