Full opinion text
OPINION LECHNER, District Judge. This is an employment discrimination action brought by plaintiff Maureen Johnson (“Johnson”) against defendant Penske Truck Leasing Company (“Penske”). Jurisdiction is alleged pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and appears to be proper. Johnson alleges Penske, her former employer, unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of age and gender when Penske did not promote her in December 1993. Johnson seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, costs of suit and other such equitable relief as deemed proper. On 7 December 1995, Johnson filed a two count complaint (the “Complaint”) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, alleging claims of gender discrimination and age discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A 10:5-1, et seq. On -7 February .1996, Penske removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. On 14 August 1996, Penske submitted, pursuant to Rule 12N, Appendix N (“Rule 12N”) of the General Rules for the District of New Jersey, a motion for summary judgment (the “Motion for Summary Judgment”). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Facts A. The Penske Corporation Penske is a national truck rental and leasing company which has field operations located throughout the United States and parts of Canada. 17 June 1996 Certification of Joseph Moleski (“Moleski Cert.”), attached to Cerra Cert, as Exhibit F, ¶ 3. Penske’s corporate headquarters are located in Reading, Pennsylvania. Moleski Cert., ¶3. Penske’s organizational structure is divided into four operating regions: the Northeast, Southeast, Central and Western regions. Moleski Cert., ¶ 4. Each region is headed by a Vice President. Moleski Cert. ¶4. Each region is subdivided into three to four smaller geographic territories (an “Area”), headed by an Area Vice President. Moleski Cert., ¶ 4. These Areas are further subdivided into districts (a “District”). Moleski Cert., ¶ 5. The number of Districts in each area varies between five and eleven, depending upon the population and demand of the Area. Moleski Cert., ¶ 5. Within each District, a District Manager oversees the overall operations of the District. Moleski Cert., ¶5. The District Manager supervises the various job functions including commercial lease activity, commercial and consumer rental activity, the service and maintenance functions and office administration. Moleski Cert., ¶5. Four Penske employees directly report to the District Manager: the District Service Manager, the District Rental Manager, the Lease Sales Representative and the District Controller (now known as the District Administrator). Moleski Cert., ¶ 6. The District Service Manager is largely responsible for supervising the maintenance of the vehicles leased and rented at the field location. Moleski Cert., ¶7. The Lease Sales Representative is primarily responsible for supervising lease sales, including the servicing of existing accounts and the soliciting of new lease business. Moleski Cert., ¶7. The District Rental Manager is primarily responsible for managing the rental functions. Moleski Cert., ¶ 8. At the time Johnson held the District Controller position, the District Controller’s primary duty was to oversee the financial and administrative functions of the District. Moleski Cert., ¶9. These responsibilities included training and supervising clerical staff, managing the accounting function at the district level, interacting with customers regarding licensing, billing, and other administrative issues. Moleski Cert., ¶ 9. Of the employees that report to the District Manager, the District Service Manager receives the highest base salary, plus a bonus and a company car. Moleski Cert., ¶ 10. The Lease Sales Representative receives a base salary, a company car and commission based on the sale activity he or she generates. Moleski Cert., ¶ 10. The District Rental Manager receives a base salary, a company car and is eligible for a bonus. Moleski Cert., ¶ 10. Finally, the District Controller receives only a base salary comparable to that of the District Rental Manager, but no company car. Moleski Cert., ¶ 10. Districts may be further subdivided into branches (a “Branch”) which are similarly structured to the District to which it reports. Moleski Cert., ¶ 11. One key difference is that a Branch does not employ its own Controller, but father the District Controller performs the functions for the Branch. Moleski Cert., ¶ 11. The primary responsibilities of a Branch Manager are to oversee the operations of the Branch, which include supervision of the employees that directly report to the Branch Manager: the Service Manager, Lease Sales. Representative and the Rental Manager. 6 June 1996 Deposition of Joseph Moleski (“Moleski Dep.Tr”), attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit E; attached to Supp. Cerra Cert, as Exhibit D, 87:1-9. Branch Manager is an operational and sales oriented position. Moleski Dep.Tr. 86:6-13. Operational functions constitute sixty percent of a Branch Manager’s responsibilities and the remaining forty percent are devoted to sales, including account management, devising sales strategy, and assisting the Lease Sales Representatives in business planning. Moleski Dep.Tr. 91:1-5, 92:17-19, 93:14-16. Approximately ten to twenty-five percent of a Branch Manager’s time is devoted to person-to-person sales. Moleski Dep. Tr. 93:25; 20 March 1996.Vol. 2 Deposition of Maureen Johnson (“Johnson Dep.Tr. 2.”), attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit B; attached to Cerra Cert, as Exhibit B; attached to Supp. Cerra Cert, as Exhibit A, 111:7 to 115:13. Controller responsibilities consume approximately ten to fifteen percent of a Branch Manager’s time. Johnson Dep.Tr. 2.111:17-20. B. Johnson’s Employment at Penske 1. Employment History Johnson began working for Penske in 1979. 14 March 1996 Vol. 1 Deposition of Johnson (the “Johnson Dep.Tr. 1.”), attached to the Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit A; attached to Cerra Cert, as Exhibit A, 38:12. At that time, Johnson was employed as a service clerk in a division of Penske called Penske GM, which is located in Ronkomkoma, New York. Johnson Dep.Tr. 1.38:1 to 1.39:15. Johnson was promoted to service- administrator, where she was responsible for assisting individuals experiencing problems with their rented trucks, boats or other equipment. Johnson Dep.Tr. 1.44:1-15. When individuals with problems called Penske GM, Johnson fielded the phone calls, made independent assessments of the problem and then dispatched a mechanic to the scene. Johnson Dep.Tr. 1.45:3-8, 1.44:10-11, 1.46:8-16, 1.48:11-13. Johnson also prepared price quotations with regard to the necessary repairs, and was involved in billing and the warranty process. Johnson Dep.Tr. 1.49:11-13; 4 April 1996 Interrogatory Answers of Johnson (“Johnson Interrog.Ans.”), attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit G, 4(7). Johnson obtained knowledge of mechanics through this position and her attendance at diesel mechanic courses. Johnson Dep.Tr. 1.45:12-16; 1 July 1996 Certification of Johnson (“Johnson Cert.”), attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit Q, ¶ 3. Johnson left Penske GM in 1982 when she relocated to New Jersey. Johnson Cert., ¶ 4. In 1984, Johnson was hired as an 800 line Rental Representative for Penske Truck Leasing. Johnson Cert., ¶ 5. In that position, Johnson received incoming calls, sold customers on the benefits of using Penske trucks, determined which type of truck would be most beneficial to the customer, answered concerns of customers, arranged for pick-up and drop off of trucks and applied the rental rate schedule to advise clients of their financial obligations. Johnson Cert., ¶ 5. Johnson also supervised a clerk performing similar responsibilities. Johnson Cert., ¶ 5. After five months as an 800 line Rental Representative, Johnson accepted a position as a Warranty Claim Writer, which she held for approximately.one year. Johnson Cert., ¶¶ 6-7. In that capacity, Johnson processed large volumes of warranty claims, presented them to component manufacturers for payment and negotiated controverted claims. Johnson Cert., ¶ 6. ■ When this division relocated to Reading, Pennsylvania, Johnson declined to move, Johnson Cert., ¶ 7. Penske then promoted Johnson to the job of Assistant District Controller in Lodi, New Jersey. • Johnson Cert., ¶ 7. The primary duty of the Assistant District Controller was to work in a training mode alongside the District Controller. 14 May 1996 Deposition of Michael Marsiglia (“Mar-siglia Dep.Tr.”), attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit D; attached to Cerra Cert, as Exhibit D; attached to Supp. Cerra Cert, as Exhibit E, 101:6-11. The eventual transition for an Assistant District Controller is to District Controller once the necessary skills have been acquired and a position is available. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 101:6-11. Johnson remained in the Assistant District Controller position for eight months, and was then offered a position as a Rental Account Manager in April 1986. Johnson Cert., ¶ 8. As a Rental Account Manager, Johnson was responsible for building a customer base at a new Penske location. Johnson Dep.Tr., 1.117:12-15. Johnson performed an area market survey and began marketing Penske services via telemarketing and direct mail. Johnson Cert., ¶ 8. Johnson also had supervisory responsibilities over several agent locations. Johnson Cert., ¶ 8. Johnson made sales calls with various Area and District Rental Managers and the Lease Sales Representative. Johnson Cert., ¶ 8. Johnson took several seminars at that time to improve her sales skills. Johnson Cert., ¶ 9. Johnson worked as a Rental Account Manager for nine months and was then offered a position as a District Controller. Johnson Cert., ¶ 10. In January 1987, Johnson accepted the position of District Controller in Pine Brook, New Jersey; this position was offered without an interview. Johnson Dep.Tr. 1.134:14-20, 1.139:5, 1.143:2-4. The job was a promotion, with a pay raise. Johnson Cert., ¶ 10. As a District Controller, Johnson was responsible for the financial and administrative functions of the District, including assisting in the development and implementation of the District’s business plan. Johnson In-terrogAns., 5(5); Johnson Dep.Tr. 2.5:9-24, 2.6:l-5. Johnson managed the accounting functions of the District, such as accounts reeeiváble, payroll and financial reporting. Johnson Cert., ¶10. The position-enabled Johnson to engage in client contact with regard to licensing, billing and other administrative matters. Johnson Cert., ¶ 10. Johnson was also charged with the responsibility of training clerical personnel on the District’s financial functions. Johnson Cert., ¶ 10. In 1987, the Pine Brook office did not have a Rental Manager. Johnson Cert., ¶ 11. For a period of six to eight months while she was District Controller, Johnson assisted hi performing the additional functions of the Rental Manager. Johnson Cert., ¶ 11. After the Rental Manager position was filled, Johnson continued to work alongside each Rental Manager daily during her tenure. Johnson Cert., ¶ 11. Johnson assisted in the implementation of sales promotion programs and customer follow-up programs, was involved in special projects such as training Controllers in other districts, organized and chaired Controller meetings, trained personnel at other locations on computer applications she developed, assisted her colleagues in the Service, Lease and Rental Departments as needed and she often involved herself in customer problem-solving. Johnson Cert., ¶ 11. In her capacity as a District Controller, Johnson was supervised by Terry Dubowick (“Dubowick”). Johnson Dep.Tr. 1.143:2-7. When Dubowick left Pine Brook in June 1990, Moleski became her supervisor. Mole-sM Cert., ¶ 12. Moleski left his position as Pine Brook District Manager, and was replaced by Bill Hopkins (“Hopkins”) in September 1992. Moleski Cert., ¶ 12. Johnson was 43 years old when she applied for the Pine Brook Branch Manager position in December 1993. Johnson Cert./¶ 16. 2. Johnson’s Performance Evaluations Johnson was selected as Controller of the Year in 1991 for the New York Metro Area and received favorable performance appraisals (the “Performance Appraisals”) throughout her employment at Penske. Johnson Cert., ¶¶ 11-12 a. Appraisal — 198k to December 1987 Johnson’s Performance Appraisals from 1984 indicate she exceeded her job requirements. See Performance Appraisal, dated 25 June 1984, attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit I. During the period from December 1986 to 1987, Johnson first occupied the District Controller position. Performance Appraisal, dated 12/15/86 to 12/15/87. Comments on Johnson’s Performance Appraisal indicate “[Johnson] has proven, in a short period of time, her capabilities as a department manager and Controller.... She is fluent in the operations of a district and is quickly learning to become a capable financial planner.” Her appraiser noted that her “[p]ast experience in service, warranty and rental operations is used daily, increasing her value to the District.” Performance Appraisal, dated 12/15/86 to 12/15/87. b. Appraisal — December 1987 to January 1989 The Performance Appraisal from the period of December 1987 to January 1989 indicates “[Johnson is] [a]lways wooking (sic) to improve.... [She] continues to develop and improve her capabilities as a Department Manager and Controller. [Johnson] is a true team player who works well with everyone in the District.” Performance Appraisal, dated 12/15/87 to 1/15/89. c. Appraisal — January 1989 to April 1990 Johnson received an overall score of “4 + ” on her Performance Appraisal, dated January 1989 to April 1990. Performance Appraisal, dated 1/15/89 to 4/15/90. Comments by her appraiser, Molestó, indicate Johnson is “[a]lways willing to help others and always living up to the commitments she makes.... [She] [m]akes decisions quickly_ [Johnson] [m]akes the right decision whether in favor of the customer or District.... [She is] [absolutely the most self-motivated person I have ever worked with.... [Johnson] continues to develop skills that help every department manager.... [Johnson] has the personality and drive to succeed at any promotional level.” Performance Appraisal, dated 1/15/89 to 4/15/90. d. Appraisal — May 1990 to January 1991 Johnson received an overall score of 4.4 on her Performance Appraisal, dated May 1990 to January 1991. Performance Appraisal, dated 12/15/87 to 1/15/89. Comments on the appraisals include: “[Johnson] is well-liked and respected by subordinates, peers, and customers_ She is an effective department manager who delegates the workload and reviews progress very well_” Performance Appraisal, dated 12/15/87 to 1/15/89. The appraiser, Molestó, indicated Johnson needed more experience in sales and recommended participating in seminars and workshops. Performance Appraisal, dated 12/15/87 to 1/15/89. e. Appraisal — February 1991 to December 1991 Johnson received a score of 4.5 on her Performance Appraisal, dated February 1991 to December 1991. Performance Appraisal, dated 2/91 to 12/91. Comments in the performance appraisal include: “[Johnson] is a very flexible person who is always willing to accommodate someone who asks for her assistance .... [Johnson] is a very competent decisionmaker.... She avoids complacency, and continually strives for a greater degree of professionalism in her work.” Performance Appraisal, dated 2/91 to 12/91 f. Appraisal — January 1992 to September 1992 Johnson received a 4.5 in her Performance Appraisal, dated January 1992 to September 1992. Performance Appraisal, dated 1/92 to 9/92. The appraiser, Molestó, noted that “[Johnson] has developed a confidence in her position that enables her to communicate in a clear and concise manner.... [Johnson] has developed innovative systems on the [D]is-tricts [computer] and trained personnel to utilize these programs. As a result, the office routine runs very smoothly.” Performance Appraisal, dated 1/92 to 9/92. g. Appraisal — September 1992 to September 1993 Johnson received an overall performance rating of 4.5 on her Performance Appraisal, dated September 1992 to September 1993. Performance Appraisal, dated 9/92 to 9/93. The appraiser, Hopkins, noted that: “[Johnson] has good relationship with all of Pine Brook’s [c]ustomer base and is often called to solve a problem. She also checks in on the [c]ustomer on a timely basis to see if she can be of assistance.... [W]hen called upon [Johnson] will assist others to plan [and] organize_ She sees what has to be done and acts on it without being directed to do so_ She has involved herself more directly with our [customers and has proven to be an asset through her professional manner and has a positive attitude.” Performance Appraisal dated 9/92 to 9/93. h. The Candidate Rating Form The Candidate Rating Form (the “Candidate Rating Form”) is another tool used by Penske to assess the skill, promotability, re-loeatability and strength and weaknesses of the. employee. Candidate Rating Forms, dated 1990 to 1993, attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit I. The skills section is rated on a scale of one to five, with one being unsatisfactory and five being exceptional. Johnson received Candidate Rating Form assessments from 1990 to 1993. Johnson generally received skills ratings of 4 and 5 for the various skills described on the Candidate Rating Form. All of the Candidate Rating Forms indicate the next suitable position for Johnson is Branch Manager. All of the Candidate Rating Forms indicate Johnson would be ready for the Branch Manager position within three to eighteen months. The 1993 Candidate Rating Form indicates Johnson was then ready for the position. See Candidate Rating Forms. All of the Candidate Rating Forms for Johnson indicate her strength to be her organization and initiative. With the exception of the 1993 Candidate Rating Form completed by Hopkins, all the Candidate Rating Forms indicate Johnson required improvement in Sales. See Candidate Rating Forms. C. Penske Downsizing of the Pine Brook Office In late 1993, Penske decided to downsize the Pine Brook field office from a District to a Branch. Molestó Cert., ¶ 13. The Pine Brook location then reported as a Branch to the South Plainfield District. 17 June 1996 Certification of Robert Costello (“Costello Cert.”), attached to Cerra Cert, as Exhibit H, ¶4. The decision to downsize the Pine Brook office was made by Costello, Vice President for the New York Metro Area, and Frank Mileto (“Mileto”), then-Senior Vice President of the Northeast Region. Costello Cert., ¶ 3. The decision to downsize was due to the lack of growth and revenue. Costello Cert., ¶4. The downsize decision was announced to the Pine Brook staff in late 1993. Molestó Dep.Tr. 143:10-13. Molestó told Johnson at a meeting after the announcement that maybe it was time for her to leave the company. Johnson Dep.Tr. 2.170:1-10. Moleski also stated to Johnson at this meeting that “maybe Pine Brook will finally become a non-smoking location.” Johnson Cert., ¶ 13. Because Johnson was the only smoker whose job status was questionable Johnson believed the statement applied to her. Johnson Cert., ¶ 13. D. Result of the Downsizing The restructuring caused Hopkins, who was then the District Manager of the Pine Brook location, to be reassigned to a new location. Moleski. Cert., ¶ 14. Hopkin’s responsibilities were to be assumed by a Branch Manager (the “Branch Manager Position”). Moleski Cert., ¶ 14. The individual hired in the Branch Manager Position would report to Moleski, the current District Manager of South Plainfield. Moleski Cert., ¶ 14. The District Controller position at the Pine Brook location, held by Johnson, was also eliminated through the restructuring. Johnson Cert., ¶ 14. The Controller functions were to be supervised by the District to which the Branch reported. Johnson Cert., ¶ 15. Penske had to decide who was going to retain the Controller position — Johnson, the Controller at the location to be downsized, or Calvin Smith (“Smith”), the Controller at the South Plainfield District. Johnson Cert., ¶ 15. Penske policy directed the position to be awardéd to the employee based upon the person’s experience and time with the company. Marsiglia Dep.Tr., 69:17-25. If both candidates were equal, Penske would eliminate the position at the downsized location. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 69:17-25. Based on this policy, Smith was awarded the position. Johnson Cert., ¶ 15. Johnson was told Penske would- try to find her another job. Johnson Dep.Tr. 2.48:23 to 2.49:7, 2.65:12 to 2.66:12. Johnson stated her interest in the position of Branch Manager. Johnson Cert., ¶ 16. The reorganization also resulted in a reduction of the clerical staff, whose functions were to be performed in the South Plainfield District. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 72:5-9. E. Filling the Branch Manager Position at Pine Brook In early December 1993, three candidates (the “Candidates”) interviewed for the Branch Manager Position at the Pine Brook office — Johnson, Gene Raffa (“Raffa”) and David Dean (“Dean”). Moleski Cert., ¶ 16. The Candidates were interviewed by Mole-ski, the District Manager of the South Plain-field office, Costello, the then-Area Vice President and Marsiglia, the Regional Human Resources Manager. Johnson Cert., ¶ 16. The job was a promotion for each of the Candidates. Johnson Cert., ¶ 16. 1. The Interview Process a. Penske Policies Penske did not have formal policy guidelines for conducting interviews at the time the Candidates interviewed for the Branch Manager Position. Johnson Cert., ¶ 17. Penske did have a promotion policy in effect (the “Promotion Policy”). The Promotion Policy provides, in relevant part: It is the policy of Penske Truck Leasing to give consideration for promotion to all available, qualified candidates currently employed within the company. Special attention will be given to fulfillment of the Affirmative Action Program objectives in the selection and development of internal candidates. In determining promotability, all sources of existing information such as employee interests, performance appraisal, data and salary increase history, will be utilized. 10 October 1991 Promotion Policy, attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit K. During this time, Penske also had an Employment and Equal Opportunity policy (the “Equal Opportunity Policy”) which provided: “Penske Truck Leasing will take affirmative action to ensure equal opportunity for all employees or prospective employees without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, age, sex, marital status....” 10 October 1991 Equal Opportunity Policy, attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit L. b. Marsiglia Preparation Marsiglia indicated he prepares for an interview by looking at the individual’s work record and responsibilities. Marsiglia Dep. Tr. 54:2-4. Marsiglia generally reviews performance appraisals unless he knows the individual well. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 56:1-4. During the interview, Marsiglia mentally compares and measures the traits and qualities necessary to the position with those of the interviewing Candidates. Marsiglia Dep. Tr. 55:1-5. Marsiglia did not review any of the three Candidates’ performance appraisals prior to-the interview for the Branch Manager Position because he felt he knew each of the Candidates sufficiently. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 79:19-24. c. Costello Preparation Costello stated his decisions on hiring are based upon a person’s experience, within and without the company, the person’s aptitude for the job, the make-up of the position he or she is applying for, the needs of the location, the distance from the location and the performance of the candidate in ■ the interview. Costello Dep.Tr. 72:9-24. Costello did not recall reviewing each Candidate’s personnel file before the Branch Manager Position interviews. Costello Dep.Tr. 74:3-8, 88:1-8. Costello believes he spoke to Johnson’s District Manager about her employment history, and knew he spoke to the District Managers for the other two Candidates about their employment history. Costello Dep.Tr. 88:9-21. d.Moleski Preparation Moleski prepares for an interview by obtaining feedback from any earlier interviewers and speaks with the direct supervisor for the Candidate to determine the individual’s performance. Opposition Brief at 13 (citing Moleski Dep.Tr. 126:22-25);- Moleski Dep.Tr. 127:8-25. Moleski does not review Performance Appraisals or Candidate Rating Forms, but determines performance by contacting the Candidate’s supervisor. Moleski Dep.Tr. 127:13 to 128:10. Moleski did not recall performing any research on Raffa or Dean, other than conversations with the District Managers for each. Moleski Dep.Tr. 171:19 to 172:2. Moleski did not recall speaking with the District Manager for Johnson about her performance. Moleski Dep.Tr. 172:7-11. Moleski relied on his personal experience supervising Johnson and the recommendations of Joe Cataudella (“Cataudella”). Moleski Dep.Tr. 147:12-14. Moleski was not fully aware of all the job responsibilities Johnson held prior to her employment with Moleski. Moleski Dep.Tr. 155:13-18,156:3^1,156:10-24. 2. Employment History of the Other Candidates a. Gene Raffa Raffa began working for Penske in 1975. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 74:li-13. During his employment, Raffa held the positions of District Controller, Branch Rental Manager and Branch Manager. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 74:17 to 76:20. Raffa held the latter two positions in Manhattan. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 74:17 to 76:20. The Manhattan Branch Manager position was primarily focused on consumer and commercial rental, had a small lease base and almost no service department. Marsig-lia Dep.Tr. 77:1-3. Therefore, the Pine Brook location, which was a more diverse location, would have exposed Raffa to all aspects of the business. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 76:21 to 77:6. Raffa was more than forty years old when he applied for the Pine Brook Branch Manager Position. Opposition Brief at 18 (citing Marsiglia Dep.Tr.. 78:18-20). b. David Dean Dean joined Penske in 1989 as a management trainee. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 80:6-16. At that time, Dean worked as a Rental Representative in the Edison District, where he was responsible for handling in-person and telephone inquiries from prospective rental customers. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 80:17 to 81:6. Dean also worked alongside the Sales Department and the Service Manager to gain familiarity with those functions. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 80:25 to 81:7. Following completion of his management training, Dean was promoted to District Rental Manager in New Brunswick, where he was responsible for managing the rental function, including supervising rental people working the counter, handling sales calls and managing the agent base. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 81:8-21, 82:1-18. In October 1990, Dean was reduced to a Rental Sales Representative. Marsiglia Dep. Tr. 83:1-13. The primary function of the Rental Sales Representative was to conduct personal sales calls outside of the District location. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 84:10-25. The job primarily involved meeting with prospective and existing rental customers to discuss or manage their accounts. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 84:12-25. In January 1992, Dean was promoted to District Rental Manager. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 88:20-22; Personnel File for David Dean, attached to Cerra Cert, as Exhibit E. Dean held that position for one year when he applied for the Branch Manager Position. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 89:15-22. Between 1989 and 1993, the Performance Appraisals for Dean reflect an overall low of 2.85 and a high of 3.9. Dean Performance Appraisals, attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit J. The 1993 Performance Appraisal for Dean indicates he “needs to get out of the office more often” on sales calls. Dean Performance Appraisals. The 1993 Performance Appraisal also indicates that “[Dean] has come a long way within the last year” and that he “is an important part of the overall success of [the] district.” Id. , The Candidate Rating Form, dated 19 July 1993 and completed by Cataudella for Dean, rates his performance as 3’s and 4’s. Id. The Candidate Rating Form indicated the next position for Dean would be Area Rental Manager, within the time frame of three to eighteen months. Id. Dean’s strengths were considered to be his high level drive and initiative; his area of improvement was his sales skills. Id. 3. The Interviews a. Johnson’s Interview The interviewers, Costello, Moleski and Marsiglia (collectively, the “Interviewers”), considered Johnson to be a qualified candidate. Costello Dep.Tr. 97:9-12, Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 73:7-18. Marsiglia stated Johnson was poised and confident during the interview. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 124:1-2. Costello stated the interview with Johnson was pleasant, however, Johnson “came across as having an edge” and stated that she was “combative” in the interview. Costello Dep.Tr. 94:22, 95:1-8. Moleski said she was “cocky” in the interview; he was disturbed by her comment that she was going to hold her people accountable. 7; 163:1-2. Moleski Dep.Tr. 161:1- The interviewers claim Johnson gave vague answers on how she intended to utilize the position to improve operations at the Pine Brook Office. Moleski Cert., ¶ 27; Marsiglia Interview Notes, attached to Onuf-rak Cert, as Exhibit 0. Johnson claims, however, that she gave very specific answers during her interview and was commended on the answers she gave during her interview. Johnson Cert., ¶ 17. The Interviewers claim they felt Johnson would not do what needed to be done to accomplish the job. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 121:21-25. When asked to identify her weaknesses, Johnson did not recognize anything she needed to do for personal development. Moleski Cert., ¶27. This was of concern to the Interviewers. Moleski Cert., ¶ 27. b. Dean’s Interview The Interviewers found Dean to be very confident in the interview. Marsiglia Dep. Tr. 118:7-8. The Interviewers noted Dean conceded during the interview that his sales skills needed improvement. Marsiglia Dep. Tr. 117:2-8. The Interviewers stated they were impressed with Dean’s plans for developing the business, although they could not identify a particular plan which factored into their decision to promote him to the Branch Manager Position. Costello Dep.Tr. 98:2-5. Costello also stated Dean impressed him by asking for the job at the interview, which Johnson did not. Costello Dep.Tr. 98:6-17. The interview notes of Marsiglia, however, indicate Johnson “wants [the] job.” Marsig-lia Interview Notes, attached to Onufrak. Cert, as Exhibit 0. c. Rajfa’s Interview The Interviewers stated Raffa performance at his interview was average. Costello Dep.Tr. 99:4-12. They stated Raffa lacked self-confidence and lease sales experience. Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 112:18-25. Moleski stated the decision between Raffa- and Dean was close, however, because Raffa was considered to be a seasoned employee. Moleski Dep.Tr. 189:6-15. 4. The Decision The Interviewers discussed the Candidates following the interviews. Moleski Dep.Tr. 166:6-8. They also spoke with Cataudella, who recommended Dean and Raffa, but preferred Dean. Moleski Dep.Tr. 147:5-8, 177:9-10. The Interviewers awarded the Branch Manager Position to Dean, indicating he was most qualified for the position due to his confidence, background in rental and his track record for people development. Costello Dep.Tr. 103:8-25; Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 132:22 to 133:9. The Interviewers decided not to choose Johnson because of her poor interview performance and her lack of sales and rental experience. Moleski Cert., 1T26-27. The Interviewers were able to recall the names of six men who held the position of Branch Manager or District Manager without rental experience. Moleski Dep.Tr. 195:3-25, 196:1-8, 196:20-25; Costello Dep.Tr. 110:6-11. Moleski stated Johnson may have been able to obtain a working knowledge of what was expected of Rental Managers and could have gained experience with regard to the rental functions when she helped with those duties in 1987 when her District was without a Rental Manager. Moleski Dep.Tr. 213:4-15. Costello acknowledged Johnson sometimes went on sales calls with the Lease Sales Representative and the District Manager when she was a District Controller, which may. have contributed to her sales experience. Costello Dep.Tr. 117:13-21. Johnson also went on sales calls with others as a Rental Account Manager. Johnson Cert., ¶ 8. The Interviewers agreed that experience as a District Controller might assist a Branch Manager in certain functions. Costello Dep.Tr. 104:2-14. F. After the Decision Johnson was informed of the Interviewers’ decision one week after the interviews. Johnson Cert., ¶ 19. Johnson did not ask why she was not chosen for the position. Johnson Dep.Tr. 2.120:3 to 2.121:5; Molestó Cert., ¶28. Johnson claimed she did not inquire because she was too upset and shocked and did not wish to discuss it. Johnson Cert., ¶ 19. On 15 December 1993, Costello called Johnson and informed her that a Branch Rental Manager position was open in Manhattan. Johnson Cert., ¶20. Johnson did not want the position because she did not perceive it as a step forward. Johnson Cert., ¶ 20. Johnson did not want the position because she already had rental experience, it was geographically inconvenient, and it was only available because the woman who was leaving the position was going to fill the job previously held by Dean. Johnson Cert., ¶!¶ 20, 29; Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 148:8-23. Johnson met with Marsiglia on 29 December 1993 to discuss her future with Penske. Johnson Cert., ¶30. Johnson never asked Marsiglia whether the Branch Rental Manager position would fill out her background for the purposes of advancement, nor what her progress would be if she took the position. Johnson Dep.Tr. 2.126:23 to 2.127:12. Johnson told Marsiglia she believed she did not get the Pine Brook Branch Manager Position because she was a woman. Johnson Cert., ¶ 32. Johnson continued to work for a few weeks after she was not promoted. Marsiglia Cert., ¶26. As a result of the decision, Johnson began feeling emotionally distressed and took an extended leave of absence in January 1994. Johnson Cert., ¶ 33; Marsiglia Cert., ¶ 26. In early January 1994, Robert Carter (“Carter”), Senior Vice President of Human Resources, called Johnson on at least two occasions to discuss her future at Penske. Johnson Cert., ¶ 34. Johnson informed Carter she was under the care of a doctor, would not be able to meet with him, but would communicate with him when able to do so. Johnson Cert., ¶ 34. In January 1995, Johnson was terminated due to her failure to return to work, pursuant to Penske policy and practice. Costello Cert., ¶ 19. G. Other Alleged Evidence of Discriminatory Conduct Proffered by Johnson Johnson contends the following circumstances demonstrate a discriminatory atmosphere at Penske. 1. Conduct of Area Vice President Johnson alleges Costello, the Area Vice President, made comments and acted in such a manner as to demonstrate discrimination on the basis of gender. Johnson Cert., ¶ 36. Costello allegedly told a co-worker that a woman employee did not get a raise because her husband was a lawyer and she did not need the money. Johnson Dep.Tr. 2.146:8-12. Costello one time reprimanded Johnson for not telling him Moleski’s wife was pregnant. Johnson Dep.Tr. 3.75:20-24. Costello contacted Johnson and asked her for the number of a woman’s clothing store, the name of which Johnson did not know. Costello replied that he thought Johnson would know the phone number because she was a woman. Johnson Dep.Tr. 3.77:9-17. On another occasion, Costello informed Johnson he hád a dream about her the night before, but could not tell her what it was about because he would then have a sexual harassment problem on his hands. Johnson Dep.Tr. 3.78:23 to 3.79:19. Costello visited the Pine Brook office every four to six weeks and took the District Manager or one of his direct reports to lunch. Johnson Cert., ¶ 37. From January 1987 to December 1993, Costello took Johnson to lunch on only two occasions. Johnson Dep. Tr. 3.83:4-15; Johnson Cert., ¶ 37. In addition to lack of sales experience, Costello indicated one of the reasons he did not hire Johnson as a Branch Manager was because she needed to polish her people skills. Costello Dep.Tr. 105:17-21. Johnson maintains her Performance Appraisals indicate she was proficient in people skills. Performance Appraisals, attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit I. Costello admits he dissuaded Crystal Higgins (“Higgins”), who was interested in a Branch Manager position, because she lacked management people skills. Costello Dep.Tr. 122:17-25, 124:6-8; Moleski Dep.Tr. 217:1-15. Johnson maintains Higgins had good people skills and was the only woman in the United States to hold an Area Management title. Johnson Cert., ¶ 38. After 1993, Costello pulled Higgins from the Area Management position and placed her in a District Lease Sales Representative position, a job that Johnson maintains needed more people skills than the Area Management position. Johnson Dep.Tr. 2.149:1-11; 3.69:2-19. Costello also alleged Karen Ritter (“Rit-ter”) lacked people skills. Costello Dep.Tr. 125:15-17. Ritter was placed in a temporary Branch Manager position in Massachusetts. Moleski Dep.Tr. 216:2-6. Costello claims Ritter was not placed permanently in the position because she failed miserably, however Marsiglia testified it was because she did not want to relocate to Massachusetts. Costello Dep.Tr. 125:17-25; Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 59:12-29. 2.Statements of Other Parties Johnson alleges that at one point she asked Marsiglia why more women were not promoted to management positions. Marsig-lia did not answer,, but replied that such a conversation was one best held in a bar some night after a couple of drinks. Johnson Dep. Tr. 1.240:1-15. Raffa and two other men approached Johnson after she was turned down for the Pine Brook Branch Manager Position and told her they believed her gender was a factor in the decision. Johnson Dep.Tr. 2.142:1-25. 3. Equal Opportunity Policy Although Penske had distinct Equal Opportunity Policy and Promotion Policies in effect during the Pine Brook Branch Manager interviews, Johnson maintains that none of the Interviewers had an accurate knowledge of them and did not consider them in deciding who would fill the Pine Brook Branch Manager Position. Opposition Brief at 30 (citing Costello Dep.Tr. 55:1-25; Moleski Dep.Tr. 117:17-25; Marsiglia Dep.Tr. 39:22-25.) 4. Circumstantial Evidence of Discrimination The Penske Telephone Directory, as of December 1993, does not show any female Senior Vice Presidents or Operations, Regional Human Resource Managers, Area Vice Presidents, District Managers, Assistant District Managers or Branch Managers. Dei position of Robert Carter (“Carter Dep.Tr."), attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit F, 73:21 to 75:5. Except for Higgins, the Penske Telephone Directory does not record any female Area Sales Managers, Area Service Managers or Area Rental Managers. As of November 1993, Johnson contends there were more than fifty women serving as Controller, Rental Manager and Lease Sales Representatives in the. District locations alone. Opposition Brief at 30-31 (citing Penske Telephone Directory, attached to On-ufrak Cert, as Exhibit M; Penske District Personnel Roster, dated November 1993, attached to Onufrak Cert, as Exhibit N). This figure does not include Branches, locations with Assistant District Managers or any other sort of location. Onufrak Cert, at Exhibits M and N. Based on the facts stated above, Johnson contends there exists a glass ceiling at Penske and that she has been discriminated on the basis of her age and gender. Opposition Brief at 31 (citing Johnson Cert., ¶ 39). Discussion A. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment Motions To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must establish “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The present task is to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether Penske is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A district court may not resolve factual disputes in a motion for summary judgment. Linan-Faye Constr. Co. v. Housing Auth., 49 F.3d 915, 926-27 (3d Cir.1995) (“at the summary judgment stage, ‘the judge’s function is not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial’”) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)); Desvi, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 307, 308 (3d Cir.1992) (“threshold inquiry is whether there are ‘genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party ”) (citations omitted). In considering a motion for summary judgment, all evidence submitted must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 130-31 (3d Cir.1996); General Ceramics Inc. v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Cos., 66 F.3d 647, 651 (3d Cir.1995); Meyer v. Riegel Products Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 & n. 2 (3d Cir.1983) (the court must resolve “all inferences, doubts and issues of credibility ... against the moving party’), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1091, 104 S.Ct. 2144, 79 L.Ed.2d 910 (1984). When the resolution of issues depends wholly upon the interpretation of specific statutory language and the applicable law, summary judgment is appropriate. See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 724 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 306, 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995); see also Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir.) (“summary judgment is proper where the facts are undisputed”), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 537, 88 L.Ed.2d 467 (1985); Estate of Reddert, 925 F.Supp. 261, 265 (D.N.J.1996). In addition, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment by showing “there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 329 (3d Cir.1995) (“[w]hen the non-moving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may meet its burden on summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving partys evidence is insufficient to carry its burden of persuasion at trial”). Once the movant demonstrates an essential element of the nonmovant’s case is lacking, “the nonmovant must then respond by pointing to sufficient cognizable evidence to create material issues of fact concerning every element as to which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 & n. 1 (3d Cir.1994) (citation omitted). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. at 2509; Brewer, 72 F.3d at 330; Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (3d Cir.1995); Witco, 38 F.3d at 686. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (nonmovant must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”); Gomez v. Allegheny Health Serv., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1085 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 2524, 135 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1996); accord Siegel, 54 F.3d at 1130-31; Nevets C.M., Inc. v. Nissho Iwai Am. Corp., 726 F.Supp. 525, 534 (D.N.J.1989), aff'd without Op’n, 899 F.2d 1218 (3d Cir.1990). “The nonmoving party creates a genuine issue of material fact, if it provides sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find for him at trial.” Brewer, 72 F.3d at 330 (citations omitted). If the nonmovant fails to make a sufficient showing regarding an essential element of its case upon which it will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, all other facts are necessarily immaterial and summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 2551-52; Brewer, 72 F.3d at 330; Siegel, 54 F.3d at 1130-31; see abo Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir.1993) (“[s]um-mary judgment is appropriate where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, or where it is so overwhelming that it mandates judgment in favor of the movant”). As discussed more fully below, the evidence presented, viewed in- a light most favorable to Johnson, does not raise a genuine issue of material'fact as to 1) whether the reasons proffered by Penske for its employment decision were unworthy of credence or 2) whether a discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause for the decision. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. Summary judgment in favor of Penske, therefore, is appropriate. B. New Jersey Law Against Discrimination Johnson alleges discrimination on the basis of age and gender in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq. The New Jersey Supreme Court has generally applied Federal case law arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, to cultivate standards governing the resolution of NJLAD claims. Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 140 N.J. 623, 631, 660 A.2d 505 (1995) (citing Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 549-50, 569 A.2d 793 (1990) (acknowledging rebanee by New Jersey Supreme Court on the order and allocation of proof used in Federal discrimination cases for NJLAD eases); Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433, 437, 561 A.2d 1130 (1989) (noting influence of Federal anti-discrimination statutes on NJLAD standards); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 82-83, 389 A.2d 465 (1978) (commending McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) methodology as starting point for litigation under NJLAD); Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 865 (3d Cir.1990) (stating that “New Jersey would apply the Title VII standard to claims under the NJLAD”); Weiss v. Parker Hannifan Corp., 747 F.Supp. 1118, 1126 (D.N.J.1990) (stating that New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted methodology of proof used in Title VII cases when deciding NJLAD claims)). See also, Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1212 (3d Cir.1995) (“New Jersey courts in applying the NJLAD generally follow the standards of proof applicable under the [Fjederal discrimination statutes_”) (citations omitted); Porta v. Rollins Environmental Serv. (NJ), Inc, 654 F.Supp. 1275, 1285 (D.N.J.1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir.1988). The Supreme Court analysis of unlawful discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII was presented first in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and later clarified in Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) and St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). McDonnell Douglas established the order and allocation of proofs in the litigation of an unlawful discrimination suit. Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 97, 570 A.2d 903 (1990). While the New Jersey Supreme Court has not “embraced the McDonnell Douglas test literally, invariably, or inflexibly,” it considers the test to reflect the general framework for analyzing unlawful discrimination claims. Id. at 98, 570 A.2d 903 (employing standard and methodology under Federal Equal Pay Act for suit brought under NJLAD on the basis of unequal wages for performance of substantially equal work). See also Erickson, 117 N.J. at 549-50, 569 A.2d 793. Under the McDonnell Douglas approach, the burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff, but the burden of going forward shifts. Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 89 N.J. 483, 492-93, 446 A.2d 486 (1982) (citations omitted); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1096 & n. 4 (3d Cir.1995). The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence must demonstrate Johnson (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) applied and was qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants, (3) was rejected despite adequate qualifications, and (4) after rejection the position was filled by someone with equivalent or lesser qualifications who was male, or sufficiently younger to create an inference of age discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Andersen, 89 N.J. at 492, 446 A.2d 486; Peper, 77 N.J. at 84-85, 389 A.2d 465. See also Lawrence, 98 F.3d at 65; Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir.1995); Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir); cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2611, 132 L.Ed.2d 854 (1995). Establishment of the prima facie case gives rise to a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the applicant. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. at 2746-47; Goodman v. London Metals Exchange, Inc., 86 N.J. 19, 31, 429 A.2d 341 (1981). The burden of going forward then shifts to Penske to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. at 2747; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094; Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 596, 538 A.2d 794 (1988); Andersen, 89 N.J. at 492, 446 A.2d 486; Goodman, 86 N.J. at 31, 429 A.2d 341; Peper, 77 N.J. at 83, 389 A.2d 465; Lawrence, 98 F.3d at 66. Penske need not persuade the court it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763. Once Penske fulfils its burden, the presumption of discrimination “drops from the case.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. at 2747; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 & n. 10, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 & n. 10. Johnson is charged with the final burden of proving that the legitimate non-discriminatory reason offered by Penske was not the genuine reason for the employment decision, but merely a pretext for discrimination. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08, 113 S.Ct. at 2747-48; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095; Andersen, 89 N.J. at 492, 446 A.2d 486; Goodman, 86 N.J. at 32, 429 A.2d 341; Peper, 77 N.J. at 83, 389 A.2d 465. Johnson carries the ultimate burden, which remains with her at all times, of proving that Penske engaged in intentional discrimination. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. at 2747; Erickson, 117 N.J. at 550, 569 A.2d 793. For the purposes of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Penske has assumed Johnson established evidence sufficient to support a prima facie case of gender and age discrimination. Moving Brief at 23, 38. In support of its burden of going forward, Penske claims Johnson was not promoted to the Pine Brook Branch Manager Position because the Interviewers determined Johnson was not the best qualified candidate for the position. Moving Brief at 24 (citing Moleski Cert., ¶¶ 19-20; Marsiglia Cert., ¶¶ 17-18; Costello Cert., ¶¶ 10-11). Penske claims the unanimous choice for hiring Dean was based upon two main factors. First, Penske claims Dean had more rental experience and more outside sales experience with customers than Johnson. Moving Brief at 15. Second, Penske claims Johnson did not perform well in her interview, when compared with the performance of Dean. Id. Penske argues Johnson has not and cannot prove that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons offered by Penske for its employment decision are pretext. Penske, therefore, moves for judgment as a matter of law. C. Standards For Pretext Once Penske meets its burden through the articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its decision, the burden of production shifts back to Johnson to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Penske’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11, 113 S.Ct. at 2748-49; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-55, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-95; Lawrence, 98 F.3d at 66 (citing Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728); Brewer, 72 F.3d at 330; Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 522-23 (3d Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 826, 114 S.Ct. 88, 126 L.Ed.2d 56 (1993). In order to prevail at trial, Johnson must show both that the proffered reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S.Ct. at 2751-52 (“a reason cannot be proved to be a ‘pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason”); Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., 26 F.3d 428, 433 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1994) (stating that “[r]ejeetion of the employer’s proffered reasons, without a finding of discrimination, is insufficient to warrant judgment for the employee”). The Hicks decision modified Third Circuit decisions which suggested the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination could be satisfied merely by disproving the defendant’s proffered reasons or showing that they were unworthy of credence. Seman, 26 F.3d at 438 & n. 13 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Ezold, 983 F.2d 509, 522 (3d Cir.1992); Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 816 (3d Cir.1991); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 341-42 (3d Cir.1990); Fowle v. C & C Cola, Div. of ITT-Continental Baking Co., 868 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir.1989); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 898 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052, 108 S.Ct. 26, 97 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987). See also McKenna v. Pacific Rail Service, 32 F.3d 820, 828 (3d Cir.1994) (predicting the adoption of Hicks clarification for proving pretext discrimination by New Jersey Supreme Court); Kelly v. Bally’s Grand, Inc., 285 N.J.Super. 422, 432, 667 A.2d 355 (App.Div.1995). At trial, “[i]t is not enough ... to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimination.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519, 113 S.Ct. at 2762. This standard is altered, however, when a plaintiff seeks to defeat an employer’s motion for summary judgment. See Lawrence, 98 F.3d at 66; Sempier, 45 F.3d at 731; Torre v. Casio, 42 F.3d 825, 832 (3d Cir.1994); Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. In Fuentes, the Third Circuit constructed the basic framework to defeat summary judgment when a defendant answers a plaintiff’s prima facie case with legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. 32 F.3d at 764. A plaintiff must discredit the proffered reason through the submission of “some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Slohoda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 207 N.J.Super. 145, 155, 504 A.2d 53 (App.Div.1986), certif. denied, 104 N.J. 400, 517 A.2d 403 (1986) (“in carrying [the] burden of persuasion plaintiff ... may succeed ... either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence”). Because the issue in dispute rests on whether discrimination motivated the employer, it is not sufficient for Johnson merely to show Penske’s decision was wrong. Rather, Johnson must demonstrate that the reasons proffered are either unworthy of credence or that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employment decision. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765; Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 782-83 (3d Cir.1994). If Johnson has adduced evidence sufficient to cast substantial doubt on the proffered reasons, however, she need not additionally come forward with evidence beyond the prima facie case, to survive summary judgment. Brewer, 72 F.3d at 331; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. In a motion for summary judgment, the evidence presented must not be weighed, but must be considered to determine whether it casts sufficient doubt on the proffered reasons to create a genuine issue of material fact. Lawrence, 98 F.3d at 67. The type of evidence required in a pretext case need not be overt or direct. Rather, it must be competent evidence to demonstrate the reason offered by the employer for the decision was, in fact, a ruse for discrimination. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764, Stinson v. Delaware River Port Auth., 935 F.Supp. 531, 541 (D.N.J.1996) (in order to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must submit evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude the proffered reasons were fabricated). This burden reflects the inherent tension between the proliferation of civil rights, and “society’s commitment to free decisionmaking by the private sector in economic affairs.” Ezold, 983 F.2d at 531. An employer must be granted substantial discretion to exercise subjective judgment in the rendering of employment decisions, especially where, as here, the success of the business is largely dependant upon the individual occupying the position. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 1096-97 (anti-discrimination statutes were not intended to “dimmish traditional management prerogatives”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1786, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (emphasizing that an “important aspect of [Title VII] is [the] preservation of an employer’s remaining freedom of choice”); see also Brewer, 72 F.3d at 332 (“an employer may have any reason or no reason for discharging an employee so long as it is not a discriminatory reason”). The Third Circuit has stated an employee’s own view of her performance, or a court’s view of an employee’s performance, is not at issue in an alleged discrimination case. What is significant is the perception of the decisionmaker. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 1096-97; Brewer, 72 F.3d at 331; Ezold, 983 F.2d at 528; Billet, 940 F.2d at 825. Absent discrimination, a company is privileged to make business judgments on an employee’s status, “particularly when the decision involves subjective factors deemed essential to certain positions.” Billet, 940 F.2d at 825 (citing Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1220 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1098, 109 S.Ct. 2449, 104 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1989)). Accordingly, to defeat summary judgment, Johnson must point to evidence tending to show Penske’s explanation for the employment decision is pretextual. Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 782. To establish pretext, Johnson must point to some evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably disbelieve Penske’s articulated legitimate, non-diserimi-natory reason or infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employment action. Brewer, 72 F.3d at 331. Because Johnson has failed to do so, Penske’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. D. Application to this Case To survive Penske’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Johnson must 1) “present sufficient evidence to meaningfully throw into question” Penske’s proffered reasons for not promoting her or 2) “come forward with sufficient evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that an illegitimate factor more likely than not was a motivating or determinative cause”