Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES GARRITY, District Judge. Until its dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on November 19, 1996, this was a civil rights action brought on behalf of Julia McLaughlin, a white twelve-year-old resident of Hyde Park, by her mother Catherine McLaughlin, seeking admission to the seventh grade at Boston Latin School (“BLS”). Julia had not previously attended Boston public schools, having completed the sixth grade at St. Mary of the Hills School, an elementary parochial school in Milton. Plaintiffs complaint was filed on August 11, 1995, by Michael C. McLaughlin, Esq. (“McLaughlin”), Juba’s father, for whom she now applies for attorneys’ fees as well as for fees for the law firm of O’Brien, Partlow & White, P.C. (“OFW”) which handled major aspects of the litigation. Background Plaintiffs complaint asserted at length a mix of federal and state claims, some of which were later withdrawn or dismissed summarily. The essence of her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was that she was denied admission to BLS because 35% of the seats in the entering class had been reserved by the defendants for Black and Hispanic students, several of whom were admitted despite having scored lower than plaintiff on the annual entrance examination. The central allegation of the complaint was that the defendants’ 35% set-aside for Black and Hispanic appbcants violated plaintiffs civil rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants’ position was that the classification at issue was narrowly tailored to advance compelhng governmental and educational interests and therefore could withstand strict constitutional scrutiny. The nature and resolution of the litigation are described in detail in McLaughlin v. Boston School Committee, 938 F.Supp. 1001 (D.Mass.1996), and McLaughlin v. Boston School Committee, 952 F.Supp. 33 (D.Mass.1996). After issuing an order to show cause dated April 17, 1996, the court revisited plaintiffs application for a preliminary injunction. On August 22, 1996, the court ordered preliminarily that the defendants admit plaintiff to the eighth grade when the 1996 summer recess ended and classes resumed for the 1996-97 school year. Trial was scheduled to start on November 19, 1996. The court had denied, at plaintiffs urging, a series of requests by defendants for postponement until after an advisory group, appointed by the Boston School Committee (“BSC”) in September 1996, had completed a study of possible alternatives to existing examination school assignment processes and filed a report of its recommendations. On November 14, 1996, the defendants voted to waive any right to reassign plaintiff from BLS, thus making the prebminary injunction effectuaby permanent. On November 15, 1996, the defendants filed a suggestion of mootness. After briefing and hearing argument, the court found, over plaintiffs opposition, that defendants’ suggestion of mootness was timely and dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After dismissal, plaintiff filed applications for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to which the following distinctive features of the case appear to be germane: 1. It was an individual suit, not a class action. 2. Plaintiff was represented by her father, an attorney, and by two other attorneys. 3. Virtually all relevant facts were undisputed. 4. Direct testimony was ordered, with consent of the parties, to be filed in writing months before the trial date. 5. On the eve of trial, defendants voluntarily agreed to keep plaintiff at BLS as long as her grades were satisfactory. 6. Plaintiff did not obtain a judgment, consent decree, or settlement in this action, which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The roles of the attorneys for whom plaintiff seeks compensation changed during the pendency of the action. For the first month (“Phase I” of the litigation), McLaughlin was sole counsel. After the complaint was filed, a partner at the law firm where McLaughlin was counsel contacted Mark A. White, Esq. and asked if he would be interested in becoming involved in the ease. White phoned McLaughlin to discuss the matter and on August 28, 1996, attended as a spectator the first hearing on plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. Thereafter McLaughlin met with members of OPW and told them that he was not a trial lawyer and needed experienced trial counsel. On September 11, 1995, White filed his notice of appearance, soon joined by his partner, R. Keith Partlow, Esq. For approximately the next year (“Phase II”), White and Partlow handled virtually all the details of the litigation, culminating in the court’s order on August 22, 1996, that plaintiff be enrolled at BLS. They drafted, briefed, and argued every motion and filed and followed up on every discovery request, but had no significant contact with either the real or nominal plaintiff. During this period, McLaughlin’s services were confined to reviewing and making some revisions in documents drafted by OPW and attending court hearings, depositions, and conferences, mainly as an onlooker. He also consulted and engaged a husband and wife team of expert witnesses, the Thernstroms. However, McLaughlin’s representation of plaintiff occurred primarily in the court of public opinion, explaining to local and national news media the objectives and status of his daughter’s lawsuit. A third period of representation (“Phase III”) began after August 1996. Several instances arose in which OPW had disagreements with McLaughlin and most, if not all, subsequent motions were signed solely by McLaughlin, who had decided to become lead trial counsel for the third phase. Working with volunteer law school students, he also briefed and argued plaintiffs unsuccessful opposition to defendants’ suggestion of mootness that led to dismissal of the case on November 19, 1996. The period after dismissal until January 9, 1997, the date of the final hearing on McLaughlin’s amended application for fees, we refer to as “Phase IV.” Applications for Fees and Court’s Duty Pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (West.Supp.1997), providing in part that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs,” plaintiff applied for attorneys’ fees and expenses exceeding $300,000 ($209,418.28 for McLaughlin and $93,235.36 for OPW) plus an upward adjustment of an unspecified percentage to reward successful efforts. The dates to which counsels’ services and plaintiffs application for fees principally relate are the following: August 11, 1995 — Complaint filed by McLaughlin, the last four pages of which are appended as Appendix A, in six counts and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; August 28, 1995 — Hearing on motion for preliminary injunction; October 10, 1995 — Hearing on plaintiffs motion for reconsideration; April 17, 1996 — Hearing on cross motions for summary judgment at which plaintiffs motion was denied and, on defendants’ motion, three counts in the complaint were dismissed, as follows: I. claiming violations of plaintiffs rights under the Fifth Amendment; III. claiming violation of unspecified statutes of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; and VI. claiming a scheme to deceive plaintiff in granting admissions to BLS; August 22, 1996 — Preliminary injunction entered ordering plaintiffs admission to BLS; November IS, 1996 — Final pretrial conference; November 19, 1996 — Hearing on defendants’ suggestion of mootness based upon BSC vote on November 14, 1996, permitting plaintiff to remain at BLS; and dismissal for mootness. In addition to attending the four hearings and final pretrial conference listed, plaintiffs counsel’s services included attending eight scheduling conferences and one settlement conference, taking two depositions, drafting the motions heard and preparing exhibits and testimony for the anticipated trial. Defendants have directed a barrage of objections, legal and factual, against the applications. In considering them, the court is obliged to undertake an independent review of the legality and reasonableness of plaintiffs requests. See Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 529 (1st Cir.1991); Gabriele v. Southworth, 712 F.2d 1505, 1507 (1st Cir.1983). As stated in Foley v. City of Lowell, 948 F.2d 10 (1st Cir.1991), “at least where public funds are involved or the public interest is otherwise implicated, the court has the duty to consider the application critically to ensure overall fairness.... ” Id. at 19. Both public funds and the public interest are involved here. The court has carefully reviewed plaintiffs applications critically in light of legal precedents, defendants’ numerous factual objections, its own experience, plaintiffs voluminous error-filled submissions, and three hearings on fee applications. Due to deficiencies in plaintiffs initial applications under § 1988, her successive ones for her father became virtually a case of their own, contrary to the admonition in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), that “[a] request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.” “Prevailing Party” under j2 U.S.C. § 1988 Defendants’ response to plaintiffs applications starts with a blanket legal objection which we address first because, if sustained, it would bar plaintiff from recovering any attorneys’ fees at all. Defendants submit that plaintiff was not a “prevailing party” as defined by Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). To qualify for recovery of “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs” under § 1988, plaintiff must be a prevailing party within the meaning of that section. Unquestionably, she prevailed in the usual sense of the word, having gained enrollment at the school which had denied her admission. However, the statutory meaning of “prevailing” in § 1988 has been the subject of several Supreme Court opinions of which Farrar v. Hobby, argue the defendants, commands the denial of plaintiffs pending applications in toto. While acknowledging the relevance of defendants’ argument, the court disagrees. The essence of defendants’ position in this regard is that the instant case was not decided on the merits but became moot before trial. Hence, plaintiff must rely upon the catalyst theory of recovery, described briefly in the court’s Supplementary Memorandum, McLaughlin, 952 F.Supp. at 36, and applied in numerous cases in this circuit and district. See e.g., Paris v. United States Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236 (1st Cir.1993); Pearson v. Fair, 980 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.1992); Kerry B. v. Union 53 Pub. Schools, 882 F.Supp. 184 (D.Mass.1995). As explained in Paris: To be a catalyst the party must demonstrate (1) a causal connection between the litigation and the relief sought and (2) that the success was not obtained by a gratuitous gesture of the fee-target. The suit need not be the sole cause but must play a “provocative” role or be a “competent producing cause.” Paris, 988 F.2d at 241 (citation omitted). Defendants do not contest that plaintiffs suit was a catalyst contributing to her admission to BLS. Enter Farrar. After a review of prior Supreme Court decisions construing the phrase “prevailing party,” the Court concluded that under these cases: The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement. Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement. Otherwise the judgment or settlement cannot be said to “affec[t] the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff.” Only under these circumstances can civil rights litigation effect “the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties ” and thereby transform the plaintiff into a prevailing party. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111, 113 S.Ct. at 573 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Whether the catalyst theory of recovery survives Farrar has produced a division of circuit authority. The question was answered negatively in S-1 and S-2 v. State Board of Education, 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 876, 115 S.Ct. 205, 130 L.Ed.2d 135 (1994); and affirmatively elsewhere. See also Joel H. Trotter, Note, “The Catalyst Theory of Civil Rights Fee Shifting After Farrar v. Hobby,” 80 Va.L.Rev. 1429 (1994). Instead of weighing the weight of authority, we simply state our reasons for concluding that the catalyst theory survives in this district and an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee to plaintiff is not barred by that Supreme Court decision. First, the holding in Farrar was that a plaintiff who won nominal damages at trial was a prevailing party, and that the prevailing party inquiry does not depend upon the magnitude of the relief obtained, Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112, 114, 113 S.Ct. at 573, 574-75. The Court did not discuss the effect of its holding on the catalyst theory. Therefore, the foregoing excerpt is dictum and is not binding on lower courts. Second, Farrar’s repeated concern, emphasized by Judge Wilkinson on behalf of the 7 to 6 en banc majority of the Fourth Circuit in S-l and S-2, that a plaintiff who obtained no effectively enforceable relief should not recover an attorney’s fee, does not apply to the instant case. Plaintiff did obtain enforceable relief of sorts in the form of the court’s ordering plaintiffs admission to BLS over defendants’ objection that the order, though called “preliminary,” would in effect be permanent. See McLaughlin, 938 F.Supp. at 1010. Third, in decisions subsequent to Farrar, no court in this circuit has interpreted that case as abolishing the catalyst theory. On the contrary, the Paris and Kerry B. cases, supra, while not addressing the precise issue raised by defendants’ pending objection, awarded fees on the basis of the catalyst theory and cited the Farrar case in the course of their opinions. Just recently, in Williams v. Hanover Housing Authority, 113 F.3d 1294 (1st Cir.1997), the First Circuit awarded attorney’s fees under § 1988, stating that “it is well-settled in this circuit that a § 1983 plaintiff seeking attorneys’ fees under § 1988 may establish ‘prevailing party’ status under a ‘catalyst’ as well as a merits’ analysis. See, e.g., Paris, 988 F.2d at 241.” Id. at 1299. Accordingly, the defendants’ blanket legal objection is overruled. Lodestar Calculations Defendants’ objections to plaintiffs applications challenge their reasonableness in all respects. The requirements for obtaining awards of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 have been well settled since 1983 when the Supreme Court decided Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). From time to time the standard has been refined, see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986), and it has been described and applied in countless lower court opinions, including many by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The customary first step is to multiply the hours reasonably spent on the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate of compensation prevailing in the relevant community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Then, the court evaluates the reasonableness of the hours-times-rate product in relation to the results obtained by plaintiff in the litigation. See Morgan v. Gittens, 915 F.Supp. 457 (D.Mass.1996). Also, the court should consider any claim by plaintiff that the product, called the “lodestar,” should be enhanced due to exceptional success. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. Black’s Law Dictionary contains this definition: Lodestar Rule. In determining amount of statutorily authorized attorneys’ fees, “lodestar” is equal to number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by prevailing hourly rate in community for similar work and is then adjusted to reflect other factors such as contingent nature of suit and quality of representation. Id. at 941 (6th ed.1990). White and Partlow With significant exceptions, the hours recorded by OPW were reasonable and characterized by sound billing judgment. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40. In affidavits appended to their brief filed December 26, 1996, White and Partlow attested to the general accuracy of their claimed hours. Their recitations of services performed are consistent with the progress of the litigation and with the filing deadlines and hearing dates scheduled by the court. In general, the hours claimed accord with the court’s opinion as to the time reasonably required to perform the services described and are in many instances corroborated by computer printouts offered by OPW. The hours claimed also indicate an underlying effort to avoid duplication of services. White did most of the talking at court hearings and conferences, and Partlow took the depositions and did most of the brief writing. Finally, the nature of services performed on particular dates is usually described adequately in OPW’s time records. Furthermore, OPW is not seeking compensation for time spent preparing or arguing applications for attorneys’ fees. Presumably, when a firm keeps reasonably accurate and contemporaneous records, in keeping with the mandate of Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 951-52 (1st Cir.1984), preparation of an invoice for services is relatively routine and can be accomplished for the most part by secretaries and staff. See Brewster v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 488, 494 (1st Cir.1993); Jacobs v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d 559, 563 (1st Cir.1987). Nevertheless, the total compensable hours claimed by OPW are excessive in two respects. First, an unjustifiably large amount of time was spent in connection with plaintiffs motion for reconsideration filed September 22,1995, which was based on new information, viz., minutes of the school committee meeting on December 12, 1989, concerning a high school student assignment plan supplementing a plan for the lower grades already in effect. Its only provisions applicable to BLS were at p. 6, ¶ 3, “for the Latin schools, the admission policies and racial percentage guidelines established by the court will continue to be in effect,” and at p. 8, ¶ 5.0, “the present assignment procedure for the three examination schools, established by Judge Garrity, will continue to be in effect.” Plaintiff submitted that these provisions were nullified by prior votes of the black members of the committee then in office and therefore the defendants’ continuing use of the 35% set-aside was ultra vires. On good grounds, defendants characterized the motion as “a frivolous waste of time.” Applicant counsel requested compensation totalling $23,530 for time spent in connection with it, including 56 hours by White and 12 hours by Partlow. The court finds that: 1) the new theory stated in the motion was not mentioned in plaintiffs complaint and was “distinct in all respects,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. at 1943, from plaintiffs constitutional claims; 2) the motion was unsupported factually and legally; and 3) it was denied. In our opinion, the time reasonably spent by OPW on this motion was half the number of hours logged by White and Partlow; 28 and 8 respectively. Second, Partlow’s application is further disallowed by half of the unreasonably large amount of time, 63.04 hours, devoted to the cross-motions for summary judgment heard on April 12, 1996. Specifically, 1) Partlow’s presentation was a rehash of the relevant part of OPW’s argument in support of plaintiffs motion for reconsideration; 2) he continued to endorse Counts I, III and VI of the complaint when he should have known that they were patently without merit; and 3) plaintiffs reply memorandum filed on April 9, 1996, to which Partlow devoted 20 hours, added virtually nothing besides gross hyperbole to the main brief previously filed. As reduced, we find that total hours reasonably spent by White were 122 and by Partlow 180 and turn now to the issue of reasonable hourly rates. The controlling law is clear and dates back at least to Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). There the Supreme Court stated: To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence — in addition to the attorney’s oim affidavits — that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. A rate determined in this way is normally deemed to be reasonable, and is referred to — for convenience — as the prevailing market rate. Id. at 896 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 1547 n. 11 (emphasis added). See also Andrade v. Jamestown Housing Auth., 82 F.3d 1179, 1190 (1st Cir.1996). OPW proposed $250 as a reasonable hourly rate for both White and Partlow who filed affidavits stating that $250 is their customary rate for the services they normally render. However, OPW failed to supply the court with the support required by the Supreme Court in Blum and later cases. Rather, it filed a compilation of hourly rates from large local law firms that was of no assistance to the court. At the initial hearing on attorneys’ fees on December 30, 1996, the court called counsel’s attention to the absence of the proper proof, viz. affidavits from local lawyers familiar with going rates for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable experience. In response, White named a prominent civil rights lawyer who, White expected, would file a conforming affidavit on OPW’s behalf. White said that it would be filed within a week; but it never was. In subsequent filings, including second and third affidavits by both White and Partlow, OPW, on January 3, 1997, filed affidavits by four qualified local attorneys attesting to market rates for work in complex civil litigation including civil rights cases by lawyers of comparable experience, ranging from $200 to $325 per hour. In opposition, a defense affidavit by corporation counsel for the City of Boston stated that the City, in routine civil matters, retains trial lawyers expert in civil rights litigation at an hourly rate of $110; and that in her tenure she never paid more than $175 per hour for civil rights defense. Plaintiff responded that lawyers frequently engaged by a municipality generally reduce their rates for a steady governmental client. This is probably a valid point. In deciding where to place an hourly rate on the spectrum outlined, the court has relied not only on the prevailing market rate but also on three additional considerations: 1) the professional backgrounds and experience of White and Partlow, both first-rate but without prior experience in civil rights litigation; 2) their performance in the case at bar, capable but subject to the criticism, discussed above, as to reasonable numbers of hours; and 3) the twelve traditional factors set forth originally in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir.1974), and discussed in Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91-96, 109 S.Ct. 939, 943-46, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989). In our opinion and finding, the prevailing market rate for the quality and kind of work done by White and Partlow in this litigation, a civil rights case involving significant matters of law but virtually undisputed facts, is $200 per hour. With further reference to reasonable hourly rates, it is well-settled that different hourly rates are appropriate when the same attorney performs different kinds of work. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892 (D.C.Cir.1980); Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915, 920-21 (1st Cir.1980). In view of the caution expressed in Miles v. Sampson, 675 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.1982), that rates not be graded “in an overly refined manner,” id. at 9, the relatively broad classifications in Brewster v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 488, 492 n. 4 (1st Cir.1993), distinguishing between “core” and “non-core” services seem preferable, as follows: Core work includes legal research, writing of legal documents, court appearances, negotiations with opposing counsel, monitoring and implementation of court orders. Non-core work consists of less demanding tasks, including letter writing and telephone conversations. In addition, non-core services also include attendance at court hearings in a non-participatory capacity and conferences with co-counsel. See Hart v. Bourque, 798 F.2d 519, 523 (1st Cir.1986); Ricci v. Key Bancshares of Maine, Inc. 111 F.R.D. 369, 378-79 (D.Me.1986); Refuse & Environmental Systems, Inc. v. Industrial Services of America, 732 F.Supp. 1209, 1217 (D.Mass.1990). Guided by these classifications, we conducted a thorough analysis of the time records filed by OPW and find that White performed 43 hours and Partlow 51 hours of non-core services. In deciding upon hourly rates of compensation, the most frequently used ratio in this circuit appears to be 3 to 2. In this instance, compensation for non-core services becomes $135 per hour. Plaintiffs claim for OPW expenses of $555 is also allowed. These findings translate into the following lodestar calculations for OPW’s services and expenses: White: Hours Award Claimed 150 @ $250 ($37,500) Disallowed 28 Allowed 122 Core 79 @ $200 $15,800 Non-Core 43 @ $135 5,805 $21,605 Parflow: Claimed 220 @ $250 ($55,000) Disallowed 40 Allowed 180 Core 130 @ $200 $26,000 Non-Core 50 @ $135 6,750 $32,750 OPW: Expenses $ 555 TOTAL $54,910 Thus the lodestar calculation for OPW services and expenses is $54,910, rounded to $55,000. Next we consider plaintiffs level of success attributable to OPW and whether its award should be reduced because plaintiff achieved only limited success, as argued by defendants. The first and definitive statement of the law in this regard appears in Hensley as follows: We hold that the extent of a plaintiffs success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee. Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney’s fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. at 1943. The court finds, with respect to the advocacy on her behalf by White and Partlow, that plaintiffs lawsuit was wholly successful. They focused on her prayer for admission to BLS and, upon achieving that goal, were given secondary roles. In sum, the defendants’ argument for reduction of OPW’s fees is rejected. On the other side of the coin, OPW makes two arguments supporting lodestar enhancement: first that engagement in this litigation precluded employment in others. No doubt it did. However, the law is clear that this factor “is not relevant unless counsel affirmatively establish not merely that they lost business, but that the foregone opportunities would have been more profitable than what the court otherwise would propose to award.” Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 47 n. 2 (1st cir.1979). As stated in Rogers v. Motta, 655 F.Supp. 39, 44 n. 2 (D.Mass.1986), “the attorney must convincingly show that the other business would have been more profitable than the court would likely award for his services in the civil rights case.” In this instance, applicants have simply submitted conclusory assertions, unconvincing because unsupported by affidavits or anything else in the record. Finally, OPW seeks enhancement of the lodestar figure because of the exceptional success of this action. It asserts that the results obtained were “distinctly beneficial” due to their “commendable diligence and ability.” With this the court agrees. However, although Hensley stated that “the important factor of ‘results obtained’ “may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward,” id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1940, OPW has not submitted specific evidence which would overcome the strong presumption that the lodestar represents a reasonable fee. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565-66, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3098-99, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). The latter case “makes clear that adjustments are not to be given in reward for stellar performance.” Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 929 (1st Cir.1987). As further explained by the First Circuit, “we have repeatedly cautioned that such enhancements will be rare. The exception is a tiny one — and we will not permit it to eclipse the rule.” Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 942 (1st Cir.1992) (citations omitted). Accordingly, plaintiffs request for an enhancement is denied and the court’s prior findings as to reasonable fees for White and Partlow in terms of the modified lodestar calculations are affirmed. The award to plaintiff for OPW’s services and expenses is $54,910, rounded to $55,000. Was McLaughlin Pro Se ? Before discussing several problems raised by McLaughlin’s application, we consider defendants’ opposition to any award of fees to plaintiff for his services on the grounds that he was representing himself as well as his daughter and was a pro se litigant within the meaning of Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991). Plaintiff in that case, which bars fees under § 1988 to pro se litigants, was an attorney challenging the constitutionality of a state statute which kept his name off the ballot in a primary election. He prevailed in the case but was denied fees because he represented himself and attorneys are no exception to the general rule that pro se litigants do not qualify for the fee-shifting benefits of § 1988. The Supreme Court said “that the overriding statutory concern is the interest in obtaining independent counsel for victims of civil rights violations____ Even a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a disadvantage in courtroom litigation.” Id. at 437, 111 S.Ct. at 1437-38. Obviously, the instant case is distinguishable from Kay because McLaughlin was on the record representing his daughter, not himself. Defendants rely on two cases applying Kay and disallowing attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs: Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F.Supp. 609 (D.Md.1993) and Miller v. West Lafayette Community School Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905 (Ind.1996). They also contend that McLaughlin’s personal stake in the outcome of the case, including his economic interest in avoiding tuition in private schools comparable to public BLS, and his frequent identification with his family bring him within the rationale of these cited decisions. The court has a different view. First, unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, McLaughlin was not representing himself. Despite his rhetorical flourishes, he had no constitutional complaint of his own and no standing to bring this action independently. Only the constitutional rights of his daughter plaintiff were at issue. The applicants in the Kay, Rappaport, and Miller cases were suing on their own behalf. The sole plaintiff in Kay was himself the attorney applying for fees. Rappaport and Miller were both actions under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., whose § 1415(b)(2) and (e)(2) confer explicitly upon the parents of a handicapped child the rights to be heard administratively and to bring a civil action. The language in Rappaport emphasized by defendants on this question, “because of the close, natural relationship between parent and child, a parent’s representation of [his] child is effectively pro se representation,” appears in a sentence which reads in full as follows: “Because the language of the statute identifies the parent with the child, and because of the close natural relationship between parent and child, a parent’s representation of a disabled child is effectively pro se representation.” Rappaport, 812 F.Supp. at 612 (emphasis added). The statute controlling here, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, contains no such identifying language. Moreover, Rappaport carefully avoided extending the term “pro se” to include situations where parents represent their children; instead it drew an analogy, stating at the end of the same paragraph, “the parent’s representing the child in administrative proceedings is analogous to the parent representing himself.” Rappaport, 812 F.Supp. at 612 (emphasis added). In addition, no precedent known to the court has held that a lawyer who represents his child is acting pro se. Perhaps sufficient reasons exist for enactment of a rule to that effect, such as the advantages of obtaining independent counsel and the danger of emotion overcoming reason, in line with the opinion of the Supreme Court in Kay. However, this court is not the appropriate authority for promulgation of such a rule. Nor would this be an appropriate case. Before filing the complaint, McLaughlin tried unsuccessfully to enlist other lawyers to represent his daughter. But for his readiness to proceed personally, plaintiffs complaint might never have been filed and her enrollment at BLS never achieved. Hence Kay is inapplicable and does not bar plaintiff from recovering a reasonable attorneys’ fee for her father under § 1988. However, McLaughlin’s application is objectionable in several other respects. One is its inclusion of invoices totalling $31,132 addressed to him by non-lawyers whom he engaged to assist him. A summary of the applicable law follows. Costs and Expenses Fee shifting under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is part of cost-shifting, which antedates fee-shifting and has a federal legislative history highlighted by the 1853 Fee Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (West Supp.1997). “The sweeping reforms of the 1853 Act have been carried forward to today, ‘without any apparent intent to change the controlling rules.’ ” Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 440, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 2496, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987) (citation omitted). In the area of cost-shifting, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991) {‘WVUH”), is as central to our analysis as are the Farrar and Kay cases in previous sections. It stated that the word “costs” under § 1988 means the same as in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, WVUH, 499 U.S. at 87 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. at 1141 n. 3, viz., out-of-pocket expenses “actually paid in prosecuting or defending an action,” United States v. Spann, 797 F.Supp. 980, 981 (S.D.Fla.1992) (emphasis added), or “incurred by the attorney.” Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir.1979) (emphasis added). 28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides in part that a court “may tax as costs ... (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses” and 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) provides in part, “[a] witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $40 per day for each day’s attendance. A witness shall also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the place of attendance.... ” Most important in this case, “these provisions define the full extent of a federal court’s power to shift litigation costs absent express statutory authority to go further.” WVUH, 499 U.S. at 86, 111 S.Ct. at 1140-41. The statute supporting plaintiffs pending application is 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) which provides: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,1981a, 1982,1983,1985, and 1986 of this title ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs....” Decisions applying § 1988 have allowed reimbursement of certain costs in addition to the six categories listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 because they were within the meaning of the term “reasonable attorney’s fee,” see, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2470, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989), in which the Court “concluded that § 1988 permitted separately billed paralegal and law clerk time to be charged to the losing party.” WVUH, 499 U.S. at 99, 111 S.Ct. at 1147. If customarily billed directly to the client and shown to have been incurred reasonably and necessarily, other out-of-pocket expenses may also be recoverable within the meaning of “attorney’s fee.” See Deary v. City of Gloucester, 789 F.Supp. 61, 68 (D.Mass.1992), aff'd, 9 F.3d 191 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Doe v. Crestwood, 764 F.Supp. 1258, 1262 (N.D.Ill.1991)); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F.Supp. 361, 367-68 (D.Mass.1993). Other types of expenses are not recoverable because “considered part of the overhead included in counsel’s fee,” Jacobs v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d 559, 563 (1st Cir.1987), i.e., “subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate,” Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3098, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986), and are not recoverable under § 1988. These include work done by administrative staff, see Jacobs, 825 F.2d at 563, and secretarial services, see Wagenmann v. Pozzi, No. CIV.A.79-1658-F, 1986 WL 11754, at *7 (D.Mass. Oct.17, 1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir.1987); Alexander S. v. Boyd, 929 F.Supp. 925, 939 (D.S.C.1995). However defined or billed, controlling statutes and precedents do not permit transfer to the defendants of liability for claimed “costs” not yet paid by plaintiff but presumably owed to nonlawyers engaged by her father to work with him. As a matter of law, the court has no discretion with respect to disallowance of these claims. They are nevertheless described in detail because of their relevance to the court’s lodestar rulings. $17,082 for Student Volunteers Plaintiffs application includes a bill for $17,082 addressed to McLaughlin and dated November 21, 1996, from six Suffolk University Law School students. It lists 949 hours of research and other services at $18 per hour. Plaintiffs application also encloses a letter dated November 21, 1996, from the school’s manager of marketing, responding to an inquiry from McLaughlin regarding law clerk salaries, and suggesting compensation in the range of $15 to $20 per hour. Robert Roughsedge, leader of the student group, had contacted McLaughlin in September 1995, and offered to help. The students received no course credit or faculty supervision for any of their work. They had no agreement with McLaughlin regarding compensation and decided to bill him, with his approval, only after concluding from decisions found in their research that law clerk time was compensable. They had kept no contemporaneous records, but were able to reconstruct the dates and activities listed in the invoice by referring to their appointment books and personal records and to Lexis and Westlaw printouts which showed the dates of their access. McLaughlin produced at the hearing on fees on December 30, 1996, a cardboard carton of Lexis and Westlaw printouts of decisions obtained by the students and delivered to him. At the hearing, Roughsedge described conferences with plaintiffs counsel and offered copies of four legal memoranda, totalling 23 pages, submitted to McLaughlin and OPW. According to their invoice, the students also researched “court proceedings in the Hopwood case,” referring to Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F.Supp. 551 (W.D.Tex.1994), rev’d, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.1996), in which plaintiffs expert Thernstrom had testified for the Hopwood plaintiff-appellant; and had a “conference call with Hopwood attorneys.” They helped McLaughlin prepare to cross-examine defense expert Professor Charles Vert Willie (“Prof.Willie”) by researching his “past reports, books, articles.” Roughsedge testified that he “read thoroughly and highlighted and tabbed” three books Prof. Willie had written and that other students went off to various libraries throughout the city to find publications by Prof. Willie. The students made two major contributions. First, they drafted plaintiffs response to the suggestion of mootness filed by the defendants on Thursday, November 15,1996. OPW had more or less dropped out of the ease by then, except for trial assignments to cross-examine some defense witnesses whose direct testimony would be in written form, and McLaughlin called upon the students to fill the breach., This they did admirably, four of them producing a brief in opposition which the court, at the November 19,1996, hearing on mootness, called “very scholarly.” Roughsedge and two other students each worked with McLaughlin for 36 hours over the preceding weekend: Friday from 3:00 p.m. to midnight and Saturday all day until 3:00 a.m. Sunday morning. Second, they minimized plaintiffs costs. According to plaintiffs reply memorandum filed December 26, 1996, at p. 15, “the use of law school students ... in fact did defray tens of thousands of dollars in Attorney McLaughlin’s research, including copying, etc. The justification for using law school students was obviously to minimize costs.” No doubt, the bulk of the expenses defrayed would have been in the area of salaries for junior associates and paralegals; and yet the cost of all the computer printouts obtained by the students would seem also to have been substantial. Allowance of the Suffolk Law students’ bill as a cost of plaintiff or otherwise is denied because they were volunteers and were paid nothing. Where a plaintiff applies for fees for work performed by non-lawyers, any award for this work is limited to the amount of money actually paid to them. See Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1979); NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Association, 620 F.Supp. 1173, 1194 (E.D.Mich.1985) (citing Lamphere). “[H]ours of time donated by law students and other local volunteers” is not compensable. Hart v. Bourque, 608 F.Supp. 1091, 1093 (D.Mass.1985), rev’d on other grounds, 798 F.2d 519 (1st Cir.1986). Services of legal interns are considered part of the overhead of plaintiffs counsel. See Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 949 (1st Cir.1984). $14,050 for Stephan Thernstrom Had the case gone to trial, plaintiffs ease-in-chief would have consisted entirely of stipulations of undisputed facts and documentary exhibits to which defendants had no objection. Plaintiffs only live testimony would have been in rebuttal of defendants’ evidence. As part of pretrial discovery, plaintiff filed on March 11, 1996, a designation of plaintiffs expert witnesses including a list of 19 aspects of defendants’ anticipated expert testimony, already disclosed in previously filed reports of Prof. Willie and Dr. Susan Ellerin, that plaintiff’s experts would refute. The experts named in plaintiffs designation were Professor Stephan Thernstrom (“Prof. Thernstrom”) and his wife, Dr. Abigail Thernstrom, both highly qualified. Prof. Thernstrom is the Winthrop Professor of History at Harvard University, whose resume lists eight books and 53 articles, chapters and reviews, and qualification as an expert witness in eleven federal court eases, ten of them brought under the Voting Rights Act and the other a successful challenge to the admissions policies of the University of Texas Law School, Hopwood v. Texas, supra, holding that the defendant “may not use race as a factor in law school admissions.” Id. at 935. As for Dr. Abigail Thernstrom, plaintiffs designation refers to her as “a nationally recognized authority on affirmative action.” Her countless publications, board memberships and media interviews would seem to support a reference to her as a nationally recognized authority on opposing affirmative action. While the expert report and prospective rebuttal testimony were Prof. Thernstrom’s, the entries in McLaughlin’s time charges regarding experts refer at first only to Dr. Abigail Thernstrom and then to the Thernstroms jointly, see, e.g., “Meeting with the Thernstroms and plan strategy” dated February 29, 1996. Their last reference to her was on March 19, 1996: “Meet with Abigail Thernstrom and review bills.” Prof. Thernstrom’s services are listed in his invoice addressed to Michael McLaughlin dated November 20,1996 (attached hereto as Appendix B). Those from February 10 to March 18, 1996, refer to his research and drafting of a critique of Prof. Willie’s report, conferring with McLaughlin and drafting and revising his own report which was filed on March 19. Except for an entry on April 22, 1996, for “discussing court order and drafting memo,” there came a seven-month hiatus in his services until a phone conversation with McLaughlin on October 28, 1996. Prof. Themstrom’s services during the next month were mainly assisting McLaughlin in recasting his expert report filed on March 19,1996, into another format of 154 separate paragraphs entitled “Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Expert Professor Stephan Thernstrom” and signed by him on November 12, 1996, when McLaughlin drove it up to his home in Lexington. It was an odd exercise, whose purpose eludes us. The details of the undertaking appear in Prof. Thernstrom’s invoice [Appendix B ] for 11-10, 11-11, and 11-12 and in McLaughlin’s billing entries filed with plaintiffs application from which the following excerpts are copies: 11/10/96 MCM ... CONF. WITH PROF. THERNSTROM ... DRAFTING AND REVISING PROF. THERNSTROM’S EXPERT TESTIMONY; WORK WITH CHERYL ... 11/12/96 MCM ... REVIEW TESTIMONY AND CALL TO STEPHAN THERNSTROM; CONF. WITH PROF. THERNSTROM; DRIVE TO THERNSTROM’S HOUSE AND REVIEW EXPERT TESTIMONY ... WORK LATE WITH CHERYL REVISING THERNSTROM EXPERT. REVISIONS, DRAFTING 11/10/96 CAL DRAFT, REVIEW, REVISE, ETC. EXPERT TESTIMONY WITH MICHAEL 11/12/96 CAL WORK LATE, REVISIONS TO EXPERT TESTIMONY A close comparison of the expert report filed on March 19, 1996, and the so-called Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Expert filed on November 18,1996, shows that they are practically identical in structure and, more often than not, in phraseology. Except for ehminating “Personal Background” attaching a curriculum vitae to the report, the subheadings are identical. Even the rhetorical questions and exclamation points are the same. Moreover, several parts of the expert report are surprisingly personal to the plaintiff. For example, at page 9 it states: McLaughlin’s time charges for February and March 1996 and entries in Prof. Thernstrom’s invoice to McLaughlin also indicate the extent of McLaughlin’s contribution to Prof. Thernstrom’s initial report. Apparently, the core of Prof. Thernstrom’s report was his critique, drafted on February 13, 1996, of a Prof. Willie report filed the week before. After conferences with Prof. Thernstrom on February 29 and March 9, 1996, McLaughlin drafted an expert witness report on March 10 and 11, 1996, and revised it jointly with Prof. Thernstrom until it was filed on March 19, 1996. McLaughlin’s participation is confirmed in Prof. Thernstrom’s affidavit dated January 2, 1997, which describes their “close collaboration” and states that “his input was invaluable to my testimony.” Finally, certain typographical errors, colloquialisms, hyperboles, and rhetorical questions strongly reflect the writing style evidenced in other filings by McLaughlin on plaintiffs behalf. In sum, its seems that McLaughlin wrote the report which Prof. Thernstrom signed. Professor Willie wants to “level the playing field for Public School Students.” This is a new and novel reason for justifying race-based quotas. It is in effect a decision to punish private school children of tax-paying residents for being sent to “better” schools, and the decision to punish them is being made by the authorities in charge of the inferior school system. And since so many private school students in Boston are enrolled in parochial schools, there might be a question as to whether such a policy discriminates against families with particular religious commitments. Plaintiffs application for $14,050 for Prof. Thernstrom is denied because expert witness fees are not recoverable in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Prof. Thernstrom did not testify. In a Title VII case decided in 1987, Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 2499, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987), the Supreme Court held that “absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization,” federal courts cannot award the prevailing party in a civil action more than $40 per day of testimony for an expert witness. Four years later, citing a Title VII plaintiffs need for testimony from economists, statisticians, and workplace experts, see H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 77-79 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 615-17, Congress overruled Crawford Fitting in a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 113(a)(2), 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071,1079 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (1994)), and enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988(e) providing that the court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attorneys’ fees in actions under § 1981 and § 1981(a). This is not such a case; and no similar provision has ever been enacted for actions brought under § 1983. Additionally, Thernstrom’s failure to testify is also dispositive. “None of the categories of expenses listed in § 1920 [of Title 28] can reasonably be read to include fees for services rendered by an expert employed by a party in a nontestimonial advisory capacity.” WVUH, 499 U.S. at 87, 111 S.Ct. at 1141. See also Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 825 F.Supp. 361, 366 (D.Mass.1993) (“[E]xpert witness fees in excess of the statutory [amount] established by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821 are not recoverable under federal law.”); Deary v. City of Gloucester, 789 F.Supp. 61, 67-68 (D.Mass.1992) (“[A]n attorney cannot recover expert witness fees, except to the extent that they fall within the $40-per-day fees for witnesses provided by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920(3) and 1821(b).”); Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons, Ltd., 855 F.Supp. 95, 100 (E.D.Pa.1994) (limiting the expert witness fee to $40 per day of trial attendance under WVUH), aff'd, 65 F.3d 162 (3d Cir.1995). $2,850 For Cheryl Lannan A third nonrecoverable inclusion in McLaughlin’s application is 38 hours worked on the ease by his secretary and office manager, Cheryl Lannan, billed at the rate of $75 per hour. Fees for work done by secretaries and administrative staff are not compensable under § 1988. McLaughlin sometimes referred to Ms. Lannan as also a paralegal, but there was no showing by anyone of any training or activity that would qualify her for the compensable classification. Summary and Consequences On the various grounds stated, the inclu-' sion in plaintiffs application of claims for sums due the student volunteers, Prof. Thernstrom, and Ms. Lannan totalling roughly $34,000 ($33,982) is contrary to law and is rejected as a matter of law. Does this overreaching by plaintiff amount to a “special circumstance” within the meaning of David v. Travisono, 621 F.2d 464, 468 (1st Cir.1980), thereby “rendering plaintiff[s] undeserving of a fees award”? Not in our opinion, because McLaughlin probably is not conversant with the controlling statutes and decisions. Regarding the students’ invoice, while the students knew of the Lamphere ease, they completely misconstrued it; and the Westlaw and Lexis printouts, when forwarded to McLaughlin, may not have carried the telltale restriction. As for the Prof. Thernstrom invoice, while the limited scope of § 1988(c) is definite, experienced defense counsel made no reference to it in responding to McLaughlin’s application. Most lawyers probably assume erroneously that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled Crawford Fitting generally instead of selectively, i.e., with respect only to §§ 1981 and 1981(a). Regarding such special circumstances, other features of McLaughlin’s application raise closer questions. Special Circumstances Although § 1988 confers discretion on the court by providing that “the court, in its discretion, may allow” attorneys fees, and it is obvious that “ ‘may’ sometimes means ‘won’t’,” Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Patternmakers League of North America, 597 F.2d 384, 387-88 (4th Cir.1979), such freedom of choice is by no means unlimited. The principle is stated in Travisono, as follows: While it is true that the district court has “broad discretion” to make an initial determination of the entitlement of a prevailing plaintiff to attorneys’ fees under the Act, see Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir.1978), that discretion is limited by the fact that “a successful plaintiff ‘should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.’ ” [ (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968)) (emphasis added).] Travisono, 621 F.2d at 468. The issue framed by the negative qualification is not how much, but whether. Certain critical factors have been discussed in several opinions in this Circuit, most recently in Williams v. Hanover Housing Authority, 113 F.3d 1294, 1301 (1st Cir.1997): In this circuit, “special circumstances” warranting a denial of attorneys’ fees under § 1988 ... exist where the fee application reflects “(1) no ‘good faith’ effort to exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, (2) no reduction for time spent on unsuccessful claims, and (3) no allowance for the limited degree of success’ achieved by the plaintiff.” See also Domegan v. Ponte, 972 F.2d 401, 419-20 (1st Cir.1992) and Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 958 (1st Cir.1991). Thus, the first question to be addressed in ruling upon McLaughlin’s application for fees and expenses totalling $209,418.28 becomes: apart from the $34,000 disallowed by previous rulings, is the overreaching for fees in McLaughlin’s application so extreme as to warrant its rejection in toto? After describing pervasive deficiencies in McLaughlin’s record-keeping and application, the court discusses the Williams factors separately. Copies of McLaughlin’s invoices, all dated either April 30 or November 26, 1996, were included in “Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of ... McLaughlin’s Application for Attorneys Fees,” filed December 13, 1996. An appendix to defendants’ opposition filed December 23, 1996, included an analysis of inconsistencies among the applications of plaintiffs three attorneys. It showed that McLaughlin claimed eleven meetings with White or Partlow, consuming 28.8 hours, that were not reflected in White or Partlov/s applications, which the court has already determined to be reliable, based on grounds discussed supra. McLaughlin also logged numerous conferences and phone calls not recorded by White or Partlow. Additionally, defendants objected to the lack of detail in McLaughlin’s descriptions of his services and the seemingly exorbitant dollar amounts he claimed in several entries. The inconsistencies noted and defendants’ general objections led to a second major litigation culminating on January 10, 1997, with plaintiff filing a so-called “Motion to Amend and Correct Attorney Michael C. McLaughlin's Time Entries and Billings for 1995,1996 and to include 1997.” The motion and supporting memorandum sought to change time charges claimed in McLaughlin’s initial application on no fewer than 36 dates. Amendments were proposed under four columns of entries headed “Time Entry Date,” “What Is On Billing Submitted to this Court,” “What Should Be On Billing Submitted to this Court,” and “The Hourly Difference”. They demonstrate that McLaughlin’s application and memoranda filed on December 13 and 26,1996, were riddled with errors and were probably never reviewed either by himself or by Ms. Lannan. McLaughlin’s January 10, 1997, motion identified 53.3 hours included in his invoices, for which compensation of $13,325 had been claimed, which he no longer claimed to have been spent on the case. Some changes were made without explanation. Others were attributed to the inability of the “transcriptionist” to read correctly longhand of figures and decimal points, computer-generated duplicate entries and duplicate time entries. However, McLaughlin’s elimination of 53.3 hours from those previously claimed did not result in a reduction in his bill for services. His review claimed 23.9 hours which had not been claimed in his initial application, some hours added on further consideration, e.g., 9.20 hours spent with news media, and others added to correct transcribing errors and scrambled dates. But the difference of 29.4 hours (53.3-23.9) hours did not shrink his total of hours claimed because it was offset by 29.5 hours of fee application time, 6.4 hours spent preparing his initial application and attending the December 30, 1996, hearing, and the other 23.1 hours logged for time spent replying to defendants’ opposition. The net effect was to increase McLaughlin’s time by one-tenth of an hour and his final invoice by $25. Even the 1997 revisions are demonstrably inflated. McLaughlin’s initial application recorded a 7.3 hour meeting on September 18, 1995, with White, which was not included in White’s application; the revision omitted a description of any such meeting, but not the $250 hourly charge for it. Similarly for September 19, 1995, the McLaughlin application was inconsistent with White’s as to a 2.7 hour item; the inconsistency was cured by omitting a description of services from the revision, but not the charge. The overbilling for those two dates totals $2,500. Overcharges for 1996, still uncorrected except by defense counsel and verified by the court, relate to charges on October 18, 1996, and November 13 and 18, 1996, totalling 2.5 hours or $625 claimed; and were due to duplicating in the revision charges already included, but out of chronological order, in McLaughlin’s initial application. The gross unreliability of McLaughlin’s successive applications, implicitly conceded in his motion to amend, is aggravated by the lack of detail in his descriptions of services rendered. At a minimum, it handicaps the court in meeting the expectations of reviewing courts as explained in United States v. Metropolitan District Commission, 847 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.1988): Although there is “some burden on the court to explain why it makes a substantial adjustment, up or down, of a diary-supported bill,” Jacobs v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d 559, 560 (1st Cir.1987), we have “never required that [district] courts set forth hour-by-hour analyses of fee requests.” Id. at 562. What we expect the trial court to do is make concrete findings, id. at 560, supply a “clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award,” Grendel’s Den, 749 F.2d at 950 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941),' and most of all, “retain a sense of overall proportion.” Gabriele, 712 F.2d at 1507. Counsel’s correlative obligation is “to maintain detailed time records, wherever practicable clearly delineating the particular claims and issues to which the legal services related.” Domegan, 972 F.2d at 423. In McLaughlin’s records, “particular claims and issues” were seldom referred to and services rendered were usually described without details. In sum, while McLaughlin’s departures from well-defined standards governing applications for attorney’s fees may not in themselves constitute a “special circumstance” warranting a complete denial of fees, they invite co