Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation. This matter comes before the court on plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the State of California Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”), Gary W. Bush, James W. Van Loben Seis, and their agents from issuing any permit to non-party Robert L. Kudler that would allow him to place any billboard or other outdoor advertising displays along the Interstate 105 freeway (“1-105”) in Los Angeles County. The court has considered the documents filed in this matter, including the briefs of the parties and non-party Kudler. In addition, the court has heard argument and considered the affidavits and declarations submitted by the parties and non-party Kudler'. The court has also reviewed the record of this litigation, including: this court’s 1972 injunction, Keith v. Volpe, 352 F.Supp. 1324 (C.D.Cal.1972), aff'd, sub nom Keith v. California Highway Comm’n, 506 F.2d 696 (9th Cir.1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908, 95 S.Ct. 826, 42 L.Ed.2d 837 (1975); the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Routes 1 & 1-105 (El Segundo-Norwalk) Freeway-Transitway, vols. 1-2 (“the Final EIS”) filed on July 21, 1977; and this court’s Final Amended Consent Decree (“the Amended Decree”) filed on September 22, 1981 and attached here as appendix A. Being fully advised, the court finds and rules as follows: I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS The matter before this court requires an interpretation of the Amended Decree and the proceedings leading up to it. The Amended Decree settled nearly a decade of litigation concerning the construction of I-105, a federally funded highway that is now part of the interstate highway system. A The 1972 Injunction This environmental protection and civil rights suit was filed in February 1972 by persons living in the path of the 1-105 freeway, and by the NAACP, the Sierra Club, Environmental Defense Fund, City of Hawthorne, and others. Plaintiffs brought suit under the National Environmental Poliey Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347, the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970, Calif. Pub. Res.Code §§ 21000-21151, the Federal-Ad Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. §§ 128(a), 501-511, and the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655. Plaintiffs asked the court to halt work on the I-105 project, which would displace 21,000 persons, until government officials complied with the above mentioned statutes, which were enacted to protect the human environment, to protect homeowners, tenants, and businesses forced to relocate, and to secure public participation in the highway decision-making process through public hearings. After conducting hearings on plaintiffs’ 1972 motion for a preliminary injunction, the court determined that plaintiffs’ claims were well-founded. The evidence presented to the court disclosed a number of deficiencies in the relocation studies on the availability of “decent, safe, and sanitary housing” required by 42 U.S.C. § 4623(a)(1)(A). The severest housing shortage was in the Watts-Willow-brook area. Evidence presented to the court during the 1972 hearings also revealed that the federal and state defendants had given little consideration to the freeway’s environmental effects. On the evidence before it, the court found that as of 1972 the defendants had failed to comply with NEPA because they refused to prepare an EIS for the 1-105 project. 352 F.Supp. at 1332. NEPA requires that an EIS be prepared for any major action significantly affecting the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). In this case, the defendants agreed that I-105 was a major federal action significantly affecting the human environment, but argued that an EIS was not required for the 1-105 project because the freeway had been, planned and initiated before NEPA was enacted. 352 F.Supp. at 1330. The court rejected that position, finding that the federal and state governments had “failed to satisfy NEPA’s commandments.” 352 F.Supp. at 1330. The court explained that an EIS, given the early stage of the I-105 project, was not optional under NEPA: The message of NEPA is loud and clear. Section 101(a) declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use all practicable means and measures ... to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony____ Section 101(b) provides that in order to carry out this policy, it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government to use all practical means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and, resources to the end that the Nation may ... assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings. 352 F.Supp. at 1332 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)) (emphasis added). Noting Congress’s directive that NEPA be complied with “to the fullest extent possible,” 42 U.S.C. § 4332, this court concluded that “the application of NEPA to [1-105] should not be considered impracticable” because “five of the freeway’s eight segments were still in their planning stage.” 352 F.Supp. at 1333. Because no final plan for 1-105 had yet heen approved, “the general judicial policy against the retroactive application of statutes ... was inapplicable.” Id. (citations omitted). On July 7,1972, the court issued a preliminary injunction halting further work on 1-105 until government officials prepared an EIS as required by NEPA 352 F.Supp. at 1324. In addition, the court’s order required that governmental officials hold additional public hearings, conduct further housing availability studies, and give satisfactory assurances that adequate replacement housing would be available as required by the Federal-Ad Highway Act and the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act. B. The Final EIS The Final EIS was completed in July of 1977. During 1969 and 1970 (before the court’s 1972 injunction), the Division of Highways (Caltrans’s predecessor agency) studied the “environmental, physical, social and economic impacts” of the path of the proposed I-105. Final EIS at 2-13. The Division of Highway’s original project design was developed by a “Design Concept Team,” which was a group comprised of “environmental and urban planners, architects, economists, sociologists- and others familiar with urban problems and impacts, as well as highway engineers.” Final EIS at 3-á. The Design Concept Team conducted studies that were “aimed at seeking ways to blend the Project into its urban setting by pointing out ways of maximizing opportunities for enhancing the neighborhood-freeway relationship and minimizing potential disruptive ejfects of the facility.” Final EIS at 2-13 (emphasis added). The design studies included consideration of a plethora of factors, including neighborhood environmental values, as well as design implications. Id. The 1-105 design was a matter of great concern for the communities affected by the project and the Division of Highways held seven public hearings about the freeway’s design. Over 5,600 people attended these meetings. Id. The 1972 injunction, however, required the federal and state governments to conduct a more substantial review of the 1-105 project. Accordingly, between 1972 and 1974, Cal-trans and the Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”) undertook a formal environmental study, leading to preparation of an EIS. Upon order of the court; this study analyzed the 1-105 project in light of NEPA’s environmental policy mandates and federal housing availability requirements. A Draft EIS, containing summaries of the findings, was made available for public comment on December 19,1974. There is no doubt that review of the Draft EIS was extensive. It included over 150 open meetings with public officials and the review of hundreds of letters, some expressing concerns and others supporting the project. During the spring of 1975, numerous public hearings were held to provide the Draft EIS project with more information and to afford the public an opportunity to discuss the Draft EIS. These public comment hearings were held in the various communities that abut the 1-105. Total attendance at these meetings was 1,230 people. Final EIS at 2-12. Two additional hearings were held after two modifications to the project were suggested by the California Highway Commission (Caltrans) and the City of Hawthorne. Total attendance at these two meetings was 1,150. Id. Freeway development requires extensive negotiations between federal, state, county, and local governments. The 1-105 project was no exception. In these negotiations, determination of the vertical alignment of the freeway (i.e., at-grade, depressed, or elevated), the landscaping concept and features, and the placement of noise-attenuation and retaining walls, all became part of the federal and state government’s negotiations with city and county officials. Final EIS at 2-12 to 2-13. As the Final EIS assures: The Division of Highways (Caltrans); has. always maintained close working relationships with local city staffs. Planning and design coordination efforts continued after execution of freeway agreements to insure that mutually agreeable and desirable design feature changes are made when conditions warrant. The currently proposed design ... has been reviewed favorably by all jurisdictions involved. Final EIS at 2-14. The Final EIS did not skirt discussion of the freeway’s aesthetic impact on the communities involved. In a significant section, entitled “AESTHETICS AND AMENITIES,” the Final EIS set forth a plan for aesthetics mitigation. Final EIS at 5-33 to 5-35. The Aesthetics and Amenities section assured that the freeway’s potential adverse aesthetic impacts would be minimized through architectural design measures. This section sketched a modern freeway that would not only “provide safety and service” but would also “bring the Project’s visual elements into harmony with the surroundings.” Final EIS at 5-33. Sections of 1-105 that had to be elevated on embankments or bridge structures presented a major challenge for plans to minimize the freeway’s aesthetic impact. Yet even at these elevated sections, the Final EIS promised to attenuate negative visual impacts: The portions of the highway elevated on embankment, especially through residential areas, will probably be screened with sound attenuation walls, a dense screen of shrubs, or a combination of both to shield the roadway and traffic from view. The side slopes will then be planted with evergreen and flowering plant material, aimed at providing a pleasant visual experience for the community. Plant material and design styles will be chosen that best blend into the community and, where possible, improve it. Through commercial and industrial areas, screen planting is ordinarily not used, and slopes are planted to conform with the landscape of the adjacent properties. This will provide a strong continuity in form and texture. Bridge structures across arterial streets are being designed with careful consideration given to the architectural character created. Freeway-to-freeway interchanges are frequently visible from a great distance and affect a large area. As in the case of bridge structures, emphasis will be placed on the aesthetics of the structural design. Outward-facing slopes will be screened where appropriate, and all planting areas will be landscaped to establish a visually oriented park-like atmosphere ... Architectural treatment of viaduct structures will differ in impact, depending on the development of areas beneath and immediately adjacent to them. Local policy and design requirements will undoubtedly have a considerable effect on what kind of visual experience results from viaduct structures in the communities along the right-of-way. Final EIS at 5-34. The aesthetic plan for 1-105 was not limited to how the freeway would look from the perspective of the surrounding communities. The Aesthetics and Amenities section also included a subsection, entitled “Views from the Facility.” This subsection addressed the perspective from the freeway itself: While views from the facility will occur at a larger scale than most views of it, the design principles to be utilized remain the same. Essentially, discordant elements must be brought into visual harmony. Final EIS at 5-34. In discussing the view from the 1-105, this subsection of the Final EIS promised to make the 1-105 blend into the landscape around it. “Visual harmony” was to be presented to the passing motorist as well as to the surrounding communities. Id. The 1-105 architects’ decision to interrupt landscaping at elevated portions of the freeway was deliberate, made for both safety and aesthetic purposes. As the Final EIS explains: Along elevated portions of the Project, particularly through residential areas, the continuous screen planting will tend to produce some monotony, ¿specially for the passengers. The continuous screen will be broken through commercial and industrial areas, providing variation and an overview of the urban landscape. Final EIS at 5-34 (emphasis added). Thus, to counter the danger of visual monotony, the Final EIS defined “landscape” broadly, allowing for breaks in vegetative plantings to present motorists with overviews of the “urban landscape.” Id. Providing drivers and passengers with an opportunity to enjoy clean vistas of the surrounding communities was a primary concern for the drafters of the Final EIS. The Final EIS promised to give motorists a good first impression of a community as they entered from the freeway: Particular design and landscaping consideration will be given to off-ramp areas where a visitor’s first impressions of a community will be formed. The Project’s design and landscaping will be directed toward a smooth transition from the large scale to the more intimate scale of the community. Final EIS at 5-35. To be sure, the Final EIS did not promise surrounding communities and motorists an architectural wonder. The Final EIS’s aesthetic goal was quite honest and even modest: Clearly, a Project of this magnitude will have visual impact to the extent that it will change existing vistas and create new visual impressions ranging from subtle to bold. Subtle changes would be anticipated, for example, in the case of a depressed roadway through a residential community [ ... ] Final EIS at 5-35. But even in the elevated sections of 1-105, the Final EIS anticipated that these elevated sections would “probably create expansive and perhaps occasional dramatic views for motorists.” Id. C. The Amended Decree On September 22, 1981, the court filed the Amended Decree, which, dissolved the court’s 1972 injunction and allowed construction of 1-105 to proceed. The Amended Decree ordered the following: In view of the EIS and the terms contained in this Decree, the parties agree that the injunction heretofore entered by this court on July 7, 1972 shall forthwith be dissolved ... Amended Decree at 5. The Amended Decree further ordered: The 1-105 Freeway shall be constructed as proposed in the Final Environmental Impact Statement on file with the above-entitled court, except as modified by the specific provisions of this decree. Id. This language in the Amended Decree clearly requires that the decree is to be read along with the extensive proposals contained in the Final EIS. This makes sense — after all, one of the purposes of the Amended Decree was to bring the 1-105 project in compliance with NEPA. Section VII of the Amended Decree, entitled “Nonseverability of Decree’s Provisions,” stipulates that the material portions of the decree are not severable, and invalidation of one provision allows the parties to seek dissolution of the Amended Decree and pursue available legal remedies. Amended Decree at 16. This stipulation necessarily applies to the Final EIS because it was explicitly incorporated by reference in the Amended Decree. See Amended Decree at 5 (quoted above). The Final EIS supplements the Amended Decree with in-depth discussions of the details of the mitigation measures that federal and state defendants agreed to perform in exchange for the dissolution of the 1972 preliminary injunction. Thus, the Amended Decree and Final EIS together form the settlement agreement that benefited all parties. The federal and state defendants were permitted to proceed with the construction of 1-105, and plaintiffs were assured that the freeway would be built in conformity with the Amended Decree and Final EIS, which promised to mitigate negative aesthetic effects on motorists and surrounding communities. To date, the settlement of this litigation in 1981 has achieved important public goals, the most obvious achievement being the opening of a fast way to get across Los Angeles County. But the 1-105 freeway was also built with an eye to future transportation needs. As constructed, the 1-105 incorporates a fixed-rail public transit system in lieu of a previously contemplated busway. This fixed-rail line is now part of the Los Angeles Metro system. In addition, the Amended Decree and Final EIS, read together, put into effect NEPA’s policy that a major federal project assure “safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings.” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b); see also Final EIS at 5-33 to 5-35 (“AESTHETICS AND AMENITIES”). In 1993, 1-105 was completed and opened to motor traffic. According to Caltrans’ Senior Landscape Architect, Dale Williams, Cal-trans has taken aesthetic mitigation measures at elevated sections of the freeway. See Request for Judicial Notice, filed Aug. 12, 1995 (C.D.Cal.) (Declaration of Dale Williams in Support of Return to Petition For Writ of Mandate, Los Angeles County Sup.Ct., filed May 7, 1996) (“Dale Declaration”). In particular, “aesthetic treatment of 2-tone tan color split face block” has been used as well as “texture treatment” which has helped to soften the freeway’s negative aesthetic impact. Dale Declaration at 2. As the photographs submitted in support of Dale Williams’s declaration show, these elevated sections of the freeway do appear to be “landscaped.” Dale Declaration, Exhibits 4-10 (photographs). To date, plaintiffs have not brought before the court any claims that defendants have violated the terms of the Amended Decree. The freeway, as it stands today, has apparently fulfilled the aesthetic expectations of the parties. D. Non-party Kudler’s State Court Action Plaintiffs’ action to enjoin Caltrans from issuing permits was precipitated by a state court suit brought against Caltrans by non-party Kudler. Kudler, an advertising billboard developer, filed applications with Cal-trans for permits that would allow him to construct billboards on ten sites along 1-105. Caltrans refused to issue those permits to him based on its understanding of its obligations under the Amended Decree. Caltrans believes that the Amended Decree disallows billboards along 1-105 because the decree requires that the entire freeway be constructed as a “landscaped freeway.” Caltrans also believes that it has met the court’s requirement to construct a landscaped freeway because the landscaping of I-105 encompasses both plantings and architectural design features that fulfill the Final EIS’s aesthetic promises. See Dale Declaration at 2. Accordingly, Caltrans believes that the Amended Decree’s mandate that 1-105 be built as a “landscaped freeway” requires it to deny all requests for billboard permits along 1-105. To that end, Caltrans has consistently denied permit applications to all advertising developers seeking to place billboards along 1-105. In fact, Caltrans’s belief is so strong that, since the state court ruled on this issue, Caltrans has issued an emergency regulation that exempts 1-105 from COAA “landscaped freeway” requirements. Thus, applicants for permits to place billboards along 1-105 can no longer rely on COAA’s regulations. Non-party Kudler disputes Caltrans’s understanding of the term “landscaped freeway” found in the Amended Decree. Kudler argued in state court that the meaning of the term “landscaped freeway” in the Amended Decree is determined by regulations promulgated under the California Outdoor Advertising Act (“COAA”), Cal. Prof. & Bus.Code § 5271. These regulations define “landscaped freeway” as a section of freeway which is continuously planted for 1000 feet or more. COAA regs. §§ 2502(f) & 2511. The COAA regulations also limit Caltrans’s discretion to declassify a landscaped freeway. The regulations provide that a section of landscaped freeway cannot lose its “landscaped” status if that section has gaps in plantings of 200 feet or less. Id. At a few elevated sections of 1-105, there are gaps in the vegetative plantings that are longer than 200 feet. Kudler contends that the COAA regulations should be read as limiting Cal-trans’s discretion to classify those elevated sections as “landscaped.” It is at these elevated sections that Kudler wants to erect his ten billboards. The state court agreed with Kudler’s view and determined that the elevated sections of 1-105 were not, and never could be, designated as “landscaped” under COAA regulations §§ 2502(f) & 2511. The state court concluded that Caltrans had improperly denied permits to Kudler. Accordingly, that court granted a writ of mandate that ordered Cal-trans to issue billboard permits to Kudler. In granting the writ, the state court interpreted the Amended Decree as not contemplating billboards; its writ, the state court reasoned, would therefore not conflict with this court’s Amended Decree. In deciding that the Amended Decree did not address the issue of billboards along the 1-105, the state court overlooked the history of this litigation; the intentions of the parties; the important federal policies vindicated by the Amended Decree; and the aesthetic provisions of the Final EIS which are an integral part of the Amended Decree. These oversights explain why the state court incorrectly read the COAA regulations as obligating Cal-trans to issue'billboard permits to Kudler for sites along the elevated sections of the freeway where gaps in vegetative planting exceeded 200 feet in length. See Kudler v. California Dept. of Transportation, No. BC 138916, Statement of Decision at 5 (Cal.Sup.Ct.1996) (interpreting COAA regulation §§ 2502(f) & 2511). E. The Temporary Restraining Order In July 1996, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in this court to prevent Caltrans from issuing a permit to non-party Kudler to place billboards or other outdoor advertising displays along the now completed 1-105. Plaintiffs argue that the state court incorrectly read the Amended Decree. Plaintiffs state that the state court’s writ contradicts the terms of the Amended Decree because the decree requires that 1-105 be “constructed as a landscaped freeway.” According to the plaintiffs, this means that Caltrans cannot permit the placement of billboards alongside the freeway without violating the instructions of the Amended Decree. Caltrans agrees with plaintiffs’ understanding of the Amended Decree and does not oppose plaintiffs’ motion that Caltrans be enjoined from issuing the ten permits to Kudler. Plaintiffs submit that even if the Amended Decree is arguably ambiguous as to the freeway’s overall design, it was their intention that the decree require that the entire length of 1-105 would be designed as a billboard-free “landscaped freeway,” irrespective of the vagaries of the state regulatory framework. Plaintiffs claim that by agreeing to the consent decree, they accepted an aesthetic plan for the freeway (set forth in the Final EIS) that would be incompatible with the placement of billboards along the elevated sections of 1-105. Caltrans shares plaintiffs’ understanding that the parties intended that the decree preclude the issuance of permits for the placement of billboards along 1-105. On July 25, 1996, this court issued an Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order. The TRO ordered the following: PENDING determination on the above Order to Show Cause, the California Department of Transportation, Gary W. Bush, James W. Van Loben Seis, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys and all those in active concert or participation with each of them ARE HEREBY RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED from issuing any permits to Robert L. Kudler that would allow him to place any billboard or other outdoor advertising displays along the freeway, including permits allowing him to erect his Proposed Displays 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, as ordered by the Judgment for Petitioner and Plaintiff Robert L. Kudler, filed July 12,1996 and attached hereto. Order to Show Cause Why Injunction to Enforce Consent Decree Should Not Issue and Temporary Restraining Order, No. 72-355-HP, at 2 (C.D. Cal., filed July 25, 1996). Since this court issued the TRO, no permits have issued. The court held a hearing on the order to show cause on Tuesday, August 13, 1996. The plaintiffs now seek a preliminary injunction to prevent the issuance of permits. II. JURISDICTION As a threshold matter, this court considers whether there is federal jurisdiction over this matter and relatedly, whether abstention may be appropriate. A Original Jurisdiction When this court exercised jurisdiction in 1972, its jurisdiction rested on the federal statutory and constitutional claims brought by plaintiffs. See Keith, 352 F.Supp. at 1328-29. In particular, this court ordered compliance with NEPA, the Federal Aid Highway Act, and the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act. See Section I, A, supra. Federal question jurisdiction thus existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The matter now before the court, however, is not premised directly on a federal statute or constitutional claim. Eather, this matter is an enforcement action brought bjf plaintiffs against Caltrans to enforce the terms of the Amended Decree. Federal courts retain power to assert ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a consent decree when that decree has explicitly reserved continuing federal court jurisdiction or when the district court has incorporated the terms of the settlement agreement into its decree. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378-82, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1676-77, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). In Kokkonen, the Court explained that when the parties’ obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement [has] been made part of the order of dismissal— either by separate provision (such as a provision “retaining jurisdiction” over the settlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order[,] ... a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist. 511 U.S. at 381, 114 S.Ct. at 1677. See also O’Connor v. Colvin, 70 F.3d 530, 532 (9th Cir.1995) (applying standard); Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1433 (9th Cir.1995) (same). Such is the case here, where the Amended Decree meets both exceptions provided for in Kokkonen. First, the court reserved continuing jurisdiction to assure compliance with and proper functioning of the decree. The Amended Decree’s section, “VI. AMENDMENT TO AND ENFOECEMENT OF FINAL CONSENT DECEEE,” states: Upon noticed motion and opportunity to any party to object, this Amended Decree may be modified or amended if plaintiffs’ counsel and State and Federal defendants to this litigation agree in writing with the approval of this court. As part of its inherent power, the court may modify this Amended Decree upon motion by either plaintiffs or Federal defendants or State defendants. If the terms of this Amended Decree are not complied with by any party, then any Party may apply to this Court for appropriate relief. This court shall issue an injunction to enforce any terms of this Amended Decree only as a last resort remedy and only when no other remedy would reasonably assure compliance with a significant term. When selecting a remedy for non-compliance, if any, with the terms of this Amended Decree, to the extent that effective enforcement of a significant term of the Amended Decree permits, a primary consideration shall be to avoid delay of the construction, completion, and ultimate opening and operation of the freeway or implementation of the housing program. Amended Decree at 15-16 (emphasis added). See also Keith, 784 F.2d at 1460-61 (recognizing this court’s power to interpret and modify the Amended Decree). Second, it should be noted that the court incorporated the terms of the settlement agreement into the Amended Decree. As discussed above, the Amended Decree mandated that the freeway be constructed as a “landscaped freeway” and that it “be constructed as proposed in the Final Environmental Impact Statement.” Amended Decree at 5. Violations of those provisions of the Amended Decree constitute a violation of this court’s decree, and this court has jurisdiction to enforce those provisions. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380-82, 114 S.Ct. at 1677. Nor is this a revolutionary notion, for federal courts have long held a recognized power to enforce their judgments. See e.g. Blackburn Truck Lines, Inc. v. Francis, 723 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir.1984), Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, 157 (9th Cir.1971) (citing Root v. Woolworth, 150 U.S. 401, 14 S.Ct. 136, 37 L.Ed. 1123 (1893)). Despite this court’s clear authority to enforce the consent decree, Kudler argues that the matter before the court involves a non-party and that jurisdiction should therefore not extend to his case. Kudler’s state claims notwithstanding, the question presented to this court is whether Caltrans would breach its contractual duties under the Amended Decree, and thus defy this court’s 1981 order, if it were to issue billboard permits to Kudler. This is not a case where a non-party is bringing an enforcement action under the decree; rather, it is an enforcement action brought by one party against the other to enforce the stipulations of a court’s decree. Kudler argues that even if this court were to hold that the Amended Decree prohibits Caltrans from issuing permits for billboards along 1-105, the decree should not be applied to him. He argues that a voluntary consent decree cannot adjudicate the legal rights of a non-party such as Kudler, and cannot therefore bind him to the terms of the decree. Kudler misapprehends the issues presented by the Amended Decree and the Final EIS. Those documents together settled complex protracted litigation concerning the plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional rights. As mentioned above, plaintiffs sought relief to alleviate serious procedural shortcomings in the 1-105 planning process, and to vindicate NEPA’s environmental mandate, as well as the federally protected rights of displaced businesses, tenants, and homeowners. The rights at stake in this matter, in short, are those of the plaintiffs, and these rights were vindicated by the Amended Decree. Kudler, by contrast, does not have an absolute right to erect billboards. Billboards are already subject to extensive limitations as evidenced by Caltrans’ regulations governing billboard placement. See COAA § 5200 et. seq. Caltrans, an agency of the State of California, has committed itself to abide by the Amended Decree and the EIS in exchange for the settlement of the plaintiffs’ federal claims. Abiding by the Amended Decree is thus a legal contractual obligation on the part of the State of California. This obligation, given the history of this case, is not easily brushed aside by changing interpretations of state regulations. If it were, the State of California could circumvent the consent decree and relieve itself of some of the burdens of this litigation by adopting regulations that conflict with the decree’s terms. B. All Writs Act and Anh-Injunction Act This court, moreover, has jurisdiction under the All Writs Act and Anti-Injunction Act. 1. All Writs Act Under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, this court is empowered, to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [its] respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). The All Writs Act gives this court authority to issue an injunction to protect its earlier order. Nowling v. Aero Servs. Int'l, Inc., 734 F.Supp. 733 (E.D.La.1990). Non-party Kudler argues that the state court’s ruling regarding the “landscaped freeway” classification does not directly conflict with any specific provision of the Amended Decree. Because this is so, he argues, this court lacks jurisdiction under the All Writs Act. See Stafford v. Superior Court of Cal. In and For Los Angeles County, 272 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 979, 80 S.Ct. 1064, 4 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1960). Yet an important factor in determining whether a court has jurisdiction over a subsequent dispute is whether the issue could have been litigated in the initial action. See Western Systems, Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 870 (9th Cir.1992). Here, plaintiffs litigated the aesthetic impact of the 1-105 project on the surrounding communities and motorists. Plaintiffs could have litigated the minutiae of billboard restrictions, but instead opted to accept the Final EIS’s assurances that the freeway would be built with architectural design features and landscaping that would minimize negative aesthetic impacts on the surrounding communities. This court resolved that aesthetic design issue in the Amended Decree, and Caltrans cannot pursue a course of conduct that conflicts with this court’s disposition of that issue. Id. 2. Anti-Injunction Act Kudler also argues that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, prohibits this court from interfering with the enforcement of the state court’s writ of mandate. The Anti-Injunction Act mandates that a federal court “may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Congress, or where necessary in aid of its Jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (emphasis added). The matter before the court falls squarely within the Anti-Injunction Act’s exception that allows a federal court “to protect or effectuate its judgments.” Id. As discussed below, the state court’s ruling contradicts the Amended Decree which designates the entire length of 1-105 as a “landscaped freeway.” The state court writ of mandate ordered Caltrans to permit billboards along 1-105 even though the Amended Decree and the Final EIS set forth a clear aesthetic vision for the 1-105 that is not consistent with billboard development. The state court, by issuing its writ, threatens to unravel the fifteen-year-old settlement agreement set forth in this court’s Amended Decree. In enjoining Caltrans from issuing permits to Kudler, the court seeks to protect and effectuate its judgment as set forth in the Amended Decree. C. Abstention and Colorado River “Abstention” Throughout the court’s review of this matter, non-party Kudler has asserted that this court should not adjudicate this matter because the California courts are currently reviewing Kudler’s state claims. As explained above, this court has inherent jurisdiction to enforce the Amended Decree. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380-82, 114 S.Ct. at 1677. Still, there are some cases in which a federal court either must abstain or may exercise its discretion to stay its proceedings pending resolution of concurrent state litigation. The matter before the court is' not one of those cases. 1. Abstention It is axiomatic that “[ajbstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1244, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). Federal courts must decide controversies properly before them, and should abdicate that responsibility only when ordering the parties to “ ‘repair to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.’ ” Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1063, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959)). There are three types of occasions when federal courts abstain from hearing a case that parallels an on-going state court proceeding. Abstention is appropriate when (1) determination of a federal constitutional issue might be rendered moot by a determination of state law, (2) the case presents difficult questions of state law that raise substantial public policy issues, and (3) federal jurisdiction is invoked to restrain state criminal proceedings, state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal prosecution, or state tax collection. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814-16, 96 S.Ct. at 1244-46. The matter involving non-party Kudler does not present any one of these three traditional grounds for invoking abstention. First, there are no federal constitutional questions that are raised in this consent decree enforcement action. To the extent that plaintiffs raised constitutional claims, those were redressed by the Amended Decree and Final EIS. Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction merely seeks to enforce the terms of the decree by prohibiting Caltrans from issuing billboard permits for the 1-105 right of way. Second, this is not a case directly involving a question of state law. The settlement agreement, like any contract, is interpreted in accordance with the intention of the parties. Rest.2d Contracts § 202(1). As the court points out below, the consent decree does not invoke California regulations to define its terms. Thus, in resolving this dispute, this court need not and does not determine the meaning of California’s COAA regulations. Moreover, even if there were a potential for conflict with the state court, this “does not, without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816, 96 S.Ct. at 1245. Third, this case is neither an on-going state criminal nor tax proceeding. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) (criminal case); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) (state nuisance proceeding); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 87 L.Ed. 1407 (1943) (tax collection). Abstention under this third exception is therefore inapplicable. In short, this case does not fall under the three traditional exceptions to the general rule that a federal court must adjudicate a matter properly brought before it. Nor does this case present facts that would indicate that principles of federalism would be better served by an extension of the abstention doctrine. Federalism is not a one-way street. An injunction that serves to protect a federal order preserves rather than offends notions of federalism. See Nowling v. Aero Services Int’l Inc., 734 F.Supp. 733, 739 (E.D.La.1990) (citing Southwest Airlines v. Texas Int’l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832, 98 S.Ct. 117, 54 L.Ed.2d 93 (1977)). This is especially true where, as here, the federal court order that is placed in jeopardy is one that resolved a complex, decade-long federal-state litigation. 2. Colorado River “Abstention” Under traditional abstention doctrine this court is not free to abstain and must exercise federal jurisdiction. Yet it bears mentioning that in some circumstances a federal court might exercise its discretion to stay its proceedings pending final resolution of an ongoing state court action. As the Supreme Court explained in Colorado River, [T]here are principles unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal courts or by state and federal courts. These principles rest on considerations of “wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.” 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S.Ct. at 1246. This so-called “Colorado River abstention” is different from the three abstention exceptions because it establishes a discretionary standard to determine whether a stay of federal proceedings pending the completion of state court proceedings is appropriate. Cobrado River requires a federal court to consider staying its own proceedings to avoid duplicative litigation, even if a separate basis for federal jurisdiction exists. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-19, 96 S.Ct. at 1246-47. In determining whether to “abstain” under Cobrado River, a federal court considers four factors: (1) whether the same res is involved; (2) the. relative inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; and (4) the order in which the federal and state proceedings were filed. 424 U.S. at 818, 96 S.Ct. at 1246-47. As the Court instructed: “No one factor is necessarily determinative; a carefully considered judgment taking into account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of factors counselling against that exercise is required.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-19, 96 S.Ct. at 1247. In Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 28-29, 103 S.Ct. 927, 943-44, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), the court reaffirmed Colorado River’s fundamental policy concern that duplicative litigation be avoided. The Court, however, explained that the task for a district court was not merely to use the Colorado River factors as a checklist; rather, a district court must carefully balance those factors. 460 U.S. at 16, 103 S.Ct. at 937. Moses cautioned that the Colorado River doctrine is to be applied sparingly, invoked only in “exceptional” circumstances. Id at 25, 103 S.Ct. at 941-42. In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, the Court advised that the existence of federal-law issues weighed heavily against abstention. Id. at 23, 103 S.Ct. at 941. In weighing the Colorado River factors in the context of this case, this court has no choice but to exercise jurisdiction. The first two Colorado River factors clearly do not apply here because there is no res involved and the Central District of California is as convenient a forum as the Los Angeles County Superior Court. However, the third Colorado River factor — the policy of avoiding piecemeal litigation — counsels against abstention here. As discussed below, this court has supervised this litigation for twenty-five years, the Amended Decree that settled this litigation was formed under the auspices of this court, and that decree stipulated to the continuing jurisdiction of this court over disputes between the parties. Thus, requiring the parties to repair to state court to adjudicate the meaning of this court’s Amended Decree increases piecemeal, duplicative litigation. The fourth Colorado River factor — the order of the filings — is easily resolved against abstention. The seeds of this matter were first brought before this court in 1972. After years of litigation in this court, the Amended Decree was filed in 1981. On these facts, the policy of discouraging forum shopping counsels against abstention. After all, Kudler’s state action asks a state court to interpret this court’s 1981 Amended Decree even though the Amended Decree clearly reserves this court’s jurisdiction to interpret and modify the decree. See Keith, 784 F.2d at 1460-61. The case against applying the Colorado River doctrine here is strengthened when the federal interests in this litigation are included in the analysis. As explained above, the Amended Decree addressed serious federal constitutional and statutory issues relating to the construction of a federally funded interstate highway. The Amended Decree and the Final EIS set forth the settlement agreement that resolved plaintiffs’ claims and allowed defendants to proceed with constructing the 1-105. The Amended Decree allows the parties to return to this court, and only this court, to seek enforcement or modification of the decree’s provisions. This court cannot shirk its obligation to the parties to enforce the Amended Decree without calling the enforceability of the entire decree into question. In this context, having weighed all relevant considerations, the court concludes that this is not an “exceptional” , case where an exercise of discretion to stay these proceedings would be appropriate. III. DISCUSSION The plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against Caltrans to prevent it from issuing billboard permits to non-party Kudler, pursuant to the state court’s writ. They argue that the Amended Decree requires that I-105 be “constructed as a landscaped freeway.” They submit that this language clearly designates the entire freeway as “landscaped” and thus billboard-free. But even assuming that this language is ambiguous, the plaintiffs argue that the parties intended that this designation would mean that no billboards would be erected along the freeway’s path. Alternatively, Kudler contends that even if this court has jurisdiction, the Amended Decree’s term “landscaped freeway” has a meaning dependent on state regulations, and this court must therefore determine the meaning of the Amended Decree consistently with the California Outdoor Advertising Act (“COAA”), Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 5200 et seq., and that Act’s regulations. COAA regs. § 2500 et seq. A The Meaning of the Amended Decree’s Definition of “Landscaped Freeway” The Amended Decree states that 1-105 “shall be constructed as a landscaped freeway, and incorpórate noise attenuation measures; all as set out in the Final Environmental Impact Statement [EIS] previously filed in this court.” Amended Decree at 6. The plaintiffs claim that permitting billboards on 1-105 would violate the decree’s designation of 1-105 as “a landscaped freeway.” As a preliminary matter, non-party Kudler relies on the state court’s reading of the consent decree as well as its reading of COAA regulations to support a technical and restrictive understanding of the decree’s terms. Kudler asserts that the Amended Decree must have referenced COAA and its regulations when it designated 1-105 as “a landscaped freeway.” Yet, the Amended Decree’s use of the term “landscaped freeway” alone does not constitute a cross-reference to the COAA regulations. In fact, the Amended Decree never mentions the COAA when it uses the term “landscaped freeway.” Nor does it even cite the relevant COAA provisions or regulations. Without such written reference in the Amended Decree incorporating the COAA or its regulations, this court is not required to apply the state court’s interpretation of “landscaped freeway.” Moreover, as discussed extensively above, the Amended Decree embodies the settlement agreement to which the parties agreed to be bound. In form, the Amended Decree is a contract. Its substance must be interpreted according to contractual interpretation principles. With this in mind, the court interprets the Amended Decree’s term “landscaped freeway” according to (a) the generally accepted meaning of the term, (b) the term when taken in context, and (c) the intention of the parties. a. The generally accepted meaning of “landscaped” When a contract does not invoke a technical meaning, the terms of the writing must be presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation. Rest.2d Contracts § 202(3). A brief survey of the generally accepted definitions of “landscape” supports the plaintiffs’ argument that the Amended Decree’s term “landscaped freeway” requires more than what the COAA or its regulations require. The architectural meaning of “landscaped” is much broader than what the state court’s interpretation of COAA’s regulations might suggest. According to The Architecture Book, “landscape” means “[a] pietoral (and hence perspective) concept of one’s on-land surrounds, as opposed to an abstract design idea ... hence the idea of the pietoral or picturesque.” Norval White, The Architecture Book 173 (1976). The notion that “landscape” goes far beyond vegetative plantings is confirmed by common-usage dictionaries. One dictionary defines “landscape” as: a section or portion of rural scenery, usually extensive, that may be seen from a single viewpoint____a panoramic view of scenery; vista____to improve the landscape of .... to improve the appearance of (an area of land, a highway, etc.), as by planting trees, shrubs, or grass, or altering the contours of the ground. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 805 (unabridged ed.1973) (emphasis added) Finally, another dictionary defines landscape as: “a portion of land or territory that the eye can comprehend in a single view including all the objects so seen ... VISTA, PROSPECT.” Webster’s Third International Dictionary 1269 (1981). According to Webster’s, the verb “to landscape” is defined as “to make a landscape of: to improve by landscape architecture or gardening.” Id. (emphasis added). The generally accepted meaning of the word “landscaped” thus appears to include more than just the mere presence of shrubbery. It evokes an aesthetic concern for the preservation of scenery or vistas by architecture as well as by plantings. A “landscaped freeway,” then, calls to mind a freeway that preserves, rather than obstructs urban vistas, a freeway that makes use of plantings but also employs architectural measures to achieve a pietoral or picturesque aesthetic effect. b. The term “landscaped” in context The term “landscaped” is “interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight.” Rest.2d Contracts § 202(1). When read in context, the term “landscaped freeway” evokes a broad meaning that is consistent with the purpose of the Amended Decree and Final EIS. As discussed above, the 1972 injunction charged the federal and state defendants with formulating an EIS . for the 1-105 project which would address NEPA’s policy concerns, including Congress’s mandate to “assure for all Americans, safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings.” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (emphasis added). In conformity with the court’s order, the Final EIS sets forth a detailed section entitled “AESTHETICS AND AMENITIES.” Final EIS at 5-33 to 5-35. As elaborated above in section I B, this section made bold promises that 1-105 would minimize any aesthetic disruption of the surrounding communities. The 1-105 architects also sought to avoid continuous vegetative plantings, because they feared that such continuity would create monotony for motorists. Final EIS at 5-35. Accordingly, the architects intentionally sought to terminate plantings at elevated sections of the freeway to afford motorists uncluttered vistas of the urban landscape. Indeed, this concern for the preservation of vistas accords with generally accepted definitions of “landscape.” Although the Final EIS did not make explicit mention of billboards in the elevated areas, the placement of large billboards at these sections seems inconsistent with the Final EIS’s promise to provide “expansive and perhaps occasional dramatic views for motorists.” Final EIS at 5-35. When read in context, especially in light of the assurances made in the Final EIS’s section “AESTHETICS AND AMENITIES,” it is clear that the Amended Decree’s use of “landscaped freeway” entailed more than vegetative plantings along the wayside. For this reason, if there is any meaning to be given to the words “landscaped freeway” that meaning must be broad enough to encompass the aesthetic mitigation measures — both architectural and vegetative — as set forth in the Final EIS. c. Intentions of the parties Kudler argues that the Amended Decree is ambiguous as to billboards and that this ambiguity requires that he prevail. But when a consent degree contains ambiguous terms, the court, in interpreting the decree “should consider the original expectations of the parties.” Keith, v. Volpe, 784 F.2d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir.1986); Rest.2d Contracts § 202(5). Here, the clear expectation of the Keith-parties was that 1-105 would be a billboard-free freeway. See Declaration of Carlyle W. Hall (supporting exhibits), filed July 25, 1996 (see especially Rypinski, Phillips, and Solander declarations). At oral argument, Caltrans stated that it has consistently denied all billboard permit applications based on its understanding that the Amended Decree had designated the entire length of 1-105 as a landscaped freeway. The parties’ stated intention to ban billboards from the 1-105 accords with the context in which the Amended Decree was issued. Plaintiffs were understandably concerned that 1-105 would adversely affect the surrounding communities. The court doubts that these same plaintiffs would have acquiesced to the settlement agreement if they knew that the proliferation of advertising billboards at major overcrossings would undermine the Final EIS’s aesthetic mitigation measures by obstructing 1-105’s expansive and dramatic views of the urban landscape. As the Supreme Court stated two months before the parties signed the Amended Consent Deeree: “[B]illboards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived as an ‘esthetic harm.’ ” Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 2893-94, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981). Based on the record before it, the court concludes that the original parties to the Amended Decree intended to designate the entire course of 1-105 as a billboard-free “landscaped freeway.” By agreeing to abide by this promise, Caltrans entered into a contractual obligation that it must adhere to. This is a legal obligation of the State of California, which cannot be brushed aside by changing interpretations of COAA regulations. B. The California Outdoor ‘Advertising Act The COAA governs the placement of outdoor advertising displays, including billboards, along roadways in California. Under the COAA, a developer is not allowed to place a billboard within 660 feet of a freeway unless Caltrans has issued a written permit. COAA §§ 5271, 5350; People ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Outdoor Media Group, 13 Cal.App.4th 1067, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, reh’g denied and modified, review denied, cert. denied 510 U.S. 932, 114 S.Ct. 346, 126 L.Ed.2d 311 (1993). The COAA requires Caltrans to issue a permit if an applicant has complied with the COAA requirements only if the proposed billboard will not violate any other state law. COAA § 5358. In particular, the COAA prohibits the placement or maintenance of a billboard on property that is adjacent to a freeway section that has been designated a “landscaped freeway.” COAA § 5440. Within the COAA, “landscaped freeway” is a term of art, it specifically means that a section of freeway has been planted with “lawns, trees, shrubs, flowers, or other ornamental vegetation.” COAA § 5216; COAA regs. § 2502(j),(m),(o). Under COAA’s regulations, Caltrans’ Chief Landscape Architect is charged with classifying a freeway as landscaped. COAA regs. § 2507. Under COAA regulations, if a freeway section is planted continuously for 1000 feet or more, it qualifies as a “landscaped freeway.” COAA regs. § 2511. Overerossings, canals, and other freeway characteristics that are 200 feet or less in length are not considered as breaking the continuity of the plantings, and Caltrans does not have the discretion to declassify those sections from their “landscaped” status. COAA regs. §§ 2502(f) & 2511. Even though COAA regulations merely limit Caltrans’s discretion to declassify freeway sections formerly deemed “landscaped” when gaps in planting continuity are less than 200 feet, id., the state court interpreted those regulations as limiting Cal-trans’s discretion to classify such freeway sections as “landscaped” when gaps in the plantings exceed 200 feet. Kudler, No. BC 138916, at 5. Based on its regulatory interpretation, made outside the historical context underlying the Amended Decree, the state court held that the ten sections of 1-105 where Kudler seeks to place his billboards did not meet COAA’s requirements for designation as “landscaped freeway.” The state court cited the length of the overcrossings and elevated sections, which exceeded 200 feet in length. Those overcrossing areas, the state court explained, were not planted, nor could they ever be planted given their elevated, concrete design. The state court concluded that these areas of 1-105 could never be classified as “landscaped freeway.” Accordingly, the state court determined that Cal-trans had relied improperly on the “landscaped freeway” designation when it denied Kudler the permits. As a remedial measure, the state court issued a writ of mandate ordering Caltrans to issue the permits to Kudler. C. The Act Read in the Context of the Amended Decree The state court correctly points out that the Amended Decree clearly does not refer to COAA’s regulations. As interpreted by that court, however, the regulations conflict with the Final EIS’s aesthetic vision for the freeway as well as the intention of the parties. In sum, the situation presented here calls for review of the historical and contractual underpinnings of this freeway project, not simply an interpretation of a particular state regulation. The court agrees with Kudler’s observation that this court cannot invalidate or rewrite state law in the absence of a constitutional or federal conflict. But as the discussion above indicates, this court does not reinterpret the COAA or its regulations — such review is properly left to the California appellate courts. What this court does engage in is an interpretation of its own consent decree. Under traditional contractual interpretation principles, there is ample basis on which to conclude that the Amended Decree mandated that the entire 1-105 be built and designated as a billboard-free “landscaped freeway.” Because the Amended Decree patently reflects the intention of the contracting parties to build a landscaped freeway, the regulations, at best, merely give Caltrans the discretion to “declassify” certain sections. Here, Caltrans is properly declining to exercise its discretion based on its long-standing contractual obligations as set forth in the Amended Decree. IV. ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Having considered the issues presented by this matter, the court now considers whether a preliminary injunction should issue. A Preliminary Injunction Standard In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.1980), the Ninth Circuit explained that: The traditional equitable criteria for granting preliminary injunctive relief are (1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if the preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest____ 634 F.2d at 1200 (citations omitted); see also State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir.1988). The Ninth Circuit has further clarified this standard in Native Village of Venetie, explaining that “plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief’ if they demonstrate “probable success on the merits,” and a “possibility of irreparable injury,” or if they demonstrate “a fair chance of success on the merits (i.e., serious questions are raised),” and “the balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor.” 856 F.2d at 1389. B. Application of the Preliminary Injunction Standard The court must determine whether plaintiffs have (1) shown a likelihood