Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ZATKOFF, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Respondent filed a response, and Petitioner has elected not to reply. On December 22, 1997, a hearing was held at which the Court heard oral argument from both parties. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s Request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted. II. BACKGROUND The facts of this case have been recounted numerous times and need not be repeated in their entirety. Therefore, only a brief overview of pertinent facts is required for the purposes of this Court’s opinion. Petitioner Nevers (hereinafter “Petitioner” or “Nev-ers”) was a police officer with the Detroit Police Department. He was on duty with former Detroit Police Officer Walter Budzyn (hereinafter “Budzyn”) when the incident occurred that resulted in Malice Green’s (hereinafter “Green”) death. Both were tried and convicted by different juries in Detroit Recorder’s Court. At approximately 10:15 p.m. on November 5, 1992, Petitioner was patrolling in the City of Detroit in plain clothes and in an unmarked car with Budzyn. They observed a Topaz, driven by Green with bullet holes in the front passenger door. Petitioner testified that he saw the car pull up in front of a house known for drug activity. The house was occupied by Robert Fletcher (hereinafter “Fletcher”). Robert Hollins (hereinafter “Hollins”) and Teresa Pace (hereinafter “Pace”), witnesses to the event, were present at Fletcher’s house and had been smoking cocaine that evening. Budzyn and Nevers stopped the Topaz to investigate. Budzyn testified that he saw Robert Knox (hereinafter “Knox”) running next to the building and chased him because he believed that Knox was in the car with Green. Budzyn eventually caught up to Knox and patted him down for weapons. He also patted down Fletcher, who had been in the car with Green. Petitioner asked Green for his driver’s license. Green did not respond to Petitioner’s request but walked around to the passenger side of the car and got in. Budzyn followed him and again asked Green to see his driver’s license. After Green opened the glove compartment, something fell to the floor of the car. Green grabbed it and Budzyn asked him to let go of what was in his hand. Green refused. At this point, there is substantial disagreement in the testimony given by defendants and that given by the civilian witnesses to the incident, Brown, Knox, Pace, and Hollins. The five civilian witnesses testified that after Green refused to open his hand, Budzyn began to hit him on the hand with the police flashlight in an effort to force him to open his hand. According to the civilian witnesses, Budzyn then climbed on top of Green who did not comply with orders to open his hand. Fletcher and Pace testified that although they did not see the blows land, from the position on which Budzyn was straddling Green, he must have been hitting him on the head. The five witnesses also testified that while Budzyn was struggling with Green in the ear, Petitioner struck Green on his knee several times. Brown and Fletcher then testified that petitioner went around the car to the driver side, opened the door and struck Green in the head with his flashlight. In contrast to the civilian testimony, Petitioner testified that he assisted Budzyn when Green resisted Budzyn’s efforts to open his hand. Petitioner explained that he only hit Green on the knees after Green kicked his knees up to stop petitioner from prying open his hand. Petitioner then went to the other side of the ear after Budzyn told him that Green was trying to escape out the driver’s side. Petitioner testified that he only struck Green in the head after Green grabbed for his gun and stopped hitting after Green let go of his gun. Petitioner flagged down an Emergency Medical Service (hereinafter “EMS”) vehicle which happened to be driving by. During the struggle with Green, Petitioner testified he saw something “shiny” in Green’s hand. Petitioner again struck Green on the head, fearing that the shiny object was a razor blade or knife. Petitioner admitted that during the struggle, he struck Green on the head five or six times with his flashlight. The EMS workers arrived in two vehicles. Albino Martinez (hereinafter “Martinez”) and Mithyim Lewis (hereinafter “Lewis”) arrived first followed by Lee Hardy (hereinafter “Hardy”) and Scott Walsh- (hereinafter “Walsh”). In response to an Officer in Distress call made by either Petitioner or Bud-zyn, several marked police cars arrived soon after the EMS vehicles. All four of the EMS workers testified that Petitioner struck Green in the head repeatedly even though Green was not offering any significant resistance. Martinez and Walsh testified that Petitioner ordered Green to sit still and open his hands and when he did not, petitioner struck him with the flashlight. Martinez and Lewis testified that Petitioner hit Green four times with the flashlight, while Hardy testified that Petitioner hit Green approximately ten times in the head. Green finally released the car keys he held in one hand and a piece of white paper used for rolling rock cocaine, he held in the other hand. The uniformed officers then handcuffed Green as he continued to struggle. The EMS workers began rendering care to Green. Green suffered a seizure and, soon after, died. The people presented Dr. Kalil Jiraki (hereinafter “Dr. Jiraki”), an assistant Wayne County Medical Examiner, who testified that Green died from blunt force trauma to his head and that he suffered at least fourteen blows to the head. Dr. Jiraki also explained that Green had .5 micrograms of cocaine in his system, indicating he was under the influence of cocaine at the time of his death. Dr. Jiraki testified that the cocaine had no bearing on Green’s death. In response, defendants presented three pathologists, each of whom testified that the cocaine played a greater role in Green’s death. Petitioner was charged with second-degree murder along with Budzyn. A barrage of media publicity began immediately after the incident and continued unabated until the trial began. The incident occurred soon after a suburban jury acquitted four white Los Angeles police officers who had been videotaped beating black motorist Rodney King. The acquittal set off a riot in Los Angeles that drew national attention. The media frequently compared the Green incident to the events in Los Angeles. The Detroit Police Department fired all of the officers at the scene before trial and before any investigation. The City of Detroit almost immediately agreed to a multimillion dollar settlement with Green’s estate. In response to criticism about the settlement, a city attorney stated that the generous settlement might spare Detroit from the same type of riot that burned Los Angeles. Defendants moved to sever the trials. The trial court refused to separate the proceedings, but did grant defendants’ motion for separate juries. Petitioner asked for a change of venue because of the extensive and prejudicial pretrial publicity. However, the trial court denied his motion. The trial court began the voir dire on June 2, 1993 and the trial began on June 18, 1993. During a recess near the end of the trial, the trial court provided the juries with a number of videos to watch during the time they were not in court. One of the movies provided was Malcolm X. The film begins with the video of the Los Angeles police officers beating Rodney King. The video of the beating is replayed eight times while a speech by Malcolm X is heard in the background. Defendants moved for a mistrial on this basis, but the motion was denied. The trial lasted for approximately seven weeks and was televised gavel to gavel on Court TV. The television coverage included daily commentary by various “legal experts.” The juries, began deliberating on August 13,1993. After nine days of deliberations, the jury convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder. The jury also convicted Budzyn of second-degree murder after eight days of deliberations. Petitioner was sentenced to twelve to twenty-four years in prison and Budzyn was sentenced to eight to eighteen years. Defendants moved for a new trial, but the trial court denied this motion. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals consolidated the defendants appeals and affirmed the convictions in an unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 22, 1995. Petitioner filed his Application for Leave to Appeal in the Supreme Court of Michigan in April, 1995. The Michigan Supreme Court took over one year to decide whether to hear the appeal and finally granted leave on May 7, 1996. After deciding to hear the appeal, the Supreme Court took another year to decide the case. Twenty-seven months after the appeal was filed, the Supreme Court issued an opinion on July 31, 1997. In People v. Budzyn, 456 Mich. 77, 566 N.W.2d 229 (1997), the court reversed Budzyn’s conviction and remanded his case for a new trial. The Supreme Court found that the constitutional rights of both Petitioner and Budzyn had been violated. However, the Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction because they found overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Id. at 108, 566 N.W.2d at 243. After exhausting state remedies, Petitioner filed a Request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October 8, 1997. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW State prisoners may seek federal habeas corpus relief on the grounds that they are being held in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Because Petitioner’s application was filed after April 26, 1996, his petition is governed by the provisions of the recently enacted Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (“AEDPA”). The AEDPA has significantly amended the habeas statute and sets forth new standards of review for federal courts to apply when addressing petitions for writs of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Harpster v. State of Ohio, 128 F.3d 322 (6th Cir.1997); Ford v. Ahitow, 104 F.3d 926, 936 (7th Cir.1997). These new standards are codified in amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides as follows: An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. Id. Thus, federal courts must deny a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as'determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Under this stricter standard, federal courts must now “give greater deference to the determinations made by state courts than they were required to do under the previous law.” Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1441 (7th Cir.1997). In addition, the language of the new § 2254(d)(1) which references “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”, appears to require that the federal courts are restricted to the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States in reviewing a petitioner’s habeas claim and may no' longer apply their own precedent. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir.1996), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Sweeney v. Parke, 113 F.3d 716, 718 (7th Cir.1997); But see Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 885-89 (7th Cir.1996) (Ripple, J. dissenting) (arguing that such a requirement is unconstitutional), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Thus, § 2254(d) and its new standards of review govern this Court’s decision whether habeas relief is appropriate in this case. Although the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided how to implement these new standards of review, the Court is guided by the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Harpster v. State of Ohio, 128 F.3d 322 (6th Cir.1997), which outlines two slightly different approaches developed by other circuits.' In Harpster, the Court explained that the first approach, followed by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, requires a federal court to first determine whether the petitioner challenges a question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact. Harpster v. State of Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 326 (6th Cir.1997); Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 767-68 (5th Cir.1996) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1114, 137 L.Ed.2d 315 (1997); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir.1996), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Thereafter, “[t]he categorization of the disputed issue determines which part of § 2254(d) applies.” Harpster v. State of Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 326 (6th Cir.1997). Under this categorization approach, if the challenge involves only a question of fact, § 2254(d)(2) applies and the federal court can grant habeas relief only “if the state court’s decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’ ” Harpster v. State of Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 326 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 767-68 (5th Cir.1996)) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1114, 137 L.Ed.2d 315 (1997). Moreover, a state court determination of a factual issue is to be presumed correct and the petitioner can rebut the presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). If however, a petitioner challenges a decision based only on a question of law, then the first clause of § 2254(d)(1) applies and “a federal court may grant habeas relief only if it determines that a state court’s decision rested on a legal determination that was ‘contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.’ ” Id. Lastly, if the challenge is one that presents a mixed question of law and fact, then the second clause of § 2254(d)(1) applies and a federal court should grant habeas relief only if the state court decision was “an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C: § 2254(d)(1); Harpster v. State of Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 326 (6th Cir.1997); Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 767-68 (5th Cir.1996) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1114, 137 L.Ed.2d 315 (1997). The new § 2254(d)(1) deferential review for reasonableness is only required on mixed questions of fact and law. Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192, 198-199 (7th Cir.1997). Mixed questions of law and fact are those decisions which require the application of a legal standard to fact determinations. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 109-11, 116 S.Ct. 457, 464, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). The Sixth Circuit in Harpster also set out a contrary approach adopted by the First Circuit in Martin v. Bissonette, 118 F.3d 871 (1st Cir.1997). The Court explained the First Circuit’s approach as follows: Guided by, the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1), the court first determines whether clearly established Supreme Court precedent provides a rule that compels an outcome to the issue at hand. If Supreme Court precedent provides no such rule, the court then determines whether the state court decision “involved an unreasonable application” of Federal law as established by the Supreme Court. Under the First Circuit approach, therefore, courts need not classify disputed questions into either questions of law or mixed question of law and fact. Harpster v. State of Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 327 (6th Cir.1997). After setting forth the two approaches, the Harpster Court remarked that although the First Circuit approach was different, it “probably will not lead to different results.” Id. The Court found that difference between the two approaches held little significance in the ease before it because there was not Supreme Court precedent providing a rule to compel the outcome, and, the question presented — whether there was manifest necessity for the state trial judge to declare a mistrial — was one that involved a mixed question of fact and law. Id. Accordingly, under either approach the result was the same and the Court’s inquiry was whether the state court decision “involved an unreasonable application of [] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” Id. Although the Sixth Circuit did not explicitly address which approach it would follow, other Courts that have considered the subject have approved of the Fifth Circuit’s categorization approach. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir.1996), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. — —, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 265 n. 3 (9th Cir.1997) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2497, 138 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1997). In contrast, the approach taken by the First Circuit, and outlined by the Sixth Circuit in Harpster, has not been adopted by any other courts. In fact, the case in which the First Circuit sets forth their approach, Martin v. Bissonette, 118 F.3d 871 (1st Cir.1997), was apparently withdrawn. The opinion which superseded it does not contain any reference to the approach as discussed by the Sixth Circuit in Harpster. See Martin v. Bissonette, 118 F.3d 871 (1st Cir.1997); Harpster, 128 F.3d 322, 327 (6th Cir.1997). Therefore, based on the above, the Court finds that the categorization method is the approach the Sixth Circuit would adopt, and the applicable standard of review is guided by whether the petition presents a question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact. Although the parties in this case did not address the requirements of the new habeas statute, the asserted errors that the Court will address all involved mixed questions of law and fact and hence, allegedly unreasonable applications of federal law. See Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 405-406 (9th Cir.1988) (whether extrinsic evidence introduced to jury was prejudicial and violated 6th amendment is mixed question of law and fact); Suniga v. Bunnell, 998 F.2d 664, 667 (9th Cir.1993) (harmlessness' is mixed question of law and fact); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1643, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961) (issue of venue is mixed question of fact and law. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marshall, 125 F.3d 739, 744 (9th Cir.1997); Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426, 1432 (8th Cir.1993); Thompson v. Leeke, 590 F.Supp. 110, 112-13 (D.S.C.1984). Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicable standard of review is that provided by the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), specifically, whether the state court decision(s) “[i]n-volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). However, the Court’s inquiry does not end here. The question remains: what constitutes an unreasonable applicable of clearly established Federal Law? The Sixth Circuit has not yet addressed this, or any other question involving the new standards of review enacted by the AEDPA. Therefore, the Court will examine the few decisions outside this circuit that have addressed the issue. Currently, the precise contours of ‘unreasonable application’ are still being debated. Compare Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 768-69 (5th Cir.1996) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1114, 137 L.Ed.2d 315 (1997). with Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870-72 (7th Cir.1996), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) and Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir.1997). In the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of what constitutes an unreasonable application, they stated: This “unreasonable application” standard of review of a state court decision must mean more than that a federal court may grant habeas relief based on its simple disagreement with the state court deci-sion____ The use of the word “unreasonable” in formulating this restrictive standard of review implicitly denotes that federal courts must respect all reasonable decisions of state courts____we hold that an application of law to facts is unreasonable only when it can be said that reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect. ■ In other words, we can grant habeas relief only if a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists. Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 768-69 (5th Cir.1996) cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1114, 137 L.Ed.2d 315 (1997). It appears that the Ninth Circuit may approve of the Drinkard standard as well. See Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir.1997); Johnson v. Gomez, 1997 WL 703770, *5 (N.D.Cal., Oct.28, 1997) (No. C 96-2913 CAL); Holdsworth v. Lindsey, 1997 WL 573417, *3 (N.D.Cal., Sept.2, 1997) (No. C 97 09*36 VRW(PR)); Cf., Mitchell v. Prunty, 107 F.3d 1337, 1339-40 n. 3 (9th Cir.1997) (one factor to consider in determining whether application of law is reasonable is the importance of the issue on review), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 295, 139 L.Ed.2d 227, (1997). On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has stated that the “criterion of a reasonable determination is whether it is____ at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the ease.” Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir.1997). While recognizing that the standard allows state court determinations to stand if it is one of several equally plausible outcomes, Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 748-49 (7th Cir.1997), the Seventh Circuit also stated that: [Cjongress would not have used the word “unreasonable” if it really meant that federal courts were to defer in all cases to the state court’s decision. Some decisions will be at such tension with governing U.S. Supreme Court precedents, or so inadequately supported by the reeord, or so arbitrary, that a writ must issue. Id. The Seventh Circuit has stated that “the care with which the state court considered the subject” is important. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 871 (7th Cir.1996), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). “[A] responsible, thoughtful answer reached after a full opportunity to litigate is adequate to support the judgment.” Id. In Drinkard, the Fifth Circuit, using the “reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect” standard held that because two of the judges on the three-judge panel “unequivocally concluded that the instruction at issue did not [violate the constitution]” and the third judge dissented, concluding that the instruction was indeed a violation, it therefore followed that the issue was one that was debatable among reasonable jurists and, hence, the state court determination was not an unreasonable application. Id. at 769. Specifically, the Court stated: “It follows that when jurists considering the state court ruling disagree in this manner, the application of the law by the state court is not unreasonable.” Id. Stripped bare, the Drinkard standard is one that conceivably requires unanimity before habeas relief can be ever be granted. Clearly Congress intended to enact tougher standards for habeas review, however, the Fifth Circuit’s articulation- of an unreasonable application cannot be the standard required under the new 2254(d)(1). Taken to the extreme, what is the result commanded when two Circuit judges find a state court determination to be an unreasonable application of law, but, the third judge dissents and concludes that it was perfectly reasonable? Must the dissenting judge be deemed an unreasonable jurist, or, must the court conclude that the state court ruling was not an unreasonable application of federal law because it is debatable among reasonable jurists? This would seem to be the result required by Drinkard if the appropriate standard is that a federal court may grant habeas relief “only if a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Id. 769. Moreover, a standard of reasonableness which looks to see whether the issue is ‘debatable among reasonable jurists’, in order to determine its constitutionality is unreasonable in and of itself. In reality, how would a federal district court, sitting alone, apply such a standard? Isn’t any determination by a federal habeas court that the state court unreasonably applied federal law a disagreement among ‘reasonable jurists’? Such a requirement, as articulated by the Fifth Circuit, is difficult to apply and presents too high a hurdle on habeas review, one which it could be argued every petition would fail to meet. Thus, the Court finds that it is not the appropriate standard under § 2254(d)(1). Therefore, the Court declines to follow the approach set forth by the Fifth Circuit. Rather, the Court is guided by the Seventh’s Circuit approach that a reasonable determination is one which is “consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.” Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir.1997). Keeping in mind that the federal courts are not to defer entirely to the state court determination. Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 748-49 (7th Cir.1997). It is up to the federal courts to determine, in light of the facts and the applicable law, whether the state court decision was reasonable. In this regard the Court finds particularly appropriate the words of Judge Garza who dissented in the Fifth Circuit’s Drinkard opinion. Judge Garza stated: The majority continues by stating that an application of law to facts is unreasonable only where “reasonable jurists would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect.” This cannot be the standard of review. Where a federal court of appeals determines that a state criminal decision is contrary to federal law, § 2254(d)(1) does not require the unanimous consent of the federal bench for habeas relief. Indeed, it does not even require unanimity among a panel of judges considering the case. The determination of reasonableness must consider only the propriety and correctness of the state court’s actions in the context of federal guarantees established by the Supreme Court. If a federal court “disagrees” with the state court’s application of federal law — if it finds that the state court unreasonably applied the law of the land — that federal court must grant habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1). Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 779 (5th Cir.1996) (Garza, J., dissenting) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1114, 137 L.Ed.2d 315 (1997) (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court rejects the standard for determination of unreasonable application as set forth by the majority in the Fifth Circuit’s Drinkard opinion, and as seemingly adopted by the Ninth Circuit as well, for the reasons set forth above. Rather, the standard that will guide this Court is that set forth by Seventh Circuit, as well as that embodied in Judge Garza’s dissent quoted above. IV. OPINION At the outset, it is important to note what this case is not about. Specifically, the guilt or innocence of Petitioner Larry Nevers in connection with the death of Malice Green is not at issue in this case. What is at issue is the question of whether the Petitioner was afforded his constitutional right to a fair trial. Although this issue necessarily arises from the state court criminal proceedings, it is a separate and distinct issue from that of his guilt or innocence. Accordingly, this Court’s decision in this matter should not be taken as an implicit, or explicit, opinion on the ultimate question of Petitioner’s guilt, or lack théreof. A. CHANGE OF VENUE The standards governing change of venue derive from the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, which safeguards a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by “a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). The trial court may be unable to seat an impartial jury because of prejudicial pretrial publicity or an inflamed community atmosphere. In such a case, due process requires the trial court to grant defendant’s motion for a change of venue or a continuance. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 1419, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1522, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). “It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 722, 81 S.Ct. at 1642. The central issue is the fundamental fairness of the defendant’s trial. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2035, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975). The Supreme Court has established two standards to guide courts, the “actual prejudice” standard and the “presumed prejudice” standard. Because this Court finds the presumed prejudice standard dispositive, I will not address the actual prejudice standard. Prejudice is presumed where pretrial publicity is so pervasive and inflammatory as to saturate the community where the trial was held. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726-27, 83 S.Ct. at 1419-20; Murphy, 421 U.S. at 798-99, 95 S.Ct. at 2035; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965). Although application of the presumed prejudice standard is “relatively rare”, where a defendant brings forth evidence of inflammatory and prejudicial pretrial publicity that so pervades the community so as to render virtually impossible a fair trial by an impartial jury drawn by that community, jury prejudice is presumed and there is no further duty to establish bias. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727, 83 S.Ct. at 1419. Moreover, adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1516, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). Because the question whether the pretrial publicity was so pervasive that prejudice should be presumed is by its very nature shapéd by the facts, this Court begins by reviewing the two kéy Supreme Court cases on the issue. In Rideau, the Supreme Court found that prejudice was presumed from pretrial publicity and no other outside influences. The defendant confessed to robbing a bank in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, kidnap-ing three of the bank’s employees, and killing one of them. The defendant’s confession was videotaped and subsequently broadcast three times by a local television station. The three broadcasts were seen by approximately 110,-000 people in the community. At trial, the court denied defendant’s motion for a change of venue. The United States Supreme Court held that this denial violated the due process clause. Although the Court noted that three jurors who decided the case had seen the televised confession, the Court presumed that the defendant was prejudiced “without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire examination of the members of the jury.” Id. at 727, 83 S.Ct. at 1419. According to the Supreme Court, the televised confession was “Rideau’s trial,” and “[a]ny subsequent proceedings in the community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality.” Id. at 726, 83 S.Ct. at 1419. Another important case dealing with presumed prejudice is Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975). In Murphy, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was not deprived of due process when the trial court denied his motion for change of venue. The defendant was convicted in 1970 of offenses related to a robbery that took place in January 1968. In 1968 and 1969, defendant was indicted for murder in another county,' declared mentally incompetent, indicted on a federal conspiracy charge, and later declared competent. The local newspaper extensively publicized the above events along with the defendant’s participation in the 1964 theft of the Star of India sapphire. The Court rejected defendant’s presumed prejudice claim, however, finding that there was no inflamed community atmosphere. The Court also placed great weight on two major factors: (1) the seven to twenty month lapse of time between the time the newspapers printed the articles complained of and jury selection; and (2) the articles printed were “largely factual in na-, ture.” Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802, 95 S.Ct. at 2037. With this background, we consider petitioner’s claim that the pretrial publicity was so pervasive that it saturated the city of Detroit. Because the presumed prejudice standard requires an extensive evidentiary showing of pretrial publicity to warrant habe-as relief, a thorough discussion of the circumstances leading up to the trial is required. 1. PERVASIVE PRETRIAL PUBLICITY Although the “firestorm of media publicity” came from both print and television, newspaper coverage constitutes the most significant source of pretrial publicity on the record. See People v. Budzyn, 456 Mich, at 86, 566 N.W.2d at 234. Petitioner includes with his brief over 162 articles related to the Green incident printed in the media between the incident on November 5, 1992 and the trial on June 4,1993. The Detroit News and The Detroit Free Press were and still are the most widely, circulated newspapers in the metropolitan Detroit area. The news coverage was immediate and immense. The combined edition of the Detroit News and Free Press on Saturday, November 7 contained at least six articles devoted to the Green incident. The front page headline read, “Fatal beating by police outrages city leaders.” The article included the first reference to the nickname given to Petitioner and Budzyn. Apparently, the two were known as “Starsky and Hutch,” a reference to their reputation as hard line police officers. The article also quoted Petitioner who stated shortly after the incident: “I must have done something wrong, a guy died.” Exh. M24. Police Chief Stanley Knox (hereinafter “Chief Knox”) immediately announced the suspensions without pay and without investigation of the seven officers at the scene in an effort “to prevent the violence that rocked Los Angeles after officers charged with beating [Rodney] King were acquitted.” Exh. M24. During a press conference held the day after the incident, Chief Knox announced “[t]his type of thing will not be tolerated.” Exh. M24. The front page article also contained information from an anonymous police official who told the press that more than twenty-five complaints were lodged against Petitioner and Budzyn, although none were sustained. The article also stated that Nevers was a member of STRESS (Stop the Robberies Enjoy Safe Streets), a controversial undercover unit that was involved in alleged harassment of young black men before it was disbanded by Former Detroit Mayor Coleman Young (hereinafter. “Mayor Young”). Exh. M25. The article included information that Nevers was involved in the shooting death of a Detroit woman in which no charges were filed. According to the newspaper, Nevers had been sued at least twice, including a case where he and another cop beat a Detroit man in a restaurant parking lot which the city settled for $6,000. Exh. M25. The article also quoted a number of neighborhood residents who commented on the reputations of Budzyn and Petitioner in the community. Nevers and Budzyn are well known in the bleak neighborhood where Green died. ‘Everybody knows them as Starsky and Hutch,’ [a Detroit resident] said. ‘They harass people. I mean, this is the first time I seen [sic] them do anything like that’ ‘They were real hard on a lot of people, real' hard,’ [a Detroit resident] said of [Budzyn and Nevers]. ‘It’s not a place in jail for them,’ [Malice Green’s mother] said through red eyes. ‘They need to get the electrical chair---They just beat him unmercifully. If I had my say, they’d be.right where my son is.’ Exh. M25. Another article in the November 7 Detroit News and Free Press entitled “Abuse of power an old problem” compared the Green incident to incidents that occurred during the 1970’s when “[t]he police department was more like an occupying force than a public servant.” Exh. M16 (quoting City Councilman Keith Butler). The article specifically referred to the officers involved in STRESS as major culprits of police brutality and stated that the controversial unit was involved in the deaths of twenty people, seventeen of whom weré black. Also in the November 7 Detroit News and Free Press was an article entitled “Officials demand unbiased investigation” which quoted then City Council' President Maryann Ma-haffey (hereinafter “Mahaffey”). “This is so hurtM ... It hurts everyone.. Yes, the family. Yes, the friends. No matter who they are or where they come from, it hurts us all when people are unprofessional and engage in brutality.” Exh. M21. The article also compared the Green incident to the Rodney King-incident in Los Angeles. However, Edward Littlejohn, a Wayne State University Law School Professor who was appointed by Mayor Coleman Young to the police commission in 1973, stated that Green is not likely to become the next Rodney King, whose attackers were acquitted by a suburban jury. If the case goes to trial, “you’re going to have a different jury composition ... You’ll get a different result than Rodney King.” Exh. M21 (emphasis added). Another article in the November 7 edition of the Detroit News and Free Press entitled “Young sees achievement of justice tarnished” quoted Mayor Young who referred to Petitioner and Budzyn by their now famous nicknames. “Starsky and Hutch-in Detroit, I just didn’t think it could happen.” Exh. M23. Mayor Young also called for a more careful examination of police, records to prevent those officers with a record of violence from serving in the community. Exh. M23. Also on November 7, an article entitled “Racial aspect: Cases are similar, responses different” included the comments of NAACP president Arthur Johnson and other local leaders: ‘Police brutality and the killings of black men has been part of police work in every section of the nation____ I think people see racism in this incident because the killing took place in that frame.’ [Johnson] said. And local NAACP Executive Director Joann Watson said the police department still has ‘holdovers from STRESS’ a controversial crime prevention program of the early 1970’s that was widely interpreted as racist. More than 20 people, most of them black were killed by STRESS officers in its 2]é-year existence. Larry Nevers, one of the officers who allegedly inflicted the fatal blows in Green’s killing was a member of the unit. Exh. M27. On Sunday, November 8, 1992, the front page headline was “Mom says victim used drugs but ‘he .was hot a violent person.’ ” Exh. 29. According to the article, Green was a hardworking young man who had troubles with drugs and hoped to be reunited with his estranged wife, two daughters and three step children. The story concluded: As Patricia Green tries to sort out the murky circumstances behind her son’s death, she is clear about one thing: She wants justice from the Detroit Police Department. ‘They are going to pay. They are going to have to pay dearly,’ Green said. ‘There’s no way they are going to get away with this.’ Exh. M29. Another article in the November 8 edition was heádlined “Accused cops are feared on the streets” and explained the reason behind the nicknames given to Petitioner and Bud-zyn. They were known in the neighborhood as “Starsky and Hutch” — maverick cops, tough-and-tumble, who used an elbow, a fist, or a threatening remark as tools of persuasion. In TV land, Starsky and Hutch played to hand-clapping reviews in the 1970s as renegade officers who operated by their own rules. But in a southwest Detroit neighborhood, plainclothes cops Larry Nevers and Walter Budzyn were far from a hit, chasing people off street corners and rousting crack heads, dope dealers, hookers and law-abiding citizens alike, residents say. ‘I’m no angel, and they beat my ass before, but nothing like this,’ said area resident Michael Jackson, commenting on Thursday’s fatal beating of Malice Green. “You might be standing on the corner. If he tells you to get off the corner, you don’t f— with him.’ You can’t disrespect the police (because) they got a license to kill.’ The death of Green could be the final episode on the force for Nevers, 52, a 24-year veteran, and Budzyn, 42, a Detroit cop for the past 19 years. . The two were immediately suspended from the force. They may face criminal charges. Exh. M32. The article also described previous incidents involving Nevers and Budzyn. For example, in 1991, 22-year-old Robert Clark (hereinafter “Clark”), a 140-pound diabetic, filed a lawsuit against the two officers in Wayne County Circuit Court. In the suit, Clark alleged that he was waiting in a car while two associates tried to break into a car near Tiger Stadium. According to the article, Nevers yanked him out of the car while he was still in his seat belt and began to punch him repeatedly, threw him down to the pavement, and broke his arm. The two officers denied any wrongdoing. However, the city settled with Clark for nuisance monetary damages between $5,000 and $10,000. In another incident, Nevers and four other members of the STRESS unit were named in a lawsuit in 1973, which alleged that police used unnecessary force when they killed a 26-year-old woman in a robbery of a Kentucky Fried Chicken. The article also mentioned two other.incidents in which Petitioner was allegedly involved. In 1972, Nevers shot and wounded a 15-year-old boy who apparently broke into a gas station on West Fort. The newspaper also linked Nevers to another widely publicized police brutality ease in Detroit. Nevers’ former partner, John Pawlak, was convicted of manslaughter in one of Detroit’s most sensational police brutality cases. In 1980, Pawlak beat a black prisoner to death after the two exchanged racial slurs. Others tried to revive the man with an electronic cattle prod. Nevers, who did not witness the incident, defended Pawlak: You get called all kinds of names on the street. You ignore it. We’re not out to battle people, and John realized that. But if someone takes a swing at you, you’ve got to defend yourself.’ In all, during the course of their careers, Nevers and Budzyn have been the subject of 25 complaints, an internal affairs officer said. However, none was [sic] ever sustained. Nevers and Budzyn teamed up in the 3rd Precinct eight years ago. The twosome used fear to gain respect in the neighborhood, residents said. Exh. M33. Another headline in the November 8, 1997 edition of the Detroit News and Free Press read “Police move quickly to find officers in Green beating death.” The article described how Chief Knox placed the seven suspended officers in a lineup and brought in witnesses to identify those responsible for the beating. The story also noted the reactions shared by some Detroit Police Officers at the quick suspensions meted out by Knox. “‘Some officers are angered at Chief Knox’s conduct,’ added Officer David Malhalab, of the 6th Precinct. ‘Nobody likes a dirty or brutal cop, but the chief has already convicted some men before there’s been an investigation.’” Exh. M36. The article again mentioned the police officers reputation in the community. Some residents in the 3rd Precinct, where Nevers and Budzyn patrolled, said the beating death was an extreme form of police brutality they frequently witness. ‘It got too easy for them to rough people up,’ said one officer close to the investigation. ‘They had been doing it, and getting away with it, for too long.’ Exh. M36. The news of the incident continued • on November 9, 1992 with a headline in the Detroit Free Press that read, “Brass blamed in city beatings.” The article reported that Detroit residents are beaten by rogue cops because police executives have repeatedly failed to take strong measures to eradicate brutality. The story also shared the results of a Detroit Free Press study of penalties meted out to police officers. In 1989, every officer found guilty of using cocaine was terminated. However, more than half of the officers found to have engaged in brutality were not immediately punished “to give them a chance to reform.” Exh. M41. The story also quoted a number of citizens who expressed their anger at the officers accused of the beating death. In addition to the anger expressed by Detroit residents,, many police officers expressed bitterness over the Police Chiefs quick reaction. Another headline in the November 9, 1992 Detroit Free Press read “Many officers are bitter about Knox’s quick reaction.” Many officers believed the whole story around the Green incident was not being told. Moreover, some officers believed the rush by Chief Knox and Mayor Young to suspend and publicly condemn the officers twenty-four hours after Green’s death was tantamount to a trial and a finding of guilt. ‘They made it sound like these guys were tried, found guilty, and on their way to Jackson Prison,’ said [a Detroit Officer], ‘The chief should stand by his men until their found guilty or acquitted.’ ‘These officers should have been treated like everyone else. I don’t believe -it’s going to be easy for them to get a fan-trial,’ said an undercover black officer who did not want to be identified. Exh. M44. On November 9 edition of the Detroit Free Press also included an editorial entitled “Police Beating: City must address problems of entire department.” The editorial reads: Once something as tragic and wrong as the beating death of Malice Green at the hands of Detroit police has occurred, all the mayor and police chief can do is to try to atone for the wrong, control the damage, and seek punishment for the guilty. That they have moved quickly to do those things helps limit the tragedy that occurred late last week. But as grateful as we are and should be that Detroit has responded directly and firmly to this outrage, that isn’t enough. Clearly, the department has unresolved problems of discipline and control. The evidence that at least some of the seven police officers now suspended were way out of line and used plainly unjustified force is simply overwhelming. The Police Department, the prosecutor and the courts will have to establish which officers were violent and to what degree. But the bare facts of the arrest, the beating and the death are too nearly incontestable to think this was anything but unnecessary force and an unnecessary death. Exh. M48. The headline on the front page of the November 9 Detroit News read “4 cops beat Green, medics say.” The article was an account of the incident from the EMS workers who witnessed the incident. The News stated that the blows were struck at a downward angle, and there was no sign of defensive wounds. Budzyn told investigators that he suffered bruises while struggling with Green; the article reported that those wounds. appeared to be self-inflicted. The article also reported that each of the seven officers involved were suspended from the department without pay pending investigation. “Each officer ‘in one way or another took part in his death’ — even those who never touched Green, police said.” An article in the November 9 Detroit News was headlined ‘“Wake up, take city back,’ NAACP leader tells rally.” The article told of a group of demonstrators who gathered in downtown Detroit to protest the violence in Detroit and other U.S. cities. At the demonstration, Mahaffey promised to seek a council resolution asking the Detroit Police Commission to review personnel procedures regarding use of force. She also said the commission should increase in-service training to better control police behavior. An article in the November 10 Detroit News was headlined “Who’s policing the police?”. According to the report, city and police officials reported that the Detroit Police Department was not doing enough to weed out “time bomb” police officers. Exh. M53. The article quotes Tom Schneider, president of the Detroit Police Officers Association who stated: “There are time bombs out there ... we all know that. But the department ignores it.” Exh. M53. Another ranking police official familiar with the discipline procedures stated: “We are operating in the Dark Ages.” The article was extremely critical of the way in which the Detroit Police Department handled police officers who have a history of violent behavior and brutality complaints. The Detroit News also included an editorial that was headlined “Police Under Fire.” The article complained that because ■ of lax administrative controls, the Detroit Police Department needed “a thoroügh shake-up.” Exh. M59. The call for reform stemmed mainly from reports that Officers Budzyn and Nevers had been involved in past violent exchanges with Detroit residents. The reputations of Officers Nevers and Budzyn were, reportedly not lost on their superiors. A red flag should have been raised after 30 citizens filed complaints against Mr. Nevers, including four this year. The civilian Board of Police Commissioners found that just five were ‘proper conduct.’ Another 21 were dismissed for insufficient evidence which generally means it was the officers word against the complainant____ Both officers had a history of incidents in which citizens were injured. Yet while the evidence indicates that these were ‘problem officers,’ subject to more allegations of questionable misconduct than most, others, they were never disciplined in relation to any alleged offenses and the command structure never tried to break up what may turn out to have been a deadly combination. Exh. M59. The November 10 Detroit Free Press included a cartoon by Bill Day which pictured a flashlight and defined it as “a large battery-operated portable electric light used by police to knock on African-American heads.” Exh. 55. Also in the November 10 Detroit Free Press was an article entitled “Lawyer surprised officer is on force.” The article stated that Jeffrey Mallon, an attorney who collected a $275,000 settlement from the city after the fatal shooting of Jewell Denise Gant Davis in 1973, assumed that Nevers had been fired by the Detroit Police Department. According to the story, Davis was shot by officers assigned to STRESS during what police described as an attempted armed robbery of a fried chicken restaurant on Wyoming Avenue. Police claimed that they shot her only after she turned toward them and brandished a handgun. However, according to Mallon, court evidence showed that Davis had been shot in the back and the handgun contained smudges of fingerprints, indicating it had been planted at the scene by police. Petitioner was reportedly involved in the shooting but was never charged. Exh. M56. The article also described another case in which Nevers allegedly. attacked Robert Clark while Clark was waiting in a car for companions who were trying to steal a car near Tiger Stadium in July 1990. The city agreed to settle the lawsuit for an undisclosed amount. Exh. M56. Another article in the November 10 Detroit Free Press was headlined “Detroit police feel hesitant in spotlight.” The article described the: anti-police sentiment brewing in the community at that time. The article quoted one Detroit Police Officer who stated: “In the last three days, its like you’re a terrorist in the city, an occupying army.” The November 10 Free Press also included an article headlined “Cops version said Green struggled.” The article told the officers version for the first time that Green was thrashing and kicking as they tried to subdue him. This version directly contradicted the accounts previously reported of the EMS workers and other witnesses, who claimed that Green offered little or no resistance. The article was also the first to report Mayor Young’s controversial and highly publicized statements he made on national television: “A young man who was under arrest was literally murdered by police.” Exh. M61. The November 12 Detroit News included a cartoon by Larry Wright in which pictured Mayor Young building á hangman’s noose on a platform. The cartoon depicted Mayor Young standing on the platform and telling a mob of reporters: “Get away. I won’t allow you folks to try this case in the media!” The headline in the November 13 Detroit Free Press read “Racism killed ... Green.” The article described Green’s funeral which was attended by 2,000 people. ‘The blood of Malice Green also says that the root of the problem that killed him is the uncured sickness of racism that plagues this society,’ [Rev. Charles] Adams told 2,000 people who crowded Hartford Memorial Baptist Church. ‘Racism killed Malice Green,’ Adams thundered as the congregation at Hartford Memorial Baptist Church voiced agreement. The congregation clapped, raised fists, or urged Adams to ‘Preach, Charles!’ Exh. M84 The November 16 Detroit Free Press included an article entitled “NAACP has praise for mayor, chief’ in which a national NAACP leader told a public forum that without the quick response by Mayor Young and Chief Knox, Detroit “would still have been burning at its walls today.” The article also described a protest of approximately 125 people. The protesters chanted, “No faith in Knox, kill the killer cops,” as they marched from the cite of Green’s death on West Warren and 23rd Street to the 3rd (Vemor) precinct. Exh. M112. The November 17 Detroit Free Press included the headline “The Death of Malice Green- — Severity of charges divides community.” The article described the differing opinions between police officers and community residents. While some police officers believed the charge of second-degree murder was excessive, many other officers believed that the charges were justified. Some officers, commenting to the press anonymously, were outspoken in their belief of the defendants’ guilt. “ ‘They were wrong. Goddamn, it was excessive,’ said [one] officer. ‘I’d say these guys have to be prosecuted for the people to feel compensated.’” The article also quoted a number of Detroit residents who felt the officers should have been charged with first-degree murder. “‘Let’s be for real,’ said [one Detroit resident]. ‘If it was anybody else, it would have been first-degree murder.’ ” Exh. M118. Another Detroit resident told the press: “It was coldblooded murder to me.” Exh. M118. Another resident was also outspoken about the charges. “I think Nevers is getting what he deserves. He’s gotten away with so much stuff in this neighborhood for so long.” Exh. M118. The headline in the November 17 Detroit Free Press read “Charges answer call to justice.” The article described four of the officers’ arraignments. The quickness with which the indictments were handed down apparently pleased community leaders. “The speed with which the charges came pleased community leaders, and blunted a mounting anxiety that while Green lay buried, his accused attackers had not been held accountable. The investigation moved much more quickly than other cases involving police slayings.” Exh. M122. However, the article also included statements from the officers attorneys who believed the officers had already been tried in the media and fan-trials would be impossible in Detroit. Exh. M122. The November 18 Detroit Free Press included an article entitled “Drugs in Green’s body — Cops’ lawyer says finding puts' victim in new light.” The article described a toxicology report from Green’s autopsy which revealed that cocaine and alcohol were found in Green’s system. Defense attorneys claimed that the reports may explain why the routine traffic stop turned deadly. However, prosecutors and community leaders were not persuaded that the results dictated a different result. The Rev. Wendell Anthony stated: “The fact that he has cocaine in his system does not excuse, does not condone, does not obstruct or legitimize misconduct on the part of the police department ... For us to use this in any way to legitimize the death of this individual is irresponsible.” Exh. M151. Moreover, Richard Lobenthal, the Michigan Director of the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith said: “In order to justify his being beaten, it presumes that seven police officers were incapable of subduing an unarmed man, and that’s simply incredible.” Exh. M151. On November 18, the Detroit Free Press printed an article that directly contradicted the defendant’s claim that drugs may have contributed to Green’s death. In an article headlined “Green died from blows”, according to the autopsy report, drugs were not likely a factor in Green’s death. The November 20 Detroit News included an editorial written by Pete Waldmeir (hereinafter “Waldmeir”) headlined “One thing is clear in the Green case: Defendants’ rights have been abused.” Waldmeir claimed that because of prejudicial statements by city leaders, fair trials in Detroit would be impossible. No prosecutor and particularly no judge who has to stand for election in these parts is going to entertain any suggestion that the defendants’ rights, such as they may be, have been collectively abused by city officials — at least two of whom already have passed judgment on the accused in the media. Detroit Mayor Coleman Young, you’ll recall, bluntly labeled the act ‘murder’ in a national television interview. Police Chief Stanley Knox made similar accusatory remarks short of that earlier on. Exh. M166. On December 15, the' front page of the Detroit Free Press included an article headlined “Attorneys grill witnesses at hearing in Green beating.” The article described the preliminary examination hearing held on Monday, December 14. Although the defense attorneys were pleased with the outcome, Green’s family reacted differently. “ ‘They’re full of it.’ said [Green’s brother-in-law]. ‘They did what they did and it’s murder, everybody knows that.’” Exh. M192. The December 21 Detroit Free Press included an article headlined “Beating hearing hones in on details.” The article indicated that both the officers’ and Green’s family attended the preliminary examination. The article also describes the intense media presence in the courtroom during the hearing. TV cameras and oversized still cameras occupied the jury box along side “scribbling reporters.” Exh. M198. The headline in the December 23 Detroit News read “City to settle Green case.” The December 23 Detroit Free Press also included a similar article detailing the Green settlement with the city.- The Detroit News article described the tentative agreement reached by the city of Detroit and Green’s estate for $5.25 million. The estate filed a civil suit for $61 million on November 9. The article also indicated the quickness of the settlement in the Green case was rather unusual. “‘The city rarely settles without lengthy, protracted litigation and negotiations,’ [a Mt. Clemens lawyer] said. ‘The firings (of the four officers charged with criminal offenses) also seemed premature, since they haven’t been tried.’ ” The article also recounted the daily events at Petitioner’s preliminary examination. Exh. M208. The January 26 Detroit Free Press included an article with t