Full opinion text
OPINION LECHNER, District Judge. This is an action for emergent relief brought by plaintiffs Alan A. (“Alan A.”), Barry B. (“Barry B.”), Carl C. (“Carl C.”), David D. (“David D.”), Jeff J. (“Jeff J.”), Kenneth K. (“Kenneth K”) (all fictitious names, collectively, the “Plaintiffs”). Plain- tiffs are subject to the requirements of Megan’s Law, New Jersey’s sex offender registration and notification act, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 et seq. (“Megan’s Law” or the “Act”). The Defendants in this matter are Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, William H. Schmidt (“Schmidt”), Bergen County Prosecutor and Ronald S. Fava (“Fava”), Passaic County Prosecutor (at times, collectively referred to as “Prosecutor”). Jurisdiction is alleged pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First Amended Complaint, ¶ 2. Declaratory and injunctive relief is requested pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. Id., ¶ 3. On 14 May 1997, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint. In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek: 1) “[ijssuance of a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction prohibiting the [Djefendants and anyone acting in concert with them from proceeding with conferences or hearings in [sjtate [cjourt for the purpose of determining tier classification and manner of community notification in this matter during the pendency of this temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction [ (‘Request to Enjoin State Proceedings’) ],” 2) “[i]ssuanee of an immediate temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction prohibiting the [Djefendants and anyone acting in concert with them from issuing or disseminating in any manner Tier II or Tier III notification regarding members of the Plaintiffs under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 et seq., during the pendency of this action or, in the alternative, until fifteen days following the Third Circuits decision in W.P. v. Verniero et al., (Dkt No. 96-5416) [ (‘Request to Enjoin Notification’) ]”, 3) “[ejntry of a declaratory judgment which defines the rights of the Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiffs? proposed class and which invalidates Megan’s Law as being unconstitutional [ (‘Request for Declaratory Judgment’)]”. See First Amended Complaint at 17-18. Plaintiffs further request relief from the obligation to post a bond (“Request For Relief from Posting Bond”), an order placing this matter under seal, an order permitting Plaintiffs to proceed In Forma Pauperis (“Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis”), and other relief as Plaintiffs may be entitled. Id. Megan’s Law is constitutional. The Plaintiffs have demonstrated no possibility of success on the merits of their claims. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the Request to Enjoin State Proceedings, the Request to Enjoin Notification and the Request for a Declaratory Judgment are denied. The Request for Relief from Posting Bond and the Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis were not briefed and are not addressed in this opinion. Facts A Parties 1. Plaintiffs Plaintiffs contend the Act, specifically the community notification provisions, violates their constitutional right to procedural due process, privacy, to be free from double jeopardy and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Moving Brief at 1. Each of the remaining Plaintiffs is a resident of the State of New Jersey and was convicted of a sexual offense, as defined in Megan’s Law, and has been classified by a county Prosecutor as either a Tier II or Tier III offender. First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 5-9, 16. Each Plaintiff is subject to the notification and tier classification provision of the Act. The date each Plaintiffs offense was committed was on or after the effective date of the Act. Id. Alan A. is eighteen years old and lives with his father. Alan A. pleaded guilty to Aggravated Sexual Assault for having sex with a twelve year old minor when Alan A. was sixteen years old. Id., ¶ 5. Alan A. was found delinquent as a juvenile and sentenced to two years at a juvenile medium security facility. Id. Alan A. was paroled in 1996. Id. Barry B. is twenty-three years old and lives with his mother. Id., ¶6. Barry B. pleaded guilty to sexual assault for committing a sexual offense against a minor. Barry B. was sentenced to four years probation. Id. Carl C. is nineteen years old. Carl C. pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual contact. Carl C. was sentenced to three years probation. Id., ¶ 7. David D. is twenty three years old and lives with his mother and step-father. David D. pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of a child by having committed a sexual act against a minor. David D. was sentenced to four years confinement and was paroled in 1996. Id., ¶ 8. Jeff J. is sixty-three years old. Jeff J. pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of a minor. Jeff J. was sentenced to five years probation and directed to have no contact with the victim. Id., ¶ 9. Kenneth K. is sixty-three years old. Kenneth K. pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of a child, a minor household member. Kenneth K. was sentenced to five years probation, no victim contact and counseling. Id., ¶ 10. 2. Defendants As stated, the Defendants are Peter Verniero, the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, who is responsible for implementing and prosecuting Megan’s Law on a statewide basis. Id., ¶ 11. The remaining Defendants are Schmidt, the Bergen County Prosecutor and Fava, the Passaic County Prosecutor. Id., ¶¶ 12-13. B. Megan’s Law Megan’s Law was enacted on 31 October 1994. The Act requires certain sex offenders to register with local law enforcement, see N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, and authorizes law enforcement agencies “to release relevant and necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when the release of the information is necessary for public protection____” See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-5. The purpose of the registration and subsequent notification is proffered in the first section of the Act: a. The danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders who commit other predatory acts against children, and the dangers posed by persons who prey on others as a result of mental illness, require a system of registration that will permit law enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when necessary for the public safety. b. A system of registration of sex offenders and offenders who commit other predatory acts against children will provide law enforcement with additional information critical to preventing and promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1. a. Registration Requirement The Act “requires registration [ (the ‘Registration Provision’)] of sex offenders convicted after its effective date and all prior convicted offenders whose conduct was found to be repetitive or compulsive.” Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 20, 662 A.2d 367 (1995); see N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2. The sex offenses that trigger the Registration Provision include the crimes of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact and kidnapping pursuant to paragraph (2), subsection c. of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1 or an attempt to commit any of these crimes. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a). “[F]or those convicted after [the] effective date, added to the foregoing are various laws, concerning endangering the welfare of a child, luring or enticing, criminal sexual conduct if the victim is a minor, and kidnapping, criminal restraint, or false imprisonment if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent,” or an attempt to commit any of these offenses. Doe, 142 N.J. at 20, 662 A.2d 367. The Registration Provision requires the offender to provide to the local law enforcement information such as the offender’s name, age, race, gender, date of birth, height, weight, hair and eye color, address of legal and temporary residence, date and place of employment, date and place of conviction, adjudication or acquittal by reason of insanity, indictment number, fingerprints, a brief description of the crime or crimes for which registration is required, as well as other information deemed necessary to assess the risk of the future commission of a crime. N.J.S.A 2C:7 — 4(b); Complaint, ¶ 15. An offender may make an application “to terminate the obligation upon proof that [he or she] has not committed an offense within [fifteen] years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed ... and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.” See N.J.S.A. 2C:7 — 2(f). The failure of an offender to comply with the Registration Provision is a fourth degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a). The Plaintiffs have registered with local law enforcement and provided the information required pursuant to the Registration Provision. First Amended Complaint, ¶ 15. b. Notification Provision Pursuant to the notification provision in the Act (“Notification Provision”), local law enforcement agencies are required to give appropriate notification of the offender’s presence in the community. Doe, 142 N.J. at 22, 662 A.2d 367. Megan’s Law provides for three levels of notification based upon the risk of re-offense of the offender (the “Tier Classification”). The Act directed the New Jersey Attorney General to promulgate guidelines and procedures for notification. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8. The New Jersey Attorney General implemented the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale Manual (“Risk Assessment Manual”) and the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale (“RRAS”). The Risk Assessment Manual was created “to assist in the implementation of the [RRAS].” See Risk Assessment Manual, attached to First Amended Complaint as Exhibit G. The Risk Assessment Manual and the RRAS were designed to provide “an objective standard on which to base the community notification decision mandated by statute and to insure that the notification law is applied in a uniform manner throughout the State.” Id. The Prosecutor of the county where the offender has chosen to reside initiates the Tier Classification process by applying the Risk Assessment Manual and the thirteen factors provided in the RRAS. Id., ¶ 16. The factors are recognized by experts in the field of risk assessment as rehable predictors of recidivism. Matter of C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 105, 679 A.2d 1153 (1996). The offender is given a score with respect to each factor: low risk (0), moderate risk (1), or high risk (3). See RRAS, attached to First Amended Complaint as Exhibits A through F. The thirteen factors that comprise the RRAS are organized into four categories: 1) seriousness of the offense, 2) offense history, 3) characteristics of the offender, and 4) community support. First Amended Complaint, ¶ 17. The initial score for each of the thirteen factors is increased by multipliers, which differ by heading; the data are added together for a final risk assessment score (“RRAS Score”). First Amended Complaint, ¶ 18. Only one RRAS exists for all sex offenders registered under the Act. Id., ¶ 19. The Prosecutor of the appropriate county determines the scope of notification by employing the guidelines promulgated by the New Jersey Attorney General. See Guidelines for Law Enforcement for Notification to Local Officials and/or the Community of the Entry of a Sex Offender into the Community (“Notification Guidelines”), attached to First Amended Complaint as Exhibit H. If the risk of re-offense is minimal (an RRAS Score of 0 to 36), notification is limited to the law enforcement agencies likely to encounter the offender (“Tier I”). If risk of re-offense is moderate (an RRAS Score of 37 to 73) community organizations such as schools, religious and youth groups are notified (“Tier II”). If there is a high risk of re-offense (an RRAS Score of 74 to 111) those members of the public “likely to encounter” the offender will be notified (“Tier III”). There is no classification for individuals who pose no risk of re-offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c); Notification Guidelines at 7. The New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that notification under Tier II and Tier III should be only to organizations and individuals “ ‘likely to encounter’ the offender.” Doe, 142 N.J. at 29, 662 A.2d 367. Offenders do not participate in the Tier Classification and scope of notification determinations made by the Prosecutor. First Amended Complaint, ¶ 23. An offender is provided written notice of the Tier Classification and is given the opportunity to object and request a hearing (the “Tier Determination Hearing”). Id., ¶ 24. “[I]f such application is made, there will be no notification until and unless affirmed by the court or, if reversed, until and unless the prosecutor provides notification in accord with the reasons for reversal.” Doe, 142 N.J. at 31, 662 A.2d 367. All of the Plaintiffs in this action have filed requests for judicial review of the Prosecutor’s proposed Tier Classification and community notification decision. First Amended Complaint, ¶ 27. c. Tier Determination Hearing Upon receipt of an objection to the Tier Classification by the offender, a court immediately sets down a date for a hearing and decision on the issue. Doe, 142 N.J. at 31, 662 A.2d 367. The offender, or his or her attorney, is provided full discovery, as is the reviewing judge. 10 April Squitieri Aff., ¶ 17. Full discovery includes everything that was relied upon by the Prosecutor in determining the Tier Classification for the offender. Id.; Doe, 142 N.J. at 31, 662 A.2d 367 (“The prosecutor shall forthwith turn over all papers, documents, and other material, including the prosecutor’s findings and statement of reasons for the level and manner of proposed notification to the court and to the offender and counsel.”). Pre-Tier Determination Hearing conferences are conducted by the trial court (“First Status Conference”). 10 April Squitieri Aff., ¶ 16. In both Bergen County and Passaic County, the First Status Conference takes place in the judge’s chambers. 10 April Eisenberg Aff., ¶ 11; 10 April Squitieri Aff., ¶ 18. At the First Status Conference, the parties attempt to assess whether, with additional information, they will be able to reach an agreement as to the Tier Classification or whether a full Tier Determination Hearing is required. 10 April Eisenberg Aff., ¶ 11; cf. 10 April Squitieri Aff., ¶ 18. A final tier status may result from the First Status Conference where the parties are in agreement as to the Tier Classification status. 10 April Eisenberg Aff., ¶ 12. “Generally, [however], the [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference results in further investigation____” 10 April Squitieri Aff., ¶ 18. At the time of the filing of this opinion, the status of the conferences and hearings for each of the Plaintiffs were as follows: Alan A. scored a 54 making [him] a [Tier II] on the RRAS. [He] was personally served on [27 January 1997] for a [10 February 1997] [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference. At the [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference [Alan A,] set forth [his] contentions, however, since the [T]ier designation would not change, even if the issues of contention were resolved in [his] favor, a request for an expert was made. The Passaic County Prosecutor’s Office did not object and the court granted the request. It was agreed by all parties that a second status conference would not be necessary. The hearing date was set for [1 April 1997]. Due to inclement weather, [Alan A.’s] expert could not appear, so the matter was adjourned to [29 April 1997]. On [29 April 1997], a hearing was held. After a full day of testimony and oral arguments, the matter was adjourned to [2 May 1997] to conclude oral arguments. On [2 May 1997], the Court heard the remainder of oral arguments and permitted [Alan A.] to reopen [his] case to have a witness testify. The Court reserved and scheduled her decision to be rendered on [9 May 1997]. On [9 May 1997], the judge adjourned the hearing to [5 September 1997] on the condition that [Alan A.] enter therapy. On [5 September 1997], the therapist will be required to render a further opinion as to the risk of reoffense. Barry B. scored an 83 initially, making [him] a [Tier III] on the RRAS. [He] was personally served on [20 February 1997] for a [10 March 1997] [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference. As a result of the [F]irst [S]tatus [C]onference, [his] score was amended to a 77, thus [Barry B.] is still a [Tier III]. Several other issues were raised, and the matter was adjourned to [4 April 1997] for a second status conference. The second status conference was further adjourned by the court due to a scheduling problem to [17 April 1997]. On [17 April 1997], a second status conference was held and continued to [18 April 1997]. The matter could not be resolved and a request for an expert was made by [Barry B.] which was not objected to and granted by the court. The matter [was] scheduled for [30 May 1997] for a third status conference to review the expert’s findings. David D scored a 63 making [him] a [Tier II] on the RRAS. [He] was personally served on 11 February 1997 for a 3 March 1997[F]irst [S]tatus [C]onference. At the [F]irst [S]tatus [C]onferenee [David D.] set forth [his] contentions, however, since the [T]ier would not change even if the issues of contention were resolved in [his] favor, a request for an expert was made. [The Passaic County Prosecutor’s Office] objected to the request and on 10 March 1997 oral argument was conducted and the judge denied the request finding that [David D.] failed to meet the minimum requirement to get an expert. On [27 March 1997] a judicial review hearing was conducted and continued to [1 April 1997]. The court ruled that [David D.] was a moderate risk for re-offense and affirmed the [T]ier designation. The matter was adjourned to [4 April 1997] on the issue of notification. On [4 April 1997] a list of [fourteen] schools/eommunity organizations were submitted to the court and [David D.’s] attorney, along with a map reflecting the zones. The court held that [six] of the [fourteen] schools could be informed. The Order was signed on [7 April 1997]. The Court granted a [two] day stay, the Appellate Division granted a stay pending appeal on [8 April 1997], Oral argument, via telephone were (sic) held on [14 April 1997], The Appellate [Division] affirmed the trial court’s findings however their decision [was filed on 29 April 1992], Based on the agreement made in court on [24 April 1997], no notification [was to] occur until the agreed upon time has elapsed. On [30 April 1997], stay pending certification was consented to. 22 May Squitieri Aff., ¶¶ 1-3. Evan E. scored a 44, making [him] a [Tier II] on the RRAS. [He] was personally served on [4 February 1997] for a [24 February 1997] [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference. [Evan E.] failed to appear and a default judgment was requested but it was denied. The court mailed [Evan E.] a letter giving [him] a new date on [24 March 1997], On [24 March 1997], [Evan E.] appeared with [his] attorney. The matter was conferenced. As a result of the status conference, the score was changed to a 36, a [Tier I], thus the matter was concluded. Frank F. scored a 51, making [him] a [Tier II] on the RRAS. [He] was personally served on [29 January 1997] for a [10 February 1997] [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference. At the [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference several issues were discussed and further investigation became necessary. The matter was set down for a second status conference for [24 February 1997]. At the second status conference the Passaic County Prosecutor’s Office changed [Frank F.’s] score from a 51 to a 41, but [he] was still a [Tier II]. A request for an expert was made which was not objected to by the Passaic County Prosecutor’s Office and was granted by the judge. The final hearing was set for [21 March 1997]. At the final hearing, the court concluded that despite the [Frank F.’s] score, [he] was a low risk for re-offense. Thus the judge made [him] a [Tier I], and the matter was concluded. Gary G. scored a 45, making [him] a [Tier II] on the RRAS. [He] was personally served on [16 January 1997] for a [3 February 1997] [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference. [Gary G.] failed to appear for the [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference. The judge requested that [the Prosecutor’s Office] reach out to [Gary G.] to inform [him] of the new date. That request was carried out. On [18 February 1997, Gary G.] appeared without an attorney. [He] was directed to go to the public defender’s office to apply for an attorney and the [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference was adjourned to [24 March 1997]. At the [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference, the case settled and although [he] is classified as a [Tier II], only [his] family and law enforcement were ... to be told. The settlement was placed on the record and approved by the court. Thus, the matter was concluded. Harry H. scored a 45, making [him] a [Tier II] on the RRAS. [Harry H.] was personally served on [26 February 1997] for a [21 March 1997] [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference. At the [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference several issues were brought to the attention of the Unit Attorney and the judge. The matter was adjourned to [11 April 1997] for a second status conference for further investigation. A conference was held on [11 April 1997] prior to the hearing and [Harry H’s] score was lowered to a 41. At the hearing the judge held that the Prosecutor’s Office did not meet its prima facie burden as to criteria number one, degree of force, therefore the score was changed to a 36, a tier [I], Thus, the matter was concluded. Irving I. scored a 43, making [him] a [Tier II] on the RRAS. [He] was personally served on [13 March 1997] for [a 4 April 1997] [F]irst [S]tatus [C]onferenee. The [F]irst [S]tatus [C]onferenee was adjourned by the Court due to scheduling problems. It was adjourned to [17 April 1997]. As a result of the [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference on [17 April 1997], the Prosecutor’s Office amended the score from 43 to 39. An expert was requested by [Irving I.] which was not objected to by the Prosecutor’s Office and the request was granted by the Court. On [2 May 1997], a hearing was conducted and the Court held that [Irving I.] was a 39, however, based upon the expert report, [he] was held to be a Tier [I] low risk. Thus, the matter was concluded. 5 May Squitieri Aff., ¶¶ 4-8. Jeff J. scored a 50, making [him] a [Tier II] on the RRAS. [Jeff J.] was personally served on [13 March 1997] for [a 4 April 1997] [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference. The [F]irst [S]tatus [C]onference was adjourned by the Court due to scheduling problems. It was adjourned to [17 April 1997]. On [17 April 1997], a request for an expert was made by [Jeff J.] which was not objected to by the Prosecutor’s Office and the request was granted. The matter was initially adjourned to [8 May 1997], however a further adjournment was granted at [Jeff J.’s] request since the expert’s report was not ready. The matter was initially adjourned to [22 May 1997] however pursuant to the Court’s request, it was adjourned to [13 June 1997]. Kenneth K. scored a 52, making [him] a [Tier II] on the RRAS. [Kenneth K.] was personally served on [13 March 1997] for [a 4 April 1997] [F]irst [S]tatus [Conference. The [F]irst [S]tatus [C]onferenee was adjourned by the Court due to scheduling problems. The matter was adjourned to [17 April 1997]. On [17 April 1997] the [F]irst [Sjtatus [C]onference was held and a request for an expert was made by [Kenneth K.] which was not objected to by the Prosecutor’s Office and the request was granted by the Court. The second status conference was scheduled for [23 May 1997], however, pursuant to the Court’s request, the matter was adjourned to [13 June 1997]. 22 May Squitieri Aff., ¶¶ 27-36. Carl C. ... was assessed as a Tier II with [forty-five] points. [Carl C.] was personally served with the notice of [his][T]ier [Classification on [4 February 1997]. At that time, he was notified that the deadline for requesting a hearing was [18 February 1997] and the preliminary conference was scheduled before Judge Ciolino on [4 March 1997]. At the preliminary conference, it was agreed that in order to properly assess [Carl C.’s] [T]ier a current therapist’s report, verification of employment and residence were required. Accordingly, Judge Ciolino carried the matter until [8 April 1996]. Subsequently, due to Judge Ciolino’s retirement and re-assignment of Megan’s Law responsibilities to Judge William Meehan, P.J.S.C., the matter was adjourned to [2 May 1997]. 10 April Eisenberg Aff., ¶ 18. ■ A conference was held on [6 May 1997], before the Honorable William C. Meehan, P.J.S.C. As a condition of probation, [Carl C.] was ordered to attend sex offender therapy. A report from his therapist noted he has recently been discharged from group therapy for the second time due to [his] lack of cooperation. As a result, Probation has indicated its intention to charge [Carl C.] with a violation of probation and to require [him] to attend individual therapy with a new therapist. It was agreed that [Carl C.’s] counsel will request that the new therapist provide the court with an evaluation. It was agreed the matter would be adjourned until [3 June 1997] at which time a hearing [would] be conducted. 7 May Eisenberg Aff., ¶ 3. A hearing was held before the Honorable William C. Meehan, P.S.J.C. on [3 June 1997]. At that time, the court ordered that [Carl C.] be classified as a Tier I with a review in six months to determine [Carl C.’s] participation and progress in counselling (sic). Because [Carl C.] recently moved to Passaic County, the matter was transferred to Passaic County to determine the scope of notification. 4 June Eisenberg Aff., ¶ 3. It appears because Carl C. has moved to Passaic County, “the whole process begins anew” and a Tier Classification must be given from Passaic County. See 20 June Tr. at 6. At the Tier Determination Hearing, the offender has the right to be represented by counsel, or if he or she cannot afford it, to have counsel assigned by the court. 10 April Squitieri Aff., ¶ 15. At the Tier Determination Hearing, conducted in camera, the Prosecutor must demonstrate that the evidence “justifies the proposed Tier Classification and manner of notification.” Doe, 142 N.J. at 31-32, 662 A.2d 367. The burden of persuasion then shifts to the offender to demonstrate by a preponderance that the evidence does not conform to the laws and guidelines. Id., at 32, 662 A.2d 367. “The court’s determination is independent and based on its own review of the case on the merits.” C.A, 146 N.J. at 84, 679 A.2d 1153. At the Tier Determination Hearing, the rules of evidence do not apply. First Amended Complaint, ¶ 30. The' offender is permitted to call his or her own witnesses and cross examine the Prosecutor’s witnesses. The offender may subpoena the victim if “absolutely necessary.” Id., ¶31 (citing C.A., 146 N.J. at 98, 679 A.2d 1153). An offender is allowed to call an expert witness if his or her case is unusual and “falls outside the heartland of cases.” Id., ¶32 (citing In the Matter of Registrant G.B., 147 N.J. 62, 82, 685 A.2d 1252 (1996)). The court is granted the authority “to determine (1) the extent of witness production; (2) the extent of cross examination; and (3) the use of expert testimony.” C.A., 146 N.J. at 83, 679 A.2d 1153 (citation omitted). Orders from the trial court which allow for notification contain a provision stating such orders shall not become effective until the expiration of two business days after the date of the execution of the order. See Outline of Procedure for Hearings on Objections to Megan’s Law Tier 2 and Tier 3 Classification and Manner of Notification Determinations (“Outline of Procedures”), attached to First Amended Complaint as Exhibit P, at 4. The offender may appeal the decision rendered at the Tier Determination Hearing. Doe, 142 N.J. at 32, 662 A.2d 367. Discussion A Abstention Under Younger Doctrine or Rooker-Feldman Doctrine As a threshold matter, it must be determined whether the Younger abstention doctrine or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the exercise of subject matter-jurisdiction in this matter. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The courts which have addressed these issues have held the two doctrines do not preclude consideration of the constitutional claims brought against Megan’s Law in Federal court. See W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F.Supp. 1187, 1189 (D.N.J.1996); E.B. v. Poritz, 914 F.Supp. 85 (D.N.J.1996); Michael M. et al. v. Verniero et al., Civ. No. 97-2435, slip op. at 25-26 (D.N.J. 29 May 1997). 1. Younger Doctrine The Supreme Court has “emphatically reaffirmed ‘the fundamental policy against [F]ederal interference with state criminal prosecutions,’ ” see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 46, 91 S.Ct. at 751); NYLife Distributors, Inc. v. Adherence Group, Inc., 72 F.3d 371, 376 & n. 8 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct, 1826, 134 L.Ed.2d 931 (1996); see Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 1721, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996); Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 882 (3d Cir.1994). Pursuant to the principles of equity and comity in the Federal system, the Court has held that, “apart from ‘extraordinary circumstance,’ a [F]ederal court may not enjoin a pending state prosecution or declare invalid the statute under which the prosecution was brought.” Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509, 92 S.Ct. 1749, 1757, 32 L.Ed.2d 257 (1972) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 768, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971)). Extraordinary circumstances exist where irreparable injury is “both great and immediate,” Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 91 S.Ct. at 751, for example where the state law is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,” id. at 53, 91 S.Ct. at 755 (citation omitted), or where there is a showing of “bad faith, harassment, or ... other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief.” Id. at 54, 91 S.Ct. at 755. “The principle underlying Younger and Samuels is that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional claims, and therefore a [F]ederal court should, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, refuse to interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding.” Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2567, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). This rule has been held to apply equally to requests for post-trial intervention by the Federal courts, before the petitioner has exhausted appellate remedies. See Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1210, 43 L.Ed.2d 482, reh’g denied, 421 U.S. 971, 95 S.Ct. 1969, 44 L.Ed.2d 463 (1975). See also New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 491 U.S. at 369, 109 S.Ct. at 2518-19. The Supreme Court expanded the Younger doctrine to incorporate state civil proceedings which implicate important state interests. See, e.g., Quackenbush, - U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1721 (1996) (citing Huffman, 420 U.S. at 592, 95 S.Ct. at 1202; Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977)); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 843 (3d Cir.1996). Abstention by a Federal court is proper where three elements are present: “(1) the ongoing state proceedings are ‘judicial’ in nature; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the proeeedings-afford an adequate opportunity to raise the [Fjederal claims.” Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1065, 114 S.Ct. 741, 126 L.Ed.2d 704 (1994) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521). The Defendants argue the relief Plaintiffs seek would obstruct either the state court proceedings or the enforcement of the state court decision which is “ ‘an integral part of the state’s judicial process for Younger purposes.’ ” Opposition Brief at 6 (quoting Marks, 19 F.3d at 883; Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13-14, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1527, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987)). Defendants further argue the Plaintiffs are free to raise their constitutional challenges at the scheduled hearings and to seek review of any adverse decision before the Appellate Division and New Jersey Supreme Court. Id. One of the prerequisites to application of the Younger doctrine requires that there be “an adequate opportunity for redress of [a plaintiffs] constitutional claims” in a state court proceeding. W.P., 931 F.Supp. at 1195 (quoting Bongiomo v. Lalomia, 851 F.Supp. 606, 613 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 39 F.3d 1168 (3d Cir.1994)). In Doe, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the same constitutional issues raised in the instant matter. See Doe, 142 N.J. at 26-28, 662 A.2d 367 (recognizing that “decision will affect all sex offenders covered by the laws” because plaintiffs claims were the same as any offender could assert). Subsequent state courts have declined to address an offender’s constitutional arguments in light of the Doe decision. See In the Matter of G.B., 286 N.J.Super. 396, 402, 669 A.2d 303 (App.Div.) (“We need not address registrant’s constitutional arguments. The Supreme Court in Doe rejected these arguments. The Court held that [Megan’s Law] was constitutional, subject to judicial review before notification.”), aff'd, 147 N.J. 62, 685 A.2d 1252 (1996); State in Interest of B.G., 289 N.J.Super. 361, 373-74, 674 A.2d 178 (App.Div.) (with regard to constitutional issues raised by offender, court noted: “[The] Supreme Court in [Doe ] has decided these issues and we cannot further consider the issues at this time.”), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 374, 678 A.2d 714 (1996). The Tier Determination Hearings established in Doe were meant to be “summary proceeding[s], limited in nature and scope, ... designed solely to provide review of Tier [Classification and [the] extent of notification.” E.B., 914 F.Supp. at 90. The judicial review afforded at the Tier Determination Hearing does not appear to be an adequate forum to raise constitutional challenges. The nature of the proceeding and the binding affect on the lower courts of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision regarding the constitutional issues preclude the Plaintiffs from adequately being heard on their constitutional claims. Accordingly, Younger abstention is not appropriate in this matter. 2. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is also inapplicable. Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “[Fjederal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a state’s highest court or to evaluate constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s [decision] in a judicial proceeding.” FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840 (quoting Blake v. Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1316 n. 16) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Ernst v. Child and Youth Serv. Of Chester County et al., 108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir.1997). “[T]he existence of a state court judgment ... bars the [F]ederal proceeding under Rooker-Feldman only when entertaining the [Fjederal court claim would be the equivalent of an appellate review of that order.” Id.; Ernst, 108 F.3d at 491 (“[I]t is improper for [Fjederal district courts to exercise jurisdiction over a case that is the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court judgment.”). The Plaintiffs in the instant matter do not seek review of the result of a Tier Determination Hearing, but rather allege those proceedings are unconstitutional. The Plaintiffs were not parties in Doe, the State court decision which held Megan’s Law to be constitutional. Accordingly, the issues in the instant matter are not “inextricably intertwined” with the merits of a decision in the state courts. In addition, the E.B. court found the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to be inapplicable because the plaintiff did not have a “ ‘realistic opportunity to fully and fairly litigate’ his or her [F]ederal constitutional claim in state court.” 914 F.Supp. at 89 (quoting Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1433 (3d Cir.1989)). As discussed, it is not clear Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to present their constitutional claims in the state courts in light of the Doe decision. It does not appear David D. raised his constitutional claims in the state court proceedings. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will not preclude consideration of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims in this matter. B. Temporary Restraining Order ¡Preliminary Injunction “[T]he grant of injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy ... which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” Frank’s CMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir.1988) (citing United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 191 n. 1 (3d Cir.1980)). Four factors are considered in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction: “(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will-result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the prehminary relief will be in the public interest.” American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n. 2 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d Cir.1994)); New Jersey Hosp. Ass’n v. Waldman, 73 F.3d 509; 512 (3d Cir.1995); Clean Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328, 331 (3d Cir.1995); American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1103, 115 S.Ct. 1838, 131 L.Ed.2d 757 (1995); Buraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1438 (3d Cir.1994). All four factors must be present pri- or to granting preliminary injunctive relief. American Tel. And Tel. Co., 42 F.3d at 1427; Duraco Prod., 40 F.3d at 1438; E.B., 914 F.Supp. at 90. The decision to grant or deny a request for a preliminary injunction is within the discretion of the trial court. New Jersey Hosp. Ass’n, 73 F.3d at 512; United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir.1982). Because Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the Request to Enjoin the State Proceedings, the Request to Enjoin Notification and the Request for a Declaratory Judgment, as applied to David D., are denied. 1. Reasonable Probability of Success on the Merits Plaintiffs argue they have a reasonable probability of eventual success on the merits in this litigation on all four constitutional claims raised: 1) procedural due process, 2) double jeopardy, 3) cruel and unusual punishment and 4) privacy. Moving Brief at 4. In support of this contention, Plaintiffs cite the injunction imposed by the Third Circuit pending its decision in W.P. et al. v. Verniero et al, No. 96-5116. Plaintiffs argue the reasonable probability of success is “particularly clear” because W.P. involves two of the same claims raised here: due process and double jeopardy. Id. This argument is not persuasive. W.P. involves claims and parties distinct from the instant matter. The Plaintiffs in this matter are not members of the members of the class certified in W.P. because the offenses committed by Plaintiffs were committed after the passage of Megan’s Law. The class certified in W.P. committed offenses prior to the enactment of Megan’s Law. Moreover, there is no indication what the basis is for the continued stay imposed by the Circuit. Accordingly, extension of the injunction imposed in favor of the W.P. class by the Third Circuit bears no relevance here. a. Fourteenth Amendment Claims Plaintiffs first argue Megan’s Law violates due process. In Doe, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded “judicial review through a summary proceeding should be available prior to notification if sought by any person covered by the law.” 142 N.J. at 30, 662 A.2d 367. The New Jersey Supreme Court directed the Office of the Attorney General to “formulate procedures designed to assure that notice is given in sufficient time prior to Tier [II] or Tier [III] notification to allow the offender to object.” Id. The notice informs the offender of the proposed Tier Classification, the specific manner and details of notification and advises him or her that “unless [an] application is made to a court on or before the date mentioned in the notice (which shall not be shorter than two weeks after the giving of the notice), the notification will take place.” Id. at 30-31, 662 A.2d 367. Upon receipt of the notice, the offender may object to the proposed notification, at which time the court sets a date for a hearing, the Tier Determination Hearing, to decide the issue. Id. at 31, 662 A.2d 367. The court presiding over the Tier Determination Hearing has the authority to determine the extent of witness production, the extent of cross-examination and the use of expert testimony. C.A., 146 N.J. at 83, 679 A.2d 1153. The court may “affirm or reverse the prosecutor’s determination.” Doe, 142 N.J. at 31, 662 A.2d 367. “[I]n the case of a reversal^] the court [must] indicate those respects in which the proposed notification does not conform to the laws and the requirements.” Id. at 31-32, 662 A.2d 367. At the Tier Determination Hearing, the burden of going forward rests with the State. Id. This is satisfied by a prima facie justification of the proposed level and manner of notification, based upon the evidence presented. Id. The burden then moves to the offender to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the State did not conform to the laws and guidelines. Id. Plaintiffs contend the procedures developed violate due process. Plaintiffs contend the hearings are criminal in nature and, therefore, warrant the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Moving Brief at 5. Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that, if the proceedings are deemed to be civil in nature, the hearings unconstitutionally place the burden on the offender. Moving Brief at 16. i. Protection of Fifth and Sixth Amendment Inapplicable The Plaintiffs proffer the factors found in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963) for a determination of whether the hearing proceedings are penal in nature, warranting the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment. Moving Brief at 5. Plaintiffs appear to argue that the Act establishes criminal proceedings and, therefore, Megan’s Law is penal in nature. Under Mendoza-Martinez, the factors deemed relevant are: Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, [7] and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id. at 168-69, 83 S.Ct. at 567-68. The factors enunciated in Mendoza-Martinez are appropriate to the determination of whether the proceedings warrant the protection of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The New Jersey Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have criticized the use of the Mendoza-Martinez factors outside of that context. See Artway v. Attorney General of State of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1262 (3d Cir.) (“Mendoza-Martinez is inapplicable outside the context of determining whether a proceeding is sufficiently criminal in nature to warrant the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments”), reh’g denied, 83 F.3d 594 (1996); Doe, 142 N.J. at 60-61 & n. 14, 662 A.2d 367 (“clear thrust of repeated Supreme Court decisions is that the Mendoza-Martinez ‘test’ has been rejected in all contexts other than those that present the question whether the proceedings are civil or criminal____”). Recently, however, the Supreme Court employed some of these factors to determine whether the Sexually Violent Predator Act, legislated in Kansas, established a criminal proceeding and, thus, constituted punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Kansas v. Hendricks, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2078, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). The Court was “unpersuaded” that the act, which permitted the civil confinement of sexually violent predators following their criminal sentence, was a criminal proceeding. The Court concluded the act was not punishment “predicated upon past conduct for which [an offender] has already been convicted and forced to serve a prison sentence.” Id., at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2081. Under the guidance of Hendricks, it appears the factors, or at least some of the factors, are instructive to the determination of whether a measure is penal in nature. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (factors, though “neither exhaustive nor dispositive,” are nonetheless helpful.). See, infra, note 25. The balancing of the factors, as applied to Megan’s Law, however, does not favor a finding that the Tier Determination Hearings are criminal proceedings. A. Affirmative Restraint Plaintiffs argue the proceedings represent an affirmative disability or restraint upon them. Plaintiffs argue: “Community notification has a significant impact on an individual’s very ability to lead a normal law-abiding life in society. It subjects [Plaintiffs to vigilantism, forces them to leave the state to avoid the stigma of notification, impairs their opportunities for work and damages their reputations and ability to develop and maintain stable relationships.” Moving Brief at 5-6. “The essence of [Federalism is that [S]tates must be free to develop a variety of solutions to problems.... ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1812, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). Community notification is such a solution. Community notification arms-those most vulnerable with the knowledge necessary for self-protection. It is a legitimate, non-punitive governmental objective that does not constitute an affirmative restraint. Hendricks, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2083 (State’s “measures to restrict the freedom of the dangerously mentally ill” not affirmative restraint). Contrary to the argument of the Plaintiffs, the conduct or the effects about which the offenders complain are not affirmative restraints imposed by Megan’s Law. Rather, the effects, if in fact they are realized, are unintended consequences that occur as a result of the offender’s crime. The fact that undesirable repercussions may occur cannot be a basis for rendering the Act an affirmative disability or restraint imposed by the State. Any negative consequences that arise from the criminal conduct of a Plaintiff (or the awareness of such conduct) can be and should be controlled through the local police power, not through the abrogation of appropriate remedial legislation designed to protect society. See Doe, 142 N.J. at 43, 662 A.2d 367 (“the most searching inquiry is required before condemning honest laws that are free of punitive intent and designed to protect society”). As well, the Notification Provision does not constitute an affirmative restraint because the information gathered and disseminated by the State is, for the most part, already available in the public domain. The Plaintiffs do not have a liberty or privacy interest in the information to prevent its disclosure because the information is public record. Although, the State’s finding of a potential for re-offense is not part of the public record, that finding is a conclusion based upon an assessment of the public record. It does not impose an affirmative restraint upon the offender. B. Historically Viewed as Punishment Plaintiffs argue notifying communities of an offender’s crimes and categorizing the offender as dangerous subjects him or her to public opprobrium, humiliation and shame. Plaintiffs contend “[s]uch a measure has historically been understood as being punishment.” Moving Brief at 7. Contrary to the argument of Plaintiff's, “[the] [Government has always had the authority to warn the community about the presence of dangerous persons, and such warnings have never been understood as imposing unconstitutional ‘punishment.’” W.P., 931 F.Supp. at 1217 (citing, as an example, “Wanted” posters which warn that a fugitive is armed or dangerous). A statute does not constitute punishment “even though its remedial provisions have some inevitable deterrent impact, and even though it may indirectly and adversely affect, potentially severely, some of those subject to its provisions.” Doe, 142 N.J. at 43, 662 A.2d 367. The first provision in Megan’s Law outlines its remedial intent — to hedge the danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders through the implementation of a system of registration, identification and, if necessary, notification. Its purpose is to prevent similar crimes in the future by notifying the community, when necessary, of the danger of potential re-offense. It is meant to enhance protection through knowledge not to promote vigilantism. Any violent repercussions argued by the Plaintiffs as a “natural and anticipated outgrowth” of Megan’s Law, see First Amended Complaint, ¶ 40, can, and should, be prevented through action taken by local law enforcement, not the eradication of this appropriate remedial legislation. The humiliation and shame felt by the offender originates in the underlying crimes committed, not in the notification procedure or in the reaction of the public to such conduct. See Doe v. Kelley, 961 F.Supp. 1105, 1110 (W.D.Mich.1997) (“Unlike historical uses of branding, shaming and banishment, the notification provisions do not affirmatively impose any suffering, restraint or obligation on the offender”). Although ostracism may be a possible consequence of notification, that is not the intended purpose of Megan’s Law. It is simply result — oriented sophistry to argue the Act was designed or implemented to promote ostracism. If ostracism occurs, it is the direct, foreseeable result of the abhorrent conduct of an offender. As well, there are numerous “critical, dis-positive differences” between community notification and the “public shaming” punishments of the colonial era. W.P., 931 F.Supp. at 1216. Unlike Megan’s Law, the historical punishment of public shaming lacked a remedial purpose and served solely to punish an individual through degradation. Historic shaming punishment was widespread as notification was made to the whole of society. Megan’s Law, in contrast, is tailored to limit notification, if it occurs at all, to protect those most vulnerable and “likely to encounter the offender.” Doe, 142 N.J. at 29-30, 662 A.2d 367. Finally, the effects of the historical shaming punishment were inevitable as they were “an integral part of the sentence.” W.P., 931 F.Supp. at 1217. The repercussions of Megan’s Law, however, are indirect consequences not part of the Act itself. “Megan’s Law is not a lust for retribution; it is a measured attempt to achieve remedial with attendant deterrent goals.” Id. Although violence against an offender is not tolerable, the offender should not, and cannot, expect community approval. C. Scienter Plaintiffs argue: “While [the] criminal mens rea may have long since disappeared by the time the [offender] is released and tiered, it is assumed by the legislature to continue throughout incarceration, and at least fifteen years thereafter.” Moving Brief at 8 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2). The high recidivism rate of sex offenders is well-documented and a cited justification behind the Act. See Doe, 142 N.J. at 15 & n. 1, 662 A.2d 367 (“the relative recidivism rate of sex offenders is high compared to other offenders; treatment success of sex offenders exhibiting repetitive and compulsive characteristics is low; and the time span between initial offense and re-offense can be long.”). This is recognized by Plaintiffs in the Verified Complaint. There Plaintiffs demanded a class because the proposed members were “so numerous” that other mechanisms would be unworkable and because the “number of the class members will continue to rise indefinitely.” Verified Complaint, ¶ 7. Plaintiffs argue, however: “In addition to having no factual basis for this assumption [of a high recidivism rate] other than disputed statistics regarding rates of recidivism, the notification laws are nonetheless triggered by a criminal conviction and, thus, a finding of scienter.” Moving Brief at 8. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, it is not a finding of scienter or mens rea which triggers the notification laws. Megan’s Law applies to those who committed one of the enumerated offenses, regardless of whether criminal mens rea existed at the time of the crime. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 (legislation encompasses persons found not guilty by reason of insanity). See also Hendricks, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2082 (no finding of scienter where commitment determination is made based on mental abnormality rather than criminal intent). Further, scienter is not present because of the fact that the State must demonstrate for the purpose of determining the Tier Classification and level of notification. Rather, the State employs a series of factors to determine the risk of re-offense. Any “focus on prior offenses is not due to any attempt at punishment but is rather a scientific attempt to better protect the public safety from [offenders] likely to re-offend.” C.A., 146 N.J. at 105, 679 A.2d 1158. The absence of scienter is evidence that notification pursuant to Megan’s Law is not intended to be retribution or punishment. Hendricks, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2082. D. Deterrence and Retribution Plaintiffs contend: “[T]he very purpose of public notification is to describe to the community the details of a person’s sexual crime, to inform them that a dangerous sex offender is living in its midst, and to cause both the offender and the public to change their behavior in response to this notification.” Moving Brief at 8. Plaintiffs argue the retributive and deterrent effects of notification cannot be explained as solely remedial. Id. A statute does not constitute punishment “even though its remedial provisions have some inevitable deterrent impact, and even though it may indirectly and adversely affect, potentially severely, some of those subject to its provisions.” Doe, 142 N.J. at 43, 662 A.2d 367. See also United States v. Ursery, — U.S. —, -, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2149, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (a deterrent purpose “may serve civil as well as criminal goals”) . (citations omitted). The stated purpose of the Act is remedial. It was enacted as a self-defense mechanism for the protection of those individuals in a community who would otherwise suffer because of their ignorance. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1. Megan’s Law does not “affix culpability for prior criminal conduct. Instead, such conduct is used solely for evidentiary purposes, ... to support a finding of future dangerousness.” Hendricks, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2082. Nor is “a criminal conviction a prerequisite” before the provisions of the Act take effect. Id.; see N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 (Megan’s Law encompasses those found not guilty by reason of insanity). The provisions of Megan’s Law do not implicate retribution or deterrence. If re-offense is deterred because the offender has changed his or her future behavior, that is an added benefit; such will not displace the primary remedial purpose of the legislation. United States v. Borjesson, 92 F.3d 954, 956 (9th Cir.) (although the asserted non-punitive goals “may resemble the legitimate objectives of punishment[,] including deterrence and incapaeitation[,]” that does not change the essentially remedial character of debarment, the procedure in issue.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 622, 136 L.Ed.2d 545 (1996); Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 777 n. 14, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1945 n. 14, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) (“[W]hether a sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant’s perspective, as even remedial sanctions carry the ‘sting of punishment.’ ”) (quotation omitted). Plaintiffs were convicted after the enactment of Megan’s Law. As with any conviction, the offender was aware at the time of the offense that certain collateral disabilities may result upon a finding of guilt — loss of voting privileges, inability to hold public office, loss of a professional license, deportation, etc. Here, the offender was aware, prior to the commission of the crime, that he or she may be subject to community notification. Notification is not punishment; it is a collateral, civil consequence resulting from the sex offense. E. Behavior to Which Act Applies is Already a Crime The Plaintiffs argue: “[E]very individual subject to Megan’s Law must be deemed to have committed a sexual offense ____ The entire thrust of the law is to single out those who have committed a particular type of criminal offense in an effort to deter similar future criminal behavior.” Moving Brief at 9. Plaintiffs further argue: “The behavior to which the law applies is ... already a crime.” Id. Megan’s Law was passed to provide knowledge as a measure of self-defense to help protect those most vulnerable in the community. It does not seek to retry an offender for a crime for which he or she has already been convicted and punished. Although it is the prior conviction which triggers the Act, no notification is made without a current individualized assessment of the comparative risk of re-offense. This assessment does include considerations of prior conduct. See Hendricks, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2080 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2644, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) (“[previous instances of violent behavior are an important indicator of future violent tendencies”); Scholl v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2417, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (explaining that “from a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct.”)). See also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 371, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 2993, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986) (statute non-punitive although triggered by a sexual assault). It also includes, however, “the offender’s record after conviction, after release, the record up to the very date of the Tier [Classification and notification, including responsiveness to treatment, whether positive or negative.” Doe, 142 N.J. at 74, 662 A.2d 367. See also W.P., 931 F.Supp. at 1217 (recognizing that sentencing for the commitment of a crime and determination of a Tier Classification involves separate risk assessments). The focus is on the likelihood of future misconduct, rather than on the culpability of a past act. See Hendricks, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2082 (where law did not “affix culpability for prior criminal conduct,” it was not a criminal proceeding); Allen, 478 U.S. at 371, 106 S.Ct. at 2993 (prior criminal conduct used not to punish but “to show the ... mental condition and to predict future behavior”); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 1155, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (“The question in each case where unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity or whether the restriction of the individual comes a