Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM ORDER ERICKSON, United States Magistrate Judge. I. Introduction This matter came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the consent of the parties, as authorized by Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), upon the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. A Hearing on the Motion was conducted on September 5, 1996, at which time the Plaintiff appeared by Susan A. McKay, Esq., and the Defendant appeared by Larry C. Minton, Esq. For reasons which follow, the Defendant’s Motion is granted in part, and denied in part. II. Factual and Procedural History The Plaintiff is a Licensed Practical Nurse and a State-certified Emergency Medical Technician (“EMT”). The Defendant is a political subdivision of the State of Minnesota. At all relevant times, the Defendant owned and operated the Blackduck Ambulance Service (“Ambulance Service”), whose purpose it was to provide ambulance assistance to the residents of Blackduck. In 1981, the Plaintiff began working for the Ambulance Service, in a part-time capacity, as a “volunteer.” On June 4, 1985, at a Black-duck City Council (“City Council”) meeting, the Plaintiff was hired as the Ambulance Service’s full-time “Ambulance Director,” and she began serving in that capacity on the following day. The need for, and the particulars of the position were detailed in the following job description, which was contemporaneously promulgated by the City Council: Due to a severe shortage of daytime personnel, the Blackduck Ambulance Association is recommending the employment of a full-time person to be available to answer daytime calls. This would be a 40-hour a week position over five days with serving the other four hours a day covered on a voluntary basis. Schedules will be worked out to cover weekends, holidays and vacations. After conferring with council members, the following job description was agreed upon: A valid EMT Certificate must be maintained, must be available to respond to all calls while on duty for 8 hours a day, five days a week. This person will be available to cover the other four hours a day on a voluntary basis. Be available to the city for general labor at all other times. Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, fka Brekke, Exhibit 6. As a beginning salary for this position, the Plaintiff was to receive “$5.00 an hour for general labor, [and] $7.00 an hour when on ambulance calls.” Id. The Plaintiffs hourly wage was periodically increased during her employment as the Ambulance Director and, at the time that the Ambulance Service was closed, she was being compensated at a rate of $10.37 an hour. The Plaintiff retained the position of Ambulance Director until April 18, 1995, when the City Council voted to discontinue the Ambulance Service. From its inception, her position required that she serve as the Ambulance Service’s primary EMT, and that she coordinate the scheduling of the staff of volunteers. Due to the frequent turnover in the roster of volunteers, the number of available volunteers tended to fluctuate, from a figure as low as eight, to as many as fifteen. In addition, as an apparent condition for State licensing, each volunteer was required to hold a valid State EMT certification. As a result, during the period from 1985 to 1993, in order to assure an adequate staff of volunteers, the Plaintiff would conduct annual EMT initial training courses and, occasionally, supplemental “refresher” courses. Since these courses required an additional expenditure of City funds, the Plaintiff originally sought the City Council’s approval prior to conducting a new class but, on July 18, 1989, the City Council passed a resolution which allowed the Plaintiff to conduct the classes without pre-authorization, so long as she kept the City Council “informed as to the classes.” Affidavit of Susan McKay, Exhibit U- As we have noted, on her regular work days, the Plaintiff was required to “volunteer” so as to cover, on an on-call basis, an additional four hours which, apparently, included the two-hour periods that immediately preceded, and directly followed, her scheduled shift. Furthermore, because of difficulties in obtaining volunteer coverage for certain of the weekend and holiday shifts, the Plaintiff was frequently called upon to “volunteer” in order to cover these shifts as well. As was the case with the other volunteers, while on-call, the Plaintiff was required to wear a paging device, which emitted an audible signal which would alert her to an emergent request for ambulance service. To facilitate a prompt response to such a request, while on-call, the Ambulance Service personnel were required to remain within a certain geographic radius of the Ambulance Service’ garage. At the commencement of the Plaintiffs employment as the Ambulance Director, this radius was limited to two miles but, later, the radius was increased to three, and then five miles. Ultimately, for the final year of the Ambulance Service’s operation, the area was increased to a radius of ten miles from the garage. On-call personnel were not required to respond to a page within a set period of time and, aside from the geographic restriction, the only limitation that the on-call status placed upon the volunteer’s personal activities, was that they could not become intoxicated during their shifts. As a consequence of the on-call component to her job description, the Plaintiff frequently worked more than 40 hours in a week’s period. On June 20, 1989, the Plaintiff informed the City Council that, since the date of her hire, and continuing through to that time, she had amassed a significant number of work hours, which exceeded 40 hours per work week, and which had not been compensated at overtime rates. When she requested reimbursement for the lost overtime pay, the City Council opted to pay her a lump sum which represented $7.00—the volunteer wage—for each hour of accumulated “overtime.” Notwithstanding this lump sum pay-' ment, for the remainder of the Ambulance Service’s existence, the Plaintiff was often compelled to work more than 40 hours a week, as a result of the Ambulance Service’s continuing staffing problems. The City attempted to rectify this problem through a variety of means. At first, the Plaintiff was instructed to take “compensatory time” in lieu of overtime pay. This solution proved unworkable, however, because the Plaintiff was unable to use her compensatory time, as she could not locate volunteers who were willing to cover her regular daytime shifts. At other times, she was paid the volunteer rate of $7.00 per hour, for those portions of her on-call shifts when she was involved in actual ambulance runs and, on other occasions, she was instructed not to schedule herself for any hours—volunteer or otherwise—which would exceed a regular 40 hour work week. Despite these measures, the issue of compensation, for the Plaintiffs excess hours, was never resolved to the parties’ mutual satisfaction. The Record reflects that, as early as February of 1992, the City Council became sufficiently concerned with the operations of the Ambulance Service that it considered several means by which the Service could be “revamped” or “reorganized.” Affidavit of Susan McKay, Exhibits 9 and 11. Among the measures considered at that time was the possible sale of the Ambulance Service to a private party. In addition, the City Council debated the feasibility of creating a committee, or some similar entity, to oversee the performance of the Ambulance Service. For most of the period in which she had served as the Ambulance Director, the Plaintiff reported directly to the City Council. On July 20, 1998, however, at the suggestion of Vernon Beighley (“Beighley”), an Ambulance Service volunteer and a member of the Ambulance Association, the City Council established the Ambulance Executive Board (“Executive Board”), “for the purpose of governing the [Ajmbulanee [Service.” Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, fka Brekke, Exhibit 6. Thereafter, the Executive Board—which was comprised of six members, inclusive of both Beighley and the Plaintiff—had direct supervisory authority over the Ambulance Service and, as a consequence, the Plaintiff reported directly to the Executive Board, rather than to the City Council. As a result of this new supervisory regime, the Plaintiff was required to obtain the approval of the Executive Board before she could teach any new EMT volunteer training courses. In early 1994, the Plaintiff sought the Executive Board’s permission to begin instructing new volunteers, but the Executive Board and, later, the City Council, chose not to authorize the proposed training sessions, and the Plaintiff did not instruct any new volunteers after 1993. In June of 1993, at approximately the same time as the formation of the Executive Board, the Plaintiffs job description was expanded to include a series of new duties, which chiefly involved billing, accounting, and record keeping. Consistent with her earlier job description—which required that she perform “general labor”—this new job description reflected that, “[ajfter fulfilling the job responsibilities of the [Ambulance Director],” the Plaintiff was to make herself “available to the City of Blackduek for miscellaneous job responsibilities.” Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, flea Brekke, Exhibit 8. Consistent with this express job requirement, the Plaintiff made herself available to perform general municipal maintenance duties, such as cleaning the City park. The Plaintiff attests, however, that, on January 4, 1994, when she reported for work at the City maintenance garage, Bob Klug (“Klug”), the City’s Maintenance Supervisor, instructed her to leave, with the following commentary: You’re making my guys look bad. You’re always seen working, and I don’t want you working here. They’re talking about laying off one of my men, and I will not have you working here and lose one of my men. So I don’t want you to work here anymore because you’re making my guys look bad. Deposition of Sharon Brekke-Bunker, at 78. Following this incident, the Executive Board revised the Plaintiffs job description, on May 17, 1994, so as to eliminate her “general labor/miscellaneous job responsibilities.” In 1993, rumors began to circulate that the Plaintiff had become romantically involved with Richard Bunker (“Bunker”), who was then a City maintenance worker. Apparently, in early 1994, the two were seen riding together in a City maintenance vehicle and, as a result, at an Executive Board meeting of May 9, 1994, Deb Eibensteiner (“Eibensteiner”), who was a City Council member and a member of the Executive Board, instructed the Plaintiff that since she was no longer performing “general labor” for the City, she “was not to be seen in any of the city vehicles.” Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, flea Brekke, Exhibit 23. Before this time, the Plaintiff had used City vehicles when running job errands, such as having the City’s ambulance serviced but, thereafter, she was not allowed to make use of the City’s vehicles, even during inclement weather. On July 17, 1994, the Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging discrimination on the basis of gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). See, Title W U.S.S. § 2000e-l, et seq.; Minnesota Statutes Section 363.01, et seq. The Plaintiff contends that, after she filed this charge, her relationships with the City Council, and with the Executive Board, became markedly hostile. On September 20, 1994, at a City Council meeting which was open to the public, Council members read aloud a letter from a member of the public that raised serious allegations—which were later determined to be without foundation—concerning the Plaintiffs professionalism and competence. After the letter was read, and upon the Motion of Eibensteiner, the letter was placed in the Plaintiffs personal file. Although the Plaintiff was present at this meeting, she was not given notice of the contents of the letter before it was publicly recited at the meeting. At this same meeting, a letter was also read which was critical of the performance of a City police officer. However, the issues generated by this other letter were “tabled” until the officer could be afforded an opportunity to respond to the letter’s charges. The Record does not indicate whether the City Council considered placing the. letter in the officer’s personnel file. Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, flea Brekke, Exhibit 23. Although the Plaintiff remained a member of the Executive Board, she avers that, after she filed her EEOC discrimination charge, the Executive Board began scheduling meetings without informing her, and conducted meetings without her participation. Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, fka Brekke, at ¶ 5. In addition, on August 29, 1994, Beighley and Jim VandeKamp—• both of whom were members of the Executive Board—called a meeting of the Ambulance Association, for which no minutes were kept, and from which the Plaintiff was excluded. Affidavit of Susan Potts, Exhibit 1, and ¶ 2. At this meeting, Beighley encouraged his daughter Kami, who was also a volunteer, to recount a then recent on-the-job experience, which she had shared with the Plaintiff, and which seriously impugned the Plaintiffs professional capacities. Affidavit of Susan Potts, at ¶ 2; Affidavit of Bridget McNeil, at 14. At this same meeting, Beigh-ley encouraged other members of the Ambulance Association to relay to State authorities any incidents which could question the Plaintiffs professional qualifications. In requesting such correspondence, Beighley stated that the City “needed something to fight [the Plaintiffs EEOC charge] with * * *.” Affidavit of Susan Potts, at ¶ 2. In December of 1994, the Plaintiff filed a second charge with the EEOC, this time alleging acts of reprisal in response to her first charge. In the latter part of 1994, the Ambulance Service, which was already understaffed with volunteers, suffered several additional resignations, including those of Beighley, his daughter Kami, and his sister. As a result, the Ambulance Service’s staffing problems became quite acute. This shortage was partially ameliorated by having Bunker cover some of the on-call shifts, but Klug, who was Bunker’s supervisor, opposed this practice because it left the City maintenance department potentially short-handed. The Record reflects that the Plaintiff suggested that these staffing problems could be redressed if the Executive Board and City Council would allow her to train new volunteers. The City Council, however, would not authorize the needed training. Instead, in January of 1995, the City Council began to explore the option of discontinuing the Ambulance Service, and of leasing its equipment to the Ambulance Association, which would be reorganized, in a corporate form, to provide the community with ambulance services. Eventually, these plans were realized and, on April 18,1995, the City Council abolished the Ambulance Service by formal resolution. In terminating the Ambulance Service, the City Council advised that it had “weighed the need against the continued cost of operating [the Ambulance Service] both financially and in terms of personnel^]” and had determined that the City’s needs could best be served by a contract with the new ambulance corporation. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B. In addition, the City Council simultaneously passed a resolution which abolished the position of Ambulance Director since, with the closing of the Ambulance Service, the City had no further need to fill that position. Id. Finally, the City Council resolved to end the Plaintiffs employment with the City, because her present position had been abolished, and “the City of Blackduck ha[d] no other position of employment for which [the Plaintiff] [wa]s qualified o[r] needed.” Id. III. Discussion On August 4, 1995, the Plaintiff commenced this action with the filing of a Complaint, in which she alleges that the Defendant has violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), by refusing to pay her overtime compensation for the work she performed in excess of 40 hours per week. See, Title 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. She also alleges that the Defendant engaged in illegal discrimination and reprisal, in violation of both Title VII, and the MHRA. In a related claim, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has practiced impermissible gender-based wage discrimination, in violation of Minnesota Statutes Section 181.67. Further, the Plaintiff has instituted a claim under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by which she accuses the Defendant of violating several of her constitutional rights—specifically, her right to procedural and substantive due process of law, and to petition for redress of grievances. Lastly, the Plaintiff has asserted State law claims for defamation, for violations of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, see Minnesota Statutes Sections 1S.01 et seq., and for violating the State’s Open Meeting Law. See, Minnesota Statutes Section 471.795. Responding to the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendant has filed the Motion for Summary Judgment which is presently before the Court, and in which it argues that each of the Plaintiffs Federal claims is untenable, as a matter of law. In addition, the Defendant seeks Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs claims under the MHRA, and under Section 181.67. Alternatively, the Defendant urges that, if we should grant Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs Federal claims, then we should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining State law claims. See, Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). A. The Plaintiffs FLSA Claims. 1. Standard of Review. Under the FLSA, employees are entitled to additional compensation for working more than 40 hours in one week. See, Title 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). While the Act provides for certain exemptions to the overtime requirement, these are “ ‘narrowly construed in order to further Congress’ goal of providing broad federal employment protection.” Spinden v. GS Roofing Products Co., Inc., 94 F.3d 421, 426 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1254, 137 L.Ed.2d 334, 1997 WL 49713 (1997), quoting McDonnell v. City of Omaha, Neb., 999 F.2d 293, 295 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1163, 114 S.Ct. 1188, 127 L.Ed.2d 538 (1994). For this reason, “[t]he burden is on the employer to prove that [an] exemption applies by ‘demonstrating] that their employees fit plainly and unmistakably within the exemption’s terms and spirit.’ ” Spinden v. GS Roofing Products Co. Inc., supra at 426, quoting McDonnell v. City of Omaha, Neb., supra at 296. Furthermore, “[t]he employer’s obligation to pay premium overtime compensation, whatever the regular rate of pay, is statutory and cannot be waived or substituted by an agreement to work for less.” Mumbower v. Callicott, 526 F.2d 1183, 1188 (8th Cir.1975). Moreover, it is well-settled that “[t]ime spent away from an employer’s premises may constitute compensable hours of work if conditions imposed by an employer restrict the employee from using the time for personal pursuits.” Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Com’n, 938 F.2d 912, 916 (8th Cir.1991). While there is no “legal formula to resolve cases so varied in their faeus[,]” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136, 65 S.Ct. 161, 163, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944), the relevant inquiry focuses upon whether the on-call time “is spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit or for the employee’s.” Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133, 65 S.Ct. 165,168, 89 L.Ed. 118 (1944). Stated somewhat more artfully, “[f]acts may show that the employee was engaged to wait, or they may show that he waited to be engaged.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., supra at 137, 65 S.Ct. at 163. 2. Legal Analysis. As a threshold observation, it appears that the Defendant has misapprehended the full measure of the Plaintiffs FLSA claim. In moving for Summary Judgment, the Defendant has characterized this claim as one in which the Plaintiff maintains “that she is entitled to overtime compensation from 1985 to the present for all time she spent ‘on-call’ for the Ambulance Service and for that time which she served as a volunteer for the Service.” Defendant’s Memorandum, at 25. This characterization, however, unduly restricts the full magnitude of the Plaintiffs FLSA claim. As we understand it, the claim has two aspects. First, as the Defendant correctly observes, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated the FLSA, by failing to pay her overtime compensation for those hours in which she served on-call. Second, she alleges that the Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to pay her overtime compensation for those occasions on which she actually “worked” more than 40 hours in a given week. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant has failed to address the latter aspect of this claim. In this respect, the FLSA specifically mandates that a State or local Government employee should either be paid overtime for periods worked in excess of 40 hours per week, or else receive “compensatory time off at a rate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of employment for which overtime compensation is required * * Title 29 U.S.C. § 207(o). Here, the Plaintiff has offered evidence to suggest that, during her period of employment as the Ambulance Director, she worked a substantial number of hours in excess of 40 hours per week, for which she was neither paid overtime compensation, nor allowed to take compensatory time in lieu of overtime. The extent of this apparently undercompensated time is not calculable from the present state of the Record, but this uncertainty merely underscores the existence of genuine and material factual disputes which preclude a grant of Summary Judgment on this aspect of the Plaintiffs FLSA claim. We do conclude, however, that the Defendant is entitled to a grant of Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs claim that she should be paid overtime for those hours that she had served “on-call.” In this respect, we note that, in the vast majority of reported cases dealing with on-call time, the hours were held noneompensable under the FLSA. See, e.g., Berry v. County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir.1994) (coroners not entitled to compensation for on-call time despite the fact that they were on call 24 hours a day, were required to respond to pages within 15 minutes, and received three to six calls per day), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1150, 115 S.Ct. 1100, 130 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1995); Gilligan v. City of Emporia, Kansas, 986 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1993) (sewer department employees not entitled to compensation for on-call time, although required to wear a pager, to participate in nothing that might prevent them from hearing the pager, to avoid alcohol, to respond within 30-60 minutes to a call, and to be subject to discipline for a failure to satisfy these requirements); Armitage v. City of Emporia, Kansas, 982 F.2d 430 (10th Cir.1992) (police detectives not entitled to on-call compensation despite requirements that they remain sober and wear pager while on call, that they respond to calls within 20 minutes, and that they were actually called to work one to two times per week); Bright v. Houston Northwest Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir.1991) (affirming grant of summary judgment despite the fact that employee was always on call, was required to carry a pager at all times, could not become intoxicated, and was required to respond within 20-25 minutes, day or night), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1036, 112 S.Ct. 882, 116 L.Ed.2d 786 (1992); see also, Owens v. Local No. 169, 971 F.2d 347 (9th Cir.1992); Martin v. Ohio Turnpike Com’n, 968 F.2d 606 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1054, 113 S.Ct. 979, 122 L.Ed.2d 133 (1993); Boehm v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 868 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir.1989); Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., 864 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir.1989); Kelly v. Hines-Rinaldi Funeral Home, Inc., 847 F.2d 147 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 835, 110 S.Ct. 112, 107 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989); Norton v. Worthen Van Service, Inc., 839 F.2d 653 (10th Cir.1988); Rousseau v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 805 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827, 108 S.Ct. 95, 98 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987); Darrah v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com’n, 885 F.Supp. 1307 (W.D.Mo.1995); Burnison v. Memorial Hospital, Inc., 820 F.Supp. 549 (D.Kan.1993); Pilkenton v. Appalachian Regional Hospitals, Inc. 336 F.Supp. 334 (W.D.Va.1971). Thus, the general rule is that “although every on-call policy creates some imposition on the life of the employee subject to the terms thereof, such time will nonetheless rarely be compensable.” Darrah v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com’n, supra at 1311. Moreover, those cases which have departed from this general rule demonstrate the exceptional circumstances which must obtain for on-call time to be compensable under the FLSA. First, in Renfro v. City of Emporia, Kansas, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1991), cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1310, 117 L.Ed.2d 510 (1992), the plaintiffs were firefighters who were scheduled for six 24-hour shifts within every 19-day period. After the completion of each of these shifts, they were required to remain on-call for an additional 24 hours. While the firefighters were not required to remain in the firehouse during the on-call periods, they had to be able to respond to a call within 20 minutes and, most notably, while on-call, the firefighters received as many as 13 calls in a shift, with an average of four to five calls per shift. Id. at 1532. According to the Court, “the frequency with which the firefighters were subject to callbacks distinguished this case from other cases which have held on-call time as noncompensable.” Id. at 1532-33. Under these onerous circumstances, the Court concluded that the District Court had reasonably determined that the firefighters were “engaged to wait” and, therefore, that they were eligible for compensation under the FLSA. Id. at 1534-35. The other exceptional case was decided by our Court of Appeals, see, Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Com’n, supra, and the decision contains the Court’s only pronouncement on this issue. In Cross, the plaintiff employees were State forest workers who, during their work periods, were “subject-to-call” 24 hours per day, and seven days a week, in the ease of a fire emergency. When subject-to-call, the Plaintiffs were provided with hand-held radios, and they Were required to monitor the traffic of these radios at all times and, indeed, they had even trained themselves to monitor the radio traffic while sleeping. Id. at 914 and n. 4. In the event of an emergency radio call, the firefighters were required to respond within 30 minutes, or face discipline. Id. Because of these extraordinary constraints, the Court concluded that a reasonable juror could find that the employees were “engaged to wait” and, accordingly, it reversed the District Court’s grant of Summary Judgment in the employer’s favor. Id. at 917. In so doing, the Court noted the factors which, in its view, distinguished the case from those in which Summary Judgment would have been proper. In the words of the Court: [T]he facts of this case are unlike typical “on-call” cases in two respects. The Commission requires the employees to monitor radio transmissions continuously during the work week, rather than contacting them exclusively by telephone or electronic pager. * * * Because the radio must be on at all times, the employees’ ability to entertain in their homes, attend social gatherings, attend church services or engage in other personal pursuits is limited. The employees’ ability to enjoy common activities such as watching television or reading is also decreased because they must devote attention to radio transmissions. Additionally, instead of being placed “on-call” for a defined number of hours during a work period, the Commission’s policy places the employees on subject-to-call status twenty-four hours per day every day of a work period, unless a supervisor agrees to—substitute for a period of time. * * * Thus, the employees do not receive a respite during the work period from the subject-to-call requirement. Id. [citations and footnote omitted] Accordingly, the features which distinguished Cross from those cases, in which on-call time was found to be noncompensable, were first, that the employees were not “merely waiting to be engaged,” but were “actually required to do an affirmative act while waiting—listen to the radio for emergency transmissions.” Darrah v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com’n, supra at 1312. Second, the employees were on-call 24 hours a day, without respite. Id. Here, unlike the employees in Cross, the Plaintiff was not required to perform any affirmative acts while on call but, instead, she only was required to wear her pager, to remain within the prescribed radius of the Ambulance Service’s garage, and to maintain sobriety. Although the Plaintiff argues that this on-call status interfered with certain activities, such as shopping, vacuuming, going for long walks, or baking, the fact remains that she was substantially at liberty to engage in any number of activities while wearing her pager, provided that her participation did not hinder her ability to hear the pager, in the event that it should activate. Thus, unlike the employees in Cross, while on-call, the Plaintiff was able to socialize, attend church services, read, watch television, and participate in similar activities. Furthermore, unlike the employees in Cross, the Plaintiff was not required to remain on call for 24 hours a day without respite. Instead, her on-call hours were confined to four hours each work day, with some weekend and holiday shifts. Lastly, unlike the firefighters in Renfro, while on-call, the Plaintiff was not actually called with any frequency and, in fact, the Plaintiff has acknowledged that the Ambulance Service, as a whole, only received an average of five calls per week. Deposition of Sharon Brekke-Bunker, at 154. Of course, we do not suggest that the on-call periods had no effect upon the Plaintiffs use of her personal time, for this is inevitably the case whenever an employee is subject to emergency on-call status. See, e.g., Bright v. Houston Northwest Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., supra at 677; Darrah v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com’n, supra at 1313. Nevertheless, “every case that has addressed this issue tells us that without some significant additional restriction on the employee’s off-duty time, such that the time can be said to have been spent primarily for the employer’s benefit, the time will not be compensable.” Darrah v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com’n, supra. Here, the Plaintiff has not drawn our attention to the existence of any significant additional restrictions, such that her on-call time could be fairly styled as time spent “engaged to wait,” rather than “waiting to be engaged” and, therefore, we conclude that the evidence, which has been presented, is insufficient to permit a reasonable factfin-der to find that the Defendant’s on-call policy violated the FLSA. Accordingly, we grant the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, on the sole issue of the general com-pensability of the Plaintiffs on-call hours. In all other respects, this aspect of the Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. B. The Plaintiffs Claims under Title VII, the MHRA, and the Minnesota Statutes Section 181.67. 1. Standards of Review. a. The Plaintiffs Gender Discrimination Claims. Both Title VII, and the MHRA, prohibit employers from discriminating against their employees on the basis of gender. See, Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Minnesota Statutes Section 363.03, subd. 1(2). An employee, such as the Plaintiff, who alleges disparate treatment in her employment, may rely upon either direct or circumstantial evidence in order to sustain her claim. See, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (establishing the framework for pretext cases that involve circumstantial evidence); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-46,109 S.Ct. 1775, 1787-88, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (establishing the framework for mixed-motive cases that involve direct evidence). A mixed-motives analysis is required “when an employment decision was ‘the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives.’ ” Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir.1993), quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, supra. In a mixed motive ease, “the plaintiff carries the initial burden of ‘showing that an illegitimate criterion was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to terminate her employment.’” Philipp v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 61 F.3d 669, 673 (8th Cir.1995), quoting Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir.1995). Once the Plaintiff has made this threshold showing, “the burden of persuasion then shifts to the employer to prove that it would have terminated the employee even without the illegitimate criterion.” Id. In making this threshold showing, the plaintiff must present evidence which demonstrates “a specific link between the discriminatory animus and the challenged decision sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the challenged decision.” Id., quoting Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 996 F.2d 200, 201 n. 1 (8th Cir.1993). “This requirement of a causal link between discriminatory statements and the decisional process therefore renders insufficient ‘stray remarks in the workplace’, ‘statements by non-decisionmakers’, or ‘statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself.’ ” Id., quoting Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir.1991), in turn quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, supra at 277, 109 S.Ct. at 1804 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Thus, “actions and comments by employees not involved in a discharge decision cannot provide a basis for charging other employees with discrimination.” Hermeling v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 851 F.Supp. 1369, 1378 (D.Minn.1994), quoting Price Water-house v. Hopkins, supra. In contrast, the premise of a pretext case “is that either a legitimate or illegitimate set of considerations led to the challenged decision.” Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., supra at 448 [emphasis in original], quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, supra at 247, 109 S.Ct. at 1788-89. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “the plaintiff creates an inference of intentional discrimination by establishing the so-called prima facie case.” Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas, 63 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir.1995). “While its elements will vary depending on the circumstances of the case, the fundamental purpose of the prima facie case is to require the plaintiff to show: (1) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (2) that the most common explanations for an adverse employment action, such as incompetence, are not applicable.” Id. Generally, in presenting a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she is a member of a protected class, that she meets the minimum qualifications for the position, and that she suffered some form of adverse employment decision. Once the plaintiff has made that prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824; Texas Department of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094-95, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra (“Once established, the prima facie case entitles the plaintiff to a rebuttable presumption that intentional discrimination played a role in the adverse employment action”). If the employer provides such a reason, then “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason provided was a pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 777. However, should the employer be unable to provide such a reason for its decision, then the employee is entitled to a finding of intentional discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 n. 3, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2748 n. 3, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). Under this burden-shifting approach, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion, that the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual, and that the plaintiff has, in fact, been a victim of intentional discrimination. Id. at 506-12, 113 S.Ct. at 2746-50; accord, Hasnudeen v. Onan Corp., 552 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1996) (construing MHRA). In sustaining this burden of persuasion, however, “a reason cannot be proved to be ‘a pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, supra at 515, 113 S.Ct. at 2751-52 [emphases in original]. b. The Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim. Title VII, and the MHRA, each prohibit employers from retaliating against employees who oppose an unlawful employment practice, or who assist others - in asserting their employment rights. Title 1*2 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Minnesota Statutes Section 363.03, subd. 7. Moreover, under either the MHRA or Title VII, such claims are evaluated under the three-part McDonnell-Douglas framework. See, Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981); Hubbard v. United Press International, 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn.1983). Accordingly, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating the following: 1. that she engaged in a protected activity; 2. that an adverse employment action occurred; and 3. that a causal connection is established between the Two. Sweeney v. City of Ladue, 25 F.3d 702, 703 (8th Cir.1994); Sherpell v. Humnoke School Dist. No. 5, 874 F.2d 536, 540 (8th Cir.1989); Womack v. Munson, supra at 1296; Callaran v. Runyun, 903 F.Supp. 1285, 1300 (D.Minn.1994), aff'd, 75 F.3d 1293 (8th Cir. 1996); Hubbard v. United Press International, supra at 444. In keeping with the McDonnell-Douglas analysis, once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. Womack v. Munson, supra; Hubbard v. United Press International, supra. The employer is not required to prove the absence of a retaliatory motive, but must only produce evidence that would dispel the inference of retaliation by establishing the existence of a legitimate reason for the challenged action. Womack v. Munson, supra. If the employer satisfies this burden of production then, to prevail, the employee must demonstrate that the proffered justification is actually a pretext for retaliation. Id. e. The Plaintiff’s Wage Discrimination Claims under Title VII and Minnesota Statutes Section 181.67. Minnesota Statutes Section 181.67 prohibits wage discrimination which is premised upon gender, and the McDonnell-Douglas analysis applies to wage discrimination claims that are brought under both this Statute, and under Title VII. See, EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664, 669 (8th Cir.1992) (Title VII); Kolstad v. Fairway Foods, Inc., 457 N.W.2d 728, 734 (Minn.App. 1990) (Section 181.67); Schiele v. Charles Vogel Mfg. Co., Inc., 787 F.Supp. 1541, 1556 (D.Minn.1992) (same) Under Section 181.67, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case with evidence of “ ‘an employer paying different wages to employees of opposite sexes for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skills, effort and responsibility ***.’” Kolstad v. Fairway Foods, Inc., supra at 734, quoting Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 400 (Minn.1978). Nevertheless, “[d]ifferences in wages are not unlawful in Minnesota if based on a seniority system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a wage differential based on any factor other than sex.” Kolstad v. Fairway Foods, Inc., supra. As a consequence, proof of any of these systems or permissible differentials rebuts the plaintiffs prima facie case, and forces her to show pretext. Id. In a similar vein, a prima facie case of gender-based wage discrimination, under Title VII, requires a virtually identical showing on the part of the complaining plaintiff, for the claimant must prove “that the employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes for ‘equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.’” EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., supra at 669, quoting Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2228, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974); see also, McKee v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 801 F.2d 1014, 1019 (8th Cir.1986). 2.Legal Analysis. With the foregoing precepts to focus our analysis, we proceed to address the Plaintiffs gender based claims, a. The Plaintiffs Gender Discrimination and Section 181.67 Claims. In her Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that she has been subjected to the following four forms of disparate treatment, which was gender-based: 1. unequal conditions of employment; 2. unequal discipline; 3. unequal wages; and 4. termination. Complaint, at ¶ 40. The Plaintiff asserts that she has both direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimination and, therefore, we will examine her claims under the mixed-motive, or the pretext framework, as appropriate. Normally, when the employee, as here, alleges both direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the Court begins by analyzing the direct evidence. Thus, “[i]f the Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Price Waterhouse threshold, the ease should be decided under the principles announced in McDonnell-Douglas [.]” Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., supra at 448 [citations omitted]. As recently expressed by our Court of Appeals, “[a]fter all, the McDonnellr-Douglas framework exists to provide discrimination plaintiffs a way to prove their case when they do not have ‘explicit, inculpatory evidence of discriminatory intent[;]’ if a plaintiff does have such evidence, burden-shifting analysis is unnecessary.” Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 682 (8th Cir.1996) [emphasis in original] quoting Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas, supra at 776. Here, the Plaintiffs “direct” evidence of gender-based animus is solely contained within Klug’s earlier-referenced statement to her when, in January of 1994, she attempted to perform her “general labor” duties: You’re making my guys look bad. You’re always seen working, and I don’t want you working here. They’re talking about laying off one of my men, and I will not have you working here and lose one of my men. So I don’t want you to work here anymore because you’re making my guys look bad. [Emphasis supplied]. Viewed objectively, we conclude that this commentary serves as direct evidence of sex-based, disparate treatment. Indisputably, after Klug made this remark, the Plaintiff was no longer allowed to perform the miscellaneous general duties that she had previously performed—with apparent enjoyment— and those duties were then reserved solely for the City’s male maintenance employees. Furthermore, within four-and-a-half months after this incident, the Plaintiffs “general labor” duties were formally eliminated from her job description. While this latter action was taken by the Executive Board, of which Klug was not a member, the Record before the Court strongly intimates that the original decision, to prohibit the Plaintiff from performing general City maintenance work, was made by Klug alone, and that this decision was only confirmed by the Executive Board’s subsequent action. Accordingly,' with respect to the Plaintiffs unequal conditions of employment claim, we conclude that she has satisfied her initial burden, under Price Wa-terhouse, of showing that an illegitimate criterion—here, gender-based animus—was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to take action, which had an adverse impact upon her employment circumstance. See, Philipp v. ANR Freight System, Inc., supra at 673; Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., supra at 471. Having satisfied her initial burden, the burden of production shifts to the Defendant to demonstrate that the Plaintiff would have been relieved of her miscellaneous maintenance job responsibilities, in the absence of illegitimate gender-based discrimination. See, Philipp v. ANR Freight System, Inc., supra. Notwithstanding this burden-shifting, the Defendant has failed to proffer any explanation as to why the Plaintiffs general labor duties were terminated—let alone, an explanation which would serve to counteract the inference of discrimination which has been raised by Klug’s commentary. For this reason, we conclude that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, on the Plaintiffs unequal employment conditions claim, must be denied, as the Plaintiff has successfully raised a genuine issue of material fact as to this claim. We conclude, however, that Klug’s comments do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination in support of the Plaintiffs remaining disparate treatment claims for, within these contexts, his remarks are inadequate in demonstrating the requisite “specific link between the discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the challenged decision.” Id. In this respect, we are satisfied that Klug was not a “decision-maker” for any of the challenged determinations which undergird the Plaintiffs remaining claims. With respect to her unequal pay and termination claims, the Record clearly reveals that the decisions, which underlie these claims, were made by the City Council, of which Klug was not a member. As a consequence, the challenged determinations as to employee pay scales, as well as that of closing the Ambulance Service, and terminating the Plaintiffs employment, were all made by the City Council, without any evidence of Klug’s personal involvement. The possibility that Klug may have fostered a gender-based hostility towards the Plaintiff is of no consequence in analyzing these claims, since that animus could not—at least on the present state of this Record—be reasonably attributable to the City Council, which was the operative decisionmaker. See, Philipp v. ANR Freight System, Inc., supra; Beshears v. Asbill, supra at 1354; Hermeling v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., supra at 1378. With respect to the Plaintiffs claim of unequal discipline, the decisions being challenged were those of the Plaintiffs superiors; namely, the City Council, and the Executive Board. As we have already observed, at all relevant times, Klug was not a City Councilperson, and the Record reveals that he was never a member of the Executive Board. Therefore, we find no evidentiary basis to “link-up” his asserted discriminatory animus with those decisions which produced the disciplinary actions that the Plaintiff has challenged here. Accordingly, having determined that the Plaintiff cannot—by resort to direct evidence—stave off an adverse award of Summary Judgment on her remaining disparate treatment claims, we turn our analysis to those same State and Federal claims, under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell-Douglas. 1. The Plaintiffs Unequal Discipline Claim. As near as we can tell, the Plaintiffs unequal discipline claim is premised solely upon Eibensteiner’s directive, which appears to have been voiced at the behest of both the City Council and the Executive Board, that the Plaintiff was not to be seen riding in and City vehicles. The Plaintiff argues that this action was fueled by gender-based discrimination because Bunker, who was the City maintenance worker with whom she had been so travelling and with whom she was rumored to be romantically involved, was not also prohibited from riding in City vehicles. We need not decide, however, whether these allegations serve to establish a prima facie case under McDonnelV-Douglas, for we conclude that the Plaintiff has not met her burden of demonstrating that the Defendant’s explanation, for this assertedly unequal treatment, was a pretext for discrimination. See, e.g., Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1316 (8th Cir. 1996) (Court assumed existence of prima facie case to sustain Summary Judgment on employee’s failure to rebut, as pretextual, employer’s business reasons); Braziel v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc., 943 F.Supp. 1083, 1105 (D.Minn.1996). Here, David E. Decker (“Decker”), who is the Defendant’s City Clerk, and who witnessed the challenged directive, has averred that the Plaintiff was directed to refrain from riding in City public works vehicles “due to the fact that she had no purpose riding in those vehicles and that she was supposed to be attending to her duties as the Ambulance Director.” Affidavit of David E. Decker, at 95. Decker further attests that Bunker was not similarly barred from the use of City public works vehicles because, as an employee of the City’s maintenance department, he “had a legitimate reason to be riding in the public works department vehicles * * Id. Further, Decker avers that the Plaintiff was not subjected to any disciplinary steps, other than being instructed to stay out of the public works vehicles. Id. In response to these legitimate business reasons, the Plaintiff has presented no showing that the proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination and, therefore, she has failed to sustain her burden at step three in the McDonnell-Douglas framework, and we conclude, therefore, that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim should be granted. See, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, supra at 515, 113 S.Ct. at 2751-52. 2. The Plaintiff’s Unequal Pay Claim. The Plaintiff stresses that Klug, who was the City’s maintenance supervisor, and Ward, who served as the municipal liquor store manager, were paid higher wages than her in her capacity as the Ambulance Director. Since she argues that these differentials were the product of illegal wage discrimination, her unequal pay claims are grounded upon an initial assumption that her position as Ambulance Director involved “ ‘equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.’ ” EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., supra at 669. However, following our close review, we disagree with this assumption, as we conclude that the Plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie showing of wage discrimination and, as a consequence, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, on the unequal pay claims, should be granted. The “equal work for unequal pay” paradigm requires equality in the work that is used to suggest an improper differential in pay. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 35 F.3d 356, 358-59 (8th Cir.1994) (female plaintiff, as only junior buyer, performed “substantially similar duties” as male buyers, but for less pay); EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., supra at 667 (plaintiff demoted and replaced by male worker who performed same work for higher pay); Schiele v. Charles Vogel Mfg. Co., Inc., supra at 1556 (after constructive discharge, plaintiff replaced by male successor who was paid “much higher salary”); Kolstad v. Fairway Foods, Inc., supra at 734 (same). This prerequisite for recovery, however, is not presented here, as the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that her job duties, as Ambulance Director, were performed by male counterparts who made a higher wage and, indeed, the Record reflects that the Plaintiff was the only person who ever held the Ambulance Director’s position. Instead, to establish her prima facie showing, the Plaintiff has sought to equate her job duties and responsibilities with those of Ward and Klug. However, such comparisons necessarily evoke “apples to oranges” associations which do not properly serve to establish the Plaintiffs prima facie ease of wage discrimination. To begin with, the background qualifications for each of the three purportedly comparable positions is markedly different. The Ambulance Director’s position required a current Minnesota EMT certification, and a minimum of two years experience in “practical EMS field experience ....” Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, fka Brekke, Exhibit 7. In contrast, the maintenance supervisor’s position required pertinent State wastewater and water treatment licenses, and mandated that the supervisor have a minimum of five years of prior experience with heavy equipment, and two years experience with plumbing equipment and water pumps. Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, fka Brekke, Exhibit 32. The liquor store manager, on the other hand, was not required to demonstrate such technical competence, but the position’s job description reflected that the jobholder should preferably have completed “some post-secondary training in business administration with some coursework in retail marketing or related subjects[,]” and that, prior to assuming the position, the manager “should have progressively responsible liquor store operations experience.” Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, fka Brekke, Exhibit 9. Furthermore, notwithstanding the Plaintiffs arguments to the contrary, we conclude that the three positions entailed substantially different job responsibilities. As has been noted, the Plaintiffs position chiefly required that she serve as the Ambulance Service’s primary EMT, and that she “[mjaintain the ongoing roster, training and CEU records, of the volunteer personnel.” Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, fka Brekke, Exhibit 7. In addition, toward the end of her term of employment, the Plaintiff was assigned a considerable amount of billing, bookkeeping, and related duties. Id. The maintenance supervisor’s position, on the other hand, was almost exclusively involved with the physical upkeep of City lands, buildings and equipment. Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, fka Brekke, Exhibit 32. Lastly, the liquor store manager’s position entailed job responsibilities that were not shared by either of the other positions, such as wholesale purchasing, product pricing, and daily banking activities. Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, fka Brekke, Exhibit 9. Indeed, both the maintenance supervisor, and the liquor store manager, were responsible for supervising and disciplining paid City employees, see, Affidavit of Sharon Bunker, fka Brekke, Exhibits 9 and 32, which starkly distinguish these positions from the former Ambulance Director position, as the staff there was wholly comprised of volunteers. Accordingly, we conclude that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of gender-based wage discrimination, under either Title VII or Section 181.67. As a consequence, these claims are legally without merit, and we grant the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on both claims. 3. The Plaintiff’s Termination Claim. The Plaintiffs final claim of disparate treatment discrimination arises from her termination, which she alleges was motivated by gender-based animus. We agree that the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of gender-based discrimination but, since she has failed to proffer evidence which would allow a factfinder to reasonably find that the Defendant’s proffered business reason for her termination was a pretext for illegal discrimination, we conclude that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim should be granted. In our view, the Plaintiff has established each of the three showings that are necessary to her prima facie case. First, as a woman, she is a member of a protected class and, second, it is undisputed that she met the minimum qualifications for the Ambulance Director’s position. Third, since her position was terminated, she unquestionably suffered an adverse employment decision. Nevertheless, the Defendant has met its burden of production, at step two of the McDonnell-Douglas analysis, by demonstrating a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the Plaintiffs termination. In this respect, Decker has offered the following testimony: [T]he abolishing of the Ambulance Service ... and the contracting out by the City for ambulance services from the Blackduck Ambulance Association was based strictly upon economic and manpower considerations in that there were great problems in finding volunteers to man the Ambulance service during the tenure of [the Plaintiff] Affidavit of David E. Decker, at ¶ 4. In challenging this testimony, the Plaintiff argues that the stated reason for terminating the ambulance services is pretextual, because the manpower shortages could have been remedied by allowing her to train a new cadre of volunteers. Accordingly, she maintains that she has demonstrated the pretextual nature of the Defendant’s business rationale for her termination, and that, as a consequence, we should deny the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim. We disagree. First, we are not persuaded that the Plaintiffs pretext argument has the ardor she attributes to it. For instance, we note that, throughout the period in which the Plaintiff served as Ambulance Director, the Ambulance Service experienced periodic shortages of volunteers, and that, from as early as February of 1992, the City Council was sufficiently concerned about this state of affairs, that it considered selling the Service to a private party. While not dispositive of the issue before us, these historic facts undermine the vitality of the Plaintiffs suggestion of pretext. Second, and far more fundamentally, the Plaintiff cannot survive the Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion merely by offering evidence that the Defendant’s reason for her termination was pretextual, for she must show that the proffered reason was a pretext for gender-based discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, supra at 515, 113 S.Ct. at 2751-52; Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1996). In the words of our Court of Appeals: Hicks allows a trial judge to decide on a motion for summary judgment that the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer discrimination even though the plaintiff may have created a factual dispute as to the issue of pretext. Intentional discrimination vel non is like any other ultimate question of fact: either the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the fact has been proven, or it is not. Indeed, Hicks emphasizes that once an employment discrimination case reaches the third stage of McDonnell-Douglas, it is to be treated like any other case. Trial courts or reviewing courts should not “treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 524, 113 S.Ct. at 2756 * * * Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., supra at 1337; see also, Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836-38 (8th Cir.1997) (“the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence of the elements of the prima facie case and where necessary, adduce sufficient proof of pretext to meet the traditional tests of the summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law”) [en banc]. Here, even if we were to assume that the Defendant’s stated reason for terminating the Plaintiff was false and, therefore, pretex-tual, she has not offered an evidence which could allow a reasonable factfinder to infer that this falsehood was a pretext for discrimination. Of course, we do not discount the possibility that the decision to eliminate the Plaintiffs position was ill-advised, or somehow motivated by personal dislike for the Plaintiff but, nonetheless, “[a]n employer’s business decision ... need not be a good decision to withstand a challenge f