Full opinion text
OPINION LONGOBARDI, Senior District Judge. I.NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS...........................560 II. THE LAWSON AND DRAGOO PATENTS..................................561 A Technological Background ..............................................561 B. The Lawson Patent ....................................................563 1. Claims at Issue ....................................................564 2. Arguments of the parties............................................565 a. Infringement...................................................565 b. Invalidity......................................................565 C. The Dragoo Patent.....................................................565 1. Claims at Issue ....................................................566 2. Arguments of the Parties............................................567 a. Infringement...................................................567 b. Invalidity......................................................568 D. Infringement.....'.....................................................568 1. Legal Standard....................................................568 a. Claim Construction..............................................568 b. Comparison of Claims with Accused Products.......................569 2. Discussion-Lawson Infringement.....................................570 a. Claim Construction..............................................570 b. Literal Infringement............................................571 c. Doctrine of Equivalents..........................................576 3. Discussion-Dragoo Infringement.....................................576 a. Claim Construction..............................................577 b. Literal Infringement............................................579 4. Conclusion-Infringement............................................582 E. Invalidity-The Lawson Patent...........................................582 1. Legal Standard....................................................582 2. Anticipation ..............................................•.........582 a. Anticipation by Prior Patent......................................583 b. Anticipation by Prior Invention.................................■.. 584 3. Obviousness.......................................................587 a. The Graham Factors............................................587 b. Resolution of the Obviousness Issue...............................595 4. Conclusion-Lawson Invalidity........................................595 F. Invalidity-The Dragoo Patent............................................596 1. The Lawson Patent.................................................596 2. The Japanese Utility Model..........................................597 3. The Beckestrom Patent.............................................598 4. “Routine Engineering” ..............................................599 5. Conclusion-Dragoo Invalidity........................................599 G. Damages..............................................................599 1. Legal Standard ....................................................599 2. Lost Profits........................................................600 a. Competition Between P & G and Paragon’s Products................600 b. Application of the Panduit Factors................................601 c. Quantification of Lost Profits Damages.............,...............602 c. Conclusion-Lost Profits..........................................606 3. Reasonable Royalty.................................................606 a. Legal Standard.................................................606 b. Application of the Hypothetical Negotiation to the Facts of this Case........................................................607 4. Enhanced Damages-Willful Infringement.....................'.........615 a. Lawson Willfulness .............................................615 b. Dragoo Willfulness..............................................616 5. Prejudgment Interest...............................................618 6. Conclusion.........................................................618 III. THE PIENIAK PATENT..................................................618 A. Technological Background ..............................................618 B. The Pieniak Patent.....................................................619 1. Claims at Issue ....................................................620 2. Arguments of the Parties............................................620 a. Infringement...................................................620 b. Invalidity/Inequitable Conduct....................................621 C. Infringement...................................................621 1. Claim Construction.................................................621 a. “Absorbent Panel”..............................................621 b. “No More Than About 0.6 Square Inches”..........................623 2. Literal Infringement............................... 624 3. Conclusion-Infringement............................................624 D. Invalidity/Unenforceability..............................................625 1. Anticipation and Obviousness Over the Weisman Patent.................625 a. Claims 1 and 10.................................................625 b. Claim 11.......................................................630 2. Inequitable Conduct.........................;......................632 a. Materiality.....................................................632 b. Knowledge.....................................................633 c. Intent.........................................................634 d. Conclusion-Inequitable Conduct ..................................635 3. Conclusion-Invalidity/Inequitable Conduct.............................635 I. NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS This suit is an action for patent infringement between two giants in the infant disposable diaper industry. Plaintiff and counterclaim defendant The Procter & Gamble Company (“P & G”), is the largest disposable diaper manufacturer in the United States, selling its products under the brand names of “Pampers” and “Luvs.” Defendant and counterclaim plaintiff Paragon Trade Brands, Inc. (“Paragon”) is the largest manufacturer private label disposable diapers in the country. Private label producers manufacture diapers which are sold under brand names selected by retailers, rather than under those of the manufacturers. Collectively, the products manufactured by these two companies comprise over 50% of the disposable diaper industry. P & G commenced this action on January 20, 1994. It alleges that Paragon manufactures and sells products which infringe two P & G patents, Lawson U.S. Patent No. 4,695,-278 (the “Lawson patent”) and Dragoo U.S. Patent No. 4,795,454 (the “Dragoo patent”). These patents relate to advancements in the barrier leg cuff feature of disposable diapers which help prevent the leakage of waste material from the leg openings of the diapers. Through its answer and counterclaim, Paragon denies that its products infringe the Lawson and Dragoo patents and seeks a declaratory judgment that these patents are invalid, unenforceable and not infringed by its products. Paragon also brings a counterclaim for infringement of Pieniak U.S. Patent No. 5,098,423 (the “Pieniak patent”). The Pien-iak patent relates to advancements in the absorbent core of disposable diapers which enable manufacturers to reduce the bulk of the diapers for improved fit and comfort. P & G denies infringement of the Pieniak patent and asserts affirmative defenses and a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the Pieniak patent is invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed by P & G. This Court conducted a thirteen day bench trial from February 3, 1997 through February 20, 1997. Post-trial briefing was completed on May 12,1997, and this Court heard oral argument in this case on October 22, 1997. This Opinion represents the Court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law with respect to all issues necessary to resolve this dispute. The Court’s discussion is divided into two parts. First, the Court will address the issues related to the Lawson and Dragoo patents. The second part of the discussion will focus upon the Pieniak patent. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claims and counterclaims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a). Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 1400(b). II. THE LAWSON AND DRAGOO PATENTS A. Technological Background The technology at issue in this case involves infant disposable diapers. The beginning of this industry can be traced back to 1965, when P & G introduced the first commercially successful disposable diaper which was sold under the brand name of “Pampers”. Prior to that time, disposable diapers accounted for approximately one-half of one percent of the total market. [Tr. at 187], Most of the diapers in use in this country at that time employed a two-piece system consisting of a cloth diaper with an outer garment. Id.; see [Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit (“PTX”) 18,19]. The outer garment was generally made of plastic and was colloquially-referred to as “rubber pants.” [Tr. at 187], The cloth diaper was placed between the baby’s legs, wrapped around the baby’s waist, and safety pinned together. Id. at 187-88. The cloth diaper itself contained no waterproof barrier, and thus, the “rubber pants,” placed over the doth diaper, acted as the ultimate barrier to contain waste. Id. at 188. The diaper market was revolutionized in 1965 with the introduction of the Pampers disposable diaper. One witness testified that this product is considered by some independent analysts as one of the most successful commercial products in the history of soft goods. Id. at 193. The 1965 Pampers was a unitary diaper, consisting of a waterproof backsheet, a liquid pervious topsheet, and a disposable core between these two layers. Id. at 189; see [PTX 20, 23]. The disposable core consisted of plies of ereped tissue paper called waddings. [Tr. at 189]. The core was rectangular in shape, sixteen inches long and twelve-and-a-half inches wide. Id. at 190. The product was z-folded widthwise at the crotch to a width of approximately from four- and-a-quarter to four-and-a-half inches, to permit the product to fit reasonably between the baby’s legs. Id. The next major innovation in the disposable diaper industry occurred in the mid-1970s, with the invention of the hourglass-shaped disposable diaper with an absorbent core. Id. at 194; see [PTX 21, 25, 26]. In addition to the new shape, this diaper also introduced the concept of the elastic leg band on the side of the absorbent core. Id. This product also consisted of a flexible flap between the absorbent core and the elastic, which enabled the leg of the baby to move freely without causing distortion or displacement of the diaper. Id. A major objective of these changes was to reduce the amount of leakage from the leg openings of the diaper caused by gaps which tended to develop between the diaper and the baby’s body as a result of the semi-rigid' nature of the absorbent body. See [PTX 25, at 1:22-28]. In 1984, P & G instituted a project to develop a disposable diaper which would better contain runny' bowel movements or “runny BMs.” [Tr. 782-84, 827-39], In 1985, Michael Lawson, an engineer át P & G, suggested adding a second barrier cuff to the then-present diaper structure described above. Id. at 784-85. This concept of the second barrier cuff. or. “barrier, leg cuff” (“BLC”) forms the basis of the Lawson patent. In its preferred form, the Lawson diaper consists of liquid impermeable BLCs, which are designed to contain all waste material, both liquid and solid, in the pocket created between the inside edges of the BLCs and the absorbent core. Id. at 211, 794; see [PTX 1025], Mr. Lawson was not alone in the mid-1980s in deciding to use a second barrier cuff to improve the containment properties of the diaper. Kenneth Enloe, an inventor working for Kimberly-Clark which sells diapers under the brand name of “Huggies”, also decided to add a BLC to the basic structure disclosed by the prior art diapers, and obtained United States Patent No. 4,704,116 for this innovation (the “Enloe patent”). See [PTX 28]. Unlike the BLCs in the Lawson and Dragoo diapers, however, the Enloe patent describes the use of a liquid pervious material for the BLCs. [Tr. at 208]; see [PTX 28]. In the diaper described by the Enloe patent, the BLC acts as a strainer which retains the solid fetal material on the inside, but allows liquid waste to pass through to be absorbed by the absorbent core. [Tr. at 211]. Given the similarities of the Lawson and Enloe inventions, Kimberly-Clark brought suit in the Western District of Washington (the “Seattle litigation”) against P & G to resolve the priority of invention issue between the Lawson and Enloe patents pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 291. Kimberly-Clark also asserted that P & G’s diapers infringed the Enloe patent. The court concluded that En-loe had priority of invention over Lawson, and, as a result, it held invalid several claims in the Lawson patent. [DTX 184, ¶¶ 89-90]. The court also concluded that P & G’s diapers did not infringe the Enloe patent. Id. ¶¶ 21-52. . The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on priority and invalidity. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 917 (Fed.Cir.1992). The Dragoo patent is directed to improving and modifying the performance of the Lawson invention. [Tr. at 239]. Jerry Dra-goo was one of the P & G employees responsible for testing diapers made pursuant to the Lawson patent. Id. at 872-74. Upon performing a leak load study, in which prototype diapers were placed on babies and loaded with synthetic urine, Dragoo discovered that the Lawson diapers leaked at the legs. Id. at 874r-75. Mr. Dragoo determined that the leakage resulted from a phenomenon known as wicking. Id. at 875% Wicking occurs when the material itself moves fluid by capillary action. Id. at 875-76. In the diapers implementing the Lawson invention, wicking occurred along the hydrophilic top-sheet, and permitted liquid waste to get outside the pocket created by the BLCs because the topsheet extended laterally beyond the BLCs to the side edge of the diaper. Id. at 240, 876. Mr. Dragoo’s solution to this problem, which forms the basis for his patent, was to extend each BLC to the side edge of the diaper and to terminate the topsheet at a point inside of the side edge of the diaper. Id. at 240. Paragon first implemented the BLC feature into its Ultra line of diapers in March of 1991. [Docket Item (“D.I.”) 259, ¶ 1]. Since November 1991, all of Paragon’s Ultra diapers contain BLCs and are alleged to infringe the Lawson and Dragoo patents. [D.1.242, § 4, ¶ 19]. B. The Lawson Patent The Lawson patent, entitled “Absorbent Article Having Dual Cuffs,” describes an integral or unitary disposable absorbent article, such as a diaper, consisting of five elements, a liquid pervious topsheet, a liquid impervious backsheet, an absorbent core, an elastically contractible gasketing cuff, and a BLC. [PTX 1, at 2:3-8]. Reproduced below is Figure 3 of the Lawson patent which depicts a cross-sectional view of the diaper in the crotch region. According to the specification, the Lawson invention addresses a problem in the containment characteristics of the prior art diapers: the leakage of body exudates out of the gaps between the diaper and the wearer’s leg or waist on to the wearer’s clothing because the exudates are not immediately absorbed within the article. [PTX 1, at 1:19-64]. . In an effort to solve this problem, the Lawson invention employs a BLC which acts as a further restraint against the leakage of body exudates. Id. at 1:50-52. The patent describes the BLC as a “flexible member” that is secured by an adhesive or glue bond to the topsheet between the side edge of the absorbent core and the flap elastic members of the gasketing cuff. Id. at Fig. 3, 4:52-58, 8:59-61; [Tr. at 215-16]. The patent further describes the BLC as having a “proximal edge” and a “distal edge,” which define the height of the BLC. [PTX 1, at 8:59-61]. The proximal edge of the BLC is the bottom edge of the BLC and is the point of the BLC that is secured to the topsheet in the construction depicted in the Lawson patent. Id. at Fig. 3, 4:56-58. The distal edge is the upper edge of the BLC and is unattached to any other portion of the diaper. Id. at Fig. 3. The distal edge is spaced away or lifted up from the surface of the topsheet by a “spacing elastic member” or “spacing means.” Id. at 4:58-65,10:56-61. In other words, an elastic member is assembled into the diaper in a stretched position and is allowed to contract when the diaper is cut. [Tr. at 225]. The contraction of the elastic member causes the distal edge of the barrier cuff to rise perpendicularly or nearly perpendicularly to the topsheet. Id. at 225, 230-31. The spacing means causes a “channel” to be formed along the entire inboard surface of the BLC. [PTX 1, at 4:65-67, 10:28-30]. When the diaper described by the Lawson patent is in use, the BLC presses against the inner thigh and the perineum of the wearer in the crotch region, and the buttocks in the back waist region. Id. at 2:18-21. Body exudates which are not immediately absorbed by the absorbent core contact the barrier cuff prior to reaching the gasketing cuff and are contained and held within the channel until the diaper is removed from the wearer. Id. at 2:22-27, 8:68-9:1. The specification of the Lawson patent describes a variety of materials that can be used for the BLC, but indicates that, in its preferred form, the BLC is made using a “liquid impermeable” material. [PTX 1, at 9:8-12], In the Seattle litigation against Kimberly-Clark, the Lawson claims describing absorbent articles with generic BLCs, i.e., the claims that do not limit or prescribe the type of material for the BLC, were invalidated over the Enloe patent. [DTX 184, ¶ 89-90], Consequently, P & G was forced to surrender coverage of its independent claims describing a generic BLC feature. Thus, each of the claims at issue in this case contains a limitation on the BLC material; the claims at issue each describe an absorbent article “wherein said barrier cuff is liquid impermeable.” 1. Claims at Issue The claims at issue in the Lawson patent are claims 17, 21, 27 and 28. These are all dependent claims, and as such, necessarily incorporate by reference all of the elements of the claim(s) from which they depend. AMP. Inc. v. Fujitsu Microelectronics, Inc., 853 F.Supp. 808, 828 (M.D.Pa.1994), appeal dismissed, 47 F.3d 1180, 1995 WL 25292 (Fed.Cir.1995). Claim 17 of the patent is dependent from claim 5. Claim 5 describes: 5. An integral, disposable absorbent article having a front waist region, a crotch region and a back waist region, said absorbent article comprising: a liquid pervious topsheet; a liquid impervious backsheet associated with said topsheet; an absorbent core disposed between said topsheet and said backsheet; an elastically'contractible gasketing cuff disposed adjacent each longitudinal edge of the absorbent article in at least the crotch region; a barrier cuff disposed adjacent each of said gasketing cuffs, each of said barrier cuffs having a proximal edge and a distal edge, said proximal edge disposed laterally inboard of said gasketing cuff; a spacing means associated with each said barrier cuffs, for spacing said distal edge away from the top surface of said topsheet, whereby a channel is formed to improve the containment characteristics of the article. [PTX 1, at 14:48-68]. Claim 17 provides: “17. The integral disposable absorbent article of claim 5 wherein said barrier leg cuff is liquid impermeable.” Id. at 15:35-36. Claim 21 of the patent is dependent from claim 19. Claim 21 adds to claim 17 the requirement that the proximal edge of the BLC must be disposed in the flexible side flap of the gasketing cuff between the absorbent core and the flap elastic members of the gasketing cuff. Id. at 15:50-16:10. Claims 27 and 28 are dependent from claim 26. Claims 27 and 28 differ from claim 17 in that they do not require that the spacing means form a channel. Id. at 16:49-51. Another difference between claim 27 and claim 17 is that claim 27 requires that the proximal edge of the BLC be disposed “adjacent” to, as opposed to “inboard” of, the gasketing cuff. Id. at 16:43-44. For purposes of the issues raised in this case, there are no material differences between claims 21, 27, and 28, and claim 17. 2. Arguments of the parties a. Infringement P & G asserts that all of Paragon’s Ultra diapers which have included the BLC feature during the damages period directly infringe claims 17, 21, 27, and 28 of the Lawson patent. P & G contends that, alternativély, the accused diapers infringe these claims under the doctrine of equivalents. Needless to say, Paragon denies that its products infringe the Lawson patent, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Paragon contends that .none of its accused diapers contain a BLC that is “liquid impermeable,” as required by each of the Lawson claims at issue. Paragon asserts as a matter of claim construction that “liquid impermeable” means “impossible for liquid to flow through.” According to Paragon, because its BLC is not totally and completely impervious to liquid body exudates, none of the accused diapers- literally infringe the Lawson patent. With respect to the doctrine of equivalents, Paragon asserts that P & G is barred by the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel from expanding the definition of “liquid impermeable” in such a manner that it covers the BLCs in the accused diapers. Paragon also contends that there is no infringement by equivalency, because the BLCs in the accused diapers do not perform the same function or achieve the same result as a liquid impermeable BLC. - P & G disputes Paragon’s asserted construction of the term “Liquid impermeable.” Relying on the specification of the Lawson patent, P & G contends that a “liquid impermeable” BLC retards the movement of liquid through the BLC thereby making the diaper more leakage resistant. P & G argues that the BLCs in the accused diapers act like a dam to prevent liquid from escaping outside the BLC to the side edges of the diaper, and therefore, the accused diapers literally infringe the Lawson claims at issue. P & G asserts that, alternatively, the BLCs in Paragon’s diapers are substantially liquid impermeable, and thus, these diapers would infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if literal infringement is not found. b. Invalidity Paragon charges that the Lawson claims are invalid as anticipated by the Enloe patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), contending specifically that the Enloe patent teaches the use of liquid impervious BLCs. Paragon also asserts that Mr. Enloe previously conceived and constructively reduced to practice disposable diapers containing liquid impervious BLCs, relying on Mr. Eidoe’s initial invention disclosure and initial patent application. Paragon therefore contends that these documents evidence that the Lawson patent is invalid as anticipated by a prior invention pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). Paragon also contends that the Láwson claims are invalid as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In making this argument, Paragon relies on the Enloe patent, Beckestrom U.S. Patent No. 4,490,148, and Japanese Utility Model No. 41-18359. C. The Dragoo Patent The Dragoo patent claims an improvement over the Lawson invention. The Dragoo patent recognizes that despite the effectiveness of Lawson diapers at containing body exu-dates, the hydrophilic topsheet in this structure permitted liquid to wick and leak under and beyond the BLC to the edges of the diaper; where it can come into contact with the clothing of the wearer. [PTX 33, at 1:27-30, 62-68]. The Dragoo patent'describes a diaper consisting of the same five elements as that described by the Lawson patent. Id. at 2:31 — 14. Reproduced below is Figure 2 of the Dragoo patent which depicts a cross-sectional view of the crotch region in the preferred embodiment of the Dragoo patent. Mr. Dragoo solved the problem of wieking by sealing the BLC to the backsheet at the proximal edge or the side edge of the diaper, extending the BLC material all the way to the edge of the diaper so that the BLC and the backsheet comprise the gasketing cuff, and terminating the topsheet inboard of the edge of the diaper. Id. at 2:57-3:2. Like the Lawson patent, the Dragoo patent employs a liquid pervious topsheet which readily permits liquid penetration. Id. at 7:56-59. In the patent’s preferred embodiment, the topsheet extends widthwise beyond the side edges of the absorbent core in the crotch region, and terminates inboard of and adjacent to the proximal edge of the BLC. Id. at 8:39-57. In Dragoo’s preferred embodiment, the BLC is a flexible member which consists of a flap portion and a channel portion. Id. at 10:42-45. The Dragoo BLC is hydrophobic, and, in its preferred form, is also liquid impermeable. Id. at 12:65-67. The flap and channel portions of the BLC are preferably comprised of a unitary member, but the flap portion may be formed by a different piece of material secured to the channel portion. Id. at Fig. 2,11:7-10. The channel portion of the BLC comprises the portion of the BLC between the proximal and distal edges and defines the length of the channel. Id. at 11:52-55. The proximal edge in the preferred embodiment is formed by securing a segment of the BLC to the backsheet by a seal means, such as an adhesive bead. Id. at Fig 2., 5:49-53. The flap portion of the BLC extends outwardly from the proximal edge to the outside or longitudinal edge of the diaper where it is again joined with the backsheet such that the gask-eting cuffs are formed by the flap portion of the BLC and the backsheet. Id. at Fig. 2, 10:67-11:6. In Dragoo’s preferred embodiment, the topsheet is secured inwardly adjacent of the proximal edge of the BLC. Id. at Fig. 2, 8:57-63. Because Dragoo terminated the topsheet inboard of the proximal edge and sealed the proximal edge to the backsheet, the proximal edge of the BLC forms a leakage-resistant seal which prevents wieking underneath and beyond the BLC to the edges of the diaper. Id. at 17:1-9. 1. Claims at Issue The claims at issue in the Dragoo patent are claims 1, 3,17,18, and 21. Claim 1 of the Dragoo patent provides: 1. A unitary disposable absorbent article comprising: an absorbent core have [sic] a garment surface and a body surface; a liquid impervious backsheet positioned adjacent said garment surface of said absorbent core; an elastically contractible gasketing cuff disposed adjacent to an edge of the absorbent article; a hydrophobic barrier cuff having a proximal edge and a distal edge, said barrier cuff disposed adjacent said gasketing cuff; spacing means operatively associated with said barrier cuffs for spacing said distal edge away from the liquid-reeeivig [sic] surface of the absorbent article so as to cause said barrier cuff to stand up; seal means positioned along said proximal edge for adjoining said proximal edge to the absorbent article so as to provide a leakage-resistant seal along said proximal edge; and a liquid pervious topsheet positioned adjacent said body surface of said absorbent core, said topsheet extending outwardly toward and terminating inwardly of said proximal edge, whereby liquids are generally prevented from wicking underneath and beyond said barrier cuff to the edge of the absorbent article. Id. at 17:42-66. Claim 3 is dependent from claim 1 and requires the BLC to be liquid impermeable. Id. at 18:1-2. Independent claim 17 is substantially similar to claim 1. Claim 17 differs from claim 1 only in three respects. First, claim 17 requires the BLC to have a flap portion and a channel portion. Second, claim 17 does not require a seal means positioned at the proximal edge, but instead requires an attachment means for attaching the flap portion of the BLC to the edge of the absorbent article. Third, the positioning of the topsheet is defined differently in claim 17. With respect to these differences, claim 17 requires: an elastically contractible gasketing cuff disposed adjacent to a pair of oppositely disposed edges of the absorbent article, each of said gasketing cuffs comprising a gasketing flap and a flap elastic member; a hydrophobic barrier cuff having a flap portion and a channel portion comprising a proximal edge and a distal edge, said barrier cuff disposed adjacent said gasketing cuff; attachment means positioned adjacent the edge of the absorbent article for associating said flap portion of said barrier cuff with said gasketing flap so as to provide a leakage-resistant seal along the edge of the absorbent article; and a liquid pervious topsheet positioned adjacent said body surface of said absorbent core, said topsheet extending outwardly toward and terminating inwardly of the oppositely disposed pair of edges of the absorbent article____ Id. at 20:3-25. Claim 18 is dependent from claim 17, and adds to claim 17 a seal means positioned along the proximal edge for joining the proximal edge to the gasketing flap. Id. at 20:28-31. Claim 21 is dependent from claim 19, which is dependent from claim 18. Claim 21 requires the flap portion of the BLC to be liquid impermeable and the BLC and the gasketing- cuff to be integral. Id. at 20:32-33,37-38. . 2. Arguments of the Parties a. Infringement P & G contends that Paragon’s Ultra diapers which include the BLC feature literally infringe claims 1, 3, 17, 18, and 2T of the Dragoo patent. P & G does not contend that the accused diapers infringe these claims under the doctrine of equivalents. Paragon denies that its diapers infringe the Dragoo patent. Paragon argues that each of the Dragoo claims requires that the topsheet terminate laterally inboard of the proximal edge of the BLC. According to Paragon, the topsheet in the accused diapers extends laterally beyond the proximal edge of the BLC, and thus, none of the diapers infringe the Dragoo patent. P & G disputes both of these arguments. P & G contends that an alternative embodiment of the Dragoo patent describes a diaper in which the topsheet extends laterally outboard of the proximal edge of the BLC, provided that the BLC has a flap portion which forms a leakage-resistant seal at the side edge of the diaper. P & G also contests Paragon’s assertion as to the location of the proximal edge in the accused diapers, contending that the topsheet terminates inboard of the properly located proximal edge. The parties also dispute as a matter of claim construction, the term “proximal edge,” as ■defined by the Dragoo patent. b. Invalidity Paragon contends that each of the Dragoo claims at issue is invalid. In support of this contention, Paragon argues that: 1) the Dra-goo claims are anticipated and obvious over the Lawson patent; 2) the Dragoo claims are anticipated and obvious over Beckestrom U.S. Patent No. 4,490,148 and Japanese Utility Model No. 41-18359; and 3) the Dragoo claims do not qualify for patentability. D. Infringement 1. Legal Standard Title 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) provides in part: [W]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 35 U.S.C. S 271 (1984 & Supp.1995). According to the Federal Circuit, the “issue of infringement raises at least two questions: (1) what is patented, and (2) has what is patented been made, used or sold by another.” Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed.Cir.1983); see also Rawlplug Co. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 11 F.3d 1036, 1041 (Fed.Cir.1993); ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1988); American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 722 F.Supp. 86, 92 (D.Del.1989). Thus, the resolution of the issue of infringement is a two-step process. First, a court must determine the scope of the claims of the patent. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 779 F.Supp. 1429, 1442 (D.Del.1991), aff'd, 980 F.2d 742, 1992 WL 279125 (Fed.Cir.1992). Then, once the scope of the claims is ascertained, the court must determine whether the defendants allegedly infringing activity falls within the scope of the claims. Id. Claim construction is a question of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 1387, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 866 (Fed.Cir.1985); Fromson, 720 F.2d at 1569; Mobil, 779 F.Supp. at 1442. The determination of whether a patented invention has been made, used or sold by another is a question of fact. Fromson, 720 F.2d at 1569. A plaintiff must establish infringement by a preponderance of the evidence. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 673 F.Supp. 1278, 1344 (D.Del.1987), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1247 (Fed. Cir.1989). a. Claim Construction In construing the meaning of patent claims, a court must consider three sources: the claim language, the' patent specification, and the prosecution history. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). A court may also hear and consider expert testimony, including evidence of how those skilled in the art would interpret the claims. Id. 1) Claim language The initial step in claim construction is an examination of the language of the claims at issue. Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1177 (Fed.Cir.1991); American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 722 F.Supp. 86, 92 (D.Del.1989). The patent claims are what defines the right to exclude . others from making the invention. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. A patent claim typically has three parts: 1) the preamble; 2) the transition; and 3) the body. 3 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 8.06[1][b] (1997). The preamble is “an introductory phrase that may summarize the invention, its relation to the prior art, or its intended use or properties.” Id. It may also constitute a limitation on a claim. Id. The transition is a phrase containing a term such as “comprising” that serves to connect the preamble to the body of the claim. Id. The third part of a patent claim, the body, is composed of the recitation of the elements and limitations that “define the product or process to be encompassed within the patent monopoly.” Id. The words of a claim are normally given their ordinary and accustomed meaning, unless it appears from the specification and prosecution history that the inventor used them differently. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed.Cir.1994). In this regard, the Federal Circuit has recently stated that: [T]he focus in construing disputed terms in claim language is not the subjective intent of the parties to the patent contract when they used a particular term. Rather the focus is on the objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to mean. Markman, 52 F.3d at 986. 2)The specification. The patent specification contains a written description of the invention that enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. It is “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996). The description of terms in the specification “may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains the invention and defines terms used in the claims.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 967. “[W]ords must be used in the same way in both the claims and the specification.’ ” ZMI Corp., 844 F.2d at 1580 (quoting Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 181 Ct.Cl. 55, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (1967)). The specification cannot be used, however, to add extraneous limitations into a claim. Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 950 (Fed.Cir.1993). Extraneous limitations are those that would be added into a claim from the specification “wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words and phrases” in the claims. Id. As stated plainly by the Federal Circuit, “claims are not to be interpreted by adding limitations appearing only in the specification.” Electro Medical Sys. S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed.Cir.1994). On the other hand, when a particular interpretation of the terms of a claim would exclude the preferred embodiment described .in the specification from the scope of the claim, such an interpretation “is rarely, if ever, correct, and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. 3)The prosecution history The prosecution history, which is the record of the proceedings in the Patent and Trademark office, cannot enlarge diminish or vary' the limitations in the claims but should be utilized to interpret the meaning of language used in the patent claims. Mark-man, 52 F.3d at 980. The prosecution history' limits permissible claim construction to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during the prosecution of the patent. Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1995). 4)Extrinsic evidence Extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony; dictionaries and learned treatises can be used, at the court’s discretion, “for the court’s understanding of the patent, [but] not for the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of the claims.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 981. When intrinsic evidence alone is sufficient to resolve the ambiguity in a disputed claim term, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. b. Comparison of Claims with Accused Products 1) Literal infringement Once the scope of the claims is ascertained, the Court must determine whether the defendant’s allegedly infringing activity falls within the scope of the claims. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 779 F.Supp. 1429, 1442 (D.Del.1991), aff'd 980 F.2d 742, 1992 WL 279125 (Fed.Cir.1992). If every limitation of a claim is found in the accused device, it is literally infringed. Uniroyal, Inc. v.. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1054-55 (Fed.Cir.1988). 2). Doctrine of equivalents Under the doctrine of equivalents, an accused product may still infringe even if literal infringement does not exist. Courts developed the doctrine of equivalents to protect the patentee from competitors who “make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions to the patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim,” thereby depriving him of the benefit of his invention. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08, 70 S.Ct. 854, 855-56, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950). The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the viability of and clarified the doctrine of equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997). The Court held that the determination of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents should be made as an objective inquiry on an element-by-element basis. Id. 520 U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1054. Thus, the determination of equivalence must be applied to the individual elements of the claims at issue, not to the invention as a whole. Id. 520 U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1049. The touchstone of this inquiry is “[d]oes the accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention.” Id. 520 U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1054. An elemental equivalency analysis involves an assessment of the substantiality of differences between the accused product and the element in question at the time of infringement. Id. 520 U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1053-54. A patentee may prove equivalence under this analysis by demonstrating that the substituted element in the accused device performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to produce substantially the same result as the element at issue, or by proof of insubstantial differences between the substitute element and the claim element. Id. 520 U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1054 (“An analysis of the role played by each element in the context of the specific patent claim will ... inform the inquiry as to whether a substitute element matches the function, way and result of the claimed element, or whether the substitute element plays a role substantially different from the claimed element.”) Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a question of fact. See id. 520 U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1053. 2. Discussion-Lawson Infringement There is no dispute that the accused diapers contain most of the elements of each of the claims at issue in the Lawson patent. It is undisputed that the accused diapers are integral disposable diapers having a front waist region, crotch region and back waist region, and include a liquid pervious top-sheet; a liquid impervious backsheet associated with the topsheet; an absorbent core between the topsheet and the backsheet; an elastically contractible gasketing cuff adjacent to each side edge of the diaper and the absorbent core; a BLC with a proximal edge disposed inboard of and adjacent to the gask-eting cuff in the side flap; and a spacing means which forms a channel by spacing the distal edge of the BLC away from the top-sheet. See [Tr. 279-88, 295-97, 479-81], The only element in dispute is the limitation contained in all four of the Lawson claims at issue which requires the BLC to be “liquid impermeable.” The parties disagree as to both the meaning of this term and whether the BLCs in the accused Paragon diapers fall within the scope of this element. a. Claim Construction Relying on the Lawson specification, P & G asserts that the term “liquid impermeable” means that the BLC will contain liquid and solid waste during wearing by retarding the movement of liquids through the BLC. Paragon counters that this term must be defined according to its ordinary or dictionary definition because the patent does not evidence that this claim limitation has a special meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art. Citing the dictionary definition of “impermeable,” Paragon asserts that “liquid impermeable” means impossible for liquid to flow through. The Court agrees with PEG that the inventor’s definition of “liquid impermeable” is dear from reading the patent specification. The purpose of the Lawson BLC is to contain body exudates that are not immediately absorbed by the absorbent core in the central portion of the diaper. [PTX 1, at 2:17-31]. Regarding the use of a “liquid impermeable” material for the BLC, the Lawson specification provides: the barrier cuff may be rendered liquid impermeable so as to prevent the striketh-rough of body exudates. A liquid impermeable barrier cuff retards the Movement of liquid through the barrier cuff thereby making it more leakage resistant. The barrier cuff may be rendered liquid impermeable in any manner well known in the art such as selectively treating the barrier cuff, entreating the barrier cuff, or by securing a separate material to the barrier cuff. Id. at 10:47-55 (emphasis added). It is a well-settled tenet of patent law that a patentee may act as his own lexicographer. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. Although the words used in a patent are generally interpreted according to their ordinary meaning, a court will construe terms used in a patent in accordance with a special meaning, provided that the special definition of this term is clearly stated in the specification. Id. It is clear from reading the Lawson specification that a BLC is “liquid impermeable” if it “retards the movement of liquid” from the central portion of the diaper above the absorbent core through the BLC to the edges of the diaper. There is nothing in the patent specification or the file history which contradicts this definition. Because this term is clearly defined in the patent specification, the Court may not resort to extrinsic evidence, such as the dictionary definition of “impermeable,” to vary the definition provided in the specification. Accordingly, the Court construes the term “liquid impermeable,” as it describes the BLC feature, to mean a material which is designed to prevent the strikethrough of body exudates by retarding the movement of liquid body exu-dates through the BLC to the outer portion of the diaper. b. Literal Infringement The accused Paragon diapers employ a BLC that is made of a hydrophobic, spunbonded, nonwoven polypropylene material. [Tr. at 1648-49]. The term “nonwoven” describes- the structure of the material. A nonwoven material is one in which the strands that comprise the material are not interweaved or intermingling. [Tr. at 332]. The term “spunbonded” refers to the manner in which the material was manufactured. In a spunbonded material, the fabric is formed by a spinning process and the fibers are consolidated together by a bonding process. [Tr. at 333]. The term “hydrophobic” refers to a materials propensity to be wetted when it comes in contact with a liquid. [Tr. at 328-31]. A hydrophobic material is one that is not readily wetted by liquid, but tends to repel liquid with which it comes in contact. [Tr. 328-31, 554], Although the hydropho-bicity of a material has an effect on the permeability of that material, the fact that a material is hydrophobic does not necessarily mean that that material is also liquid impermeable. [Tr. at 339-40]. The testimony of several of Paragon employees and statements in Paragon’s own documents support the conclusion that the BLCs employed in the accused diapers are liquid impermeable, given this Court’s construction of that term. Gloria Huffman, a diaper designer at Paragon, described the Paragon BLCs as acting like a “dam” which is supposed to hold liquid in the region of the absorbent core and to retard liquid from seeping out the edges of the diaper. [Tr. 492-93]. Ms. Huffman testified via deposition as follows: Question: What is the purpose of the ILG, what is its function in Paragon’s diapers? . Answer: Actually, it is supposed to retard the liquid from seeping out the edges of the diaper. Question: And so liquid coming from the absorbent core, if it flows outwardly, will hit the inside of the ILG, the inside wall of the ILG? Answer: We hope so. Question: But your design is an attempt to hold the liquid in the region of the absorbent core; correct? Answer: Yes. Question: You are trying to prevent it from escaping the side margins of the diaper; correct? Answer: Right. Question: That’s why it’s the inside face of the ILG that’s acting like a dam; correct? Answer: Yes. I think the height acts like a dam. Answer: Well, the ILG is like a dam. We hope that it retards the liquid enough to give the absorbent core a chance to absorb the liquid rather than have it seep out. [Tr. 492-98, 498]. Likewise, Stephen Geimer, outside counsel for Paragon, stated that he understood the accused Paragon diapers to include liquid impermeable BLCs. [Tr. 697], The testimony of these witnesses is supported by Paragon’s own documents which describe its BLCs as “moisture-proof’ and “waterproof’ and creating a “snug-fitting seal.” [PTX 624, at K021025, K021031]. The documents further provide that the Paragon BLC “totally repels moistures” and “traps urine and feces.” Id. at K021030. Paragon’s documents also contrast its BLCs with “hydrophilic” cuffs. According to these documents, the diapers employing a hydro-philic cuff permit moisture to “eseapef ] through and under” the BLC,’ while in the Paragon diaper with its hydrophobic BLC, moisture is totally blocked. Id. at K021032. Moreover, P & G’s expert, Richard Moran, conducted a series of ex parte tests which provide further support for the conclusion that the BLCs employed in the accused diapers are liquid impermeable. Although these tests, because they were conducted ex parte, are of limited probative value, Wagoner v. Barger, 59 C.C.P.A 1213, 463 F.2d 1377, 1382 (1972) (“the results of tests made by one party ... without notice to, an in the absence of, the other party ... [are] for that reason alone entitled to little or no weight”); accord In re Newman, 782 F.2d 971, 974 (Fed.Cir.1986), this Court finds that the tests bear sufficient indicia of reliability such that they need not be entirely disregarded. P & G recorded these tests on videotape, and the results of the tests were detailed in Mr. Moran’s laboratory notebook. Paragon was given full discovery of Mr. Moran’s testing; it received both the videotape, including outtakes, and the notebook. Paragon also deposed Mr. Moran and questioned him on cross-examination regarding the tests. Furthermore, the tests were performed on Paragon products, and, because they were recorded on videotape, Paragon could have performed substantially the same tests. See IV Charles W. Rivise and AD. Caesar, Interference Law and Practice, § 664 (1948) (“testimony regarding ex parte tests cannot be disregarded if the opposing party had been given an opportunity to witness the tests____[A] party cannot complain that his opponent’s tests were ex parte, if he was given samples of the tested material, and did not introduce any evidence as to tests which he was presumed to have made.”) (cited in Wagoner, 463 F.2d at 1382). Accordingly, the Court will not entirely disregard Mr. Moran’s tests in resolving the issue of infringement. See Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Montedison S.P.A., 664 F.2d 356, 376 (3d Cir.1981) (district court did not err in relying on other tests where opposing party was permitted discovery of the persons who performed them and cross-examination at trial). In a videotaped presentation, Mr. Moran performed a runoff test and a side seal leakage test. [PTX 32], In the runoff test, the BLC material was placed above an absorbent material on a runoff board, a table slanted at a 45 degree angle. See id. Synthetic urine was dropped from a peristaltic pump onto the BLC material. See id. A towel placed at the bottom of the runoff board was employed to collect the synthetic urine that “runs off’ or does not penetrate through the BLC. See id. When Mr. Moran tested the Paragon BLC material, only a small portion of the synthetic urine penetrated. Id. In the side seal leakage test, the entire diaper was placed on the runoff board, and synthetic urine was dropped from a peristaltic pump into the diaper adjacent to the inside face of each BLC. See id. When Mr. Moran performed this test on a Paragon diaper, none of the synthetic mine leaked through the BLC to the outer edges of the diaper. Id. Additionally, Mr, Moran performed a strik-ethrough test on the Paragon BLC material. In the strikethrough test, a small amount of synthetic urine was placed into a separatory funnel and then allowed to flow out of the funnel onto the material being tested. [Tr. at 446-47, 462]. If the liquid did not strik-ethrough the material in 200 seconds, the test was terminated. [Tr. at 447; PTX 31, at 97]. Mr. Moran performed this test on two samples of Paragon BLC material and recorded the results in the laboratory notebook. [PTX 31, at 97]. According to the notebook, “[n]o specification exists for the strikethrough of BLC materials, but the target would clearly be infinity, with the lower limit set at some relatively high value like 60 seconds.” Id. Mr. Moran testified that although the perfect strikethrough would be infinity, a BLC material exceeding the lower limit would essentially be liquid impermeable in the diaper context “because liquids are not retained in a free form in the disposable diaper for anywhere near that length of time.” [Tr. 463-64], Paragon’s sample BLCs performed well above the lower limit set for a suitable BLC material. The notebook indicates that the average strikethrough time for the two samples was 179 and 177 seconds. [PTX 31, at 97]. Mr. Moran’s notebook also indicates that the Paragon samples were supplied in very poor condition which “may have had some modest impact upon the test results.” Id. In addition to arguing that the tests should be rejected because P & G conducted them ex parte, Paragon raises several grounds on which it claims that the test results should be disregarded as meaningless. First, Paragon contends that the tests should be disregarded because they are not disclosed in the Lawson patent as methods for determining whether a particular material is liquid impermeable. Second, Paragon asserts that the tests do not measure the worst case conditions contemplated by the Lawson patent where runny BMs remain in the channel formed by the BLC for substantial periods of time. These contentions are without merit. Although, as Paragon points out, the patent does not direct any competitors to perform Mr. Moran’s tests (or any test for that matter) to determine if a particular material is “liquid impermeable”, the Court has already determined the patent defines a liquid impermeable material as one that retards the movement of liquid body exudates through the BLC. The tests performed by Mr. Moran were clearly designed to determine to what extent a particular material would prevent the strikethrough of liquid exudates, and thus, are probative evidence of whether a particular material is “liquid impermeable” according to the Lawson patent. Moreover, the fact that the tests did not replicate the worst case scenario for leakage containment is not a proper basis for completely disregarding them. The tests demonstrated that the Paragon BLC tended to prevent leakage of synthetic urine through the BLC material. As Mr. Moran pointed out, urine is much more prone to penetrate the BLC than runny BMs given the differences in viscosity of the two substances. [Tr. at 393-94], Accordingly, the tests, although of limited probative value because they were conducted ex parte, are relevant as an empirical demonstration of the veracity of the statements contained in Paragon’s documents and the testimony of its employees that the Paragon BLC is designed to retard or prevent the strikethrough of liquid body exu-dates. In response to the evidence that its diapers literally infringe the Lawson patent, Paragon asserts that P & G itself has recognized that the BLC material in the accused diapers, an uncoated, spunbonded, nonwoven material, is not liquid impermeable. Paragon first cites to a February 1,1993 interdepartmental correspondence which summarizes a meeting regarding the BLC feature. [DTX 1101]. This correspondence compares the performance of a BLC coated with a polyethylene film with that of an uncoated BLC. The document characterizes uncoated cuffs as “liquid pervious,” while characterizing cuffs coated with a polyethylene film as “liquid impervious.” Id. at DL-100416. The reason for this characterization is described in the document’s “Summary of Key Learnings” section as follows: 1. Material substitution only (uneoated vs. coated) in an IBLC configuration results in significantly higher urine leakage, particularly among females at the legs. 2. The mechanism of leakage is believed to be through the cuff material, not under the cuff, and is accelerated even when only slight pressure is applied to a wet cuff. 3. Increasing the hydrophobicity of un-coated cuff materials did not result in significant differences in leakage. Id at DL-100412 (footnote added). Paragon also cites to the testimony of William Sed-wick, the primary product developer on the BLC project at P & G. Mr. Sedwick testified that a BLC coated with a polyethylene film passes less fluid than an uncoated BLC. [Tr. 148-50]. Given this Court’s construction of the term “liquid impermeable,” P & G’s internal characterizations as to the performance of un-coated BLCs do not establish that the BLCs in the accused diapers fall outside the definition of liquid impermeable. The Court determined that a BLC is liquid impermeable according to the Lawson patent if it is designed to prevent the strikethrough of body exudates by retarding the movement of liquid through the BLC to the outside edges of the diaper. The Court has already rejected Paragon’s assertion that a BLC must permit no liquid to flow through it in order to be considered “liquid impermeable.” P & G’s admissions that an uncoated BLC is less effective than a coated BLC at preventing the strikethrough of liquid body exudates therefore does not conclusively show that the former is not liquid impermeable under the Lawson patent. Most significantly, Paragon’s contention that an uncoated BLC can never be liquid impermeable is directly contrary to the teachings of the Lawson patent. The Lawson patent provides that the BLC material “may be rendered liquid impermeable in any manner well known in the art such as selectively treating [it], untreating [it], or by securing a separate material to [it].” [PTX 1, at 10:51-55], The Lawson patent cites a material known as “Celestra” in its untreated form as an example of a particularly preferred BLC material. Id. at 9:7-12. Like the BLCs in the accused diapers, Celestra is an uncoated, hydrophobic, spunbonded, polypropylene material. [Tr. at 218, 221-22]. Based on these teachings, Mr. Moran testified that the Lawson patent does not require a polyethylene coating to be applied to the BLC material to achieve liquid impermeability: Q: [D]id Lawson teach in his specifications [sic] that using a plastic film was the only way to provide the liquid impermeability that he wanted? A. No. He described that as one of the three principal ways____ Q. And what other ways providing liquid impermeability did Mr. Lawson teach in his patent specification? A. He taught, again, thát a material could be added to the non-woven, which was descriptive of what actually took place with the carded non-wovens, where a different finish, hydrophobic finish, was added to the material. Where in the case of Celestra cited as the preferred execution, no treatment whatsoever, no surfactant addition or other addition was required. The naturally hydrophobic polypropylene spunbond was sufficiently liquid impermeable to form an excellent barrier cuff. [Tr. at 221-22], The Court agrees with Mr. Moran that the Lawson patent clearly indicates that an uncoated, spunbonded, nonwoven, polypropylene material can constitute a liquid impermeable BLC. The Court accordingly rejects Paragon’s assertion that its un-coated BLC is not liquid impermeable based on the findings in P & G study that an uncoated BLC is less effective at leakage prevention than a material coated with a polyethylene film. The only other evidence presented by Paragon that its BLC is not liquid impermeable was the expert opinion of Peter Zajackowski, the current Vice President for Sales and Marketing for Feminine Care at Paragon. Although Mr. Zajackowski opined that the Paragon BLC is not liquid impermeable, his opinion was based on an erroneous construction of the term “liquid impermeable” as it is’ used in the Lawson patent. [Tr: 1647-50]. Mr. Zajackowski indicated that he believed the term “liquid impermeable” as used in the Lawson patent “means that no liquid passes through the material.” [Tr. at 1647]. The Court, however, has previously rejected this construction of the term liquid impermeable as incongruous with the clear language of the Lawson patent. See supra section II.D.2.a. Notably, Mr. Zajackowski admits that an uncoated nonwoven material, such as Celes-tra, falls within Mr. Lawson’s definition of “liquid impermeable.” Q. [I]sn’t Mr. Lawson giving an example, such as Celestra, of a material that he considers to be under his definition, liquid impermeable? A. He’s using Celestra as a material that he thinks is liquid impermeable. Q. So you disa