Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MeKNIGHT, United States Magistrate Judge. THIS MATTER comes before the undersigned United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to consider Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Having carefully considered all submissions of the parties, including transcripts, affidavits, briefs, and eases cited, the undersigned concludes, for the following reasons, that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and to summary judgment on that ground, as to Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims, which are the basis of the court’s original jurisdiction, and that Plaintiffs’ state law claims in turn should be dismissed without prejudice. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The following account, for summary judgment purposes, is drawn from undisputed facts and Plaintiffs version of disputed facts, as supported by depositions and affidavits. In mid-July, 1992, the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) infiltrated a drug transportation organization in El Paso, Texas, and allowed two cooperating individuals to transport a shipment of marijuana in a ' tractor-trailer from Texas to North Carolina. Deposition of John Boone (“Boone Dep.”) at 11-12. On July 15, 1992, DEA agents contacted Jeff Sellers, a Special Agent with the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”), and asked for the SBI’s assistance. Deposition of Jeff Sellers (“Sellers Dep.”) at 8-11. In turn, SBI agents contacted Allegheny County Sheriff J. Michael Caudill, requesting his assistance. Deposition of J. Michael Caudill (“Caudill Dep.”) at 11-15. At all relevant times, government agents had control of the marijuana. (Sellers Dep. at 10; Boone Dep. at 12.) When the shipment arrived in the area of Sparta, North Carolina, on the night of July 16-17, 1992, federal and state agents monitored a meeting between Steven Shew, Donnie McLamb, John Norris and the informants driving the truck. Sellers Dep. at 11-14. The tractor-trailer truck containing the marijuana and a pick-up truck carrying Norris, McLamb, and Shew left this meeting and drove to a remote area in Allegheny County, which was later identified as a farm belonging to the Plaintiffs. Boone Dep. at 13-14. The tractor-trailer truck backed up to a barn on the farm, and the marijuana was unloaded. Law enforcement officers established surveillance points around the area. Boone Dep. at 14. During this surveillance, a 1986 Honda motor vehicle was driven by a white male wearing glasses around the area from where law enforcement officers were observing the unloading of the marijuana. The vehicle made a circle around the law enforcement officers and then left, Boone Dep. at 14-15; Sellers Dep. at 21-22, proceeding in a direction away from the Andrews farm. Boone Dep. at 15. Sellers stated that Agent Giles Berrier recorded in his notes that the vehicle appeared to pick up another individual, who was wearing a white ball cap, “near the barns there” and to return, passing by the surveillance team and continuing on down the road. Sellers Dep. at 22. Law enforcement officers ran a license tag check on the car, which showed that it was registered to Bonnie Andrews, the recently-separated wife of Plaintiff Robert Andrews. Sellers Dep. at 25-26. John Norris entered a car and left the area around the barn. The decision was made to stop Mr. Norris’ ear, and he was arrested. Boone Dep. at 15. At that point, law enforcement officers proceeded toward the barn into which the marijuana was being offloaded. Arriving at the barn, and prior to looking into the barn or making any arrest, Sheriff Caudill and Carlton Edwards, one of his deputies, spoke with Shew, who was outside the barn. Boone Dep. at 16; Caudill Dep. at 18-19. Shew told them he was trying to work a little bit and that he had leased the farm from Robert Andrews. Caudill Dep. at 19-20. Sheriff Caudill then asked if he could look around, and Shew responded that “you just do what you goddamn have to do.” Caudill Dep. at 20-21. Looking into the barn, Sheriff Caudill and Officer Edwards saw Donnie McLamb and a large amount of marijuana in bales. Caudill Dep. at 21-23. Shew and McLamb were then arrested. Caudill Dep. at 23. Having arrested Shew and McLamb, Sheriff Caudill with other law enforcement officers went to the house of Jones Andrews and told him he was needed at the barn. Caudill Dep. at 26-27. Jones Andrews’ house is not within sight of the barn. Affidavit of Jones Andrews (“Jones Andrews Aft.”) at ¶ 4. Jones Andrews denied having any knowledge of the marijuana off-loading or the leasing of the barn. Caudill Dep. at 27-28; Jones Andrews Aff. at ¶ 5. Sheriff Caudill and Jones Andrews, along with law enforcement officers, then went to Robert Andrews’ residence, which is between a mile and three-quarters and two miles from the barn in question and not within sight of this barn. Caudill Dep. at 28; Boone Dep. at 19. When the doorbell was rung, Robert Andrews appeared and was dressed. Caudill Dep. at 29. Robert Andrews explained that he was dressed at this time (approximately 2:00 a.m.) because he had fallen asleep while watching television and waiting for a friend to visit. Sellers Dep. at 34-35; compare, Affidavit of Robert Andrews (“Robert Andrews Aff.”) at ¶3. Officer Sellers observed the 1986 Honda that had earlier been driven around the watching officers now parked by the house. He asked Robert Andrews about the vehicle, and Andrews explained that his 15-year-old son had been out driving earlier that night and had told him that he had seen some vehicles on the farm, who he assumed were driven by individuals who were fox hunting. Sellers Dep. at 34-35; Affidavit of Joseph K. Andrews (“Joseph Andrews Aff.”) at ¶¶ 2-4. Robert Andrews denied any knowledge of illegal use of the property and denied having leased the barn to Shew. Sellers Dep. at 36; Caudill Dep. at 31; Robert Andrews Aff. at ¶¶ 2,4. During the morning of July 17, 1992, Sheriff Caudill contacted Defendant R. A. Hughes and told him that a large amount of marijuana had been seized. Caudill Dep. at 32-33; Deposition of R. A. Hughes (“Hughes Dep.”) at 10. Hughes drove to the site and discussed the situation with Agent Sellers. Sellers Dep. at 39-40. Sellers “basically just gave [Hughes] a synopsis of what had transpired in the past 24 to 36 hours.” Sellers Dep. at 40. The synopsis included the driving by of the 1986 Honda vehicle, the interviews of Jones and Robert Andrews, and, most likely, the statement made by Shew about leasing the barn. Sellers Dep. at 40-43; Hughes Dep. at 21-23. In another discussion a day or so later, Sellers and Hughes discussed probable cause in connection with Robert Andrews. Later, law enforcement officers at the scene discussed whether Robert Andrews could be arrested in connection with the drug off-loading, but concluded that there was no probable cause to arrest either Jones Andrews or Robert Andrews. Sellers Dep. at 46-48. Sellers told Hughes that in the opinion of the law enforcement officers at the scene, there was not probable cause to arrest Robert or Jones Andrews in connection with the marijuana. Sellers Dep. at 48. (Sheriff Caudill, testified that he told Hughes that “Bobby probably knew about it,” Caudill Dep. at 59-60. The deposition does not clearly establish the time of this conversation, but seem to place it at or near the time of Hughes’ initial inquiry. Id.) Hughes decided to confer with his office in Raleigh before taking further action. Hughes Dep. at 20. The next day, after going home and sleeping, he contacted Defendant Crump. Hughes Dep. at 28-29. Hughes and Crump discussed the quantity of marijuana unloaded on the Andrews’ farm, the statement by Shew about leasing the barn, the appearance of the 1986 Honda vehicle, Robert Andrews’ being fully dressed and apparently nervous when law enforcement officers talked with him, and that some farm equipment had been moved out of the barn contrary to custom. Hughes Dep. at 30-31; Deposition of Robert W. Crump (“Crump Dep.”) at 28-29. Having heard Hughes’ account of the situation, Crump did not respond immediately as to whether or not an assessment should be made. Hughes Dep. at 31; Crump Dep. at 27. At first, Hughes and Crump decided not to issue a tax assessment against Robert Andrews. Crump Dep. at 27. Later, Crump contacted Hughes and told him that he thought a viable assessment against Robert Andrews could be made and authorized Hughes’ making such an assessment. Hughes Dep. at 31-32; Crump Dep. at 33-35. Both Hughes and Crump were aware that Robert Andrews was not arrested in connection with the marijuana. Hughes Dep. at 35. Shortly after the offloading, Sheriff Caudill interviewed Robert and Jones Andrews in his office. Hughes was present for the meeting. Caudill Dep. at 47-48. At this meeting, both Robert and Jones Andrews denied having given permission to anyone to use the farm or having rented it to them. Jones Andrews explained that he had moved a truck out of the barn two days before the offloading. Hughes Dep. at 40; Andrews Aff. at ¶ 5; Jones Aff. at ¶ 6. At the interview, Hughes told the Plaintiffs that he was “on the knife’s edge” as to whether to issue the assessment. Hughes Dep. at 45. Moreover, Hughes told the Plaintiffs that he did not need any reason to issue an assessment and that he was the best revenue agent in the State. Jones Andrews Aff. at ¶6; Robert Andrews Aff. at ¶ 5. Hughes did not interview any other witnesses. He did not interview Joseph Andrews, who drove the 1986 Honda. Hughes Dep. at 42; Affidavit of Joseph Andrews (“Andrews Aff. ”) at ¶ 6. On July 21,1992, Agent Sellers prepared a Form BD-4 (“Report of Arrest and/or Seizure Involving Nontaxpaid (Unstamped) Controlled Substances and Counterfeit Controlled Substances”) regarding Robert Kent Andrews. Sellers Dep. at 51-52; Form BD~ 4, Sellers Dep. Exh. 1. This document names Robert Andrews as the person arrested in possession of the controlled substance. (Sellers, Hughes, and Crump each knew that Robert Andrews had not been arrested. Sellers Dep. at 52; Crump Dep. at 41.) There was no time deadline before which Form BD-4 was required to be filled out and submitted. Sellers Dep. at 68. Hughes testified in deposition that he had sufficient opportunity to investigate the matter as thoroughly as he felt appropriate. Hughes Dep. at 80. After the BD-4 Form had been completed, Hughes prepared a Notice of Controlled Substance Tax Assessment, Form BD-10, for Robert Andrews, dated July 21, 1992, assessing him with a Controlled Substance Tax in the amount of $6,371,673.84 based upon 2,000 pounds of marijuana. Hughes Dep. at 35-36, Plaintiff’s Exh. 2. In addition, Hughes prepared a Certificate of Tax Liability in the amount of $6,371,673.84 (“Form DOR-40”) as to Robert Andrews, which he then served on Andrews and recorded with the Alleghany County Register of Deeds. Hughes Dep. at 36-42, 49, Plaintiffs’ Exh. 3. The Alleghany County Certificate of Tax Liability is file stamped July 22, 1992. Approximately two weeks later, Hughes filed the Certificate of Tax Liability in Surry County as well. Hughes Dep. at 52. At the time he filed the Certificates of Tax Liability, Hughes knew that Jones and Robert Andrews were in the Christmas tree farm business. Hughes Dep. at 99. Hughes knew that filing the Certificates of Tax Liability would impede the Andrews’ use of the property subject thereto. In his deposition, Hughes stated the following: Q. Now, after you went to Mr. Dough-ton’s office, you went and filed the Certificate of Tax Liability, Plaintiffs [sic] Exhibit Number 3? A. Yes, sir. Q. And where did you file that? A. In the Clerk of Superior Court’s Office in Alleghany County. Q. All right. And what does that document do? What’s your understanding of what it does? A. That document is a lien against property of the taxpayer, real property. Q. Okay. It would prevent the taxpayer from being able to sell that property without the resolution of the lien? A. Without the resolution of the lien. The lien would have to either be paid off or some resolution made. Q. If there were no ability to resolve that lien, it would effectively freeze the property from being sold? A. Yes, sir. MR. ALLEN: Could I interject one comment? This is not the nature of an objection but just a point of clarification. The Secretary does have discretion to release a lien, if it’s shown that it’s in the best interest of the State to do so. So the property could be sold. The Secretary could release the lien with respect to one tract of property, although that CTL would be valid against all the other property in the county. I just wanted to make sure that’s a point of law that’s clarified. MR. WYATT: Certainly. BY MR. WYATT: Q. Let me just rephrase my question. Without the consent of the Secretary’s Office, this document would effectively freeze the sale of the property? A. Right. Q. Unless the lien was paid off? A. Right. There would have to be a release, which has been done. I’ve done it in a couple of cases. Hughes Dep. at 48-49. Later, Hughes testified: Q. Now, did you have any knowledge whatsoever about the Andrews’ mortgage situation when you filed the tax assessment? A. No, sir. Q. Okay. Did you know that they were engaged in the Christmas tree farm business? A. Among other things, yes, sir, I understood that. Q. And how did you learn that information? A. It was common knowledge in Sparta. Q. Okay. Do you usually make any investigation with regard to mortgage information before filing an assessment? A. No, sir. Q. Why is that? A. Well, because the filing of the tax lien against the person, we don’t throw them out of the house or anything like that, and they end up in control of this property and have control of it, and especially if they object or whatever and they’re—as long as they’re paying their mortgage and all like that, we don’t bother them on that. And so—and the—most of the time, it has no effect on me whatsoever as to whether there’s a mortgage or not. It’s up to the taxpayer as to whether they pay it or not, because we haven’t taken actual possession of the property. It’s not ours. Q. When you filed the assessment against Robert Andrews, you knew that it would essentially tie up his property until this—• until the issue of the tax lien and tax assessment was resolved? A. Well, I knew that he could not dispose of the property. He personally wouldn’t receive any benefits from it. Q. Okay. Now the bond that has to be posted when there is a tax assessment is an amount equal to the tax assessment? A. It’s been a long time since I’ve been through that, but I don’t know that it’s ever been done but one time. But I do believe that’s correct. Hughes Dep. at 99-100. Hughes knew when he filed the Certificates of Tax Liability that the real property was owned jointly by Jones and Robert Andrews. Hughes Dep. at 93. In his deposition, Crump states that it is “entirely likely” that the Andrews’ attorney, Harold Bender, told him that there was an urgency to get the lien off of the land because it was Christmas tree land and Christmas tree selling season was not long off. Crump Dep. at 45. On November 12, 1992, Bender wrote to Crump requesting prompt consideration. Plaintiffs’ Exh. 11 to Crump Dep. As a result of the filing of the Certificates of Tax Liability, Plaintiffs were unable to harvest Christmas trees from the property. Robert Andrews Aff. at ¶ 8; Jones Andrews Aff. at ¶ 8. They depended on income from tree sales to pay their debts on these properties: 8. Because of the filing of Certificates of Tax Liability, prior to my filing of bankruptcy protection, we were unable to harvest the Christmas trees during the fall and winter of 1992. The filing of the Certificates of Tax Liability effectively froze the property and prevented us from receiving the normal income from these properties. I was dependent on the income from harvesting Christmas trees in order to make payments on indebtedness on the property. As a result of the filing of the Certificates of Tax Liability, I was unable to make payments on this indebtedness. Because of the filing of the Certificates of Tax Liability and resulting loss of income, I was forced to seek bankruptcy protection on October 23,1992. Robert Andrews Aff. at ¶ 8. 8. As a result of the filing of the Certificates of Tax Liability in Alleghany and Surry Counties by Hughes and Crump, the Christmas tree land owned by my son and me was effectively frozen. Specifically, prior to my son’s filing for bankruptcy protection, we were not able to harvest any Christmas trees off of our property. We were dependent on the income from the harvesting of Christmas trees in order to make payments on the indebtedness on the property. My son and I tried to obtain additional loans, but because of the presence of the Certificates of Tax Liability on the public records, we could not obtain any loans. 9. As a result of the filing of the Certificates of Tax Liability, I was forced to file for bankruptcy protection on April 22, 1993. Prior to my filing for bankruptcy protection, the Certificates of Tax Liability were removed on March 26,1993. However, the removal of these Certificates came at too late at [sic] time for me to be able to avoid bankruptcy because we were unable to harvest Christmas trees during the 1992 Christmas tree season. Jones Andrews Aff. at ¶¶ 8, 9. After the assessment had been issued, on or about August 3, 1992, Bender filed an “Objection to Assessment and Application for Hearing”. Crump Dep. at 42, Plaintiffs’ Exh. 9. On September 11, 1992, Bender and Robert Andrews met with Crump for a pre-hearing conference. Plaintiffs’ Exh. 11 to Crump Dep. After meeting with Bender, Crump attempted to obtain more information. He sent a letter to the SBI requesting additional information on the transaction. Crump Dep. at 48-49. On October 12, 1992, he received a letter from SBI Special Agent in Charge J. S. Moiler, Jr. Crump Dep. at 50, Plaintiffs’ Exh. 5 to Crump Dep. The concluding paragraph of this three-page letter states: Due to the facts that Shew had used the Andrews farm as a drop site for such a large amount of marijuana, that Andrews’ vehicle was seen in the area around the barn by the surveillance teams while the marijuana was being worked in the barn, that at 2:00 a.m. in the morning when the officers spoke with Andrews that he was fully dressed and appeared to be very nervous, and that by Steve Show’s statement that he leased the barn from Robert Andrews, it is believed that Robert Andrews was a silent partner for this shipment of marijuana and supplied the drop site for Shew. Plaintiffs’ Exh. 5 to Crump Dep. at 3. Crump discussed the information in this letter with Hughes. Crump Dep. at 51. Hughes gathered police reports for Crump in connection with deciding the merits of Bender’s objection. Hughes Dep. at 60-61. During the time that he was so engaged, Hughes learned, and told Crump, that Shew had recanted his statement. Id. Hughes told Crump he had come to believe that there was not a good case for an assessment in light of Shevfs recantation and the fact that it was Robert Andrews’ son who was driving the 1986 Honda. Hughes Dep. at 67-68. Crump asked Hughes to see if there were other information relevant to the assessment. Hughes investigated further and told Crump that there was no further information linking Robert Andrews with the marijuana found at the farm. Hughes Dep. at 68-69. On January 11, 1992, Robert Andrews’ attorney in the bankruptcy proceeding filed a challenge to the tax assessment. Crump Dep. at 57; Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in. Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at Tab 4. The challenge claimed, in part, that “[t]he DOR has encumbered all property owned by the Debtor in Alleghany County and Surry County, North Carolina in connection with the Tax”; that “[t]he Debtor was neither involved in the Transaction nor did he have prior knowledge of the Transaction”; and that “[t]he Tax is illegal and invalid and no debt is owed by the Debtor to the DOR in connection with the Tax.” Id. Crump was notified of this challenge. He discussed it with an attorney in the Attorney General’s office, and it was decided that the assessment should be cancelled. Crump Dep. at 57-59. On February 26, 1993, the assessment still being in effect, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Determining Tax Liability stating that no objection to the Motion for Determination of Tax Liability was filed and that the North Carolina Department of Revenue through the North Carolina Attorney General’s Office expressly consented to the relief sought. The Court found that “[t]he tax, penalty and interest assessed against the Debtor were assessed without good and valid basis in law or fact,” and ordered that “[t]he DOR shall within fifteen (15) days of this Order formally withdraw its Notice of Controlled Substance Tax Assessment and shall cancel or release the Certificates of Tax Liability filed against the Debtor in Alleghany County and Surry County, North Carolina.” Tab 5 to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Despite the Order of the Bankruptcy Court, the Certificates of Tax Liability were not removed until March 23, 1993, twenty-five days after the issuance of the Order. Hughes effected the cancellation on March 23d and stated that Crump’s directive to him to do so had come within forty-eight hours of March 23d. Hughes Dep. at 73-74. II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT A. GENERAL STANDARD To grant a motion for summary judgment, a court must find that the materials submitted, including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits, “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of fact is one which “may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see, White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98, 101 (4th Cir.1987) (“There is no genuine issue for trial unless sufficient evidence favors the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”). To make this finding, a court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir.1985). The movant has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to a material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). When the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, its burden “may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Justice White warns, however, that “[i]t is not enough to move for summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case.” Id. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at 2555. What showing of evidence by the movant is sufficient for summary judgment depends upon the basis of the motion: If the motion asserts that the opponent lacks proof to establish a requisite element of its ease, as in Celotex, the movant must show the absence of facts, usually by producing relevant excerpts from the opponent’s discovery responses, supplemented as needed by affidavits. If the motion purports to negate an essential element of the nonmovant’s case, for example, to establish that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant, a more elaborate showing on affidavits may be necessary. Schwarzer, Hirsch & Barrans, THE ANALYSIS AND DECISION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS (Federal Judicial Center 1991), at 46. Rule 56(e) requires that the party resisting summary judgment go beyond pleadings and designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Rule 56(e) also requires that “affidavits set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence.” In a case where “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial’,” and summary judgment is proper. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592-1593, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). Justice White, writing for the majority, stated in Anderson: [SJummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is “genuine,” that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. ... [T]here is no issue for trial, [however], unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. 477 U.S. at 248-252, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-2512. Dismissing a fraud claim in 1988, Judge Robert D. Potter phrased the standard for prevailing on summary judgment: “[I]t must be apparent on summary judgment that plaintiff will be unable to present evidence at trial sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that plaintiff has proved his case by a preponderance.” Wilson v. Popp Yam Corp., 680 F.Supp. 208, 210 (W.D.N.C.1988) (emphasis added). Characterizing the genuineness standard, Judge Wilkinson wrote for the Fourth Circuit: Genuineness means that the evidence must create fair doubt; wholly speculative assertions will not suffice. A trial, after all, is not an entitlement. It exists to resolve what reasonable minds would recognize as real factual disputes. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir.1985), quoted in Ca-taioba Indian Tribe v. State of South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334, 1339 (4th Cir.1992). Credibility is not an issue for summary judgment. Therefore, the nonmovant’s evidence must be accepted as true for purposes of the motion. When resolution of issues of fact depends upon a determination of credibility, summary judgment is improper. Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1979). The underlying facts and contentions will be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. [T]he court is obliged to credit the factual asseverations contained in the material before it which favor the party resisting summary judgment and to draw inferences favorable to that party if the inferences are reasonable (however improbable they may seem). Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083,1092 (4th Cir.1980). B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT In Pittman v. Nelms, 87 F.3d 116 (4th Cir.1996), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the pattern of analysis for qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. The Court stated that “the accepted summary judgment analysis is a condensed version of the full analysis,” 87 F.3d at 119 n. 2, and developed that analysis as follows: A qualified immunity case must develop through two primary levels. The first does not involve immunity at all, but focuses on the merits of the plaintiffs claim— whether the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff. It includes the factual issue of what actually happened, ..., and the legal question of whether the defendant’s actions were unconstitutional..... Only if the defendant did act illegally must the case proceed to the second level to determine whether he is, nevertheless, immune from suit..... The immunity level consists of two sub-issues—whether the law governing the violation was clearly established at the time of the incident, ..., and whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position should have known that his conduct was illegal,____ Both are issues of law for the court: Only if a court determines that the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a right clearly established at the time the actions occurred should it proceed to determine whether a reasonable person in the official’s position would have known that his actions violated that right. When the inquiry proceeds to this point, “the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct,” ...; however, the defendant may still be able to show “extraordinary circumstances” and “prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard.”.... Since such a claim would turn “primarily on objective factors,” ..., this determination, too, is “also a matter for the courts,”.... Policy considerations favor deciding qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage: One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit. ____ When a court addresses qualified immunity in the summary judgment context, it can condense its analysis. As with any motion for summary judgment, it must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non movant, so it need not make factual findings. Nor must it determine directly whether the plaintiffs evidence indicates a constitutional violation. Instead it can combine the second prong of the immunity inquiry by asking whether the plaintiff has “allege [d] the violation of a clearly established right.”____ If the answer is affirmative, the court must determine whether the defendant “knew or should have known” that his conduct was illegal..... Pittman, 87 F.3d at 118-119 (ease citations omitted). III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY A. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AS TO SEIZURE. (COUNT ONE: THAT DEFENDANTS CRUMP AND HUGHES SEIZED THE PLAINTIFFS’ PROPERTY WITHOUT ANY BASIS FOR DOING SO, IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.) WHETHER THE RIGHT ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED What is “clearly established” must be tied to the facts of the particular case. It is not sufficient to articulate a right in broad, general terms without concrete application. In Gooden v. Howard County, Md., 954 F.2d 960 (4th Cir.1992), the Fourth Circuit stated in this regard: However, “if the test of ‘clearly established law5 were to be applied at this level of generality,.... [plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity ... into a rule of virtually unqualified liability” Anderson [v. Creighton ], 483 U.S. [635] at 639, 107 S.Ct. [3034,] at 3039[, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)]. Instead, for an official to lose his qualified immunity, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. “Harlow’s ‘clearly established’ standard demands that a bright line be crossed.” Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1194 (11th Cir.1989). “The right must be sufficiently particularized to put potential defendants on notice that their conduct probably is unlawful.” Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1301 (7th Cir.1986). Of course, “[t]his is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039 (citations omitted). 954 F.2d at 968. The standard was further developed in Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307 (4th Cir.1992): In determining whether the specific right allegedly violated was “clearly established,” the proper focus is not upon the right at its most general or abstract level, but at the level of its application to the specific conduct being challenged. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 774-75 (4th Cir.1987). And the determination whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have known that his conduct would violate the right at issue must be made on the basis of information actually possessed by the officer at the critical time, Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. at 3039-40, or that was then reasonably available to him, Harlow [v. Fitzgeraldl 457 U.S. [800] at 815[, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)]; Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 957 n. 5 (4th Cir.1988), and in light of any exigencies of time and circumstance that reasonably may have affected the officer’s perceptions. See, Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 350, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1100-01, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The tolerance thus accorded by the qualified immunity defense to “good faith” mistakes of judgment traceable to unsettled law, or faulty information, or contextual exigencies, is deliberately designed to give protection to “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. at 1096, in order to avoid undue inhibitions in the performance of official duties. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638,107 S.Ct. at 3038. 973 F.2d at 312. With respect to the ease at hand, in order to assess the potential civil liability of these state actors under § 1983, we ask whether Plaintiffs have properly asserted a violation of a clearly established right arising under either the Constitution or a federal statute. It is beyond cavil that Plaintiffs enjoyed the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. To be decided is whether that right was clearly established in reference to the specific conduct being challenged, that is, whether filing these Certificates of Tax Liability constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1628, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), provides in pertinent part that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.... ” The Fourth Amendment is violated if there is a seizure which is outside the parameters of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, an objective standard, with the requisite level of intent. At issue in this case is whether there was a seizure and, if so, whether it was reasonable. The tax assessment was imposed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 105-113.111, which provided in part as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an assessment against a dealer who possesses a controlled substance to which a stamp has not been affixed as required by this Article shall be made as provided in this section. The Secretary shall assess a tax, applicable penalties, and interest based on personal knowledge or information available to the Secretary. The Secretary shall notify the dealer in writing of the amount of the tax, penalty, and interest due, and demand its immediate payment. ... If the dealer does not pay the tax, penalty, and interest immediately upon receipt of the notice and demand, the Secretary shall collect the tax, penalty, and interest pursuant to the procedure set forth in G.S. 105-241.1(g) for jeopardy assessments or the procedure set forth in G.S. 105-242, including causing execution to be issued immediately against the personal property of the dealer unless the dealer files with the Secretary a bond in the amount of the asserted liability for the tax, penalty, and interest.. The Secretary shall use all means available to collect the tax, penalty, and interest from any property in which the dealer has a legal, equitable, or beneficial interest. The dealer may seek review of the assessment as provided in Article 9 of this Chapter. N.C.G.S. § 105-113.111. A “dealer” was defined as follows: A person who in violation of G.S. § 90-95 possesses, delivers, sells, or manufactures more than 4.25 grams of marijuana, or 7 or more grams of any other controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance that is sold by weight, or 10 or more dosage use units of any other controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance that is not sold by weight. N.C.G.S. § 105-113.106(3). The Certificate of Tax Liability prohibited an owner from delivering good title even to a subsequent bona fide purchaser of real estate: Provided, however, that the lien of State taxes shall not be enforceable as against bona fide purchasers for value, and as against duly recorded mortgages, deeds of trust and other recorded specific liens, as to real estate, except upon docketing of a certificate of tax liability or a judgment in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county wherein the real estate is situated ..., and the priority of the State’s tax Hen against property in the hands of bona fide purchasers for value, and as against duly recorded mortgages, deeds of trust and other recorded specific Hens, shall be determined by reference to the date and time of docketing of judgment or certificate of tax liability or the levy under execution or tax warrant. N.C.G.S. § 105-241. It does not appear that the filing of a tax assessment under the above statutes has been held to be a “seizure” implicating the Fourth Amendment, or even that the issue has been squarely presented to North Carolina or federal courts. See, however, State v. Ballenger, 123 N.C.App. 179, 472 S.E.2d 572 (1996) (divided court, applying the Supreme Court’s analysis in Dept. of Rev. of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994), to G.S. § 105-113.105 et seq., holding that “the North Carolina Controlled Substance Tax does not have such fundamentally punitive characteristics as to render it violative of the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense contained in the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Id. 472 S.E.2d at 575). Nor was the undersigned able to discover federal or state case authority analyzing Fourth Amendment seizure issues under relevantly similar statutes in the laws of other states. This alone might be deemed decisive as to whether the application was clearly established. But' we must inquire as to whether persuasive analogies rendered the instant application apparent. Historically, for purposes of § 1983, the Supreme Court has analyzed deprivations of liberty and property arising out of a seizure of property in terms of procedural due process rather than Fourth Amendment violations. See, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). This reasoning was accepted by the Seventh Circuit in Soldal v. County of Cook, 942 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir.1991), decided August 27, 1991, a ease which, at the Circuit and Supreme Court levels, will be important for this discussion. In that opinion, the facts of which will be discussed below, Judge Posner, writing for the Court, determined that the disconnection of a mobile home from its utilities, and the towing of the home off the premises of the trailer park, did not constitute a seizure for purposes of the owners’ claim that their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures had been violated. The purpose of the actions was to evict the tenant, and there had been no previous search for evidence of crime implicating the owners’ privacy rights. Judge Posner reasoned as follows: Yet in all these cases the seizure of items that were in the public view, while lawful, was treated as a Fourth Amendment seizure, so that it had to be pronounced reasonable (for example because it was consented to, or supported by probable cause, or it seized something that was in plain view) before it could be permitted. The reason, however, is that seizures made in the course of investigations by police or other law enforcement officers are almost always, as in the plain view cases, the culmination of searches. The police search in order to seize, and it is the search and ensuing seizure that the Fourth Amendment by its reference to “searches and seizures” seeks to regulate. Seizure means one thing when it is the outcome of a search; it may mean something else when it stands apart from a search or any other investigative activity. The Fourth Amendment may still nominally apply, but, precisely because there is no invasion of privacy, the usual rules do not apply. There is another reason for distinguishing public law enforcement from other contexts in which seizures may occur, and that is the historical connection between the Fourth Amendment and liberty. The objection to an arrest is not only that it is an invasion of privacy, but also that it is a restriction of liberty. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Some property seizures are of this character as well, such as prolonged detention of an individual’s luggage at an airport, which by preventing him from going on his way curtails his liberty. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). In none of these cases is the court concerned with property rights as such, although in some of the cases property rights get mentioned in connection with the question of standing to maintain a Fourth Amendment challenge, an issue since laid to rest by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 88, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). Outside of the law enforcement area the Fourth Amendment retains its force as a protection against searches, because they invade privacy. That is why we decline to confine the amendment to the law enforcement setting. But concerns of liberty will rarely be present outside of that setting and they are not in this case—which because it is a case of seizure, not search, does not involve an invasion of privacy, either. Thus, no interest protected by the Fourth Amendment is involved, and this helps show that even if, despite what we have said, there is some element or tincture of a Fourth Amendment seizure, it cannot cany the day for the Soldáis. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), established the principle that the dominant character of the conduct challenged in a section 1983 case determines the constitutional standard under which it is evaluated. The narrow holding of Graham is that when the gist of the challenged conduct is an arrest, the Court should use the standards of the Fourth Amendment to adjudge its lawfulness even though the conduct could also be characterized as a deprivation of liberty. But the converse should also be true. If the gist of the challenged conduct is a repossession or eviction conventionally challenged under the due process clause as a deprivation, recharacterization as a Fourth Amendment seizure is barred. The suggestion that Graham stands for the proposition that all property disputes should so far as possible be stuffed into the Fourth Amendment strikes us as bizarre. Mr. Soldal is neither an arrestee (so far as pertinent to this part of the case) nor a prison inmate, but the principles of Graham v. Connor and Hudson v. Palmer[, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393(1984)] sweep broader than the facts or narrow holdings, and the need to carve the joint between the Fourth Amendment and the due process clause is as urgent in this case as in an arrest ease or a prisoner case. The decisions require us to mesh the different provisions in or incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment while preserving their separate domains—and thus to make the amendment coherent. Hudson tells us to do so by allocating the protection of privacy to the Fourth Amendment and the protection of property to the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537 (7th Cir.1983). Mr. Soldal lost his property but not his privacy or his liberty. He has no Fourth Amendment case. He had other legal remedies but he waived them. The paradox seemingly presented by our decision—that the law-abiding have fewer rights under the Fourth Amendment than the criminal—is superficial. Different constitutional provisions protect different interests. The Fourth Amendment protects privacy, and that interest is more likely to be infringed by criminal investigations than by other governmental activities— though the law-abiding are, occasionally, the inadvertent and, rarely, the intended targets of a criminal investigation, and when they are they receive the full protection of the amendment. The due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is among the provisions that protect property (though that is not all it protects); and property interests are more likely to be asserted by the law-abiding than by the criminal class. The Soldáis, to repeat, had remedies; they chose the wrong one. 942 F.2d at 1079-1080 (case citations omitted; emphasis in original). Since Soldal, decided by the Seventh Circuit in 1991 and by the Supreme Court in 1992, tests the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of property only where privacy or liberty is also implicated, its reasoning and holding are important for deciding the instant case; for although the filing of a lien to collect a tax implicates neither privacy nor liberty, the court is asked to hold that it was a Fourth Amendment seizure and that it was unreasonable under the parameters of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Soldal asks the questions which must be asked in instant ease (was there a Fourth Amendment seizure, and was it reasonable) about state interference with possessory interests where the property was not seized as evidence of a crime. Unlike the Soldáis, the Andrews were subjects of a criminal investigation, their property was searched, and the tax was assessed on the basis of the results of the criminal investigation. However, neither the privacy nor liberty interests of the Andrews was implicated in this process. The seizure of the Andrews’ property, if such it was, was not a seizure of possible evidence of criminal activity but an interference, to satisfy a tax,' with the Andrews’ ability to sell property and things attached to property. Soldal is persuasive in the instant case because it resolves the determining question of the instant case, whether the Fourth Amendment may apply when neither liberty nor privacy interests are brought into question by state action interfering with possessory interests. The relevant facts in Soldal, as recounted in the Supreme Court opinion, Soldal v. Cook County, III., 506 U.S. 56, 57-58, 113 S.Ct. 538, 541-542, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992), are as follows. The Soldal family resided in a trailer home located on a rented lot in the Willo-way Terrace mobile home park in Elk Grove, Illinois. In May, 1987, Terrace Properties, which owned the park, and Margaret Hale, its manager, filed an eviction proceeding against the Soldáis in an Illinois state court. Under Illinois law, dispossession must follow a judgment of eviction. The suit was dismissed on June 2, 1987, and the owner brought a second eviction action for nonpayment of rent in August, 1987. Trial was set for September 22,1987. Terrace Properties and Hale did not await trial, but instead forcibly evicted the Soldáis two weeks prior to September 22d. Hale notified the Cook County Sheriffs Department on September 4th that she was going to have the trailer taken out of the park. She asked for sheriffs deputies in case of resistance. Later on the 4th, two Terrace Properties employees, accompanied by Cook County Deputy Sheriff O’Neil, removed the sewer and water connections from the trailer, disconnected the telephone, tore off the canopy and skirting, and attached the trailer to a tractor. O’Neil told Soldal that “he wás there to see that [Soldal] didn’t interfere with [Willoway’s] work.” Two more deputies arrived. Soldal asked to file a criminal trespass complaint. He was referred to Lieutenant Jones in Hale’s office. Jones refused to accept the complaint because, in his opinion, it was a landlord-tenant situation. The deputies knew that Terrace Properties had not obtained an eviction order. With the deputies present, the Willo-way employees pulled the trailer free and towed it to nearby property. A state judge on September 9th found that the eviction had not been authorized and ordered the trailer, which had been badly damaged, returned to the lot. The Soldáis brought a § 1983 action alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and claiming that the private defendants had conspired with the deputies to unreasonably seize and remove the Soldal’s trailer home. The district court granted summary judgment for failure to show a conspiracy. As we have seen, the Seventh Circuit found state action but held that the removal of the trailer was not a Fourth Amendment seizure or Fourteenth Amendment deprivation. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Seventh Circuit, and its reasoning and holding informs the determination of the instant case. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice White reaffirmed the definition of “seizure” set forth in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), that a seizure of property occurs “when ‘there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property,’ ” 506 U.S. at 61,113 S.Ct. at 543, and determined by this definition that, contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s view, the Soldal’s home was seized. Justice White stated that the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of seizure followed from too narrow a reading of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment does not protect only liberty and privacy interests “while leaving unprotected possessory interests where neither privacy nor liberty was at stake.” 506 U.S. at 62, 113 S.Ct. at 543. The language of the Fourth Amendment and interpreting cases “unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property as well as privacy.” 506 U.S. at 62, 113 S.Ct. at 544. “We axe thus unconvinced that any of the Court’s prior cases supports the view that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of property only where privacy or liberty is also implicated.” 506 U.S. at 65, 113 S.Ct. at 545. Moreover, “the Amendment’s protection applies in the civil context as well.” 506 U.S. at 67,113 S.Ct. at 546. The Court rejected the view of the Seventh Circuit, set out above, that the Amendment protects only against those unreasonable seizures that are the outcome of a search. “[0]ur cases ... hold that seizures of property are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment -has taken place.” 506 U.S. at 68,113 S.Ct. at 547. In our view, the reason why an officer might enter a house or effectuate a seizure is wholly irrelevant to the threshold question of whether the Amendment applies. What matters is the intrusion on the people’s security from governmental interference. Therefore, the right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure of the house was undertaken to collect evidence, verify compliance with a housing regulation, effect an eviction by the police, or on a whim, for no reason at all. 506 U.S. at 69,113 S.Ct. at 548. The Court notes that Fourth Amendment reasonableness determination “will reflect a ‘careful balancing of governmental and private interests’.” 506 U.S. at 71, 113 S.Ct. at 549 (quoting from New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341, 105 S.Ct. 733, 742, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985)). The Court implies that probable cause is the presumptive standard, at least where police are involved in a search, even in the absence of a privacy interest, as in the plain view decisions, where “[a] seizure of the article ... would obviously invade the owner’s possessory interest’.” 506 U.S. at 66, 113 S.Ct. at 546 (quoting from Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134,110 S.Ct. 2301, 2306, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)). Applying the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Soldal, we ask first if the filing of the certificates of tax liability was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Under Soldal and Jacobsen, this amounts to asking whether there was meaningful interference with the Andrews’ possessory interests in their property. Jacobsen does not define “possessory,” and the definition, in the context of the facts of Jacobsen, could (but not necessarily) be read as limiting the protection to interests arising out of actual physical possession, in which case it would protect the right of present use and enjoyment and the right to transfer possession, e.g., through sale or lease. See, Steven G. Davison, WARRANTLESS INVESTIGATIVE SEIZURES OF REAL AND TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 25 American Criminal Law Review 577, 587-590 (1987). Even under a restrictive reading of the definition, the right to sell property actually possessed would be protected. If filing the tax certificates meaningfully interfered with the Andrews’ ability to sell their property, then under Jacobsen there was an interference with possessory interests. Neither Jacobsen nor Soldal defines “meaningful.” Nor do these opinions inform whether “meaningful” is determined subjectively, by reference to the possessor, or objectively, by reference to a standard. See, id. at 591. Applying the reasoning of Soldal, the undersigned concludes that whether the criteria are subjective or objective, government acquisition of physical possession of property, or assertion of dominion and control (constructive possession) over it, which prevents the property from being sold, is a meaningful interference with possessory interest. Applying Jacobsen and Soldal, placing a tax lien on the Andrews’ property was a meaningful interference with possessory interests and, thus, a Fourth Amendment seizure. We now inquire as to whether it was reasonable under Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. Assuming the traditional view, that reasonableness is an objective standard as regards the seizure itself in light of law then in effect, we must decide whether “probable cause” is the appropriate measure of reasonableness for seizures of property where neither liberty nor privacy interests are implicated and where the seizure is not of evidence of a crime. As noted above, where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a standard short of probable cause, the Supreme Court has been willing to adopt such a standard. Probable cause, however, is the point of departure. In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), the Court, summarizing the appropriation of the reasonableness standard, commented: [Sjome seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained and are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity. In these cases, ..., the Court was applying the ultimate standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment. They are consistent with the general rule that every arrest, and every seizure having the essential attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause. But they demonstrate that the exception for limited intrusions that may be justified by special law enforcement interests is not confined to the momentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk for weapons involved in Terry and Adams [v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)]. 452 U.S. at 699-700,101 S.Ct. at 2592. The reasoning and principles articulated by reference to arrest in Michigan militate against a departure from the probable cause standard in the situation represented by the instant facts. The intrusion of the tax lien was substantial in that it prevented the exercise of fundamental rights attendant upon ownership of the property for a relatively long period of time and carried with it by analogy the essential attributes of a formal arrest. Law enforcement interests do not counterbalance. There was no exigency or danger of loss of evidence or other necessity of action to prevent frustration of law enforcement functions and interests. Moreover, as the statutes above indicate, the basis for assessing the tax and filing the certificates was a determination that the owner was a dealer in possession, terms deriving from criminal law and to which the probable cause standard has traditionally been applied for warrants of arrest and seizure. Nor does it seem wise on policy grounds. As LaFave comments regarding evidence of crime, “the mere suspicion alternative, although explainable upon the superficially plausible ground that less evidence should be required merely to interfere with a possessory interest than to, say, make an arrest or enter premises, is undesirable because such a watering down of the probability nexus would result in wholesale seizures.” Wayne R. LaFave, S SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.7(a) (1996). Moreover, courts have uniformly imposed a probable cause requirement on tax seizure warrants. In G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977), the Court held that an IRS agent’s warrantless nonexigent entry into the privacy of a taxpayer’s office to seize the taxpayer’s property subject to a Federal tax lien violates the Fourth Amendment. See, United States v. Shriver, 645 F.2d 221, 222 (4th Cir.1981). In G.M. Leasing, the Court found that there was “probable cause to believe that assets held by the petitioner were properly subject to seizure in satisfaction of the assessments.” 429 U.S. at 351, 97 S.Ct. at 628. By way of analogy, at least one court has applied the probable cause standard to the freezing of assets in a bank account, finding it to be a necessary and, perhaps, sufficient condition for seizing money in a bank account without a warrant. In Colello v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 908 F.Supp. 738 (C.D.Ca.1995), Plaintiffs’ bank accounts in Switzerland were frozen by Swiss authorities upon request of the United States Department of Justice pursuant to a treaty. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the asset freeze. Plaintiffs contended that the Swiss asset freeze was a Fourth Amendment seizure and that Defendants’ failure to obtain a warrant rendered the freeze unreasonable. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice agreed that the freeze was in fact a seizure. 908 F.Supp. at 752-753. Citing Jacobsen and Soldal, the court stated: To obtain a warrant, of course, the government must have probable cause. When proceeding without a warrant, as here, the government’s “conduct is governed by the other half of the Fourth Amendment, which declares the right of the people to be secure ‘against unreasonable searches and seizures’. But it is clear that such an arrest or search is unreasonable if not based upon probable cause.” 908 F.Supp. at 753 (quoting 1 LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984), § 3.3, p. 184). The Court held that the Treaty’s reasonable suspicion standard for the freeze of a citizen’s assets violated the Fourth Amendment. 908 F.Supp. at 755. The undersigned concludes that probable cause is the appropriate standard for determining the reasonabl