Full opinion text
OPINION Amended Findings on Liability and Damages MOTLEY, District Judge. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff, a former Connecticut State Police Trooper Trainee, brought this employment discrimination action against his employer, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”). This court, after a trial on the merits, rendered a decision on July 11, 1996 finding defendants liable for firing plaintiff because of his race. Evans v. Connecticut, 935 F.Supp. 145 (D.Conn.1996). The court now amends its opinion on liability, which included its findings of facts, to include the fact that Evans graduated 17th out of his Connecticut Police Academy class of 55. (see Transcript Hearing on Damages, dated October 10,1996, 204). In accordance with a ruling during trial, issues of back pay and reinstatement were considered after the finding of liability. On July 15, 1996, plaintiff moved for a hearing on remedy, limited discovery and designation of an expert to assess back pay damages and the plausibility of reinstatement, which was granted. 168 F.R.D. 118 (D.Conn.1996). The court also ruled that Evans’ request, pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 37”), for default judgment and attorney’s fees for defendants’ failure to produce relevant records throughout this case would be taken up at the damages phase of the case. See, Evans, 935 F.Supp. at 159 n. 23. A hearing was set for October 10,1996. After the court granted the hearing on damages, both parties submitted a plethora of pleadings and motions alleging that the other was not complying with discovery. On August 20, 1996, defendants requested leave to depose plaintiff and his expert. Defendants also noted that plaintiff had not fully complied with their first set of interrogatories and production requests, dated April 20, 1990. Defendants moved the court to compel plaintiff to supplement his previous responses to the interrogatories and production requests by September 15, 1996. On September 5, 1996, the court granted defendants’ request to take the depositions and ordered plaintiff to supplement his response to defendants’ requests by September 20,1996. On September 23, 1996, by a faxed motion, plaintiff moved to compel defendants to adhere to their noticed deposition dates of Evans and Woundy on September 24, 1996 and September 26, 1996, respectively. Additionally, plaintiff moved the court to order defendants to confirm plaintiff’s 30(b)(6) deposition of defendants, noticed for September 30, 1996. In an effort to give defendants an opportunity to respond to plaintiff’s motion, the court waited two hours and then, by faxed order, granted plaintiff’s motion directing defendants to adhere to the deposition dates. Shortly thereafter, defendants faxed a reply to plaintiffs motion and the court’s order, asserting that plaintiff had not complied with the court’s September 5th Order and that plaintiff had been informed that defendants would not confirm the deposition dates until he supplemented the interrogatories. Defendants also moved to vacate the court’s order arguing that they would be prejudiced if forced to proceed with the deposition without having had an opportunity to review the documents requested from the plaintiff. In opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff argued and proved that he did not violate the court’s order because he had been instructed by the defendants to bring the documents with him to his deposition (see Defendants’ Notice of Deposition, dated August 20, 1996), which he was intending to do. During Evans’ deposition, plaintiffs counsel called chambers requesting a ruling on Rule 30(c). Defendants argued that the rule did not permit plaintiff to raise evidentiary objections but only objections as to form while plaintiff argued otherwise. By faxed order, the court notified the parties that objections to form or substance may be noted although the witness still had to answer and that all objections would be ruled on by the court at a later date. On September 27, 1996, plaintiff faxed a motion requesting the court to compel defendants to produce a witness with knowledge for the 30(b)(6) deposition, scheduled for September 30, 1996. Plaintiff’s counsel alleged that at Evans’ and Woundy’s depositions, defendants voiced confusion as to the scope of the 30(b)(6) deposition and were informed on both days of what was expected. Plaintiff further alleges that after faxing a follow up letter on September 26,1996, indicating that the scope of the deposition would include assumptions or errors made in Woundy’s report and issues concerning state trooper salaries, benefits, pension plans and availability of overtime beginning in 1986 (the year plaintiff was terminated), defendants failed to confirm the production of a witness with knowledge on these matters. Defendants’ counsel allegedly asserted that if such a witness could only be found at the state Comptroller’s office, he was not required to produce such a witness because the Comptroller’s office was a different state agency. Plaintiff moved the court to preclude defendants from questioning or asserting any factual matters on back pay, reinstatement or front pay if defendants failed to provide a witness with knowledge for the court ordered deposition. In response, defendants stated that they would attend the deposition and produce a witness that could answer questions regarding payroll records, benefits, and other data that were given to plaintiff. Defendants argued, however, that plaintiff was asking the court to order the production of a witness to address purely legal questions on the calculation of back pay, front pay and reinstatement which were to be determined by the court at the hearing. Furthermore, defendants argued that plaintiff sought a witness to address the Woundy report, a subject matter not designated in his notice of deposition. On September 30,1996, following the deposition of defendants’ witness, Judith Hess, a payroll supervisor, plaintiff informed the court, by fax, that Hess could not answer questions regarding benefits, the assumptions or errors in Woundy’s report, or reinstatement. Plaintiff maintained that he was not asking defendants to calculate back pay but was asking defendants to disclose the state’s method in calculating back pay based on it’s policies and procedures, including the figures and assumptions involved in it’s calculation, which could affect the expert’s assumptions made, based on the information or the lack of information provided to him. Plaintiff argued that these issues fell clearly within the scope of discovery in a damages case, (see Transcript of Hess Deposition, dated September 30, 1996, 80-82) (Tr. Dep. Hess). Plaintiff also noted for the record that he would move to preclude any evidence defendants attempted to introduce at the hearing that was not disclosed by Hess during discovery, (Tr. Dep.Hess, 78), and that Woundy would be recalculating his numbers based on the new information disclosed by Hess. (Tr. Dep.Hess, 51). The night before the hearing, defendants informed plaintiff, by a faxed letter, that Hess would testify at the hearing on Woundy’s calculation of income and that Sue Fabian from the Comptroller’s Office would testify regarding the state’s calculation of pension benefits and the conditions under which an employee was reimbursed for the cost of health benefits. The next day at the hearing, plaintiff moved to preclude any examination or proffering of evidence relating to false assumptions, errors in compensation rates, raises, overtime or pension compensation which were not disclosed to plaintiff at the 30(b)(6) deposition of defendants, (see Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and Transcript of Damages Hearing, dated October 10, 1996, 27-30) (“Tr.”). The court granted the motion and prevented defendants from submitting evidence contrary to the assumptions made in the Woundy report, particularly in regards to overtime (Tr., 51-53, 58-59, 142-144) and pension and benefits (Tr., 150-158). The court pointed out that defendants could not introduce the factors the state would have considered in determining plaintiffs speculated overtime, nor could they now produce a witness from the Comptroller’s office to testify on pension and benefits calculations. (Tr., 43-44). The court also barred defendants from recalling Hess to testify about any information she did not disclose at the 30(b)(6) deposition. (Tr., 238). Plaintiff maintained that when Hess was asked if she knew of benefits, overtime and the figures in Woundy’s report she said no. Plaintiff offered the transcript of the deposition into evidence without objection. Plaintiff cited, from the transcript, several examples of Hess’ lack of knowledge. (Tr., 214, 220). The following are excerpts from defendants’ 30(b)(6) deposition; Q. So it would be fair to say that, subsequent to the Notice of Deposition and the areas upon which you were to testify, you have done nothing to familiarize yourself or prepare yourself to testify here today? A. That’s correct. Q. Okay. Are you familiar with the calculation of pension benefits and the awarding of pension benefits to state troopers? A. No. Q. Would it be fair to say that you, as opposed to the Controller’s Office, are totally unfamiliar with pension plan and pension benefits? A. Basically, all we do is look for the information as to salaries. We send it over to the controllers and they take care of all the pension information. Q. What familiarity do you have with the conditions under which it is feasible or not feasible to reinstate a trooper who has for one reason or another, lost his job? A. None at all. Q. You have no familiarity with whatever standards are applicable? A. That’s right ... (Tr. Dep.Hess, 8-9). When asked about overtime, Hess manifested the same lack of knowledge. Q. Let me ask you this. You commented on how overtime is awarded. Is it awarded on a totally random basis? A. I would have no idea. Q. How is regular overtime assigned, do you know? A. I would have no idea. Q. Is it voluntary? A. Yes. That much I do know. It’s never forced. Q. In preparing for the deposition today, did you make any effort to determine who would know the answer to these questions regarding overtime? A. No, I didn’t, because I would have no idea those would be the questions you would be asking. (Tr. Dep.Hess, 17-19). Furthermore, when Hess was asked about the Woundy report which she admitted to being given for review that morning on the way to the deposition by defense counsel, she said she was incapable of commenting on his calculations. Q. Would you please answer whether there’s anything in that document [the report] with which you disagree factually after having read it? A. I couldn’t make any kind of comment as to figures ... Q. Do you understand what I am saying? A. Yes, I do. And truthfully, I can’t make, even after reading this any judgments on the future assumptions of his or anyone else’s. Q. I’m not asking you to do that. I’m asking for factual errors in the factual assumptions that [the expert] made that he based upon your data and the information the State Police has, you know, to be incorrect. A. For future assumptions? Q. Yes. (Tr. Dep.Hess, 23,28). Defendants argued that Hess did assert challenges to the assumptions and calculations in the Woundy report and that by the court barring the recalling of Hess, the state was not being given the opportunity to cross examine Hess on her deposition testimony. Plaintiff asserted that defendants were given the opportunity to cross examine their witness during the deposition, in accordance with this court’s order clarifying Rule 30(e). The court barred defendants’ attempt to recall Hess and informed defendants that the court had already allowed examination of Hess when she was called on direct and that it would not permit defendants to introduce undisclosed information via cross examination. (Tr., 217-223). The court reasoned that what defendants sought to introduce was precisely the information requested during discovery by plaintiff in his notice of deposition and ruled that it was not going to be disclosed for the first time at the hearing. (Tr., 162,163, 238). Lastly, the court rejected defendants’ argument that since the court was barring the admission of any undisclosed information produced after the 30(b)(6) deposition, it should bar plaintiffs evidence on front pay which defendants alleged was not disclosed until after the deposition. The court ruled that defendants had been put on notice about front pay long before the 30(b)(6) deposition, by Woundy’s original report dated September 20, 1996 and the various amendments, including the final October 1, 1996 report, and by plaintiff’s letters to the defendants, dated September 26th and 30th. (Tr., OS-OS). At the close of the hearing, the court noted that a written opinion on plaintiffs damages, Rule 37 motion, which this court tabled until a finding of liability, and application for attorney’s fees would be forthcoming. The court addresses, herein, it’s finding as to plaintiffs damages, Rule 37 motion, and application for attorney’s fees. DISCUSSION I. Remedy Although amendments to Title VII contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the remedy available to a plaintiff, plaintiff, in this case, was terminated prior to the enactment date of the Act on November 21, 1991. See, Brooks v. Fonda-Fultonville Cent. School, 938 F.Supp. 1094, 1107 n. 5 (N.D.N.Y.1996). Plaintiff is limited to the damages available prior to the amendments to Title VII contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 since the amendments are not retroactive. Id.; Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.1993) (Civil Rights Act of 1991 section conferring right to trial by jury and allowing recovery of compensatory and punitive damages did not apply retroactively to claim arising before Act’s effective date). Hence, neither punitive nor compensatory damages are recoverable under Title VII claims in this case, see, Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1363-64 (11th Cir.1982), nor awards of pain and suffering. Carrero v. New York City Housing Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 581 (2d Cir.1989). Upon a finding of liability under Title VII, a plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to back pay from the date of termination until the date of judgment, including prejudgment interest on the back pay award. Clarke v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146, 1154 (2d Cir.1992) (court held it was ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to award pre-judgment interest on a back pay award); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital 4 F.3d 134, 144—45 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164, 114 S.Ct. 1189, 127 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994) (pre-judgment interest is to be compounded given the goal to make plaintiff whole); Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 558, 108 S.Ct. 1965, 1971, 100 L.Ed.2d 549 (1988). The general availability standard for awarding back pay was first adopted by the Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). The Court acknowledged that back pay was not automatic or mandatory but was a remedy that could be invoked by district courts, id. at 415, 95 S.Ct. at 2370, and ruled that district courts were granted discretionary choices as to an appropriate remedy, which were equitable in nature and had to be exercised “in light of the large objectives of the Act.” Id. at 416, 95 S.Ct. at 2371; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944). A. Back Pay The purpose of a back pay award under Title VII is to “make persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination,” Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170 (2d Cir.1996) (citing Loeffler, 486 U.S. at 558, 108 S.Ct. at 1971), by completely redressing the economic injury the plaintiff has suffered due to the unlawful actions of the defendant. Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 145 (injured party made whole by being put in position he would have been in ‘but for’ the employment discrimination); see, Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418, 95 S.Ct. at 2372. Therefore, a back pay award should consist of lost wages, pay increases, fringe benefits like insurance, medical and pension benefits, and overtime. Id. see also, Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc., 482 F.Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y.1979); Bonura v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 629 F.Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (award includes those benefits that would have accrued to plaintiffs in the course of their employment with defendants if they had not been diseriminatorily discharged). Any calculation of a back pay award must be reduced by “interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Defendant bares the burden of establishing that plaintiff failed to mitigate damages. Clarke, 960 F.2d at 1152. In order to meet its “extremely high” burden of proving failure to mitigate, defendant “must show that the course of conduct plaintiff actually followed was so deficient as to constitute an unreasonable failure to seek employment.” Bonura, 629 F.Supp. at 356 (quoting EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross Inc., 420 F.Supp. 919, 925 (S.D.N.Y.1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920, 98 S.Ct. 395, 54 L.Ed.2d 277 (1977)). Given the purpose of the employment discrimination laws and the fact that defendants have presented no evidence showing why back pay relief should be denied, the court finds that back pay is appropriate in this case. Since plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing damages, the court now turns to the Woundy report for evidentiary support on plaintiffs back pay damages. In determining a back pay award of plaintiffs losses to date (from January 1, 1987 through September 30, 1996), Woundy included Evans’ lost salary, pension benefits, and loss of two other types of benefits, namely health insurance and use of the company car. For lost salary, Woundy provided three varying calculations which were based on the top 10 earners of plaintiffs police training classmates, on only the male classmates, and lastly, on both the male and female classmates. Woundy concluded that the calculations based on the top 10 earners were the most appropriate assessment of plaintiffs lost salary given his past work history. Defendants contend that it is unreasonable to assume that Evans would be among the top 10 earners from 1987-1996, considering the fact that only one of the top earners appeared on the list for all the years in question. Woundy’s opinion turned on the availability of overtime. He testified at the hearing that if overtime was readily available to Evans, Evans’ total earnings would not be reflected in the average earnings of his classmates but would more closely resemble the top 10 members of his class. (Tr., 86). He based this conclusion on Hess’ testimony of overtime being voluntary and on Evans’ past work history. Woundy pointed to 1986 (the last year Evans worked for the police department) when Evans earned 71 percent more than his contract rate by working substantial amounts of overtime and was among the highest earners in his class. (Tr., 86-87). He also noted, as the record before the court reflects, even today, Evans exhibits the same propensity for working more than the traditional 40 hours per week. (Tr., 87). In the early part of 1996, Evans worked on average seven days a week with a full time job at Hilton Hotel and a second job on the weekends as a security officer at a hospital. Woundy testified that Evans currently works at a hotel in New York, as an Assistant Director of Security, sometimes working more than 12 hours a day. (Tr., 88). Woundy asserted that he, like other experts in the human resources field, generally looks at an employee’s work history to determine how an employee will perform in the future. (Tr., 88). Although Evans’ status as a top 10 earner is not conclusive, given the evidence, the court accepts Woundy’s assumption and notes that in determining damages, “all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the injured party; the wrongdoer does not become the beneficiary of his own wrongful conduct.” E.E.O.C. v. Kallir, 420 F.Supp. at 923; Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 560 F.Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (Wrongdoer shall bear the risk of uncertainty which his wrong created); Buckley v. Reynolds Metals Co., 690 F.Supp. 211, 216 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (Defendant cannot complain of uncertainty when that uncertainty has been caused by its own acts). Hence, the following is Woundy’s computation of Evans’ lost salary, as a top 10 earner, in the years 1987-1996; (see October 1,1996 Woundy Report, Exhibit A). As shown, Woundy mitigated Evans’ damages for each year by deducting Evans’ interim earnings, as provided by Evans and his income tax returns, from the earnings of the top 10 earners in his class and brought the difference to its present value. Woundy added up the present value of each year to reach a sum total of $393,119.35 of lost wages due to plaintiff. At the hearing, defendants questioned Woundy on the credibility of his figures on Evans’ salary, given the fact that Evans did not produce tax returns for the years 1987 and 1988 and that from 1990 to 1992 Evans filed joint tax returns that included his wife’s earnings. Defendants pointed out that Woundy’s sole method of determining Evans’ salary for those years and for subtracting the income from his wife was based on what Evans told him. Woundy replied that it was not unusual in his experience for a plaintiff in a back pay suit to not have all his tax records, particularly given the number of years under consideration in this suit. The court accepts Woundy’s statement of facts in his report as to Evans’ interim earnings and the deduction of Evans’ wife’s earnings of $12,000.00 in 1990 through 1992. Woundy has made a concerted effort in preparing a document to reflect the losses of this plaintiff and little evidence has been submitted for this court to doubt his credibility. At the hearing, in an effort to establish that plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages by seeking employment, defendants argued that plaintiff did not produce any documentation showing his consistent and steady attempt to find employment since his termination with the state police. Plaintiff explained that since his termination, he has worked as a limousine driver and has applied a substantial number of times with different police agencies throughout the tristate area, being denied employment, despite a Connecticut Police Department employment reference. The Woundy report noted that Evans held employment as a partial owner of an “I Can’t Believe It’s Yogurt” business and had worked as a security officer for various hotels. The report also establishes that income from each place of employment, including income derived from Evans’ partial ownership, were deducted accordingly from the lost salary calculations. Defendants maintained that plaintiffs failure to secure employment with the various police departments was due to plaintiffs failed efforts to pass the police examination and not due to any continued discrimination on the part of the Connecticut State Police. Plaintiff testified that he did in fact fail the exam a few times, but that he continued to seek employment in his field and was not told in the majority of instances why he was denied employment. The court finds that defendants have failed to meet their burden of proving plaintiffs failure to mitigate. Defendants’ burden is ‘extremely high’ and cannot be “satisfied merely by a showing that there was further actions that plaintiff could have taken in pursuit of employment. Rather, defendants must show that the course of conduct plaintiff actually followed was so deficient as to constitute an unreasonable failure to seek employment ... plaintiff must be given the benefit of every doubt in assessing [his] conduct.” E.E.O.C. v. Kallir, 420 F.Supp. at 925. The court finds that plaintiff is entitled to $393,119.35 in lost wages. Woundy also calculated the value of plaintiffs lost pension benefits. Woundy based his calculations on the state pension plan found in the Connecticut State Employees Retirement System-Tier II, revised May I, 1991. According to that plan, Woundy asserted that an employee working in hazardous positions, like Evans’, was entitled to a pension of 50% of the average of his highest three years of income, provided he remained on the force for twenty years. Woundy explained that, in -the pension calculations, he used the average of the highest three years of Evans’ lost wages, multiplied it by 2.5% (which represents the full plan of 50% over a twenty year period) of the years of Evans’ service (11.25), and discounted that amount ($280,935.13) to its present value of $160,637.89. (Tr., 80-81). Defendants argue that Woundy used the wrong formula (2.5%) in calculating plaintiffs pension benefits. Defendants assert that the retirement plan did not entitle employees who left voluntarily before twenty years to a 50% return but only entitled them to a refund of their contributions with interest. However, as Woundy pointed out, the plan does not provide a formula for when a person does not leave voluntarily or leaves for reasons beyond his control, as was the case with Evans. (Tr., 146-149). The court notes that since the aim of a Title VII award is to make plaintiff whole, Evans should not be penalized or suffer any economic loss in the calculation of his pension entitlement due to the state’s discriminatory firing or due to the lack of definition of all contingencies in the state’s retirement plan. Therefore, this court accepts Woundjfs finding and holds that plaintiff is entitled to $160,637.89 of lost pension benefits. Lastly, plaintiff claims a loss of company car and health insurance benefits. Woundy testified at the hearing on damages that he included loss of company car as a benefit because according to the labor agreements provided to him by the State, Evans, as a police officer, would have been entitled to personal use of the state vehicle with a few restrictions. (Tr., 160-161). However, Woundy asserted that because the State failed to provide information regarding the restrictions on personal use of the state vehicle, he calculated the value of the company car benefit without knowledge of the restrictions. From 1987 to October, 1, 1996, Woundy calculated the combined present value total of the company car and lost health insurance benefits to be $91,919.19. The report stated that had Evans remained with the State of Connecticut, his insurance would have been provided without cost and insurance for his children would have been provided at a minimal cost. Woundy estimated the state’s cost at $125.00 per month from 1987 to 1990 and from 1990-1993, estimated it’s cost at $400.00 per month for Evans and his family. From 1994 until the present, Woundy deducted Evans’ actual out-of-pocket cost for health insurance from the state’s cost. This court finds that except for the years 1994 to 1996, plaintiff has failed to submit any proof that his lack of health insurance from 1987 to 1993 caused him any economic injury or left him in a different position than he would have been in had he had the insuranee. Therefore, the court offsets his claimed benefit losses by the health insurance benefits calculations for years 1987 to 1993. The court finds that plaintiff can only be compensated for his actual out of pocket cost of medical insurance from 1994 to 1996. The court finds that plaintiff is entitled to $56,360.57 in lost benefits, which is the present value of the sum of plaintiffs out of pocket health insurance plus the value of his loss company car benefits. The court finds that plaintiff is entitled to a back pay award in the amount of $610,-117.81 which is the total of his lost wages ($393,119.35), pension benefits ($160,637.89), and company car and out of pocket cost of health insurance benefits ($56,360.57). The court finds that plaintiff is also entitled to pre-judgment interest, compounded annually, in the amount of $161,909.27. Plaintiff therefore is entitled to $772,027.08, the sum of the back pay and pre-judgment interest awards. B. Reinstatement Like back pay, reinstatement is not mandatory and is only to be denied if it frustrates the central purpose of the statute. Courts have acknowledged that there are times when reinstatement is impractical and should not be granted, such as when the employee-employer relationship has become hostile and has been irreparably damaged due to on-going litigation or when the position in question no longer exists or has changed substantially. See, Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir.1984); Reed, 95 F.3d 1170, 1182 (2d Cir.1996); Rose v. Ireco, Inc., 872 F.Supp. 1127, 1135 (N.D.N.Y.1994); Talada v. International Service System, Inc., 899 F.Supp. 936, 957 (W.D.N.Y.1995); Frank v. Relin, 851 F.Supp. 87 (W.D.N.Y.1994) (courts are to weigh all the factors and surrounding circumstances in a particular case in determining whether reinstatement is an appropriate remedy, including when the position has undergone change). In Frank v. Relin, the district court , ruled that reinstatement was inappropriate for a former employee of a county district attorney because her position had changed considerably in the approximate eight years since her termination. In this ease, plaintiff asserted, at the hearing on damages and in his post hearing brief, that he no longer seeks reinstatement. He also argued that reinstatement was inappropriate because the relationship between himself and his former employer, the State Police, had become hostile and damaged as a result of the ensuing litigation. Plaintiff contended that defendants had exhibited considerable hostility towards him by ignoring the letters he sent to both the police union and defendants’ attorney (the Connecticut Attorney General) requesting information about the conditions of his reinstatement. Defendants argued that neither of plaintiffs letters could serve as a basis of determining the sentiments of the police department nor Evans’ potential fellow officers since neither letter was sent directly to the employer. The court finds that plaintiff has not submitted enough evidence to establish that the employee-employer relationship between himself and the Connecticut State Police has become so irreparably damaged and hostile as a result of this litigation. See, EEOC v. Kallir, 420 F.Supp. at 926 (antagonism are the natural result of litigation and denying reinstatement on this basis alone may be contrary to the purpose of Title VII); Sims v. Mme. Paulette Dry Cleaners, 638 F.Supp. 224, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1138-1139 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 969, 102 S.Ct. 515, 70 L.Ed.2d 386 (1981)). At the hearing, the court noted that the letter written to the union was only written a month ago and may not serve as an adequate basis of concluding that police officers in the union harbored hostile feelings toward Evans. However, the court gives considerable weight to Evans’ withdrawal of his request for reinstatement. The Court rules that since Evans no longer desires to be a Connecticut State Police Officer, reinstatement would be impractical in this case. C. Front Pay District Courts have been granted the broad discretionary power in determining whether to award front pay as a possible equitable remedy for plaintiffs damages. Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 149 (2d Cir.1990) (citing Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, 890 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir.1989)). If reinstatement is deemed inappropriate, a plaintiff must show that he is entitled to front pay in lieu of reinstatement as an equitable remedy for continued (future) damages he will suffer as a result of defendant’s unlawful conduct. Reed, 95 F.3d at 1182; see also, Whittlesey, 742 F.2d at 728; Frank, 851 F.Supp. at 93. Additionally, it is not an abuse of discretion if the court finds that back pay is sufficient to make plaintiff whole. Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 145; Barbano, 922 F.2d at 147 (holding that because district court impliedly determined that other relief was sufficient, denial of front pay award was not an abuse of discretion). In exercising its discretionary power, this court finds that plaintiff has not established that he is entitled to front pay. The court also notes that the damage that plaintiff may suffer in the future, as a result of not being reinstated as a police officer, is not due solely to defendants’ unlawful termination of plaintiff but is also due to his failure to bring this case to trial in an expeditious manner. Reinstatement is inappropriate to some degree due to the length of time that has passed. As the record will reflect, the plaintiff is as much at fault as the defendants in prolonging the closure of this case. During trial this court found that certain documents were necessary for both sides. After three or four attempts to get defendants to produce the documents, the court appointed a special master, Burke Marshall, to review the documents to compare plaintiffs performance with that of his classmates who were not discharged. Marshall informed the court that defendants did not produce the necessary documents, despite defendants’ contention that they had. When this court finally called the case to trial on its merits, plaintiffs counsel, William Laviano (“Laviano”), resisted with the excuse that his wife was the attorney for the case and was in the hospital and unavailable for trial. The court denied plaintiff’s request for postponement since he had been given one earlier from December, 1993 to January, 1994 and ordered plaintiff to go forward. When trial commenced, both Laviano and his wife were present. This court finds that plaintiff failed to prepare for trial by requesting and examining the relevant records prior to trial and had made no effort to get a prompt trial, at any point, prior to a hearing on damages. Reinstatement, which plaintiff was originally seeking, may have been possible had he expedited these proceedings. This court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to front pay in lieu of reinstatement. However, the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to $772,027.08 in back pay and pre-judgment interest and rules that plaintiff is made whole by this award. II. Rule 37 motion A. Underlying facts The trial of this case began on January 12, 1994. Due to the complex nature of this litigation, the court adjourned trial and appointed an expert, Yale Professor Emeritus Burke Marshall (“Marshall”), to take possession, review, and analyze all documents relating to plaintiff and other members of his police training class to determine whether the reasons offered by defendants for terminating Evans were legitimate and based on objective criteria or were a pre-text for racial discrimination. Plaintiff had filed several motions to compel the production of documents. By order, the court directed defendants to produce the following documents to Professor Marshall on or before April 15, 1996; 1. All performance evaluation reports on all 52 trooper trainees in the 94th Academy Class from 12/20/85 until 12/31/96; 2. All reports and rewrites of reports written by all 52 members of the 94th class for the year 1986, including the criticisms of said reports, and; 3. All documentation for members of the 94th class who were terminated at any time, including the material submitted by the barracks, division commanders, labor relations and any other departments, whether the person leaving was white or a minority, (emphasis added), (see Order dated April 4, 1994) (hereinafter, “April 4th Order”). The court directed defendants to submit an index to the documents being reviewed and directed the expert to submit a report that made a specific comparison between the treatment accorded to black trainees and that accorded to white trainees with respect to personal conduct, discipline, and warnings, by June 15, 1994. The court noted that a hearing would be held on the report and that each side would be given the opportunity to make objections and submit additional evidentiary material relevant to the report. On April 18, 1994, three days after the documents were due to be produced to Professor Marshall, defendants mailed a notice of compliance with the court’s April 4th Order, indicating that the records required in Items 1 and 3 were ready for review and that the index to the records was being compiled. On April 21,1994, plaintiffs counsel informed the court, by letter, that despite two written requests, defendants still had not produced the documents nor the index. Without the index, plaintiff felt that he would be disadvantaged in preparing for the scheduled May 6, 1994 conference. Plaintiff requested the court to again order immediate production of a full and complete index to the documents. At the May 6th conference, the court amended the April 4th Order by deleting Item 2 of the requested documents. Items 1 and Items 3 remained unchanged. On June 10 1994, Professor Marshall sent a letter to the court stating that defendants had still not produced documents covered by Item 3 of the court’s April 4th Order, as amended, by a June 7, 1994 Order, pursuant to the conference held on May 6,1994. Marshall indicated that without information relating to the termination of the individuals covered in Item 3, he was unable to make a comparative review with respect to the treatment of minority and non-minority trainees by the June 15, 1994 deadline. A copy of this letter was also sent to the defendants. By order dated June 16, 1994, defendants were ordered to show cause on June 22,1994 why they should not be held in contempt of the court’s April 4th Order, as amended. At the contempt hearing, Mr. Lanoue, standing in for Assistant Attorney General Chappie, who was on vacation at the time, explained to the court that a good faith effort and diligent search had been undertaken to find the documents covered by Item 3. He explained that in a last attempt, Chappie searched in the basement of the headquarters building in Hartford through hundreds of documents and found the requested items. According to Mr. Lanoue, the documents were disorganized and needed to be copied and indexed before releasing them to plaintiff, a task which Chappie said she would do immediately upon her return from vacation the following Monday. The court noted that on prior occasions Attorney Chappie had indicated to the court that all the documents required in this case had been produced and were ready for review by Marshall. Mr. Lanoue responded that, since he was standing in for Chappie, he was not familiar with everything that had or had not happened nor what Attorney Chappie had or had not said, (see Transcript of Contempt Hearing, dated June 22,1994, 5). On June 24, 1994, this court found defendants in contempt for failing to comply with its April 4th Order, as amended. The court gave defendants 10 days (until July 2, 1994) to purge themselves by producing the documents and noted that failure to do so would result in a fine of $10,000.00 per day against defendants until such records were produced. On July 1, 1994, defendants sent to Marshall documents of individuals who left voluntarily or involuntarily during 1986. In a letter to defendants, plaintiff asserted that they still had not complied with the court’s April 4th Order because Item 3 did not limit production to documents covering 1986. Both parties disputed the meaning of their dialogue at the May 6, 1994 conference where both sought clarification from the court as to the meaning of Item 3. (see Supra footnote 5). On July 21, 1994, for the purpose of clarification, the court issued an order amending Item 3 to read as follows; All documentation for members of the 94th class who were terminated at any time, whether within the working test period or thereafter, and whether during 1986 or the late months of 1985, but no later than 1988. This includes the material submitted by the barracks, division commanders, labor relations and any other departments, whether the person leaving was white or a minority, (see Order dated, July 21, 1994) (hereinafter, “July 21st Order”). On July 25, 1994, defendants notified the court that according to their records, 15 members of the Connecticut State Police’s 94th Training Class dropped out before graduating and therefore were never trainees in the probationary working test period and that only one member of the class resigned or was terminated in 1988. On August 17, 1994, in accordance with the July 21st Order, defendants sent Professional Marshall copies of Elizabeth Pelletier’s file, the trooper who voluntarily resigned from her position as a State Police Trooper effective May 6, 1988. It is in immediate response to this production that plaintiff filed his motion for contempt and sanctions pursuant to Rule 37. Plaintiff contends that when a comparison is made between the Evans’ file and the file of his classmates, it is obvious that many documents were omitted or had ‘not been found’ by defendants. Plaintiff asserts that as a result of the court’s July 21st Order, defendants sent to Marshall, who was presumably in the middle or toward the end of his review of the documents previously produced, documents that should have been produced much earlier during discovery since defendants were required by state law to file and produce such documents. Plaintiff argues that defendants’ piece-meal fashion of complying with discovery made it impossible for him and Marshall to compare documents or to make statistical comparisons. Plaintiffs counsel asserts that he has expended considerable time and effort examining and reexamining documents and preparing for and attending defendants’ contempt hearing. Plaintiff requests the court to enter a default judgment in his favor and to award attorney fees. In objection to plaintiffs motion, defendants contend that a finding of contempt and the imposition of sanctions is completely unwarranted and that Rule 37 does not grant the court authority to impose sanctions for a party’s failure to obey a court order to provide or permit discovery. Defendants argue that discovery had long been completed and that they did in fact comply with the court’s July 21st Order by immediately producing the documents on Trooper Pelletier. Defendants assert that the Pelletier file was only recently discovered because it had been misplaced by a retired employee. B. Standard Generally, district courts possess broad power to sanction parties for abusive litigation practices that disrupt the administration of justice. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club. Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976). In National Hockey, the Supreme Court observed that “rule 37 sanctions must be applied diligently both to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, and to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.” Id. at 643, 96 S.Ct. at 2781. . Rule 37 provides a non-exclusive list of sanctions that may be imposed on a party for failing to obey an order to provide or permit discovery. Werbungs Und Commerz Union Austalt v. Collectors’ Guild, Ltd., 930 F.2d 1021, 1027 (2d Cir.1991). The mildest sanction is the reimbursement of expenses to the opposing party caused by the offending party’s failure to cooperate while the harshest sanction is the order of dismissal and default judgment. Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp., v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir.1979). This Circuit has ruled that “dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 is a drastic penalty which should be imposed only in extreme circumstances,” Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1131 (2d Cir.1986) (citing Israel Aircraft Indus., Ltd. v. Standard Precision, 559 F.2d 203, 208 (2d Cir.1977)), and may not be imposed as a “mere penalty.” Penthouse Intern., Ltd. v. Playboy Enterprises, 663 F.2d 371, 387 (2d Cir.1981). Dismissal or default judgment may not be imposed where the party made a good faith effort at compliance or could not comply for reasons beyond its control. Cine Forty-Second, 602 F.2d at 1066. However, where the non-complying party’s disobedience was willful and deliberate or exemplified gross professional negligence, harsh sanctions under Rule 37 are permitted. Id. at 1067. As a preliminary matter in the case now before the court, the court rejects defendants’ contention that the court lacks authority to consider plaintiffs Rule 37 motion and notes that it is well within the court's powers to consider this matter although a decision on the merits of the case has already been rendered. See, Heinrichs v. Marshall and Stevens Inc., 921 F.2d 418, 421 (2d Cir.1990) (it is well established that a federal court may consider independent, collateral issues-such as costs, attorney’s fees, and contempt sanctions, pursuant to Rule 37-after an action is no longer pending) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2455, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990)). Moreover, the court also dismisses defendants’ argument that Rule 37 is inapplicable since the various court orders, under eonsideration, were not issued pursuant to Rule 37(a) and defendants’ alleged non-compliance occurred well past the pre-trial discovery phase of the ease. The Second Circuit has held that “provided there is a clearly articulated order of the court requiring specified discovery, the district court has the authority to impose Rule 37(b) sanctions for noncomplianee with that [particular] order.” Daval Steel Products v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1363 (2d Cir.1991); Jones v. Uris Sales Corp., 373 F.2d 644, 647-648 (2d Cir.1967); Penthouse Int’l., 663 F.2d at 382-83 (sanction of dismissal affirmed for party’s noncompliance with a court order issued during trial recess and not issued pursuant to Rule 37(a)); see also, ACLI Government Securities. v. Rhoades, et al., 813 F.Supp. 255, 258 (S.D.N.Y.1993). Since there was a court imposed-diseovery order in this case, Rule 37 sanctions are applicable. Lastly, although defendants also argue that sanctions are not warranted because they made a good faith effort to comply (and eventually did comply) with this court’s July 21st Order which they maintain clarified the previous orders, this court finds otherwise. In determining whether sanctions are warranted, the court must weigh the full record in the case. National Hockey, 427 U.S. at 642, 96 S.Ct. at 2780. Defendants were previously held in contempt for not complying with this court’s April 4th Order, as amended, and were given 10 days to purge themselves. Although a dispute arose between the parties over the documents defendants were required to produce within the 10 day purging period which led to the issuance of the July 21st clarifying order from the court, defendants cannot rely on this order alone and their subsequent actions to comply with this order as evidence of why they should not be sanctioned. In looking at the full record before the court, it is clear that defendants have repeatedly failed to comply with this court’s discovery orders. Approximately two weeks after the issuance of the April 4th Order, defendants informed the court that the documents were ready for the expert’s review. Two months later in June, defendants were held in contempt for not complying with the order. At the contempt hearing, when asked why defendants did not bring the documents with them, defendants’ counsel asserted that the documents had just been found in a basement and would be produced once lead defense counsel returned from vacation and organized them. When a document was finally produced, it was a document that defendants were required by state law to have ready and accessible to the public, particularly in eases such as these. The original April 4th Order made clear that the purpose of the appointment of an expert was to compare plaintiffs treatment with that of other troopers. Despite notification from the expert and plaintiff and orders from this court, defendants failed to produce meaningful comparative records, which ultimately led this court, in its decision on liability, to draw an adverse inference of discrimination against defendants. Plaintiff maintains that defendants have not provided any justification to date for their failure to comply with this court’s April 4th Order while defendants seem to be asserting that they should be spared sanctioning due to their misunderstanding as to what was required of them. This court finds that sanctions against defendants are warranted, given the record before the court. The question then is the amount of sanctions which should be levied against defendants. Given the case law, this court finds that defendants’ conduct (due to alleged misunderstanding) does not rise to the level of fault or gross professional neglect required for the imposition of the harsh sanction of default judgment permitted under Rule 37. See, Penthouse Int’l., 663 F.2d 371 (harsh sanction of dismissal affirmed because defendant made a mockery of discovery process by engaging in calculated and willful conduct of misrepresentations, false testimony, and failure to produce relevant documents); Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp., 602 F.2d at 1067 (ordinary negligence partially excusable but gross professional negligence found where party clearly should have understood his duty to the court); see contra, Polylok Corporation v. Valley Forge Fabrics, Inc., 670 F.Supp. 1210, 1213 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (where defendant misunderstood the relevanee of a file and notified plaintiff of file the night before pre-trial order was due, rule 37 sanctions not warranted because conduct not persistent, repeated, and deliberate, as in Penthouse). However, this court does find it just to impose the sanction of reimbursement of attorney’s fees against defendants for failing to comply with the court’s April 4th Order. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2), the court directs defendants to pay plaintiffs attorney’s fees for the time and services expended for such noncompliance. Since plaintiff has submitted an application for attorney’s fees and has included in his fee request the expenses incurred due to defendants’ disobedience of court orders, the court’s consideration of the amount due to plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 37 sanctions, is included in its discussion of plaintiffs general application for an attorney’s fees award. III. Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney’s Fees as Prevailing Party Plaintiff filed an application for attorney’s fees and costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Plaintiff’s counsel also submitted a supporting affidavit setting forth the following figures; $200.00 per hour for the three attorneys who were at one point or another involved in the case and $75.00 per hour for the three legal assistants, two of whom where law students, and the third, a paralegal. Plaintiffs counsel claimed a total of 792.20 hours spent on the case as of September 30, 1996 and multiplied this amount by the fees described above to reach plaintiffs total legal costs of $136,748.60. Plaintiff argues that the factors courts consider in determining whether a party is entitled to attorney’s fees are all present and warrants the granting of an attorney’s fees award. Furthermore, plaintiff requests the court to adjust plaintiff counsel’s legal fees of $136,748.60 with a multiplier of 1.5% to reflect a more accurate reasonable fee, thereby, bringing the amount to $205,122.90. In objection, defendants contend that plaintiffs application is replete with excessive, redundant, unnecessary and nondeseriptive entries. In regards to the request for an upward adjustment using the 1.5 multiplier, defendants cite several cases to support their argument that fee enhancements are not permitted in contingency cases brought under fee shifting statutes. In reply, plaintiff argues that the cases cited by defendants restrict enhancements when contingency alone is the factor being considered by the court and asserts that given the numerous other factors supporting his application, it is within the sound discretion of the district court to make an upward adjustment. A. Standard As a general rule, a prevailing party in a federal lawsuit is not entitled to legal fees incurred during the course of the litigation. United States v. 110-118 Riverside Tenants Corp., 5 F.3d 645, 646 (2d Cir.1993); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (holding that federal courts could not award attorney’s fees absent explicit statutory authorization). Under the employment discrimination statute, district courts are given the discretionary power to grant reasonable legal fees and costs. See, Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1453 (2d Cir.1995) (only ‘prevailing party’ permitted to recover attorney’s fees and costs in a civil rights action). The Supreme Court has held that the language of most federal fee-shifting statutes, i.e. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k), are generally the same, therefore, “ornease law construing what is a reasonable fee applies uniformly to all of them.” Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 2641, 120 L.Ed.2d 449, 456 (1992) (citing Ind. Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2732, 2735 n. 2, 105 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989)). In this matter before the court, based on the ruling on liability holding defendants liable for employment discrimination, the court finds that plaintiff is a prevailing party and is entitled to attorney’s fees. In determining the amount of an attorney’s fees award in civil eases, district courts begin by using the ‘lodestar’ amount, which is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This Circuit endorsed the lodestar method in the Grinnell opinions. See, City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir.1974) (“Grinnell I”), rev’d on other grounds, 440 U.S. 568, 99 S.Ct. 1355, 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir.1977) (“Grinnell II”) (multiply billable hours spent on case by the hourly rate to calculate attorney’s fees); see also, Dague, 505 U.S. at 559, 112 S.Ct. at 2369-40, 120 L.Ed.2d at 454; Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3097, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) (“Delaware I”); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (“product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate normally provides a reasonable attorney’s fee within the meaning of the statute”). The Second Circuit has warned that attorney’s fees are to be awarded “with an ‘eye to moderation,’ seeking to avoid either the reality or the appearance of awarding “wind falls.’ ” Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 558 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir.1977); Wheatley v. Ford, 679 F.2d 1037, 1040 (2d Cir.1982); New York State Association for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1139 (2d Cir.1983). 1. Calculation of Hourly Rate For the specific hourly rates, the prevailing party is “entitled to reasonable hourly rates which fall within the prevailing marketplace rates in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1159 (2d Cir.1994); Polk v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 722 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir.1983). The burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence, in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits, showing that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n. 11, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). Additionally, the community to which the district court should look is the judicial district in which the court sits. Cruz, 34 F.3d at 1159. The attorney in this case failed to submit any additional evidence, beyond his own affidavits, establishing the prevailing rates for similar services rendered in the relevant community. Therefore, this court looks to attorney’s fees granted in cases in the District of Connecticut and uses its own knowledge of similar cases to determine what is a reasonable rate. Miele v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir.1987) (trial judge may rely on his or her knowledge of prevailing community rates). Cases in the District of Connecticut reveal what has been considered reasonable rates for attorneys, paralegals, and law students in this community. See, G.R., et al. v. Regional School District # 15, 1996 WL 762324 (D.Conn.1996) ($225.00 per hour is reasonable rate for attorney); Natale v. City of Hartford, 1989 WL 132542 (D.Conn.1989) ($50.00 per hour is reasonable for paralegal or law clerk); Gibbs v. Southeastern Investment Corp., 705 F.Supp. 738 (D.Conn.1989). The amount of any award, however, must ultimately be determined by looking to the facts of the particular case. Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. at 1937. In this case, based on the contingency and risk of nonpayment, extent of success achieved, and the years of experience of plaintiffs attorney, see also, United States Football League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 415 (2d Cir.1989); Cruz, 34 F.3d at 1160, the court determines that Attorney Laviano’s rate of $200.00 per hour for the three attorneys (including himself) is reasonable. The court finds that $50.00 per hour for the paralegals and the two law students involved in the litigation in this case is a reasonable rate. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-86, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2470-71, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (law student is compensable in an award of attorney’s fees); Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 885 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir.1989). Laviano has calculated the lodestar amount by multiplying his hourly rates to the number of hours (792.20) he and his staff have put into this case, reaching a total of $136,748.60. He asks the court to adjust this amount upwardly with a 1.5 multiplier and to award the resulting sum of $205,122.90. Although the Hensley Court noted that lodestar calculations may not end the inquiry of reasonable attorney’s fees because there may “remain other considerations that [could] lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward,” 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1940, there is a strong presumption that the lodestar is reasonable. Dague, 505 U.S. at 561-63, 112 S.Ct. at 2641, 120 L.Ed.2d at 456; Lunday v. Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994). The party asking the court to depart from the lodestar amount bears the burden of proving that such a departure is necessary to the calculation of a reasonable fee. See, Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1992); Dailey v. Societe Generóle, 915 F.Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y.1996). An upward adjustment is only justified in rare instance where the fee applicant offers “specific evidence [showing] that the quality of service rendered was superior to that one reasonably should expect in light of the hourly rates charged and that the success was ‘exceptional.’ ” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940; Blum, 465 U.S. at 897, 104 S.Ct. at 1548 (in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award may be justified). The Supreme Court has held that novelty and complexity of issues, quality of representation, special skill and experience of counsel, results obtained, and a contingency fee arrangement and risk of n