Full opinion text
WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge: Table of Contents I. Introduction......................................................... 645 II. Facts................................................................ 645 A. Patricia Geressy................................................... 645 B. Jill M. Jackson.................................................... 645 C. Jeannette Rotolo .................................................. 645 III. Law and Its Application .............................................. 646 A. Federal Rules On Setting Aside Verdicts ............................. 646 1. Law.......................................................... 646 2. Application of Law to Facts ..................................... 647 a. Due Diligence Prior to and During Trial........................ 647 b. Existence at Time of Trial.................................... 648 c. Non-Cumulative Evidence.................................... 648 d. Witness Credibility.......................................... 648 e. Admissibility and Materiality ................................. 648 f. Substantial Probability of a Change in the Outcome at Trial....... 648 B. Experts.......................................................... 648 C. Warnings......................................................... 649 1. Law.......................................................... 649 2. Application of Law to Facts ..........‘........................... 650 D. Statute of Limitations.............................................. 650 1. Law.......................................................... 650 2. Application of Law to Facts ..................................... 651 a. Patricia Geressy......................................... 651 b. Jill M. Jackson.............................................. 652 c. Thomas M. Farrell .......................................... 652 d. Jeannette Rotolo............................................ 652 E. Injury to Spouse Prior to Marriage.................................. 652 1. Law.......................................................... 652 2. Application of the Law to the Facts............................... 653 F. Deviation of Verdict................................................ 653 1. Law.......................................................... 653 a. Identifying the Normative Group for Comparison................ 657 b. Deviation from the “Normal” Group ........................... 657 c. Defining Material Deviation.................................. 658 d. Burden of Proof............................................. 660 2. Application of Law to Facts ..................................... 660 a. Patricia Geressy............................................. 660 b. Jill M. Jackson.............................................. 662 c. Jeannette Rotolo............................................ 663 IV. Conclusion.......................................................... 663 Appendix A Comparable Cases Considered...............................'.......... 664 Appendix B Patricia Geressy: Tentative Computations................................ 675 Appendix C ' Jill M. Jackson: Tentative Computations................................. 675 Appendix D Jeanette Rotolo: Tentative Computations ................................ 676 I. Introduction In suits commenced on March 16, 1994, plaintiffs Geressy, Jackson and Rotolo claimed that use of Digital’s LK201 computer keyboard caused repetitive stress injuries (RSI). Their husbands alleged loss of consortium. The jury returned a verdict in favor of all plaintiffs on failure to warn claims, rejecting negligent design claims and declining to award punitive damages. Defendant moved in all cases for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial and remittitur. More recently defendant sought a new trial on the Geressys’ claims based on newly discovered evidence. For the reasons indicated below, viewing the evidence most favorably to support the verdicts, only that for Jeannette Rotolo can stand. Newly discovered evidence requires a new trial on the claims of Patricia Geressy and the estate of Thomas A. Geressy. The claims of John William Rotolo are dismissed since, having been married after his wife was injured, he suffered no loss of consortium. Those of Jill M. Jackson and her husband, Thomas A. Farrell, are dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. II. Facts A.Patricia Geressy Ms. Geressy worked as a secretary at the Port Authority for five years in the 1960s and again from 1984 until the present. She used defendant’s keyboard and did other secretarial work. She had never been told that use of the keyboard might cause RSI. She testified that the first manifestation of her condition “was [in] the summer of 1991. I started waking up at night with numbness, tingling in my hands, burning in my wrists, I didn’t think much of it at the time.” Initially, Ms. Geress/s most severe problems were with her left wrist and hand. She underwent surgery for that wrist and hand in December of 1991. Because her first surgery was not successful, Ms. Geressy had a second operation in May of 1992. The second operation also gave no relief. She then started to experience pain in her right wrist and hand, her neck, and her shoulders. By the time the failure of her first two operations was known, the problems throughout her upper extremities had intensified. A third operation, on her neck, was recommended and eventually performed. By the end of 1994 her then treating doctor recommended surgery for her right hand. After four operations and other therapy, Ms. Geressy’s condition has continued to deteriorate. She has very little use of either hand. Plaintiffs’ experts testified that these problems were due to use of defendant’s keyboard which presented ergonomic dangers requiring warnings to the user. Defendant’s experts testified to the contrary, attributing plaintiffs physical symptoms to natural causes, finding no keyboard dangers, and no need to warn. B. Jill M. Jackson In the 1980s Ms. Jackson worked intensively at one of defendant’s computers without warnings of dangers. Some time around Christmas of 1989 she experienced “a pinching pain in [her] left elbow one day at work.” She was treated with cortisone. She had elbow pain again a few months later in 1990 and sought the advice of another doctor. In filling out preliminary medical forms, she included in her complaints “lower back pain, right hip pain after sitting,” and pain in the “upper right back shoulder area.” From 1990 on she has experienced debilitating pain in her elbows, forearms and hands, as well as a severe loss of strength in her upper extremities. In 1994 her disabilities forced her to leave her position as a legal secretary and to begin training in a new field. C. Jeannette Rotolo Ms. Rotolo—married on May 15, 1993— has a short history of poor health. Until the onset of RSI, she was a “very athletic person,” involved in such sports as karate and horseback riding. In April of 1993, Ms. Rotolo, a secretary using defendant’s keyboard, first experienced symptoms of RSI. At work, she began to notice that her hands were “cold and stiff’ and that she made an undue number of mistakes in typing. By June she began dropping things. Eventually the pain become constant. In the years since her first symptoms, Ms. Rotolo has been diagnosed with a variety of specific RSIs. She has tried numerous treatments, from physical therapy to surgery on her wrists and hands. Since September of 1993, Ms. Rotolo has not been able to return to clerical work, although she has been able to do some lower-paid child care work that does not exacerbate her condition. III. Law and Its Application This is a diversity action governed by federal procedural law and the substantive law of New York state. See, e.g., Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). A. Federal Rules On Setting Aside Verdicts 1. Law In deciding Rule 50(b) motions for judgment as a matter of law the evidence is viewed most favorably to the party defending the jury’s verdict. In ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) ... a district court is required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made and to give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence. The court cannot assess the weight of conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury____ Only if there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury’s findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded men could not arrive at a verdict against [the moving party] may the court properly grant the motion. LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 429 (2d Cir.1995), cert, denied sub nom., Village of Airmont, N.Y. v. LeBlanc-Sternberg, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2546, 135 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1996) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), Motions for a new trial under Rule 59(a) give the trial court more leeway. The rule provides: A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties on all or part of the issues ... in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.... Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). See, e.g., Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, N.Y., 950 F.Supp. 1267, 1272 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“a less stringent standard applies to a motion for a new trial than to a motion for judgment as a matter of law”) (citations omitted). In contrast to the standard for judgment as a matter of law, “a new trial may be granted even if there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict .... [A] trial judge hearing a motion for a new trial ‘is free to weigh the evidence himself and need not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.’ ” Song v. Ives Labs., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir.1992). When the motion pursuant to Rule 59 for a new trial is based on newly discovered evidence, the criteria for granting has been stated as: (1) the evidence was newly discovered since the trial; (2) the moving party was diligent in discovering the new evidence; (3) the newly discovered evidence could not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the newly discovered evidence was material; and (5) that a new trial, with the newly discovered evidence, will probably produce a different result. Joseph v. Terminix Int’l Co., 17 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir.1994) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Put more concisely the factors are: The new evidence [must be] (1) be material and not merely cumulative, (2) could not have been discovered before trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence and (3) would probably have changed the outcome of the trial. Compass Tech. v. Tseng Labs., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir.1995) (citations omitted). For the purposes of the instant case the factors to be considered in deciding whether a new trial based on new evidence should be granted are: (1) despite the exercise of due diligence, the moving party was not able to obtain the newly discovered evidence during trial; (2) it existed at the time of trial; (3) it is not cumulative; (4) it is not exclusively about the credibility of a witness; (5) it would probably have been admissible because it is both material and does not violate the rules of evidence and (6) there is a substantial probability that it would have changed the outcome of the trial. Other than the time for filing and the nature of the burden on the moving party, “Rule 59 and Rule 60(b)(2) share the same standard for granting relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence.” Compass Tech, v. Tseng Labs., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1995). All motions were received prior to the issuing of any final judgment and therefore time limits that come into play after the entry of final judgement are not relevant. 2. Application of Law to Facts National publicity followed the announcement of the jury verdict in December of 1996. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Big Jury Award in Injury Case Over Keyboards, N.Y. Times, December 10, 1996, at Dl; Jon Auerbach and Laura Johannes, Digital Equipment Loses Verdict on Carpal Tunnel, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1996, at B4. The news of Ms. Geress/s nearly $5.3 million verdict against defendant reached Gary S. Gevisser, Chief Executive Officer of Sunmed, Inc. (formerly known as Injury Evaluation Consultants (IEC)) in Las Vegas, Nevada. The information struck Mr. Gevisser as particularly noteworthy because, before the litigation had been commenced, doctors from his company had examined Ms. Geressy, prepared a medical evaluation on her condition for The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the IEC Report) and, contrary to the jury finding at trial, had determined that her ill health was unrelated to her work. See Affidavit of Kenneth J. King, sworn to March 25, 1997 ¶¶ 10, 11, Exhibit A (King Affidavit). Mr. Gevisser contacted Digital Equipment Corporation to explain his knowledge of the Geressy case and his company’s own information regarding Ms. Geressy, See King Affidavit ¶ 11. Defendant then subpoenaed the IEC Report and filed the instant motion for a new trial based on discovery of this evidence. a. Due Diligence Prior to and During Trial Defendant exercised due diligence to obtain every possible medical record regarding Ms. Geressy prior to trial. Defendant requested: the name(s) and address(es) of all medical or health care personnel, and each physician, practitioner, medical facility, clinic and hospital that saw, examined, treated or consulted with Patricia Geressy in connection with [the complained of] injury. King Affidavit, Exhibit 13 (Digital Equipment Corporation’s First Set of Interrogatories for Plaintiffs Patricia Geressy and Thomas A. Geressy ¶ 4). Also sought were: All medical records, doctors’ reports, hospital records, and any other material relevant to the health and physical well-being of plaintiff Patricia Geressy. All documents relating in any way to the amount(s) and source(s) by which any costs or expenses for medical care, dental care, custodial care, rehabilitation services, loss of earnings or other economic loss for which plaintiff! ] seek[s] to recover in this action, was or may be replaced or indemnified, in whole or in part, from any collateral source including, but not limited to, insurance, social security, workers’ compensation, or employee benefit. King Affidavit, Exhibit C (Notice to Produce ¶¶ 3, 5). Defendant also obtained authorizations for all medical records which were to include names and addresses of all health care providers. See King Affidavit, Exhibit D (Demand for Executed Authorizations ¶¶ 1, 3). Defendant repeatedly asked Ms. Geressy at her deposition to identify all healthcare providers. See King Affidavit, Exhibit E (June 25, 1996 Deposition Transcript of Patricia Geressy). There is no doubt that defendant was diligent in seeking all relevant medical records, including the IEC Report, prior to trial. b. Existence at Time of Trial IEC evaluated Ms. Geressy on August 18, 1993 and issued a report shortly thereafter. The IEC Report was in existence years before the trial took place in the fall of 1996. c. Non-Cumulative Evidence The IEC Report reflects the results of an Integrated Movement Analysis (IMA), described as follows: Integrated Movement Analysis is a modality that allows the diagnostician an opportunity to monitor the voluntary and involuntary responses of muscle groups, in direct correlation with the patient’s range of motion, in order to assess the viability of alleged myofascial-type injuries. This highly reliable monitoring system allows the treating physician an opportunity to validate the existence of subjectively reported symptoms in an objective format and can further establish the clinical and pathological significance of other tests, such as MRIs, when findings are present. King Affidavit, Exhibit A (the IEC Report). The admission of the IEC Report would not have been cumulative. No other experts presented similar evidence. d.Witness Credibility The proffered IEC Report is unrelated to issues of witness credibility at trial. e.Admissibility and Materiality Mary Rose Cusimano, who has a doctorate in psychology and who co-authored the IEC Report has expressed her willingness to testify in court. See Reply Affidavit of Kenneth J. King, sworn to April 23, 1997, Attachment (Cusimano Affidavit ¶ 4) (Reply King Affidavit). It appears likely that Ms. Cusimano’s expert testimony would have been admissible and that the IEC Report would have served as a foundation. See Fed.R.Evid. 702, 703. The IEC Report states that: [Ms. Geressy’s] complaints of carpal tunnel like symptoms are related to hypertonicity in the cervical region____ The readings of the IMA indicate a causal relationship to the symptoms reported by the patient that are non work related in nature.... Causation is ... from the cervical region and appears to be non industrial in nature. King Affidavit, Exhibit A (the IEC Report). In her recent sworn affidavit, Ms. Cusimano summarized the findings of that report: We saw no evidence of any cumulative trauma disorder or any injury due to repetitive motion. We concluded that she did not have carpal tunnel syndrome but that her complaints were caused by pathology in her cervical musculature. Based on our examination we concluded that her health complaints were not caused by her work. Reply King Affidavit, Attachment (Cusimano Affidavit ¶ 33). This Report and expert explanatory testimony went to the heart of a central issue at trial—the cause of Ms. Geressy’s injuries. f.Substantial Probability of a Change in the Outcome at Trial This newly discovered evidence is unique and directly relevant to the critical issue of causation. It is substantially probable that this medical report, created almost a year before the instant litigation was filed and obviously unconnected to it, would have caused the jury to evaluate all of the evidence at trial differently. The outcome at trial could well have been different if this evidence had been available. This new evidence satisfies all of the factors for granting a new trial based on new evidence pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the motion was timely pursuant to Rule 59(b), the court need not consider Rule 60(b)(2) which would, in any event, have provided an alternative basis for granting a new trial in the exercise of discretion. B. Experts No serious question was raised about the admissibility of expert evidence. All such testimony was admissible since it was helpful to the jury in determining the issues, and the reasoning, techniques, methodology and bases were scientifically appropriate. See Fed. R.Evid. 702, 703; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). C. Warnings 1. Law A “manufacturer’s knowledge of special risks of harm attendant upon normal use of his product imposes a duty upon the manufacturer to warn adequately those using his product of those risks.” Ezagui v. Dow Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 732 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Amatulli v. Delhi Constr. Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 525, 532, 571 N.E.2d 645, 648, 569 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (1991) (“A manufacturer who places into the stream of commerce a defective product which causes injury may be liable for such injury. A defect in a product may consist of a mistake in manufacturing, an improper design or the inadequacy or absence of warnings for the use of the product.”) (citations omitted); Enright by Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377, 568 N.Y.S.2d 550, 555, 570 N.E.2d 198 (1991); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 72 A.D.2d 59, 62, 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (4th Dep’t 1979), ajfd mem. 52 N.Y.2d 768, 417 N.E.2d 1002, 436 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1980). The nature of the failure to warn tort in New York is fairly straight forward. See 1 N.Y. Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil § 2:135 (1974) (“The manufacturer of a product which is reasonably certain to be dangerous if used in a way which he should reasonably foresee it would be used is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to give reasonable and adequate warning of any dangers known to him or which in the exercise of reasonable care he should have known and which the user of the product ordinarily would not discover. Reasonable care means that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same circumstances.”); IA N.Y. Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil § 2:135 (3d ed.1996). See also Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2(c) (Draft adopted at May 1997 meeting of American Law Institute) (“A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product ... is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.”). Whether it is reasonably safe “when marketed” depends in part on what the manufacturer knew or should have known at the time of marketing—i.e., the state of the art. The manufacturer may be found to be unreasonable even after the product has been marketed if it should have been aware of dangers and ii was reasonable to try to bring them to the attention of users of the product in the field. The relevant portions of the charge, without substantial objection, became the law of the case: ____ A failure to warn or an inadequate warning about dangers attendant upon the use of the product may make the product not reasonably safe and therefore defective even if it was otherwise properly designed, manufactured and sold. A manufacturer of a product which is likely to be dangerous if utilized in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner is under a duty to give adequate warning which would be useful to the user of any known dangers or dangers which in the exercise of reasonable care it should have known and which those foreseeably exposed to these products ordinarily would not discover. It is sufficient that a reasonable manufacturer which knew of the product’s potential for causing injury would have concluded that the product should not have been marketed without suitable warnings. When we talk of exercising “reasonable care” to give a warning, we mean that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same circumstances. The manufacturer must keep informed of knowledge of the effect of its products gained through research, reports, scientific literature and other available methods. It must, when reasonable, take such steps as are reasonably necessary to bring that knowledge to the attention of those foreseeably exposed to its products; that is, it must take reasonable steps to adequately warn them. In deciding what is reasonable you may consider the special circumstances of the case including the degree of hazard and whether it would reasonably be expected to be known to the user, the likelihood and severity of harm, and the feasibility of actually getting a warning to the plaintiff and the effectiveness of a warning, and whether the danger was not obvious to the user and whether the product causes immediate symptoms. A manufacturer does not have a duty to warn the user of a danger obvious to the user. The duty to warn extends to dangers or defects about which the manufacturer either actually knew or should have known. “Should have known” means that a manufacturer is held to that level of knowledge which knowledge people in the particular industry had, and in view of the state of medical and scientific knowledge, and technology in general, and in the manufacturer’s own experience in particular, reasonably should have had at the time the product was marketed. You may consider what was known or should have been known about the dangers of the product and the effects of a failure to take adequate precautions in its use. You must decide, based on all the evidence that you have heard and seen during this trial, whether the plaintiff has proved that the defendant actually was, or should have been aware that its products, when used as the manufacturer would reasonably foresee that products would be used, could cause injury to those who used the products. The precise disease suffered by a plaintiff need not have been foreseeable by the' defendant. It is sufficient that the defendant knew or should have known that some serious injury could result from use of its products. Each plaintiff had a right to decide for herself whether to work and what she would require as protection before continuing to work. The fact that another worker might have done the job does not negate the obligation of the defendant to a particular worker. If, however, as defendant claims, a plaintiff would have done her work the same way whether or not the defendant gave warnings, then there was no cause of the injuries from the failure to warn. You may find that a warning must specifically and clearly identify each of the potential dangers involved in the products’ uses including those dangers which might affect only some users, but not all users. A defendant’s duty to use reasonable care in giving adequate warning is nondelegable. That means that a defendant may not rely on others to issue an adequate warning. It was the duty of defendant to issue warnings, if any, that you find were necessary to those who might be exposed to the defendant’s products. The duty to warn does not terminate when an item produced by the manufacturer is sold. It continues to exist and be a responsibility of a defendant even after the product was sold, if it becomes known or reasonably should have become known to the manufacturer that persons who use the product may be harmed. 2. Application of Law to Facts Plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to make out a classic product liability case for failure to warn under New York law. They successfully persuaded the jury to find in their favor on all of the elements of such a case. Based on the evidence, the jury could have found that: defendant had a duty to plaintiffs to warn of the dangers inherent in its product, the LK201 keyboard; defendant breached that duty by not issuing appropriate warnings; and defendant’s failure to warn was the proximate cause of all three plaintiffs’ RSIs. D. Statute of Limitations 1. Law With the exception of certain specified actions not relevant in the instant case, personal injury suits in New York must be commenced within three years from the date of injury. See CPLR §§ 214, 214-a, 214-b, 214-c, 215. “The time within which an action must be commenced ... shall be computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed.” CPLR § 203, See, e.g., Dorsey v. Apple Computers, Inc., 936 F.Supp. 89, 90 (E.D.N.Y.1996). At the time of the Dorsey decision, there was uncertainty about what constitutes “the time of injury” in RSI cases: When does the statute of limitations begin to run in a products liability action in which plaintiffs continued use of a keyboard has caused “repetitive stress” injuries (“RSI”) or carpal tunnel syndrome? Divergent decisions have been reached by the Appellate Divisions of the Fourth and First Departments. Interestingly, both courts purportedly apply the traditional “date of injury” rule, but with somewhat different results. Vincent C. Alexander, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, 7B Civil Practice Law and Rules 116 (McKinney 1990 & Supp.1997) (discussing Piper v. International Business Machines Corp., 219 A.D.2d 56, 639 N.Y.S.2d 623 (4th Dep’t 1996) and Blanco v. American Tel. & Tel., 223 A.D.2d 156, 646 N.Y.S.2d 99, reh’g denied, leave to appeal granted, 234 A.D.2d 239, 652 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1st Dep’t 1996) (Mem.) currently pending before the Court of Appeals). Because the Court of Appeals “has not yet ruled .... [i]ts view must be predicted.” Dorsey v. Apple Computers, Inc., 936 F.Supp. 89, 90 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (citations omitted). If any plaintiff had suffered a new injury subsequent to her initial injury, any claims based on the later injury could be filed within three years of that later injury. New York’s two-injury rule controls in such cases: New York courts recognize that a single causal agent or event may produce two diseases [that] are separate and distinct. Each disease may give rise to its own cause of action.... Under the [two-injury] rule, diseases that share a common cause may nonetheless be held separate and distinct where their biological manifestations are different and where the presence of one is not necessarily a predicate for the other’s development. In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F.Supp. 958, 961-62 (S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y.1996) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The two-injury rule, however, is inapplicable in cases where continued contact with a causal agent leads to a worsening of the original condition rather than a separate and unrelated injury: It is a settled principle that once a compensable injury has occurred, the time within which an action may be commenced may not be extended merely by the aggravation, or exacerbation, of that injury by continued contact with the same offending product. Coughlin v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 225 A.D.2d 256, 260, 650 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (3d Dep’t 1996). Plaintiffs filed their suits on March 16, 1994. Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on statute of limitations grounds must be granted with respect to each plaintiff who suffered no new and distinct injury after March 16, 1991. Since all of the injuries in the instant case involved a single injury for each plaintiff that developed over time, the court need not further consider the two-injury rule. 2. Application of Law to Facts a. Patricia Geressy According to Ms. Geressy’s own testimony, her symptoms of what was later diagnosed as RSI began in the summer of 1991. See Trial Transcript at 288. There is no reason to believe that Ms. Geressy was unable to testify accurately as to the first signs of a significant change in her health. The evidence submitted at trial supports a finding of the initial date of injury in the summer of 1991. There are, however, two pieces of evidence that suggest Ms. Geressy experienced RSI related pain and numbness before the summer of 1991. Neither was necessarily sufficient to convince a reasonable juror that her symptoms began earlier. Dr. Pascarelli testified that “[a]ccording to Mrs. Geressy, she said the first symptoms began in early 1991. She complained of pain, numbness, tingling in the left hand.” Id. at 464. When pressed, however, Dr. Pascarelli could identify nothing that suggested that Ms. Geressy sought medical attention for this condition prior to the summer of 1991. See id. at 465. His only basis for saying that Ms. Geressy’s injuries began in “early 1991,” a fairly indeterminate period of time, was his own memory of a conversation with Ms. Geressy. As a matter of law, this nebulous testimony need not be given decisive weight. The records of Dr. Urs also suggest that Ms. Geressy may have been injured prior to the summer of 1991. These records are more troubling, indicating that Ms. Geressy had been suffering for a year prior to her November 18, 1991 consultation with Dr. Urs. See id. at 569. The evidence presented at trial, however, did not require this conclusion since it suggested only an imprecise recording of approximate times that Ms. Geressy had been afflicted. At most, the trial record indicates that Ms. Geressy may have suffered from de minimus injury prior to March 1991, although even this possibility could properly have been ignored by the jury. b.Jill M. Jackson Ms. Jackson has suffered from a number of ailments as far back as the late 1980s. By 1990, Ms. Jackson had begun to experience RSI symptoms in her upper extremities. Testimony and records presented at trial indicate that in 1990, Ms. Jackson sought medical treatment for left elbow pain, “lower back pain, right hip pain after sitting” and pain in her “upper right back shoulder area.” Trial Transcript at 617, 619. This evidence is fairly consistent (although off by a few months) with Ms. Jackson’s initial complaint in which she claimed that “on or about August 1990, [she] began to experience some symptoms such as numbness, tingling, pain and/or sensory motor impairments of the upper extremities, neck and torso.” Evidence of Ms. Jackson’s 1990 shoulder pain clearly refers to a condition in her upper extremities. Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to distinguish Ms. Jackson’s left elbow pain during the 1989-1990 winter from later injuries to the same elbow in an effort to establish that Ms. Jackson experienced new injuries after March 16, 1991, the critical date for statute of limitations purposes. Counsel was unsuccessful. No possible reasonable analysis of the evidence supports a finding that Ms. Jackson’s alleged repetitive stress injuries began any later than 1990. Were they caused by use of defendant’s keyboard, she would reasonably have been expected to have been aware of their cause before March 1991. As a matter of law, regardless of later related or aggravated conditions, Ms. Jackson’s RSIs (in both left and right upper extremities) first occurred, and her cause of action accrued, before March 16,1991. c. Thomas M. Farrell Because Ms. Jackson’s claim fails on statute of limitations grounds, the derivative loss of consortium claim filed by her husband, Thomas M Farrell must also fall. See, e.g., Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 N.Y.2d 622, 623, 427 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748, 404 N.E.2d 1288, 1291 (1980) (“[A] spouse’s cause of action for loss of consortium [does not] exist[] in the common law independent of the injured spouse’s right to maintain an action for injuries sustained.”) (citations omitted), Rothfarb v. Brookdale Hosp., 139 A.D.2d 720, 722, 527 N.Y.S.2d 473, 475 (2d Dep’t 1988) (a “loss of consortium ... cause of action ... is a derivative one ..., and thus is governed by the same period of limitations which controls the underlying cause of action”) (citations omitted). d. Jeannette Rotolo Ms. Rotolo first used a Digital Keyboard when she began working at Long Island Jewish Medical Center in February 1992. Her first RSI symptoms appeared in April 1993. Defendant recognizes that no statute of limitations can be asserted against this plaintiff. E. Injury to Spouse Prior to Marriage 1. Law A cause of action will not he for loss of consortium where the injured tort victim was not married to the plaintiff-spouse at the time of injury. In a ease involving a man who married a woman two months after she was injured, a New York court explained the rationale for this rule: “If, at the time of his subsequent marriage, plaintiffs wife was disabled as a result of a previous negligent act by the defendant, the plaintiff took her as his wife in her then existing state of health and thus assumed any deprivation resulting from such disability.” Rademacher v. Torbensen, 257 A.D. 91, 91, 13 N.Y.S.2d 124, 124 (4th Dep’t 1939). It does not matter whether the preexisting injury was observable by the spouse. See, e.g., Consorti v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 86 N.Y.2d 449, 450, 634 N.Y.S.2d 18, 18, 657 N.E.2d 1301, 1301 (1995); Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 N.Y.2d 797, 798, 580 N.Y.S.2d 168, 169-70, 588 N.E.2d 66, 67-68 (1991). 2. Application of the Law to the Facts Ms. Rotolo’s RSI first manifested in April 1993. She married John William Rotolo on May 15, 1993. He may not recover for her prior injury. His claim for lost consortium must be dismissed. F. Deviation of Verdict 1. Law Because the court of appeals may differ from the trial court on the issue of a new trial and require reinstatement of the verdicts, the appropriateness of the amount of the verdicts should be assessed. Historically, New York courts, like those in the federal system and the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, applied a “shock the conscience” standard to determine the possible exeessiveness or insufficiency of jury awards. In 1986, in an effort to curb escalating awards, the New York legislature created a statutory standard designed to give courts greater discretion in monitoring verdicts. See Legislative Findings and Declarations, 1986 N.Y. Laws 470 (McKinney). The statute provided a new standard for judicial review of jury awards— “deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.” In relevant part it reads: In reviewing a money judgment____ in which it is contended that the award is excessive or inadequate and that a new trial should have been granted unless a stipulation is entered to a different award, the appellate division shall determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation. CPLR 5501(c) (emphasis added). These last eight words, and in particular, the two phrases deviates materially and reasonable compensation provide a more complex challenge to a federal trial court than first meets the eye. “This legislation was apparently intended to relax the former standard of review and to facilitate appellate changes in verdicts.” O’Connor v. Graziosi, 131 A.D.2d 553, 554, 516 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277 (2d Dep’t 1987) (citations omitted). Courts and commentators alike have understood the new language as providing courts with much greater latitude than the former shock the conscious standard for reviewing and altering jury awards. Summarizing New York state law, the Supreme Court recently stated: New York state-court opinions confirm that § 5501(c)’s “deviates materially”; standard calls for closer surveillance than the “shock the conscious” oversight---The “deviates materially” standard ... in design and operation, influences outcomes by tightening the range of tolerable awards. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415,---—, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 2218-19, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). See also Baumgarten v. Slavin, No. 9018/84, slip op. at 3 (Sup.Ct. Nas. County May 6, 1997) (“The ‘deviates materially’ standard calls for much closer scrutiny of the size of jury awards than the old ‘shocks the conscience’ test.”), discussed in Cerisse Anderson, $5 Million Pain and Suffering Award Upheld, N.Y.L.J, May 13, 1997, at 1. Professor David D. Siegel, a leading scholar on New York civil procedure, has written that “[t]he amendment invites the appellate division’s alteration of the [jury] verdict on the presumably lighter finding that the award ‘deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.’” David D. Siegel, New York Practice 617 (2d ed.1991). The enlarged power of review, although directed at the state intermediate appellate courts, applies to federal trial courts that must follow the same standard in evaluating jury verdicts. In diversity cases and other cases applying state substantive law, federal courts may do so without violating the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., Gasperini, 518 U.S. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 2218 (“Although phrased as a direction to New York’s intermediate appellate courts, § 5501(c)’s ‘deviates materially standard, as construed by New York’s courts, instructs state trial judges as well.”); Ashton v. Bobruitsky, 214 A.D.2d 630, 631, 625 N.Y.S.2d 585, 586 (2d Dep’t 1995) (“The trial court ha[s] the power ... to set aside [the jury verdict] if it f[i]nd[s] that the verdict deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation.”) (citations omitted); see also David D. Siegel, New York Practice 77 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp.1996) (“Recent decisions appear to acknowledge the futility of having a trial court, in assessing a legal maximum or minimum for damages, apply a standard different from that which would be applied on appellate review, and indicate that the trial court should also apply the ‘deviates materially’ standard—applicable in terms only to the appellate division under CPLR 5501(c)— instead of the older ‘shocks the conscious’ standard”). There are two major stumbling blocks for federal courts applying the New York statute. First, the role of a federal court sitting in diversity is controlled both by state law under Erie and sometimes conflicting federal law under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. Second, a federal court with relatively limited experience in applying state tort law and evaluating state tort verdicts must acquire a sense for what New York courts would do under the circumstances. The Gasperini Court resolved the constitutional conflict in favor of Erie. As to the duty of federal courts to act as if they were state courts, it noted that “[t]o determine whether an award ‘deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation,’ New York state courts look to awards approved in similar cases.” Gasperini 518 U.S. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 2218. State courts at both the trial and appellate levels are well-situated to gauge which jury awards deviate materially and which do not. Unlike federal courts they see hundreds of tort cases every year. In New York’s Second Department (which corresponds geographically to the area covered by the Eastern District of New York), 46,325 and 48,326 tort cases were filed in state courts in 1995 and 1996, respectively. See Memorandum on Statistics on Tort Litigation in the Second Department from the Clerk of the Court, Eastern District of New York, to the Chambers of Senior District Judge Jack B. Weinstein, January 30, 1997, at 2. Notices of appeal were filed in 2,592 and 2,913 cases again in 1995 and 1996, respectively. See id. at 1. Although less than half of the appeals filed were perfected, the Appellate Division for the Second Department could expect to see over 1,000 cases each year. See id. (Note that the state statistics include both jury and bench trials.) It is much easier for state judges to evaluate jury verdicts. They can look at their own records and rely on institutional know-how. In the Eastern District of New York, in contrast, only 1,152 and 1,298 tort cases were filed in 1995 and 1996, respectively. See Memorandum on Statistics on Tort Litigation in the Second Department from the Clerk of the Court, Eastern District of New York, to the Chambers of Senior District Judge Jack B. Weinstein, January 27,1997, at 2 (for 1995 statistics); Memorandum from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts Statistics Division, Analysis and Reports Branch to the Clerk of the Court, Eastern District of New York, January 27,1997, at 2-3 (for 1996 statistics) (Administrative Office Memorandum). Almost all of these cases settle without trial. Usually the court is not aware of the amount of settlement. Only 40 cases in 1995 and 35 eases in 1996—divided among some thirty district judges and magistrate judges—resulted in jury verdicts. See Administrative Office Memorandum at 4-12. Federal courts sitting in diversity and applying New York substantive law lack the institutional experience of state courts which must routinely review verdicts under the deviates materially standard. Without the expertise of state courts, federal courts applying the deviates materially standard must chart an independent course to arrive at a comparable result. Each experience of human suffering is unique. The reverberations from a tragic event are not necessarily any more intelligible or quantifiable through an examination of other peoples’ suffering. And yet, considering comparable injuries is a necessary first step for any court attempting to develop a sense of reasonable compensation under the circumstances. CPLR 5501(c) forces the court into the awkward position of attempting to do what the tort victim cannot— analyze, classify and (implicitly) rank the affliction of one tort victim against that of another. In one sense this is an impossible endeavor. To measure the impact of a tragedy in the life of one person vis-a-vis another is beyond judicial (and perhaps human) capacity. Yet, if the courts are to administer a fair and just tort system, they must work out methods, however imperfect, for evaluating and entering tort judgments under Gasperini. Theoretically, courts have a straightforward basis from which to begin this analysis. Reasonable compensation is compensation that would make a plaintiff whole, as if he or she had never suffered the injury. See, e.g., McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 253-54, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937, 939, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374 (1989) (The purpose of “an award of damages to a person injured by the negligence of another is to compensate the victim.... The goal is to restore the injured party, to the extent possible, to the position that would have been occupied had the wrong not occurred.”). Compensatory damage awards include a number of components, only some of which lend themselves easily to this process. There are quantifiable damages such as lost earnings and past medical bills, more speculative awards for predicted future lost earning capacity and costs associated with injuries, and, finally, non-economic awards for the intangible emotional experience of a life marred by a tortious event. Attempts to make the plaintiff whole through money damages are acts of legal fiction which cannot mask the ultimate powerlessness of money to replace what an individual has lost in suffering the unalterable consequences of an injury. The New York Court of Appeals acknowledges that: An economic loss can be compensated in kind by an economic gain; but recovery for noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life rests on the legal fiction that money damages can compensate for a victim’s injury. ... We accept this fiction, knowing that although money will neither ease the pain nor restore the victim’s abilities, this device is as close as the law can come in its effort to right the wrong. We have no hope of evaluating what has been lost, but a monetary award may provide a measure of solace for the condition created____ McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 254, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937, 939-40, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374-75 (1989). Courts must not only determine sufficient monetary compensation to assuage non-monetary suffering, but they must also identify the upper limit beyond which a compensatory award cannot go. As the Court of Appeals has noted, “Our willingness to indulge in this fiction [making the tort victim whole] comes to an end ... when it ceases to serve the compensatory goals of tort recovery.” Id. Another court has echoed similar concerns: [T]he law does not permit a jury to “abandon analysis for sympathy for a suffering plaintiff and treat an injury as though it were a winning lottery ticket____ Rather, the award must be fair and reasonable, and the injury sustained and the amount awarded rationally related. This remains true even where intangible damages, such as those compensating a plaintiff for pain and suffering, cannot be determined with exactitude.” Taylor v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 868 F.Supp. 479, 484 (E.D.N.Y.1994). A nonjudicial observer, writing on the old shock the conscious standard, expressed concerns about boundless pain and suffering awards: The amount of money that a court or a jury will award ... for pain and suffering [is] unpredictable and, in some cases, may bear no reasonable relationship to a plaintiffs actual economic injury. Juries awarding damages for pain and suffering [under the shock the conscious standard] have virtually unbridled discretion, as there is currently no meaningful way to measure such non-quantifiable losses monetarily. Leslie A. Rubin, Note, Confronting a New Obstacle to Reproductive Choice: Encouraging the Development of RU—486 Through Reform of Products Liability Law, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 131, 146 (1990-1991). Courts have at their disposal methods for reviewing the portion of compensatory awards that address economic loss, but the non-economic portion has remained intransigent. The New York legislature intended CPLR 550 1(c) as a solution, but the quandary resists solution by the mere replacement of the shock the conscious standard with the material deviation standard. CPLR 5501(c)’s conception of reasonable compensation cannot exist in a vacuum. There needs to be some point of reference. With economic damages, the court may rely on traditional methods of economic analysis. As for the non-economic pain and suffering award, the reviewing court must begin by identifying some group of similar cases to serve as a referent. This task is difficult, particularly in eases exploring relatively new types of injuries and claims such as those in the instant case involving RSI claims against a keyboard manufacturer. Cases with similar causal agents, similarly-named diagnoses, or similar reductions in quality of life might serve as benchmarks. The pain and suffering award requires an assessment of a plaintiffs emotional and physiological responses to the injury, including such factors as “fright, anxiety, nervousness, worry, shock, humiliation, embarrassment [and] terror____” Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of Damages, 12 Pac. L.J. 965, 971-72 (1981). This kind of analysis does not easily lend itself to objective comparison. As the Second Circuit has observed, “measuring pain and suffering in dollars is inescapably subjective.” Gibbs v. United States, 599 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir.1979). There is an inherent difficulty in considering such disparate factors as a plaintiffs “ability to dance, bowl, swim, or engage in similar recreational activities, inability to perform customary chores [,] and ... to engage in the usual family activities.” Downie v. United States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344, 347 n. 3 (3d Cir.1966). Plaintiffs differ. Some are more susceptible to pain than others. Some may be younger, perhaps more deserving in the jury’s view, or more vulnerable, or may have led a more difficult life or an easier one. There is an infinite variety of people and reactions to tragedy, further compounding the difficulty of quantifying verdicts. Even with seemingly objective criteria, such as measurements of the amount of time that a tort victim suffers, different juries produce a seemingly erratic set of verdict data. One scholar in this field, Dean David W. Leebron, attempted to finding a correlation between time suffered and the amount of the award. In his research, he was unable to discover any rationale for jury awards for pain and suffering. Dean Leebron found that “the temporal element of the pain and suffering has no statistically significant effect for durations from half a minute up to one week.” David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 256, 294 (1989). He concluded, “[t]ort awards ... vary significantly and ... neither the specific facts of the case nor differing views of the functions of the awards can explain such variation.” Id. at 259. See also Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors to Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 Hofstra L.Rev. 763, 768 (1995) (“Both anecdotal and empirical evidence indicates that the disparity between awards for pain and suffering among apparently similar cases defies rational explanation.”). Within the same state verdicts vary widely by geographic area. As Justice Edward T. O’Brien recently observed: It is curious that awards for pain and suffering on one side of the East River are uniformly two and three times higher than on the other. Is it that the composition of the two respective communities are so different? I think not.... Baumgarten v. Slavin, No. 9018/84, slip op. at 3 (Sup.Ct. Nas. County May 6,1997) quoted in Cerisse Anderson, $5 Million Pain and Suffering Award Upheld, N.Y.L.J, May 13, 1997, at 1. State verdicts vary widely even in the Eastern District of New York depending on the county in which the case is tried. However inexact, the process for determining the category of award that is a material deviation may be undertaken in three steps. First, identify the normative group—what kinds of cases are sufficiently similar to serve as the referent group for determining what is reasonable? Second, determine what constitutes a deviation from that group. Third, define statistically and intuitively how far a verdict can deviate before that deviation becomes material. After this three step analysis, the court reviews the more traditional examination of economic damages and the statistical analysis for non-economic damages and decides how much leeway should be allowed the fact finders before determining that a jury verdict deviates materially. a. Identifying the Normative Group for Comparison Holding a post-trial Gasperini hearing is the initial step. The parties provide experts (subject to the court’s power to appoint Rule 706 independent experts) who can assist the court in identifying appropriate comparative cases. Such a hearing is by no means ideal. The court does not have the capacity or the time to go through possibly scores of records in order to see what is equivalent. It has to have the information summed up in some convenient way. This is much the same task it undertakes in determining land values from comparable sales (a more developed technique). Cf. 1 Lewis Orgel, Valuation Under the Law of Eminent Domain §§ 136-140 (2d ed.1953); Stephen H. Kalos and Jonathan D. Putnam, On the Incomparability of ‘Com-parables’: An Economic Interpretation of ‘Infringer’s Royalties’, 9 J. of Proprietary Rts., Apr. 1997, at 2. Similar injuries or diagnoses are primary (but not controlling) criteria in choosing sufficiently analogous cases. In evaluating the pain and suffering that results from a tortious event, the court also may consider the causal agent itself and the circumstances surrounding the injury in determining the nature of the anguish for which plaintiff should be compensated. The life changes that follow the tortious event are also of critical importance. If at all possible, cases within the relevant venue should be relied upon because the farther the court moves beyond the place of trial, the more likely it is that community conceptions of reasonableness diverge in various directions. In determining whether an award is reasonable, it is almost impossible to find cases for comparison where all relevant factors are identical to those in the case under consideration. Rather, the court must review the totality of the circumstances of the proffered sample cases to ascertain whether they can provide a basis for comparison. There are almost no “all fours” cases. As Appendix A indicates the decisions on comparability are somewhat arbitrary. The court’s evaluation may be supplemented by expert testimony of practitioners and others familiar with state tort cases. b. Deviation from the “Normal” Group Once the court has chosen a group of settlements and verdicts with which to compare the verdict under consideration, there is no simple method for determining whether that verdict is reasonable vis-a-vis those in the normative group. The imprecision inherent in simply making a vague estimate by looking at a comparative group turns the court toward a statistical analysis. The initial step in considering whether a jury verdict is reasonable as compared to settlements and verdicts in other eases is to determine the variance within the group. “Statisticians use several statistics to measure the amount of variation within a data set.” James Brook, A Lawyer’s Guide to Probability and Statistics 24 (1990). “[T]he statistic most often seen as a measure of variation within a data set is the standard deviation.” Id. at 25. See also, e.g., The Evolving Role of Statistical Assessments ás Evidence in the Courts 88 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed.1989) (discussing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496, n. 17, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1281 n. 17, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977)). Even though the entire enterprise is expected to provide only a rough approximation, close to an intelligent and well-informed guess, the court is well advised to rely on sophisticated statistical experts. See generally, e.g., Michael O. Finklestein & Bruce Levin, Statistics for Lawyers 46 (1990); The Evolving Role of Statistical Assessments as Evidence in the Courts 36, 91 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed.1989) (two or three standard deviations, one or two tailed hypotheses). The discussion which follows is illustrative only. In the instant case the statistical analysis provided by the parties, and largely relied upon in this memorandum, was not satisfactory to the court. Should it actually become necessary to fix the appropriate range of verdicts a full hearing and a more comprehensive statistical analysis will be required. See, e.g., David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference on Statistics, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 331 (Fed. Jud.Ctr. ed.1994); The Evolving Role of Statistical Assessments as Evidence in the Courts 91 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed. 1989) (“The methodologies of the experts show increasing complexity, but the comprehension of the judges has clearly not kept apace.”), c. Defining Material Deviation The court may use the dollar amount to measure, by standard deviation, how far past settlements or verdicts for pain and suffering have varied from the mean settlement or verdict. “The mean of a set of observations is the value obtained by summing all the observations and dividing by the number of observations.” R. Kapadia & G. Anderson, Statistics Explained: Basie Concepts and Methods 68 (1987). Approximately two-thirds of the values under a normal distribution, a symmetrical bell-shaped curve, fall within one standard deviation of the mean, and approximately 95% fall within two standard deviations of the mean. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference on Statistics, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 331, 379 (Fed.Jud.Ctr. ed.1994). The data available in the instant case did not generate a symmetrical bell-shaped curve, but for the purposes of this memorandum, it is assumed that classic statistical analysis of such curves is appropriate. Expert statisticians will have to assist the court in dealing with curves that dive off sharply at the lower end, where the limit is zero, while tailing off into what are often very high figures at the upper end. There are arguments supporting a rule for Gasperini purposes of one, two or more standard deviations. Using two standard deviations to define the group of values that constitute reasonable compensation supports the judiciary’s efforts to sustain jury verdicts whenever reasonably possible. This approach is consistent with the federal and New York state constitutions that guarantee the right to trial by jury in civil cases. See U.S. Const, amend. VII; N.Y. Const, art. I, § 2. Narrowing the range to figures that fall within one standard deviation, however, speaks to the state policy of controlling jury verdicts. See Legislative Findings and Declarations, Ch. 266,1986 N.Y. 470 (McKinney). Given the awards in the instant ease, and subject to reconsideration on advice of experts, a two standard deviation rule seems appropriate. Settlements and jury verdicts do not, unfortunately, seem to fall along a normal distribution curve. When there are many more extreme values on one side of the mean than the other, as there usually are with pain and suffering awards, statisticians must consider the issue of skew: [An] aspec