Full opinion text
ORDER KYLE, District Judge. Introduction This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. In a Report and Recommendation dated March 27, 1996 (“R & R”), Magistrate Judge Erickson recommends the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment be denied, the Defendant Independent School District’s (“District”) Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part, and the Defendants Commissioner of Minnesota Department of Education (“Commissioner”) and the Board of Education for the State of Minnesota’s (“Board”) (collectively the “State Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. Before the Court are the State Defendants’ Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to deny in part its Motion to Dismiss, and the Plaintiffs response thereto; the Plaintiff and the District have not filed objections. Plaintiff commenced this action alleging the Defendants violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and various Minnesota state laws. The pertinent factual and procedural background in this matter is fully set forth in the R & R. (See R & R at 4-20.) In the R & R, Magistrate Judge Erickson concluded, inter alia: (1) the Commissioner may be held liable for the District’s alleged failure to provide the Plaintiff with a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) (R & R at 47-48); and (2) the Plaintiffs Complaint states a viable ADA claim (R & R 35-39). The State Defendants object to both these conclusions. With respect to the first objection, the Commissioner contends he may not be held liable for the District’s alleged failure to provide a FAPE because Plaintiff has not shown the District “significantly breached its responsibility” under the IDEA (Objections at 4.) With respect to the second objection, the Commissioner and the Board contend Plaintiffs ADA claim is cognizable as an IDEA claim, and as such, should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust available IDEA administrative remedies pri- or to commencing suit. The Court has independently reviewed the R & R, the State Defendants’ objections, the Plaintiffs response, and the material submitted to the Magistrate Judge relative to the State Defendants’ Motion as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The R & R is thorough and well-reasoned. The R & R correctly analyzed the issues raised in the State Defendants’ objections, and that analysis will not be repeated here. The Court concurs with the conclusions of Magistrate Judge Erickson and will adopt his R & R in its entirety. Conclusion Accordingly, based upon a de novo review of all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Erickson dated March 27, 1996 (Doe. No. 39) is ACCEPTED and IT IS ORDERED that: (1) Defendant Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss (Doe. Nos. 2, 5) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: (a) Defendant Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claim to enforce the HRO’s Order is GRANTED and this claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; (b) Defendant Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claims for reimbursement of educational costs and expenses during the 1994-95 school year and claims for compensatory education during the 1994r-95 school year is GRANTED and these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and (c) The Independent School District’s Motion is, in all other respects, DENIED. (2) State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doe. No. 4) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as Mows: - (a) The State Defendants’ Motion, with respect to Plaintiffs claims the Commissioner failed to ensure he received special education services from October 1993 through April 1994 and Plaintiffs ADA claims premised upon discrimination in personnel qualifications and the establishment of a state facility devoted to children suffering from apraxia, is DENIED; and (b) The State Defendants’ Motion is, in all other respects, GRANTED; Plaintiffs claim, as it relates to the Commissioner’s monitoring and complaint process, is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and Plaintiffs claim, as it relates to the qualifications of the District’s “related service personnel,” is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (3) Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, alternatively, for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 6) is DENIED. ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ERICKSON, United States Magistrate Judge. At Duluth, in the District of Minnesota, this 27th day of March, 1996. I. Introduction This matter came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a special assignment, made in accordance with the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), upon the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, upon the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, and upon the Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement the Record. A Hearing on the Motions was conducted on November 7, 1995, at which time the Plaintiff appeared by Sonya Kerr, Esq., the Defendant Independent School District No. 696 (“School District”) appeared by Susan E. Torgerson and Charles E. Long, Esqs., and the Defendant Commissioner of Minnesota Department of Education and the Defendant Board of Education for the State of Minnesota (collectively referred to as the “Commissioner”) appeared by Rachel Kaplan, Assistant Minnesota Attorney General. For reasons which follow, we grant, in part, the Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement the Record, and we recommend that the School District’s Motion to Dismiss be granted in part; that the Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss be granted in part; and that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment be denied. II. Procedural and Factual Background A. Procedural Posture. Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Title 20 U.S.C. § 11/.00, et seq. (“IDEA”), the Federal Government ensures that students with disabilities receive a “free, appropriate public education” (“FAPE”). Title 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). The IDEA imposes extensive procedural and substantive requirements on participating State and local agencies to safeguard a disabled student’s right to FAPE. Among the procedural safeguards that are mandated by the IDEA, Section 1415(b)(2) requires an independent Due Process Hearing to be conducted by a State educational agency, so as to insure that the parents of handicapped children will be afforded an opportunity to register their complaints concerning a public school’s evaluation, or the educational placement of their child. Pursuant to the Act, the State of Minnesota has promulgated Rules which ereate a procedure for the conduct of such Hearings. See, Minnesota Statutes Section 120.17, Subdivision 3b(e); Minnesota Rule 35254000; see also, Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12, 108 S.Ct. 592, 598, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1987) (The procedural safeguards “guarantee parents both an opportunity for meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child’s education and the right to seek review of any decisions they think inappropriate.”). In accordance with Minnesota law, two levels of Administrative Review were completed below. See, Minnesota Statutes Section 120.17, Subdivision 3b(a) and Section 120.17, Subdivision 3b(g); Title 20 U.S.C. § 14.15(b)(2). At the first level of the administrative process, a Hearing Officer (“HO”), who was appointed by the Minnesota Commissioner of Education, heard seven days of testimony, and concluded that the School District had failed to provide the Plaintiff with FAPE, as required by the IDEA, for the period commencing in October of 1992, and continuing through October 4, 1993, but that the School District was not responsible for its failure to provide services during the period fi-om October 4,1993, through March of 1994. The Plaintiff subsequently appealed this determination. A Hearing Review Officer (“HRO”), who was also appointed by Minnesota’s Commissioner of Education, conducted an Administrative Review, considered additional evidence and, essentially, affirmed the decision of the HO. In order to furnish a succinctly stated factual context for the discussion which follows, we briefly summarize the Administrative Record before us. B. Factual Background. The Plaintiff, who was bom on May 21, 1989, suffers from verbal apraxia — an impairment which has resulted in severe speech communication problems — as well as deficiencies in fine and gross motor skills. The Plaintiff was first diagnosed at the University of Minnesota Clinic, in Minneapolis, in July of 1992. At that time, the Plaintiff was 3 years old, and his Mother (“Moubry”) was concerned that his speech was not developing in a normal manner. In August of 1992, Moubry began driving the Plaintiff to Duluth for weekly speech services in the Robert F. Pierce Clinic at the University of Minnesota — Duluth. At that time, the Plaintiff resided in Ely, Minnesota, a rural community which is located approximately 150 miles northwest of Duluth. The Clinic did not charge for the speech services, and Moubry was reimbursed for her transportation costs by a social service agency. On September 9, 1992, Moubry referred the Plaintiff to Childlink — an interagency review team which refers children in need of special education and related services to the School District. On September 22, 1992, Childlink referred the Plaintiff to the School District for an early childhood development assessment. Moubry agreed to an assessment on September 29 and, on October 6, 7, and 13, 1992, the assessment was conducted. Testing staff included Denise Dreschler (“Dreschler”), Speech Clinician, Vickie Salmela (“Salmela”), Occupational Therapist, and Linda Jensen (“Jensen”), Early Childhood Special Education (“ECSE”) teacher. Based upon this assessment, as well as treatment notes from the Robert F. Pierce Clinic, a meeting was conducted on October 27, 1992, to develop an Individual Education Plan (“IEP”). Present at the meeting were Moubry, who was accompanied by her legal advocate, Linda Bonney (“Bonney”); Lavonne See (“See”), who was an early childhood coordinator for the Northland Coop; a social services representative; the Elementary School Principal; together with Dreschler, Salmela, and Jensen. Under the IEP, which Moubry signed on November 18, 1992, the Plaintiff received early childhood classroom experience, 75 minutes per week of speech therapy (“ST”), for which Dreschler was listed as the service provider, and 35 minutes per week of occupational therapy (“OT”), for which Salmela was listed as the service provider. Under the IEP, the Plaintiff received ST and OT at the ECSE classroom. Notably, the IEP did not provide for physical therapy (“PT”). In November of 1992, the Plaintiff began receiving additional speech services from Carol Sazama (“Sazama”), who was the Director of the Scottish Rite Clinic at the University of Minnesota — Duluth. The Scottish Rite Clinic operated under a grant and, thus, did not charge for its services. Thereafter, Sazama recommended increased speech services in Duluth, which required that the Plaintiffs IEP be changed to remedy a scheduling conflict. A renewed IEP was developed on March 2, 1993. At this meeting, Moubry advised that the Plaintiff would continue to receive services at the Clinic throughout that Summer. There was no discussion, however, about the potential need for extended school year services, and Moubry was not informed of any such option. The Plaintiff attended OT services only twice between March 2 and May 29, 1993. At about this same time, Moubry related her difficulties in making the appointments, which were scheduled in Ely after the Plaintiffs return from Duluth. Alternative methods of service delivery, however, were not explored. A periodic review, which had been originally scheduled for March, was conducted on May 11, 1993. All goals and objectives were continued without change. The Plaintiff received speech services from the Clinic Director during the Summer of 1993, and throughout the 1993-1994 school year, but he received no services from the School District during the Summer of 1993. In the Fall of 1993, Moubry discussed with Salmela the possibility of a reassessment of the Plaintiffs motor abilities. Salmela advised that a formal reassessment would not be necessary, since she would only need to rewrite the Plaintiffs goals and objectives. The IEP team met, again, on October 1, 1993, at which time it was agreed that the Plaintiff was not making progress on his speech goals and that an alteration would be required. Individuals present at this meeting included Moubry, Bonney and Sazama. At this conference, Moubry expressed concern about the level of care that was being provided to her son in the ECSE classroom. Specifically, she was concerned that speech services were not being conducted at a scheduled time. On October 4, 1993, Moubry visited the Plaintiffs ECSE classroom in order to monitor the provision of ST services. There, she observed Dreschler use “tongue blades” — a technique that Moubry had asked not to be used on her son. Susan Ferguson (“Ferguson”), who was the ECSE classroom teacher, felt that Moubry was being disruptive, and so informed the Elementary School Principal. Ferguson advised Moubry that she would need to provide advance notification of her visits, and she referred Moubry to the Elementary School Principal. The Principal confirmed the policy which required all visitors to sign in, and further related the importance of providing advance notification, and the District’s concern that too many visits would be disruptive to the classroom experience. In response, Moubry returned to the ECSE classroom and removed her son. After his removal from the classroom, the Plaintiff visited his aunt, who resided in Madison, Wisconsin, and did not return until October 25,1993. Thereafter, Moubry was informed that advance notification would not be required for her to visit the ECSE classroom. Moreover, Dreschler notified Moubry that she would be willing to provide speech services while the Plaintiff was receiving his Head Start instruction. Moubry responded by informing Ferguson that she would prefer to have the speech services provided in her home. Mou-bry also stated that she did not require the services of an occupational therapist as her son’s motor abilities were being reassessed. On November 3, 1993, the Minnesota Department of Education (“MDE”) advised the School District that Moubry had filed a Complaint (“Complaint No. 472”), which alleged that the District was not implementing the IEP and that OT services had been cancelled from January through September of 1993. Her Complaint further alleged that the School District was refusing to allow her access to the ECSE classroom, and that the Plaintiff was not progressing under the speech component of the IEP. On November 4, 1993, Moubry informed Francis Spencer (“Spencer”), who was the Director of the Northland Special Education Cooperative, that she did not want Dreschler to provide services to her son. Contemporaneously, Bonney advised a Coop Coordinator that Moubry did not want therapists coming to her home. On November 10, 1993, the IEP team reconvened. At that session, the Elementary School Principal told Moubry that she would not be required to have advance permission to visit her son’s classroom, and further explained the requirements of signing-in her attendance at the School. On November 17, 1993, Moubry objected to the proposed interim IEP that had been developed at the meeting of November 10. In particular, she objected to a report, which was contained in the IEP, and which recorded her son’s performance on a certain test, known as “the Brigance.” In Moubry’s view, the results were invalid because Ferguson, who conducted the test, had no assistance from anyone who could interpret the Plaintiffs speech. Moreover, Ferguson had not administered the full Brigance, nor had she proposed, in writing, a formal reassessment to Moubry. In addition, Moubry protested certain characterizations of her son, she requested additional occupational therapy, and she sought a reassessment of her son by an occupational therapist. Moubry did not, however, object to the goals and objectives that were recited in the IEP. The School District acceded to the OT reassessment and, on December 15, 1993, Salmela reassessed the Plaintiff. The results of that reassessment revealed that, since the Plaintiff was last tested in October of 1992, his delay had increased from 13-14 months to 17-18 months. Thereafter, on January 7, 1994, the School District deleted the objectionable characterizations from the IEP of November 18,1993, and included the request for OT services. The interim IEP was then accepted by Moubry on January 26,1994, but with her continued objection to the Brigance test results. On January 17, 1994, Moubry met with Spencer and the ECSE Coop Coordinator in order to discuss speech services. At that time, the Parent reiterated her request that Dreschler not be permitted to provide the speech services. Spencer and the ECSE Coop Coordinator concluded that Moubry also did not want the services of the speech clinician, who provided services at a neighboring school district. On January 26,1994, the MDE notified the School District that the Plaintiff had filed a Complaint (“Complaint No. 491”), which related to Ferguson’s assessment of the Plaintiff, and which claimed that the resort to the Brigance test results, without her notice and consent, amounted to impermissible discrimination. On February 17, 1994, an IEP conference was conducted, at which speech goals were added to the Plaintiffs IEP. Those present at this meeting included Moubry, the District Superintendent of Schools, the Coop ECSE Coordinator, the certified occupational therapist assistant, together with Dreschler, Spencer and Salmela. While Spencer was temporarily out of the room, the Coop ECSE Coordinator told Moubry that her son would not receive OT unless he was enrolled in an ECSE classroom. Whereupon, Moubry left the meeting, with her observation that a Due Process Hearing would be required under the provisions of the IDEA. On that same day, Moubry filed a third Complaint with the MDE (“Complaint No. 499”), in which she claimed that her son’s services had been discontinued. At about the same time, Moubry brought her son to visit his aunt in Madison, where he remained until March of 1994. After discussing, with the Coop ECSE Coordinator, the statement made to Moubry, that she needed to keep her son in the ECSE classroom in order to receive OT services, Spencer informed Moubry, by letter dated February 22, 1994, that the Plaintiff would continue to receive OT, and that Ferguson would observe the Headstart class and would consult. He also indicated that a formal Due Process Hearing would be in order, and that he would initiate that process. On February 28, 1994, Spencer received Moubry’s request for a Hearing. On March 2, 1994, Moubry met with the District Superintendent and agreed upon a means by which speech services would be provided to her son. Thereafter, Dreschler incorporated a list of items that had been requested by Moubry in the IEP of February 17, 1994. On March 14, 1994, Moubry brought the Plaintiff to school in order to commence his speech services. Due to an apparent misunderstanding, which is not explained in this Record, no speech services were provided on that date. On March 23, 1994, Spencer contacted the MDE with respect to Mbubry’s request for the appointment of an HO. On the next- day, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Education appointed Steve M. Mihal-chick, a State Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), to act as the HO, and a Hearing was scheduled for April 4,1994. On March 24 and 26, 1994, Moubry met with Dreschler and Joan Kjorsvig, the School Psychologist, in order to incorporate the suggestions of the Director of the Scottish Rite Clinic into the IEP. Based upon these suggestions, a revised IEP was prepared on March 26,1994. Notwithstanding the School District’s encouragement, that she sign the IEP so as to avoid the Due Process Hearing, Moubry refused and commented that she had felt pressured. On March 22, 1994, Moubry sought an extension of the Hearing date, in order that she could obtain legal counsel, and have the Plaintiffs aunt present. By Order dated March 28, 1994, the HO granted the Parent’s request for an extension and, on April 12, 1994, the HO required the provision of extended school year services and interim services. The HO’s Order of April 12 also provided for an independent assessment of the Plaintiff at public expense. As a consequence, the Plaintiff requested a continuance of the Hearing until completion of that assessment. On April 13, 1994, the School District commenced the furnishing of services, which were provided three times a week for the following five weeks, until the Plaintiff left the District in order to visit his aunt. By letters dated April 13 and 14, 1994, the MDE made findings in each of the three Complaints filed by the Plaintiff. As to Complaint No. 472, the MDE found that the Plaintiff had not demonstrated a lack of progress. However, in response to the additional submissions of the Plaintiff, the MDE determined that the School District had failed to provide appropriate OT services during the period from January through September of 1993, and directed the School District to consider whether compensatory education was appropriate. In all other respects, the MDE ruled in favor of the School District. On June 24, 1994, after his return from Madison, the Plaintiff began his extended school year (“ESY”) services. ESY speech services were provided by Elizabeth Harry-man (“Harryman”), who was an experienced speech therapist, who had retired after 23 years of employment as a speech pathologist in the public schools, and who had served as a supervising teacher for graduate and undergraduate speech therapy students in another State. However, because Harryman did not hold a Minnesota license, Dreschler observed and monitored the provision of those speech services. In addition, the Plaintiff continued to receive OT services. The Plaintiff’s Summer services lasted for approximately six weeks. Subsequently, the School District proposed an IEP on June 21, 1994 and, again, on August 11, 1994, but neither of these were acceptable to Moubry. Following the completion of his ESY services,- the Plaintiff again travelled to Madison so as to visit his aunt. On September 7, 1994, Moubry notified the School District that the Plaintiff would attend public school in the Madison School District, as she had discovered that a nationally known expert in apraxia was practicing in Madison, at the Waisman Center Phonology Clinic. As well, an elementary school, which was located in the aunt’s neighborhood, had a relationship with the Clinic, by which any students, who were in need of services, would be seen cooperatively by the school and by the Clinic. On September 14, 1994, the Clinic evaluated the Plaintiff and found particular problem areas. Thereafter, Moubry informed the School District that the Plaintiff would not undergo an independent evaluation which had been scheduled at the Minneapolis Children’s Medical Center. The Madison School District completed an IEP for the Plaintiff on January 23, 1995, based upon its assessment of him during the period from September through December of 1994. In the interim, on December 6, 1994, the ALJ resigned from any farther participation in the case, and the Commissioner reassigned the matter to Sara Jay, as the HO. The Hearing was convened on January 17, 1995, at which time testimony was presented for a period of seven days. On April 7,1995, the HO issued a decision which concluded that the School District had not consistently provided the Plaintiff with access to services, which were reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit. In this respect, the HO determined that the District had failed to provide the Plaintiff with FAPE for a period commencing in October of 1992, and continuing through October 4, 1993. In addition, the HO ruled that the Plaintiffs IEP, for the period of February 17 through March 9, 1994, did not properly satisfy the District’s obligation to provide FAPE, since the IEP had relied, in part, upon the provision of services by an outside agency. The HO concluded, however, that the School District was not responsible for its failure to provide services during the period from October 4, 1993, through March of 1994, because of Moubry’s decision not to work with the School District’s personnel. The HO also concluded, with a limited exception, that the IEP of March 24 through 26, 1994; the IEP of June, 1994; and the IEP of August, 1994; substantially satisfied the School District’s obligation to provide the Plaintiff with FAPE. Next, the HO determined that the School District improperly failed to consider ESY for the Summer of 1993, and improperly relied upon an occupational therapist to assess and provide for the Plaintiffs physical therapy needs. Lastly, the HO ruled that the School District had not failed to identify the Plaintiff, consistent with its child find requirements, but the HO declined to rule on issues that were related to the monitoring system and the complaint process. Based upon these determinations, the HO required the School District to provide the Plaintiff with compensatory education in the amount of 34 hours of individual ST, and 10 hours of OT. The HO also found that compensatory education, for ST, would be appropriate for the time period commencing on November 18, 1992, and extending through October 4, 1993. In the HO’s view, compensatory OT would be appropriate for the period from March 2 through May of 1993, as had been determined by the MDE in its investigation of Complaint No. 490. In addition, the HO reformulated the Plaintiffs IEP, based upon the goals and objectives that had been developed during the Plaintiffs speech program in Madison. Specifically, the HO ordered the School District to provide the Plaintiff with four, 30-minute, individual speech therapy sessions per week. In this respect, the HO stated that Dreschler would provide the speech services or, if the District so chose, it could provide the services through a contract with a licensed speech pathologist. The HO also restructured the Plaintiffs IEP so as to provide for an assessment, by a physical therapist, of motor skills services for a total of 120 minutes per week, for continued ESY services and, lastly, for related services that would be offered on a pull-out basis during the Plaintiffs regular educational program. In due course, the Plaintiff appealed the HO’s decision, as authorized by Minnesota Statutes Section 120.17, subd. 3b(g), and the Minnesota Commissioner of Education appointed Jerry Colglazier as the HRO. As recognized by the HRO, the Plaintiff alleged three deficiencies in the HO’s determinations. First, the Plaintiff asserted that the HO erred in finding that Moubry had refused special education services during the period from October 4,1993, through April 12,1994. Next, the Plaintiff alleged error in the HO’s finding that the School District could use Dreschler as the Plaintiffs speech therapist and, lastly, the Plaintiff argued that the HO erred in finding that the District was not aware of his specialized needs until September 22,1992. The HRO heard and considered additional evidence and, on August 1, 1995, issued his decision on appeal. In his decision, the HRO, with two exceptions, affirmed the HO’s determinations. As a first exception, the HRO added an additional 100 minutes per week of speech services to the IEP that had been formulated by the HO. These services were to be performed by the Waisman Clinic, if those services were available, or else, by nearly similar facilities in Minnesota, such as the Scottish Rite Clinic or the Robert Pierce Clinic. As a second modification of the HO’s decision, the HRO determined that Dreschler should not perform speech services “unless and until she has received in service for providing speech services to Students with verbal apraxia.” HRO Report, at 24. In all other respects, the HRO affirmed the HO’s rulings. Thereafter, on August 21, 1995, the School District submitted a proposed IEP, in which the Plaintiff was scheduled to receive services from Dreschler, notwithstanding the fact that she would be providing the services while she was being trained. On August 30, 1995, the Plaintiff filed this civil action, as an “aggrieved party” under the judicial review provisions of the IDEA. See, Title 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). In his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the conduct of the School District violated the provisions of the IDEA; the protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), Title 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., as augmented by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title 29 U.S.C. §§ 706 and 794a; the provisions of Minnesota Statutes Section 120.17; and the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (“MGDPA”), Minnesota Statutes Section 13 et seq. In addition, his Complaint contends that the Commissioner violated the IDEA; the provisions of Minnesota Statutes Section 120.17; and the ADA — again, as including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In specifics, the Plaintiff asserts that the Commissioner failed to properly ensure that the School District rendered appropriate IDEA services to him; that the Commissioner did not establish an effective monitoring and complaint process; and, that the Commissioner failed to develop rules that would assure that the School District would employ properly trained instructors. On August 31, 1995, the School District filed its Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s Complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction. In this respect, the District maintains that the Plaintiff is not an “aggrieved party,” and that, therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction over his IDEA claims. In addition, on September 8, 1995, the Commissioner filed its Motion to Dismiss, urging that neither the Commissioner, nor the State Board of Education, were implicated, in any way, in the immediate provision of special education services to the Plaintiff. Thereafter, on September 18, 1995, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, alternatively, for Summary Judgment, on his claims against both the Commissioner and the School District, under the IDEA. Lastly, on October 11, 1995, the Plaintiff has moved to supplement the Record by the incorporation of evidence that he claims is relevant to his ADA and MGDPA claims. III. Discussion A. The School District’s Motion to Dismiss. Premised upon Rule 12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the School District seeks to dismiss the Plaintiffs Complaint on jurisdictional grounds. As such, the District’s Motion does not challenge the correctness of the HRO’s decision but, rather, solely urges that we are without the requisite jurisdiction to review the Plaintiffs challenge to that decision. As should be obvious, the limited scope of the District’s Motion is instrumental in delineating the narrowness of the issues that the Motion presents. 1. Standard of Review. Quite logically, we examine the jurisdictional issue at the outset. See, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1582-83, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981); Bueford v. Resolution Trust Corp., 991 F.2d 481, 485 (8th Cir.1993) (“Lack of subject matter jurisdiction * * * cannot be waived[;][it] may be raised at any time by a party to an action, or by the court sua sponte,”); Redman v. F.A.A., 759 F.Supp. 1384, 1387 (D.Minn.1991). As Rule 12(b)(1) clearly allows, a party may properly raise a jurisdictional defense prior to the filing of an Answer on the merits of the Plaintiffs claims. This sequencing of the pleadings is consistent with the core truth that “federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction and have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Marine Equipment Management Co. v. United States, 4 F.3d 643, 646 (8th Cir.1993), citing Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1331, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986), citing in turn Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 [5 U.S. 137], 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). A Federal Court, therefore, has a primordial duty, in every case before it, to inquire whether the vital prerequisite of subject matter jurisdiction has been satisfied. Bradley v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 962 F.2d 800, 802 n. 3 (8th Cir.1992); Thomas v. Basham, 931 F.2d 521, 523 (8th Cir.1991); Woodke v. Dahm, 873 F.Supp. 179, 185 (N.D.Iowa 1995), aff’d, 70 F.3d 983 (8th Cir.1995). Moreover, as subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold consideration, the Court has “broader power to decide its own right to hear the case than it has when the merits of the case are reached.” Bellecourt v. United States, 994 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir.1993), quoting Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109, 114 S.Ct. 1049, 127 L.Ed.2d 371 (1994). In order to properly dismiss an action under Rule 12(b)(1), the challenging party must successfully attack the Complaint, either upon its face or upon the factual truthfulness of its averments. Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir.1993); Osborn v. United States, supra at 729 n. 6. Where, as here, a defendant mounts a facial challenge to jurisdiction, all of the factual allegations, which concern the jurisdictional issue, are presumed to be true, and the Motion will find success if the plaintiff has failed to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Titus v. Sullivan, supra at 593, citing Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 731-32 (11th Cir.1980); Woodke v. Dahm, supra at 186; Wittmann v. United States, 869 F.Supp. 726, 729 (E.D.Mo.1994). 2.Legal Analysis. Contending that the Plaintiff has not been “aggrieved” by the HRO’s decision, the School District doubts our jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiffs IDEA claims. As to the Plaintiffs ADA claim, the School District asserts that the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, which is a condition precedent to our review. In addition, the District urges that we decline to exercise our supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs MGDPA claim. We address each of these contentions, in turn. a. The Plaintiff’s IDEA claims. As plainly enunciated in Title 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), only a “party aggrieved by the findings and decision shall have the right to bring a civil action.” Accordingly, the right to bring a Federal suit, under the IDEA, extends only to those persons who are aggrieved by a final agency action. Arguing that the Plaintiff prevailed in the administrative proceedings, the School District contends that he lacks the requisite standing to mount an IDEA claim. Although we agree with the District, that the Plaintiff obtained a generally favorable result during the administrative processing of his claim, we conclude that he qualifies, as an aggrieved party, since he contests those aspects of the administrative rulings which were found against him, and for which he has requested relief. See, Board of Educ. of Cabell County v. Dienelt, 843 F.2d 813, 814 (4th Cir.1988) (shortcomings between the relief requested, and the relief received at the administrative level, render the plaintiff an aggrieved party); Slack v. State of Del. Dept. of Public Instr., 826 F.Supp. 115, 120 (D.Del.1993) (“Other courts faced with similar partial victories have found plaintiffs aggrieved parties.”). In contrast to the District’s position, the Plaintiff claims that he is “aggrieved” in the following four respects: 1. The HRO’s refusal to disqualify Dres-chler as a provider of speech services to the Plaintiff; 2. The School District’s post-Hearing failure to implement the HRO’s Order that Dreschler not provide services until she has received proper training; 3. The HRO’s determination not to award compensatory education for the October, 1993 through April, 1994 period, and the 1994-1995 school year; and 4. The HRO’s refusal to review the monitoring and complaint system. In view of the District’s facial challenge to the jurisdictional pinions of the Plaintiffs Complaint, we accept, as, true, all of the Plaintiffs allegations of jurisdictional fact. We turn, therefore, to the 'bases for the Plaintiffs claimed “aggrieved” status. 1) The District’s Refusal to Remove Dres-chler. Our analysis commences with the HRO’s refusal to remove Dreschler as the Plaintiffs provider of speech services. Of necessity, we are obliged to determine whether the authority of a Court, to remove a service provider, is contemplated by the IDEA. If not — as the District contends — then our jurisdiction falls short of providing the remedy that the Plaintiff requests. We conclude, however, that we are not jurisdietionally powerless to grant the relief that the Plaintiff evokes. Of course, for these purposes, we accept the Plaintiffs allegations that Dreschler failed to abide by the decisions of the IEP team, failed to follow procedural safeguards, and failed to show that the Plaintiff made progress under her instruction. Under the IDEA, a Federal Court has the power to “grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate.” Title 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). As a result, “ ‘equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief and the court enjoys ‘broad discretion’ in so doing.” Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 16, 114 S.Ct. 361, 366 (1993), quoting Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed., 471 U.S. 359, 374, 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 2004-05, 2002, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). In Burlington, the Supreme Court explained that the reviewing Court had broad discretion in fashioning relief which was “appropriate in light of the purpose of the Act.” Burlington School Committee, supra at 369, 105 S.Ct. at 2002. Not surprisingly, appropriate relief is that relief which is designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA. Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District No. 3, 31 F.3d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir.1994). In support of its Motion to Dismiss, the School District argues, albeit without supporting authority, that we do not enjoy any greater authority over the assignment of individual service providers than that held by the administrative officers. We disagree. As recently confirmed by the Supreme Court, “absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute.” Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 70-71, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1035-36, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (monetary damages available in an action to enforce Title IX). Accordingly, “[w]here legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Id., at 66, 112 S.Ct. at 1033, citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776-77, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). We find no suggestion, let alone a “clear direction,” to rebut the general presumption that all appropriate relief is available for our deployment, under the IDEA. The Senate Conference Report simply states that Courts can grant “all appropriate relief.” S.Rep. No. 94-455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975). One Court has interpreted this legislative expression of purpose as reflecting Congress’s intent that “a district judge could adopt the program offered by the school district or the program advocated by the parents, or that he could take any other action and devise any program which in his view would ensure an appropriate individualized educational program.” Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1211-1212 (7th Cir.1981); see also, W.B. v. Matulo, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3rd Cir.1995) (finding nothing in the text or history of IDEA which precludes a Federal Court from awarding monetary damages in a Section 1983 action to enforce the IDEA). We draw additional support, for a broad interpretation of the phrase “appropriate relief,” from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Honig v. Doe, supra. There, the Court rejected a State’s argument that there should be a “dangerousness” exception to the IDEA’S requirement that a child remain in his or her current placement pending the outcome of an IDEA proceeding. The Court reasoned that school officials had adequate authority to deal with a “truly dangerous child,” by “invok[ing] the aid of the courts under § 1415(e)(2), which empowers courts to grant any appropriate relief.” Id., at 326, 108 S.Ct. at 605-06. The Court concluded that the relief, which a Court is authorized to grant under Section 1415(e)(2), included the issuance of an injunction so to remove a student from his or her school environment. Notwithstanding these authorities, the District underscores that decisions, as to who should provide any particular special educational services, are exclusively rendered by the School District. We do not wholly disagree for, “once a Court determines that the requirements of the IDEA have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States.” Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3052, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). Indeed, it is well-settled that an appropriate public education does not require the absolutely best, or any “potential maximizing” of the educational benefit for the disabled child. Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir.1987). Rather, the program provided by the School District need only be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed v. Rowley, supra at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051. Here, however, we must assume, without deciding, that the IDEA has not been satisfied and, further, that any deficiencies in the Plaintiffs instructional experience are due to Dreschler. Under these circumstances, we conclude that, within the context of the IDEA, a Court is not precluded from directing a School District to employ a different instructor to provide special educational services to a disabled student. To hold otherwise would be to place an unintended restriction on IDEA’S clear mandate — namely, to ensure that all disabled students be provided a free appropriate public education, “by grant[ing] such relief as the Court determines is appropriate.” Title 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). Therefore, we conclude that, arguably, the Plaintiff has been “aggrieved” by the HRO’s refusal to disqualify Dreschler as a service provider, and we recommend that the School District’s Motion to Dismiss, as to this claim, be deified. Of course, in so concluding, wé do no more than hold that this aspect of the Plaintiffs IDEA claim is not meritless as a matter of law. 2) The District’s Purported Failure to Implement the HRO’s Ruling that Provisionally Disqualified Dreschler. Next, the Plaintiff claims to be “aggrieved” because of the School District’s failure to implement the HRO’s Order so as to preclude Dreschler from providing speech services “unless and until she has received in service for providing speech services to students with verbal apraxia.” HRO Report, p. 24. After the HRO issued his decision, the District submitted an IEP, which stated in part, that Dreschler would receive training “before and while working” with the Plaintiff. In practical effect, the Plaintiff seeks an enforcement of the administrative decision below. In the School District’s view, the IDEA does not contemplate an action to enforce an administrative decision — a proposition with which we agree. We note, however, that the reason enforcement is not contemplated under the IDEA is because jurisdiction under that Act is limited to parties who are aggrieved by an administrative decision. See, Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir.1987) (IDEA does not provide jurisdiction to' enforce administrative orders, since access to the Courts is provided only to review adverse administrative orders); Slack v. State of Delaware Department of Public Instruction, supra at 120; Grace B. v. Lexington School Committee, 762 F.Supp. 416, 418 (D.Mass.1991). As a preliminary observation, we note the incongruity presented by the Plaintiffs simultaneous petition to enforce the HRO’s decision with respect to Dreschler while, at the same time, challenging the propriety of that decision. At least at this juncture, we have concluded that our jurisdiction, to address Dreschler’s assignment to instruct the Plaintiff, is not wanting, and we have not been asked by any party to determine, on the Record presently before us, whether a program, which includes Dreschler as an instructional provider, is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, supra. As best as we can surmise — because it is not directly alleged anywhere — the Plaintiff seeks enforcement of the HRO’s decision, as it relates to Dreschler, in the event that this Court should conclude, in its ultimate review on the merits, that an IEP which includes Dreschler is appropriately calculated to provide him with educational benefit. As so understood, the Plaintiffs claim is fundamentally flawed, for it impermissibly seeks protection from what, at this point, is only an anticipatorily adverse ruling by this Court. Since, on this enforcement claim, we find that the Plaintiff is not an “aggrieved party,” we recommend that this aspect of his claim be dismissed. 3) The HRO’s Decision Not to Award Compensatory Education for the period from October of 1993, Through April of 199k, and during the whole of the 1994.-1995 School Year.. The Plaintiff contends that he is aggrieved by the HRO’s refusal to award compensatory education for the period from October of 1993, - through April of 1994, and because the HRO failed to award relief for the whole of the 1994-1995 school year. Of course, it is well-settled that Federal Courts have the authority to award tuition reimbursement for private school expenses, and for compensatory education. In Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed., supra at 369, 105 S.Ct. at 2002, the Supreme Court held that the Courts’ authority to grant relief, under the IDEA, “includes the power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private school education for. a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.” Id. Similarly, in Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 754 (8th Cir.1986), our Court of Appeals extended the rationale in Burlington to support an award of compensatory education so as to insure that a parent, who could not afford to - unilaterally place her child in a private educational setting, would have a viable remedy should her child be deprived of an education under the IDEA. As noted, the HRO determined that the District was not obligated to compensate the Plaintiff for the period, from October of 1993, through April of 1994, because Moubry unilaterally removed the Plaintiff from his educational program, and later refused Dres-ehler’s -services. Unquestionably, we have the requisite jurisdiction to review this determination of the HRO. Indeed, at the Hearing in this matter, the School District conceded that, with respect to the period from October through April, the Plaintiff is, arguably, an “aggrieved party.” On the contrary, however,- insofar as the Plaintiff claims to be aggrieved by the HRO’s determination as to the 1994-1995 school year, we find his claim to have no legal merit. The purpose of compensatory education is to replace lost educational services. See, Miener v. State of Missouri, supra. During the 1994-1995 school year, however, the Plaintiff was enrolled in the Madison School District and, notably, he advances no claim that the services, which he received there, were less than appropriate. In addition to compensatory education, the Plaintiff seeks to be reimbursed for the costs that were related to his stay in Madison, inclusive of his travel and telephone expenses. Nevertheless, we need not here decide whether such reimbursement expenses, which are generated by a disabled student’s instruction in another public school system, are compensable under the IDEA, for we conclude that this issue has been waived by the Plaintiffs failure to preserve the claim at the administrative level. See, e.g., David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee, 775 F.2d 411, 424 (1st Cir.1985) (“for issues to be preserved for judicial review they must first be presented to the administrative hearing officer”), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140, 106 S.Ct. 1790, 90 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986); Carey v. Maine School Administrative Dist. No. 17, 754 F.Supp. 906, 921 (D.Me.1990). As a consequence, we conclude that the Plaintiff is “aggrieved” to the extent that the HRO declined to award compensatory education for the period from October of 1993, through April of 1994 and, to that extent, we recommend that the School District’s Motion be denied. We further recommend, however, that the Plaintiffs claim for reimbursement expenses, which are related to the 1994r-1995 school year, be dismissed as legally barred. 4) The HRO’s Claimed Refusal to Review the Commissioner’s Monitoring and Complaint Review System as it Relates to the School District. Lastly, the Plaintiff claims to be “aggrieved” because the HRO concluded that he lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s monitoring of the School District. Since the Plaintiffs claim, as it relates to the monitoring and complaint process, directly involves the Commissioner as opposed to the School District, we will, address this issue in the framework of the Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss. b. The Plaintiff’s Nan-IDEA Claims. In addition to his core claim under the IDEA — namely, that additional relief is essential in order to provide him an educational program from which he can benefit — the Plaintiff has also alleged that the School District violated the protections of the ADA, and of the MGDPA. 1) The ADA Claim. As a preliminary observation, we have no doubt that viable claims can be asserted against a School District under the ADA, either separately, or in conjunction with an IDEA claim. Petersen v. Hastings Public Schools, 31 F.3d 705, 708 (8th Cir.1994); Digre v. Roseville Schools Ind. D. No. 623, 841 F.2d 245, 249-50 (8th Cir.1988). While that has not always been the ease, Congress has left no doubt as to its intention to allow such claims to proceed in tandem with an IDEA claim. See, Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3468-69, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984) (Section 1983 and equal protection claims preempted by IDEA), overruled by The Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-372 § 3, 110 Stat. 796 (1986). By an amendment, in 1986, the IDEA was modified to read as follows: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 791, et seq.], or other Federal statutes protecting the rights of handicapped children and youth, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (b)(2) and (c) of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter. Title 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). Our Court of Appeals has held that this Section was designed to reestablish the statutory rights that “were repealed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson.” Digre v. Roseville Schools Ind. D. 623, supra at 250, quoting Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 754 (2d Cir.1987). The exhaustion requirement of Section 1415(f), however, precludes litigants from circumventing the Act’s procedural requirements by bringing a related claim under a different Federal statute. Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, supra at 756 (“[W]hen parents choose to file suit under another law that protects the rights of handicapped children—and the suit could have been filed under the [IDEA]—they are first required to exhaust the [IDEA’s] remedies to the same extent as if the suit had been filed originally under the [IDEA’s] provisions.”); see also, House Report at 7 (“parents alleging violations of section 504 * * * are required to exhaust administrative remedies before commencing separate actions in court where exhaustion would be required under [IDEA]”). This exhaustion requirement “permits states and local agencies to employ their educational expertise, ‘affords full exploration of technical educational issues, furthers development of a complete factual record and promotes judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled children.’ ” Hope v. Cortines, 872 F.Supp. 14, 19 (E.D.N.Y.1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 687 (2d Cir.1995), quoting Hoeft v. Tucson- Unified School District, 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir.1992). Here, the School District contends that the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. However, since the Plaintiff has obtained a final decision on the District’s provision of FAPE through the IDEA administrative process, and because it would be futile to require the Plaintiff to exhaust the administrative process with respect to a non-FAPE, ADA claim, we are not persuaded by the District’s argument. For dismissal, the District relies upon the similarity between the Plaintiffs IDEA and ADA claims. As it is alleged in the Complaint, the fulcrum of the Plaintiffs ADA claim is the District’s asserted denial of “access to the same benefits and programs of services provided to nondisabled children, or children with other kinds of disabilities.” Complaint, p. 11. While there appears to be some overlap in the respective contentions, at this preliminary stage, we are hesitant to presume a perfect correlation in the relief the Plaintiff seeks under each statutory framework. Rather, we regard the District’s exhaustion argument as misplaced, since we already have the benefit of a fully developed Record, albeit restricted to whether the Plaintiff was provided with FAPE. Ordinarily, exhaustion is required when the expertise of an administrative hearing officer is necessary in order to develop a factual record. Lester H. By Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 869 (3rd Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 1317, 113 L.Ed.2d 250 (1991). Where, as here, the Plaintiff has exhausted the IDEA’S administrative procedures, Section 1415(f) does not require the Plaintiff to pursue further administrative proceedings so as to maintain a claim, under another Federal Statute, that he was not provided with FAPE. To do so what mandate a truly fruitless act. On the other hand, to the extent that the Plaintiffs ADA claim is not a mere reiteration of his IDEA claim, exhaustion would be futile, since the administrative hearing officers lack jurisdiction to decide non-FAPE, discrimination claims. See, C.B. ¶. Kasson-Mantorville, 22 IDELR 380, 383 (SEA MN 1994). In this respect, it has long been settled that plaintiffs need not exhaust the procedures set forth in Section 1415 where resort to the administrative process would be either futile or inadequate. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, supra at 327, 108 S.Ct. at 606 (1988) (“parents may by-pass the administrative process where resort to this process would be futile or the available remedies would be inadequate”); Digre v. Roseville Schools Ind. D. 623, supra at 250 n. 3. The futility exception to the exhaustion requirement seems particularly pertinent where, as here, the purported violation cannot be adjudicated at the administrative level. Accordingly, we recommend that the School District’s Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs ADA claim be denied at this juncture. 2) The MGDPA Claim. As to the Plaintiffs MGDPA claim, the District commends us to withhold an exercise of our supplemental jurisdiction. Relying on the reasoning of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), the District contends that a ruling on this State law claim is needless and, therefore, should be avoided, both as a matter of comity and so as to promote justice between the parties. We disagree. In 1990, Congress codified the common law rules of pendent jurisdiction into the amalgam of “supplemental jurisdiction.” Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Craig Lyle Ltd. Partnership v. Land O’ Lakes, Inc., 877 F.Supp. 476, 485 (D.Minn.1995) (test in Gibbs has been codified in Section 1367). As so codified, Section 1367(a) confers supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that “are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” Accordingly, supplemental jurisdiction exists when the Federal claim has sufficient substance to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Court, and the State and Federal claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. In determining whether the State and Federal claims are sufficiently related, the Seventh Circuit recently observed that “[a] loose factual connection between the claims is generally sufficient.” Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423, 424 (7th Cir.1995); see also, Travelers Insurance Co. v. Intraco, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 554, 557 (S.D.Iowa 1995) (“The essential question is whether the claims are so related that the parties would ordinarily be expected to resolve them in one proceeding.”). While Section 1367(a) affirmatively bestows supplemental jurisdiction upon the Federal Courts, subsection (c) allows the Courts to decline to exercise this jurisdiction if one of the following four conditions is met: 1. The claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 2. The claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 3. The district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or 4. In exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). As a consequence, if we conclude that the Plaintiffs State law claim “form[s] part of the same case or controversy” as the Federal claims, we are obliged to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in the absence of a defined exception. McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir.1994) (Absent presence of circumstances for which statute expressly granted discretion to reject supplemental jurisdiction, “section 1367(a) requires the district court to accept supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.”); see also, Executive Software v. U.S. District Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1556 (9th Cir.1994) (same); Habiger v. City of Fargo, 905 F.Supp. 709, 722 n. 18 (D.N.D.1995), citing McLaurin v. Prater, supra. As described in the Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to the District’s Motion to Dismiss, the State law claim is premised upon an allegedly unauthorized release of educational data, and upon the failure of the District to implement a data practices policy. Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that he was denied educational services for the period from October of 1993, through April of 1994, as a result of a conversation between Bonney and an employee of the